Supplementary Appendix for: Hawks Become Us: The Sense of Power and Militant Foreign Policy Attitudes

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A1 Overview of the Observational Surveys

Table A1 provides a brief summary of the original surveys fielded for the paper. Note that the survey fielded in China targeted Beijing residents in particular. All surveys were conducted online. All survey instruments were housed on the Qualtrics online platform, with the exception of the APP survey.

Table A1: Overview of the Surveys

	Country	Date	Recruitment Firm	Purpose
1	Russia ($N = 181$)	March 2020	Anketolog	• Pilot sense of state power scale
2	United States ($N = 1{,}593$)	October 2020	American Population Panel	• Replicate results from Russia in the US • Assess dovish moderation effects (i.e., interaction between ideological liberalism and sense of power)
3	United States ($N = 735$)	April 2021	Qualtrics	• Replicate results from APP again in the US • Include more-detailed scenario (i.e., nuclear weapons use against Iran)
4	China (Beijing) ($N = 880$)	July 2021	Qualtrics	• Replicate results from Russia/US in China • Replicate dovish moderation effects from US with alternative dovish measure (i.e., individualizing moral foundations and power) • Include more-detailed scenario (i.e., tensions in the South China Sea)
5	United States ($N = 393$)	April 2022	Qualtrics	• Replicate all previous MI results • Include more-extensive measures of individual differences to compare sense of power to competing bottom-up/dispositional explanations

A2 Survey Instrumentation

This section presents the survey instrumentation in detail, including translations where relevant. Both the Russia and China surveys were translated from English into Russian and Mandarin Chinese, respectively, by native speakers who are also fluent in English. Then, the translations were assessed by a separate native speaker to ensure comprehension. All studies first obtained informed consent (with the option to opt-out of the study), then gathered standard demographic questions, followed by the foreign policy relevant questions and scenarios, concluding with a short debrief and option for the individual to remove their data from analysis.

A2.1 Russia Survey – Anketolog

National Attachment *($\alpha = 0.63$, Herrmann et al 2009)*

1. When someone says something bad about Russian people, how strongly do you feel that this applies to you personally? [Когда кто-то плохо отзывается о россиянах, насколько сильно вы чувствуете, что это относится лично к вам?]
2. How strongly do you feel that what happens to Russia in general will likely determine your fate as well?[Насколько сильно вы ощущаете, что все, что происходит с Россией, определяет вашу собственную судьбу?]

Moral Foundations Battery *($\alpha's$: $harm/care$ = 0.59, fairness/reciprocity = 0.31, ingroup/loyalty = 0.68, authority/respect = 0.66, Graham et al 2013)*

When you decide what is right and what is wrong, how important are the following considerations to you? [Когда Вы решаете, что правильно, а что неправильно, какое значение имеют для Вас следующие соображения?]

1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally. [Испытал ли кто-нибудь от этого поступка душевные страдания]
2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others. [Отнеслись ли при этом к кому-нибудь необъективно]
3. Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country. [Проявилась ли в этом поступке любовь к своей стране]
4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority. [Было ли продемонстрировано неуважение к власти]
5. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable. [Была ли проявлена забота о слабых и беззащитных]
6. Whether or not someone did something to betray their team. [Предал ли кто-то свой коллектив]
7. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society. [Соблюдались ли обычаи и традиции]
8. Whether or not someone was cruel. [Была ли проявлена жестокость]
9. Whether or not there was lack of loyalty. [Было ли проявлено отсутствие преданности своей группе]
10. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder. [Привел ли этот поступок к хаосу или беспорядку]

Moral Foundations Battery (cont.)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. [Пожалуйста, укажите меру своего согласия со следующими утверждениями]

1. Compassion is the most important virtue. [Сострадание – самая важная добродетель]
2. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. [В законах важнее всего –гарантия, что с каждым будут поступать справедливо]
3. I am proud of my country's history. [Я горжусь историей своей страны]
4. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. [Уважение к власти и к авторитету – это то, чему должны учиться все дети]
5. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong. [Люди должны быть преданы своим близким, даже если те совершили что-то плохое]
6. It can never be right to kill a human being. [Нельзя найти оправдание убийству человека]
7. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. [Быть частью команды важнее самовыражения]
8. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty. [Если бы я был солдатом и не согласился с приказами моего командира, я бы все равно им подчинился, потому что это мой долг]

Militant Internationalism *($\alpha = 0.63$, Wittkopf 1990)*

1. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems. [Война является не лучшим, но зачастую единственным способом решения международных проблем.]
2. Russia must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it. [Россия должна продемонстрировать свою решительность, чтобы другие страны не использовали ее в своих интересах.]
3. Russia's military strength is the best way to ensure world peace. [Лучшим способом обеспечения мира для России является наращивание военной мощи.]
4. There is considerable validity to the domino theory that when one nation falls to aggression, others nearby will soon follow a similar path. [Теория о том, что падение одного государства от напора агрессора неизбежно повлечет за собой падение близлежащих стран, является весьма состоятельной.]
5. Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power. [Вместо того, чтобы просто сдерживать натиск оппонента, необходимо поразить его в самое сердце.]

Sense of State Power *($\alpha = 0.72$, adapted from Anderson et al 2012)*

In Russia's relations with other countries...[В отношениях России с другими странами...]

