Power Over Presence: Women's Representation in Comprehensive Peace Negotiations and Gender Provision Outcomes
Elizabeth Good
Appendix

A.1) Qualitative Summary of Provisions

Type of Provision	Examples	Provision Frequency*
Equality on the basis of gender	"All human beings are equal before the law regardless of race, ethnic origin, geographical origin, sex, religion, political affiliation or social status." (Central African Republic, 2013)	29%
Anti-Discrimination on the basis of gender	"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this Article or in the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." (Bosnia and Herzegovina/Yugoslavia (former), 1995)	43%
Socio-Economic Provisions	"Deliberate promotion of compulsory primary education that ensures gender parity through joint financial support from the State and the communes." (Burundi, 2000) "Under conditions determined by law, suffrage is universal, equal and secret. It can be direct or indirect. Under conditions determined by law, all Comorians of both sexes can vote in enjoyment of their civil and political rights." (Comoros/Anjouan, 2001)	43%
Condemnation of GBV / SBV	"We agree as follows: … To end violence and cruel treatment against women" (Central African Republic, 2020)	29%
GBV / SBV Ceasefire Violation	"The Parties agree that this immediate, complete, and irrevocable cessation of hostilities commits them to scrupulously refrain from: (d) Any act of violence against women and girls, or of sexual or gender-based violence." (Central African Republic, 2019)	7%
Citizenship Rights	"Anyone who is born to an Iraqi father or to an Iraqi mother shall be considered an Iraqi. This shall be regulated by law." (Iraq, 2005) "Women, children, as well as men have equal rights to obtain all necessary identity documents and have the right to have such documents issued in their own names." (Sudan/Darfur, 2011)	16%
Consent to Marriage	"A marriage shall not be legal without the free consent of both the man and the woman, or if either party has not reached the age of maturity." (Somalia, 2012)	9%
State Funding for Women-Specific Issues	"Set up appropriate and specific structures which can enable women to gain access to credit, micro-finance and the business world" (Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003) "The State shall provide maternity, child care and medical care for pregnant women, children in need, persons with special needs and the elderly, in line with regional and international instruments ratified by the GoS." (Sudan/Darfur, 2006)	26%
Women's Representation	"The authorities shall guarantee the adequate and effective participation of women in the decision-making ranks of the public administration." (Colombia, 1991) "A publicity campaign to promote the recruitment of new personnel for the National Civil Police shall be designed and implemented as soon as possible. Special consideration shall be given to the recruitment of women. (El Salvador, 1992)	57%
Judicial Reparations for Survivor-Victims	"Compensation and Reparations Protocol… Individuals and groups affected by the conflict in Darfur, including male and female survivors of rape, victims of physical, mental, and psychological injuries or those who lost their property or whose basic rights were violated." (Sudan, 2020)	6%

- Percentage is determined by dividing the number of agreements containing the specific type of provision by all comprehensive agreements *that contain provisions for women*, not all comprehensive agreements finalized between 1990 and 2021.

A.2a) Regional distribution of 116 comprehensive peace agreements finalized between 1990 and 2021



A.2b) Regional distribution of women signatories across 116 comprehensive peace agreements finalized between 1990 and 2021



A.3a) Binary Measurement of Women Delegates (GLM Regression). Delegates with multiple positions were coded down to their lowest-powered position

	Dependent Variable			
	Provisions for Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Signatories	1.341**			
	(0.598)			
Women Negotiators		0.698		
		(0.860)		
Women Mediators			−0.266	
			(1.428)	
Women Observers				1.056
				(0.690)
Constant	0.045	0.219	0.266	0.148
	(0.213)	(0.200)	(0.196)	(0.206)
Observations	108	108	108	108
Log Likelihood	−70.982	−73.596	−73.933	−72.614
Akaike Inf. Crit.	145.965	151.191	151.865	149.227
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note that some women were coded down to logistical support staff and thus dropped from the model. A.3a shows complete bivariate models.

