Supplementary Information for "How Do Politicians Bargain? Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries"

Lior Sheffer* Peter John Loewen† Stefaan Walgrave‡
Stefanie Bailer§ Christian Breunig¶ Luzia Helfer‖ Jean-Benoit Pilet**
Frédéric Varone††Rens Vliegenthart‡‡

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*School of Political Science, Government, and International Affairs, Tel Aviv University. liorsheffer@tauex.tau.ac.il
†Department of Political Science, University of Toronto.peter.loewen@utoronto.ca
‡Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp.stefaan.walgrave@uantwerpen.be
§Department of Political Science, University of Basel.stefanie.bailer@unibas.ch
¶Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz.christian.breunig@uni-konstanz.de
‖Department of Political Science and International Relations, Geneva University.Luzia.Helfer@unige.ch
**Department of Political Science, Université libre de Bruxelles .jpilet@ulb.ac.be
††Department of Political Science and International Relations, Geneva University.Frederic.Varone@unige.ch
‡‡Strategic Communication Group, Wageningen University Research.rens.vliegenthart@wur.nl

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1 Overview

This online appendix provides supplementary information for "How Do Politicians Bargain? Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries".

We first provide additional details on the fielding of this project, including contact and interview procedures. We then provide the full experimental vignette texts in English, and the full partisan composition of the sample and the legislatures from which it was collected. Finally, we report additional per-country models, elaborating on the pooled models reported in the paper itself and estimating our quantities of interest in each country separately.

2 Details on Contact and In-Person Interview Procedure

The majority of our data was collected during in-person interviews with sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, conducted during 2018-2019. In the US, data was collected using an established online survey of local and state-level representatives, conducted periodically by CivicPulse. Our experiment was one of several fielded during summer 2018 wave of this survey. Details on the project are available in https://www.civicpulse.org/.

For the non-US recruitment, initial contact with MPs was made through a formal letter sent to politicians. The letter described the goals of the project, the interview setup, the type of questions asked, and the funding. This initial contact was followed by a phone call to either the MP herself, her staffer(s), or her parliamentary office, depending on the country. The goal of the follow-up phone call was to set a date for an in-person interview meeting.

Those politicians who agreed to participate in the study met in person with either a senior (professor or post-doc) or junior researcher (Ph.D. students) from the team working in her country. Meetings were held mostly in respondents' parliamentary offices, and took about 45 to complete, on average.

Before the start of the survey, politicians provided informed consent to participate. We informed them in advance that the questionnaire includes mainly closed-ended items about their attitudes and perceptions but also some open-ended items and behavioral vignettes. There was no deception of respondents involved, no intervention in political processes, and respondents were assured explicitly and repeatedly that their answers will remain confidential and anonymous.

3 Vignette Texts

This section presents the full English texts of the vignettes used for the ultimatum game experiment in this study. We first present the version used in the non-US cases, which were fielded to sitting politicians in face-to-face interviews using tablets and laptops. This version was fielded in multiple languages (Dutch, English, French, German) and translations were made directly from the original English wording reported here. We then present the version used in the US case, which was fielded in English.

The vignettes are presented in a condensed format that reports the different treatment texts where they are manipulated. In each case, we first report the condensed vignette for the 'propose first' condition, and then the 'accept first' condition, for ease of reading.

Summary of treatment breakdowns (all treatments are cross-cutting):

1. T1 - counterpart: citizen target / politician target.
2. T2 - partisanship: co-partisan / out partisan (in non-US instrument). Democrat / Republican / Independent (in US instrument).
3. T3 - presentation order: propose first / accept first.

3.1 Non-US instrument, propose first vignette

Q1:
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. There is €1000 that needs to be divided between yourself and a [citizen/politician]. The money is unrelated to politics or to your work and carries no legal obligations. It is purely hypothetical. All you know about the [citizen/politician] is that s/he is [(politician target:) also a member of your party / a member of a party on the opposite side of the political map. / (citizen target:) a supporter of your party / a supporter of a party from the opposite side of the political map.]
In this scenario, you propose to the [citizen/politician] how to split the money.

