A Survey Experiment on Dispositional Blame, Expressions of Populism, Respondent Self-Coding, and Cooperation

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ABSTRACT: This document contains the sampling, design, and analysis plans for a large, randomized experiment hosted via *The Guardian* as part of their New Populism Project. The experiment builds on research on populism, framing, gender, status, and number of other literatures. The experiment randomizes subjects to two different sets of treatments, one focusing on different blame tasks and the other on different messengers of populist rhetoric. We describe our hypotheses, design, sampling strategy, and analytic plans in detail.

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Introduction

This document is a pre-registration of a large-scale online survey experiment conducted in November and December of 2018, partnered with *The Guardian* and their New Populism project (https://www.theguardian.com/world/series/the-new-populism). At the time of this posting, the data collection is underway but not concluded. No analyses or data cleaning have begun. The study itself focuses on the connection between populism and blame framing, while including a number of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. The sample is diverse, including subjects from across the world and with varying political views. We first discuss the theories and expectations that guide this work. Second, we discuss the sampling strategy we employed in conjunction with *The Guardian*. Third, we describe our experimental design in detail, and provide the full item wordings in the Appendix. The fourth section outlines our analysis plans and how those plans connect to our hypotheses.

Theory and hypotheses

This section would contain a bit about our theoretical orientations and the predictions we have going into the study. I've pasted in Ryan's notes from our meeting – they still need to be organized and sorted.

Although several approaches to populism have been proposed (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Laclau 2005; Ostiguy 2009; Weyland 2017), we draw on an ideational one that defines populism in minimal terms as a discursive frame that interprets politics as a cosmic struggle of the common people against a conspiring elite (Aslanidis 2016; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2019). Populism stands in opposition to other discursive frames, most notably pluralism, in which politics is conceived of in universalistic terms as a struggle of various interests against impersonal evils. Populism in the ideational sense is not strictly speaking an ideology, because it is not consciously articulated and does not offer anything like a full program for political action; it has the clearest bearing on liberal democratic institutions, such as the separation of powers, civil liberties, and competitive elections, which it tends to sacrifice in the name of the people and

their putative struggle with an evil elite. Hence, populism must normally be filled with other ideological content to speak to other political issues and address voters' full array of policy concerns. This makes it possible to have populist parties of various ideological stripes, right and left, which differ in terms of who they define as the people and the elite and in what policies are needed to resolve their conflict.

In addition to this definition, our ideational approach offers a causal argument for the emergence and success of populist parties, one that starts at the level of individual voters (E. Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins forthcoming; Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, and Andreadis 2018). It argues that populism accompanies a belief in popular sovereignty and is present in the minds of most citizens of modern, mass democracies. However, populism competes with other discursive frames and is often latent. For populism to be activated, citizens must experience normative democratic threat: policy failure that can be attributed to the malfeasance of elected representatives. While the existence of this type of policy failure makes the populist frame sensible, in order to become salient it must also be deployed by political actors who interpret the failure in populist terms. This rhetoric includes two crucial components: a reference to the democratic in-group (a reified notion of the people), and attribution of blame to a knowing, agential elite. Finally, actual mobilization as a party or movement requires an effort at organization by political actors.

In recent work, we and other colleagues conducted a series of experiments testing one of these rhetorical mechanisms of populism, namely, blame attribution (E. Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins forthcoming). Blame attribution is one of the rhetorical elements that is easiest to change in the real world of politics and is an essential to the electorate's ability to exact vertical accountability. While populist rhetoric uses one type of blame attribution, a *dispositional* one that targets actors (powerful individuals in the polity, whom it reifies and demonizes as a conspiring elite), other discursive frames such as pluralism instead engage in *situational* attribution, blaming impersonal circumstances for policy failure. We designed an experiment that varied the type of attribution while holding other elements constant (in-group references and the presence of democratic normative threat). In two US online experiments, we found that asking subjects to discuss the country's most serious problems in dispositional terms, rather than situational terms, elicited stronger populist responses in open-ended questions as well as greater vote intention for populist candidates during the 2016 presidential primaries. Importantly, we also found that asking subjects to discuss the country's problems in situational terms had no distinguishable effect from the control condition (in which subjects were not asked about the country's problems at all). One of the policy implications of this finding is that non-populist politicians have alternative frames that can be used to discuss policy failures without activating populism. Hence our first hypothesis is as follows:

> H_1. Individuals exposed to dispositional blame attribution (holding threat and in-group identity constant) will express more populism and show greater affinity for populist actors than will individuals exposed to situational blame attribution or individuals not exposed to any of these factors.

A secondary finding of the experiment was that treatment effects were moderated by initial

populist attitudes. The ideational approach argues that the populist frame is actually quite common among citizens of democracies today, associated with a belief in popular sovereignty as well as personality features such as a belief in conspiracy theories (Castanho Silva, Vegetti, and Littvay 2017; Silva et al. 2018). In fact, public opinion surveys find that populist attitudes exist in high but varying levels within many different countries and regions (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroek 2016; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018); indeed, variance within countries is much higher than variance across them (Hawkins and Littvay forthcoming). To the degree that existing survey inventories of populist attitudes are probably measuring a combination of active and latent frames, we expect to find a curvilinear effect of our treatment. Those with very low populist attitudes (below the theoretical midpoint of the scale) and those with high attitudes (above the mean) should register very little effect, because they are either uncomfortable with populist rhetoric or already have a very active populist frame. In contrast, individuals in the middle of the distribution—above the scale midpoint, but below the mean—have the frame in their minds but it is not active.

While these findings were generally strong and consistent in our two US samples, the study left several questions open. One is whether the results were limited to the United States. The ideational approach suggests they should be found in any country where a belief in popular sovereignty is strong. Another question is whether the moderating effect of populist attitudes is truly curvilinear, or simply a ceiling effect. Because populist attitudes were widespread in our US samples (consistent with findings in even more representative surveys) we could only split our samples in two: below and above the mean. A much larger sample would allow us to look at treatment effects for individuals with low initial populist attitudes (below the midpoint). Thus, our current study harnesses a much larger sample to examine two related hypotheses from our previous work:

> H_{1A}. Curvilinear heterogeneous effects: moderate populists should react more strongly to treatment than high *and* low populists.
>
> H_{1B}. Ceiling heterogeneous effects: moderate and low populists should react more strongly to treatment than high populists.

