Online Appendix

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A. Questions Used to Create Control and Interacting Variables in Analysis

Age:

2. Let us begin with some questions related to your socioeconomic conditions. To start, how old are you?

Sex:

3. Your sex? [coded so that 1=female, 0=male]

Education:

6. How many years of education do you have?

City:

5. Do you live in a city or in the countryside? [coded so that 1=city, 2=rural]

OpTrObPo [used for variables *Trump No Worse* and *Trump Better*]:

How would you compare President Trump's policies toward Albania/Kosovo/Serbia compared to President Obama's policies toward Albania/Kosovo/Serbia? [coded: -2 = far worse; -1 = slightly worse; 0 = about the same; +1 = slightly better; +2 = far better]

B. Survey Methodology

In Albania, enumerators conducted the interviews on the three major cellphone networks in the country, Vodafone, AMC, and Eagle, which together in 2018 combined for 100 percent of the country's cellphone users. According to its 2018 Annual Report, the National Agency of Electronic and Postal Communication (AKEP 2019) states that the penetration of landline telephones in Albania was only 8.6 percent during the year of our survey, almost seven times lower than the Southeastern European regional average (40 percent), almost twice as low as the world average (15.2 percent), and even lower than the world developing country average (10 percent). We thus make a reasonable inference that the number of cellphone users in Albania in 2018 (around 2.7 million (AKEP 2019)) is very close to the total population of the country as estimated for December 31, 2018 (2,862,427 (INSTAT 2011)). While official estimates of cellphone penetration are not available in the country, in 2015, the percentage of the Albanian population using cellphones has been estimated at near 97 per cent (Konica 2019). In Serbia, we conducted the survey on the country's three cellphone networks, Telecom Srbija (46.8 percent), Telenor (31.2), and VIP Mobile (22 percent), which in 2018 combined for 100 percent of its cellphone coverage (RATEL, 2018, p. 9). In 2018, the latest data available, the number of landlines was 2,480,000, representing an average landline penetration of 35.25 percent. During year 2018, the number of cellphone users reached 8,620,000, a figure that is 22.46 percent greater than the population as a whole (RATEL 2018). While official statistics are absent here as in Albania, Statista.com (2017) reports that 95 percent of Serbia's population used mobile phones (basic mobile phone and smartphone) in 2017. Finally, in Kosovo, we conducted also the survey on all of the country's cellphone networks, in this case Vala, Ipko, and Z-Mobile, which also combined for 100 percent of the country's cellphone coverage. While we lack even a non-governmental estimate of the share of Kosovo's population with a cellphone, its socioeconomic similarities with Albania and Serbia lead us to plausibly believe that the percentage of cellphone users in Kosovo, as in Albania and Serbia, hovers around 95 percent of the entire population. On this basis, we claim to have reached a wide sample frame.

Due to this high level of cellphone penetration in these countries, and the fact that in most European countries, including the Balkans, cellphone providers use a single national code, which frees the sampling process from the need for survey stratification, our strategy produces a true random sample of the country's adult population as a whole. This has several advantages relative to other sampling methods. The first is simplicity and transparency of the sampling process. Second, cellphone RDD sampling enables better coverage of marginal groups, which are more difficult to reach through household sampling, in particular "the highly elusive young adult cohort" (AAPOR Cell Phone Task Force, 2010, p. 4). We therefore do not need to rely on preconceived assumptions related to geographic place and community size for our claim to national representativeness.

Cellphone RDD sampling is particularly advantageous in the Balkan urban chaos complicated by community life, where household sampling methods likely create strong and systematic biases due to the difficulty of sorting out which family unit the interviewer is exactly sorting out (Peshkopia and Voss 2016). Also, cellphone RDD helps to overcome sampling difficulties created by local norms and family structure (Peshkopia 2019). An additional strength of our sampling approach is that the Balkans cellphone space has not yet been invaded by phone marketers in the same way as in the most developed countries, keeping people receptive to calls from unknown numbers. Moreover, in contrast with the United States, European cellphone providers do not charge their clients for incoming services, so Albanian and Serbian cellphone

users do not incur any costs for incoming calls, making them more inclined to participate in cellphone surveys. All together, these advantages facilitate interpretation, replication, and simple and transparent econometric analysis.