1. Russia can get others to listen. [Россия может сделать так, чтобы другие страны прислушивались к ней]
2. Russia's wishes do not carry much weight (rc). [Другие страны не считаются с желаниями России]
3. Russia can get others to do what it wants. [Россия может заставить другие страны делать то, что она хочет]
4. Even when voiced, Russia's views have little sway (rc). [Даже когда Россия озвучивает свои взгляды, с ними мало кто считается.]
5. Russia has a great deal of power over other countries. [Россия обладает значительной властью над другими странами.]
6. Russia's ideas and opinions are often ignored (rc). [Идеи и мнения России часто игнорируются]
7. Even when it tries, Russia is unable to get its way (rc). [Не смотря на всяческие усилия, Россия не может добиться своего.]
8. If Russia wants, Russia gets to make the decisions. [Если Россия захочет, то решения будут за ней.]

Scenario Prompt

Please imagine the following situation. Recently, a warship from a country that is [more/less] powerful than Russia entered Russian territorial waters and threatened to strike Russian ships.

→ Представьте себе следующую ситуацию. Военный корабль страны, [более / менее] влиятельной чем Россия, зашел в российские территориальные воды и пригрозил нанести удар по российским судам. По вашему мнению, как на это должно отреагировать российское руководство?

In your opinion, how should Russian leaders respond? [choose one option, with order randomized]

- Strike the foreign ship. [нанести удар по иностранному судну]
- Issue a threat to strike the foreign ship. [пригрозить ударом по иностранному судну]
- Negotiate with the country one-on-one. [провести переговоры с лидерами иностранного государства один на один]
- Negotiate with the foreign country with the help of other countries. [провести переговоры с лидерами иностранного государства с помощью других стран]
- Do nothing. [не делать ничего]

A2.2 US Survey #1 – American Population Panel

Sense of State Power

1. In the U.S.'s relations with other countries, the U.S. has a great deal of power.

Militant Internationalism

1. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems.

Political Ideology

1. When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as…[7-point scale from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative."]

A2.3 US Survey #2 – Qualtrics

National Attachment *($\alpha = 0.79$)*

1. When someone says something bad about American people, it feels as if they said something bad about me.
2. Being American is important to how I feel about myself.
3. What happens to America in general will likely be my fate as well.

Militant Internationalism *($\alpha = 0.82$)*

1. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
2. The U.S. must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.
3. American military strength is the best way to ensure world peace.
4. When one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path.

Sense of State Power *($\alpha = 0.67$)*

In the U.S.'s relations with other countries...

1. The U.S. can get others to do what it wants.
2. The U.S. has a great deal of power over other countries.

Scenario Prompt

There has been much debate recently about Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. is concerned that Iran might develop nuclear weapons, but Iran claims that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, like sustainable energy and medical research. Some Americans believe that the U.S. should use military force against Iran to eliminate the possibility that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. Other Americans believe that the U.S. should instead negotiate with Iran to place limits on Iran's nuclear program, rather than use military force.

- How much would you support a U.S. military strike with a 50% chance to completely destroy Iran's nuclear materials, but a 50% chance that the attack fails and Iran successfully develops nuclear weapons, where 0 represents 'strongly oppose' a strike and 10 represents 'strongly support' a strike?

If a U.S. war with Iran would eventually break out...

- How much would you support the use of nuclear weapons to shock Iran into surrender, where 0 represents 'strongly oppose' and 10 represents 'strongly support'? This would save American military lives but would kill Iranian civilians, which violates international law.

A2.4 China Survey – Qualtrics

National Attachment

1. Being Chinese is important to how I feel about myself. [中国人这个身份对我非常重要]

Militant Internationalism

1. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems. [战争是残酷的，但有时却是解决国际问题的唯一办法]

Sense of State Power *($\alpha = 0.43$)*

Thinking about the world in general, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [在当前的世界格局下，你多大程度上同意下面的说法?]

1. China can get other countries to do what it wants. [中国可以让其他国家做它（中国）想要的事]
2. China has a great deal of power in international relations. [中国在国际关系中拥有强大的实力]

Moral Foundations Battery *($\alpha's$: $harm/care = 0.75$, fairness/reciprocity = 0.41, ingroup/loyalty = 0.54, authority/respect = 0.62)*

When you decide what is right and what is wrong, how important are the following considerations to you? [当您区分对与错时，下面罗出的考虑因素在多大的程度上与您的判断有关？请按照0-5的等级顺序进行评定]

1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally. [某人感情上是否受到伤害]
2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others. [某人是否被区别对待]
3. Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country. [某人的行为是否体现了对国家的热爱]
4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority. [某人是否表现出对权威的不尊重]
5. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable. [某人是否关心处于弱势的人（弱势群体）]
6. Whether or not someone did something to betray their team / group. [某人是否背叛了自己的组织／团体]
7. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society. [某人是否遵循社会传统]
8. Whether or not someone acted unjustly. [某人是否有不公正的行为]

Moral Foundations Battery (cont.) *($\alpha's$: $harm/care = 0.75$, fairness/reciprocity = 0.41, ingroup/loyalty = 0.54, authority/respect = 0.62)*

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. [阅读下面的表述后，请依1至6的程度不同表示您同意与否:]

1. Compassion is the most important virtue. [同情受害者是最重要的美德]
2. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. [伤害没有防备的动物是一个人能做的最恶劣的行为之一]
3. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. [政府制定法律的首要原则是保证个人受到公平对待]
4. Justice is the most important requirement for a society. [社会最需要的是正义]
5. I am proud of my country's history. [对自己国家的历史感到骄傲]
6. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. [每个孩子都应该学会尊重权威]
7. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong. [人们应该忠于自己的家庭成员，即便他们做错了什么]
8. Men and women each have different roles to play in society. [在社会上，男女各司其职]

Scenario Prompt

Recently, there has been much attention over tensions in the South China Sea. Multiple countries in the region have claimed rights to disputed international waters, which are home to a wealth of natural resources, fisheries, and trade routes — all of which are at stake in the increasingly frequent diplomatic standoffs. China is often concerned about the United States' assertiveness in the region.