While it is possible to study a number of other moderators, two are of particular interest because of the non-intuitive arguments of the ideational approach: gender and traditional ideology. Regarding gender, the ideological approach suggests that the populist frame is independent of being male or female. Populism is, instead, largely a function of democratic beliefs and personality that are not strongly linked to gender identity across countries. While some populist parties (such as radical right populists) are known for having a stronger support among men, this is presumably due to the parties' other ideological or issue stances—the "radical right" part—rather than their populism. Thus, we would not expect to have substantively stronger treatment

effects[1] among men or women.

H_{1C}. Treatment effects will not differ by gender of the respondent.

In a similar vein, the ideational approach does not see populism as linked to specific ideologies. Traditional ideologies—especially defined in terms of a left-right dimension—represent consciously articulated beliefs with a much more comprehensive programmatic scope. They are orthogonal to the ideas that constitute a discursive frame such as populism. In observational studies of citizens and politicians, populism has been found on both the ideological right and left. Hence, we do not expect to have substantively stronger treatment effects among people with different political ideologies.

H_{1D}. Treatment effects will not differ by the ideology (left/right) of the respondent.

Likewise, we do not expect any broad cultural differences in treatment effects within our sample. This is not because the ideational theory rejects the possibility of national-level differences in culture; it is, after all, a cultural theory of populism. In particular, in groups with strong collectivist cultures, citizens may be uncomfortable making dispositional attributions of blame, especially towards authorities. However, our sample is concentrated among native English-speaking countries with individualistic cultures, and so we do not expect differential country-level treatment effects.

H_{1E}. We do not expect country-level differences in treatment effects.

Our primary concern with these and any other demographic moderators is how they intersect with our measure of populism. Since we use an observed, rather than a randomized, variable to evaluate H_{1A}, we seek to rule out as many potential confounding variables – which correlate both with populism and with reactions to the treatment – as possible. Therefore, to consider other variables beyond the comparisons described in H_{1B}, H_{1C}, H_{1D}, and H_{1E} we will regress populist attitudes on all of the demographic variables we have available. Based on these analyses, our estimates of treatment effects will consider any statistically significant predictors of populist attitudes as possible moderators in order to isolate the moderating effects of populist attitudes.

These hypotheses about moderating effects concern the attributes of our subjects; however, the attributes of the populist messenger should have an impact, as well. We are especially curious about the gender of those who espouse populist messages. Our earlier experiment established a relatively neutral, genderless voice, with the treatment written in a relatively dispassionate language of the hidden researcher. However, the gender of the person spouting populist rhetoric may alter how individuals receive and process it. While scholars of political psychology and political communications and have long recognized the importance of such "source cues," populism scholars have thus far neglected this question.

Literatures outside of populism studies suggest different possibilities. On the one hand, the

[1] By "substantively similar," we mean that slopes may differ but that we expect similar signs/same directional effects. Our sample will be very large, and any treatment effects (heterogenous or otherwise) are likely to be statistically significant.

political science literature has found that male politicians are generally seen more favorably than female politicians. This is especially true in more stereotypically "masculine" issues (e.g. defense, security, foreign affairs, crime), which require tough, rational, emotionally stable, and decisive leaders(Tickner 1992; Barnes and O'Brien 2018). However, the reverse is true when it comes to corruption (e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Goetz 2007; Barnes and Beaulieu 2014): women are seen as better capable to clean up corrupt institutions and practices. Given the central of corruption to populist messaging, one might expect a female source might be expected to activate populist attitudes and behaviors better than a male source. In contrast, the psychological literature on gendered perceptions and stereotypes suggests that people of both genders react more positively to women than men (Eagly and Mladinic 1989, 1994). This so-called "women are wonderful" effect has consistently been demonstrated with explicit and implicit measures of attitudes (Rudman and Goodwin 2004) and in adults and young children (Cvencek, Greenwald, and Meltzoff 2011).[2] In this sense, females may be more apt to generate adhesion to a populist message than males.

The singular direction of these expectations notwithstanding, populism research has shown it to be male-dominated (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015), especially true among the populist parties of the "radical right" (Mudde 2007, ch. 4). At least one experimental study of a woman populist candidate found her message to be generally unconvincing (Aguilar and Carlin 2017). Unfortunately, that study could not rule out factors related to ideology and strategic voting considerations. Therefore, we have competing hypotheses:

> H_{2A}. When populist rhetoric is associated with a female source it will generate greater populist support than when it is associated with a male source.
>
> H_{2B}. When populist rhetoric is associated with a male source it will generate greater populist support than when it is associated with a female source.

Gender is not the only characteristic of a populist source that matters; other attributes that relate to stereotypes about power, privilege, and elites may also correlate with populist support. As with gender, here we also have competing hypotheses. On the one hand, populist rhetoric from majority or privileged groups may reap the benefits of that group membership. In other words, they may be more trusted, competent, and worthy of support than sources from minority or disadvantaged groups; this would be consistent with research about stereotypes of these types of groups in society at large (e.g., Fiske et al. 2002; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). The content of populism, though, leads to a different perspective. Populist messengers from disadvantaged or minority groups may be seen as more disconnected from the status quo and whatever elites are responsible for current political problems. As such, they may appeal more to those with strong populist attitudes as they symbolic represent a departure from politics as usual.

Given these two possibilities, and the dearth of research on the important characteristics of the source of populist rhetoric, we propose these two competing hypotheses and use our data to

[2] There are a number of interesting avenues in this research – that this positivity can depend on women's adherence to specific gender roles, that women prefer women *more* than men prefer women, etc. – but the general finding has held across different measures, samples, and time.

adjudicate between them.

> H_{3A}. When populist rhetoric is associated with a majority or advantaged group, it will generate greater populist support than when it is associated with a minority or disadvantaged group.
>
> H_{3B}. When populist rhetoric is associated with a minority or disadvantaged group, it will generate greater populist support than when it is associated with a majority or advantaged group.