We are naturally sensitive to downsides of this technique, in particular dealing with the fact that cellphone penetration in both countries exceeds 100% of the population, meaning there are active cellphone users who own more than one number. This results from cellphone firms' marketing strategies that set better prices for calls within given networks, though price unification and the spread of Internet calling has led to a fast decline in second cellphone use (AKEP 2019; RATEL 2018; Fakte Plus 2018; ARKEP 2017). The primary risks of some individuals holding multiple phones are that, in theory, an individual with two phones might be contacted twice or be more likely to be contacted in the first place. We think it quite reasonable to expect, however, that this would not significantly impact our results and, indeed, that an individual contacted twice would alert us and not answer the same questions all over again. In any case, we have no indication that any of our respondents were interviewed twice, which in any case is a possibility of miniscule probability. And checks presented in our Supporting Information (SI) (see Appendices A and B) report no problematic imbalances in our sample.

Our samples reflect completion rates of 50 percent in Albania, 49 percent in Kosovo, and 73 percent in Serbia, making for a total of 3,188 respondents overall. These numbers are far higher than the usual 10%-20% response rates that RDD cellphone surveys achieve in the US (AAPOR Cell Phone Task Force 2010). To generate descriptive statistics, we use weights that adjust for discrepancies between our data and the known population in age and gender.

C. Balance Tables

Each table below reports the mean of the control and treatment groups for each experiment in each country, with the right-most columns reporting the differences in means between the treatment and control groups on a given variable (* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$), with standard deviations in parentheses.

Table C1. Experiment 1: Albania

	Control group mean	Treatment group mean	Difference
Age	41.206 (16.688)	41.002 (16.257)	-0.204 (1.004)
Sex	0.448 (0.498)	0.441 (0.497)	-0.008 (0.030)
EdYears	11.694 (3.532)	11.900 (3.334)	0.205 (0.209)
City	0.627 (0.484)	0.684 (0.465)	0.057** (0.029)
N	*540*	*538*	*1,078*

Table C2. Experiment 1: Kosovo

	Control group mean	Treatment group mean	Difference
Age	35.551 (13.861)	36.146 (14.182)	0.595 (0.866)
Sex	0.395 (0.489)	0.427 (0.495)	0.032 (0.030)
EdYears	12.207 (2.700)	12.228 (2.877)	0.020 (0.172)
City	0.534 (0.499)	0.503 (0.500)	-0.031 (0.031)
N	*521*	*527*	*1,048*

Table C3. Experiment 1: Serbia

	Control group mean	Treatment group mean	Difference
Age	45.430 (16.351)	43.721 (15.882)	-1.709* (0.989)
Sex	0.490 (0.500)	0.512 (0.500)	0.023 (0.031)
EdYears	13.553 (2.495)	13.700 (2.417)	0.147 (0.151)
City	0.787 (0.410)	0.805 (0.397)	0.018 (0.025)
N	*535*	*527*	*1,062*

Table C4. Experiment 2: Albania

	Control group mean	Treatment group mean	Difference
Age	40.405 (16.416)	41.805 (16.512)	1.400 (1.003)
Sex	0.447 (0.498)	0.442 (0.497)	-0.005 (0.030)
EdYears	11.914 (3.479)	11.675 (3.390)	-0.239 (0.209)
City	0.646 (0.479)	0.664 (0.473)	0.018 (0.029)
N	*548*	*529*	*1,078*

Table C5. Experiment 2: Kosovo

	Control group mean	Treatment group mean	Difference
Age	35.679 (13.967)	36.021 (14.084)	0.342 (0.867)
Sex	0.401 (0.491)	0.422 (0.494)	0.021 (0.030)
EdYears	12.254 (2.735)	12.181 (2.844)	-0.073 (0.172)
City	0.527 (0.500)	0.510 (0.500)	-0.017 (0.031)
N	*524*	*524*	*1,048*

Table C6. Experiment 2: Serbia

	Control group mean	Treatment group mean	Difference
Age	44.284 (15.987)	44.869 (16.286)	0.585 (0.991)
Sex	0.503 (0.500)	0.499 (0.500)	-0.004 (0.031)
EdYears	13.689 (2.449)	13.566 (2.465)	-0.123 (0.151)
City	0.783 (0.413)	0.808 (0.394)	0.025 (0.025)
N	*521*	*541*	*1,062*

D. Full Tables of Responses in Control and Treatment Groups for Experiments 1 and 2

Experiment 1:

Table D1. Responses of CONTROL group (percentage of subsample) to the question "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?"

