Supplementary Materials

Download data at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MPQUE2

Priority and ownership indices: illustrations

Table A1 - Example of relative and absolute priority indices applied to four countries, for the same draft

	Priority (absolute)	**Priority (relative)**
Root L-Document **A/64/L.63** Original sponsor: Bolivia Co-sponsors (joined prior to tabling): ex.: Bahrain Document position within the draft: 0	Bolivia (1) Bahrain (2)	Bolivia (1) Bahrain (2)
Edit 1 **A/64/L.63/Rev.1** Co-sponsors: Burundi (only joined in this Revision) Document position within the draft: 1	Burundi (2+1=3)	Burundi (2)
Edit 2 **A/64/L.63/Rev.1/Add.1** Additional sponsor: Angola Document position within the draft: 2 Total draft length = 3	Angola (3+2=5)	Angola (3)

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Table A2 presents a summary of descriptive statistics that provides an overall view of the distribution of the priority and ownership indices in the dataset, along with other metrics used to build them.

Table A2 – Descriptive statistics of indices and other metrics

	Total sponsors per draft (ownership)	Country priority score (absolute)	Country priority score (relative)	Draft length
Min.	1	1	1	1
1st qu.	32	2	1	1
Median	59	2	1	1
Mean	67.26	2.42	1.47	1.43
3rd qu.	109	3	2	2
Max.	193	6	3	4

Source: elaborated by the authors. Note that continuous values are reported for the sake of summarization, but only integers are used to score total sponsors and priority.

Figure A1 shows that the priority and total sponsors in the UNGA are intuitively correlated: as drafts become lengthier, they offer more entry opportunities for new countries to join, which means the final count of sponsors tends to rise during revisions. UNGA drafts are rarely longer than two L-Documents.

Figure A1 – Correlation between total sponsors and draft length



Source: elaborated by the authors. All coefficients are significant at the $p<0.001$ level. R^2 is 0.63 for the linear model and 0.68 for the quadratic model.

Data gathering

Metadata on draft resolutions were retrieved from the UN Digital Library (UNDL, https://digitallibrary.un.org/). We implemented a six-step procedure to extract and process this information:

(a) Selecting and extracting the corpus: We retrieved metadata from L-Documents via the UNDL search engine, by applying a custom search formula at the *simple search* interface, combined with faceting to restrict our results to the UNGA. An example of the formula for the year 2017 is provided below:

title:'draft resolution' AND year:2017 NOT (documentsymbol: 'hrc' OR documentsymbol: 'ac' OR documentsymbol: 'es' OR documentsymbol: 'conf')

The search ignored documents which, though bearing the "A/" prefix in their UN Document Symbol, relate to *ad hoc* bodies, thematic conferences, or separate UN organs with a distinct workflow (i.e. the HRC). Our results also ignore corrigenda (Corr.), but preserve amendments, as the latter can be informative on country preferences (i.e. interest in editing contents of a given draft). UNDL's export utility allows the user to define pertinent metadata by supplying MARC Codes. We extracted 19 variables related to draft identification, date, topic, authorship, related documents, among others. The full set of variables is shown in the table below.

Table A3 – List of variables

MARC code	Variable name in dataset	Description
089	doc_type	Type of document (b02 draft, b01 resolution, b23 voting record)
269	date	Date
191__a	undocsymbol	UN Document Symbol
191__c	session	UNGA Session
981	un_bodies	UN Bodies
245__a	title	Title (draft title)
245__b	version	Title of type of document (resolution, draft resolution, revised draft resolution, amendment, etc.)
610__a	rel_orgs	Related organizations
611__a	rel_init1	Related initiatives
630__a	rel_init2	Related initiatives2
650__a	subject_list	Subject (multiple topics)
651__a	subject_country	Subject (if specific country or region is targeted)
9911_d	subject_agenda	Subject (agenda item)
993__a	rel_docs	Related documents
791__a	rel_res_vote	Voted resolution (applies only to b23 voting records)
245__c	sp_list_t	List of sponsors (extracted from Title)
7102__a	sp_list_a	List of sponsors (extracted from Authors)
500__a	notes1	Notes
515	notes2	Notes

Source: elaborated by the authors.