Finally, we are interested in determining the effect of different issues on the activation of populism. Here we have diverse expectations. Our original experiment asked subjects to name an issue *of their choice* that they think is the most important problem the country faces, and we provided a closed-ended list piloted in earlier surveys. The ideational theory does not expect any one issue to be inherently better at activating the populist frame, as long as the issue reasonably connects with a relevant in-group identity of "the people" and an out-group of an elite. Thus, smaller, local issues may not be as readily connected with populism as national-level issues because they fail to connect with subjects' notion of the people or what counts as an important problem; our treatment asks only about national issues, so this difference cannot be tested. However, even national problems may be perceived differently by those holding different political ideologies, because these already make claims about who or what is responsible. For example, US conservatives tend to blame environmental problems on impersonal forces and collective action problems, while US liberals blame corporations. We may distinguish different issue effects if we break results down by country and especially by political ideology.

Therefore, we will test in an exploratory manner to see if different issues are more or less likely to generate high treatment effects. Previous research argues there should not be a difference by issue.

> H_4. Treatment effects will vary by the issue subjects see as most important.
>
> H_5. Treatment effects will vary by the issue subjects see as most important and by their ideology.
>
> H_6. Treatment effects will vary by the issue subjects see as most important and by their country.

Sample collection information

We test these hypotheses through an online experiment launched on 21 November 2018. The experiment employs a novel, large sample. To conduct the experiment, we have teamed up with *The Guardian*, the UK daily, as part of a series of long-format digital articles on populism. The project, titled The New Populism, introduces readers to academic research on populism's meaning, presence, causes, and consequences. Our experiment stems from one of the early articles in the series, an interactive survey that lets readers measure their populist attitudes and political ideology, which are plotted alongside those of a few world leaders (the latter measured through an expert survey). Because of the European Union's General Data Protection

Regulation, we are unable to save any of these data, but at the end of the article readers are presented with an invitation to participate in an additional survey experiment. The invitation reads "Take another survey: If you enjoyed this quiz, we invite you to take part in another survey run by Team Populism, the group of academics who helped build this questionnaire. It takes less than five minutes – and will contribute to research in this area." Readers who click on the link are taken offsite to a Qualtrics instrument that we designed, where they are presented with a standard welcome and consent form to begin the survey.

The Guardian's online readership is large (several million, fifth-largest online daily in the world). Given response rates to the previous, initial article in The New Populism series, we expect our pool to be anywhere from 100k to 500k viewers. It is unclear how many viewers will accept the invitation to take our additional survey (neither we nor *The Guardian* could make any guesses), but even a 5% response rate could generate between 5000 and 25000 responses—a much larger sample than is typical for low-cost online survey experiments.

A sample this large would eliminate most concerns about experimental power, but there are at least two other concerns we will have to deal with. First, while the sample comes from a large number of countries (roughly 40 percent of readers are from the UK, with large percentages from the United States, Australia, and Canada)—a plus, given our goal of replicating earlier US findings—the rest of the readership is spread across a very large number of countries, and if we test for country effects we may not be able to draw strong inferences from these other countries. Also, as with other low-cost online survey experiments, the sample will not be anywhere near representative of the populations of these countries. That said, we know that *The Guardian* readership is generally better educated and more politically left than average residents, a profile that tends to result in somewhat lower levels of initial populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroek 2016; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). Effectively oversampling on low populist attitudes will be a benefit to us as we test our curvilinear hypothesis about the interaction of populist attitudes with the treatment. Also, if the sample is large enough, we may still have large enough subsamples of non-left ideology and lower-educated residents that we can make strong inferences across these demographics.

Note that because the survey experiment is connected to an online newspaper article, which will be available indefinitely, we are leaving the survey instrument open as well; this raises the possibility of analyzing new responses in the future. However, *The Guardian* has informed us that the vast majority of responses will happen in the first few days of the survey, so we anticipate making a cutoff five weeks after the survey opens for the purpose of analyzing our hypotheses. This is not an uncommon period of time for large-N online surveys and should be compact enough to claim that the sample represents a fairly homogenous point in time for each country—helpful if we conduct a comparative analyses down the road.

Experimental design

After clicking on the link on *The Guardian's* webpage, subjects are taken to the instrument, hosted in Qualtrics. They first see a consent form, which is included along with the entire survey

instrument in the Appendix. After agreeing to participate, they answer a question about their age to ensure that the study includes only individuals 18 or older (individuals younger than that are taken to the end of the survey immediately). Those who agree to participate and are 18 or older are randomly assigned one of three treatment conditions with equal probability (via a random number generator in Qualtrics) and begin the substantive portion of the study.

First, subjects are asked about their gender and education. We then ask an abbreviated set of questions about respondents' populist attitudes, drawn from existing research (Silva et al. 2018). Prior to our study, subjects answer a more extensive battery of questions about populism on *The Guardian's* website, as part of their New Populism project. For legal reasons, we could not import their responses to these prior items; as a result, we use this condensed set of questions instead of the larger battery. Following these populism questions, subjects answer items about their left-right ideology and general trust in other people. These questions are related to our hypotheses and existing studies of populism.

At this point, subjects are asked to select (from a dropdown list) which they consider to be their country. Subjects in the control condition then proceed to the dependent variables, discussed later in this section. Subjects in the two treatment conditions, on the other hand, are then asked the following:

> "Here is a list of problems that different people mention in different countries. Which one worries you the most for your country?
>
> If the problem that worries you most is missing from the list, please pick "other" and type it in. (If you select other, please limit your response to a few words)"

Participants then choose from the following list of problems, presented in randomized order: the (1) decline in our traditional values, (2) the lack of direction in our government, (3) environmental degradation, (4) economic and social inequality, (5) racism and the lack of tolerance, (6) the negative state of our economy, (7) the threat of terrorism, (8) the high cost of health care, (9) the poor quality of education, (10) the increasing number of immigrants, or (11) Other (and asked to explain). This list has been pre-tested and used elsewhere (E. C. Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins Forthcoming); we made minor adaptations to fit the international nature of the sample involved here.

The purpose of this problem selection was to give the respondents context for the main part of the treatments, which engage either dispositional or situational blame attribution. Subjects randomly assigned to the disposition blame attribution (also referred to here as a the "groups" condition), then complete the two following elaboration items about the problem they select:

> What groups or individuals do you think are most responsible for *(problem they select piped in)*? (Please limit your response to a few words)
>
> In at least a few sentences, explain why you think these groups or individuals are

> responsible and what should be done about them.

