Serious Conflicts with Benign Outcomes? The Electoral Consequences of Conflictual Cabinet Terminations

Online Appendices Part 2, APSR Dataverse

Online Appendix E: Multiple Cabinet Terminations

I restrict my set of observations to parties that have participated in at least one cabinet that has ended due to conflict, regardless of the party's responsibility for it. While it is possible to include every cabinet into my observations, doing so would lead to bias, as I would be over-counting parties and placing greater weight on those that have participated in multiple cabinets between elections. Restricting my observations allows me to test the electoral impacts of one versus multiple conflictual cabinet terminations during CIEP in a meaningful manner. Pooling all observations may obfuscate the difference between no termination and one termination, versus between one termination to two or more terminations. This results in a truncated sample size of 264 observations instead of 591 observations, with 10 observations in single-party governments. Due to the small sample size in single-party governments, I do not test the effect of multiple cabinet terminations in this type of government.

I construct variables that measures the number of times a party has been responsibility for a non-policy as well as a policy conflict termination in a given CIEP. The variables, *Multiple Non-Policy Termination* and *Multiple Policy Termination*, are equal to the number of times a ruling party has been responsible for a non-policy conflict termination and policy termination between two parliamentary elections, respectively. I then construct five models, which are the same as Models 1, 3, 4, and 5 Table 1, but include these two variables.

The results are displayed in Table E1. The coefficient for *Multiple Non-Policy Termination* is negative and statistically significant in all models, while the coefficient for its interaction with *Junior Partner* is negative and statistically significant in Model 4. Using the results from Model 3, the marginal effects plot in Figure E1, shows that, all other vari-

ables at the means/modes, being responsible one additional non-policy conflict termination is associated with a vote loss of 3.40 percentage points for prime ministers' parties, but does not affect the vote shares of junior coalition partners. This result is consistent with the theoretical mechanism guiding my hypothesis on non-policy conflict termination (H1), but once again only for prime ministers' parties.

The coefficients for both *Multiple Policy Termination* and its interaction with *Junior Partner* are negative but statistically insignificant in all models. This is consistent with H2 and H3a. Assuming a party belonged to at least one coalition that ended in conflict, the number of times it is responsible for policy conflict termination does not affect its vote share. The results differ when we examine the electoral impact of responsibility over multiple inter-party policy terminations. In Model 4, the coefficient for *Multiple Inter-Party Policy Termination* is negative and statistically significant, while its interaction with *Junior Partner* is positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects plot in Figure E2 reveals that, all other variables at their means/modes, being responsible for one more inter-party policy conflict is associated with an average vote share loss of 1.29 percentage points for the prime minister's party, but does not affect a junior partner's vote share. This suggests that for the prime minister's party, although responsibility for one inter-party policy termination is not electorally detrimental, having responsibility for two or more such termination between two elections is electorally costly. This hints at the possibility that voters also expect prime minsters' parties to serve as the coalition manager. When it repeatedly engages in policy conflict with other parties and fail to keep the coalition together, voters may perceive the party as lacking the necessary governing competence to weather any policy storm. The same expectation does not seem to be imposed upon junior partners, as for these parties,

responsibility for multiple inter-party policy terminations is not electorally damaging.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Multiple Non-Policy Termination	**-1.54***	**-2.14***	**-3.40***	-4.50*
	(0.75)	**(0.77)**	**(1.05)**	(1.17)
Multiple Non-Policy Termination* Junior Partner			**2.52**	3.84*
			(1.49)	(1.60)
Multiple Policy Termination	**-0.34**	**-0.26**	**-0.72**	
	(0.39)	**(0.39)**	**(0.67)**	
Multiple Policy Termination* Junior Partner			**0.63**	
			(0.83)	
Multiple Intraparty Policy Termination				0.35
				(0.49)
Multiple Intraparty Policy Termination* Junior Partner				**-0.50**
				(1.13)
Multiple Interparty Policy Termination				**-1.29***
				(0.49)
Multiple Interparty Policy Termination* Junior Partner				**1.37***
				(0.56)
Multiple Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination				-0.27
				(0.47)
Multiple Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination*Junior Partner				**-0.31**
				(**0.95**)
Junior Partner	0.17	0.18	-0.69	-1.59
	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.93)	(0.89)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.40*	-0.36*	-0.37*	-0.36*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)

