Supplementary Material

Outsourcing Machines: How Programmatic Parties Include Clientelistic Strategies

Gonzalo Contreras Aguirre

1. Context and additional information for case selection strategy

Research on comparative politics does not offer a compelling explanation of the circumstances under which parties use a hybrid linkage strategy to connect with voters at the municipal level.[1] Prevailing theories, which focus exclusively on district-level variation, assert that diversification is a function of the socioeconomic backgrounds of voters (Magaloni et al., 2007). This is a plausible explanation for parties that are compelled to segment electorates at the national level in order to appeal to a broader share of the electorate (Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014; Calvo and Murillo, 2019). However, these frameworks fail to explain party-voter strategies at the local level, where multiple linkages are routinely observed.

I identify four shortcomings in this literature. First, it neglects the role of the demand side in explaining party strategies. While acknowledging the crucial role of elites in formulating electoral strategies at headquarters to connect with voters, scholarship has shown that voters also play an active role in demanding targeted distribution (Nichter, 2018; Johannessen, 2019; Borges, 2023; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023). Second, diversification models have overlooked the significance of voters' organizational capacity. Recent studies have demonstrated this variable to be as relevant as class in explaining clientelism (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Palmer-Rubin, 2022; Cooperman, 2023). Third, conventional accounts suggest that diversification is primarily driven by factors such as class, territory, and electoral competition. I argue that this is an incomplete explanation. Party-voter linkages vary within municipal/district territories, where electoral dynamics are constant and the socioeconomic backgrounds of voters exhibit lower levels of variation. Lastly, these accounts predominantly focus on cross-national or cross-district variation, neglecting the examination of *hybrid linkages* at the subnational level, where programmatic policies and targeted distribution are simultaneously observed.

Under what circumstances local politicians use multiple strategies to link with voters, relying on a hybrid linkage strategy? I address this puzzle in programmatic local settings. To empirically generate theory and test alternative accounts, I draw on evidence from Chile, a polity where parties are structured predominantly around programmatic guidelines. Chilean parties are structured through ideological brands distinguishable from each other. (Kitschelt et al., 2010; Mainwaring, 2018). Recent surveys give empirical credit to this argument.

1 Kitschelt (2000:854) refers directly to this question: "Why might clientelism and programmatic linkages be hard to combine?". He posits: […] "For one thing, programmatic focal points that permit solutions to social choice problems in existing democracies are typically grounded in universalistic principles that militate against particularistic, informal practices of resource allocation […] For another thing, once politicians have secured their political office through clientelist exchanges, they may have expended their resources and/or lost their incentives to address the challenge of the collective choice problem. Consequently, empirical research should find a negative association between clientelist linkage building and programmatic cohesion inside parties." Similar argument may be found in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (eds. 2007) and Kitschelt and Singer (2011).

Figure A.1. Programmatic linkages score in Latin American countries



Figure A.1 presents a box plot illustrating the mean programmatic scores in Latin American countries. The PREPPS questionnaire assesses various dimensions of linkage mechanisms and party organizations, including social policies, redistribution, the left-right dimension, privatization, among others. It reveals that, according to surveyed experts, the Chilean party system is the second most programmatic in the region after Uruguay's.[2] Along similar lines, The Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) surveyed experts from 95 democracies around the world.[3] The dataset includes questions about the organization of political parties; linkage mechanisms; organizational efforts; local intermediaries; and party policy positions. A subset of Latin American countries linkages classification shows very similar patterns than PREPPS. The last version of 2014 reports that Chile has an average programmatic linkages score of 3.07 (where 1 = Not at all; and 4 = To a great extent[4]) higher than the regional mean of 2.97. In sum, survey data show that Chile represents a case where parties are predominantly programmatic. This is consistent with what scholarship on Latin American party systems has showed after the third wave of democratization (Kitschelt et al., 2010; Mainwaring; 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006).

Indeed, in Chile there are no parties that display the characteristic of party machines as Peronism (Argentina) or PRI in Mexico.[5] Nevertheless, Chilean scholars have shown that programmatic ties are not as strong as they used to be (Luna and Altman, 2011). Clientelistic dynamics are in fact routinely observed at the municipal level (Barozet, 2003; Arriagada, 2013; Pérez, 2020; Espinoza and Madrid, 2010; Álvarez, 2016). Moreover, other Chilean experts have pointed out the exchange of influence, favours, and biased distribution of central government resources to partisan mayors,

[2] The data used to create Figure A.1 is the same as that used for the regional programmatic score map (Figure 2) presented in the main document.

[3] Information and further details about the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project are available on https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/

[4] The question about programmatic linkages is the following: "Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party's positions on policy issues". DALP survey, 2014.

[5] The exception is the UDI, where party elites designed a top-down strategy to reach out to low-income constituencies (Luna, 2014; Loxton, 2016; Barozet, 2003).

crafting a brokerage network between local politicians and the central government (Valenzuela, 1977; Corvalán et al. 2018; Luna and Mardones, 2017).

Summing up, drawing on expert surveys data about party-voters linkages made available by PREPPS and DALP, parties in Chile can be classified as predominantly programmatic relative other countries in the region. Ethnographic research, however, reports that clientelistic dynamics are still visible and displayed specially by municipal authorities. Chile is therefore a suitable case to explore *why* and *how* politicians from programmatic parties include clientelistic strategies in their political portfolio at the municipal level.

The study of the Chilean case has limitations and advantages. I identify three main limitations. Firstly, because my fieldwork was conducted only in three municipalities in urban Santiago, I cannot claim that the findings apply to rural contexts or to comunas with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Interestingly, Durston (2005: 27) points out that rural clientelism in Chile strongly depends on collective action and the capacity of community organizations to present individual demands to municipal authorities seeking to address them. Therefore, due to these potential similarities, further research is necessary to assess whether the causal mechanisms identified in my research hold true in rural contexts and in areas where ethnic populations are larger. Second, and related to the intrinsic limitations of qualitative inquiry, I do not claim representativeness (Small, 2009; Small and Calarco, 2022; Beach and Pedersen, 2019). Instead, the case sheds light on the bottom-up mechanism and the relevance of local associativity to explain hybrid linkages. Other methods should be used to gauge the magnitude and test the patterns uncovered in this article and the effects of claim-making in producing clientelism A third limitation is the external validity. As typical of case studies, the theorized mechanism is *empirically* restricted to how this process unfolds in Chile. However, the *theoretical* implications could be further explored in different contexts to determine its scope conditions.