(b) Matching with voting data: In order to monitor the outcome of an L-Document (e.g. withdrawal, adoption by vote, without a vote, etc.), the results from the previous operation must be complemented with voting records. A separate search was done through UNDL for the latter, covering the same time period, and both results were merged. L-Documents with no matching voting data were left in blank or completed through manual inspection. Possible outcomes for draft resolutions include: (1) adoption without a vote, (2) recorded vote, (3) rejection, and (4) withdrawal by sponsors.

(c) Removing unwanted L-Documents: As the dataset is focused on draft sponsorship by member states at the UNGA, the following types of L-Documents were discarded: (1) drafts submitted by UN leadership (e.g.: President of the UNGA or the Secretary General), (2) drafts submitted by the representatives of Main Committees (e.g. Chairman, Rapporteur, etc.), unassigned to member states; (3) drafts mentioning no country as sponsor; (4) corrigenda and other pieces which cannot impact content or authorship; (5) false positives (e.g. documents incorrectly catalogued at the UNDL).

It is important to underscore that this removal affected more some committees, which means the filtered outcome is not evenly distributed across committees. Committees such as C.5, C.2 and C.6 were more prone to omit country names in published drafts. Although this visibly limits inferences on each committee's productivity, this filtering was necessary given how the main object of study of the dataset is activity by states.

(d) Accounting for groups and withdrawals: Drafts which were presented by a member-state "on behalf" of a given group had their list of sponsors edited, so that the full list of members of the said group was included. We carried out additional research on several information sources relating to such groups (e.g. the G77, the EU) in order to obtain the full record of participating member states at each year. In addition, a categorical variable for identifying groups was added. During this step, we also accounted for instances when countries withdrew as individual sponsors, to remove their names from the sponsors list and tally them in a separate roster.

(e) Counting sponsors and coding priority: Given the many entry doors at the disposal of member states, the raw UNDL metadata is insufficient to discriminate supporting countries based on the priority of their engagement. It is common that even the very first iteration of an L-Document will present a sizeable number of co-sponsors from the start. In order to more accurately establish who was "sponsor zero", additional sources were consulted. From Main

Committees (C.1 to C.6), we consulted Committee Reports, Summary Records[1] – both of which searchable at the UNDL –, and lists of "Proposal Status", which are normally made available at the webpage of each committee. Additional sources from the Plenary included Meeting Records/*Procès-Verbal* and Press Releases. Country sponsorship was thus weighted based on priority.

(f) Sequencing: Even though all L-Documents have unique UN Document Symbols and entries at the UNDL, they cannot be considered independent pieces. In fact, many extracted drafts are subsequent versions of a preceding document. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish every document between the original draft and the complementary additions (revisions and addenda). For instance, L-Documents 'A/63/L.29', 'A/63/L.29/Rev.1' and 'A/63/L.29/Rev.1/Add.1' should not be considered 3 independent drafts, but one single piece, consisting of a root document ('A/63/L.29') and followed by two later edits. We refer to this process as "sequencing".

One of the implications of the sequencing procedure is that our final dataset acquires a nested structured. As sponsors participate in L-Documents, and L-Documents combine with subsequent revisions and addenda to form a single draft, our data can be aggregated in different levels. We therefore focus on the highest level of aggregation, "drafts", as fully sequenced sets of L-Documents. Nonetheless, the published dataset also provides a lower level of aggregation, down to separate L-Documents.

The final codebook of all variables listed on the dataset, on both levels of aggregation (L-Documents and Drafts) is the following:

[1] C.1 is the only Main Committee which does not publish Summary Records.