This task focuses the respondents on actors and individuals who are responsible for prominent political problems. Our previous work has found that this treatment elicits increased expressions of populism and support for populist figures (E. C. Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins Forthcoming).

Subjects randomly assigned to the situational blame attribution (also referred to here as the "events" condition) were asked the following pair of elaboration items instead of the ones presented above:

> What events or circumstances do you think are the main cause of *(problem they select piped in)*? (Please limit your response to a few words)
>
> In at least a few sentences, explain why you think these events or circumstances have caused this and what should be done in response.

This task focuses the respondents on impersonal forces that are responsible for prominent political problems. Our previous work has found that this treatment fails to elicits increased expressions of populism or support for populist figures (E. C. Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins Forthcoming).

These blame-oriented elaboration tasks form the core of our treatments. Following these items, all subjects in the groups or events conditions then completed a self-rating task, where they were asked to compare their responses to the elaboration items to two other responses from a prior study. These two example responses, which can be seen in the Appendix, were selected because they were coded as populist or nonpopulist and because they represented realistic reactions to the task subjects had just completed. Participants were asked to indicate which response was most like their own as a binary choice. This item, then, serves as an alternative, self-coded way to measure individual-level populism beyond the human-based coding described above. It also indicates whether subjects recognize the populism in their own speech.

Next, all subjects (including those in the control condition) were presented with a set of questions about a t-shirt with a populist statement on it – specifically, the statement "Politicians need to stop doing what's good for the politics and start doing what's good for people". These questions are new to this study and gauge willingness to trust and cooperate with a populist. They include questions about how much the respondent would want to buy the t-shirt, how much they would trust someone wearing the shirt, and how seriously they would consider attending a rally with the person wearing the t-shirt.

Embedded in these t-shirt questions is another set of randomized treatments that address H_2. Subjects were randomized (with equal probability) to see one of four possible t-shirt models (as shown in the Appendix). We included two female and two male t-shirt models to examine gendered effects as described in H_2. Further, one of each gender had a lighter skin tone to evaluate the role of skin tone alongside gender. Using two torsos of each gender also allows us to rule out the possibility that gendered differences we see are about something idiosyncratic about

the particular male and female models in any one comparison. It also allows us to evaluate H_{3A} and H_{3B} in an initial way, recognizing that skin tone is only one marker of social status.[3] The randomization of the t-shirt models was independent of the groups-events-control randomization earlier in the experiment and was done using a random number generator in Qualtrics. Additionally, only subjects who continued on to the t-shirt items were randomized to different models, meaning that any incidental survey attrition prior to this point would not threaten our causal inferences on the t-shirt model component.

Following the t-shirt items, respondents' participation is complete. They are then shown an information page that explains more about the experiment, their treatment conditions, their score on the populism items, and then takes them to a page with the aggregated, anonymized results of the study (up to the point when they are taking it). These debrief items are a part of our agreement with *The Guardian* and their efforts to make this research accessible and interesting to a broader audience.[4]

This experimental design and research is conducted in line with Central European University's Ethical Research Policy, Version Date: May 9, 2018 (https://documents.ceu.edu/documents/p-1012-1v1805) according to which it is exempt from explicit review.

Analysis plans

Prior to any analyses, the open-ended responses to the blame treatments must be coded for populism. This exercise is challenging due to the size of the sample – we anticipate tens of thousands of participants, based on *The Guardian's* estimates of the readership of their articles. As such, the human coding procedures we have used elsewhere are not feasible, given our time and resource constraints. We plan to proceed with the following strategy.

A random sample of the open-ended responses (approximately 1,000) will be coded for populism by trained research assistants.[5] This is a procedure we have implemented multiple times elsewhere (E. C. Busby et al. 2018; E. C. Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins Forthcoming) and that is detailed extensively in the Appendix of this document. Coders process these open-ended items for three components – if the response mentions an agent responsible for the problem, if that agent is an elite of some kind, and if the response mentions the people in a positive way. Only if a response contains all three elements will it be marked as populist (given a value of 1). Otherwise, the response will be coded as nonpopulist (given a value of 0).

This sample of human coded responses serves several key purposes. As a first step, we will compare the coded populism variables with subjects' self-coding of their responses for this

[3] We recognize that different countries have different stereotypes about skin tone; however, in the countries that will predominantly make up our sample (UK, US, Canada, Ireland, and Australia), lighter skin tone is typically associated with higher social status.
[4] We use the term debrief to refer to providing additional information to the respondents after the experiment. As the experiment involves no deception, this debrief is not about providing respondents with full information about the study or reconsenting them.
[5] The two open-ended questions are collapsed into a single text field for this coding procedure.

random sample. This is an initial check on how well self-coding from the survey can be used as a substitute for the human coding procedure. As the human coded responses are a random subset of the entire sample, they should be representative of how well the two measures of populism correspond in the sample as a whole.

Additionally, we will explore three other techniques to code the entire set of open-ended responses. The first is a dictionary-based approach – using a set of keywords that correspond highly with our human coding of populism, we will mark responses as populist or nonpopulist without reading each response.[6] Second, we will use supervised, machine learning techniques to perform a supervised classification of these responses as populist or nonpopulist. We will use the human-coded subsample as a training set for the algorithm and then apply the program to the entire set of responses. This is an approach that has been used with populism elsewhere, with moderate levels of success (Hawkins and Silva 2019). We plan to implement it here, given the large number of responses at our disposal.

This leaves us with two different versions of the open-ended coding of populism – the dictionary method and the machine learning method. One of our preliminary steps, then, is to consider how much these items correspond with one another. We plan on comparing the estimated amounts of populism with these approaches (for the whole sample and the two treatment groups). Further, we will consider the tetrachoric (binary) correlation between the dictionary and supervised methods. We will also conduct various measurement analyses (using both factor analysis and item-response theory) to determine if the different versions of the open-ended coding tap into same underlying construct of populism. These analyses involve the open-ended codings, self-coding, and the battery of populist attitudes from earlier in the survey. Should we see divergence on these measures (or a lack of correlation between them), we will conduct the subsequent analyses with the different versions of the populism coding as robustness checks.