A.3b) Percentage Measurement of Women Delegates (OLS Regression). Delegates with multiple positions were coded down to their lowest-powered position

	Dependent Variable				
	Provisions for Women				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women Sign.	2.096** (0.898)				
Women Negot.		2.584*** (0.849)			
Women Med.			−1.005 (1.370)		
Women Obs.				0.588 (0.487)	
Women Staff					−1.000 (0.577)
Constant	0.517*** (0.052)	0.217* (0.119)	0.613*** (0.081)	0.587*** (0.071)	0.833 (0.373)
Observations	103	17	40	55	3
R^2	0.051	0.381	0.014	0.027	0.750
Adj. R^2	0.042	0.340	−0.012	0.008	0.500
Resid. SE	0.488 (df = 101)	0.412 (df = 15)	0.499 (df = 38)	0.488 (df = 53)	0.408 (df = 1)
F Statistic	5.444** (df = 1; 101)	9.249*** (df = 1; 15)	0.538 (df = 1; 38)	1.457 (df = 1; 53)	3.000 (df = 1; 1)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.3b shows complete bivariate models.

A.4a) Binary Measurement of Women Delegates (GLM Regression). Delegates with multiple positions were coded in all positions, increasing their statistical weight.

	Dependent Variable			
	Provisions for Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Signatories	1.341**			
	(0.598)			
Women Negotiators		0.698		
		(0.860)		
Women Mediators			0.867	
			(1.171)	
Women Observers				1.056
				(0.690)
Constant	0.045	0.219	0.232	0.148
	(0.213)	(0.200)	(0.197)	(0.206)
Observations	108	108	108	108
Log Likelihood	−70.982	−73.596	−73.643	−72.614
Akaike Inf. Crit.	145.965	151.191	151.286	149.227
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.4a shows complete bivariate models.

A.4b) Percentage Measurement of Women Delegates (OLS regression). Delegates with multiple positions were coded in all positions, increasing their statistical weight.

	Dependent Variable			
	Provisions for Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Signatories	2.096** (0.898)			
Women Negotiators		2.352** (0.899)		
Women Mediators			0.259 (0.799)	
Women Observers				0.588 (0.487)
Constant	0.517*** (0.052)	0.277** (0.122)	0.639*** (0.073)	0.587*** (0.071)
Observations	103	18	48	55
R^2	0.051	0.300	0.002	0.027
Adjusted R^2	0.042	0.256	−0.019	0.008
Residual Std. Error	0.488 (df = 101)	0.441 (df = 16)	0.488 (df = 46)	0.488 (df = 53)
F Statistic	5.444** (df = 1; 101)	6.845** (df = 1; 16)	0.105 (df = 1; 46)	1.457 (df = 1; 53)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.4b shows complete bivariate models.

A.5) To mitigate confounders, I control for the following variables:

Concept	Measurement	Data
International Involvement	United Nations Security Council Resolutions	UNSC Resolutions
	United Nations Security Council Press Releases	UNSC Press Statements
	United Nations Signature to the agreement	Peace Agreement Database (Bell et al. 2021)
	Other International Signatory to the agreement	Peace Agreement Database (Bell et al. 2021)
	National Action Plan Present	National Action Plan Database (WILPF)
Public Attention	New York Times publications on the conflict and/or peace process	New York Times Article Archive
Gender Inequality	Health and survival; educational attainment; economic participation and opportunity; political empowerment	Global Gender Gap Index
	Reproductive health; empowerment; labour market access	Gender Inequality Index
	Life expectancy; years of schooling; earned income	Gender Development Index
	Secondary education enrollment for girls and women	World Bank
	Teen Pregnancy[1]	World Bank
Public Perception	Survey response to the statement, "men should have more right to a job than women"	World Values Survey Afrobarometer
	Survey response to the statement, "men make better political leaders than women do"	World Values Survey Afrobarometer
Women's Interest in Politics	Survey response to the question, "How interested are you in politics/public affairs?"	World Values Survey Afrobarometer
	Percentage of parliamentary seats held by women	United Nations Development Programme
Women and Conflict	Frequency of wartime sexual-based violence	Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset (SVAC)[2]
	Women as combatants	Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD v1.3)

[1] Teen Pregnancy is defined as girls and women between the ages of 15-19 who have had children or are currently pregnant.