On the other hand, Chile represents an opportunity to study hybrid political linkages. First, as highlighted above, Chilean parties are predominantly programmatic at the national level, yet municipal clientelism is observed regularly. A second advantage is that myriad local organizations are operative in all municipalities. Neighbourhood associations, for instance, are the basic form of territorial organization within comunas. These groups are, in fact, institutionalized as the vehicle to connect communities and political authorities – as outlined by Law 19.418 on neighbourhood associations. Additionally, other local associations are also operative, such as sports clubs, senior groups, cooperatives, and local unions. This variety of local groups offers an opportunity to evaluate whether the organizational features and the different roles of local groups are related to clientelism. Moreover, a third advantage in the case of Chile is related to data availability. In contrast to other settings where interviewing local leaders and politicians is often difficult and even risky, in Chile, contacting and interviewing local actors is a feasible task. This is important for contrasting the narratives of local leaders, politicians, and key municipal workers about the quid-pro-quo, which is crucial in qualitative projects. Importantly, this type of triangulation also reduces systematic measurement errors due to partial access to the informants (Beach and Pedersen, 2019; Gerson and Damaske, 2020).

Finally, I would like to briefly comment on the political process that Chile has undergone during my fieldwork. After experiencing an escalated crisis of representation since the 2000s (Luna, 2016), progressive declines in turnout rates (Contreras et al., 2016), and cultural changes (Somma et al., 2021), popular discontent turned into massive protests in 2019, triggering the most significant political and institutional crisis in Chile since the return of democracy. This is, in part, explained by the progressively weakening capacity of political parties to represent people's preferences and ideas since the inaugural democratic elections of 1989. Hence, when the social crisis unfolded, Chilean parties performed poorly in addressing the discontent of Chileans.

In the context of weakening party-voter linkages, it is reasonable to think that politicians turned to non-programmatic electoral strategies to mobilize voters. Although this analysis is not the focus of the article, I believe that a historical account would illuminate how the crisis of representation contributes to understanding the shift from a strong programmatic setting (Mainwaring, 2018; Kitschelt et al., 2010) to a political landscape where politicians routinely employ both programmatic and clientelistic appeals for electoral competition.

The social crisis of 2019 might have significant implications for party-voter linkages. Nevertheless, the impetus behind claim-making by local groups has been previously reported since the 2000s. Barozet (2003) shows that mayors use communitarian organizations at the municipal level as intermediaries for local redistribution. Similarly, Arriagada (2013) describes how local leaders have become crucial actors in connecting citizens with municipal authorities. This is evidence that even though the crisis could have impacted the linkages between parties and voters, the role of local groups in explaining clientelism predates the social and political unrest of 2019.

1.1. Case selection strategy of the municipalities

The first municipality selected to generate hypothesis, identify causes, and theorize about mechanism, was the comuna of Recoleta. The Mayor of this municipality is a national figure from the strong ideological Chilean Communist Party (PC). His Mayor, up to the date this document was written, has governed by three consecutive periods displaying a highly programmatic agenda in the territory. I conducted fieldwork in Recoleta to learn about the interaction of different actors. On the one side, I interviewed municipal officers such as key directives, municipal workers and councillors. On the other hand, following previous findings (Arriagada, 2013; Barozet, 2003), I contacted leaders of local associations – e.g. neighbourhood associations, local unions, sports clubs, senior clubs – to understand the logic of the local interaction between local politicians and organized local groups. As Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) and Palmer-Rubin (2022) suggest, civil society groups are crucial to explain the dynamics of clientelism in developing countries.

The PC ideological portfolio in Recoleta is vast. In October 2015 the municipal authorities inaugurated the first *popular pharmacy*. This was the flagship policy of the administration. The mayor, when presenting this initiative, declared: "In Chile, unfortunately, health and medicines are still a business. The pharmaceutical industry for years was deceiving us with high prices for medicines that we must pay monthly [...]."[6] In the four years following the inauguration of the municipal pharmacy, 80 municipalities throughout Chile replicated the initiative.[7] Due to the success of this local policy, the municipality implemented a series of other progressive schemes. Since 2015 local authorities opened an optician, a bookstore called Recoletras, the municipal record store RecoMúsica, the Open University of Recoleta, and even a public real estate company. Through these programmes, the municipality of Recoleta increased its intervention in the local market of goods and services.

Since socioeconomic conditions of voters is a crucial factor identified by conventional accounts to explain hybrid linkages, I decided to select two additional municipalities with different socioeconomic features. By doing so, I evaluate whether the findings in the case of Recoleta operate under different contextual conditions (Beach and Pedersen, 2019). Importantly, this design

[6] Statement pronounced by the Mayor during the inauguration of the first *popular drugstore* in Recoleta. Available on the website: https://www.recoleta.cl/farmacia-popular/.

[7] Chilean Association of Popular Drugstores (Asociación Chilena de Farmacias Populares). Information provided on May 12, 2019.

allows me to evaluate alternative theories that predict different linkages according to the class of voters. In order to maximize variation, I also selected municipalities governed by different parties.

The case selection of two additional cases followed a *diverse-case* strategy (Gerring, 2017). I chose these settings based on different characteristics in terms of socioeconomic and political dimensions. The socioeconomic variable was determined using the municipal poverty index,[8] which I recoded into three levels: high, medium, and low average poverty.[9] The political dimension was classified based on the Mayor's party coalition, categorized into the two main historical Chilean coalitions: Nueva Mayoría (centre-left), Chile Vamos (right-wing), and Mayors with no political affiliation (independents). As a result, both variables have three values, leading to the classification of the 41 municipalities in the sample into nine groups.[10] The resulting classification is presented in Table A.1.

Table A.1. Socioeconomic classification and mayor's party of the municipalities in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile.

