A Supporting Material for: "The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability?"

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For additional information on the survey instruments, ethical considerations, covariate balance, power and MDE calculations, full regression tables for figures and tables in the paper and SM, additional figures and tables for the attentive sample, additional tables for alternative specifications of co-partisanship and partisanship, alternative analysis specifications for Studies 1 and 2, and information about the pilot study, see the Appendix to the Supporting Material available at: [paste in dataverse link].

A.1 Sample Representativeness

Table A1 presents information to assess the representativeness of the samples in the five studies compared to the US population. All five samples are quite representative of the US population, with some relative under-representation of Hispanic individuals and Republicans in the Prolific (Study 4) sample. The data sources for the US population information include the US Census Bureau QuickFacts (2021) and Gallup Party Affiliation (2022).

Demographic	US Population	Study 1 Sample	Study 2 Sample	Study 3 Sample	Study 4 Sample	Study 5 Sample
Median Age	38.00	43.00	43.00	44.00	40.00	44.00
Female	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51
White	0.76	0.72	0.73	0.72	0.78	0.72
Black	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13
Asian	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04
Hispanic	0.19	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.08
Northeast	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.21
Midwest	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.23	0.19
South	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.39	0.37
West	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.17	0.23
Democrat	0.30	0.40	0.41	0.34	0.41	0.32
Republican	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.22	0.12	0.25
Independent/Other	0.40	0.32	0.31	0.44	0.47	0.43

Table A1: Representativeness of Samples

A.2 Survey Response Quality and Respondent Attentiveness

Given recent concerns about survey response quality through the Lucid platform (Aronow et al. 2020), we included attention check questions (described in more detail in Section A.3) on our surveys. We find consistent rates of attentiveness across our Lucid surveys—44%, 39%, 41%, and 37% of respondents answered both attention check screeners correctly in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 5, respectively. Moreover, as presented in our main figures and in the next section, we find that our results are consistent, if not stronger, when we subset to only the attentive respondents. This provides strong evidence that our Lucid results are not driven by poor respondent attention or quality. We also replicate our results with a higher-quality, highly-attentive sample through Prolific (Study 4). 96% of the Prolific respondents answered both attention check screeners correctly, and 99% of those assigned to a video treatment clicked to watch the video.

We further explore response quality by examining the time spent by respondents on our surveys. Figure A1 presents histograms of the total survey duration (in minutes) for respondents across our surveys. We find that about two-thirds of respondents per survey took at least as long as what we deemed reasonable (3 minutes for Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5, and 5 minutes for Study 2). In addition, we again find no evidence of decreasing response quality over time—the median response times for Studies 1, 3, and 5 are 3.78, 3.67, and 4.38 minutes, respectively, and the p-value for a K-S test comparing the duration distributions for Studies 1 and 3 (most similar in terms of platform and length, but separated by eight months) is 0.09, suggesting that the distributions are indistinguishable.



Figure A1: Time Spent on Surveys

A.3 Alternative Specifications of Co-Partisanship and Partisanship

Figure A2 presents results corresponding to Figure 5 but classifying leaners as independents. Results are very similar to those presented in Figure 5.

We also investigate heterogeneous treatment effects by co-partisanship for Democrats and Republicans separately. Our replication materials include code to produce Figure 5 for the Democrat and Republican subsets, independently. We find similar results within the Democrat and Republican subsets—claims of misinformation invoking informational uncertainty and oppositional rallying are broadly effective for both co-partisan and out-partisan Democrats and Republicans. While informational uncertainty may be less effective for Republican out-partisans, differences between co-partisans and out-partisans are statistically insignificant for both Republicans and Democrats and for both strategies.



Figure A2: Figure 5 Results with Leaners Classified as Independents

Notes: Based on pooling the samples for Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5. Full tables of results with covariates available as SM Tables B24 and B25 (Attentive).

Figure A3 shows heterogeneous treatment effects by co-partisanship for Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5 separately rather than pooling respondents across studies. Results for Studies 4 and 5 alone are similar to the pooled results. The results for Study 1 are also similar, but with reduced precision. The results for Study 2 are smaller in magnitude and highlight only significant effects for oppositional rallying rebuttals on co-partisans. Our replication materials include code to produce similar plots for video treatment effects for Studies 1 and 4 individually.



Figure A3: Figure 5 Results by Study

Notes: Based on the separate text-only samples for Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5. Full tables of results with covariates available as SM Tables B26, B27, B28, and B29.

Figures A4, A5, and A6 show the distribution of the primary support outcome by partisan group.



Figure A4: Study 1 - Distribution of Support (Primary Outcome) by Partisan Group

Notes: Based on text-only. Support is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree" for the question "I would support the politician."



Figure A5: Study 4 - Distribution of Support (Primary Outcome) by Partisan Group

Notes: Based on text-only. Support is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree" for the question "I would support the politician."



Figure A6: Study 5 - Distribution of Support (Primary Outcome) by Partisan Group

Notes: Based on text-only. Support is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree" for the question "I would support the politician."

Figure A7 shows potential "persuasion in parallel" (Coppock 2022) effects by politician and media format between control and the treatment groups for Study 4. We chose to produce this figure for Study 4 because Study 4 had the largest and most highly-attentive sample.



Figure A7: "Persuasion in Parallel" Treatment Effects in Study 4

Notes: The figure depicts jittered scatterplots of politician support by politician (columns), media format (rows), respondent political party (color and shape), and treatment (Control - left, IU - middle, and OR - right for each panel of the figure). The lines depicted are simply line segments connecting the average support in the Control group to the average support in the IU treatment group to the average support in the OR treatment group, by respondent party, and within the respective politician-media format panel. The line segments are intended to illustrate the difference in means across the treatment groups. Support is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree" for the question "I would support the politician."

Figure A8 uses the Lucid samples for Studies 1, 2, and 5, subsetted to attentive respondents, to examine the robustness of our results regarding co-partisanship to alternative specifications of co-partisanship. In particular, we include and exclude leaners, and we also use a pre-treatment measure of partisanship provided by Lucid for the respondents in the Lucid panel to define co-partisanship. This pre-treatment measure avoids concerns about potential post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018; Schiff, Montagnes, and Peskowitz 2022). We also present heterogeneous effects by partisanship excluding and including leaners.