Table E1a: Statistical results for hierarchical models on the relationship between conflict termination and changes in the vote shares of ruling parties, one or more conflictual cabinet terminations between elections only. Main explanatory variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Strong PM Dissolution Power	-0.22	-0.18	-0.26	-0.20
	(0.87)	(0.91)	(0.91)	(0.90)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power	-0.11	-0.16	-0.23	-0.16
	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.54)
PM Cabinet Powers	-0.18	-0.18	-0.19	-0.23
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Coalition	1.00			
	(1.49)			
Minority	-0.60	-0.51	-0.43	-0.40
	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.46*	0.47*	0.46*	0.44*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Change in Extremism	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Intercept	-2.09	-1.11	-0.39	0.49
	(1.62)	(0.84)	(1.01)	(1.00)
Number of Obs.	264	254		
Log Likelihood	-751	-721	-719	-715
Variance, Election Date	0	0	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.28*	17.08*	16.87*	16.37*
AIC	1532	1470	1468	1471
BIC	1585	1519	1522	1542

Table E1b: Statistical results for hierarchical models on the relationship between conflict termination and changes in the vote shares of ruling parties, one or more conflictual cabinet terminations between elections only. Control variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$.



Figure E1. Marginal effects plot of multiple non-policy conflict termination on the responsible coalition parties' vote share changes, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 3 of Table E1. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.



Figure E2. Marginal effects plot of multiple interparty policy termination on the responsible coalition parties' vote share changes, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 4 of Table E1. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

Online Appendix F: The Moderating Impact of Time from Termination to Election

I examine if the time passed between conflictual cabinet terminations and parliamentary elections moderates their electoral impacts. I restrict my observations to parties that have participated in a cabinet that ended in conflict, regardless of responsibility for it. Next, I measure the number of days between the termination and the date of the next parliamentary election. I then construct the variables *Time To Election, Non-Policy Conflict Termination*; *Time To Election, Policy Termination*; *Time To Election, Intraparty Policy Termination*; *Time To Election, Interparty Policy Termination*; and *Time To Election, Intra- and Interparty Policy Termination*. Positive values indicate the number of days between the termination that the party was responsible for and the next parliamentary election. If multiple terminations occurred between two elections, I measure the number of days between the last termination before the next election and the election itself.

The results are listed in Table F1. They reveal that, given that a conflict termination has occurred, the timing of the termination does not affect a cabinet party's vote share. The coefficients for all the aforementioned variables, as well as their interactions with *Junior Partner*, are statistically insignificant, and the effect sizes are minute. These results strengthen the validity of my hypotheses' theoretical mechanisms. Regardless of the number of days passed from termination to election, the impact of conflictual cabinet terminations on voters' perceptions of the prime minister's party's governing competence (in the case of responsibility for non-policy conflict termination) and ruling parties' policy profiles (in the case of responsibility for policy terminations) do not seem to fade with the passage of time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time to Election,	**-0.001**	**-0.003**	**-0.003**	-0.003
Non-Policy Termination	**(0.002)**	**(0.002)**	**(0.002)**	(0.002)
Time, Non-Policy Termination*			**0.0002**	0.0002
Junior Partner			(0.003)	(0.003)
Time to Election,	**-0.0001**	**-0.00006**	**-0.002**	
Policy Termination	**(0.001)**	**(0.001)**	**(0.001)**	
Time, Policy Termination*			**0.003**	
Junior Partner			**(0.002)**	
Time to Election,				-0.003
Intraparty Policy Termination				(0.002)
Time, Intraparty Policy Termination*				**0.003**
Junior Partner				**(0.003)**
Time to Election				-0.002
Interparty Policy Termination				(0.002)
Time, Interparty Policy Termination*				**0.003**
Junior Partner				**(0.002)**
Time to Election,				0.0007
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination				(0.005)
Time, Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination*				**-0.02**
Junior Partner				(**0.02**)
Junior Partner	0.34	0.36	-0.25	-0.19
	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.68)	(0.69)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.39*	-0.35*	-0.37*	-0.36*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)