		Mayors' political coalition		
		Nueva Mayoría	***Chile Vamos***	***Independent***
Index of Poverty	*High*	La Pintana (PDC) El Bosque (PS) Independencia (PS) Pudahuel (PS) Cerro Navia (IND) Recoleta (PC) La Cisterna (PPD) Cerrillos (PS) Lo Espejo (PPD)	San Bernardo (UDI) Buin (UDI) Puente Alto (RN)	Macul Conchalí
	Medium	Lo Prado (PPD) Huechuraba (PPD) San Joaquín (PPD) Peñaflor (PDC) La Granja (PDC) San Ramón (PS) Peñalolén (PDC) Quinta Normal (PDC) Renca (PDC) Talagante (PS)	Colina (UDI) Estación Central (UDI) Melipilla (RN) San Miguel (RN) La Florida (IND) Paine (RN) Santiago (RN) Lampa (RN) Lo Barnechea (UDI) Maipú (IND)	Pedro Aguirre Cerda Quilicura
	Low		La Reina (UDI) Ñuñoa (IND) Providencia (UDI) Las Condes (UDI) Vitacura (RN)	

Note: Index of poverty obtained from the National Socioeconomic Survey (CASEN) 2017. Mayors' political coalition provided by the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL). In parenthesis, the Mayor's party. PDC=Christian Democratic Party; PS=Socialist Party; PPD=Party for Democracy; PC=Communist Party; UDI=Democratic Union Independent; RN=National Renovation.

A typology of municipalities is useful for distinguishing different contextual conditions at the municipal level. Since prevailing theories are class-based, I selected cases to purposefully control

[8] Index of poverty was obtained from the National Socioeconomic Survey (CASEN) 2017. Data recovered from the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM, in Spanish). Available on http://www.sinim.cl/.

[9] I decided to classify socioeconomic status of the Municipalities according to the level of municipal poverty. To be sure, this index is highly correlated with similar indicators as average level of income. On the other hand, Mayors' political affiliation was grouped by coalition to reduce the potential categories in the typology.

[10] The 41 municipalities correspond to all the comunas of the Province of Santiago plus nine municipalities with more than 70.000 inhabitants in the Metropolitan Region, capital of Chile. The criteria to includes municipalities are size (large population) and urban conditions. Several authors report evidence that rural clientelism in Chile works in a very different manner than urban locations (see Durston, 2005).

for alternative theories *by design*. The goal, therefore, is testing whether the causal explanation identified in Recoleta travel to other contexts where Mayors represent different ideologies, and where voters face different socioeconomic conditions as alternative theories claim. Table A.1 shows that there are two cells without cases. Neither Nueva Mayoría nor independent candidates were elected in rich municipalities. In turn, the case of Recoleta belongs to the group of poor comunas governed by Nueva Mayoría, the leftist coalition of which the Communist Party is a member. I excluded municipalities where the Mayor is independent simply because they do not allow me to probe the implications of the Mayor's programmatic orientation.

Even though it would be ideal to select cases from each cluster (Gerring, 2017; and George and Bennett, 2005), this is not feasible due to the intensive nature of the fieldwork required for this project (Small and Calarco, 2022). Consequently, I chose La Pintana, the poorest comuna in Santiago, which is governed by a Christian Democratic mayor (PDC), also considered a programmatic party according to the PREPPS survey. The third municipality is La Florida, a middle-income comuna governed by a mayor elected as a candidate from the right-wing elite party UDI. Figure A.3. lays out the location of the three municipalities in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile.

Figure A.2. Municipal case selection. Metropolitan Region, Chile.



While diversification theories would predict clientelism in La Pintana due to its levels of poverty, it would be surprising to find similar mechanisms triggering clientelism in La Florida.[11] However, the evidence presented throughout this article demonstrates that clientelism is at least partially driven by a bottom-up mechanism present in all municipalities, regardless of their average socioeconomic conditions. Furthermore, by collecting within-case evidence, I have shown variation in the types of linkages driven by the different organizational capacities of local groups, which is an omitted variable in existing frameworks. Remarkably, multiple linkage strategies are observed in municipalities with fairly homogeneous socioeconomic conditions (Candia et al.,

[11] Segmentation theories would predict *exclusively* top-down strategies undertook by UDI party elites.

2021), which lends credibility to the argument that heterogeneous demands, beyond class alone, can plausibly cause hybridity at the subnational level. This evidence undermines theories that exclusively explain hybrid linkages as a top-down party strategy crafted by party elites.

1.2. Selecting cases with variation in class and political characteristics

Selecting cases that offer variation in socioeconomic and political characteristics serves three purposes. First, to control for alternative hypotheses *by design*. Finding evidence that despite different socioeconomic contexts, a hybrid portfolio is still observable would increase the plausibility of my theory over alternative explanations. Second, I aim to overcome potential endogeneity problems. Since reverse causality is plausible (i.e., parties display clientelistic strategies that produce demand for municipal resources), I test my theory in settings where alternative explanations do not expect municipal politicians to distribute resources in exchange for political support (La Florida). By transforming the endogeneity problem into a potential omitted variable problem (King et al., 1994: 193), I provide some evidence that demands from organized local groups may play a causal role. Finally, testing the evidence in municipalities with different features contributes to increasing the generalizability of the argument.. The presence of the *bottom-up* mechanism under various contextual conditions – not only in poor municipalities but also in affluent ones and in municipalities governed by different parties – would give credibility to the crucial role of neighbourhood associations. Before turning to explain the data collection strategy, I will briefly show part of the policy offer deployed by La Pintana and La Florida Mayors.

a. Programmatic portfolio of La Pintana

Currently, La Pintana's Mayor is a party member from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). According to PREPPS expert survey, PDC's programmatic linkage score is 3.18 (considerably higher than the region mean, 2.88). Although the party used to have a strong historical roots and successful electoral past since foundation, the last decades has seen a continuous erosion of its electoral support. Thus, it is not surprising that party members at the municipal level include clientelism in their electoral repertoire.

Even though clientelistic dynamics reported in this research are a common practice, local authorities still display a clear programmatic portfolio. I draw on reports from the 'Municipal Development Plan 2020-2023' as evidence of the policy offer deployed in La Pintana. The document reports an implementation of policy-based programs in several areas, such as economic development, employment, health, and educational services, to name just a few. Concretely, Table A.2 displays ten guidelines included as part of the Mayor's programmatic offer.

Table A.2. Excerpt of the policy-based offer in La Pintana, 2020-2023.