	Albania	*Kosovo*	*Kos Alb*	*Kos Serb*	*Serbia*	*All*
Very unfavorable	4.00	2.69	0	0	1.12	2.94
Somewhat unfavorable	5.56	0	0	0	1.87	2.51
Somewhat favorable	29.63	17.47	10.25	97.67	91.40	46.37
Very favorable	56.30	79.08	86.19	0	3.74	46.12
H/S, Ref, Missing	3.52	0.77	0.63	2.33	1.87	2.07
Mean	2.42	2.74	2.81	2.00	2.00	2.39
N	*540*	*521*	*478*	*43*	*535*	*3188*

Table D2. Responses of the TREATMENT group (percentage of the subsample) to the question: In November 2016, Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.

	Albania	*Kosovo*	*Kos Alb*	*Kos Serb*	*Serbia*	*All*
Very unfavorable	8.55	5.12	5.43	0	0.19	4.59
Somewhat unfavorable	10.78	7.40	7.72	0	0.38	6.16
Somewhat favorable	38.66	27.13	21.09	95.24	93.74	53.08
Very favorable	36.25	59.96	64.93	4.76	4.93	33.73
H/S, Ref, Missing	5.76	0.76	0.84	0	0.76	2.45
Mean	2.09**	2.43**	2.47**	2.05	2.04**	2.19**
N	*538*	*527*	*479*	*42*	*527*	*3188*

Notes. Asterisks report confidence levels from a two-tailed t-test as to whether the treatment group mean (dropping categories of hard to say, refusal, or missing) is different from the control group mean: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

Experiment 2:

Table D3. CONTROL group for Experiment 2: "In cases when the US's and EU's views on policies diverge, should Albania/Kosovo/Serbia rally with the US, with the EU or remain neutral?"

	Albania	*Kosovo*	*Kos Alb*	*Kos Serb*	*Serbia*	*All*
-1. Rally with the EU	39.60	40.27	39.18	55.56	38.20	39.36
0. Remain neutral	36.31	19.85	19.79	22.22	54.51	36.85
1. Rally with the US	20.99	35.88	38.35	0	1.15	19.40
H/S, Ref, Missing	3.10	4.01	2.68	22.22	6.14	4.39
Mean	-.19	-.05	-.01	-.71	-.39	-.21
N	*548*	*524*	*485*	*36*	*521*	*3188*

Table D4. TREATMENT group for Experiment 2: "In cases when President Trump's and EU leaders' views on policies diverge, should Albania/Kosovo/Serbia usually rally with President Trump, with the EU leaders or remain neutral?"

	Albania	*Kosovo*	*Kos Alb*	*Kos Serb*	*Serbia*	*All*
-1. Rally with EU leaders	34.97	49.24	47.46	67.35	39.74	41.28
0. Remain neutral	43.67	24.62	24.79	22.45	53.60	40.78
1. Rally with Trump	16.07	20.80	23.09	0	0.92	12.48
H/S, Ref, Missing	5.29	5.34	4.66	10.20	5.73	5.46
Mean	-.20	-.30**	-.26**	-.75	-.41	-.30**
N	*529*	*524*	*472*	*49*	*541*	*3188*

Notes. Asterisks report confidence levels from a two-tailed t-test as to whether the treatment group mean (dropping categories of hard to say, refusal, or missing) is different from the control group mean: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

E. Results in Tabular Form and Robustness Checks for Findings Reported in Figures 1-4

The following tables present the full results forming each graph in Figures 1 and 2, plus robustness checks for each of these findings. Robustness checks include adding demographic control variables and using different models (logit for binary dependent variables and ordinal logit for ordered categorical dependent variables). Then tables are presented with the results behind Figures 3 and 4.

