Serious Conflicts with Benign Outcomes? The Electoral Consequences of Conflictual Cabinet Terminations

Online Appendices Part 1 (Part 2 is located in the APSR Dataverse)

Online Appendix A: Summary Statistics

Variable	#	Percent
All Observations		
Non-Policy Conflict Termination	22	3.72
Policy Termination	166	28.09
Termination Not Responsible	76	12.86
Junior Partner	172	29.10
Coalition	498	84.26
Minority	160	27.07
Strong PM Dissolution Power	136	23.01
Strong Government Dissolution Power	293	49.58
Opposition	67	11.34
Single-Party Government		
Non-Policy Conflict Termination	6	6.45
Policy Termination	3	3.23
Intra-Party Policy Termination	3	3.23
Inter-Party Policy Termination	0	0
Intra and Inter-Party Policy Termination	0	0
Minority	51	54.84
Strong PM Dissolution Power	39	41.94
Strong Government Dissolution Power	60	64.52
Opposition	4	4.30
Coalitions		
Non-Policy Conflict Termination	16	3.21
Policy Termination	163	32.73
Intra-Party Policy Termination	16	3.21
Inter-Party Policy Termination	138	27.71
Intra and Inter-Party Policy Termination	9	1.81
Termination Not Responsible	75	15.06
Junior Partner	172	34.54
Minority	109	21.89
Strong PM Dissolution Power	97	19.48
Strong Government Dissolution Power	233	46.77
Opposition	63	12.65

Table A1: Summary statistics for binary variables. Unit of analysis: party.

Variable	Median	Mean	Std Deviation	Min	Max
All Observations					
Party Vote Share Change	-0.95	-1.65	4.73	-30.74	20.7
Party Vote Share Change t-1	0.05	0.45	5.04	-53.78	26.88
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate	2.23	2.47	2.92	-10.02	24.00
Change in Extremism	0	-0.06	15.08	-80.6	62.3
PM Cabinet Powers	3	3.57	1.89	1	7
Single-Party					
Party Vote Share Change	-1.91	-2.30	5.77	-16.54	20.7
Party Vote Share Change t-1	1.57	1.68	5.57	-11.23	22.73
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate	2.62	2.53	2.44	-4.97	8.63
Change in Extremism	0.8	-0.83	13.76	-40.5	36.7
PM Cabinet Powers	5	5.12	1.61	2	7
Coalitions					
Party Vote Share Change	-0.81	-1.53	4.51	-30.74	15.39
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.03	0.22	4.91	-53.78	26.88
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate	2.20	2.46	3.00	-10.02	24.00
Change in Extremism	-0.01	0.08	15.32	-80.6	62.3
PM Cabinet Powers	3	3.28	1.80	1	7

Table A2: Summary statistics, non-binary variables.

Online Appendix B: Clustered Standard Errors around Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Policy Termination	**-2.65**	**2.83**	**-3.08***	-6.16	-6.16
	(1.39)	**(2.74)**	**(1.53)**	(3.13)	(3.15)
Non-Policy Termination*				8.19*	8.09*
Junior Partner				(4.04)	(4.03)
Policy Termination	**0.16**	**-4.15**	**1.20**	**0.34**	
	(0.71)	**(4.52)**	**0.65**	**(0.78)**	
Policy Termination*				**3.53***	
Junior Partner				**(1.62)**	
Intraparty Policy Termination					0.41
					(1.12)
Intraparty Policy Termination*					**2.10**
Junior Partner					**(2.11)**
Interparty Policy Termination					0.46
					(0.97)
Interparty Policy Termination*					**3.55***
Junior Partner					**(1.73)**
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination					-0.13
					(1.48)
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination*					**0.93**
Junior Partner					(**2.71**)
Termination Not Responsible	1.10		1.96*	4.13*	4.04*
	(0.99)		(0.94)	(1.50)	(1.41)
Junior Partner	0.28		0.001	-2.85	-2.75*
	(0.74)		(0.74)	(1.46)	(1.36)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.23*	-0.09	-0.25*	-0.25*	-0.26*
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)