Strategic Guidelines	Number of Initiatives	Example of Initiatives
Local plan and Urban Planification	26	Construction of La Pintana park; Construction of a community centre for public and private services; Construction of a municipal multi-sports centre.
Connectivity	20	Repair of roads in the four sectors of the municipal territory.
Public Security	25	Plans to reduce gender-based violence; drugs and alcohol dependency; implementation of video cameras in the four sectors of La Pintana.
Education and People Development	17	Maintenance and conservation program for educational buildings; acquisition of technological equipment for schools.
Health Services Access and Life Quality	17	Promote community popular pharmacy; Construction of medical centres in the north sector of La Pintana; Construction of a Mental Health Centre in the south sector.
Citizen Participation, Sports, Culture	22	Municipal program to promote sports and physical activities; Promote athletes grants; Expansion of La Pintana's Cultural Centre.
Environmental Management	27	Implementation of several programs to promote: Responsible Pet Ownership; recycling; composting.
Human Development	47	Municipal training programs for the elderly; improvement of the municipal ethnic centre; Introduction of gender perspective approaches in the municipal programmatic offer; Development of a municipal fund of youth initiatives.
Economic Development and Associativity	17	Program of technical assistance for support for local cooperatives.
Institutional Modernization	17	Program of modernization of the municipal archives; implement a program to measure the quality of municipal services.

Source: Municipality of La Pintana. PLADECO report. Available online on https://www.pintana.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IF%20PLADECO_2020_2023.pdf

b. Programmatic portfolio La Florida

La Florida is a middle-class *comuna* with one of the largest population in Santiago. The Mayor was elected as a member of Independent Democratic Union (UDI), a right-wing conservative party. The UDI has a strong and distinguishable ideological position, scored in PREPPS with 3.54 in programmatic linkages (the regional party average is 2.88). It was forged during the Chilean dictatorship to provide organizational support to the authoritarian regime. As Loxton (2016) explains, the party endured –even becoming the most-voted party– due to authoritarian heritance. Resources such as territorial organization, cohesion, a clear party brand, a source of party finance, and clientelistic networks, contributes to explain why the UDI became a multiclass party.

The UDI's policy-offer converges with Chilean elite interests. To attract non-core voters from low and middle-income backgrounds, the party strategy is based on non-programmatic strategies (Luna, 2014). Several ethnographic studies support this claim (Barozet, 2003; Arriagada, 2013). Yet, La Florida is ranked in the last quartile of household average poverty in Santiago (8.04%), while the mean for Santiago is 9.52%, although with a large standard deviation of 2.93. Alternative frameworks do not predict clientelistic strategies in this setting since they are simply too expensive to afford quid-pro-quo with wealthy citizens (Magaloni et al. 2017). Other approaches would expect only strategies undertaken by party elites as a linkage strategy to court poor constituencies.

I contend that, even in a middle-class municipality such as La Florida, one can observe clientelistic relationships triggered by bottom-up interactions between local groups and municipal authorities. This evidence increases the plausibility of the argument that the demand-process is part of the explanation of clientelism in local settings. The policy offer deployed by the Mayor in La Florida might be tracked from the Communitarian Development Plan (PLADECO, in Spanish). In fair contrast to the more ideologically progressive programs of the other cases, in La Florida, the policy portfolio accentuates individual capacity, stimulates entrepreneurial ventures, and nurtures individual businesses. Table A.3 shows a summary of the main strategic dimensions, number of initiatives, and policies to illustrate policy-based programs implemented in La Florida.

Table A.3. Excerpt of the policy-based offer in La Florida

Strategic guidelines	Number of initiatives	Example of initiatives
Environment and Infrastructure	119	Construction of the municipal theatre; Acquisition of school buses; Improvement and repairing of public green areas (e.g., parks, squares) along the municipal territory; Construction of a temperate municipal pool for the elderly; Construction of Tobalaba park.
Sociodemographic, Cultural, Health, and Education	52	Adults learning programs; Promotion of older adults preferential health services; Program "Culture in your neighbourhood."
Economic Productivity	12	Creation of cluster strategy by business area; Promotion of local entrepreneurship, through fairs for entrepreneurs and/or permanent spaces to offer their products.
Municipal Management	15	Generate strategic alliances with other municipalities; Updating the Manual of Functions, Organisational Chart, and Internal Municipal Regulations; Create an IT security policy and internal communication policy.

Source: Municipality of La Florida. PLADECO report. Available online on www.laflorida.cl

2. Methodological details

This section details the methodological decisions and challenges of this research project. I explain how I entered the field, ethical consideration, positionality, data limitation, confidentiality and data protection, and the data collection process.

2.1. Entering the field

I started my fieldwork in the case of Recoleta. In a municipality like Recoleta, with strong ideological leanings and relatively similar socioeconomic conditions, it is not expected to observe parties engaging in quid-pro-quo. Thus, I chose it to conduct an iterative theory-building approach to identify causes and mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen, 2019; Fairfield and Charman, 2019). What explains the routinely observed clientelism in Recoleta, where people do not vary significantly along socioeconomic conditions? I theorized that class alone cannot explain the variation of multiple linkages present in the municipal territory.

I am very familiar with the sociodemographic features of Recoleta. I knew the main streets, public transportation routes, and both the more secure and insecure areas, as my high school was located there. I began by interviewing a local leader of one of the largest markets in the city, called *La Vega*. I was able to reach him through previous contacts with stall owners in the market. He was my first contact and the one who provided access to other local leaders. After this initial interview, I obtained the contacts of other union leaders. Simultaneously, I started reaching out to leaders of neighbourhood associations in different parts of Recoleta. I spoke with three local neighbourhood leaders—two from the north-side and one from the south area—who then gave me further contacts to continue the research in other areas and with different types of local associations (for instance, one leader introduced me to the president of communal sports clubs). All of this took place between December 2018 and early January 2019, during which I spent roughly 6 hours a day conducting interviews and attempting to contact more leaders. At the end of each interview, I also requested to be introduced to other local leaders.

Since then, I have been conducting interviews with leaders and members of sports clubs, neighbourhood associations, Seniors groups, and cooperatives throughout Recoleta. I returned to Recoleta in 2022 to interview some neighbourhood associations, but I focused especially on sports clubs and senior groups. The last stage of the field research took place between August 2022 and January 2023.