We also examine demographics associated with the liar's dividend for out-partisans. Among out-partisans, we did not detect any significant heterogeneous effects for the informational uncertainty treatment. However, among out-partisans, the oppositional rallying treatment was more effective for individuals with lower digital literacy (less familiarity with deepfakes). Future work should further explore susceptibility to the liar's dividend, especially among out-partisans.



(a) Co-Partisanship



(b) Partisanship

Figure A8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Co-Partisanship and Partisanship

Notes: Based on pooling the samples for Studies 1, 2, and 5 and subsetting to attentive respondents. Full tables of results with covariates available as SM Tables B30 to B35.

A.4 Pre-Registered Hypotheses

Table A2 provides information about how our hypotheses discussed in the main paper relate to our pre-registered hypotheses. Note that in our hypotheses in the paper and throughout the paper, we adopt the term "claim" rather than "allegation" to refer to politician responses utilizing misinformation. We made this change based on feedback during the review process and in order to differentiate between the allegations pertaining to the scandal and the politician response. In Table A2, we also point readers to the location of results corresponding to several pre-registered hypotheses that are not formally named in the paper, but which still feature into our overall presentation. We discuss most of these results in the main paper in some detail (namely, H1.1, H1.2, and Study 3's examination of alternative politician responses). Other hypotheses, such as the effects of fact-checking, and ancillary predictions from H1.1, and H1.2, are presented solely in the SM, based on our determination and reviewer feedback regarding which aspects of the paper were of primary or secondary importance. Beyond the tables and figures noted in Table A2, SM Section A.6 presents the outcomes of additional, largely exploratory analyses mentioned in our pre-analysis plans but not detailed in the aforementioned table.

Hypothesis in Paper	Pre-Registered Hypothesis	Studies	Findings	Table or Figure
Liar's Dividend Hypothesis: "In the face of scandal, claims of misinformation (fake news or deepfakes) will increase average support for politicians relative to no response, apologizing, or simply denying a scandal."	H1 Liar's Dividend Hypothesis: "Compared to a control group, respondents treated with an allegation of misinformation will exhibit increased average support for the politician." (In PAP from 2/19/21, page 10)	All (1-5)	Claims of misinformation increase politician support compared to non-response (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5) and compared to apologizing (Study 3).	Fig 3 Fig 4 Tab B6 - B13
Unnamed in paper	H1.1 Informational Uncertainty Hypothesis: "Compared to a control group, respondents treated with an allegation of misinformation will exhibit decreased average belief in the story about the politician when primed to think about informational uncertainty." (Effects to be concentrated amongst individuals in the middle of the political spectrum, expected higher variance in belief.) (In PAP from 2/19/21, page 10)	1, 2, 4, 5	While we find no effects on belief in the scandal in Studies 1, 2, and 4, a clearer measure of belief in the scandal in Study 5 reveals that claims of misinformation do reduce belief in the scandal for both the informational uncertainty and oppositional rallying strategies.	Fig 6 Tab A6 Fig B1 Tab B51
Unnamed in paper	H1.2 Oppositional Rallying Hypothesis: "Compared to a control group, respondents treated with an allegation of misinformation will exhibit increased average support for the politician when primed to think about politician support in terms of their political friends and foes." (Effects to be concentrated amongst strong co-partisans.) (In PAP from 2/19/21, page 10)	1, 2, 4, 5	Claims of misinformation that blame opponents lead to politician support gains amongst co-partisans, but these claims are also effective for independents and even out-partisans.	Fig 5 Tab A7 Tab B14 - B15
Deepfakes Hypothesis: "Rebuttals claiming misinformation, relative to no response, will lead to smaller improvements in average support for politicians when the underlying stories are reported via video as compared to text."	H2 Deepfakes Hypothesis: "Compared to a control group, respondents treated with an allegation of misinformation will exhibit smaller improvements in average support for the politician in response to a claim of a deepfake." (In PAP from 2/19/21, page 11)	1, 4	In Study 1, we find that liar's dividend effects are significantly and substantially larger for text-based scandals than video scandals (politicians that allege "deepfake" do not receive a liar's dividend). Study 4 replicates this finding for the informational uncertainty strategy but reveals that oppositional rallying rebuttals may now be effective against video evidence of scandal (statistically indistinguishable from text).	Fig 3 Tab B6 - B9
Trust in Media Hypothesis: "Rebuttals claiming misinformation will lead to decreased trust in media relative to no response, denial, and apologizing."	H3 Trust in Media Hypothesis "Compared to a control group, respondents treated with an allegation of misinformation will exhibit decreased average trust in media." (In PAP from 2/19/21, page 11)	All (1-5)	Claims of misinformation significantly reduce trust in media compared to apologizing (Study 3) but not compared to nonresponse after scandal (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5).	Tab 2 Tab 3 Tab B16 - B17
Unnamed in paper	Exploration into "whether fact-checking might reduce some of the support gains from the Liar's Dividend" (In PAP Amendment 1 from 4/29/21)	2	A fact-checking statement rebutting the politician's claim of misinformation and confirming the original scandal eliminates the liar's dividend.	Tab A8
Unnamed in paper	Exploration into whether participants would have "reacted similarly if the politicians had denied the accusations without alleging misinformation, or if they had instead admitted responsibility and apologized" (In PAP Amendment 2 from 10/21/21)	3	Claims of misinformation are more effective in recovering politician support than apologies but not simple denials.	Tab 3 Tab B17

Table A2: Connections between Hypotheses, Pre-Registered Hypotheses, and Findings

A.5 Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan

We also report several deviations from our pre-analysis plan in Table A3. The most relevant deviations relate to our pooling of the treatments, and our coding of partisanship. More specifically, due to power concerns, we initially planned to test the Liar's Dividend Hypothesis by pooling across allegation strategies and across text and video treatments to measure responses to politician "allegations" in an aggregate fashion. Based on editor and reviewer feedback, and to improve transparency by centering differences *between* responses to various treatments, our main analyses featured in the paper separate the IU and OR strategies, and the text and video treatments. However, Figure A9 and Tables B18 to B21 report results including both of the pre-registered types of pooling. We also changed our planned coding of partisanship to more carefully examine the possibility of asymmetrical responses to claims of misinformation across co-partisans, out-partisans, and independents; furthermore, we consider differences between Democrat and Republican respondents.

