Online Appendix for:
"Nowhere to Hide? Global Policing and the Politics of Extradition"

Daniel Krcmaric
Northwestern University
daniel.krcmaric@northwestern.edu

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Table A1. Summary Statistics: This table reports summary statistics for the covariates included in Models 1-3 of Table 1.

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Geopolitical Alignment	.36	.34	-.44	1
Autocratic Regime	.79	.19	.16	.99
Human Rights Violations	.10	1.41	-3.07	3.21
Political Trials	.23	1.31	-2.90	2.98
Same Death Penalty Laws	.87	.33	0	1
Same Legal Tradition	.21	.40	0	1
Same Criminal Laws	.16	.26	0	1
Distance	74.76	12.72	0	97.26
Economic Size	7.18	2.89	0	15.49
Inherited BET	.22	.41	0	1
Regional BET Diffusion	.37	.22	0	1
Time	33.10	29.81	0	195
$Time^2$	1983.85	4124.58	0	38025
$Time^3$	178313.20	625298.10	0	7414875

Table A2. Countries with Inherited BETs: This table lists the countries that "inherited" BETs with the US upon their independence as well as the source of the inherited BET. Most countries that inherited BETs were once British colonies, but there are some cases where the BET originated from Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, or the Ottoman Empire.

Antigua and Barbuda (UK)	Australia (UK)
Austria (Austria-Hungary)	Bahamas (UK)
Belize (UK)	Canada (UK)
Congo (France)	Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia)
Dominica (UK)	Egypt (Ottoman Empire)
Fiji (UK)	Gambia (UK)
German Federal Republic (Germany)	Ghana (UK)
Guyana (UK)	Hungary (Austria-Hungary)
Iceland (Denmark)	India (UK)
Kenya (UK)	Kiribati (UK)
Lesotho (UK)	Malawi (UK)
Malta (UK)	Mauritius (UK)
Myanmar (UK)	Nauru (UK)
Nigeria (UK)	Pakistan (UK)
Papua New Guinea (UK)	Seychelles (UK)
Sierra Leone (UK)	Singapore (UK)
Slovak Republic (Czechoslovakia)	Solomon Islands (UK)
St. Kitts and Nevis (UK)	St. Lucia (UK)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (UK)	Suriname (Netherlands)
Swaziland (UK)	Tanzania (UK)
Tonga (UK)	Trinidad and Tobago (UK)
Tuvalu (UK)	Zambia (UK)

Table A3. BETs as a Repeatable Event: In the models reported in the main text, I treated the signing of a BET as a one-time event. That is, the observation window for a state ended if and when it signed its first BET with the US, thereby joining the American extradition network. As an alternative, the models below treat the signing of a BET as a repeatable event. That is, a state does *not* drop out of the sample after signing its initial BET with the US. This means that amendments, supplements, and replacement BETs are included in the analysis. The main results are all consistent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Incentives			
Geopolitical Alignment	3.464**	3.127**	3.017**
	(0.332)	(0.308)	(0.324)
Autocratic Regime	-2.263**		
	(0.336)		
Human Rights Violations		-0.317**	
		(0.058)	
Political Trials			-0.351**
			(0.066)
Legal Compatibility			
Same Death Penalty Laws	0.094	-0.066	-0.152
	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.159)
Same Legal Tradition	0.140	0.226	0.118
	(0.214)	(0.185)	(0.168)
Same Criminal Laws	0.321	0.363	0.366
	(0.279)	(0.284)	(0.287)
Control Variables			
Distance	-0.009	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Economic Size	0.191**	0.219**	0.233**
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Inherited BET	-0.259	-0.145	-0.147
	(0.292)	(0.265)	(0.267)
Regional BET Diffusion	-0.449	-0.099	-0.155
	(0.342)	(0.353)	(0.387)
N	11998	12154	11850
AIC	1708.87	1738.87	1704.72
BIC	1804.97	1835.14	1800.66