→ 近来，南海紧张局势备受关注。该地区的多个国家都声称对有争议的国际水域拥有权利，这片水域拥有丰富的自然资源、渔业和贸易路线——所有这些都在日益频繁的外交对峙中处于危险之中。中国非常关注美国在该地区的过于自信的（挑衅）行为。

Thinking about the South China Sea in particular, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- U.S. actions often threaten China's security. [美国的行动经常威胁到中国的安全]
- Other countries often harbor aggressive intentions towards China. [其他国家常常怀有侵略中国的意图]

A2.5 US Survey #3 – Qualtrics

Sense of State Power *($\alpha = 0.82$)*

In the U.S.'s relations with other countries...

1. The U.S. has a great deal of power.
2. The U.S. can get other countries to do what it wants.
3. The U.S. has overwhelming military superiority.
4. The U.S. has a great deal of economic leverage.

Militant Internationalism *($\alpha = 0.61$)*

1. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
2. The U.S. must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.
3. American military strength is the best way to ensure world peace.

National Attachment *($\alpha = 0.80$)*

1. When someone says something bad about American people, it feels as if they said something bad about me.
2. Being American is important to how I feel about myself.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism *($\alpha = 0.56$)*

1. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live
2. Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today
3. It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get hold of destructive and disgusting material

Social Dominance Orientation *($\alpha = 0.45$, Pratto et al 2013)*

There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the following ideas about groups in general?

1. In setting priorities, we must consider all groups
2. Group equality should be our ideal
3. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups

Moral Foundations *($\alpha's$: $harm/care = 0.69$, fairness/reciprocity = 0.65, ingroup/loyalty = 0.57, authority/respect = 0.70)*

When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?

1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally
2. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable
3. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others
4. Whether or not someone acted unfairly
5. Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country
6. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty
7. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority
8. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue
2. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly
3. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong
4. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn

Big Five Inventory–10 *(Rammstedt and John 2007)*

How well do the following statements describe your personality? I see myself as someone who...

1. is reserved
2. is generally trusting
3. tends to be lazy
4. is relaxed, handles stress well
5. has few artistic interests
6. is outgoing, sociable
7. tends to find fault with others
8. does a thorough job
9. gets nervous easily
10. has an active imagination

A3 Unpacking the Sense of Power as a Distinct Psychological Variable

As the first empirical paper in IR that examines the sense of state power as a variable, this section descriptively unpacks this variable, first assessing which members of the public tend to feel a sense of state efficacy, followed by factor analysis results that show that the sense of power and militant internationalism are distinct constructs.

A3.1 Who Feels That Their State is Powerful?

Given that the paper relies on correlational studies, it is worth asking whether any subpopulations of the public systematically feel that their state is relatively strong or weak in international relations. Table A2 presents results from OLS regressions with the sense of power as the DV, alongside a host of individual-level predictors.[1] The strongest candidate is those highest in national attachment or ingroup/loyalty, i.e., those who display greatest identification with their country. While individuals in the US high in national attachment do indeed tend to feel that the US is relatively powerful in IR, this effect does not extend to the Chinese or Russian samples. Similarly, while Chinese respondents who score high

[1] The regression tables in this appendix were generated using the `texreg` package in R (Leifeld 2013).

in the moral foundation of ingroup/loyalty feel that China is more powerful in IR, this effect does not extend to the American or Russian samples. Authoritarianism is perhaps another strong candidate to explain motivated evaluations of the state in a positive light, but even here the authority/respect effect is limited to the Chinese and Russian publics, and even RWA does not predict positive evaluations of the US's power in the American sample. In short, it is not clear that any systematic patterns exist across these mass publics. All of this aligns with psychological research on power, which tends to find that no subpopulation has a monopoly on the felt effects of power. Regardless, the models throughout this paper control for all of these variables.

A3.2 Factor Analysis: The Sense of Power versus Militant Internationalism

Table A3 presents loadings from a two-dimensional factor analysis for the April 2022 Qualtrics sample, showing that the items from the sense of power scale (i.e., the first four items) load onto a separate factor than the items used to measure militant internationalism (i.e., the final three items). Also, note that the sense of power items all load onto the first factor, whether items used by psychologists to assess the sense of efficacy or items adapted to assess perceptions of material capabilities in IR. That is, there is likely a psychological component to material power, given that the items used in the psychology literature load onto the same factor as the items measuring perceptions of material power specified for an IR context.

A4 Main Effects: The Sense of Power Explains Hawkishness

A4.1 Full Regression Tables with Comparisons to Individual Differences

Figure 1 of the main text displays a subset of coefficients from OLS regressions that model the relationship between the sense of state power and militant internationalism. Table A4 presents the full regression tables associated with the figure, as well as simpler bivariate specifications.

Table A2: OLS Results: Who Feels That Their State is Powerful?