[2] I use data issued by the US State Department because it reports the highest rates of sexual violence.

A.6a) Correlation Matrices



Note: See codebook for full variable details (Good, 2024). GDI: Gender Development Index; GGGI: Global Gender Gap Index; GII: Gender Inequality Index; ImUN: UN signatory; ImOth: Other third-party signatory; ImPK: UN peacekeeping; Press_UNSC: UN Security Council press statements; NAP: National Action Plan; NYT_p: New York Times publications; SEP_Fem: Secondary education pupils, female enrollment; TeenPreg: Teenage mothers; WomParl: Women in parliament (%).

A.6b) Variance Inflation Factor Analysis

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Women Delegates (%)	1.316	3.076	1.481	1.015	1.015	1.017	1.110
UNSC Resolutions	1.358						
UNSC Press	1.125						
UN Signatory	1.665						
Third Party Signatory	1.624						
National Action Plan	1.494						
Gender Development Index		171.367	1.276				
Global Gender Gap Index		209.672					
Gender Inequality Index		758.024					
Secondary Education for Women		2.253	1.067				
Teen Pregnancy		89.361	1.381				
Women's Political Interest				1.055			
Women in Parliament				1.041			
Sexual violence in Conflict					1.002		
Women Active Combatants					1.013		
NYT Publications						1.659	
NYT Publications Lagged						1.664	
Perception of Employment for Women							2.473
Perception of Women in Leadership							2.501

A.7) OLS Regression using oiriginal and imputed data. Analysis excludes the one agreement that negatively impacts women (Adadda Agreement, Ethiopia Somalia Ogaden Puntland, 2007) and includes alternative measures of gender equality

	Dependent Variable					
	Provisions for Women					
	Original(1)	Imputed(2)	Imputed(3)	Imputed(4)	Imputed(5)	Imputed(6)
(Intercept)	0.479***	0.339*	1.160	0.290	0.412***	0.152
	(0.054)	(0.159)	(1.011)	(0.586)	(0.102)	(1.987)
Women Delegates (%)	2.070**	1.796**	1.989*	2.134***	1.806**	1.786
	(0.704)	(0.680)	(0.735)	(0.575)	(0.653)	(1.066)
UNSC Resolutions		0.032				0.027
		(0.024)				(0.033)
UNSC Press		−0.006				0.001
		(0.018)				(0.019)
UN Signatory		0.139				0.271
		(0.126)				(0.192)
Third Party Signatory		−0.025				0.069
		(0.127)				(0.149)
National Action Plan		0.033				−0.011
		(0.157)				(0.148)
Gender Development Index			−0.866*			−0.762
			(0.378)			(0.616)
Global Gender Gap Index			1.093			2.086
			(1.042)			(2.035)
Gender Inequality Index			−0.530			−0.905
			(0.574)			(0.701)
Secondary Education for Women			−0.008			−0.012
			(0.011)			(0.012)
Teen Pregnancy			0.002			0.003
			(0.007)			(0.011)
Womens Political Interest				0.074		0.020
				(0.185)		(0.282)
Women in Parliament				−0.002		−0.005
				(0.006)		(0.008)
Sexual Violence in Conflict					0.241	−0.200
					(0.196)	(0.297)
Women Active Combatants					0.034	0.040
					(0.134)	(0.236)
New York Times Publications						0.001*
						(0.000)
Perception of Employment for Women						0.124
						(0.276)
Perception of Women in Leadership						0.045
						(0.141)
Num. obs.	107	107	107	107	107	107
R^2	0.076	0.154	0.180	0.115	0.100	0.428

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A.8) Examples of imputed data



Data: United Nations Development Programme



Data: World Bank

A.9a) A GLM model leveraging a binary indicator of whether women comprise at least 10 percent of delegates (1), or not (0).