- You can divide the money between you two in whatever way you like: you can take the entire amount yourself, give it all to the [citizen/politician], or split it.
- You can only make one proposal to the [politician/citizen] and you cannot negotiate with them.
- Once you make your proposal, the [citizen/politician] decides whether to accept or reject the offer.
- If the [citizen/politician] accepts your offer, the money is split between the two of you according to your proposal.
- If the [citizen/politician] rejects your offer, you both get nothing.
- The [citizen/politician] will never know your identity. They only know how you propose to split the money.

What would be your proposal? Please indicate how much you would give to the [citizen/politician] of the €1000. The remainder is what goes to you.

[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

Q2:
Now assume the [citizen/politician] is the one making the proposal and you are required to accept or reject their offer. Remember that if you accept, you take the amount they offer you, and they take the rest. If you reject, you both get nothing. What is the lowest offer that you will be willing to accept?

[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

3.2 Non-US instrument, accept first vignette

Q1:
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. There is €1000 that needs to be divided between yourself and a [citizen/politician]. The money is unrelated to politics or to your work and carries no legal obligations. It is purely hypothetical. All you know about the [citizen/politician] is that s/he is [(politician target:) also a member of your party / a member of a party on the opposite side of the political map. / (citizen target:) a supporter of your party / a supporter of a party from the opposite side of the political map.]
In this scenario, the [citizen/politician] proposes to you how to split the money.

- The [citizen/politician] can divide the money between you two in whatever way they like: they can take the entire amount to themselves, give it all to you, or split it.
- The [citizen/politician] can only make one proposal to you and they cannot negotiate with you.
- Once the [citizen/politician] makes the proposal, you decide whether to accept or reject the offer.
- If you accept the offer, the money is split between the two of you according to the [citizen's/politician's] proposal.
- If you reject the offer, you both get nothing.
- The [citizen/politician] will never know your identity. They only know how you respond to their proposal.

What is the lowest offer that you would be willing to accept? Please indicate how much the [citizen/politician] would need to offer you of the €1000 for you to accept. The remainder

is what goes to the [citizen/politician].

[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

Q2:
Now assume that you are the one making the proposal and the [citizen/politician] is required to accept or reject your offer. Remember that if they accept, they take the amount you offered them, and you take the rest. If they reject, you both get nothing.
What would be your proposal? Please indicate how much you would give to the [citizen/politician] of the €1000. The remainder is what goes to you.
[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

3.3 US instrument, propose first vignette

Q1:
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. There is $1000 that needs to be divided between yourself and a [citizen/politician] from your locality. The money is unrelated to politics or to your work and carries no legal obligations. It is purely hypothetical. All you know about the [citizen/politician] is that s/he [(citizen target:) is a supporter of the Democratic Party / is a supporter of the Republican Party / does not identify with any political party. / (politician target:) is a member of the Democratic Party / is a member of the Republican Party / is not affiliated with a political party.]
In this scenario, you propose to the [citizen/politician] how to split the money.

- You can divide the money between you two in whatever way you like: you can take the entire amount yourself, give it all to the [citizen/politician], or split it.
- You can only make one proposal to the [citizen/politician] and you cannot negotiate with them.
- Once you make your proposal, the [citizen/politician] decides whether to accept or reject the offer.
- If the [citizen/politician] accepts your offer, the money is split between the two of you according to your proposal.
- If the [citizen/politician] rejects your offer, you both get nothing.
- The [citizen/politician] will never know your identity. They only know how you propose to split the money.

What would be your proposal? Please indicate how much you would give to the [citizen/politician] of the $1000. The remainder is what goes to you.
[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

Q2:
Now assume the [citizen/politician] is the one making the proposal and you are required to accept or reject their offer. Remember that if you accept, you take the amount they offer you, and they take the rest. If you reject, you both get nothing. What is the lowest offer that you will be willing to accept?

[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

3.4 US instrument, accept first vignette

Q1:
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. There is $1000 that needs to be divided between yourself and a [citizen/politician] from your locality. The money is unrelated to politics or to your work and carries no legal obligations. It is purely hypothetical. All you know about the citizen is that s/he [(citizen target:) is a supporter of the Democratic Party / is a supporter of the Republican Party / does not identify with any political party. / (politician target:) is a member of the Democratic Party / is a member of the Republican Party / is not affiliated with a political party.]
In this scenario, the [citizen/politician] proposes to you how to split the money.