In 2021, after the COVID-19 pandemic emergency was partially under control in Chile, I began the second stage of fieldwork, this time in La Pintana and La Florida. For 8 months, I attended various venues to contact leaders of local associations, sports clubs, and seniors groups.

In La Pintana, I obtained contact information on neighbourhood groups covering the four sectors of the municipal territory. This information is available on La Pintana webpage. It is also available the geographic bounds of every group using geographical data (For access: https://geopintana-lapintana.hub.arcgis.com/pages/descargas). Because it is straightforward to track leaders' names and addresses, I opted to present all interview excerpts anonymously.

The strategy was to contact all the leaders of neighbourhood associations in La Pintana. To do so, I went to neighbourhood association venues to talk in-person with their leaders. After a couple of successful interviews, the local leaders provided me with the contact information of other leaders and introduced me to them. Once I obtained phone contacts, I sent them an instant message introducing myself, explaining the objectives of my research, and asking for their availability to have an interview. With those who agreed, we coordinated the most suitable date and time for the interviews to take place. I conducted interviews in 46 out of 76 neighbourhood associations, which represents a rate of participation of 62.2%.

I employed a similar strategy in La Florida. Some early contacts helped me to get in touch with local association leaders. Once the contact and interviews were arranged, we usually met up at the group's venue. In the case of La Florida, I also conducted some interviews remotely (7). Although this was an exception due to the pandemic restrictions in Chile, the interviews followed the same protocol as those conducted in-person. I could not identify any significant differences compared to the interviews carried out in person.

2.2. Ethical considerations

The research project was approved by the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. I documented in detail how I planned to obtain participants' consent, evaluate personal risks, guarantee the physical and psychological safety of participants, as well as identify the potential ethical issues that my research entailed. Beyond the formal ethical evaluation from my institution, I worked hard to address potential issues related to participants' privacy and safety. Since my research involved asking participants about sensitive topics such as clientelism, I took precautions to avoid any negative consequences for them (I discuss this in the confidentiality section below). For instance, I only shared information obtained in interviews when it would not entail any potential risk for participants. All these ethical considerations meet the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research.[12]

Importantly, the second stage of my fieldwork was interrupted due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2021, when my field research began, Chile's sanitary situation was relatively normal. Until late mid-March, I was able to conduct face-to-face interviews. Later, as restrictions increased and quarantine was imposed by Chilean authorities, I conducted interviews through phone calls and video calls. I communicated to the authorities of my institution about the additional ethical considerations that my fieldwork entails in the pandemic context. For example, to conduct face-to-face interviews, I followed the guidelines of the Chilean Ministry of Health. I ensured an appropriate distance, met up in open spaces, and used face masks. When these conditions were not possible to meet, I carried out the interviews remotely. Overall, despite my field research facing a very challenging situation, I can responsibly say that the data collection was carried out in accordance with the initial plans outlined in the research design.

2.3. Positionality and self-awareness

Since I was born and raised in Santiago, Chile, I didn't face the problems other scholars often encounter during fieldwork, such as adjusting to the language, context, or history. On the positive side, this gave me a communicational advantage. As a Spanish native speaker, I am familiar with Chilean people's vocabulary, slang, and gestures, at least in Santiago. Additionally, I have physical features that are quite common among the average male population in Chile – brown skin, black hair, Andean facial features, and brown eyes. I believe this aspect was relevant in approaching some local groups that might have otherwise had reservations. Therefore, I had no issues introducing myself and explaining – as simply as possible – the purpose of the interview. In general, I found that participants understood the questions and the subject of conversation very well.

I also studied the history of the municipalities included in the study. For instance, I examined the displacement of hundreds of families from different parts of Santiago to create what is now known as La Pintana (Guerra, 2009; Morales and Rojas, 1986; Alvarez and Cavieres, 2016). Additionally, I familiarized myself with the political experiences of some residents in Recoleta during the dictatorship repression. This contextual information allowed me to gain a clearer understanding of the residents, their organizations, and the demand-process mechanism.

[12] The guidelines are available on https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/diversity%20and%20inclusion%20prgms/Ethics/Final_Principles%20with%20Guidance%20with%20intro.pdf?ver=2020-04-20-211740-153

On the downside, being considered 'one of them' (an average *santiaguino*), not a foreigner, or expressing in-depth knowledge of the context, also has disadvantages. People could respond to the questions according to either my expectations – producing response bias – or in a way that is subjectively viewed as desirable – social desirability bias. Moreover, since the contacts were usually directed by other interviewees, they could put me in contact only with leaders who share similar opinions and experiences, also producing bias. I address both problems in the next section.

2.4. Data limitation

In qualitative studies, sources of reliability (non-systematic measurement error) and respondents' bias (systematic measurement error) indeed present serious challenges. I tackle these problems as follows: drawing on interviews from different geographical areas, across various municipalities from different parts of Santiago, non-politically related, and with dissimilar socioeconomic backgrounds, it is plausible to argue that the evidence is not systematically biased. For instance, finding the same pattern in the poorest comuna of La Pintana as well as the more affluent La Florida would lend credibility to the hypothesis that demands by organized groups are not the result of cherry-picking or partial access to the empirical record. Furthermore, even if systematic bias is produced due to case selection, one might reasonably state that the bias would underestimate the potential causal relationship.

Regarding reliability, I assume that people have little incentives to declare that they are part of quid-pro-quo. It is, in fact, unlikely that municipal authorities would recognize that they rely on clientelistic strategies. Likewise, local leaders have few incentives to declare that they received benefits contingent on political favours. A triangulation strategy to learn from multiple sources, collecting data from different places and diverse actors, increases confidence in the argument that at least part of the explanation of hybridity is due to the local dynamics reported in this research.

Regarding desirability bias, quantitative scholars usually address this challenge by using list experiments in surveys (Imai, 2011; Thomas, 2024). Scholarship in clientelism, such as González-Ocantos et al. (2012) and Oliveros (2016), has exemplarily employed this method to reduce the underestimation of vote buying and patronage in Latin American countries. Yet qualitative research, particularly interview-based designs, offers other tools to mitigate this sort of bias. Small and Cook (2023) assert that, to reduce *deception*, scholars may triangulate interview data with ethnographic observations. This approach implies not only trusting what interviewees say but also corroborating their statements with observations of their actions. In the empirical section of the article, I frequently integrate interview excerpts with observational data collected during my ethnographic work. For instance, the quotes from neighbourhood association leaders declaring that they turn to municipal offices to demand resources are also supported by observational data of local leaders approaching the municipal offices. Thus, the intertwined use of interview material and field notes increases the plausibility of identifying contradictory narratives.