	Dependent Variable
	Provisions for Women
Women Delegates (Binary)	0.026
	(0.729)
Women Delegates (Percent)	10.145
	(6.578)
Constant	−0.087
	(0.241)
Observations	108
Log Likelihood	−69.533
Akaike Inf. Crit.	145.066
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

18 cases had delegations comprised of 10 percent or more women. Controlled for the total percentage of women delegates to determine the presence of a threshold effect. A.9a shows complete bivariate models.

A.9b) OLS model leveraging a binary indicator of whether women comprise at least 10 percent of delegates (1), or not (0).

	Dependent Variable			
	Provisions for Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Signatories	0.235			
	(0.173)			
Women Negotiators		0.714***		
		(0.240)		
Women Mediators			0.114	
			(0.255)	
Women Observers				0.154
				(0.188)
Constant	0.543***	0.286**	0.636***	0.596***
	(0.051)	(0.113)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Observations	103	18	48	55
R^2	0.018	0.357	0.004	0.013
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.317	−0.017	−0.006
Residual Std. Error	0.496 (df = 101)	0.423 (df = 16)	0.487 (df = 46)	0.492 (df = 53)
F Statistic	1.844 (df = 1; 101)	8.889*** (df = 1; 16)	0.199 (df = 1; 46)	0.673 (df = 1; 53)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Logit models unidentifiable due to power constraints. 9 cases have 10 percent or more women signatories; 4 cases with 10 percent or more women negotiators; 4 cases with 10 percent or more women mediators; 8 cases with 10 percent or more women observers. A.9b shows complete bivariate models.

A.10) Track 1 positions held by women



A.10 shows complete bivariate models.

A.11) Positions of power separated by all women delegates, women signatories, and non-signatory delegates (negotiators, mediators, and observers). GLM Regression:

	Dependent Variable		
	Provisions for Women		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
All Women Delegates	1.021**		
	(0.430)		
Women Signatories		1.341**	
		(0.598)	
Women Non-Signatories			0.614
			(0.579)
Constant	−0.087	0.045	0.174
	(0.241)	(0.213)	(0.209)
Observations	108	108	108
Log Likelihood	−70.962	−70.982	−73.359
Akaike Inf. Crit.	145.924	145.965	150.717
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

A.11 shows complete bivariate models.

A.12) OLS Regression using oiriginal and imputed data. Analysis includes the one agreement that negatively impacts women (Adadda Agreement, Ethiopia Somalia Ogaden Puntland, 2007).

	Dependent Variable					
	Provisions for Women					
	Original(1)	Imputed(2)	Imputed(3)	Imputed(4)	Imputed(5)	Imputed(6)
(Intercept)	0.486^{***}	0.335^{*}	1.420^{**}	0.376	0.433^{***}	1.121
	(0.054)	(0.132)	(0.472)	(0.307)	(0.104)	(1.092)
Women Delegates (%)	2.027^{**}	1.878^{**}	2.636^{***}	2.052^{***}	1.662^{*}	2.012^{*}
	(0.704)	(0.708)	(0.656)	(0.571)	(0.651)	(0.781)
UNSC Resolutions		0.023				−0.015
		(0.018)				(0.031)
UNSC Press		0.006				0.017
		(0.022)				(0.026)
UN Signatory		0.139				0.408
		(0.116)				(0.207)
Third Party Signatory		−0.030				−0.061
		(0.117)				(0.138)
National Action Plan		−0.007				0.044
		(0.146)				(0.119)
Gender Development Index			−0.764			−0.717
			(0.427)			(0.542)
Secondary Education for Women			−0.005			0.000
			(0.007)			(0.011)
Teen Pregnancy			−0.005			−0.005
			(0.008)			(0.011)
Womens Political Interest				0.032		−0.004
				(0.100)		(0.154)
Women in Parliament				0.001		0.002
				(0.008)		(0.010)
Sexual Violence in Conflict					0.320	0.346
					(0.208)	(0.287)
Women Active Combatants					−0.023	−0.070
					(0.135)	(0.159)
New York Times Publications						0.001
						(0.000)
Perception of Employment for Women						−0.096
						(0.408)
Perception of Women in Leadership						0.046
						(0.130)
Num. obs.	108	108	108	108	108	108
R^2	0.073	0.135	0.158	0.091	0.106	0.380