We also deviate from the pre-analysis plan in our analysis of belief change in Study 5. Here we chose an alternative measurement to highlight in the main paper because, as we argue in the paper, the post-treatment measure is more clearly worded for respondents, and thus a better measure of belief overall. Nevertheless, SM Section A.6 contains the pre-registered analyses using a measure of change in belief and also controlling for pre-treatment measures of belief. Results are similar or larger in magnitude.

Deviation from PAP	Reason	Mention in Main Text
Coding of Co-Partisanship: We pre-registered that we would compare strong co-partisans (respondents that are co-partisans with their treatment politicians, excluding leaners) to all other respondents (see PAP from 2/19/21, page 27). We instead compare co-partisans, out-partisans, and independents, as defined in the note for Figure 5.	We do this in order to better identify distinct subgroups of respondents. Moreover, we classify leaners as partisans rather than as independents, as is more common in the political psychology literature. Based on editor and reviewer feedback, we also explore alternative coding for co-partisanship and partisanship in SM Section A.3.	Note for Figure 5 Footnote 28
Coding of Race/Ethnicity: We pre-registered only three levels: White, Black, and Other (see PAP from 2/19/21, page 30). We instead coded race/ethnicity with five levels: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other.	Our pre-analysis plan acknowledged that this was subject to change. We were originally worried about race/ethnicity categories that might be too small. However, we ended up with sufficiently large samples and large enough subgroups. We thought that the additional levels would better capture differences in distinct subgroups of respondents. Our results are almost identical if we instead code the variable with only the three categories, and, for those who are interested, our replication materials include code to reproduce all of our main tables and figures for this alternative coding of race/ethnicity.	Footnote 16
Pooling Across Treatments: Due to power concerns, our pre-analysis plan specified that we would pool across the text and video groups and that we would also create an "allegation" treatment group pooling both the IU and OR treatment groups (see PAP from 2/19/21, page 24). Instead, we report results separately for video and text and for IU and OR in the main text. This also applies to our investigation of the Deepfakes Hypothesis and the Trust in Media Hypothesis, for which we originally pre-registered that we would pool across the IU and OR treatments (see PAP from 2/19/21, pages 28-29).	We made this change based on encouragement of reviewers that disaggregating would provide greater clarity in reporting the results, especially given the differences in responses to the text and video treatments. However, Figure A9 and Tables B18 to B21 report results including both of these pre-registered types of pooling. Additionally, Tables B36 to B41 in the SM Appendix report results across studies for all three outcomes (support, belief, and trust) and for the text and video treatments separately for comparability. Tables B42 to B47 in the SM Appendix report similar results for the pooled "allegation" treatment.	Footnote 17
Comparing Claims of Misinformation to Other Responses to Scandal: Due to power concerns, our pre-analysis plan amendment specified that we would compare claims of misinformation invoking informational uncertainty (IU) to a pooled treatment group of both alternative strategies, simply denying and apologizing (see PAP amendment 2 from 10/21/21, page 2). Instead, we report in Table 3 regression results comparing each of the IU and simple denial treatments to the apology treatment.	We made this change due to feedback from the editor that suggested using the apology treatment as the reference group and in order to more clearly present the results relative to the alternative response strategies.	Footnote 32
Measuring Belief Change in Study 5: Our pre-analysis plan amendment specified that we would examine belief change in Study 5 utilizing a pre-post design (see PAP amendment 3 from 11/8/22, page 3). Instead, we present results solely utilizing the post belief measure in Figure 6.	We believe that the post belief measure, which asks respondents whether they agree with the statement that the "politician really said" the scandalous comment (using the actual wording from the scandal), more clearly captures respondents' understanding of and reactions to the scandal. The pre belief measure (representing the belief measure used on our previous surveys) may reflect responses to either the scandal, or the story about the scandal. As these measures may not measure the same underlying constructs and as differences between them may thus be misleading, we opted to focus on the post belief measure instead. Still, SM Table A14 presents results using the belief change measure that echo the findings reported in the main text.	Footnote 29

Table A3: Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan



(a) Study 1 with Pooling



(b) Study 4 with Pooling

Figure A9: Liar's Dividend Results for Study 1 and Study 4 with Pooling

Notes: Based on the Study 1 (Lucid, Feb 2021, $n = 2503$) and Study 4 (Prolific, Nov 2022, $n = 4432$) samples. All figures display 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. "Allegation" refers to a pooled treatment group with either Informational Uncertainty or Oppositional Rallying rebuttals, and the reference group is composed of respondents who received a non-response from the politician. Full tables of results with covariates available as SM Tables B18 (Study 1), B19 (Study 1, Attentive), B20 (Study 4), and B21 (Study 4, Attentive).

A.6 Additional Pre-Registered Analyses

In this section, we present results based on our pre-registered hypotheses, including some exploratory hypotheses.

A.6.1 Study 1

For Study 1, within hypothesis families with multiple exploratory tests, we use the Benjamini-Hochberg method to correct for multiple testing and present corrected p-values (using a false discovery rate of 0.05), following the approach of Bohlken, Iakwad, and Nellis (2018).

We first interact each rebuttal treatment with attentiveness and media literacy, separately, to assess heterogeneous treatment effects for the Study 1 survey. We use the interaction with attentiveness to explore whether treatment effects are stronger amongst surveytakers that are more engaged, and as a robustness check given the possibility of surveytaker satisficing behavior. Table A4 presents results. In line with expectations, the magnitude of effect sizes is larger for attentive survey participants, though differences are not statistically significant (nominal p-values are 0.229 and 0.164, and adjusted p-values are 0.229 and 0.229 for informational uncertainty and oppositional rallying, respectively).