Table A4 – Codebook of variables

Ldocs	Drafts	Variables	Description
		id_undl_ldoc	Unique document ID as attributed by the UNDL interface (not a document symbol)
		id_draft	Draft ID (attributed manually)
		undocsymbol	UN Document Symbol
		ldoc_final	UN Document Symbol for the last L-Doc sequenced for the draft
		n_sponsors_final	Final number of sponsors, considering all sequenced L-Docs and withdrawals
		ldoc_or	UN Document Symbol for original L-Doc (root document of the sequence)
		n_sponsors_or	Number of sponsors of the original L-Doc
		ldoc_edit1	UN Document Symbol for 1st edit of the sequence (likewise for vars _edit2, _edit3)
		n_sponsors_ed1	Number of sponsors of the L-Doc which introduced the 1st edit (likewise for vars _ed2, _ed3)
		draft_length	Total L-Docs sequenced in the draft
		date_or	Date of original L-Doc
		date_final	Date of last sequences L-Doc
		days_elapsed	= date_final – date_or
		doc_type	Type of document (b02 draft, b01 resolution, b23 voting record)
		date	Date of L-Doc
		session	UNGA Session
		un_bodies	UN Bodies
		title	Title (L-Doc or draft title)
		version	Title of type of document (resolution, draft resolution, revised draft resolution, amendment, etc.)
		rel_orgs	Related organizations
		rel_int1	Related initiatives
		rel_int2	Related initiatives2
		subject_list	Subject (multiple topics)
		subject_country	Subject (if specific country or region is targeted)
		subject_agenda	Subject (agenda item)
		rel_docs	Related documents
		posit_in_draft	The position of the L-Doc within the full draft
		outcome	Adopted (without a vote), Amendment rejected/accepted, Postponed, Voting recorded, Rejected, Withdrawn (or NA for L-Docs succeeded by Rev. Add. etc)
		group	Name of group or groups which presented the L-Doc
		sp_zero	Sponsor zero or original sponsor of the L-Doc
		sp_list_t	List of sponsors (extracted from Title)
		notes1	Notes
		sp_withdraw	Withdrawing sponsors
		n_sponsors	Number of sponsors
		sp_list_a	List of sponsors (extracted from Authors)
		notes2	Notes

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Results

Draft level analysis

The dataset registers sponsorship behavior for all 193 UNGA members plus Palestine through over 2,518 drafts. If all member country x drafts combinations are arrayed, we obtain over 400k observations. The resulting dataset has a multilevel structure: all countries act upon all drafts, and drafts are nested within years. Some variables are indexed to countries (*i*) (e.g. ODA/GDP ratio), other to drafts (*n*) (e.g. issuing committee) and years (*t*). In addition, resolutions are nested within years, while countries are not nested (crossed).

Figure A2 – Diagram exemplifying the multilevel structure of the dataset



Source: elaborated by the authors.

Given this layering of our variables and the repeated observations, a multilevel model was employed. These data were submitted to two tests.

Table A5 - Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Data source
Year *t*	470,250	2014	2.89	2009	2018	Own data
Priority (absolute) *in*	470,250	1.60	2.23	0	6	Own data
US priority *n*	470,250	0.98	1.86	0	6	Own data
France priority *n*	470,250	1.47	2.13	0	6	Own data
UK priority *n*	470,250	1.32	2.06	0	6	Own data
China priority *n*	470,250	1.71	2.29	0	6	Own data
US sponsored first *in*	470,250	0.17	0.37	0	1	Own data
France sponsored first *in*	470,250	0.24	0.43	0	1	Own data
UK sponsored first *in*	470,250	0.21	0.41	0	1	Own data
China sponsored first *in*	470,250	0.19	0.39	0	1	Own data
Country sponsored *in*	470,250	0.35	0.48	0	1	Own data
Country followed the US *in*	470,250	0.02	0.14	0	1	Own data
Country followed France *in*	470,250	0.03	0.17	0	1	Own data
Country followed the UK *in*	470,250	0.03	0.16	0	1	Own data
Country followed China *in*	470,250	0.02	0.13	0	1	Own data
t	470,250	4.73	2.89	0	9	Own data
Ratio ODA(US)/GDP *it*	319,943	0.01	0.04	0.0000	0.43	OECD (aid), WB (GDP)
Ratio ODA(France)/GDP *it*	310,524	0.003	0.01	-0.001	0.12	OECD (aid), WB (GDP)
Ratio ODA(UK)/GDP *it*	306,900	0.002	0.01	-0.36	0.08	OECD (aid), WB (GDP)
Ratio ODA(China)/GDP *it*	100,297	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.78	AidData.org (aid), WB (GDP)
Democracy score *it*	467,326	6.62	3.08	0.00	10.00	QOG FH Polity
NATO *i*	470,250	0.13	0.34	0	1	NATO website
EU *i*	470,250	0.13	0.34	0	1	EU website
Former French colony *i*	470,250	0.16	0.36	0	1	CEPII
Former UK colony *i*	470,250	0.33	0.47	0	1	CEPII
G77 *i*	470,250	0.69	0.46	0	1	Misc.
Trade share w/ US *it*	370,518	0.10	0.14	0.0000	0.88	UNComtrade
Trade share w/ France *it*	370,518	0.04	0.05	0.0000	0.37	UNComtrade
Trade share w/ UK *it*	370,518	0.03	0.03	0.0000	0.36	UNComtrade
Trade share w/ China *it*	370,518	0.09	0.08	0.001	0.66	UNComtrade
Draft committee (factor) *n*						Own data
Total Sponsors (% of UNGA members) *n*	470,250	0.35	0.24	0.01	1.00	Own data