Table B1a: Alternative models with clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. Note: * denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Minority	1.39*	2.38	1.37*	0.74	0.76
	(0.59)	(1.75)	(0.66)	(0.56)	(0.55)
Coalition	1.10				
	(0.67)				
Strong PM Dissolution Power	-0.13	-3.93	0.02	0.19	0.18
	(0.61)	(3.73)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.59)
Strong Government Dissolution Power	-0.11		-0.22	-0.15	-0.16
	(0.48)		(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.45)
PM Cabinet Powers	0.002	-0.66	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.13)	(3.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.21	0.47	0.16	0.16	0.15
	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Change in Extremism	0.005	-0.01	0.003	0.007	0.007
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-3.51*	0.31	-8.02*	-2.29*	-2.31*
	(1.05)	(16.32)	(3.08)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Number of Obs.	591	93	498		
R-squared, within	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.16
R-squared, between	0.10	0.08	0.28	0.16	0.16
R-squared, overall	0.11	0.04	0.17	0.16	0.16
σ_μ	2.88	3.12	2.12	2.33	2.18
σ_ϵ	3.97	5.89	3.91	3.83	3.84
ρ	0.34	0.22	0.23	0.27	0.24

Table B1b: Alternative models with clustered standard errors, control variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. Note: * denotes $p < 0.05$.

Online Appendix C: Step-wise Inclusion of Control Variables

I first provide a brief overview of the control variables' effects on parties' vote share changes, as they behave similarly in all models (except for the state of the economy and minority government status). In Model 1 of Table 1, which include both coalition and single-party observations, being in a coalition does not alter a party's change in vote share. Also, consistent with Schleiter and Tavits (2016), neither PM or government dissolution power exerts independent and statistically significant impact on a party's electoral performance. This is also the case for the prime minister's cabinet powers. On average, parties in minority governments gain more votes than those in majority governments (Model 1 of Table 1). However, the effect dissipates when I group the observations into single-party (Model 2 of Table 1) and coalition governments (Models 3, 4, and 5 of Table 1). The coefficient for *Change in Extremism* is small and statistically insignificant in all models, reaffirming Grynaviski's (2010) argument that voters do not pay attention to ruling parties' election manifestos. In contrast, the coefficient for *Per Capita GDP Growth Rate* is positive and statistically significant in Models 1, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 1: except in single-party governments (Model 2 of Table 1), the macroeconomy positively impacts ruling parties' electoral performances.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-Policy Termination	-2.36*	-2.32*	-2.29*	-2.22*
	(0.99)	(0.99)	(1.00)	(0.99)
Policy Termination	0.62	0.65	0.52	0.68
	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.43)
Termination Not Responsible	1.20*	1.23*	1.18*	1.39*
	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.60)	(0.57)
Junior Partner		0.07		
		(0.43)		
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.25*	-0.23*	-0.24*	-0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Coalition		0.99		
		(0.59)		
Minority		1.03		
		(0.44)		
Strong PM Dissolution Power			0.30	
			(0.47)	
Strong Govt Dissolution Power			-0.01	
			(0.38)	
PM Cabinet Powers			-0.07	
			(0.11)	
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate				0.17*
				(0.06)
Change in Extremism				0.008
				(0.01)
Intercept	-1.78*	-2.86*	-1.60*	-2.25*
	(0.25)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.31)
Number of Obs.	591			
Log Likelihood	-1728	-1725	-1728	-1725
Variance, Election Date	0	0	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	20.31*	20.08*	20.29*	20.05*
AIC	3471	3470	3478	3469
BIC	3501	3513	3526	3512

Table C1: Step-wise inclusion of control variables, Model 1 of Table 1. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-Policy Conflict Termination	1.24	0.84	1.28	1.62
	(2.43)	(2.42)	(2.43)	(2.40)
Policy Termination	-3.58	-3.21	-4.05	-4.11
	(3.32)	(3.29)	(3.38)	(3.28)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.11	-0.08	-0.11	-0.14
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Minority		1.79		
		(1.21)		
Strong PM Dissolution Power			-1.04	
			(0.65)	
Strong Govt Dissolution Power			0.97	
			(1.55)	
PM Cabinet Powers			-0.08	
			(0.42)	
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate				0.43
				(0.24)
Change in Extremism				-0.02
				(0.04)
Intercept	-2.07*	-3.09*	-2.07*	-3.12*
	(0.65)	(0.94)	(2.22)	(0.93)
Number of Obs.	93			
Log Likelihood	-293	-292	-293	-292
Variance, PM Party	0	0	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	31.97*	31.24*	31.76*	30.93*
AIC	600	599	606	601
BIC	618	620	631	624