Table F1a: Statistical results for hierarchical models on the moderating impact of time of termination, one or more conflictual cabinet terminations between elections only. Main explanatory variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Strong PM Dissolution Power	-0.12	-0.03	-0.14	-0.13
	(0.88)	(0.92)	(0.92)	(0.92)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.56)
PM Cabinet Powers	-0.25	-0.27	-0.24	-0.25
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Coalition	1.18			
	(1.48)			
Minority	-0.66	-0.57	-0.62	-0.59
	(0.76)	(0.79)	(0.78)	(0.79)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.47*	0.48*	0.49*	0.49*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Change in Extremism	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Intercept	-2.61	-1.42	-1.07	-1.09
	(1.62)	(0.79)	(0.82)	(0.83)
Number of Obs.	264	254		
Log Likelihood	-753	-723	-722	-721
Variance, Election Date	0	0	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.53*	17.40*	17.19*	17.10*
AIC	1535	1472	1473	1492
BIC	1589	1518	1526	1553

Table F1b: Statistical results for hierarchical models on the moderating impact of time of termination, one or more conflictual cabinet terminations between elections only. Control variables only. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$.

Online Appendix G: Post-Termination Opposition Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.83*	-5.58*	-5.56*	-5.37*	-5.41*	-5.26*
	(1.14)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(1.89)	(1.87)	(1.88)
Non-Policy Termination*		6.39*	6.38*	6.17*	6.22*	6.04*
Junior Partner		(2.88)	(2.87)	(2.88)	(2.87)	(2.86)
Non-Policy Termination*		-2.81	-2.53	-3.04	-2.65	-2.42
Opposition		(3.24)	(3.25)	(3.25)	(3.22)	(3.25)
Non-Policy Termination*Junior Partner*		5.29	5.35	5.85	5.23	5.73
Opposition		(4.72)	(4.71)	(4.73)	(4.76)	(4.69)
Policy Termination	0.42	0.45	0.50	0.55	0.51	0.59
	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.63)	(0.64)
Policy Termination*		2.69	2.69	2.63	2.57	2.54
Junior Partner		(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.42)
Policy Termination*		**-2.99**	**-2.73**	**-3.06**	**-2.76**	**-2.44**
Opposition		**(2.14)**	**(2.14)**	**(2.14)**	**(2.12)**	**(2.15)**
Policy Termination*Junior Partner*		4.70	4.66	4.85	4.74	4.78
Opposition		(2.79)	(2.79)	(2.79)	(2.78)	(2.77)
Junior Partner*		-2.15	-2.01	-2.23	-2.21	-2.11
Opposition		(1.92)	(1.91)	(1.91)	(1.91)	(1.91)
Termination Not Responsible	1.07	3.47*	3.57*	3.52*	3.55*	3.67*
	(0.72)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.10)
Junior Partner	0.30	-2.37	-2.35	-2.34	-2.27	-2.24
	(0.58)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.21)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.26*	-0.26*	-0.26*	-0.26*	-0.26*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Opposition	0.73	1.67	1.33	1.69	1.56	1.11
	(0.59)	(1.18)	(1.21)	(1.19)	(1.17)	(1.23)