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Great power influence as a moderating factor

For our first test with the complete data, we verified whether great power influence affected a country's decision to sponsor a draft. Hence, the dependent variable is dichotomous: a member state's choice to sponsor a draft or not. Great power influence is factored in as a moderator or interaction effect. Table A5 illustrates the coding process by showing, for three fictional drafts, how the absolute priority scores of the US and country *i* were compared for each draft in order to build the variables used in the model.

Table A6 – Example of how the absolute priority index was used to build the dependent and dummy variables

	Great power US absolute priority score	**Country *i* absolute priority score**	**Dependent variable sponsorship**	**Great power sponsored first dummy**
Draft A	The US was the original sponsor. Absolute priority score = 1	Country *i* joined as co-sponsor. Absolute priority score = 2	Country *i* sponsored draft A. Dependent variable = 1	US joined earlier than country *i* (1<2), so dummy = 1
Draft B	The US joined as an additional sponsor. Absolute priority score = 3	Country *i* was the original sponsor. Absolute priority score = 1	Country *i* sponsored draft B. Dependent variable = 1	US joined after country *i* (3>1), so dummy = 0
Draft C	The US was the original sponsor. Absolute priority score = 1	Country *i* did not sponsor. Absolute priority score = NA	Country *i* did not sponsor draft C. Dependent variable = 0	US joined early but country *i* did not join at all, so dummy = 0

Source: elaborated by the authors.

For countries experiencing heavier influence (e.g. high levels of ODA dependency), the early support by a patron of a given draft should affect more strongly its likelihood of also

supporting it. In simplified notation, a model for the probability that a country *i* will sponsor draft *n* is given by:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&logit(Sponsorship)_{in} \\
&\quad = \beta_1 Total\ Draft\ Sponsors_n + \beta_2 Draft\ Committee_n \\
&\quad + \beta_3 Democracy\ Score_{it} + \beta_4 Grt.Power\ Sponsored\ First_{in} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 Group\ Membership_i + \beta_6 Group\ Membership_i \\
&\quad * Grt.Power\ Sponsored\ First_{in} + \beta_7 ODA\ Dependency\ from\ Grt.Power_{it} \\
&\quad + \beta_8 ODA\ Depend.from\ Grt.Power_{it} * Grt.Power\ Sponsored\ First_{in} \\
&\quad + \beta_9 Trade\ Depend.from\ Grt.Power_{it} \\
&\quad + \beta_{10} Trade\ Depend.from\ Grt.Power_{it} * Grt.Power\ Sponsored\ First_{in} \\
&\quad + \beta_{11}\alpha_i + \beta_{12}\delta_n + \beta_{13}\gamma_t
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the model includes random intercepts for all three levels. Anova tests did not recommend the expansion of the model to include random slopes.

The variables of interest are those that place countries under the influence of a great power: belonging to specific geopolitical groups (e.g. for the US, NATO; for France, being a former colony, etc.), ODA dependency (measured as ODA received from a great power, as a share of GDP), and trade dependency (measured as the participation of the great power in a country's total trade, i.e. imports + exports). By interacting these variables with a dummy indicating if a great power first sponsored a resolution, we are able to check whether this entrance exerts differenced effects on UNGA members, according to their level of dependency. We expect this moderating effect to be significant and positive. That is, the probability that a country will sponsor a draft following the lead of a great power increases in the proportion of dependency increases. Countries with small dependency, in turn, should be relatively unmoved in their decision to sponsor or not if a great power goes about it first.

Other controls were added, relating to draft (e.g. number of sponsors, issuing committee) and country features (democracy) that might influence the likelihood of sponsorship. We applied this model to all four great powers.