As discussed, our instrument includes several items about a t-shirt with a populist slogan, meant to tap into populist attitudes and behavior. If the various items scale together we will create an index. If not, we will consider using them separately or only combining those that correlate highly with a latent variable. By scale together, we mean an acceptable Cronbach's alpha (>=0.65) and factor loadings on a single dimension (standardized loadings of 0.40 or more).

After these preliminary steps, our main analyses connect directly to our hypotheses. In all of these analyses, we will report p-values, while noting conventional standards of significance ($p<0.05$, $p<0.01$, etc.). We will begin by considering how demographic and pre-treatment variables correlate with our measure of populist attitudes (per the closed-ended battery). We start here as this informs our tests of $H1_A$, $H1_B$, $H1_C$, $H1_D$, and $H1_E$ and may suggest other moderated relationships to rule out (as mentioned earlier). These analyses employ OLS regression, with this form:

$$Popuist\ attitudes = \alpha + \beta_1 Age + \beta_2 Gender + \beta_3 Education + \beta_4 LeftRight + \beta_5 Trust + \epsilon$$

We will consider any statistically significant predictor of populist attitudes as potential

[6] This dictionary will be developed after the human coding.

moderator to rule out in later analyses. This is in addition to the specified moderators discussed below.

To test H_1, we will conduct a difference-in-means test (using a proportions test for expressed populism, a proportions test for populist self-coding, and a t-test for the scaled t-shirt items[7]) on our measures of populism between the dispositional and situational blame groups. This test will be a two-sided test. We will conduct this test for both of our versions of the open-ended coding, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

To evaluate H_{1A} and $H_{1B,}$ we will separately estimate these tests for those at low, medium, and high levels of populism. These three distinctions will be made based on responses to the populist attitude battery; those with responses in the bottom third of the distribution will be classified as low, those in the middle third as medium, and those in the top third as high. We will also consider dividing the subjects into low, medium, and high groups based off on the midpoint of the possible responses to the question in order to ensure that these distinctions do produce robust results. This more theoretical division will consider those below the midpoint on the scale (4 out of 7) as low in populism, those at the midpoint as medium, and those above the midpoint as high in populism. To determine if H_{1A} or H_{1B} are supported by the data, we will compare 95 percent confidence intervals of the treatment effects for all three groups. If this interval is highest for those with medium levels of populism, we will conclude that H_{1A} is supported by the data. If the interval for those high in populism is lower than those with medium and low levels (and those two groups are not distinct from one another), we will conclude that H_{1B} is supported by the data.

To evaluate H_{1C}, we will separately estimate the test for H_1 for those identifying as male and female. We do not anticipate having sufficient numbers of individuals identifying with a non-binary gender category to evaluate treatment effects for that subset. To determine if H_{1C} is supported by the data, we will compare 95 percent confidence intervals of the treatment effects for both gender groups. If these intervals overlap, we will conclude that H_{1C} is supported by the data.

To evaluate H_{1D}, we will separately estimate the tests for those who identify as left, middle, and right. These three distinctions will be made based on responses to the left-right pre-treatment item; those responding with “extremely left”, “left”, and “slightly left” will be classified as left, those choosing “moderate; middle of the road” as middle, and those stating “extremely right”, “right”, and “slightly right” as right. To determine if H_{1D} is supported by the data, we will compare 95 percent confidence intervals of the treatment effects for all three groups. If the intervals overlap and are not reliably different from one another, we will conclude that H_{1D} is supported by the data.

Ideally, evaluating H_{1E} would entail separate tests for each country represented in the sample. However, the distribution of the respondents across countries is unknown and unlikely to be even across the world’s nations (correspondence with staff at *The Guardian* suggest that the sample

[7] We will also compare these tests to other forms of difference-in-means test (such as randomization inference and regression style models) to ensure that the findings are consistent across estimation techniques.

should most heavily involve subjects from the UK, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and the United States). As such, we will separately estimate the tests for the top four countries in the dataset and compare them to the overall sample estimate. If these country-specific estimates do not reliably differ from the overall estimates, we will conclude that the data support H_{1E}.

The next pair of hypotheses (H_{2A} and H_{2B}) involve comparing the t-shirt items for those who see male and female torsos. Judging between these hypotheses involves a difference-in-means t-test between the two groups (male vs. female torsos). If we observe statistically significant, higher support in the female torso conditions, we will conclude that the data support H_{2A}. If we observe statistically significant, higher support in the male torso conditions, we will conclude that the data support H_{2B}. To ensure that these tests are robust to any treatment effects from the blame conditions, we will control for and interact the treatment effects with blame treatment assignment (control, dispositional, and situational blame). As noted earlier, if the t-shirt items scale well together, we will consider them as a combined index. If not, we will conduct these analyses on each t-shirt item separately.

Similarly, H_{3A} and H_{3B} involve comparing the t-shirt items for those who see lighter and darker skinned torsos. Judging between these hypotheses involves a difference-in-means t-test between the two groups (lighter vs. darker skinned torsos). If we observe statistically significant, higher support in the lighter skinned torso conditions, we will conclude that the data support H_{3A}. If we observe statistically significant, higher support in the darker skinned torso conditions, we will conclude that the data support $H_{\backslash 3B}$. To ensure that these tests are robust to any treatment effects from the blame conditions, we will control for and interact the treatment effects with blame treatment assignment (control, dispositional, and situational blame). As noted earlier, if the t-shirt items scale well together, we will consider them as a combined index.

As the design also allows us to consider the intersection of different social categories (lighter skinned females, darker skinned males, etc.), we will consider how support on the t-shirt items varies across the individual torsos. However, as we have little guidance from populism research on this topic (beyond what has already been discussed with regards to gender and social status), we will treat these comparisons as exploratory.

Evaluating H_4, H_5, and H_6 involves repeating the previous analyses separately for those who choose different types of problems. The way we will do this depends on how many respondents choose each type of problem; as such, we cannot a priori lay out which groups we will compare. For this reason, we consider these analyses to be exploratory.

As an additional note, we have not conducted a priori power analyses prior to this experiment for two main reasons. The first is that the nature of the collaboration with *The Guardian* granted us no control over the sample size. We could only recruit subjects via the link they created for us at the end of their article, the distribution of which was entirely under their control. Even if we had concerns about power, we have no ability to adjust the recruitment strategy. Secondly, the readership numbers for *The Guardian* suggested that the sample would be unusually large (on the order of tens of thousands). This reassured us that even the multi-stage experiment outlined earlier, consisting of 12 treatment conditions, would have sufficient power to evaluate our

hypotheses (our conservative estimates suggested more than one thousand subjects per condition).