Table G1a: Moderating impact of opposition status. Main explanatory variables only. # obs: 498.
Note: The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority			0.59			0.69
			(0.49)			(0.54)
Strong PM Dissolution Power				0.61		0.33
				(0.51)		(0.52)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power				-0.02		-0.10
				(0.40)		(0.41)
PM Cabinet Powers				-0.06		-0.07
				(0.11)		(0.11)
Per Capita GDP Growth					0.15*	0.15*
					(0.06)	(0.06)
Change in Extremism					0.006	0.007
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-1.84*	-1.94*	-2.09*	1.88*	-2.34*	-2.33*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.56)	(0.33)	(0.59)
Log Likelihood	-1421	-1414	-1413	-1413	-1411	-1410
Variance, Election Date/PM Party	0	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.49	0.50
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.64*	16.47*	16.43*	16.43*	16.47*	16.36*
AIC	2862	2862	2863	2866	2858	2866
BIC	2905	2934	2938	2951	2934	2963

Table G1b: Moderating impact of opposition status. Control variables only. # obs: 498. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. Note: $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

Online Appendix H: Results with Mainstream Parties Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Policy Termination	**-2.24***	**1.20**	**-3.56***	**-5.72***	-5.73*
	(1.02)	**(2.40)**	**(1.17)**	**(1.49)**	(1.49)
Non-Policy Termination* Junior Partner				**7.33***	7.33*
				(2.41)	(2.41)
Policy Termination	**0.80**	**-3.70**	**0.75**	**0.45**	
	(0.47)	**(3.34)**	**(0.58)**	**(0.62)**	
Policy Termination* Junior Partner				**3.27***	
				(1.37)	
Intraparty Policy Termination					0.77
					(1.50)
Intraparty Policy Termination* Junior Partner					**2.16**
					(2.63)
Interparty Policy Termination					0.39
					(0.69)
Interparty Policy Termination* Junior Partner					**3.43***
					(1.40)
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination					0.44
					(1.59)
Intra- Inter-Party Policy Termination* Junior Partner					**0.28**
					(**3.49**)
Termination Not Responsible	1.58*		1.50*	3.71*	3.70*
	(0.63)		(0.75)	(1.10)	(1.10)
Junior Partner	-0.10		0.46	-2.34*	-2.34*
	(0.43)		(0.57)	(1.18)	(1.18)
Number of Obs.	564	91	473		

Table H1a: Statistical results for multilevel models (with election and country levels) on the relationship between conflict termination and changes in the vote shares of ruling parties. Main explanatory variables only. All single-issue parties are excluded. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$. Note: all control variables of these models are located in Table H1 (Cont.) below.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.22*	-0.13	-0.25*	-0.25*	-0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Strong PM Dissolution Power	0.02	-0.94	0.29	0.25	0.26
	(0.50)	(1.64)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power	-0.002	0.51	0.0001	-0.09	-0.07
	(0.41)	(1.57)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
PM Cabinet Powers	-0.02	0.34	-0.07	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.12)	(0.45)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Coalition	0.91				
	(0.60)				
Minority	1.13*	1.94	0.65	0.70	0.68
	(0.48)	(1.31)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.18*	0.42	0.15*	0.14*	0.14*
	(0.07)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Change in Extremism	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-327*	-5.87*	-2.37*	-2.32*	-2.32*
	(0.84)	(2.77)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.62)
Number of Obs.	566	93	473		
Log Likelihood	-1647	-290	-1343	-1338	-1337
Variance, Election Date/PM Party	0.70	0	0.98	0.97	0.98
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	19.06*	30.09*	16.21*	15.85*	15.79*
AIC	3326	607	2716	2710	2716
BIC	3396	639	2779	2780	2804

Table H1b: Statistical results for multilevel models (with election and country levels) on the relationship between conflict termination and changes in the vote shares of ruling parties. Control variables only. All single-issue parties are excluded. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$.