Table A7 - GLMM models with random intercepts. Dependent variable: sponsorship

	US	France	UK	China
(Intercept)	-4.23 (0.23)***	-4.52 (0.21)***	-4.51 (0.21)***	-3.84 (0.29)***
Draft Level				
n_sp_final_p	9.44 (0.27)***	11.19 (0.34)***	11.10 (0.31)***	12.06 (0.41)***
factor(com)C2	-1.36 (0.19)***	-1.69 (0.24)***	-1.79 (0.22)***	0.65 (0.28)*
factor(com)C3	0.60 (0.16)***	0.89 (0.19)***	0.54 (0.18)**	0.53 (0.23)*
factor(com)C4	-0.25 (0.24)	0.62 (0.29)*	0.45 (0.27)	0.75 (0.34)*
factor(com)C5	-1.44 (0.69)*	-2.63 (0.84)**	-2.55 (0.78)**	0.82 (1.11)
factor(com)C6	-0.62 (0.28)*	0.47 (0.35)	0.27 (0.32)	-0.03 (0.45)
factor(com)P	0.36 (0.16)*	0.62 (0.19)**	0.17 (0.18)	0.45 (0.23)*
Country level				
fh_ipolity2	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)**
nato	-0.28 (0.36)			
eu		-0.30 (0.35)	-0.19 (0.39)	
former_col		0.38 (0.12)**	-0.12 (0.10)	
g77	1.75 (0.15)***	1.83 (0.13)***	1.98 (0.14)***	-0.33 (0.18)
oda_gdp	-0.25 (0.55)	0.52 (1.71)	8.56 (3.26)**	0.03 (0.34)
trade_sh	-1.13 (0.23)***	1.69 (0.48)***	-1.16 (0.37)**	-0.26 (0.43)
Country-draft				
grt_power_first	-8.47 (0.08)***	-8.50 (0.08)***	-8.02 (0.08)***	-8.99 (0.13)***
Cross-level interactions				
nato:grt_power_first	**4.17 (0.12)*** **			
eu:grt_power_first		**0.83 (0.14)*** **	**0.63 (0.14)*** **	
former_col:grt_power_first		**-0.89 (0.06)*** **	**-1.45 (0.04)*** **	
grt_power_first:oda_gdp_us	**1.63 (0.80)***	**-19.25 (3.45)*** **	**-62.04 (5.24)*** **	**1.54 (0.82)**
grt_power_first:trade_sh	**1.58 (0.15)*** **	**1.01 (0.46)***	**4.34 (0.64)*** **	**0.86 (0.57)**
AIC	180844.89	162950.08	164515.81	54005.92
BIC	181052.94	163178.37	164743.95	54173.46
Log Likelihood	-90402.45	-81453.04	-82235.90	-26984.96
Num. obs.	243447	237237	235677	81438
Num. groups: draft:t	2475	2475	2475	1392
Num. groups: iso3	124	120	123	101
Num. groups: t	10	10	10	6

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Source: elaborated by the authors. Coefficients are not exponentiated. Total number of observations in each regression varied because of different missingness for some of the variables specific to each great power.

Draft followership

The previous models verified great power influence as a moderating effect. It can be argued that this is a more incidental phenomena, and that multiple considerations might impact the decision to sponsor a draft. Even though the added controls provide some security regarding the validity of this relation, we carried out an additional robustness test, by replacing the dependent variable, from sponsorship to followership, in the previous model. The dependent variable is coded as 1 for instances when country *i* sponsored draft *n* after initial endorsement by a great power – i.e. the last column in the illustration on Table A6.

As this model now concerns explicit followership, we use a simpler model, without cross-level moderator effects.

$$
\begin{aligned}
logit(Grt.\,Power\ Followership)_{in} \\
&= \beta_1 Total\ Draft\ \ Sponsors_n + \beta_2 Draft\ Committee_n \\
&+ \beta_3 Democracy\ Score_{it} + \beta_4 Group\ Membership_i \\
&+ \beta_5 ODA\ Dependency\ from\ Grt.Power_{it} \\
&+ \beta_6 Trade\ Depend.\ from\ Grt.Power_{it} + \beta_7 \alpha_i + \beta_8 \delta_n + \beta_9 \gamma_t
\end{aligned}
$$

This model again uses random intercepts. Anova testing did not recommend the usage of random slopes for all four powers.