- The [citizen/politician] can divide the money between you two in whatever way they like: they can take the entire amount to themselves, give it all to you, or split it.
- The [citizen/politician] can only make one proposal to you and they cannot negotiate with you.
- Once the [citizen/politician] makes the proposal, you decide whether to accept or reject the offer.
- If you accept the offer, the money is split between the two of you according to the [citizen's/politician's] proposal.
- If you reject the offer, you both get nothing.
- The [citizen/politician] will never know your identity. They only know how you respond to their proposal.

What is the lowest offer that you would be willing to accept? Please indicate how much the [citizen/politician] would need to offer you of the $1000 for you to accept. The remainder is what goes to the [citizen/politician].

[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

Q2:
Now assume that you are the one making the proposal and the [citizen/politician] is required to accept or reject your offer. Remember that if they accept, they take the amount you offered them, and you take the rest. If they reject, you both get nothing. What would be your proposal? Please indicate how much you would give to the [citizen/politician] of the $1000. The remainder is what goes to you.

[Text entry, limited to numbers between, 0 – 1000]

4 Partisan Composition of Sample

This section reports the number and proportion of interviewees from each party in each of the legislatures we sampled, and compares them to the distribution and share of seats each party had in these legislatures at the time of fielding. In the US, we report the self-reported party ID of participating local- and state-level representatives.

Parliament	Party	% Sample	N Sample	% Parl.	N Parl.
Belgium - Federal	N-VA	22.73	20	20.26	33
	PS	13.64	12	11.67	23
	CD&V	17.05	15	11.61	18
	Open Vld	7.95	7	9.78	14
	MR	11.36	10	9.64	20
	sp.a	7.95	7	8.83	13
	Groen	5.68	5	5.32	6
	cdH	4.55	4	4.98	9
	PVDA-PTB	0	0	3.72	2
	VB	3.41	3	3.67	3
	ECOLO	5.68	5	3.30	6

	FDF	0	0	1.80	2
	PP	0	0	1.50	1
Belgium - Flanders	N-VA	35.29	30	34.68	43
	CD&V	22.35	19	21.77	27
	Open Vld	11.76	10	15.32	19
	sp.a	15.29	13	14.52	18
	Groen	9.41	8	8.06	10
	VB	4.71	4	4.84	6
	UF	1.18	1	0.81	1
Belgium - Wallonia	PS	34.38	22	34.69	51
and FR Brussels	MR	25	16	29.25	43
	FDF	14.06	9	8.16	12
	cdH	10.94	7	14.97	22
	Ecolo	12.50	8	8.16	12
	PTB-GO/PVDA	1.56	1	4.08	6
	PP	1.56	1	0.68	1
Canada - Federal	Liberal	55.10	27	54.44	184
	Conservative	34.69	17	29.29	99
	New Democratic	10.20	5	13.02	44
	Bloc Québécois	0	0	2.96	10
	Green	0	0	0.30	1
Canada - Ontario	Conservative	53.57	15	61.29	76
	New Democratic	39.29	11	32.26	40
	Liberal	7.14	2	5.65	7
	Green	0	0	0.81	1
Germany	CDU/CSU	27.78	20	34.70	246
	SPD	12.50	9	21.58	153
	Linke	11.11	8	9.73	69
	Grüne	12.50	9	9.45	67
	AfD	22.22	16	13.26	94
	FDP	13.89	10	11.28	80
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	19.79	19	28.46	70
	Social Democratic Party	35.42	34	22.36	55
	FDP.The Liberals	14.58	14	18.70	46

	Christian Democratic People's Party	16.67	16	16.26	40
	Green Party	5.21	5	4.88	12
	Green Liberal Party	2.08	2	2.85	7
	Conservative Democratic Party	4.17	4	3.25	8
	Evangelical People's Party	0	0	0.81	2
	Ticino League	0	0	0.81	2
	Swiss Party of Labour	1.04	1	0.41	1
	Geneva Citizens' Movement	1.04	1	0.41	1
	Independent/other	0	0	0.81	2
United States - Local and State	Republican	41.00	255		
	Democratic	31.41	214		
	Independent/No Party	24.60	153		

Table A.1: Partisan Composition of MP Sample

5 Counterpart Treatment Results

Table A.2 reports the topline results for the politician/citizen treatment included in our module but not reported on in the paper. Results are means across the other treatments (partisanship and presentation order of requests/demands).