	Politician Support Index
Info. Uncertain	0.022
	(0.073)
Opp. Rally	−0.015
	(0.076)
Attentiveness	−0.139***
	(0.040)
Strong Democrat	0.032
	(0.063)
Democrat	0.054
	(0.055)
Lean Democrat	−0.095
	(0.063)
Lean Republican	0.109+
	(0.060)
Republican	0.287***
	(0.066)
Strong Republican	0.255***
	(0.074)
Female	−0.088*
	(0.038)
Black	0.146*
	(0.065)
Hispanic	0.059
	(0.069)
Asian	−0.141*
	(0.070)
Other Race	0.187+
	(0.103)
Millennial	0.235***
	(0.063)
Gen X	0.210**
	(0.066)
Boomer	0.075
	(0.068)
Silent Gen.	0.110
	(0.120)
Some College	−0.080
	(0.049)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.037
	(0.057)
Graduate Degree	0.238***
	(0.067)
Low Income	0.033
	(0.045)
High Income	0.064
	(0.047)
Midwest	0.013
	(0.058)
South	−0.023
	(0.051)
West	−0.023
	(0.056)
Media Literacy	−0.146***
	(0.020)
Digital Literacy	0.075***
	(0.016)
Info. Uncertain x Attentiveness	0.062
	(0.052)
Opp. Rally x Atteentiveness	0.073
	(0.054)
Constant	−0.107
	(0.101)
Sample	Study 1
N	2,503
R^2	0.104

+p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Attentiveness

Similarly, Table A5 presents results exploring heterogeneous effects by media literacy. Against expectations, the magnitude of effect sizes is larger for survey participants with higher levels of media literacy, though the differences are not statistically significant (nominal p-values are 0.249 and 0.199, and adjusted p-values are 0.249 and 0.249 for informational uncertainty and oppositional rallying, respectively).

	Politician Support Index
Info. Uncertain	0.038
	(0.065)
Opp. Rally	0.004
	(0.066)
Media Literacy	-0.199^{***}
	(0.034)
Strong Democrat	0.021
	(0.063)
Democrat	0.054
	(0.056)
Lean Democrat	-0.104
	(0.063)
Lean Republican	0.098
	(0.061)
Republican	0.286^{***}
	(0.066)
Strong Republican	0.260^{***}
	(0.073)
Female	-0.104^{**}
	(0.038)
Black	0.165^{*}
	(0.065)
Hispanic	0.065
	(0.069)
Asian	-0.133^{+}
	(0.071)
Other Race	0.183^{+}
	(0.102)
Millennial	0.230^{***}
	(0.063)
Gen X	0.208^{**}
	(0.066)
Boomer	0.057
	(0.068)
Silent Gen.	0.103
	(0.121)
Some College	-0.082^{+}
	(0.049)
Bachelor's Degree	-0.055
	(0.057)
Graduate Degree	0.247^{***}
	(0.068)
Low Income	0.046
	(0.046)
High Income	0.062
	(0.047)
Midwest	0.012
	(0.058)
South	-0.028
	(0.051)
West	-0.025
	(0.057)
Digital Literacy	0.082^{***}
	(0.016)
Info. Uncertain x Media Literacy	0.051
	(0.044)
Opp. Rally x Media Literacy	0.058
	(0.045)
Constant	-0.209^{*}
	(0.098)
Sample	Study 1
N	2,503
R^2	0.098

$^{+}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table A5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Media Literacy

Next, Table A6 presents nominal and BH-adjusted p-values for three exploratory analyses related to informational uncertainty and the belief outcome, using Study 1 results. First, we consider whether informational uncertainty has stronger effects on belief for independents; the effects are larger but are not statistically distinguishable. Second, we evaluate whether the informational uncertainty treatment increased the overall variance of the belief measure, as a reflection of uncertainty, compared to control. Contrary to our expectations, it does not. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that partisans with strong prior views actually moderated those views, leading to *less* variance for informational uncertainty (var = .83) compared to control (var = 1). That is, increased individual uncertainty may have translated to *decreased* population-level variance, such that our original hypotheses committed a compositional fallacy. Finally, we evaluate whether the coefficients on the informational uncertainty and oppositional rallying treatments are statistically distinct for belief. We find that they are not.

	Nominal p-value	Corrected p-value
IU*Independent (ATE for Belief)	0.19	0.42
IU vs. Control (Belief Distributions)	0.39	0.42
IU vs. OR (ATE for Belief)	0.42	0.42

Table A6: Exploratory Analyses for Informational Uncertainty

Table A7 presents nominal and BH-adjusted p-values for two exploratory analyses related to oppositional rallying and the support outcome, again using Study 1 results only. First, we consider whether oppositional rallying has stronger effects on support for (strong) co-partisans; the effects are larger but are not statistically distinguishable. Note, this analysis collapses independents and out-partisans into a single category whereas Figure 5 in the main paper separates them. The former analysis fails to support our hypothesis, though the latter analysis may be more illuminating. Second, we evaluate whether the coefficients on the informational uncertainty and oppositional rallying treatments are statistically distinct for support. We find that they are not.

	Nominal p-value	Corrected p-value
OR*Co-partisan (ATE for Support)	0.28	0.53
IU vs. OR (ATE for Support)	0.53	0.53

Table A7: Exploratory Analyses for Oppositional Rallying

A.6.2 Study 2

In Study 2, to consider factors that may mitigate the harms of the liar's dividend, we also introduced a new experimental component: fact-checking statements designed to counteract the politicians' false claims of misinformation. We designed the fact-checking treatment based on practices considered to be most impactful according to a recent meta-analysis by Walter et al. (2020), which finds that complex statements and graphical elements are less effective, while length is not important. Our statements are inspired by typical language used by two prominent fact checking organizations, FactCheck.org and PolitiFact, are not overly complex or long, and omit graphics or visual elements. The fact-checking statement, reportedly from a non-partisan fact-checking organization, informs participants that "[Politician Name] was recently accused of making offensive comments but disputes the truthfulness of the story. We find evidence that [Politician Name] did make the comments as originally reported."

Following the analyses in Studies 1 and 2, we regress politician support on the informational uncertainty rebuttal and the rebuttal followed by fact-checking (the reference group received no claim of misinformation), and a set of pre-registered covariates. Fortunately, Table A8 suggests that fact-checking can eliminate the liar's dividend. While the informational uncertainty treatment increased politician support, a statement rebutting the politician claim and confirming the original scandal wipes away any politician support gains.

It is reassuring that even a single fact check might counteract misinformation about misinformation, particularly as the literature on fact-checking cautions that individuals may be reluctant to accept fact checks that run counter to their political identity and beliefs. Yet, the fact-checking statements in our study are presented in the context of issues that may not be highly salient to individuals' current political priorities, with statements coming from politicians who are no longer prominent. Furthermore, in practice, fact-checking organizations may not always get the last word and politicians are likely to counter-argue and drown out fact-checkers. This may be especially problematic, as individuals may have a low propensity to seek out fact-checking information. Indeed, in this study, participants were uninterested in learning more about fact-checking, as less than 2% of respondents clicked on additional resources in the debrief for spotting fake news and deepfakes. We believe that analyzing the dynamics between politicians who falsely claim misinformation and the organizations that attempt to fact check them is a fruitful area for further research.