Table C2: Step-wise inclusion of control variables, Model 2 of Table 1. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.44*	-3.40*	-3.30*	-3.33*
	(1.09)	(1.13)	(1.10)	(1.09)
Policy Termination	0.72	0.53	0.79	0.78
	(0.43)	(0.56)	(0.44)	(0.43)
Termination Not Responsible	1.37*	1.13	1.43*	1.54*
	(0.56)	(0.73)	(0.57)	(0.56)
Junior Partner		0.42		
		(0.58)		
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.26*	-0.27*	-0.27*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Minority		0.62		
		(0.46)		
Strong PM Dissolution Power			0.56	
			(0.50)	
Strong Govt Dissolution Power			0.03	
			(0.38)	
PM Cabinet Powers			-0.06	
			(0.11)	
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate				0.15*
				(0.06)
Change in Extremism				0.009
				(0.01)
Intercept	-1.80*	-1.98*	-1.76*	-2.21*
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.53)	(0.32)
Number of Obs.	498			
Log Likelihood	-1422	-1421	-1422	-1419
Variance, Election Date	0	0	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.71*	17.63*	17.66*	17.50*
AIC	2861	2862	2865	2859
BIC	2894	2904	2911	2901

Table C3: Step-wise inclusion of control variables, Model 3 of Table 1. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.64*	-6.05*	-6.03*	-5.94*	-5.88*
	(1.13)	(1.50)	(1.50)	(1.51)	(1.50)
Non-Policy Termination* Junior Partner		7.70*	7.77*	7.67*	7.50*
		(2.40)	(2.40)	(2.40)	(2.40)
Policy Termination	0.47	0.22	0.28	0.29	0.27
	(0.56)	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.60)
Policy Termination* Junior Partner		3.30*	3.31*	3.28*	3.20*
		(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.37)
Termination Not Responsible	1.05	3.39*	3.47*	3.43*	3.46*
	(0.72)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.10)
Junior Partner	0.39	-2.51*	-2.48*	-2.49*	-2.42*
	(0.58)	(1.20)	(1.20)	(1.20)	(1.20)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.26*	-0.26*	-0.26*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Minority			0.65		
			(0.46)		
Strong PM Dissolution Power				0.53	
				(0.49)	
Strong Govt Dissolution Power				-0.06	
				(0.38)	
PM Cabinet Powers				-0.05	
				(0.11)	
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate					0.14*
					(0.06)
Change in Extremism					0.009
					(0.01)
Intercept	-1.80*	-1.81*	-2.00*	-1.75*	-2.19*
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.53)	(0.32)
Number of Obs.	498				
Log Likelihood	-1420	-1414	-1415	-1416	-1414
Variance, Election Date	0	0.16	0.06	0.13	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.69*	17.15*	17.16*	17.12*	17.10*
AIC	2862	2855	2855	2860	2853
BIC	2900	2901	2905	2918	2908