A second strategy I employed during fieldwork was to ask sensitive questions several times throughout the interview, using alternative question-wording (Gerson and Damaske, 2020; Small and Cook, 2023). The assumption is that as the interview unfolds, rapport increases, making it more likely to detect discrepancies in the narrative and to obtain sincere answers. For example, in my set of interview questions with local leaders, I initially inquire about their relationship with municipal officers and politicians. Later, I revisit the same topic and inquire whether politicians "request anything in exchange for the resources and favours they provide."

Another way to address social desirability bias is by identifying the *direction* of the potential bias (King et al., 1994). As scholarship has shown, for sensitive topics, interviewees tend to underreport clientelistic exchanges (González-Ocantos et al., 2012). As mentioned above, local leaders and politicians have few incentives to admit their involvement in clientelistic exchanges. This means that the evidence collected probably *underestimates* the clientelism at Chilean municipal level.

2.5. Confidentiality and data protection

The interviews lasted, on average, 90 minutes. Naturally, as is typical when using interviews as a data collection strategy, some interviews extended for hours, while others were more brief. For instance, when local leaders invited me to group activities, I spent hours engaging with them, discussing their experiences, demands, and ideas for addressing neighbours' issues. On the other hand, some respondents were very concise in their answers to my questions.

I ensured full confidentiality regarding the identity of the participants. Anonymity was a critical aspect of my research for two reasons. First, local associations in Chile are easily traceable, and in some cases, the leaders' contacts are available online. Second, in research projects where participants are exposed to sensitive questions or asked to discuss difficult experiences, anonymity fosters a sense of comfort and security, reducing potential reprisals from those involved in the conversation. It also helps mitigate the influence of the social desirability bias, a major challenge reported in previous studies on clientelism (González-Ocantos et al., 2012).

The majority of participants preferred not to be recorded, but all of them allowed me to take notes of the conversations. One individual decided to withdraw from the study, and another one asked me expressly not to report their answer to one of the questions. The interviews were conducted in the locations that participants considered appropriate. In the case of political authorities and key actors of the local government, I conducted the interviews usually in municipal buildings. In the case of the president of the neighbourhood associations and social organizations, the interviews were conducted in their group's venues, houses, or at a public space.

Regarding the management of personal data, I followed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the ethical guidelines of the University of Oxford. I used a small notebook (passport size) to write down field notes and participants' answers. I did not use a recorder to increase the rate of interview acceptance. After the interviews, I transferred and stored the material and field notes in my personal encrypted and password-protected Nexus 365 OneDrive account. The information provided in the article was used with the explicit consent of the participants (I used a consent form template from the DPIR, University of Oxford). The interview material (notes, transcriptions) was confidential, and only the author has access to it.

2.6. Data collection

This is a research project aimed at generating an explanation for why and how parties diversify linkage strategies at the local level. The project was not designed to find variations in correlational terms, as other studies do. Rather, I was intrigued by the micro dynamics that make sense for parties and citizens to engage in quid-pro-quo. Moreover, I was interested in identifying the crucial actors, their actions, and how the supply and demand-side reach an equilibrium where clientelism is favourable for the actors involved. Particularly, I was attentive to observing how voters approach politicians, an often overlooked perspective in diversification theories.

There was no available data to conduct the sort of research questions I was interested. In fact, the empirical study of linkages has usually been explored through cross-national surveys (such as DALP, PREPPS, V-DEM) and by evaluating cross-district evidence in case studies (e.g., Mexico, Chile, Japan, Turkey, to name a few). Hence, since my research was focused on a relatively unexplained social phenomenon, I decided to engage in an in-depth study using interviews with components of participant observation. I aimed to uncover unattended causes and potential mechanisms that might explain the outcomes (Gerson and Damaske, 2020; Small and Calarco, 2022). My research, in fact, focused on the process and the concrete motivations of the actors involved.

The use of some alternative research designs (e.g., surveys and experimental methods) requires a clear definition of the theoretical implications (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; King et al., 1994). However, for this research project, conventional models did not account for the phenomenon I explored. As a result, an in-depth qualitative design with a high degree of exposure was more appropriate to identify omitted variables as a first stage of inquiry (Gerson and Damaske, 2020; Small and Calarco, 2022). Interview-based research permits generating in-depth empirical insights that other methods simply cannot (Gerson and Damaske, 2020; Lareau, 2021). In sum, a theory-building approach allowed me to identify both causes and to theorize (and evaluate) the causal process (Beach and Pederson, 2019; Waldner, 2015), which was the primary goal of my project.

2.7. Exposition in the fieldwork

I conducted fieldwork in three stages. The first stage took place from December 2, 2018, to January 10, 2019. During this initial round, I interviewed 16 participants, including presidents of neighbourhood associations (7), presidents of three of the most important unions in Recoleta (3), councillors (2), key actors of the municipality (2), and presidents of social organizations (2). The interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes. While the respondents preferred not to be recorded, they all allowed me to take notes of the conversations.

The data collected, including quotes and other meta-data (e.g., expressions and reactions during the interviews), was recorded in my personal laptop. All the interviews were conducted in locations that respondents considered appropriate. For councillors and key actors of the local government, as said above, I conducted the interviews in the municipal building. In the case of the leaders of neighbourhood associations and social organizations, the interviews were conducted mainly at groups' venues.

I travelled to Chile for a second round of fieldwork between December 18, 2020, and April 18, 2021. This stage was particularly challenging due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In the first few months of my stay, the health situation was relatively normal, and I was able to conduct face-to-face interviews (28) as planned. However, in late mid-March, as personal restrictions increased and the Chilean authorities imposed quarantine measures, I had to adapt and conduct interviews via videocalls (15) and telephone (7) instead of face-to-face.

I conducted the final stage of the field research between August 2022 and January 2023. During this phase, I conducted 31 interviews in the three municipalities that were part of the study. By this point, I had already identified heterogeneity of linkages according to groups' organizational characteristics. Therefore, I focused my efforts on engaging with local leaders from sports clubs, seniors clubs, and cooperatives. In total, throughout the three stages from 2019 to 2022, I conducted a total of 96 interviews.