Upon acceptance for publication, the data and analysis files for this experiment will be made publicly available on the authors' websites, on teampopulism.com, and on the repository of choice for the publication outlet.

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Appendix

Survey instrument (and consent form)

Comments are included in italics.

Q1 – *Consent form*
Dear participant

We invite you to help us better understand populism! You can do so by answering multiple choice questions and providing brief responses about political issues. Along the way, you will learn about the scientific study of populism. At the end, you can compare your own answers with those of others we have received. It should only take about 4 minutes, and is completely anonymous and voluntary.

Just to be clear, unlike the previous website managed by *The Guardian*, this website is operated by Central European University and it will record your answers. We may later publish your answers, along with those of other participants, in aggregated form in a scientific study about populism around the world. We will not ask you anything that could uniquely identify you, and we will not share this data with anyone for commercial purposes. The results of this study will solely be used for social scientific research purposes only.

Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary. If you decide to participate in this survey, you may withdraw at any time by closing the site. None of the questions are mandatory, and if you prefer not to answer one or some of them, please just move on to the next question.

Electronic consent: Checking the "I agree to participate" button below indicates that you:
- Have read the above information;- Voluntarily agree to participate.
- Agree that we may record the data you provide and members of the research team may use it for social scientific purposes over the next 10 years.

The study is led by Levente Littvay at Central European University's Political Behavior Research Group (PolBeRG), one of the partners in the New Populism project at *The Guardian*. Additional collaborators include members of Team Populism (teampopulism.com). If you have questions regarding this study, you may send them to polberg@ceu.edu

- ○ I **AGREE** to participate (4)
- ○ I **DO NOT AGREE** to participate (5)

If respondent indicates "I DO NOT AGREE to participate", they are immediately taken to the end of the survey and do not complete any of the following items.

Q3 First, we'd like to ask you some questions about yourself.
What is your age?

- ○ Younger than 18
- ○ 18-24
- ○ 25-34
- ○ 35-44
- ○ 45-54
- ○ 55-64
- ○ 65+

Respondents who indicate "Younger than 18" are immediately taken to the end of the survey and do not complete any of the following items.
Q4 What is your gender?

- ○ Male (1)
- ○ Female (2)
- ○ Other (3) _____

Q5 What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

- ○ No formal education (1)
- ○ Incomplete primary school (2)
- ○ Complete primary school (3)
- ○ Incomplete secondary school (4)
- ○ Complete secondary school (5)
- ○ Some university-level education, without degree (8)

- ○ University-level education, with degree (9)
- ○ Post-graduate education (11)
- ○ Other (10) _____

Q6 Next, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please indicate your answer on a scale of strongly disagree to strongly agree.

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat Disagree (3)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)	Somewhat Agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly Agree (7)
The will of the people should be the highest principle in politics. (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked. (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
A small, select group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q8 On a scale of political views from left to right, where would you place yourself?

- ○ Extremely left (1)
- ○ Left (2)
- ○ Slightly left (3)
- ○ Moderate; middle of the road (9)
- ○ Slightly right (10)
- ○ Right (11)
- ○ Extremely right (12)

Q9 Generally speaking, would you say that you can't be too careful in dealing with people, or that most people can be trusted? Please use a scale from 1 to 10, where [1] means that ‘you can't be too careful' and [10] means that ‘most people can be trusted'.

- ○ 1-You can't be too careful (1)
- ○ 2 (2)
- ○ 3 (3)
- ○ 4 (4)
- ○ 5 (5)
- ○ 6 (6)
- ○ 7 (7)
- ○ 8 (8)
- ○ 9 (9)
- ○ 10-Most people can be trusted (10)

If the subject is assigned to the control group (Treatment = 0), they see the following item:

Q10 What do you consider your country to be?
▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (1357)
This is a standard list of countries in a drop-down format

Only subjects assigned to either the groups or events conditions (Treatment>0), see the following.

Q11 Now we are going to ask you a set of questions about problems that your country faces today. To start with, what do you consider your country to be?
▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (1357)
This is a standard list of countries in a drop-down format

Q12 Here is a list of problems that different people mention in different countries. Which one worries you the most for your country?

If the problem that worries you most is missing from the list, please pick "other" and type it in. (If you select other, please limit your response to a few words)

- ○ the decline in our traditional values (1)
- ○ the lack of direction in our government (2)
- ○ environmental degradation (3)
- ○ economic and social inequality (4)
- ○ racism and the lack of tolerance (5)
- ○ the negative state of our economy (6)
- ○ the threat of terrorism (7)
- ○ the high cost of health care (10)
- ○ the poor quality of education (11)
- ○ the increasing number of immigrants (12)
- ○ Other (13) _____

Subjects assigned to the groups condition (Treatment = 1) see the following:

Q14 What groups or individuals do you think are most responsible for *(problem they selected in Q12 is piped in)*? (Please limit your response to a few words)

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Q16 In at least a few sentences, explain why you think these groups or individuals are responsible and what should be done about them.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Subjects assigned to the events treatment (Treatment=2)

Q20 What events or circumstances do you think are the main cause of *(problem they selected in Q12 is piped in)*? (Please limit your response to a few words)

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Q22 In at least a few sentences, explain why you think these events or circumstances have caused this and what should be done in response.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Subjects in both the groups and events conditions (Treatment >0) see the following item:

Q18 The next thing we would like you to do is compare your responses to the previous questions with some others we have received.

We will present you with two responses and show you what you wrote in the previous open-ended questions. Please indicate which of the two other responses is most like yours, even if neither matches yours particularly well.

Q19 In the previous questions, you said:

Their response to the elaboration questions (Q14 and Q16 OR Q20 and Q22) are piped in here

Which of the two responses below seems most like yours?

	1 (1)	2 (2)	
"Decisions are often made based on lack of information given to politicians. Further education of the people about the consequences of not being active in advising the gov't about their needs. Our politicians can't know everything about everything. They are human."	○	○	"Politicians are responsible. They are making decisions that benefit the wealthy and themselves but selling a fake dream to regular people and giving false hope. They need to stop doing whats good for the politics and start doing whats good for the people"

All subjects see the following, including the control condition.