Table C4: Step-wise inclusion of control variables, Model 4 of Table 1. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.58*	-6.05*	-6.03*	-5.94*	-5.88*
	(1.13)	(1.50)	(1.49)	(1.50)	(1.49)
Non-Policy Termination*		7.70*	7.77*	7.67*	7.50*
Junior Partner		(2.39)	(2.39)	(2.39)	(2.39)
Intra-Party Policy Termination	0.03	0.74	0.77	0.91	0.64
	(1.12)	(1.49)	(1.49)	(1.51)	(1.48)
Intra-Party Policy Termination*		1.37	1.35	1.26	1.39
Junior Partner		(2.39)	(2.39)	(2.41)	(2.38)
Inter-Party Policy Termination	0.67	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.19
	(0.60)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.68)
Inter-Party Policy Termination*		3.57*	3.56*	3.56*	3.47*
Junior Partner		(1.42)	(1.41)	(1.42)	(1.41)
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination	-0.53	0.06	0.07	0.25	0.35
	(1.43)	(1.59)	(1.59)	(1.61)	(1.59)
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination*		0.10	0.26	0.07	0.23
Junior Partner		(3.54)	(3.53)	(3.54)	(3.53)
Termination Not Responsible	1.14	3.39*	3.47*	3.44*	3.46*
	(0.73)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.10)
Junior Partner	0.28	-2.50*	-2.49*	-2.48*	-2.42*
	(0.59)	(1.20)	(1.20)	(1.20)	(1.19)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.26*	-0.26*	-0.26*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Minority			0.66		
			(0.46)		
Strong PM Dissolution Power				0.53	
				(0.49)	
Strong Govt Dissolution Power				-0.06	
				(0.38)	
PM Cabinet Powers				-0.05	
				(0.11)	
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate					0.13*
					(0.06)
Change in Extremism					0.009
					(0.01)
Intercept	-1.80*	-1.81*	-2.00*	-1.77*	-2.18*
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.53)	(0.32)
Number of Obs.	498				
Log Likelihood	-1422	-1415	-1412	-1415	-1413
Variance, Election Date	0	0.15	0.06	0.11	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.66*	17.06*	17.07*	17.06*	17.03*
AIC	2866	2860	2860	2865	2857
BIC	2912	2923	2928	2941	2924

Table C5: Step-wise inclusion of control variables, Model 5 of Table 1. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

Online Appendix D: Endogeneity Concerns

My theoretical mechanisms do not consider the strategic incentives behind a policy termination. The decision to terminate following intra-cabinet conflict is often the result of calculations on electoral gains versus losses. Lupia and Strøm (1995) argue that faced with a critical event, strategic incentives dictate if these parties stay together, form a replacement cabinet, or dissolve the parliament and call for early election. Thus, not all conflicts are government-ending, and not all policy terminations result in parliamentary dissolution. Instead, replacement cabinets and early elections are two competing risks: the choice depends on their relative electoral popularity and time left to the end of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP), among others (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 2000). This suggests that the electoral impacts of conflictual cabinet terminations on ruling parties may, in fact, be artifacts of the general electoral mood at the time in which the conflictual cabinet terminations take place, which would guide the strategic decisions to terminate governments.

The above suggests that my hypotheses and findings may suffer from an potential endogeneity problem. Namely, the null electoral effect of policy terminations may stem from strategic dissolution on the part of the prime minister's party, guided by the favorable electoral environment. Voters may be inclined to punish a prime minister's party for being responsible for the government-ending policy conflict. However, if the party has the power to dissolve the parliament, it may choose to replace the cabinet if public opinion trends against the party, thus escaping potential voter punishment, or call early election if the reverse is true, to take advantage of the favorable electoral environment. The party may even engineer a policy conflict as a pretext for calling early election. In other words, it would

not be voters' perception of the steadfastness of the prime minister's party in adhering to its policy stances that makes a policy termination electorally benign; instead, the null effect would be attributed to the ability to terminate government at an electorally opportune time.

I examine this potential endogeneity problem using the prime minister's assembly dissolution power. Schleiter and Tavits (2016) find that the prime minister's power to dissolve the parliament is a good predictor of opportunistic elections, which can boost the party's vote share. This dissolution power thus affects the strategic timing for cabinet termination (Schleiter and Morgen Jones 2009). It follows that during policy conflict, prime ministers' parties with assembly dissolution power have a wider range of vote-maximizing options to choose from than those without such powers. That is, they are in a privileged position to consider strategic election timing when deciding whether or not to terminate the cabinet. For these parties, the decision to terminate a cabinet would have incorporated popular opinion towards the party and other electoral considerations. Even if these parties are not the ones who broke up the government, they can still decide to form replacement cabinets or call early elections, depending on their electoral popularity at the time of the terminations.