Also in Study 2, we incorporated new exploratory outcome and covariate questions including questions related to informational uncertainty. These questions were designed to assess whether informational uncertainty indeed works through inducing uncertainty or changing belief as originally hypothesized, or through other mechanisms. For example, we explicitly asked respondents exposed to the informational uncertainty treatment whether they believed the *politician claim* that the original story was false. Note that this differs from our key outcome measuring respondent belief in the scandalous story. Based on our theory of informational uncertainty, we expected that individuals who reported believing the politician claim would also be more likely to agree with the statement that "it's hard to know what's true these days," a measure of uncertainty that directly mirrors the language invoked by the politician. Logically, we expected this uncertainty to then translate into relative gains in politician support via the liar's dividend through affecting belief in the underlying scandal.

Table A9 shows that, among those exposed to the informational uncertainty prime, individuals who believe the politician claim of misinformation are also more likely to agree with the statement that "it's hard to know what it's true these days."[34] The difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.02$) and suggests that the informational uncertainty channel works as intended for some individuals, at least in terms of its most immediate effects. Moreover, believing the politician claim and agreement with the statement that "it's hard to know what's true these days" are both correlated with increased politician support ($r = 0.38$ and $r = 0.22$, respectively). Consistent with this finding, when we ask participants explicitly whether the politician rebuttal claiming misinformation affected their support, 42% of those who believed the rebuttal responded affirmatively, compared to only 8% of those who did not believe the rebuttal (p-value of difference < 0.01).

However, for members of this treatment group, believing the politician rebuttal is oddly not correlated with belief in the scandal itself ($r = -0.003$). Overall, these results are puzzling. Despite some

34. We classify those who believed the politician allegation as those who strongly agreed or agreed with the politician's claim that the news story is false.

	Politician Support Index
Info. Uncertain	0.077^{+}
	(0.045)
IU + Fact Check	-0.012
	(0.045)
Strong Democrat	0.277^{***}
	(0.062)
Democrat	0.144^{*}
	(0.056)
Lean Democrat	-0.070
	(0.057)
Lean Republican	0.164^{**}
	(0.060)
Republican	0.291^{***}
	(0.063)
Strong Republican	0.289^{***}
	(0.077)
Female	-0.139^{***}
	(0.038)
Black	0.076
	(0.062)
Hispanic	-0.039
	(0.077)
Asian	0.009
	(0.075)
Other	-0.172
	(0.120)
Millenials	0.106^{+}
	(0.061)
Gen X	0.106^{+}
	(0.064)
Boomers	-0.056
	(0.065)
Silent	-0.202^{+}
	(0.105)
Some college	-0.089^{+}
	(0.048)
Bachelor's degree	-0.077
	(0.055)
Graduate degree	0.265^{***}
	(0.062)
Low income	0.066
	(0.046)
High income	0.113^{*}
	(0.047)
Midwest	-0.032
	(0.058)
South	0.015
	(0.049)
West	-0.001
	(0.055)
Media Literacy	-0.199^{***}
	(0.020)
Digital Literacy	0.076^{***}
	(0.016)
Constant	-0.192^{*}
	(0.095)
Sample	Study 2
N	2,518
R^2	0.138

$^{+}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table A8: The Impact of Fact-Checking on the Liar's Dividend

Believe Allegation	Pct. Hard to Know What's True	Pct. Alleg. Affects Support
No	73.61	8.36
Yes	80.76	41.58
p-value of difference	0.02	0.00

Table A9: Exploring Informational Uncertainty

descriptive evidence that informational uncertainty works as intended through elevating considerations of uncertainty, in combination with the experimental evidence, there appear to be substantial inconsistencies in the ways in which individuals process their beliefs. This may be evidence of a belief-support disconnect, expressive reporting, or something else. Differences within the informational uncertainty treatment group also point to heterogeneous responses to politician claims of misinformation, which are washed out when we consider the treatment group as a whole.

We also considered whether attitudes towards forgiveness, accountability, and cancel culture might influence the proclivity of participants to buy into politician claims of misinformation and support or punish politicians as a result. We asked participants directly if hearing the politician claim of misinformation increased their support. Table A10 displays the results from an analysis which divides respondents into those who said claims of misinformation increase their support of politicians, and those who did not increase their support. For each covariate, we present average values for each group and indicate whether the differences are statistically significant.

Covariate	No Support Increase	Support Increase	p-value of Diff.
Prefer Accountability	0.64	0.43	0.00
Cancel Culture is a Problem	2.88	3.01	0.11
Concerned about Fake News	2.95	3.29	0.00
Can Detect Fake News	2.52	2.93	0.00
Find Story Offensive	3.46	3.60	0.18
Co-partisan	-0.05	0.10	0.04
Republican	3.70	3.22	0.00
Favor Political Correctness	3.50	3.79	0.00

Table A10: Factors Related to Susceptibility to Informational Uncertainty

Amongst those who did increase their support, they are statistically significantly more likely to favor second chances over accountability, to be more concerned about fake news, to feel confident in their ability to detect fake news (perhaps an indicator of gullibility), to be co-partisans with the politician in the story, to be Democrats, and to be in favor of political correctness. While some of these differences may be informative for understanding how informational uncertainty in the liar's dividend operate, not all of them are clear or point in the same direction. As such, further work is needed to understand how individuals update their evaluations of politicians in light of claims of misinformation that invoke uncertainty.

A.6.3 Study 3

For Study 3, we pre-registered that we would examine heterogeneous effects by partisanship and co-partisanship. Table A11 reports the results indicating no significant heterogeneous effects by partisanship and increases in belief in the scandal for out-partisans relative to co-partisans when

denials are employed over apologies. That is, out-partisans appear to doubt denials more than co-partisans.