Q24 Consider the shirt pictured here

Subjects are randomly assigned to one of four t-shirt photos

Q28

If the shirt were available in your preferred size, color, and language, how seriously would you consider purchasing it? Please provide your response on a scale from not at all seriously (1) to very seriously (7).

- ○ Not at all seriously -1 (1)
- ○ 2 (2)
- ○ 3 (3)

- ○ 4 (4)
- ○ 5 (5)
- ○ 6 (6)
- ○ Very seriously -7 (7)

Q29 How trustworthy or untrustworthy would expect a person wearing the t-shirt pictured here to be?

- ○ Extremely untrustworthy (1)
- ○ Untrustworthy (2)
- ○ Somewhat untrustworthy (3)
- ○ Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy (4)
- ○ Somewhat trustworthy (5)
- ○ Trustworthy (6)
- ○ Extremely trustworthy (7)

Q30 Continue to think about the same shirt, again pictured below.
Subjects are show the same t-shirt photos as in Q24

Q34
If a person wearing this t-shirt invited you to attend a political rally, how seriously would you consider attending? Please provide your response on a scale from not at all seriously (1) to very seriously (7).

- ○ Not at all seriously -1 (1)
- ○ 2 (2)
- ○ 3 (3)
- ○ 4 (4)
- ○ 5 (5)
- ○ 6 (6)
- ○ Very seriously -7 (7)

Q35 Thank you for taking our study on populism! Now we want to tell you a little bit more about what the study itself.

First, we asked you a series of items about populist views to gauge how much you do or do not agree with populist beliefs. We find that those who agree with and those who disagree with populist ideas approach the rest of our survey quite differently. In particular, people with moderately strong populist attitudes respond the most strongly to our experiment in the second half of the survey. Based on your responses to the previous questions, you got a score of *(score on the grid in Q6 piped in here)*, where 4 is the least populist and 28 is the most populist. In a few moments, we'll show you how other people have scored so far on this measure of populism.

If the subjects were in the control condition (Treatment = 0), they saw the following:

Q36 Second, the heart of this study is a short experiment in which people are asked a series of questions about problems that their country faces today. Because you were in the comparison group, you skipped over most of this—you were asked which country you are from and then asked some questions about a t-shirt. Your responses are critically important, because they give us a baseline for comparing the effects of the experiment.

The other respondents in our survey were asked to consider a list of political and social problems and choose the one that worried them the most. They were then asked to write about the problem they chose, either focusing on the groups and individuals or the events and circumstances responsible for that problem (people saw only one version of this task—we decide which through a random process like flipping a coin). This experiment simulates an important component of populist rhetoric: its tendency to blame powerful groups in society for our problems. In our other research, we find that thinking about groups and individuals rather than events and circumstances prompts people to express more populist ideas and be more supportive of populist politicians.

Note that because people from many different countries are taking this experiment, we could not ask about your support for populist politicians. Instead, we gauged how you would react to people with populist ideas by using the t-shirt questions.

To see how other people responded to our study, click on the button below. You will be redirected to an anonymous report of the data we have so far.

If you'd like to keep the information we've told you about your score and experience, please print or save this page before continuing. Once you click on the button below, you will not be able to see this information again.

If the subjects were in the groups condition (Treatment = 1), they saw the following:

Q37 Second, the heart of this study is a short experiment in which people are asked to consider a list of political and social problems and choose the one that worries them the most. They are then asked to write about the problem they choose, either focusing on the groups and individuals or the events and circumstances responsible for that problem (people saw only one version of this task—we decide which through a random process like flipping a coin). This experiment simulates an important component of populist rhetoric: how it blames powerful groups in society for our problems. In our other research, we find that thinking about groups and individuals rather than impersonal circumstances prompts people to express more populist ideas and be more supportive of populist politicians.

Your group was asked to focus on the groups and individuals who were responsible—the populist version of the task. Another group of other respondents in our survey was asked to consider the same list of political and social problems but wrote about the events and circumstances responsible for that problem. A third set of respondents was our comparison group - they were asked which country they are from, then they skipped to the questions about a t-shirt. The responses of people in this last group allow us to compare different frames of mind with how people think normally.

Note that because people from many different countries are taking this experiment, we could not ask about your support for populist politicians. Instead, we gauged how you would react to people with populist ideas by using the t-shirt questions.

To see how other people responded to our study, click on the button below. You will be redirected to an anonymous report of the data we have so far.

If you'd like to keep the information we've told you about your score and experience, please print or save this page before continuing. Once you click on the button below, you will not be able to see this information again.

If the subjects were in the events condition (Treatment = 2), they saw the following:

Q38 The heart of this study is a short experiment in which people are asked to consider a list of political and social problems and choose the one that worries them the most. They are then asked to write about the problem they choose, either focusing on the *groups and individuals* or the *events and circumstances* responsible for that problem (people saw only one version of this task—we decide which through a random process like flipping a coin). This experiment simulates an important component of populist rhetoric: how it blames powerful groups in society for our problems. In our other research, we find that thinking about groups and individuals rather than impersonal circumstances prompts people to express more populist ideas and be more supportive of populist politicians.

Your group was asked to focus on the events and circumstances that were responsible—the non-

populist version of the task. Another group of other respondents in our survey was asked to consider the same list of political and social problems but wrote about the groups and individuals responsible for that problem—the populist version. A third set of respondents was our comparison group - they were asked which country they are from, then they skipped to the questions about a t-shirt. The responses of people in this last group allow us to compare different frames of mind with how people think normally.

Note that because people from many different countries are taking this experiment, we could not ask about your support for populist politicians. Instead, we gauged how you would react to people with populist ideas by using the t-shirt questions.

To continue to see how other people responded to our study, click on the button below. You will be redirected to an anonymous report of the data we have so far.

If you'd like to keep the information we've told you about your score and experience, please print or save this page before continuing. Once you click on the button below, you will not be able to see this information again.

At this point, all subjects' participation was complete. They were taken to a page that allowed them to view the aggregated results of the survey up to that point in time.