	US Public	Chinese Public	Russian Public
(Intercept)	0.37**	−0.09	−0.09
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.28)
National Attachment	0.27***	−0.04	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)
No College Degree	−0.21*	0.12^	−0.02
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.16)
Male	0.25*	−0.11*	−0.11
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.14)
Age	−0.09**	0.03^	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Harm/Care	0.08	0.38***	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Fairness/Reciprocity	0.19**	−0.15***	−0.05
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Ingroup/Loyalty	−0.08	0.35***	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Authority/Respect	−0.05	0.17***	0.27**
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Extraversion	0.07		
	(0.05)		
Agreeableness	0.05		
	(0.05)		
Conscientiousness	0.05		
	(0.06)		
Neuroticism	0.01		
	(0.06)		
Openness	−0.07		
	(0.05)		
RWA	0.04		
	(0.06)		
SDO	−0.17**		
	(0.06)		
R^2	0.22	0.47	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.19	0.46	0.07
Num. obs.	390	879	183

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

Table A3: Sense of Power and Militant Internationalism Factor Loadings

	PA1	PA2
SOP: Has a Great Deal of Power	0.87	0.13
SOP: Others Do What It Wants	0.55	0.14
SOP: Has Overwhelming Military Superiority	0.65	0.21
SOP: Has a Great Deal of Economic Leverage	0.83	0.21
MI: Must Demonstrate Resolve	0.14	0.61
MI: Peace Through Strength	0.10	0.54
MI: War Unfortunate but Necessary	0.20	0.58

Table A4: OLS Estimates: Sense of Power Explains Militant Orientation

	US Sample		China Sample		Russia Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.64***	0.61***	0.73***	0.77***	0.50***	0.46***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Sense of State Power	0.06***	0.05***	0.02**	0.04***	0.06***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
National Attachment		0.03***		0.05***		0.03**
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Less than College		−0.01		0.03^		0.05*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Male		0.03		−0.04**		0.04*
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Age		0.01		−0.01		0.00
		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Harm/Care		0.00		−0.07***		−0.06***
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Fairness/Reciprocity		−0.01		−0.00		0.02
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Ingroup/Loyalty		0.02		0.01		0.05**
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Authority/Respect		0.04***		0.07***		0.04*
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Extraversion		0.00				
		(0.01)				
Agreeableness		−0.02^				
		(0.01)				
Conscientiousness		−0.01				
		(0.01)				
Neuroticism		−0.00				
		(0.01)				
Openness		−0.02^				
		(0.01)				
Right-Wing Authoritarianism		0.03**				
		(0.01)				
Social Dominance Orientation		0.02^				
		(0.01)				
R^2	0.11	0.35	0.01	0.30	0.11	0.37
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.33	0.01	0.29	0.11	0.34
Num. obs.	393	390	880	879	183	183

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^ $p < 0.1$

A4.2 Further Replications of Power's Correlation with MI

In addition to the three surveys presented in table A4, which measured a number of individual differences, two further surveys were fielded in the US to assess moderation effects (i.e., the APP survey) and to include a more-detailed security scenario (i.e., the Qualtrics survey fielded in April 2021). Table A5 shows that these surveys further replicated the positive relationship between the sense of power and militant internationalism. Whereas the APP survey only included one item to measure MI (due to space constraints), the Qualtrics survey here included four items. In other words, this positive relationship exists regardless of the number of items used to measure the sense of power or militant internationalism.

Table A5: OLS Estimates: Sense of Power Explains Militant Orientation (Further Replications)

	US Sample (APP, Oct 2020)		US Sample (Qualtrics, Apr 2021)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.49***	0.38***	0.62***	0.57***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Sense of State Power	0.08***	0.05***	0.11***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative		0.11***		0.03***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Male		0.08***		0.03*
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Age		0.00***		0.01*
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Urban Resident		−0.00		
		(0.02)		
Less than College		0.02		
		(0.01)		
White		0.01		−0.00
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Republican				0.02
				(0.02)
National Attachment				0.08***
				(0.01)
R^2	0.08	0.25	0.25	0.41
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.25	0.25	0.41
Num. obs.	1593	1558	734	733

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

A4.3 Robustness Checks

A4.3.1 National Attachment

A potential concern with measuring perceptions of power correlationally is that some individuals who are highly attached to their state might be more likely to positively evaluate their state, such as viewing their state as powerful. This section reruns the primary models presented in table A4 for only those individuals below the median on national attachment scores to assess whether the sense of state power effect still holds. Table A6 displays the OLS results for those individuals least nationally attached to their state (that is, respondents who fall below the median on national attachment scores). The results suggest that the effect of power on MI is just as strong for this truncated sample.

A4.4 Waltz Cross-Validated: Structure Still Explains a Lot With a Little

While the coefficients on the sense of power seem reasonably large and stable, this section takes a page out of the structuralist book to probe the substantive importance of power. In particular, if we knew *nothing* about an individual except for their sense of state power, could we still explain hawkishness? A basic premise of structuralist theory is that structure – namely power against the backdrop of anarchy – tends to explain a lot of variance with very little, regardless of unit-level idiosyncracies (Waltz 1959; 1979). We think of structuralism as a state-level concern today, but past structuralists applied this argument straight to humans. Take Wolfers's (1962, 13) classic fire example: even if individuals "vary widely in their predispositions," a house on fire compels all of us to run for the exits, "whatever the psychological peculiarities of the actors." This section examines exactly this question, whether the sense of power alone predicts substantial variance in hawkishness, regardless of dispositional peculiarities.

To examine this question, this section uses ten-fold cross validation to assess the predictive performance of the fully-specified models (from figure 1 of the main text) against a model that uses the sense of state power as the *only* right-hand covariate. K-fold cross validation works by splitting the dataset into k distinct subsets (here, ten distinct subsets). The first nine subsets are used to fit (or "train") the model, and then the model attempts to predict the tenth slice of data out-of-sample (i.e., the "test" set). Then, the process repeats such that each of the ten slices serves once as the out-of-sample target, calculating the root mean square error (RMSE) for each iteration to assess model performance along the way. The intuition is as follows: if power explains a lot with a little, then the model with the sense of power alone will predict hawkishness nearly as well as the fully-specified model.