Assuming the alternative theoretical mechanism, it follows that prime ministers' parties without assembly dissolution power would incur vote loss for policy terminations, but those that possess such power would not. That is, my hypothesis on the electoral impact of policy termination on prime ministers' parties (H2) would only be applicable to those with assembly dissolution power. Those without it (e.g. in Norway) would be forced to install a replacement cabinet, give up the top post, or compromise their policy positions to remain in the cabinet, which is electorally costly. This yields the following alternative hypothesis:

Strategic Termination and PM Parties' Vote Shares (A1): Given responsibility for the government-ending conflict, only prime ministers' parties with prime minister assembly dissolution power do not suffer vote loss from policy termination.

If the electoral impact of policy termination on prime ministers' parties were, as hypothesized, dependent on voters' perceptions of the ruling parties' governing competence and adherence to their policy positions, then prime ministers' parties without assembly dissolution powers would also escape voter punishment for a policy termination. Note that this potential endogeneity problem should only apply to policy termination. Since non-policy conflicts are predicted to harm parties' governing competence, the ability to call early election would not pose as an electoral advantage. In fact, a snap election post-termination may even hurt the prime minister's party's vote share, assuming it is responsible for the government-ending non-policy conflict.

My hypotheses on the electoral impacts of policy terminations on junior coalition partners may likewise suffer from the same endogeneity problem. When a policy conflict arises, and the electoral environment at the time favors a particular junior coalition partner, the partner may be able to take advantage of this electoral opportunity if the government has assembly dissolution power. It can do so by insisting on leaving the coalition and calling early election, particularly if few alternatives exist for a replacement cabinet, though the consensus needed for doing so may it make difficult to execute in practice. If so, then the electoral benefit that a policy termination confers to junior partners would not reflect improved voter perception of junior partners' policy stances, but be an artifact of the favorable electoral environment at the time of the policy termination. This would imply that only junior coalition partners

with government assembly power would electorally benefit from a policy termination:

> Strategic Termination and Junior Partners' Vote Shares (A2): Assuming responsibility, only junior coalition partners with government assembly dissolution power electorally benefit from policy termination.

I test the alternative hypothesis that only prime ministers' parties with PM dissolution power do not lose votes due to responsibility for policy termination. For the sake of comparability with the potential moderating effects of *PM Dissolution Power* on junior coalition partners,I restrict my observations to those in the coalition setting. I construct the same model as in Model 4 of Table 1 in the main paper, but interact *Strong PM Dissolution Power* with *Policy Termination* and *Junior Partner* to distinguish potentially divergent electoral impacts of policy terminations on prime ministers' parties with and without strong PM dissolution power. I include stepwise inclusion of control variables to ensure that my results are not dependent on the inclusion of specific control variables.

The results are displayed in Table D1. The main variables of interest behave similarly as they do in Model 4 of Table 1 in the main paper. The coefficient for *Policy Termination* is negative but statistically insignificant, while the coefficient for *Policy Termination*Strong PM Dissolution Power* is positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects plot in Figure D1 reveals the following. All other variables held at their means/modes, for prime ministers' parties without strong PM assembly dissolution power, policy termination does not affect their vote shares in a statistically significant manner. For prime ministers' parties with such power, policy terminations boost their vote shares by an average of 4.48 percentage points. These results refute the first alternative hypothesis. As shown, prime ministers'

parties without strong PM assembly dissolution power do not, on average, lose votes from policy terminations. Even though prime ministers' parties with such power can exercise their strategic advantage and gain votes, the null effect of policy termination on prime ministers' parties is unlikely a product of the electoral environment during termination.

The coefficient for *Junior Partner*Strong PM Dissolution Power* is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that, consistent with Gopelrud and Schleiter (2016), the prime ministers can exercise their assembly dissolution power, at the electoral expense of junior partners. For junior partners that are not responsible for a conflict termination, having a prime minister that can dissolve the parliament unilaterally is electorally costly. Reassuringly, the triple interaction variable *Policy Termination*Strong PM Dissolution Power*Junior Partner* is negative but not statistically significant. The marginal effects plot in Figure D1 reveals that although the effect size is less positive, policy termination remains electorally beneficial to junior partners, even if their prime ministers' parties possess strong PM assembly dissolution power. If my manuscript's main findings were endogenous to the electoral landscape at the time of the termination, instead of a reflection of the clarifying effect of policy profiles of the responsible parties, these junior partners would not gain votes from policy terminations. Rather, the prime minister's party would dissolve the coalition at a time that would enhance its electoral prospects,at the expense of its coalition partners' electoral prospects. Together with the statistically insignificant effect of policy termination on prime ministers' parties without strong PM assembly dissolution power, the results offer evidence against the fist alternative hypothesis.