Results behind Figure 1A (Study 1, Albania):

Table E1. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on 4-point scale of U.S. favorability in Albania only, OLS and ordinal logistic models

	(1) OLS	(2) ologit	(3) OLS	(4) ologit
Trump mention	-0.33**	-0.79**	-0.33**	-0.80**
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Age			0.00*	0.01*
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Female			-0.08	-0.19
			(0.05)	(0.12)
Years education			-0.00	-0.02
			(0.01)	(0.02)
Urban			0.07	0.25+
			(0.06)	(0.13)
Constant	2.42**		2.30**	
	(0.04)		(0.13)	
N	1028	1028	1021	1021

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 1B (Study 1, Kosovo):

Table E2. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on 4-point scale of U.S. favorability in Kosovo only, OLS and ordinal logistic models

	(1) OLS	(2) ologit	(3) OLS	(4) ologit
Trump mention	-0.31**	-0.98**	-0.31**	-1.08**
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.15)
Age			0.00	0.01
			(0.00)	(0.01)
Female			-0.04	-0.23
			(0.05)	(0.15)
Years education			-0.02*	-0.08**
			(0.01)	(0.03)
Urban			0.05	0.25+
			(0.04)	(0.15)
Ethnic Serb			-0.63**	-2.18**
			(0.08)	(0.22)
Constant	2.74**		2.91**	
	(0.03)		(0.14)	
N	1040	1040	1040	1040

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 1C (Study 1, Serbia):

Table E3. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on 4-point scale of U.S. favorability in Serbia only, OLS and ordinal logistic models

	(1) OLS	(2) ologit	(3) OLS	(4) ologit
Trump mention	0.05**	0.62*	0.04*	0.57*
	(0.02)	(0.27)	(0.02)	(0.27)
Age			-0.00**	-0.06**
			(0.00)	(0.01)
Female			0.02	0.30
			(0.02)	(0.27)
Years education			-0.02**	-0.24**
			(0.00)	(0.07)
Urban			0.05*	0.68+
			(0.02)	(0.37)
Constant	2.00**		2.35**	
	(0.01)		(0.09)	
N	1048	1048	1048	1048

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 2A (Study 2, Albania):

Table E4. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on probability of siding with US vs EU in Albania only, with binary and 3-point-scale measures of the dependent variable, OLS, logit, and ordinal logistic models

	(1) OLS binary	(2) OLS scale	(3) Logit binary	(4) Ologit scale	(5) OLS binary	(6) OLS scale	(7) Logit binary	(8) Ologit scale
Trump mention	-0.05+	-0.01	-0.30+	0.01	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.33*	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Age					0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female					-0.04	-0.05	-0.26	-0.13
					(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Years education					-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
					(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Urban					0.04	0.07	0.25	0.18
					(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Constant	0.22**	-0.19**	-1.29**		0.22**	-0.11	-1.28**	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.11)		(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.39)	
N	1032	1032	1032	1032	1025	1025	1025	1025

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 2B (Study 2, Kosovo):

Table E5. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on probability of siding with US vs EU in Kosovo only, with binary and 3-point-scale measures of the dependent variable, OLS, logit, and ordinal logistic models

	(1) Binary OLS	(2) Scale OLS	(3) Binary logit	(4) Scale ologit	(5) Binary OLS	(6) Scale OLS	(7) Binary logit	(8) Scale ologit
Trump mention	-0.15**	-0.25**	-0.75**	-0.54**	-0.14**	-0.23**	-0.23**	-0.23**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age					0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female					-0.09**	-0.19**	-0.19**	-0.19**
					(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Years education					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban					0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
					(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ethnic Serb					-0.41**	-0.74**	-0.74**	-0.74**
					(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Constant	0.37**	-0.05	-0.52**		0.12	-0.34*	-0.34*	-0.34*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
N	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 2C (Study 2, Serbia):

Table E6. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on probability of siding with US vs EU in Serbia only, with binary and 3-point-scale measures of the dependent variable, OLS, logit, and ordinal logistic models