Online Appendix I: Intraparty versus Interparty Conflictual Cabinet Termination

I test the potential effect of intraparty versus interparty conflictual cabinet terminations on ruling parties' electoral performances. To do so, I re-categorize conflictual cabinet terminations into ones that are preceded by intra-party conflicts, inter-party conflicts, or both. If the alternative theoretical mechanism of clarity of responsibility better predicted the electoral impacts of conflictual cabinet terminations, then one would expect that only cabinet terminations based on intra-party conflicts would reduce the vote shares of the responsible parties. I employ the coding of the PAGED dataset to determine whether a government-ending conflict is intra-party, inter-party, or both in nature. I construct three indicator variables to denote a ruling party's responsibility for at least one conflict termination during CIEP, with the criteria that every government conflict must have occurred within the party (*Intra-Party Conflict Termination*), between ruling parties (*Inter-Party Conflict Termination*), or either within and between ruling parties (*Intra- and Inter-Party Conflict Terimination*). Parties that have been responsible for both intra- and inter-party conflict terminations during the period are also assigned the the value of 1 for (*Intra- and Inter-Party Conflict Terimination*). The summary statistics for these variables are displayed in Table I1.

I construct the same models as Models 1 to 4 in Table 1, but include these variables instead of *Non-Policy Conflict Termination* and *Policy Termination*. The results are displayed in Table I2. Both *Intra-Party Conflict Termination* and *Intra- and Inter-Party Conflict Termination*, as well as their interactions with *Junior Partner*, are positive and statistically insignificant in all models. Notably, in single-party governments, cabinet terminations that

are preceded by intra-party conflicts are not electorally damaging to parties. Given the high clarity of responsibility in this type of governments, intra-party conflicts should have had the most potential to exert harm on these ruling parties' electoral wellbeing. That they do not suggests that while intra-party conflicts may damage ruling parties' governing competence (Greene and Haber 2015), terminating the government may impose a corrective effect.

In Model 4, the coefficient for *Inter-Party Conflict Termination* is negative and statistically insignificant, while the coefficient for *Inter-Party Conflict Termimation*Junior Partner* is positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects plot in Figure I1, using results from Model 4, reveals that, all other variables at their means/modes, responsibility for an inter-party conflict termination is associated with a 3.33 percentage point increase in a junior partner's vote share, but does not affect the vote shares of the prime minister's party. Given the theoretical mechanism behind my hypothesis on junior partners and inter-party policy conflict terminations, the statistical significance of this variable is likely driven by junior partners that are responsible for inter-party policy conflict terminations. In any case, together with the results regarding intra-party conflict terminations, the main findings of this manuscript do not seem to be endogenous to the whether or not the government-ending conflicts occur within or between ruling parties.

Variable	#	Percent
All Observations		
Intra-party Conflict Termination	24	4.08
Inter-Party Conflict Termination	153	26.02
Intra and Inter-Party Conflict Termination	11	1.87
Single-Party Government		
Intra-party Conflict Termination	9	9.89
Coalitions		
Intra-party Conflict Termination	15	3.02
Inter-Party Conflict Termination	153	30.78
Intra and Inter-Party Conflict Termination	11	2.21

Table I1: Summary statistics for intra- and inter-party conflict terminations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intra-Party Conflict Termination	**0.28**	**-0.46**	**0.95**	**2.86**
	(0.96)	**(1.97)**	**(1.15)**	**(1.63)**
Intra-party Conflict Termination*				**-1.06**
Junior Partner				**(2.43)**
Inter-Party Conflict Termination	**0.30**		**0.57**	**-0.28**
	(0.61)		**(0.59)**	**(0.65)**
Inter-party Conflict Termination*				**3.61***
Junior Partner				**(1.38)**
Intra- and Inter-Party Conflict Termination	**-1.89**		**-1.94**	**-2.08**
	(1.38)		**(1.31)**	**(1.44)**
Intra- and Inter-Party Conflict Termination*				**1.07**
Junior Partner				**(3.34)**
Junior Partner	0.45		0.21	-2.15
	(0.62)		(0.59)	(1.18)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.23*	-0.14	-0.27*	-0.27*
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Strong PM Dissolution Power	0.03	-0.78	0.27	0.29
	(0.48)	(1.65)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power	0.01	0.12	0.05	0.0003
	(0.38)	(1.55)	(0.39)	(0.39)
PM Cabinet Powers	-0.03	0.39	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.11)	(0.45)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Coalition	0.91			
	(0.55)			
Minority	1.07*	2.25	0.71	0.73
	(0.46)	(1.30)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.17*	0.40	0.14*	0.14*
	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Change in Extremism	0.008	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-3.26*	-6.03*	-2.24*	-2.18*
	(0.81)	(2.80)	(0.58)	(0.57)
Number of Obs.	591	93	498	
Log Likelihood	-1723	-291	-1422	-1418
Variance, Election Date	0	0	0	0
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	19.94*	30.56*	17.72*	17.38*
AIC	3480	606	2877	2873
BIC	3554	636	2944	2953

