Appendix B: Additional Empirical Analysis

Predictive Performance at the Dyad and State Levels (Models 9 and 10)

Incorporating democratic reform periods into model specification increases out-of-sample predictive power of statistical estimation. This is also the case for inaugural negotiations (i.e. very first peace talks) between the belligerents. Figure 1 below demonstrates the out-of-sample performance of *Democratic Reform* for predicting inaugural negotiations at the state and dyad level based on fourfold cross-validation with 1000 cycle runs. Incorporating *Democratic Reform* into the specification increases the area under the receiver-operator curve (AUC), which indicates that *Democratic Reform* improves the predictive power of statistical analysis. Note that predicting inaugural negotiations is especially hard because the history of negotiations is a strong predictor of future negotiations. Therefore, improving predictive performance on this front is a significant achievement.



Figure 1: Out-of-sample fourfold cross-validation with 1000 cycle runs and the area under the receiver-operator-curve when Democratic Reform (t-1) is included/excluded from the specification

Controlling for Causes of Democratization

Based on Haggard & Kaufman (2016), additional controls are added to rule out omitted variable bias. These variables are:

- *Intervention of a democratic state:* Haggard & Kaufman (2016) argue that military interventions by a democratic state may lead to democratization. This variable is coded by using ACD and V-Dem. All external military interventions are considered, and a dichotomous variable is coded true if any of the intervenors is a democracy and false otherwise.
- *Oil production and other natural resources:* The literature proposes that natural resources (particularly oil production) may influence democratization processes (see Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). Natural resources may also influence conflict (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004). Data on oil production is taken from Haber & Menaldo (2011). Data on natural resources is taken from (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009).
- *Socioeconomic inequality:* Inequality is proposed as a factor influencing both prospects of democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005) and conflict processes (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). This variable is taken from V-Dem.
- *Non-violent protests:* Non-violent protests are associated with democratic reforms (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). They may also influence civil conflict processes. Data for non-violent protest is taken from (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019).
- *International sanctions:* Although there is no established relationship linking international sanctions to neither democratization nor conflict resolution, international sanctions are often used to influence regime type and to address human rights issues during civil conflicts (Morgan et al., 2013).

These additional controls aim to exhaust the list of observable variables cited in the literature (see Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). Controlling for these variables do not affect the main finding regarding the relationship between democratization and peace talks. Models are presented below. Finally, democratization is modelled as the dependent variable to uncover the correlates of democratic reform and to see whether negotiations predict democratization. The results indicate that negotiations do not predict democratization. Overall, empirical results are consistent with the theoretical framework; no single factor convincingly predicts democratization, but democratization predicts peace talks.

Table I: Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Polyarchy	2.84***	2.39***	1.79***	0.87
	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.53)	(1.48)
Democratic Reform (t-1)	1.29***	1.36***	1.37***	2.28***
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.52)
Duration	0.40***	0.38***	0.42***	0.59***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.13)
GDP pc ln	-0.14†	-0.06	-0.05	0.39
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.42)
Pop pc ln	-0.50***	-0.42***	-0.48***	0.18
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(1.14)
Minor Conflict	-0.45***	-0.42***	-1.80***	-2.11***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.43)	(0.59)
Major Conflict	-0.40*	-0.43*	-2.55***	-2.74**
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.68)	(0.89)
Rebel Strength		0.51*	0.17	
		(0.21)	(0.28)	
Executive Change		0.51***	0.73***	0.68**
		(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Foreign Aid		0.03	-0.10	0.01<
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Previous Mediation		0.48***	0.33*	0.61**
		(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Battle Deaths ln			0.32***	0.35**
			(0.08)	(0.12)
UN Personnel ln			0.07**	0.04
			(0.03)	(0.06)
Protest	-0.23	-0.35†	-0.42†	-0.16
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.40)
Social Inequality	-1.14**	-0.94**	-1.13*	-0.09
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.45)	(2.36)
Oil production	0.01†	0.01*	0.01<	
	(0.01<)	(0.01<)	(0.01<)	
Natural resources	0.23†	0.25†	0.45*	
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.20)	
Int. Sanctions	0.37**	0.35**	0.06	0.13
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.24)
AIC	2288.15	2258.69	1520.86	789.54
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Dyad Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
Cubic Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	2532	2532	1753	1753