	Support Index		Belief Index		Trust Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info. Uncertain	0.028	0.054	-0.336^{***}	-0.362^{***}	-0.122	-0.188^{+}
	(0.083)	(0.106)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.085)	(0.097)
Simple Denial	-0.001	0.096	-0.390^{***}	-0.247^{*}	-0.082	-0.111
	(0.083)	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.102)	(0.085)	(0.101)
Independent	-0.648^{***}		0.098		0.384^{***}	
	(0.079)		(0.090)		(0.083)	
Out-Partisan	-0.703^{***}		0.157^{+}		0.097	
	(0.088)		(0.095)		(0.084)	
No Party		-0.250^{**}		-0.019		0.291^{***}
		(0.089)		(0.090)		(0.085)
Democrat	-0.068	-0.056	0.167^{**}	0.119	0.968^{***}	0.907^{***}
	(0.052)	(0.099)	(0.056)	(0.099)	(0.053)	(0.091)
Female	-0.085^{*}	-0.070^{*}	-0.081^{*}	-0.088^{*}	-0.080^{*}	-0.083^{*}
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Black	0.171^{**}	0.169^{**}	-0.029	-0.026	0.046	0.046
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Hispanic	-0.086	-0.063	-0.223^{**}	-0.235^{**}	-0.037	-0.042
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Asian	-0.007	-0.007	-0.060	-0.065	0.119	0.118
	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Other Race	-0.022	-0.025	-0.166	-0.176	-0.274^{*}	-0.277^{*}
	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Millennial	0.303^{***}	0.299^{***}	0.057	0.052	0.163^{**}	0.161^{**}
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Gen X	0.155^{*}	0.140^{*}	-0.044	-0.037	0.123^{*}	0.125^{*}
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Boomer	0.058	0.047	-0.063	-0.058	0.070	0.071
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Silent Gen.	0.079	0.122	-0.161	-0.181^{+}	0.014	0.005
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Some College	0.002	0.006	-0.0004	-0.003	-0.077^{+}	-0.077^{+}
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Bachelor's Degree	0.014	0.018	0.058	0.056	0.129^{*}	0.129^{*}
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Graduate Degree	0.088	0.095	0.046	0.043	0.136^{*}	0.134^{*}
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Low Income	0.099^{*}	0.094^{*}	-0.026	-0.019	0.139^{***}	0.140^{***}
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.040)
High Income	0.135^{**}	0.138^{**}	0.038	0.039	0.059	0.060
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Midwest	-0.050	-0.056	0.024	0.026	-0.110^{*}	-0.110^{*}
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.052)
South	-0.002	-0.003	0.013	0.012	-0.154^{***}	-0.153^{***}
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.046)
West	-0.014	-0.016	-0.107^{+}	-0.104^{+}	-0.123^{*}	-0.122^{*}
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Media Literacy	-0.187^{***}	-0.188^{***}	-0.015	-0.014	-0.068^{***}	-0.068^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Digital Literacy	0.091^{***}	0.091^{***}	0.087^{***}	0.088^{***}	0.068^{***}	0.069^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
IU x Independent	0.118		-0.045		0.017	
	(0.097)		(0.112)		(0.102)	
Denial x Independent	0.025		0.123		-0.040	
	(0.098)		(0.112)		(0.103)	
IU x Out-Partisan	0.003		0.126		-0.031	
	(0.121)		(0.131)		(0.117)	
Denial x Out-Partisan	0.073		0.327^{*}		0.094	
	(0.122)		(0.131)		(0.117)	
IU x No Party		0.091		-0.021		0.082
		(0.117)		(0.119)		(0.112)
Denial x No Party		-0.072		-0.021		-0.011
		(0.117)		(0.117)		(0.116)
IU x Democrat		0.008		0.138		0.073
		(0.134)		(0.134)		(0.121)
Denial x Democrat		-0.044		0.023		0.115
		(0.133)		(0.133)		(0.123)
Constant	0.282^{*}	-0.116	-0.297^{*}	-0.181	-0.696^{***}	-0.605^{***}
	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Sample	Study 3	Study 3	Study 3	Study 3	Study 3	Study 3
N	2,994	2,994	2,994	2,994	2,994	2,994
R^2	0.166	0.105	0.081	0.067	0.205	0.203

$^{+}$p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A11: Study 3 Heterogeneous Effects

A.6.4 Study 4

For Study 4, we pre-registered that we would examine impacts on support using an alternative support index excluding the more demanding donation measure. Table A12 reports the results, which are slightly larger in magnitude than the results with the support index including the donation measure.

	Support Index Without Donation					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Allegation	0.169***		0.233***		0.106*	
	(0.032)		(0.044)		(0.046)	
Info. Uncertain		0.157***		0.248***		0.063
		(0.036)		(0.050)		(0.053)
Opp. Rally		0.182***		0.218***		0.149**
		(0.036)		(0.051)		(0.052)
Strong Democrat	−0.052	−0.052	−0.070	−0.069	−0.026	−0.025
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Democrat	−0.075+	−0.075+	−0.057	−0.058	−0.087	−0.090
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Lean Democrat	−0.005	−0.006	0.021	0.021	−0.034	−0.039
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Lean Republican	0.157**	0.156**	0.109	0.110	0.209**	0.207**
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Republican	0.277***	0.277***	0.274**	0.276**	0.279***	0.281***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Strong Republican	0.218*	0.217*	0.157	0.157	0.277+	0.275+
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Female	−0.055+	−0.055+	−0.050	−0.050	−0.065	−0.064
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Black	0.069	0.069	0.103	0.103	0.031	0.029
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Hispanic	−0.012	−0.014	0.020	0.022	−0.041	−0.049
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Asian	0.009	0.010	−0.050	−0.050	0.072	0.077
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Other Race	0.091	0.089	−0.139	−0.136	0.416*	0.410*
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.194)	(0.194)
Millennial	0.061	0.061	0.116	0.117	0.004	0.010
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Gen X	0.227***	0.227***	0.275***	0.275***	0.179*	0.178*
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Boomer	0.277***	0.277***	0.341***	0.342***	0.207*	0.210*
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Silent Gen.	0.423**	0.422**	0.335	0.337	0.519*	0.518*
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.202)	(0.202)
Some College	−0.027	−0.027	−0.049	−0.049	−0.017	−0.016
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Bachelor's Degree	0.011	0.012	0.024	0.023	−0.011	−0.010
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Graduate Degree	0.029	0.030	0.005	0.004	0.042	0.045
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Low Income	0.055	0.056	0.045	0.045	0.065	0.070
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.057)
High Income	0.029	0.028	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Midwest	−0.038	−0.039	−0.039	−0.038	−0.038	−0.037
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
South	−0.019	−0.018	−0.056	−0.057	0.016	0.016
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.060)
West	−0.005	−0.005	0.017	0.016	−0.039	−0.039
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Media Literacy	−0.070***	−0.070***	−0.059**	−0.059**	−0.084***	−0.084***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Digital Literacy	−0.0001	0.0001	0.003	0.003	−0.004	−0.003
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	−0.018	−0.020	−0.090	−0.089	0.072	0.067
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Sample	Study 4 All	Study 4 All	Study 4 Text	Study 4 Text	Study 4 Video	Study 4 Video
N	4,297	4,297	2,151	2,151	2,146	2,146
R^2	0.041	0.041	0.046	0.047	0.044	0.046