Table A8 – Robustness test (GLMM models with random intercepts. Dependent variable: great power followership)

	US	France	UK	China
(Intercept)	-8.07 (0.48)***	-7.15 (0.35)***	-7.60 (0.40)***	-7.86 (0.47)***
Draft level				
n_sp_final_p	2.84 (0.72)***	2.80 (0.56)***	3.23 (0.59)***	4.76 (0.78)***
factor(com)C2	-2.80 (0.64)***	-1.78 (0.41)***	-1.78 (0.43)***	-2.82 (0.69)***
factor(com)C3	0.20 (0.39)	0.40 (0.31)	0.49 (0.33)	0.23 (0.45)
factor(com)C4	-1.39 (0.81)	-0.70 (0.53)	-0.41 (0.56)	-0.01 (0.76)
factor(com)C5	-15.43 (743.31)	-15.27 (454.66)	-15.09 (457.01)	-16.45 (1332.73)
factor(com)C6	-0.98 (0.97)	0.01 (0.60)	0.57 (0.61)	-0.14 (1.12)
factor(com)P	0.27 (0.39)	0.25 (0.31)	0.32 (0.33)	0.25 (0.46)
Country level				
fh_ipolity2	0.09 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.02)
nato	**0.27 (0.46)**			
eu		**0.43 (0.56)**	**0.22 (0.51)**	
former_col		**0.05 (0.20)**	**-0.61 (0.14)***	
g77	**-1.13 (0.20)***	**-1.26 (0.21)***	**-0.94 (0.19)***	**-0.88 (0.13)***
oda_gdp	**0.22 (1.28)**	**2.95 (3.40)**	**-7.03 (7.22)**	**0.20 (0.80)**
trade_sh	**0.26 (0.46)**	**3.45 (1.01)***	**2.34 (0.98)***	**0.14 (0.66)**
AIC	23904.90	37481.95	32442.31	7346.89
BIC	24071.35	37658.35	32618.60	7486.50
Log Likelihood	-11936.45	-18723.97	-16204.15	-3658.45
Num. obs.	243447	237237	235677	81438
Num. groups: draft:t	2475	2475	2475	1392
Num. groups: iso3	124	120	123	101
Num. groups: t	10	10	10	6

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Source: elaborated by the authors. Coefficients not exponentiated.

The effects of US ODA and trade dependency remain positive, but no longer statistically significant. Nonetheless, log transforming the values for ODA and trade dependency (not shown in the table) renders them significant again at the 0.1 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The results for France and the UK are in tune with previous tests, as only trade dependency stands out as a relevant predictor of followership, with a positive and statistically significant effect. For the three Western powers, two factors were consistently relevant: countries with higher democracy scores were more likely to follow the US, France and the UK, while countries from the G77 were more prone to avoid doing so. The same effect was picked up for China and the G77, though we suspect a different mechanism is at work. Virtually all G77 drafts are introduced alongside with China, which means Chinese endorsement prior to that of a G77 partner proves in itself a very rare event.

As a last robustness test, we repeated the previous model, this time applying a lagged dependent variable at *t-1* (followership count at the previous year), in order to verify the present impact of past levels of followership. Apart from a loss in statistical significance in trade dependency for the UK, there are no major changes in the results.

Table A9 – Robustness test (GLMM models with random intercepts. Dependent variable: great power followership)

	US	**France**	**UK**	**China**
(Intercept)	-8.27 (0.48)***	-7.38 (0.35)***	-7.80 (0.39)***	-7.51 (0.54)***
n_sp_final_p	2.82 (0.77)***	2.79 (0.59)***	2.89 (0.62)***	3.97 (0.88)***
factor(com)C2	-3.08 (0.72)***	-1.83 (0.43)***	-1.71 (0.46)***	-2.75 (0.81)***
factor(com)C3	0.17 (0.41)	0.34 (0.32)	0.44 (0.35)	0.15 (0.50)
factor(com)C4	-1.48 (0.87)	-0.72 (0.56)	-0.42 (0.59)	-0.25 (0.88)
factor(com)C5	-16.96 (1574.68)	-15.32 (460.43)	-15.03 (466.77)	-16.61 (1766.25)
factor(com)C6	-1.22 (1.09)	0.08 (0.62)	0.30 (0.66)	-0.38 (1.34)
factor(com)P	0.16 (0.41)	0.23 (0.33)	0.24 (0.35)	-0.07 (0.51)
fh_ipolity2	0.09 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.03)
nato	**0.24 (0.40)**			
g77	-1.00 (0.17)***	-1.10 (0.18)***	-0.80 (0.16)***	-0.85 (0.18)***
eu		**0.28 (0.49)**	**-0.00 (0.43)**	
former_col		**0.10 (0.18)**	**-0.56 (0.13)*** **	
oda_gdp	**0.64 (1.35)**	**-0.58 (4.24)**	**-8.12 (6.86)**	**-0.94 (1.11)**
trade_sh	**0.20 (0.43)**	**3.09 (1.03)****	**0.92 (1.00)**	**0.33 (0.83)**
ldv1	**0.03 (0.01)*** **	**0.02 (0.00)*** **	**0.03 (0.01)*** **	**0.06 (0.02)***
AIC	21416.23	33125.13	26905.50	3960.62
BIC	21591.27	33309.69	27089.55	4100.79
Log Likelihood	-10691.11	-16544.57	-13434.75	-1964.31
Num. obs.	218884	209612	203809	47118
Num. groups: draft:t	2266	2266	2266	1183
Num. groups: iso3	119	117	116	72
Num. groups: t	9	9	9	5