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Table II: Additional Controls (Markov Transition & Inaugural)

	Negotiation Onset	Negotiation Continuation	Inaugural Negotiation
Polyarchy	2.69***	-0.13	2.08**
	(0.63)	(0.90)	(0.67)
Democratic Reform (t-1)	1.36***	1.06*	1.43***
	(0.40)	(0.51)	(0.41)
Duration ln	0.14	0.09	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.05)
GDP pc ln	-0.07	0.10	-0.31*
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Pop pc ln	-0.61***	-0.04	-0.57***
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Minor Conflict	0.18	-1.05***	0.20
	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Major Conflict	0.27	-1.14***	0.38
	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Rebel Strength	-0.06	0.62	0.98**
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.33)
Executive Change	0.66***	0.73*	0.54**
	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.21)
Foreign Aid	0.05	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Previous Mediation	0.30	0.43†	0.23
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Protest	0.12	-0.33	0.35
	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.32)
Social Inequality	-1.25*	-0.07	-1.52*
	(0.52)	(0.72)	(0.62)
Oil production	0.01†	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Natural resources	-0.01<	0.20	0.03
	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.23)
International Sanctions	0.22	0.54*	0.32
	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.21)
AIC	1120.12	639.78	950.36
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	1640	581	1477

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Table III: Modelling Democratic Reforms

	Democratization
Negotiation (t-1)	0.20
	(0.36)
Duration ln	-0.24
	(0.20)
GDP pc ln	-0.61*
	(0.29)
Pop pc ln	0.07
	(0.22)
Rebel Strength	-0.26
	(0.59)
Foreign Aid	0.11
	(0.20)
Previous Mediation	0.20
	(0.39)
Protest	2.05***
	(0.42)
Social Inequality	0.68
	(1.02)
Oil production	0.01<
	(0.01)
Natural resources	-0.38
	(0.46)
Int. Sanctions	0.10
	(0.40)
Middle East	-0.74
	(1.29)
Asia	1.11
	(0.99)
Africa	0.31
	(0.98)
Americas	2.56*
	(1.00)
AIC	344.79
Num. obs.	1049

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Alternative measurement 1

As an alternative measurement, three categorical data sources are used to further verify the results. These are the Lexical Index, the V-Dem Regimes of the World, and the Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions Dataset (hereafter GWF). The procedure is explained in the manuscript in detail. The V-Dem Regimes of the World variable (v2x_regime) has four categories: (0) Closed Anocracy; (1) Electoral Anocracy; (2) Electoral Democracy; (3) Liberal Democracy. A move from Closed Anocracy to Electoral Anocracy is considered as authoritarian liberalization whereas a shift from Closed or Electoral Anocracy to Electoral or Liberal Democracy is democratic transition. Overall, the main findings remain robust to this alternative measurement. Results are presented below.

Categorical Dataset Models 1: Negotiation

	Lexical	V-Dem	GWF
Autocratic Liberalization (t-1)	0.37*	0.69***	
	(0.17)	(0.17)	
Democratic Transition (t-1)	0.78***	0.74**	0.63***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.17)
Duration ln	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP pc ln	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Populationpc ln	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle East	-1.21***	-1.23***	-1.19***
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Asia	-0.36	-0.41†	-0.31
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Africa	-0.59*	-0.65**	-0.53*
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Americas	-0.63*	-0.80**	-0.64**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Time Since Last Neg.	-0.82***	-0.83***	-0.81***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Time Since Last Neg.^2	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time Since Last Neg.^3	-0.01<***	-0.01<***	-0.01<***
	(0.01<)	(0.01<)	(0.01<)
Minor Conflict	-0.51***	-0.51***	-0.51***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Major Conflict	-0.58***	-0.55***	-0.58***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
AIC	2577.36	2568.79	2565.86
Num. obs.	2787	2787	2778

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Categorical Dataset Models 2: Negotiation