Figure A1 displays the cross-validation results, with the RMSEs plotted from each of the ten folds,

Table A6: Robustness Check: Sense of Power Explains Militant Orientation (Low National Attachment)

	US Sample		China Sample		Russia Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.58***	0.57***	0.58***	0.63***	0.47***	0.48***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.10)
Sense of State Power	0.05**	0.05**	0.12***	0.05**	0.09***	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
National Attachment		0.02		0.03		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Less than College		−0.01		0.03		0.04
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Male		0.05^		−0.03		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)
Age		0.01		−0.00		−0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)
Harm/Care		0.00		−0.02		−0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Fairness/Reciprocity		−0.01		0.04*		−0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ingroup/Loyalty		−0.00		0.07**		0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Authority/Respect		0.06***		0.06***		0.07*
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.03)
Extraversion		0.01				
		(0.01)				
Agreeableness		0.00				
		(0.01)				
Conscientiousness		−0.03				
		(0.02)				
Neuroticism		0.02				
		(0.02)				
Openness		−0.01				
		(0.01)				
Right-Wing Authoritarianism		0.04**				
		(0.02)				
Social Dominance Orientation		0.04*				
		(0.02)				
R^2	0.06	0.36	0.18	0.35	0.21	0.42
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.29	0.17	0.32	0.20	0.33
Num. obs.	167	165	287	287	65	65

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

where lower RMSEs indicate better out-of-sample predictive accuracy. The results tell a clear story: the sense of state power alone predicts nearly as well as all of the individual-level variables taken together. In the US, the full model displays an average RMSE of 0.16 whereas the model with power alone displays an average RMSE of 0.18 ($t = 2.93, p < .01$). The stories are the same in China and Russia (average RMSEs of 0.19 versus 0.22, $t = 3.94, p < .01$ and 0.15 versus 0.17, $t = 1.44, p = .17$, respectively). In other words, if we knew *nothing* about an individual except for their sense of state power, we could predict their hawkishness with about 90.1%, 85.1%, and 87.3% of the accuracy of the full models, respectively. Of course, this is not to rule out the possibility that other variables could also provide strong predictive

purchase. The point is that we can get pretty far by looking at power alone, as structural realists have long pointed out.



Figure A1: *Ten-Fold Cross-Validation Results.* Root mean square errors (RMSEs) from regressions using ten-fold cross-validation to assess predictive performance. The "All Variables" model refers to the full regression models reported above, which include standard individual-level covariates as well as the sense of power. The "Sense of Power Alone" model refers to a regression using the sense of state power as the only right-hand side covariate.

A5 Moderation Effects: The Sense of Power Changes and Reveals

A5.1 US Moderation Analysis: Power Reveals Conservatives, Changes Liberals

Figure 3(A) of the main text displays the interaction between the sense of American power and political ideology, with liberals versus conservatives dichotomized to ease visualization. Table A7 displays the full regression table, with political ideology retained on the original seven-point scale from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative." The other variables in the regression include male (relative to female or non-binary), age, urban resident (relative to individuals who live in a city or village with fewer than 50K residents), less than college (relative to individuals with a bachelor's, master's, doctorate, or professional degree), and white (relative to non-white).

Table A8 presents the regression results for the security scenario in the US, retaining political ideology on the original numeric scale. Notably, although liberals tend to reject force on average (i.e., a negative main effect), they tend to endorse violence at higher rates than conservatives as their sense of state power increases. However, as mentioned in the main text, this effect is primarily limited to the

Table A7: OLS Estimates: Sense of Power Reveals Conservatives, Changes Liberals

	(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	0.49***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Sense of State Power	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sense of State Power × Conservative	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male		0.08***
		(0.01)
Age		0.00**
		(0.00)
Urban Resident		−0.01
		(0.02)
Less than College		0.02
		(0.01)
White		0.01
		(0.02)
R^2	0.24	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.24	0.26
Num. obs.	1593	1558

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

risky preventive strikes item.

A5.2 China Moderation Analysis: Power Changes Dovish Moral Foundations

Figure 3(B) of the main text displays the moderating effect of the sense of Chinese power on the individualizing foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, with respondents' scores on each foundation added and median split to ease visualization. Table A9 presents the regression table, with moral foundations represented using unidimensional factor scores. In short, although harm/care and fairness/reciprocity tend to explain negative variance in militant internationalism, when those same individuals feel that their state is powerful, they become just as militant as individuals with more dispo-

Table A8: OLS Results: The Sense of American Power Moderates Liberals in Iran Scenario

	Risky Preventive Strike	Nuclear Weapons Use
(Intercept)	0.58***	0.57***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sense of American Power	0.03**	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Liberal	−0.08***	−0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.08***	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	−0.02**	−0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	−0.07**	−0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	0.00	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
National Attachment	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sense of Power × Liberal	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.17	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.17	0.14
Num. obs.	734	732

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

sitionally militant tendencies. National attachment is represented using unidimensional factor scores. The other variables are coded as described in table A7. Table A10 further presents the moderation results for the South China Sea security scenario, retaining the moral foundations on the original (i.e., non-binarized) scale.