Country	Target	Mean Proposal (out of 1,000)	Mean Demand (out of 1,000)	N
All	Non-Politician	600	208	555
	Politician	487	308	554
	Difference	−113	100	-
Belgium	Citizen	591	217	122
	Politician	479	327	115
	Difference	−112	110	-
Canada	Citizen	623	190	35
	Politician	475	310	42
	Difference	−148	119	-
Germany	Citizen	578	317	29
	Politician	487	367	45
	Difference	−91	50	-
Switzerland	Citizen	515	265	52
	Politician	434	366	44
	Difference	−81	101	-
United States	Citizen	617	187	317
	Politician	500	283	308
	Difference	−117	96	-

Table A.2: Mean proposals and demands reported by politicians in the ultimatum game experiment, by politician/citizen target treatment. Figures reported are amounts in either Dollars, Euros, or Francs, out of 1,000.

6 Distribution Plots of Responses

We report density plots for the distribution of proposals (Figure A.1) and demands (Figure A.2). Results are reported by country, and are further broken down by the co-/out-partisanship treatment condition.



Figure A.1: Distribution of proposals made by politicians in the ultimatum game. Figures are density plots by country and partisanship treatment condition.



Figure A.2: Distribution of demands made by politicians in the ultimatum game. Figures are density plots by country and partisanship treatment condition.

7 Per Country Models

The following tables present per-country regression models estimating the effects of our experimental treatments in each country separately. The models follow the same specifications of the pooled models reported in the paper, excluding country fixed effects. Table A.3 reports the per-country results for proposals made by politicians, and Table A.4 reports the results for demands.

	Outcome: Proposal			
	Belgium		Canada	
Co-partisan Target	94.85***	90.62***	107.40**	110.36**
	(35.21)	(34.58)	(50.69)	(47.95)
Politician Target		−109.11***		−149.69***
		(34.61)		(48.02)
Propose First	11.03	14.44	22.35	19.39
	(35.24)	(34.60)	(50.69)	(47.95)
Intercept	484.33***	537.56***	480.18***	562.02***
	(30.72)	(34.55)	(43.28)	(48.63)
Observations	237	237	77	77
	Germany		Switzerland	
Co-partisan Target	153.29**	196.56***	95.12*	93.85*
	(65.09)	(66.93)	(56.56)	(56.25)
Politician Target		−142.91**		−80.89
		(68.70)		(56.35)
Propose First	−124.19*	−109.68*	95.51	97.04
	(65.69)	(64.58)	(59.02)	(58.70)
Intercept	499.71***	558.71***	393.84***	431.05***
	(54.98)	(60.76)	(46.26)	(52.80)
Observations	74	74	96	96
	United States			
Co-partisan Target	58.95**	50.37*		
	(26.75)	(26.15)		
Politician Target		−113.38***		
		(26.27)		
Propose First	−7.60	−10.41		
	(26.73)	(26.07)		
Intercept	507.66***	576.97***		
	(22.73)	(27.37)		
Observations	343	343		
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table A.3: Estimation results: proposals by politicians in the ultimatum game, by treatment variables. All models are linear regressions. Propose first - respondent was asked to make the proposal before stating their lowest acceptance offer. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