	Lexical	V-Dem	GWF
Autocratic Liberalization (t-1)	0.39*	0.72***	
	(0.17)	(0.17)	
Democratic Transition (t-1)	0.68**	0.65**	0.62***
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.17)
Duration ln	0.33***	0.33***	0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP pc ln	0.08	0.07	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Populationpc ln	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.18***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle East	-1.11***	-1.12***	-1.09***
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Asia	-0.15	-0.18	-0.11
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Africa	-0.31	-0.35	-0.26
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Americas	-0.16	-0.28	-0.16
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Time Since Last Neg.	-0.74***	-0.75***	-0.73***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Time Since Last Neg.^2	0.05***	0.06***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time Since Last Neg.^3	-0.01<***	-0.01<***	-0.01<***
	(0.01<)	(0.01<)	(0.01<)
Minor Conflict	-0.46***	-0.46***	-0.45***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Major Conflict	-0.54***	-0.51**	-0.53***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Rebel Strength	0.69***	0.68***	0.68***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Ethnic	0.27*	0.35**	0.31*
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Previous Mediation	0.56***	0.55***	0.57***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
AIC	2533.75	2523.55	2520.52
Num. obs.	2785	2785	2776

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Categorical Dataset (Dyad Fixed-Effect): Negotiation

	Lexical	**V-Dem**	**GWF**
Autocratic Liberalization (t-1)	0.61*	0.46	
	(0.29)	(0.28)	
Democratic Transition (t-1)	0.79*	0.43	0.41
	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.29)
Duration ln	0.39***	0.41***	0.40***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
GDP pc ln	-0.25	-0.21	-0.22
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Population pc ln	2.25***	2.17***	2.11***
	(0.64)	(0.64)	(0.63)
Time Since Last Neg.	-0.47***	-0.47***	-0.47***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Time Since Last Neg.^2	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time Since Last Neg.^3	-0.01<***	-0.01<***	-0.01<***
	(0.01<)	(0.01<)	(0.01<)
Minor Conflict	-0.32†	-0.28†	-0.27
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Major Conflict	-0.12	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Previous Mediation	0.51**	0.52**	0.52**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
AIC	1339.81	1343.48	1341.45
Num. events	768	768	763
Num. obs.	2787	2787	2778

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Categorical Dataset (Markov Transition): Negotiation Onset

	Lexical	V-Dem	GWF
Autocratic Liberalization (t-1)	0.58*	0.71**	
	(0.24)	(0.25)	
Democratic Transition (t-1)	1.10**	0.56	0.69*
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.27)
Duration ln	0.02	0.04	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
GDP pc ln	0.16	0.15	0.14
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Population pc ln	-0.31***	-0.31***	-0.32***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Middle East	-1.13**	-1.14**	-1.13**
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Asia	0.29	0.34	0.37
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Africa	1.20**	1.19**	1.27**
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Americas	0.41	0.45	0.46
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.44)
Minor Conflict	0.08	0.06	0.08
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Major Conflict	0.09	0.12	0.06
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Rebel Strength	0.48	0.47	0.40
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Ethnic	0.42*	0.50**	0.44*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Previous Mediation	0.38*	0.42*	0.40*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
AIC	1249.55	1252.45	1251.33
Num. obs.	1799	1799	1797

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Categorical Dataset (Markov Transition): Negotiation Continuation

	Lexical	**V-Dem**	**GWF**
Autocratic Liberalization (t-1)	-0.31	0.19	
	(0.34)	(0.34)	
Democratic Transition (t-1)	0.15	-0.06	0.21
	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.33)
Duration ln	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01<
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
GDP pc ln	0.06	0.08	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Population pc ln	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Middle East	-1.07*	-1.09*	-1.00*
	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.50)
Asia	-0.16	-0.16	-0.08
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Africa	-0.61	-0.70	-0.60
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Americas	-0.25	-0.18	-0.15
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.52)
Minor Conflict	-0.86***	-0.90***	-0.89***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Major Conflict	-0.92**	-0.95**	-0.91**
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Rebel Strength	0.55†	0.60†	0.58†
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Ethnic	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01<
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Previous Mediation	0.47*	0.47*	0.48*
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
AIC	688.41	689.20	686.27
Num. obs.	624	624	622