2.8. Interviews strategy

In the three municipalities that were part of this project, I began contacting leaders of different types of local associations. In some cases, it was easier to obtain contacts as they were partially available on municipal websites. For example, in the case of La Pintana, I used available information to visit different venues in various sectors and explained the interview plan to members of the local associations. I purposely made contact with local groups from different areas of the municipal territory to avoid systematic measurement problems (Gerson and Damaske, 2020), such as only interviewing leaders with the same perspective (see Figure A.4.). By collecting perceptions and motivations from a broader range of local leaders in diverse areas, I reduced systematic bias among participants (Beach and Pedersen, 2019).

Figure A.3. Access strategy in La Pintana to reduce systematic bias.



Source: Author's elaboration with geospatial data provided by the Municipality of La Pintana.

In Recoleta and La Florida, contact information of local groups was not available. In both comunas, I asked municipal workers for an updated list of active local groups. Unfortunately, this information was not provided before my fieldwork started. Consequently, in both cases, I opted to use a snowball strategy to approach neighbourhood associations, sports clubs, and cooperatives leaders. As many scholars have argued, this strategy is appropriate for investigating inaccessible populations that are otherwise difficult to identify or contact (see Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Gilbert, 2021). Just as I did in La Pintana, in order to interview unrelated participants, I started making contacts in different sectors (nodes) of Recoleta and La Florida. For instance, in Recoleta, I began by contacting union leaders and two neighbourhood group leaders in the north sector. They provided me with contacts to interview other leaders they knew (also from the north). Simultaneously, I contacted a Mother's club in the south of Recoleta. Their leaders kindly put me in contact with four neighbourhood association leaders and the president of a sports club. At the end of each interview, I asked participants for the contact information of other local leaders

2.9. Different type of participants

My research involves two main groups of participants. Firstly, I collected experiences, perceptions, and narratives from leaders of local associations. Given the multitude of groups in the local communities, my initial approach aimed to capture the broadest diversity of organizations. I sought to understand the heterogeneity of leaders' incentives to engage in clientelism. It became evident that neighbourhood associations have constant demands that they approach local authorities to address. In exchange for sorting out requirements, local politicians ask leaders to participate in electoral campaigning, utilizing the groups' vertically-integrated structure to provide electoral support. When incentives were mutually beneficial, clientelism was observed. On the other hand, some groups do not frequently demand targeted distribution. Consequently, they do not invest equally in organizational structure as neighbourhood groups do. With no constant flow of demands and no structure to offer, quid-pro-quo is less likely to be observed.[13]

In addition to local association leaders, my research also involved interviews with local authorities, key directors, party members, and municipal workers. To approach this group, my strategy was to coordinate interviews by directly reaching out to municipal buildings, party headquarters, and the Congress, and requesting meetings with authorities. While this approach was effective in a few instances, it was mostly successful in Recoleta. In the other municipalities, and when dealing with party elites, I relied on previous contacts to introduce myself to key directors, public workers, and party members.

2.10. Details of interviews

Interviewee	Date	Role	Modality	Municipality
1	05/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
2	07/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
3	07/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
4	09/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
5	10/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
6	10/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
7	13/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
8	14/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
9	15/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
10	15/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
11	17/12/2018	Local leader	face-to-face	Recoleta
12	19/12/2018	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	Recoleta
13	20/12/2018	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	Recoleta
14	05/01/2019	Adviser at Municipality	face-to-face	Recoleta
15	07/01/2019	Adviser at Municipality	face-to-face	Recoleta
16	01/02/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
17	10/02/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
18	11/02/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Pintana
19	16/02/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
20	16/02/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
21	16/02/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
22	26/02/2021	Adviser at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
23	26/02/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
24	02/03/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
25	03/03/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Pintana
26	04/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana

[13] To be sure, this does not imply that other sorts of non-programmatic distribution could be observed.

27	04/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
28	04/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
29	05/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
30	05/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
31	05/03/2021	Adviser at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
32	05/03/2021	Adviser at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
33	05/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
34	09/03/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
35	11/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
36	11/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
37	11/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
38	11/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
39	12/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
40	12/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
41	15/03/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Pintana
42	18/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
43	18/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
44	18/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
45	18/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
46	18/03/2021	Local leader	face-to-face	La Pintana
47	19/03/2021	Mayor	face-to-face	La Pintana
48	19/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
49	19/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	face-to-face	La Pintana
50	21/03/2021	Directive at Municipality	Videocall	La Pintana
51	24/03/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
52	24/03/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
53	24/03/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
54	25/03/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Pintana
55	29/03/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Pintana
56	06/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
57	13/04/2021	Councillor	Videocall	La Pintana
58	13/04/2021	Local leader	Phone Call	La Pintana
59	14/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
60	16/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
61	18/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
62	20/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
63	20/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
64	20/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Pintana
65	21/04/2021	Local leader	Videocall	La Florida
66	23/09/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
67	23/09/2022	Senator	Face-to-Face	National Congress
68	27/09/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
69	27/09/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Florida
70	04/10/2022	Party directive	Face-to-Face	Socialist Party
71	07/10/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
72	07/10/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
73	11/10/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
74	13/10/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
75	19/10/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
76	29/10/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
77	07/11/2022	Local leader	Call	La Pintana
78	07/11/2022	Local leader	Call	La Pintana
79	11/11/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
80	11/11/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
81	22/11/2022	Local leader	Call	La Pintana
82	22/11/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
83	22/11/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
84	22/11/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	La Pintana
85	03/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta

86	15/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
87	15/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
88	15/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
89	19/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
90	21/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
91	27/12/2022	Local leader	Call	Recoleta
92	28/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
93	28/12/2022	Local leader	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
94	05/01/2023	Party Elite	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
95	05/01/2023	Municipal Director	Face-to-Face	Recoleta
96	06/01/2023	Party Elite	Face-to-Face	Recoleta

Source: Author elaboration

3. Appendix References

Álvarez, A. and Cavieres, H. 2016. El Castillo: territorio, sociedad y subjetividades de la espera. *EURE* (Santiago), 42(125), 155-174. https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0250-71612016000100007.