Table A9: OLS Estimates: The Sense of Chinese Power Changes Dovish Moral Foundations

	Harm/Care		Fairness/Reciprocity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.70***	0.75***	0.72***	0.76***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Sense of State Power	0.04***	0.03**	0.02**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Harm/Care	−0.08***	−0.07***		−0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Fairness/Reciprocity		0.00	−0.05***	−0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ingroup/Loyalty		0.01		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Authority/Respect		0.06***		0.07***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
National Attachment		0.04***		0.05***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Less than College		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Male		−0.03*		−0.04**
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Age		−0.01		−0.01
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Sense of State Power × Harm/Care	0.06***	0.03***		
	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Sense of State Power × Fairness/Reciprocity			0.05***	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.18	0.31	0.09	0.30
Adj. R^2	0.18	0.30	0.09	0.30
Num. obs.	880	879	880	879

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A10: OLS Results: Sense of Chinese Power Moderates Dovish Foundations in South China Sea Scenario

	Countries Harbor Aggressive Intentions	U.S. Threatens China's Security
(Intercept)	0.79***	0.80***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sense of Chinese Power	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Binding Foundations	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
National Attachment	−0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
No College Degree	0.01	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	−0.01^	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	−0.00	−0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Harm/Care	0.02**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fairness/Reciprocity	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sense of Power × Binding Foundations	−0.01***	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.27	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.13
Num. obs.	879	879

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

A6 Country-Specific Scenarios: The Sense of Power and Discrete Security Attitudes

A6.1 Russian Maritime Security

Table A11 displays the logistic regression results for the Russian maritime security scenario.

Table A11: OLS Results: The Sense of Russian Power Explains Discrete Security Attitudes

	Strike the Foreign Warship
(Intercept)	−4.69***
	(1.02)
Sense of Russian Power	0.53*
	(0.24)
National Attachment	−0.06
	(0.23)
No College Degree	0.64
	(0.46)
Male	0.97*
	(0.46)
Age	0.05*
	(0.02)
Harm/Care	−0.63*
	(0.30)
Fairness/Reciprocity	−0.09
	(0.27)
Ingroup/Loyalty	−0.22
	(0.33)
Authority/Respect	0.72*
	(0.35)
AIC	155.83
BIC	187.82
Log Likelihood	−67.92
Deviance	135.83
Num. obs.	181

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

A6.2 Support for Nuclear Weapons Use Against Iran

Table A12 displays the OLS regression results for the Iranian nuclear program scenario.

Table A12: OLS Results: Sense of American Power Explains Discrete Security Attitudes

	Risky Preventive Strike	Nuclear Weapons Use
(Intercept)	0.57***	0.57***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sense of American Power	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.08***	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	−0.02**	−0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	−0.07**	−0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
National Attachment	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.17	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.16	0.15
Num. obs.	734	732

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

A6.3 Tensions in the South China Sea

Table A13 displays the OLS regression results for the South China Sea scenario.

Table A13: OLS Results: Sense of Chinese Power Explains Discrete Security Attitudes

	Countries Harbor Aggressive Intentions	U.S. Threatens China's Security
(Intercept)	0.77***	0.78***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sense of Chinese Power	0.03***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
National Attachment	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)
No College Degree	0.00	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	−0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	−0.00	−0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Harm/Care	0.02**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fairness/Reciprocity	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ingroup/Loyalty	0.01^	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Authority/Respect	0.01*	0.01^
	(0.00)	(0.01)
R^2	0.24	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.23	0.10
Num. obs.	879	879

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ^$p < 0.1$

A7 Re-Analysis of the 2019 Chicago Council–Levada Center Survey

While this paper's original surveys suggest that the sense of power explains hawkishness, there are two concerns here: perhaps this consistent effect is in-part an artifact of the various questions used in the paper's original surveys, and the Russian sample size in particular is quite small (with only 181 individuals). To overcome these issues, this section re-analyzes a Chicago Council–Levada Center survey fielded in Russia in February 2019 (Smeltz and Wojtowicz 2019). The instrumentation and the regression results are presented below.

The survey included four items that tap into this paper's conception of the sense of power: (1) whether individuals view Russia's military power as rising, declining, or staying about the same, and whether Russia's international policy "in recent years" has improved or worsened Russia's (2) defensive capabilities, (3) economy, and (4) influence abroad. Factor analysis is used to reduce responses to these four questions down to a single sense of power dimension, where higher scores indicate a greater sense of Russian capacity, although the results are robust to additive combination.

Further, this paper is interested in four dependent variables, each of which captures preferences for an assertive foreign policy and beliefs in the efficacy of force to achieve state aims: (1) whether it is best for Russia to take an active part in versus stay out of world affairs, (2) whether Russian military involvement in Syria has been good or harmful to Russia, (3) whether Russia's forceful annexation of Crimea has been good or harmful to Russia, and (4) whether ten years from now (i.e., ten years from 2019) the Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk will be a part of Russia rather than independent or a part of Ukraine. This lattermost item is particularly interesting: although the question does not specify *how* those Republics would become part of Russia, the question at a minimum implies a perception that pro-Russian forces in the Donbas would emerge victorious, and at most implies that Russia might annex the Republics by force, as happened with Crimea in 2014. Indeed, that was exactly the pretense given by Putin for the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, just three years after this survey. In either case, the unification of these Republics with Russia would require some kind of bloodshed, and thus this item provides a measure of foreign policy hawkishness.

A7.1 Instrumentation

Perceptions of Russian Power

1. Do you think Russia is a rising military power, a declining military power, or is it staying about the same relative to other countries? [select one.]
2. What impact do you think Russia's international policy in recent years has had on the following factors? [select improved/worsened for each]
   (a) The state of the defense forces.
   (b) The state of the economy.
   (c) Russia's international influence.