	Outcome: Demand			
	Belgium		Canada	
Co-partisan Target	−60.07*	−56.71*	−105.63*	−108.04*
	(31.65)	(31.02)	(55.92)	(54.50)
Politician Target		103.33***		121.32**
		(31.04)		(54.57)
Propose First	14.94	11.44	−14.32	−11.91
	(31.68)	(31.05)	(55.92)	(54.50)
Intercept	287.40***	237.16***	312.53***	246.20***
	(28.04)	(31.34)	(47.74)	(55.27)
Observations	240	240	77	77
	Germany		Switzerland	
Co-partisan Target	−143.80**	−172.43**	−65.74	−64.15
	(71.12)	(73.75)	(53.51)	(52.74)
Politician Target		104.41		102.01*
		(76.78)		(52.83)
Propose First	−22.37	−36.47	−89.98	−91.91*
	(72.10)	(72.41)	(55.83)	(55.04)
Intercept	431.30***	386.63***	377.82***	330.90***
	(59.60)	(67.74)	(43.76)	(49.51)
Observations	72	72	96	96
	United States			
Co-partisan Target	−69.29***	−62.69**		
	(26.14)	(25.78)		
Politician Target		90.47***		
		(25.85)		
Propose First	−24.11	−22.43		
	(26.10)	(25.68)		
Intercept	303.92***	248.66***		
	(22.22)	(26.97)		
Observations	341	341		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Estimation results: demands (lowest acceptable offers) reported by politicians in the ultimatum game, by treatment variables. All models are linear regressions. Propose first - respondent was asked to make the proposal before stating their lowest acceptable offer. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

8 Per Country Interaction Models

The following tables present per-country regression models estimating the interaction effect of our experimental treatments in each country separately. The models follow the same specifications of the pooled model reported in the paper, excluding country fixed effects. Table A.5 reports the per-country results for proposals made by politicians, and Table A.6 reports the results for demands.

	Outcome: Proposal				
	BE	CA	DE	CH	US
Co-partisan Target	112.02**	267.67***	298.21***	110.82	59.36
	(48.23)	(67.56)	(110.39)	(76.94)	(39.54)
Politician Target	−87.55*	−16.47	−75.60	−61.34	−104.89***
	(48.42)	(62.12)	(89.92)	(82.61)	(38.39)
Propose First	14.96	5.38	−101.93	98.15	−9.84
	(34.66)	(45.51)	(64.77)	(59.08)	(26.17)
Co-Partisan X Politician	−44.18	−286.61***	−160.22	−36.93	−16.03
	(69.31)	(91.33)	(138.55)	(113.62)	(52.81)
Intercept	526.42***	497.71***	524.22***	421.53***	571.62***
	(38.76)	(50.29)	(67.56)	(60.60)	(32.58)
Observations	237	77	74	96	343
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5: Estimation results: proposals by politicians in the ultimatum game, by treatment variables, including an interaction between the counterpart and partisanship treatments. All models are linear regressions. Propose first - respondent was asked to make the proposal before stating their lowest acceptance offer. Standard errors reported in parentheses. BE - Belgium; CA - Canada; DE - Germany; CH - Switzerland; US - United States.

	s	Outcome: Demand			
	BE	CA	DE	CH	US
Co-partisan Target	−87.53**	−88.13	−316.09**	−93.56	−85.42**
	(43.35)	(81.79)	(121.90)	(72.04)	(39.09)
Politician Target	71.56	138.18*	7.39	68.12	68.82*
	(44.02)	(75.21)	(100.67)	(77.35)	(38.10)
Propose First	10.62	−13.69	−44.51	−93.84*	−23.69
	(31.05)	(55.10)	(72.00)	(55.32)	(25.75)
Co-Partisan X Politician	63.17	−36.26	224.34	64.02	40.22
	(62.06)	(110.58)	(152.31)	(106.39)	(51.97)
Intercept	253.61***	238.06***	437.20***	347.40***	262.27***
	(35.26)	(60.89)	(75.43)	(56.75)	(32.21)
Observations	240	77	72	96	341
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.6: Estimation results: demands (lowest acceptable offers) by politicians in the ultimatum game, by treatment variables, including an interaction between the counterpart and partisanship treatments. All models are linear regressions. Propose first - respondent was asked to make the proposal before stating their lowest acceptance offer. Standard errors reported in parentheses. BE - Belgium; CA - Canada; DE - Germany; CH - Switzerland; US - United States.

9 Minor Party Models

This section reports results from estimating the main pooled models reported in the paper with the sample limited to politicians from minor parties only. In the non-US sample, we define minor parties as either those that have not been in government for the last 20 years, or parties that received less than 5 percent of the vote in the election preceding the interview. In the US, we look at respondents who identified as neither Democrats nor Republicans (i.e. independent / unaffiliated). Importantly, our original analysis excluded independent/unaffiliated US respondents from the analysis of the partisanship treatment because it is unclear what co-partisanship signifies for those without a partisan affiliation (e.g. they might not consider other independents as co-partisans). For the sake of this analysis, we do include those representatives, and code their counterparts as co-partisans if they are also independents/unaffiliated representatives, and out-partisans if they are either Democratic or Republican.