Angrist, J. and J. Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion. Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1,

Arriagada, E. 2013. Clientelismo político y participación local. El rol de los dirigentes sociales en la articulación entre autoridades y ciudadanos en Santiago de Chile. *Polis. Revista Latinoamericana*, vol. 12 (36): 15-38.

Auerbach, A. and T. Thachil. 2023. Migrants and Machine Politics: How India's Urban Poor Seek Representation and Responsiveness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barozet, E. 2003. Movilización de recursos y redes sociales en los neopopulismos: Hipótesis de trabajo para el caso chileno. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 23(1).

Beach, D. and B. Pedersen. 2019. Process-Tracing Methods. Foundations and Guidelines. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Borges, M. 2023. Weapons of Clients: Why Do Voters Support Bad Patrons? Ethnographic Evidence from Rural Brazil. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 65(1): 22-46.

Calvo, E., and V. Murillo. 2019. Non-Policy Politics: Richer Voters, Poorer Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Corvalán. A. P. Cox., and R. Osorio. 2018. Indirect political budget cycles: Evidence from Chilean municipalities. *Journal of Development Economics* 133, pp. 1-14.

Contreras, G., A. Joignant, and M. Morales. 2016. The return of censitary suffrage? The effects of automatic voter registration and voluntary voting in Chile. *Democratization*, 23:3, 520-544.

Cooperman, A. 2023. Bloc Voting for Electoral Accountability. *American Political Science Review*. Published online 2023: 1-18.

Durston, J. 2005. El clientelismo político en el campo chileno (primera parte): la democratización cuestionada. En Ciencias Sociales Online, marzo de 2005, vol. II, No. 1 (1-30), Universidad de Viña del Mar, Chile.

Espinoza, V. and S. Madrid. 2010. Trayectoria y Eficacia Política de los Militantes en Juventudes Políticas. Estudio de la Élite Política Emergente. Santiago de Chile: CEP, Proyectamérica, LyD, CIEPLAN, IDEA, USACH.

Fairfield, T. and A. Charman. 2019. A Dialogue with the Data: The Bayesian Foundations of Iterative Research in Qualitative Social Science. Perspectives on Politics, Volume 17 , Issue 1 , March 2019 , pp. 154 – 167.

George, A. and A. Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gerring, J. 2017. Case Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gerson, K., and S. Damaske. 2020. Science and Art of Interviewing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
González-Ocantos, E., C. Kiewiet de Jonge, C. Meléndez, J. Osorio, and D. Nickerson. 2012. Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1): 202–217.
Guerra, C. 2009. La evaluación del proceso de descentralización en Santiago de Chile. América Latina Hoy, 6. https://doi.org/10.14201/alh.2222.
Holland, A., and B. Palmer-Rubin. 2015. Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America.". *Comparative Political Studies* 48(9): 1186–1223.
Imai, I. 2011. Multivariate Regression Analysis for the Item Count Technique. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 106: 494, 407-416.
Johannessen, P. 2020. Linkage Switches in Local Elections: Evidence From the Workers' Party in Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 53(1): 109-143.
King, G., R. Keohane, and S. Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press.
Kitschelt H. and S. Wilkinson. 2007. Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, H., K. Hawkins, J. P. Luna, G. Rosas and E. Zechmeister. 2010. Latin American Party Systems, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, H. and M. Singer. 2011. 'Do Everything' (DoE) Parties: When Can Politicians Combine Clientelistic and Programmatic Appeals. Paper Sketch prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies. Duke University. Durham, May 18-19, 2011.
Lareau, A. 2021. Listening to People: A Practical Guide to Interviewing, Participant Observation, Data Analysis, and Writing It All Up. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Loxton, J. 2016. Authoritarian successor parties and the new right in Latin America. In Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America, eds. Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck, and Jorge Domínguez, 245-272. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Luna, J., and D. Altman. 2011. Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization. *Latin American Politics and Society* 53(2): 1-28.
Luna, J. 2014. Segmented representation: Political party strategies in unequal democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Luna, J., and R. Mardones. 2017. La columna vertebral fracturada: revisitando intermediarios políticos en Chile. Santiago: RIL Editores.
Magaloni, B., A. Díaz-Cayeros, and F. Estévez. 2007. Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico. In H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, pp. 182-205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, S. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization. The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mainwaring, S. and M. Torcal. 2006. Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization». In R. S. Katz y W. Crotty (eds), pp. 204-227. Handbook of Party Politics. Londres, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Mainwaring, S. 2018. Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morales E., and S. Rojas. 1986. Relocalización socio espacial de la pobreza. Política estatal y presión popular, 1979-1985. (Documento de trabajo 280). Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).

Nichter, S. 2018. Votes for Survival. Relational Clientelism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oliveros, V. 2016. Making it Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina. Comparative Politics, 48(3): 373–391.
Palmer-Rubin, B. 2022. Evading the Patronage Trap: Interest Representation in Mexico. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Pérez, A. 2020. ¿Una democracia sin política? Municipios, alcaldes y mediadores políticos durante la transición (1992-2004). *Revista Notas Históricas y Geográficas* 24 (enero-junio), pp. 413-452.
Somma, N., M. Bargsted, R. Disi, and R. Medel. "No water in the oasis: the Chilean Spring of 2019–2020". *Social Movement Studies*, 20(4): 495-502.
Small, M. 2009. How many cases do I need?: On science and the logic of case selection in field-based research. *Ethnography*, 10(1), 5-38.
Small, M. and J. Calarco. 2022. Qualitative Literacy: A Guide to Evaluating Ethnographic and Interview. Oakland: University of California Press.
Small, M. and J. Cook. 2023. Using Interviews to Understand Why: Challenges and Strategies in the Study of Motivated Action. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 52(4): 1591-1631.
Thachil, T. 2014. Elite Parties, Poor Voters. How Social Services Win Votes in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas K. 2024. The Advent of Survey Experiments in Politics and International Relations. *Government and Opposition*. 59(1): 297-320.
Valenzuela, A. 1977. Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a centralized polity. Duke University Press.
Waldner, D. 2015. What makes process tracing good? Causal mechanisms, causal inference, and the completeness standard in comparative politics. In A. Bennet and J. Checkel (eds.), Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytical Tool, pp. 126-152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.