Table I2: Statistical results for hierarchical models on intra- versus inter-party conflictual cabinet terminations. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. * refers to $p < 0.05$.



Figure I1. Marginal effects plot of interparty conflict termination on the responsible coalition parties' vote share changes, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 4 of Table I2. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

Online Appendix J: PM Cabinet Powers

Finally, I test the alternative explanation that my findings on policy termination is masking the cabinet powers of the prime minister's party, i.e. the power to wield the policymaking process and appoint ministers, etc. Since prime ministers' parties in single-party governments always have the highest degrees of PM cabinet powers, I restrict my observations to those in coalition parties to provide a more meaningful and less biased test of whether PM cabinet powers influences the relationship between policy termination and the vote shares of prime ministers' parties. I construct the same models as those in Model 4 of Table 1, but interact *PM Cabinet Powers* with *Policy Termination* and *Junior Partner* to create the triple interaction variable, so as to separate the potentially divergent effects on prime ministers' parties versus their coalition partners. I also interact *PM Cabinet Powers* with *Non-Policy Termination* to test whether or not prime ministers' parties with wide-ranging cabinet powers are more severely punished for being responsible for a non-policy conflict termination than those with weaker PM cabinet powers.

The results are displayed in Table J1. The coefficient for *Non-Policy Termination* is now negative and statistically insignificant. However, since the minimum value of *PM Cabinet Powers* is 1, the coefficient for *Non-Policy Termination* is substantively meaningless. The coefficient for *Non-Policy Termination*PM Cabinet Powers* is positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that the prime minister's party's cabinet powers do not moderate the negative relationship between non-policy termination and the vote share changes of the prime minister's party. Indeed, the marginal effects plot in Figure J1 shows that non-policy conflict termination reduces the vote share of the responsible prime minister's party by about

7 percentage points, regardless of its PM cabinet powers. In contrast, this type of termination does not affect junior partners' vote shares, regardless of the degree of cabinet powers wielded by the prime minister's party.

The coefficient for *Policy Termination* is positive and statistically significant. However, since there are no observations in which the value for *PM Cabinet Powers* is 0, the variable's coefficient is substantively meaningless. More importantly, the coefficient for *Policy Termination*PM Cabinet Powers* is negative and statistically significant. The marginal effects plot in Figure J2 illustrates a negative slope for the marginal effects for prime ministers' parties (solid line). As the degree of PM cabinet powers increases, the effect of responsibility of policy termination on prime ministers' parties becomes more negative. However, note that despite the trend, in no degree of PM cabinet powers do we observe a statistically significant electoral impact of policy termination on prime ministers' parties. This suggests that PM cabinet powers do not moderate the relationship between responsibility of policy termination and prime ministers' parties' electoral performances.