+p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A12: Study 4 Support Results with Alternative Support Index

A.6.5 Study 5

We also present additional pre-registered results for Study 5. In particular, we examine how the treatments affected belief in the scandal controlling for the pre belief measure (Table A13) and

using a pre-post belief change measure (Table A14); we explore interactions with co-partisanship, attentiveness, media literacy, and whether the respondent thought that the scandal was embarrassing (Table A15); and we examine the correlation between belief in the scandal and belief in the politician's rebuttal.

The alternative belief and belief change results convey the same message as presented in Figure 6 and as discussed in the main text—the claims of misinformation reduced respondents' beliefs that the scandals actually occurred.[35] We also find that belief is not moderated by attentiveness or media literacy and that there are stronger belief impacts amongst those who thought that the scandal was embarrassing and amongst out-partisans who received the OR treatment (relative to independents). There is a slight negative correlation between belief in the politician's rebuttal and belief change in the scandal ($r = -0.07$), but this is weaker than the negative correlation between belief in the rebuttal and the post belief measure ($r = -0.22$).

35. We chose to present results in the main texted focused solely on the post belief measure for easier presentation and explanation, and also because we think that the second belief measure more clearly captures respondents' understanding of and reactions to the scandal.

	Post Belief in Scandal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Allegation	-0.180^{***}	-0.286^{***}		
	(0.041)	(0.066)		
Info. Uncertain			-0.175^{***}	-0.270^{***}
			(0.048)	(0.077)
Opp. Rally			-0.184^{***}	-0.303^{***}
			(0.047)	(0.075)
Pre Belief	0.437^{***}	0.511^{***}	0.437^{***}	0.512^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.036)
Strong Democrat	0.013	−0.059	0.013	−0.058
	(0.069)	(0.111)	(0.068)	(0.111)
Democrat	0.053	−0.073	0.053	−0.072
	(0.062)	(0.101)	(0.062)	(0.101)
Lean Democrat	0.013	−0.129	0.013	−0.129
	(0.066)	(0.107)	(0.066)	(0.107)
Lean Republican	0.040	0.029	0.040	0.033
	(0.067)	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.105)
Republican	−0.006	−0.003	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.069)	(0.108)	(0.069)	(0.108)
Strong Republican	0.110	−0.045	0.110	−0.043
	(0.070)	(0.113)	(0.070)	(0.113)
Female	−0.006	0.013	−0.006	0.014
	(0.040)	(0.065)	(0.040)	(0.065)
Black	0.104	0.036	0.104	0.035
	(0.065)	(0.135)	(0.065)	(0.135)
Hispanic	−0.001	−0.175	−0.001	−0.176
	(0.077)	(0.117)	(0.077)	(0.117)
Asian	0.226^{*}	0.075	0.227^{*}	0.076
	(0.103)	(0.163)	(0.103)	(0.164)
Other Race	0.077	−0.059	0.076	−0.063
	(0.122)	(0.179)	(0.122)	(0.179)
Millennial	0.035	−0.183	0.035	−0.182
	(0.072)	(0.134)	(0.072)	(0.134)
Gen X	0.042	−0.182	0.042	−0.180
	(0.074)	(0.134)	(0.074)	(0.134)
Boomer	−0.006	-0.257^{+}	−0.006	-0.257^{+}
	(0.078)	(0.138)	(0.078)	(0.138)
Silent Gen.	−0.042	-0.403^{+}	−0.042	-0.399^{+}
	(0.113)	(0.207)	(0.113)	(0.207)
Some College	−0.053	−0.120	−0.053	−0.120
	(0.049)	(0.081)	(0.049)	(0.081)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.010	−0.089	−0.011	−0.092
	(0.058)	(0.092)	(0.058)	(0.092)
Graduate Degree	0.022	−0.021	0.022	−0.022
	(0.081)	(0.145)	(0.081)	(0.145)
Low Income	−0.038	−0.048	−0.038	−0.048
	(0.047)	(0.079)	(0.047)	(0.079)
High Income	−0.074	-0.205^{**}	−0.074	-0.205^{**}
	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.051)	(0.077)
Midwest	−0.048	0.171^{+}	−0.047	0.173^{+}
	(0.061)	(0.093)	(0.061)	(0.093)
South	-0.095^{+}	−0.011	-0.094^{+}	−0.011
	(0.056)	(0.086)	(0.056)	(0.086)
West	−0.078	0.034	−0.078	0.036
	(0.061)	(0.091)	(0.061)	(0.091)
Media Literacy	-0.056^{**}	−0.019	-0.056^{**}	−0.019
	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Digital Literacy	0.061^{***}	0.041	0.061^{***}	0.041
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Constant	1.857^{***}	1.972^{***}	1.856^{***}	1.969^{***}
	(0.124)	(0.215)	(0.124)	(0.215)
Sample	Study 5	Study 5 Att.	Study 5	Study 5 Att.
N	2,838	1,055	2,838	1,055
R^2	0.201	0.261	0.201	0.261

$^{+}$p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A13: Study 5 Belief Results Controlling for Pre Belief Measure