Meanwhile, strong PM dissolution power moderates the electoral consequences of non-policy conflict termination, but the direction differs from that for policy termination. As-

suming responsibility for the government-ending conflicts, for prime ministers' parties with strong PM assembly dissolution power, non-policy conflict terminations reduce their vote shares by an average of 10.6 percentage points, while the average vote share reduction is 5.2 percentage points for prime ministers' parties without such power. For junior coalition parties whose prime ministers possess strong PM assembly dissolution power, responsibility for a non-policy conflict termination boosts their vote shares by a whopping 10 percentage points. This gives greater stock to the conjecture that clarity of responsibility may moderate the electoral impact of non-policy conflict termination. It also suggests that since non-policy conflicts lower the governing competence of the responsible prime minister's party, prime ministers' parties that call for early election after this type of conflict termination would be met with even greater electoral punishment. This is consistent with my first hypothesis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.56*	-5.30*	-5.37*	-5.26*	-5.12*	**-5.16***
	(1.13)	(1.58)	(1.58)	(1.59)	(1.58)	**(1.58)**
Non-Policy Termination*		6.10*	6.27*	6.11*	5.82*	6.05*
Junior Partner		(2.48)	(2.48)	(2.48)	(2.47)	(2.48)
Non-Policy Termination*		-5.58	-5.19	-5.73	-5.73	**-5.44**
Strong PM Dissolution Power		(4.40)	(4.41)	(4.41)	(4.42)	**(4.42)**
Non-Policy Termination*Junior*		14.80*	14.01*	14.81*	15.68*	14.70*
Strong PM Dissolution Power		(6.51)	(6.55)	(6.50)	(6.55)	(6.54)
Policy Termination	0.56	-0.29	-0.28	-0.30	-0.18	**-0.18**
	(0.57)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.65)	**(0.65)**
Policy Termination*		3.70*	3.73*	3.71*	3.56*	3.63*
Junior Partner		(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.39)	(1.38)	(1.38)
Policy Termination*		4.97*	5.09*	4.94*	4.56*	**4.67***
Strong PM Dissolution Power		(1.75)	(1.75)	(1.75)	(1.75)	**(1.75)**
Policy Termination*Junior*		-1.63	-1.85	-1.62	-1.32	-1.60
Strong PM Dissolution Power		(3.04)	(3.05)	(3.04)	(3.03)	(3.03)
Junior Partner*		-4.60*	-4.51*	-4.59*	-4.77*	-4.65*
Strong PM Dissolution Power		(2.20)	(2.20)	(2.20)	(2.18)	(2.18)
Strong PM Dissolution Power	0.52	0.49	0.31	0.53	0.52	0.33
	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.59)
Termination Not Responsible	1.15	3.48*	3.52*	3.46*	3.54*	3.59*
	(0.73)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.10)	(1.09)	(1.09)
Junior Partner	0.40	-2.16	-2.16	-2.19	-2.06	-2.09
	(0.58)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.19)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.26*	-0.25*	-0.26*	-0.25*	-0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Table D1a: Testing the moderating effect of PM Dissolution Power on the electoral impacts of conflictual cabinet terminations, main explanatory variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