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Categorical Dataset: Inaugural Negotiation

	Lexical	V-Dem	GWF
Autocratic Liberalization (t-1)	0.50*	0.70**	
	(0.25)	(0.26)	
Democratic Transition (t-1)	0.54	0.32	0.35
	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.31)
Duration ln	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
GDP pc ln	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Population pc ln	-0.27***	-0.27***	-0.28***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Middle East	-1.37***	-1.35***	-1.32**
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.42)
Asia	-0.88*	-0.85*	-0.81†
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.43)
Africa	-0.11	-0.13	-0.05
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.45)
Americas	-1.05*	-1.07*	-1.01*
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.51)
Minor Conflict	0.21	0.22	0.21
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Major Conflict	0.21	0.24	0.16
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Rebel Strength	1.15***	1.14***	1.13***
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Ethnic	0.49*	0.55**	0.50**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Previous Mediation	0.27	0.30	0.26
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
AIC	1084.68	1082.35	1077.13
Num. obs.	1670	1670	1663

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Alternative measurement 2

In the main text, a democratic reform period was identified if both V-Dem (Polyarchy) and Polity IV (XPOLITY) datasets agree that a country's democracy value is increased from the previous year. In the analysis below, models are re-estimated using an alternative measurement of democratization by incorporating Freedom House as well.

Alternative Measurement 2 (Polyarchy + XPOLITY + Freedom House)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
V-Dem Polyarchy	1.98***	1.57**	0.89†	0.20
	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(1.29)
Democratic Reform (t - 1)	1.11***	1.13***	0.99*	1.87***
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Duration ln	0.39***	0.37***	0.41***	0.55***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.12)
GDP pc ln	-0.17	-0.08	-0.07	0.30
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.40)
Population ln	-0.33***	-0.26**	-0.37***	0.23
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(1.05)
Minor Conflict	-0.45*	-0.41*	-1.80***	-2.35***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.51)	(0.54)
Major Conflict	-0.38†	-0.39†	-2.39**	-2.99***
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.80)	(0.83)
Rebel Strength		0.58*	0.25	
		(0.25)	(0.27)	
Ethnic		0.29†	0.39*	
		(0.17)	(0.20)	
Executive Change		0.41**	0.49**	0.58**
		(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Foreign Aid		0.02	-0.14*	-0.03
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Previous Mediation		0.53**	0.46**	0.55**
		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.21)
Battle Deaths ln			0.32**	0.41***
			(0.10)	(0.11)
UN PKO personnel ln			0.09**	0.06
			(0.03)	(0.05)
Cubic Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓
Regional Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✗
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Dyad
Observations	2,785	2,783	1,915	1,153
AIC	2523	2484	1702	866.6

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Alternative Measurement 2 (Polyarchy + XPOLITY + Freedom House): Markov Transition & Inaugural Negotiations

	Negotiation Onset	Negotiation Continuation	Inaugural Negotiation	Inaugural (State-level)
Polyarchy	1.97**	-0.19	1.09*	1.76†
	(0.65)	(0.79)	(0.51)	(1.02)
Democratic Reform (t - 1)	1.19**	0.71	1.49***	1.69**
	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.37)	(0.59)
Duration ln	0.08	-0.01<	-0.01	-0.10
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.08)
GDP pc ln	-0.03	0.05	-0.17	-0.53*
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.25)
Population ln	-0.42***	0.05	-0.32***	-0.44**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.16)
Minor Conflict	0.18	-0.95**	0.24	0.02
	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.37)
Major Conflict	0.29	-1.08***	0.33	0.25
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.50)
Rebel Strength	0.29	0.70†	1.02***	0.87*
	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.35)
Ethnic	0.38	-0.04	0.54**	0.69*
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.31)
Executive Change	0.69**	0.51	0.56**	0.31
	(0.24)	(0.32)	1.09*	(0.30)
Foreign Aid	0.08	-0.08	0.04	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Previous Mediation	0.26	0.53*	0.23	
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.21)	
Regional Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,760	610	1,670	615
AIC	1175	664.5	1063	415.3

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

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