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
Time polynomials included but not reported
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table A4. Disaggregated Legal Traditions: In the models reported in the main text, I controlled for whether states have the same legal tradition as the US (i.e., common law). Consequently, the reference category was all other legal traditions. As an alternative, the models below treat common law states as the omitted category and include dummy variables for the three other legal traditions: civil law, Islamic law, and mixed law. This provides a more disaggregated approach to how the various legal traditions view the use of precedent, good faith in contracting, and the obligation to keep promises (Mitchell and Powell 2011). The main results are all consistent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Incentives			
Geopolitical Alignment	3.555**	3.289**	3.460**
	(0.634)	(0.625)	(0.679)
Autocratic Regime	-3.292**		
	(0.820)		
Human Rights Violations		-0.298**	
		(0.119)	
Political Trials			-0.235*
			(0.138)
Legal Compatibility			
Same Death Penalty Laws	0.354	-0.201	-0.356
	(0.544)	(0.538)	(0.538)
Civil Law	0.325	-0.244	-0.206
	(0.394)	(0.335)	(0.349)
Islamic Law	0.140	-0.512	-0.491
	(1.005)	(0.919)	(0.921)
Mixed Law	0.402	-0.053	-0.193
	(0.788)	(0.699)	(0.805)
Same Criminal Laws	0.551	0.406	0.426
	(0.587)	(0.589)	(0.595)
Control Variables			
Distance	-0.023**	-0.018*	-0.020*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Economic Size	0.270**	0.281**	0.285**
	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.077)
Inherited BET	-0.950**	-0.717**	-0.611*
	(0.393)	(0.333)	(0.355)
Regional BET Diffusion	0.032	0.644	0.590
	(0.719)	(0.708)	(0.853)
N	6350	6469	6275
AIC	548.30	567.58	549.38
BIC	649.64	669.20	650.55

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
Time polynomials included but not reported
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table A5. Alternative Regime Type Variables: In the models reported in the main text, I used a measure of autocracy derived from V-Dem's liberal democracy index. As an alternative, the models below replicate Model 1 of Table 1 using three different measures of regime type: V-Dem's electoral democracy index, Polity's democracy score, and Boix, Miller, and Rosato's (2013) autocracy/democracy dummy variable. All three regime type indicators provide results similar to those reported in the text (the US is less likely to sign BETs with autocracies than with democracies).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Incentives			
Geopolitical Alignment	3.834**	3.442**	3.816**
	(0.610)	(0.585)	(0.547)
V-Dem Electoral Democracy	3.202**		
	(0.825)		
Polity Score		0.106**	
		(0.034)	
BMR Democracy Dummy			1.174**
			(0.462)
Legal Compatibility			
Same Death Penalty Laws	0.365	-0.106	0.183
	(0.539)	(0.513)	(0.599)
Same Legal Tradition	-0.359	-0.128	0.013
	(0.387)	(0.383)	(0.380)
Same Criminal Laws	0.517	0.192	1.087**
	(0.582)	(0.622)	(0.489)
Control Variables			
Distance	-0.025**	-0.027**	-0.024**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Economic Size	0.276**	0.301**	0.200**
	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.055)
Inherited BET	-0.922**	-0.696**	-0.218
	(0.377)	(0.348)	(0.324)
Regional BET Diffusion	-0.022	0.095	0.368
	(0.726)	(0.822)	(0.675)
N	6414	5919	6594
AIC	544.57	512.30	605.47
BIC	632.53	599.22	693.79

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
Time polynomials included but not reported
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table A6. Rare Events: These models use penalized maximum likelihood regression (Firth 1993) to account for the possibility of rare events bias. The main results are all consistent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Incentives			
Geopolitical Alignment	3.555**	3.336**	3.482**
	(0.596)	(0.601)	(0.625)
Autocratic Regime	-3.324**		
	(0.807)		
Human Rights Violations		-0.290**	
		(0.111)	
Political Trials			-0.242*
			(0.127)
Legal Compatibility			
Same Death Penalty Laws	0.287	-0.295	-0.447
	(0.550)	(0.520)	(0.516)
Same Legal Tradition	-0.330	0.245	0.211
	(0.401)	(0.381)	(0.393)
Same Criminal Laws	0.520	0.382	0.386
	(0.640)	(0.633)	(0.634)
Control Variables			
Distance	-0.024**	-0.018*	-0.020*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Economic Size	0.267**	0.275**	0.278**
	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Inherited BET	-0.926**	-0.668	-0.584
	(0.423)	(0.417)	(0.417)
Regional BET Diffusion	0.040	0.654	0.628
	(0.614)	(0.623)	(0.649)
N	6350	6469	6275
AIC	461.95	477.84	459.87
BIC	549.78	565.91	547.55

Standard errors in parentheses
Time polynomials included but not reported
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)