I now test whether the positive electoral impact of policy terminations on junior partners is endogenous to these parties' ability to call early elections. I employ the same approach as for testing first alternative hypothesis. However, since my focus is on junior partners, I restrict my observations to coalition parties and construct the same model as Model 5 of Table 1 in the main paper, but interact *Strong Government Dissolution Power* with all variables that indicate policy termination. This allows me to test if the observed pattern on the electoral impact of inter-party policy termination on junior partners is due to these parties possessing strong government assembly dissolution power. The main interaction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority			0.55			0.71
			(0.48)			(0.49)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power				-0.08		-0.12
				(0.38)		(0.39)
PM Cabinet Powers				-0.04		-0.04
				(0.11)		(0.11)
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate					0.13*	0.14*
					(0.06)	(0.06)
Extremism					0.01	0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-1.95*	-1.97*	-2.07*	-1.79*	-2.33*	-2.27*
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.53)	(0.35)	(0.57)
Number of Obs.	498					
Log Likelihood	-1421	-1407	-1407	-1408	-1405	-1404
Variance, Election Date/PM Party	0	0.28	0.21	0.33	0.09	0.09
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.65*	16.39*	16.41*	16.34*	16.41*	16.34*
AIC	2863	2848	2847	2852	2847	2851
BIC	2905	2920	2919	2932	2927	2944

Table D1b: Testing the moderating effect of PM Dissolution Power on the electoral impacts of conflictual cabinet terminations, control variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

variables of interests are *Inter-Party Policy Termination*Junior Partner* and *Inter-Party Policy Termination*Junior Partner*Strong Govt Dissolution Power*. A positive and statistically significant coefficient for the former variable and a statistically insignificant coefficient for the latter variable would offer support against the alternative explanation that the electoral benefit from an inter-party policy termination on junior partners is endogenous to the electoral landscape during termination. I also interact this variable with *Non-Policy Termination* and *Junior Partner*, so as to examine whether possessing his power affects junior partners' electoral immunity from being responsible for non-policy terminations.

The results are displayed in Table D2. First, the coefficients for the variables regarding non-policy conflict terminations are consistent with those in Model 5 of Table 1. In the full model (Model 6), we observe that non-policy terminations remain electorally detrimental



Figure D1. Marginal effects plot of the moderating impact of PM dissolution power on the relationship between policy termination and the responsible coalition parties' electoral performances, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 6 of Table D1. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

to prime ministers' parties, and even more for prime ministers' parties with strong government dissolution power. In contrast, the coefficient for *Non-Policy Termination*Junior Partner* is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient for triple interaction variable, *Non-Policy Termination*Junior Partner*Strong Govt Dissolution Power*, is positive but statistically insignificant. The marginal effects plot in Figure D2 reveals that an non-policy conflict termination does not affect a junior partner's vote share, regardless of its possession of strong government assembly dissolution power. In contrast, this type of termination reduces the vote share of the responsible prime ministers' parties by a whopping 11.1 percentage points if they possess strong government assembly dissolution power, and

by 3.9 percentage points if they do not. This is consistent with the results of models with *Strong PM Dissolution Power*.