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Source: elaborated by the authors. Coefficients are not exponentiated.

Social network analysis

Binary vs weighted sponsorship

For the simpler version of our network, sponsorship was binary. Hence, edge weight between any dyad of countries equals the total sum of shared drafts between them. For example, Turkey co-sponsored the most drafts with Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia; consequently, these three European countries present the greatest edge weight with the Turkish node in the first network. The second network does not consider a shared draft between a dyad of countries as a binary value. Instead, it applies the equation described in the manuscript to attribute a continuous weight to each draft. In this approach, the countries sharing the highest edge weight with Turkey are Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan – all from Central Asia. These differences in edge weight are shown in Figure A3, which displays a sample of Turkish co-sponsors as nodes and the different edge weights attributed by the binary network (left plot) and the weighted one (right plot). As the plots demonstrate, the first scheme suggests a stronger bond between Turkey and European countries, whereas the second reveals a more salient connection with Central Asian partners.

Figure A3 – Ego network of Turkey and 12 partners, for binary and weighted sponsorship values



Source: elaborated by the authors

Communities from binary sponsorship

Table A10 - Membership of the two identified clusters

Cluster 1	**Cluster 2**
AFG, AGO, ARE, ATG, BDI, BEN, BFA, BGD, BHR, BHS, BLZ, BOL, BRB, BRN, BTN, BWA, CAF, CHN, CIV, CMR, COD, COG, COL, COM, CPV, CUB, DJI, DMA, DOM, DZA, ECU, EGY, ERI, ETH, FJI, FSM, GAB, GHA, GIN, GMB, GNB, GNQ, GRD, GUY, HND, HTI, IDN, IND, IRN, IRQ, JAM, JOR, KEN, KHM, KIR, KNA, KWT, LAO, LBN, LBR, LBY, LCA, LKA, LSO, MAR, MDG, MDV, MHL, MLI, MMR, MNG, MOZ, MRT, MUS, MWI, MYS, NAM, NER, NGA, NIC, NPL, NRU, OMN, PAK, PAN, PHL, PNG, PRK, PSE, QAT, RWA, SAU, SDN, SEN, SGP, SLB, SLE, SLV, SOM, SSD, STP, SUR, SWZ, SYC, SYR, TCD, TGO, THA, TJK, TKM, TLS, TON, TTO, TUN, TZA, UGA, UZB, VCT, VEN, VNM, VUT, WSM, YEM, ZAF, ZMB, ZWE, **ARG, AZE, BIH, BLR, BRA, CHL, CRI, GTM, PER, PRY, URY**	ALB, AND, ARM, AUS, AUT, BEL, BGR, CAN, CHE, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, GEO, GRC, HRV, HUN, IRL, ISL, ISR, ITA, JPN, KAZ, KGZ, KOR, LIE, LTU, LUX, LVA, MCO, MDA, MEX, MKD, MLT, MNE, NLD, NOR, NZL, PLW, POL, PRT, ROU, RUS, SMR, SRB, SVK, SVN, SWE, TUR, TUV, UKR, USA

Source: elaborated by the authors. Countries in **bold** had varying classification, depending on the algorithm.