Measures of Assertive, Hawkish Foreign Policy

1. Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? [select active part / stay out / don't know]
2. In your opinion has the Russian military involvement in Syria brought Russia more good or more harm on the whole? [select more good / more harm / neither]
3. In your opinion has the annexation of Crimea brought Russia more good or more harm on the whole? [select more good / more harm / neither]
4. Ten years from now, do you think the Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk will be: [select a part of Ukraine / a part of Russia / independent states]

A7.2 Regression Results

Table A14 displays coefficients from logistic regressions that model the relationship between the sense of Russian power (as measured in this survey) and each of these dependent variables.[2] "Voted for Putin" is a dichotomous variable with all other candidates as the baseline category, indicating whether the individual voted for Putin in Russia's 2018 presidential election.[3] "Rural Resident" is a five-point variable, where higher values indicate more rural respondents.[4] A one standard deviation increase in the sense of Russian power explains a consistent, positive increase in each of these hawkish beliefs, ranging from a 1.20 to 1.68 increase in the odds, an effect size only consistently overshadowed by

[2]The results here derive from models with missing data imputed, but the statistical and substantive conclusions are unchanged when using listwise deletion instead.

[3]The survey listed seven other candidates alongside Putin. 73% of respondents expressed that they voted for Putin.

[4]The scale's points include Moscow, over 500K residents, 100-499K residents, less than 100K residents, and rural settlement.

support for Putin himself. Together, these results provide further confirmation that the sense of state power explains positive variance in hawkishness, here replicated using a different set of measures.

Table A14: Logistic Regression Estimates: Sense of Russian Power Explains Alternative Hawkish Measures

	Assertive Posture in World Affairs	Military Involvement in Syria Effective	Annexation of Crimea Good for Russia	Luhansk and Donetsk Part of Russia within Ten Years
(Intercept)	0.26	-2.80^{***}	-1.24^{***}	-0.72^{*}
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Sense of Russian Power	0.33^{***}	0.45^{***}	0.52^{***}	0.18^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Voted for Putin	0.51^{*}	1.09^{***}	1.35^{***}	$0.47^{\wedge}$
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.24)
Male	0.02	0.60^{***}	0.30^{*}	0.37^{**}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age	0.01^{*}	0.03^{***}	0.02^{***}	$0.01^{\wedge}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Less than College	-0.21	0.01	-0.05	0.03
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Income	$0.12^{\wedge}$	0.03	-0.10	-0.17^{*}
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Rural Resident	-0.03	-0.06	0.08	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	1613	1613	1613	1613

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\wedge}p < 0.1$

A8 Survey Experiment

To verify the causal direction of power's effect on militant internationalism, the paper fielded an online survey experiment in January 2023. Respondents consisted of 1,203 US-based adults recruited from Prolific. The demographic composition of the sample is as follows: 51.0% male, 53.5% college educated (i.e., at least a four-year degree), 28.5% Democrat or strongly Democrat, 23.9% Republican or strongly Republican, 47.6% Independent, 13.3% aged 18-24, 30.9% aged 25-34, 24.3% aged 35-44, 15.0% aged 45-54, and 16.5% aged 55 or older. Thus, compared to the US adult population, the sample skews slightly younger and slightly more educated.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: rising US power, declining US power, and a baseline condition that provided no information about US power. The main text presents the full instrumentation used for the experiment, including the rise/decline prompt and the post-

treatment measures of militant internationalism (the DV) and the sense of state power (to further verify the measures used in the correlational studies). The remainder of this section presents the full regression table for figure 4 of the main text, as well as mediation analyses that assess possible mechanistic pathways.

A8.1 Regression Results

Table A15 presents the full regression results for the experiment. The first model assesses the effect of rising power relative to declining power, which is the primary focus of the paper's argument. However, to further verify that declining power induces hawkishness, the second model assesses the effect of declining power relative to the baseline, no power information condition. Age, conservative ideology, and national attachment are scaled to mean zero and standard deviation one. Male and college educated are binary indicators (relative to non-male and less than a completed bachelors degree, respectively). As described in the main text, the key takeaways are that rising power increases militant internationalism relative to declining power and declining power decreases militant internationalism relative to the baseline, no power information condition. The effect sizes are quite modest but very notable for such a brief intervention, given that militant internationalism is considered to be a very stable orientation.

A8.2 Mediation Analysis

The paper's core argument is that the sense of state power activates foreign policy hawkishness. However, a second possible expectation is that hawkish individuals are motivated to positively evaluate their state as powerful such that the correlational results reduce to motivated biases on the part of hawks, rather than the sense of power per se. Of course, the experimental results in table A15 provide the cleanest verification of the paper's expectation. However, to further verify this paper's expectation against the motivated pathway, this section empirically investigates the explanatory work done by two possible pathways in the experiment: the power prompts activate a sense of power which in turn increases hawkishness (as this paper expects) versus the alternative path in which the power prompts activate hawkishness which in turn leads to a motivated desire for hawks to evaluate their state as powerful.[5] This analysis also serves as a construct validity check (see, e.g., Lench et al 2014), helping to validate the sense of power measures used in the correlational studies.

Figure A2 displays the results of this mediation analysis. The "Total" effect refers to the total effect

[5]These analyses employ the mediation technique outlined in Imai et al (2011) available in the `mediation` package for the R statistical programming environment (Tingley et al 2014).