More importantly, the coefficient for *Inter-Party Policy Termination*Junior Partner* remains positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient for the triple interaction variable, *Inter-Party Policy Termination*Junior Partner*Strong Govt Dissolution Power*, is positive but statistically insignificant. Figure D3 reveals that all else equal, an inter-party policy termination raises a junior partner's vote share by 4.1 percentage points if it does not possess strong government dissolution power, and by 3.25 percentage points if it possesses such power. In other words, junior partners electorally benefit from being responsible for an inter-party policy termination, even if it cannot formally call early election. And, having such power does not further enhance the electoral benefit from an inter-party policy termination. These results provide evidence against the alternative hypothesis that the aforementioned electoral gain by junior partners is an artifact of the electoral landscape post-termination.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.58*	-4.21*	-4.22*	-4.16*	-3.92*	-3.90*
	(1.13)	(1.74)	(1.73)	(1.74)	(1.73)	(1.73)
Non-Policy Termination*		6.51*	6.61*	6.51*	6.36*	6.45*
Junior Partner		(2.71)	(2.71)	(2.71)	(2.70)	(2.69)
Non-Policy Termination*		-6.81*	-6.86*	-6.64	-7.23*	-7.19*
Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(3.41)	(3.41)	(3.42)	(3.40)	(3.40)
Non-Policy Termination*Junior*		4.16	4.32	4.10	4.09	4.25
Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(4.94)	(4.93)	(4.93)	(4.91)	(4.90)
Intra-Party Policy Termination	0.04	0.97	0.92	1.12	0.87	0.88
	(0.13)	(1.50)	(1.50)	(1.51)	(1.50)	(1.50)
Intra-Party Policy Termination*		1.69	1.78	1.67	1.82	1.91
Junior Partner		(2.68)	(2.68)	(2.68)	(2.67)	(2.66)
Intra-Party Policy Termination*		-1.59	-1.65	-1.80	-1.83	-2.01
Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(3.21)	(3.20)	(3.21)	(3.19)	(3.19)
Intra-Party Policy Termination*Junior*	No Observations					
Strong Govt Dissolution Power						
Inter-Party Policy Termination	0.67	0.67	0.76	0.67	0.65	0.72
	(0.60)	(0.90)	(0.91)	(0.91)	(0.90)	(0.90)
Inter-Party Policy Termination*		3.27*	3.30*	3.28*	3.32*	**3.37***
Junior Partner		(1.65)	(1.65)	(1.65)	(1.64)	**(1.64)**
Inter-Party Policy Termination*		-1.15	-1.19	-1.06	-0.94	-0.93
Strong Govt Dissolution Power	(1.35)	(1.35)	(1.35)	(1.36)	(1.35)	(1.35)
Inter-Party Policy Termination*Junior*		0.54	0.53	0.49	0.13	**0.09**
Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(1.95)	(1.94)	(1.94)	(1.95)	**(1.95)**
Intra- and Inter-Party Policy Termination	-0.52	1.14	1.03	1.30	1.41	1.41
	(1.44)	(1.72)	(1.72)	(1.73)	(1.72)	(1.73)
Intra- and Inter-Party Policy Termination*		-2.27	-1.98	-2.34	-2.12	-1.89
Junior Partner		(4.64)	(4.63)	(4.63)	(4.61)	(4.60)
Intra- and Inter-Party Policy Termination*		-6.35	-5.98	-6.38	-6.19	-5.84
Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(4.48)	(4.48)	(4.48)	(4.46)	(4.45)
Intra- and Inter-Party Policy Termination*		8.82	8.47	8.93	8.66	8.43
Junior*Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(7.43)	(7.42)	(7.43)	(7.38)	(7.38)
Junior Partner*		-0.18	-0.06	-0.13	0.08	0.24
Strong Govt Dissolution Power		(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.23)	(1.23)
Termination Not Responsible	1.14	3.33*	3.44*	3.38*	3.44*	3.56*
	(0.73)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.09)	(1.10)
Junior Partner	0.28	-2.33	-2.40	-2.34	-2.35	-2.43
	(0.59)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.29)	(1.29)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.26*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power	0.01	0.43	0.28	0.28	0.45	0.26
	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.52)

Table D2a: Moderating impact of government dissolution power, main explanatory variables only. # obs: 498. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority			0.66			0.73
			(0.47)			(0.49)
Strong PM Dissolution Power				0.47		0.19
				(0.49)		(0.51)
PM Cabinet Powers				-0.04		-0.04
				(0.11)		(0.11)
Per Capita GDP Growth					0.14*	0.15*
					(0.06)	(0.06)
Change in Extremism					0.008	0.009
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-1.81*	-2.03*	-2.14*	-1.99*	-2.44*	-2.47*
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.56)	(0.42)	(0.59)
Log Likelihood	-1422	-1411	-410	-1411	-1406	-1407
Variance, Election Date/PM Party	0	0	0	0.05	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.66*	16.94*	16.88*	16.91*	16.76*	16.66*
AIC	2867	2871	2871	2874	2867	2870
BIC	2918	2972	2976	2973	2972	2988

Table D2b: Moderating impact of government dissolution power, control variables only. # obs: 498. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.



Figure D2. Marginal effects plot of the moderating impact of government assem-bly dissolution power on the relationship between non-policy conflict termination and the responsible coalition parties' electoral performances, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 6 of Table D2. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.



Figure D3. Marginal effects plot of the moderating impact of government assem-bly dissolution power on the relationship between inter-party policy termination and the responsible coalition parties' electoral performances, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 6 of Table D2. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.