	Change in Belief			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Allegation	-0.198^{***}	-0.318^{***}		
	(0.047)	(0.074)		
Info. Uncertain			-0.180^{**}	-0.277^{**}
			(0.055)	(0.086)
Opp. Rally			-0.215^{***}	-0.362^{***}
			(0.055)	(0.085)
Strong Democrat	−0.048	−0.012	−0.047	−0.008
	(0.079)	(0.127)	(0.079)	(0.126)
Democrat	−0.011	−0.107	−0.011	−0.104
	(0.073)	(0.117)	(0.073)	(0.117)
Lean Democrat	−0.009	−0.143	−0.008	−0.143
	(0.076)	(0.118)	(0.076)	(0.118)
Lean Republican	0.056	0.002	0.056	0.011
	(0.078)	(0.118)	(0.078)	(0.119)
Republican	0.049	0.066	0.048	0.061
	(0.081)	(0.123)	(0.081)	(0.124)
Strong Republican	0.056	−0.113	0.057	−0.107
	(0.081)	(0.123)	(0.081)	(0.123)
Female	−0.023	−0.0003	−0.022	0.003
	(0.047)	(0.073)	(0.047)	(0.073)
Black	0.071	0.068	0.071	0.065
	(0.074)	(0.149)	(0.074)	(0.148)
Hispanic	−0.014	−0.174	−0.014	−0.176
	(0.091)	(0.119)	(0.092)	(0.119)
Asian	0.272^{*}	0.154	0.273^{*}	0.156
	(0.124)	(0.185)	(0.124)	(0.185)
Other Race	0.255^{+}	0.169	0.253^{+}	0.159
	(0.147)	(0.206)	(0.147)	(0.206)
Millennial	−0.003	−0.197	−0.003	−0.195
	(0.087)	(0.165)	(0.087)	(0.165)
Gen X	0.062	−0.142	0.062	−0.137
	(0.088)	(0.165)	(0.088)	(0.164)
Boomer	0.095	−0.144	0.095	−0.147
	(0.092)	(0.165)	(0.092)	(0.166)
Silent Gen.	0.047	−0.302	0.047	−0.292
	(0.128)	(0.251)	(0.128)	(0.251)
Some College	−0.009	−0.080	−0.009	−0.080
	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.057)	(0.092)
Bachelor's Degree	0.021	−0.093	0.020	−0.101
	(0.068)	(0.105)	(0.068)	(0.105)
Graduate Degree	0.025	0.053	0.025	0.049
	(0.094)	(0.166)	(0.094)	(0.166)
Low Income	−0.029	−0.033	−0.030	−0.035
	(0.056)	(0.093)	(0.056)	(0.093)
High Income	-0.155^{**}	-0.265^{**}	-0.155^{**}	-0.265^{**}
	(0.058)	(0.085)	(0.058)	(0.085)
Midwest	−0.061	0.178^{+}	−0.059	0.183^{+}
	(0.071)	(0.103)	(0.071)	(0.103)
South	-0.109^{+}	0.008	-0.109^{+}	0.009
	(0.065)	(0.094)	(0.065)	(0.094)
West	−0.086	−0.001	−0.085	0.004
	(0.071)	(0.101)	(0.071)	(0.102)
Media Literacy	-0.049^{+}	−0.007	-0.049^{+}	−0.006
	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.038)
Digital Literacy	0.024	0.006	0.025	0.005
	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.032)
Constant	0.273^{*}	0.564^{**}	0.271^{*}	0.560^{**}
	(0.125)	(0.213)	(0.125)	(0.213)
Sample	Study 5	Study 5 Att.	Study 5	Study 5 Att.
N	2,838	1,055	2,838	1,055
R^2	0.016	0.041	0.016	0.042

$^{+}$p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A14: Study 5 Belief Change Regression Results

	Post Belief in Scandal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info. Uncertain	-0.119^{+}	0.390^{+}	-0.100	-0.142^{+}
	(0.071)	(0.229)	(0.081)	(0.075)
Opp. Rally	-0.090	0.220	-0.106	-0.096
	(0.070)	(0.225)	(0.084)	(0.075)
Co-Partisan	-0.031			
	(0.118)			
Out-Partisan	0.470^{***}			
	(0.107)			
Embarrassing		0.171^{***}		
		(0.043)		
Attentive			0.015	
			(0.045)	
Strong Democrat	-0.091	0.055	0.063	0.061
	(0.092)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Democrat	-0.039	0.104	0.105	0.104
	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Lean Democrat	0.030	0.025	0.031	0.032
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Lean Republican	0.026	0.018	0.028	0.028
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Republican	-0.202^{*}	-0.047	-0.047	-0.049
	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Strong Republican		0.149^{+}	0.152^{*}	0.152^{*}
		(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Female	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Black	0.142^{*}	0.148^{*}	0.124^{+}	0.128^{+}
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Hispanic	0.005	0.014	0.005	0.008
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Asian	0.192^{+}	0.208^{*}	0.189^{+}	0.194^{+}
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Other Race	-0.060	-0.047	-0.054	-0.058
	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Millennial	0.069	0.070	0.068	0.065
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Gen X	0.030	0.030	0.027	0.025
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Boomer	-0.075	-0.078	-0.080	-0.084
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Silent Gen.	-0.117	-0.098	-0.111	-0.114
	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Some College	-0.081	-0.078	-0.084	-0.088
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Bachelor's Degree	-0.020	-0.030	-0.032	-0.038
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Graduate Degree	0.032	0.026	0.018	0.019
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Low Income	-0.034	-0.039	-0.045	-0.046
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
High Income	-0.015	-0.005	-0.011	-0.013
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Midwest	-0.033	-0.036	-0.040	-0.039
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)
South	-0.075	-0.080	-0.084	-0.083
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)
West	-0.071	-0.073	-0.073	-0.072
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Media Literacy	-0.062^{**}	-0.066^{**}	-0.057^{*}	-0.032
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.039)
Digital Literacy	0.092^{***}	0.090^{***}	0.088^{***}	0.090^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
IU x Co-Partisan	-0.049			
	(0.132)			
OR x Co-Partisan	-0.046			
	(0.134)			
IU x Out-Partisan	-0.123			
	(0.124)			
OR x Out-Partisan	-0.226^{+}			
	(0.123)			
IU x Embarrassing		-0.149^{*}		
		(0.059)		
OR x Embarrassing		-0.100^{+}		
		(0.058)		
IU x Attentive			-0.071	
			(0.062)	
OR x Attentive			-0.055	
			(0.062)	
IU x Media Literacy				-0.028
				(0.054)
OR x Media Literacy				-0.061
				(0.054)
Constant	3.021^{***}	2.430^{***}	3.068^{***}	3.057^{***}
	(0.116)	(0.201)	(0.122)	(0.117)
Sample	Study 5	Study 5 Att.	Study 5	Study 5 Att.
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838
R^2	0.051	0.042	0.033	0.033

$^{+}$p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A15: Study 5 Belief Results - Heterogeneous Effects

A.7 References

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