Open-ended coding procedure

The open-ended responses in the survey consist of answers to two questions that immediately followed the closed-ended question about the country's most serious problem. Each pair of responses will be examined simultaneously by coders. Each pair of responses will be listed side-by-side in a spreadsheet, and all pairs will be blinded by ordering them randomly, without treatment condition revealed. Coders were first trained in a codebook (below) and practiced coding several rounds of responses drawn from pilot studies until their responses achieved a 90 percent level of agreement. In training and the final coding, coders are instructed to read over each pair of responses in their entirety and assign a value (0 or 1) to three variables: Badactor (presence of an agent seen as responsible for the problem), Badelite (agent can be considered socially or politically powerful, such as "Congress" or "the health care industry"), and Goodpeople (presence of a collective majority of the citizenry constituted by ordinary citizens who are seen positively). Coders will subsequently meet with the authors in an adjudication session to double-check for errors or to decide difficult cases, again with all treatment conditions hidden. Inter-coder reliability values will be reported in the text. When coders disagree, the response will be coded as a 0.5, or midway between 0 and 1. Subjects will coded as giving a populist response if they have at least a score of 0.5 for ***both*** Goodpeople and Badelite.

Detailed Codebook for coding of open-ended questions

General Coding

In general, "element" refers to the characteristics that must be met for each category. Code each element as either 0 or 1, 0 if the criteria for the category are not met, and 1 if the criteria are met and the element is present.

If a response does not attempt to give an answer (e.g. "I don't know"), code as ".".

Note that intent or attributes may be ascribed implicitly by the respondent, but be conservative in assigning these judgments.

Bad Actor

Response must identify at least one unitary actor that has agency. (Note: this agency should give the impression of malicious intent, rather than bad decisions due to ignorance or incompetence.)

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"Powerful white people; They feel other groups are inferior and do not matter and can be treated differently. They believe they have all this power as well."	"No particular group; It isn't a particular group. All groups of people need to recognize that intolerance is a problem and that open-mindedness is a solution."
"Politicians; They only look out for their own self-interest. The would sell us to China if they could get away with it."	"Everyone is responsible; The health and welfare of the environment is the responsibility of everyone. We need to protect it as much as we can."

The actor identified must have power to effect change; the issue noted must not simply be a systemic issue.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"Corporate America, lobbyists, and all politicians; Have too much money to provide for special interests that are not in the interest of the general public."	"I belie that the university education system has become more of a business than a public service; Non-profit university system."
"Pharmaceutical companies and politicians; I think that some politicians are paid by pharmaceutical companies to push for their drugs to be approved even if they're not safe."	"Banks and stock market; Stock market crashes result in a loss of money for investors. There should be something in place to prevent this from happening, like a safety net."

Response must ascribe negative attributes or actions to the actor.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"The rich and greedy; Such a large percentage of wealth is controlled by such a small percentage of people. Nobody needs to be that wealthy."	"Oil and coal companies; We need to move to a cleaner form of energy."
"Elite billionaires that have horded most of the money; I feel that if there is a finite amount of money for all the people to live with and the top 1 percent has that majority it leaves little room for the lower classes to	"Congress; Political gridlock in Congress."

move up creating a slave state."

Bad Elite

The actor identified must be seen as an elite.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"The elite wealthy; The income inequality in this country has been rapidly accelerating for the past several decades."	"The Luciferians; Duality is not reality; we are one."
"Corporate business; Businesses are interested in making the biggest profits at the expense of their workers and consumers."	"Culture and parents; If a student does not value education, no amount of money is going to get that student to learn."

The elite must have the power to cause political or economic change domestically.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"Bad economic decisions and priorities by elected officials; I would like to see elected officials strive to invest more money in education and infrastructure and enact trade policies more favorable to American companies."	"Extremist groups from different Arab countries; The groups of people have been indoctrinated to hate America. They don't like the freedoms we have and they don't like us. There people need to be brought to justice by any means necessary."
"Politicians; Well they are the ones leading our country in the wrong direction."	"Al Qaeda; They have very extreme views that involve killing people. We should kill them."

Note: The elite identified can be either seen through either a "right populist" lens or a "left populist" lens (generally a bad elite in government vs. a bad elite in business).

Good People

Response must identify a clearly distinguished majority (a separate entity; not simply humanity as a whole) that is hurt by the bad actor/bad elite.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"Politicians; The politicians are the ones that are keeping social differences as they are, and creating chaos. If they would work for the people, the people would be better off."	"Humanity; We do not take care of the environment, we abuse it. We use too much gas. We should reduce our usage."
"Congressional Republicans; They are in the pockets of big business. They are responsible for the government shutdown and prevent any positive legislation from being passed to help the middle class."	"Humans; Many are unaware of the effect products and actions have on the environment. People need to be educated to become aware of the climate changes that are happening and could happen."

The people must be ascribed positive moral attributes, either explicitly or implicitly; this can include being seen as the commoners, the regular guy, the workers, etc.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*

"Politicians and business owners; They have done very little to prevent the growing income gap between the average worker and those in control of America's businesses."	"Hypersensitivity; It seems that everyone is offended by things they don't agree with nowadays."
"Big corporations; they commit fraud and become overly greedy at the expense of regular individuals like myself."	"Everyone is responsible; It is the responsibility of the entire human race to protect our planet."

An implicit understanding of the people can be assumed when there are clear and consistent mentions of an "us vs. them" mentality (including the 1% vs. the 99%).

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"The upper 1 percent; They just want to keep as much money for themselves, so they use loopholes, bailouts, etc and in the long run it just hurts everybody else."	"Corporations; Big companies use the greatest amount of resources. We need policy limiting the damage they can do."
"Deadbeats, lazy people, and Obama; They use our money to work against us."	"For profit insurance companies; We've tried to follow the Swiss model, but it doesn't work."

The people should be seen as the common people, and the group fit to have control.

Code as 1:	*Code as 0:*
"Politicians; They only look out for their own self interest. I think the ordinary people should lead the country so even the little mans interests are taken into consideration."	"Declines in teachers' ability and increasing classroom disruptions; Teachers aren't teaching to the children's abilities. They are teaching so that they can pass tests."
"Liberals; They generally do not uphold the traditional values of the masses but rather the interest of small select interest groups. We ought to uphold the traditional values of the people."	"Kids are getting dumber and we're doing nothing about it; Parents should be held accountable."