The resulting sub-sample consists of 237 politicians. In Belgium, 26 politicians belong to minor parties (Federally: cdH, FDF, ecolo, and Vlaams Belang; Flanders: Vlaams Belang, Wallonia: FDF and PTB-GO). In Canada, 21 politicians belong to such a party (Federal NDP / Ontario NDP, and two independent members). In Germany, 24 politicians (AfD, Linke); In Switzerland, 13 politicians (Conservative Democratic Party, Green Liberal Party, Green Party, Geneva Citizens' Movement, and the Swiss Party of Labour). In the US, 153 representatives were neither Democratic nor Republican.

Table A.7 presents the results of this analysis. Results are overall similar to the main analysis, with two noteworthy differences. First, partisanship effects, while substantively similar to those seen in the full sample, are only significant for demands, and not for proposals, although the substantive effect is in the same direction and of similar magnitude to that found in the full sample. Second, there are important country differences, with American independent/unaffiliated politicians being substantially more generous in their proposals compared to the rest of the sample, although the differences do not reach statistical significance. Second, Swiss and German politicians from minor parties make significantly higher demands than politicians from other countries in this sub-sample.

	Outcome: Proposal		Outcome: Demand	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Co-partisan Target	76.44*	68.85	−91.90**	−85.84**
	(43.93)	(43.69)	(38.74)	(38.86)
Politician Target		−84.91**		50.37
		(38.36)		(34.30)
Propose First	64.14*	66.15*	−6.25	−7.78
	(38.65)	(38.34)	(34.25)	(34.18)
Canada (FE)	34.08	55.36	89.65	76.26
	(85.81)	(85.63)	(74.92)	(75.28)
Switzerland (FE)	−35.20	−41.92	219.82**	222.56**
	(100.76)	(99.96)	(88.04)	(87.84)
Germany (FE)	−28.94	−11.87	233.74***	219.83***
	(82.91)	(82.58)	(74.03)	(74.45)
United States (FE)	100.33	101.79	6.44	4.41
	(62.53)	(62.02)	(54.38)	(54.26)
Intercept	425.89***	463.96***	229.79***	207.37***
	(61.07)	(62.96)	(53.03)	(55.06)
Observations	237	237	235	235
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Estimation results: proposals and demands by politicians from minor parties in the ultimatum game, by treatment variables. Models are linear regressions. Country fixed effects are included, with Belgium as the base rate. Propose first - respondent was asked to make the proposal before stating the lowest acceptance amount. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

10 Calibration Analysis of Politicians' Co-/Out-Partisan Bargaining Behavior

We conduct a calibration analysis of how well politicians bargain with each other by comparing in-party and out-party offers and demands when participants are pitted against fellow representatives. Results are reported in Table A.8. Politicians' offers to and demands from out-partisan colleagues are more closely aligned compared to offers to and demands from co-partisan politicians. In the former, we observe a difference of about 10 percentage points

between the mean offers and the mean demands (449 vs. 343). That is, politicians making offers to out-partisan colleagues extract about 100 Euros/Dollars/Francs less than what they theoretically could. In contrast, bargaining between co-partisan politicians seems less efficient, resulting in offers that are about 21 percentage points higher than demands (505 vs. 294), translating to a loss of about 200 Euros/Dollars/Francs for the proposing politician.

One possible interpretation for this difference is that politicians are indeed better calibrated when reasoning into their rivals' logic. Another is that their behavior reflects a generosity premium in negotiations with political allies, which could be a signal of cooperative intentions, or a reflection of reduced concern about ending up with a large portion of the endowment in the hands of a co-partisan colleague.

Target	Mean Proposal	Mean Demand	Mean Difference	N
Co-Partisan Politicians	505	294	206	250
Out-Partisan Politicians	449	343	104	247
All Politicians	477	318	155	497

Table A.8: Mean proposals and demands reported by participants in the ultimatum game experiment, for politician targets, across partisanship treatment conditions. Figures reported are amounts in either Euros, Dollars, or Francs, out of 1,000.