Communities from sponsorship weighted by relative priority over ownership

All four igraph algorithms “Fast and Greedy”, “Walk Trap”, “Louvain” and “Spinglass” were applied to the weighted network. The algorithms Fast and Greedy and Walk Trap detected three groups; Louvain and Spinglass four. For the main manuscript, we privileged the latter solution because the three-group partition classified only 94 countries consistently across algorithms, while the four-group solution assigned a stable classification to 185 countries. The plot in Figure 6 of the main manuscript shows the Spinglass solution. China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Micronesia, Honduras, Panama, Philippines, Slovenia and Thailand had varying classification across algorithms (Spinglass vs. Louvain).

Table A11 – Membership of the three clusters detected by “Fast and Greedy” and “Walk Trap” algorithms

Cluster 1	**Cluster 2**	**Cluster 3**
AFG, ARM, AZE, BLR, CHN, ECU, IND, KAZ, KGZ, LKA, MDV, NGA, RUS, SGP, TJK, TKM, TUR, UZB, **ARE, BGD, BHR, BOL, BRN, BTN, COM, CUB, DJI, DZA, EGY, ERI, GIN, GMB, IDN, IRN, IRQ, JOR, KWT, LAO, LBN, LBY, MAR, MLI, MMR, MRT, MYS, NAM**	BDI, BWA, CAF, CMR, COD, COG, CPV, DMA, ETH, GAB, GNB, GNQ, KNA, LSO, MOZ, MUS, MWI, NER, RWA, SSD, STP, SWZ, SYC, TCD, UGA, VCT, ZMB, **AGO, ATG, BEN, BFA, BHS, BLZ, BRB, CIV, FJI, GHA, GRD, GUY, HTI, KEN, KHM, KIR, LBR, LCA, MDG, MHL, NRU, PNG, SLB, SUR, TGO, TLS, TON, VUT, WSM**	ALB, AND, AUS, AUT, BEL, BGR, CAN, CHE, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, GEO, GRC, HRV, HUN, IRL, ISL, ISR, ITA, JPN, KOR, LIE, LTU, LUX, LVA, MCO, MDA, MKD, MLT, MNE, NLD, NOR, NZL, PLW, POL, PRT, ROU, SMR, SRB, SVK, SVN, SWE, USA, **ARG, BIH, BRA, CHL, COL, CRI, DOM, FSM, GTM, HND, JAM, MEX, MNG, PAN, PER, PHL, PRY, SLV, THA, TTO, TUV, URY**

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Table A12 - Membership of the four clusters detected by “Louvain” and “Spinglass” algorithms

Cluster 1	**Cluster 2**	**Cluster 3**	**Cluster 4**
AGO, ATG, BDI, BEN, BFA, BHS, BLZ, BRB, BTN, BWA, CAF, CIV, CMR, COD, COG, CPV, DMA, ERI, ETH, FJI, GAB, GHA, GIN, GMB, GNB, GNQ, GRD, GUY, HTI, IND, IRN, JAM, KEN, KHM, KIR, KNA, LBR, LBY, LCA, LKA, LSO, MDG, MDV, MHL, MMR, MNG, MOZ, MUS, MWI, NER, NGA, NPL, NRU, PNG, RWA, SGP, SLB, SLE, SSD, STP, SUR, SWZ, SYC, TCD, TGO, TLS, TON, TTO, TZA, UGA, VCT, VNM, VUT, WSM, ZMB, ZWE, **CHN**, **COL**, **DOM**, **FSM**, **HND, PAN**, **PHL**, **SLV**, **THA**	ALB, AND, ARG, AUS, AUT, BEL, BGR, BIH, BRA, CAN, CHE, CHL, CRI, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, GEO, GRC, GTM, HRV, HUN, IRL, ISL, ISR, ITA, JPN, KOR, LIE, LTU, LUX, LVA, MCO, MDA, MEX, MKD, MLT, MNE, NLD, NOR, NZL, PER, PLW, POL, PRT, PRY, ROU, SMR, SRB, SVK, SVN, SWE, TUV, UKR, URY, USA	AFG, ARE, BGD, BHR, BOL, BRN, COM, CUB, DJI, DZA, ECU, EGY, IDN, IRQ, JOR, KWT, LAO, LBN, MAR, MLI, MRT, MYS, NAM, NIC, OMN, PAK, PRK, PSE, QAT, SAU, SDN, SEN, SOM, SYR, TUN, VEN, YEM, ZAF	ARM, AZE, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, RUS, TJK, TKM, TUR, UZB

Source: elaborated by the authors.