Table A15: Rise/Decline Experiment: OLS Results

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	−0.09	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Rise Condition	0.13**	
	(0.05)	
Decline Condition		−0.13**
		(0.05)
Age	0.02	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Male	0.08	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
White	−0.01	−0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Bachelors Degree	−0.16**	−0.16***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Conservative	0.23***	0.21***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	0.03	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)
National Attachment	0.37***	0.44***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.38	0.44
Adj. R^2	0.38	0.44
Num. obs.	800	785

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

of the rise treatment (relative to the decline treatment) on militant internationalism as the DV (left panel) and the sense of state power as the DV (right panel). The average causal mediation effect (or "ACME") refers to the effect of treatment on these DVs that flows through the sense of power (left panel) or militant internationalism (right panel) as a mediating variable. Finally, the "Direct" effect refers to the effect of treatment that flows through all mediating variables except for the sense of power (left panel) and militant internationalism (right panel). With these estimates in hand, the mediation effect, or ACME, divided by the total effect quantifies the proportion mediated via each mechanistic pathway.

At least two results stand out. First, the right panel's total effect confirms that the treatments ex-



Figure A2: *Alternative Mediation Pathway.* The rise treatment (relative decline treatment) serves as the IV, with two potential mediation pathways: treatments → sense of state power → militant internationalism versus treatment → militant internationalism → sense of state power. Confidence intervals estimated using 2,000 bootstrapped replications.

perimentally shift the sense of power and thus activate the same sense of power conceptualized in the correlational studies. Second, and more importantly, whereas the left panel shows that sense of power mediates a full 64.4% of the effect of power on hawkishness ($p < .001$), the right panel shows that hawkishness only mediates 5.5% of the effect of the prompts on the sense of power ($p < .01$). These proportions suggest that hawks might be motivated to evaluate their state as powerful, but far more explanatory work is done by this paper's suggested process that the sense of power begets hawkishness. However, given that these mediators were measured post-treatment rather than randomized, it is important to avoid strong conclusions about the causal pathways.

A9 Human Subjects and Research Ethics

The paper's original surveys were deemed exempt by the Institutional Review Boards at The Ohio State University (#2021E0239, #2021E0578, #2022E0350) and Dartmouth College (#00032660). Subjects recruited by the APP, Qualtrics, and Anketolog were compensated directly by those organizations at standard market rates. Subjects recruited on Prolific's platform were compensated an average of $13.97 per hour. All surveys began with an informed consent form and concluded with a debrief form that explained the purpose of the study and provided subjects the option to withdraw their data from the study at no penalty to the subject. No subject decided to exercise that option. The original surveys

fielded in China and Russia avoided sensitive questions about the countries' leaders, laws, and so forth. All subjects participated in the studies anonymously (i.e., no personally identifiable information was collected).

Below are the standard consent and debrief forms used in the surveys. The forms below are taken from the survey experiment fielded on Prolific, and other surveys used these forms with minor stylistic adjustments where appropriate.

A9.1 Consent Form

Foreign Policy Opinion Study – Consent to Participate in Research

The following academic research project investigates individuals' opinions about foreign affairs. You will be asked questions about yourself and your opinions about the U.S.'s relationships with other countries and the U.S.'s role in the world. You will not be fully informed about the nature of the study before your participation. After the study, you will receive more information and have the option to withdraw from the study if you so choose.

Your participation is completely voluntary. The survey will take approximately 2 to 7 minutes. You will be compensated the amount you agreed upon before you entered into the survey. If you decide to stop participating in the study, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The research team is located at Dartmouth College, and your decision will not affect your future relationship with Dartmouth College. We will work to make sure that no one sees your survey responses without approval. But, because we are using the internet, there is a chance that someone could access your online responses without permission. In some cases, this information could be used to identify you. Your data will be protected with a code to reduce the risk that other people can view the responses. Your de-identified information may be used or shared with other researchers without your additional informed consent. We know of no benefits to you for participating in this study.

If any question makes you uncomfortable or is upsetting, please move on to the next one. You also have the option to discontinue the survey at any time without penalty. If you have questions, comments or concerns about the survey, or if you feel you have been harmed by study participation, you may contact [AUTHOR NAME] at Dartmouth College at [AUTHOR EMAIL]@dartmouth.edu.

By clicking the next button below, you confirm that you are 18 years of age or older and confirm your consent to participate in the survey.

A9.2 Debrief Form

Thank you!

The study you have just completed examines individuals' attitudes towards foreign affairs. In order to study the relationship between perceptions of power and foreign policy opinions, some participants were told that U.S. power in international relations has increased, some were told that U.S. power has decreased, and others were given no information about power. We gave participants this information to study the effect of different perceptions of power on decisions.

All information, situations, and scenarios presented in the survey were purely hypothetical and may or may not reflect the actual characteristics or intentions of countries in international relations.

Your participation is greatly appreciated by the researchers. You can withdraw your data from this study within two weeks of today at no penalty to you or loss of benefits. If you decide to withdraw your data, please type a removal code in the field provided below and email it to [AUTHOR NAME] at Dartmouth College at [AUTHOR EMAIL]@dartmouth.edu.

If you have further questions about this study, you may contact [AUTHOR NAME] at Dartmouth College at [AUTHOR EMAIL]@dartmouth.edu.

If for any reason you want to remove yourself from this study, type any code below and email a copy of the code to [AUTHOR EMAIL]@dartmouth.edu within two weeks of today to remove your data.

Data Removal Code: [CODE ENTRY BOX]

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research. Please click the next button to receive the Completion Code to manually enter on Prolific.

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