Meanwhile, the coefficients for *Policy Termination*Junior Partner* and *Policy Termination*Junior Partner*PM Cabinet Powers* are both positive but statistically insignificant. The same marginal effect plot illustrates that for the responsible junior partners, the electoral impact of Policy Termination remains positive and statistically significant for all values of *PM Cabinet Powers* except 7. When the prime minister's party possesses the greatest degree of cabinet powers, policy termination no longer affects junior partners' vote shares. In any case, the alternative explanation stipulates that as the prime minister possesses more cabinet powers, the likelihood of electoral punishment on the prime minister's party becomes greater. Following this logic,policy terminations occurring under greater PM cabinet powers

would have been even more electorally beneficial for junior partners, as, given the prime minister's power, voters would perceive the latter party as more likely to have their hands tied during a conflict. All in all, the results do not support the alternative explanation that the null electoral impact of policy termination on prime ministers' parties, and the positive electoral effect on junior partners, are endogenous to the power distribution within a coalition cabinet.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Non-Policy Termination	-3.60*	-7.36	-7.29	-7.52	-7.36	-7.43
	(1.13)	(4.11)	(4.11)	(4.12)	(4.10)	(4.09)
Non-Policy Termination*		10.21	10.05	10.26	10.49	10.36
Junior Partner		(5.77)	(5.76)	(5.76)	(5.76)	(5.74)
Non-Policy Termination*		0.26	0.25	0.31	0.29	0.32
PM Cabinet Powers		(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.85)
Non-Policy Termination*Junior Partner*		-0.48	-0.42	-0.49	-0.58	-0.53
PM Cabinet Powers		(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.24)
Policy Termination	0.46	2.71*	2.74*	2.71*	2.96*	2.98*
	(0.56)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.29)
Policy Termination*		0.79	0.84	0.86	0.61	0.71
Junior Partner		(2.06)	(2.05)	(2.06)	(2.05)	(2.04)
Policy Termination*		**-0.72***	**-0.71***	**-0.71***	**-0.78***	**-0.76***
PM Cabinet Powers		**(0.33)**	**(0.33)**	**(0.33)**	**(0.33)**	**(0.33)**
Policy Termination*Junior Partner*		0.78	0.77	0.76	0.80	0.78
PM Cabinet Powers		(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Junior Partner*		-0.27	-0.26	-0.26	-0.30	-0.29
PM Cabinet Powers		(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Termination Not Responsible	1.03	3.51*	3.57*	3.56*	3.61*	3.72*
	(0.73)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.10)
Junior Partner	0.37	-1.78	-1.80	-1.80	-1.59	-1.62
	(0.58)	(1.49)	(1.49)	(1.50)	(1.49)	(1.48)
Party Vote Share Change t-1	-0.27*	-0.26*	-0.25*	-0.26*	-0.26*	-0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
PM Cabinet Powers	-0.04	0.13	0.10	0.10	0.17	0.12
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)

Table J1a: Moderating impact of PM cabinet powers. Main explanatory variables only. # obs: 498. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority			0.67			0.73
			(0.47)			(0.49)
Strong PM Dissolution Power				0.48		0.19
				(0.50)		(0.51)
Strong Govt Dissolution Power				-0.07		-0.10
				(0.39)		(0.39)
Per Capita GDP Growth					0.15*	0.16*
					(0.06)	(0.06)
Change in Extremism					0.007	0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Intercept	-1.67*	-2.29*	-2.38*	-2.30*	-2.85*	-2.92*
	(0.47)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.68)
Log Likelihood	-1422	-1414	-1413	-1413	-1410	-1409
Variance, Election Date/PM Party	0	0.31	0.25	0.28	0.09	0.07
Variance, Country	0	0	0	0	0	0
Variance, Residuals	17.69*	16.81*	16.79*	16.81*	16.80*	16.72*
AIC	2864	2861	2861	2865	2859	2862
BIC	2906	2933	2937	2945	2939	2947

Table J1b: Moderating impact of PM cabinet powers. Control variables only. # obs: 498. The dependent variable is *Party Vote Share Change*. $*$ denotes $p < 0.05$.



Figure J1. Marginal effects plot of the moderating impact of PM cabinet powers on the relationship between non-policy conflict termination and the responsible coalition parties' electoral performances, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 6 of Table J1. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.



Figure J2. Marginal effects plot of the moderating impact of PM cabinet powers on the relationship between policy termination and the responsible coalition parties' electoral performances, by prime minister's party status. The plot is based on results from Model 6 of Table J1. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.