	(1) Binary OLS	(2) Scale OLS	(3) Binary logit	(4) Scale ologit	(5) Binary OLS	(6) Scale OLS	(7) Binary logit	(8) Scale ologit
Trump mention	-0.00	-0.02	-0.23	-0.06	-0.00	-0.03	-0.23	-0.14
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.61)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.71)	(0.15)
Age					-0.00**	0.01**	-0.09**	0.08**
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Female					0.01	-0.01	0.52	-0.04
					(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.72)	(0.15)
Years education					-0.01**	-0.03**	-1.07**	-0.11*
					(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.19)	(0.04)
Urban					0.02*	-0.01	2.53*	-0.11
					(0.01)	(0.04)	(1.29)	(0.20)
Constant	0.01**	-0.39**	-4.39**		0.23**	-0.65**	10.08**	
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.41)		(0.03)	(0.14)	(2.75)	
N	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 3 (heterogeneous effects by views of Trump's policies in Albania, Kosovo)

Table E7. Average marginal effects of Trump mentions in Experiments 1-2 among people in Albania and Kosovo by whether people perceive Trump policies to be worse than Obama's

	(1) Albania	(2) Kosovo Albanians	(3) Albania	(4) Kosovo Albanians
Trump no worse	0.15^{+}	-0.08	0.12**	0.09^{+}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Trump treatment 1	-0.47**	-0.45**		
	(0.08)	(0.06)		
Trump treatment 1 X Trump no worse	0.20^{+}	0.27*		
	(0.11)	(0.11)		
Trump treatment 2			-0.06^{+}	-0.18**
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Trump treatment 2 X Trump no worse			0.02	0.03
			(0.05)	(0.07)
Constant	2.35**	2.83**	0.16**	0.37**
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	939	879	946	858

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Results behind Figure 4 (heterogeneous effects by views of Trump's policies in Serbia)

Table E8. Average marginal effects of Trump mentions in Experiments 1-2 among people in Serbia by whether people perceive Trump policies to be better than Obama's

	(1) Experiment 1	(2) Experiment 2
Trump better	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trump treatment 1	0.01	
	(0.02)	
Trump treatment 1 X Trump better	0.05	
	(0.03)	
Trump treatment 2		-0.00
		(0.01)
Trump treatment 2 X Trump better		-0.00
		(0.01)
Constant	2.00**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	994	952

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

F. Distribution of Beliefs about How Trump's Policies Compare to Obama's

Table F1. "How would you compare President Trump's policies toward Albania/Kosovo/Serbia compared to President Obama's policies toward Albania/Kosovo/Serbia?"

	Albania	*Kosovo*	*Kos Alb*	*Kos Serb*	*Serbia*	*All*
-2. Trump's policies are far worse than Obama's policies	15.40	17.94	19.33	3.53	0.28	11.20
-1. Trump policies are slightly worse than Obama's policies	27.09	38.84	42.32	1.18	0	21.93
0. Trump's policies and Obama's policies are about the same	20.22	31.11	27.06	74.12	60.36	37.17
1. Trump policies are slightly better than Obama's policies	16.33	3.15	1.78	18.82	32.77	17.47
2. Trump's policies are far better than Obama's policies	11.60	1.72	1.88	0	1.04	4.83
H/S, Ref, Missing	9.37	7.25	7.63	2.35	5.56	7.40

G. Test of Whether Serbia's Difference is Statistically Significant

Table G1. Average marginal effects of Trump mention on 4-point scale of U.S. favorability in Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia, OLS and ordinal logistic models

	(1) OLS	(2) ologit
Trump mention	-0.31**	-1.00**
	(0.01)	(0.13)
Serbia	-0.57*	-2.22*
	(0.11)	(0.88)
Trump X Serbia	0.36**	1.11**
	(0.01)	(0.20)
Age	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female	-0.04	-0.15*
	(0.03)	(0.07)
Years education	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.04)
Urban	0.03+	0.16**
	(0.01)	(0.04)
Constant	2.73*	
	(0.31)	
N	3109	3109

Notes. Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. "Trump X Serbia" is an interaction term, capturing the effect of the Trump mention among Serbia residents specifically; by implication, the simple "Trump mention" term here reflects the impact of the Trump prime outside Serbia, that is, in Albania and Kosovo.