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A.13) Lagged Gender Development Index variable from the year prior the agreement was finalized (1yr) and 5 years prior (5yr). OLS Regression:

	Dependent variable:
	Provisions for Women
Women Delegates (Percent)	2.446**
	(0.946)
GDI lagged 1yr	1.407
	(2.280)
GDI lagged 5yr	−3.722
	(2.350)
Constant	2.387***
	(0.719)
Observations	67
R^2	0.167
Adjusted R^2	0.128
Residual Std. Error	0.462 (df = 63)
F Statistic	4.218*** (df = 3; 63)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.13 shows complete bivariate models.

A.14a) Women's involvement and references to specific provisions. GLM Regression:

	Dependent variable:			
	Equality	Protection	Movement	Vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Delegates (Percent)	0.273	0.042	0.090	0.068
	(0.239)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.083)
Constant	0.855***	0.188***	0.217***	0.188***
	(0.144)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Observations	108	108	108	108
R^2	0.012	0.003	0.010	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.003	−0.007	0.001	−0.003
Residual Std. Error (df = 106)	1.193	0.406	0.435	0.412
F Statistic (df = 1; 106)	1.306	0.271	1.074	0.679
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I find no significant correlation between women's inclusion in peace negotiations and provisions referencing equality, protection of civilians, freedom of movement, or voting rights. A.14a shows complete bivariate models.

A.14b) Women's involvement and references to socio-economic provisions. GLM Regression:

	Dependent variable:				
	Education	Property	Work	Health	Water
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women Delegates (Percent)	−0.009	0.094	−0.006	−0.006	0.056
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.100)
Constant	0.188***	0.188***	0.159***	0.159***	0.406***
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.060)
Observations	108	108	108	108	108
R^2	0.0001	0.012	0.0001	0.0001	0.003
Adjusted R^2	−0.009	0.002	−0.009	−0.009	−0.006
Residual Std. Error (df = 106)	0.392	0.417	0.368	0.368	0.498
F Statistic (df = 1; 106)	0.013	1.255	0.006	0.006	0.312
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I find no significant correlation between women's involvement and socio-economic rights, including rights to education, property, work, health, or access to water. A.14b shows complete bivariate models.

A.14c) Women's involvement and references to survivor-victim provisions. GLM Regression:

	Dependent variable:			
	Justice	Victims	Reparations	Reconciliation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Delegates (Binary)	0.080	0.099	0.278	0.255
	(0.095)	(0.209)	(0.207)	(0.203)
Constant	0.304***	0.696***	0.594***	0.899***
	(0.057)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.122)
Observations	108	108	108	108
R^2	0.007	0.002	0.017	0.015
Adjusted R^2	−0.003	−0.007	0.007	0.005
Residual Std. Error (df = 106)	0.474	1.041	1.032	1.016
F Statistic (df = 1; 106)	0.714	0.226	1.801	1.574
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I find no significant correlation between women's involvement in peace negotiations and agreements referencing justice sector reform, assistance to victims, reparations, or reconciliation measures. A.14c shows complete bivariate models.

A.14d) Women's involvement and substantive provisions for children. GLM Regression (Binary) and OLS Regression (Percentage):

	Dependent variable:	
	Substantive Provisions for Children	
	(1)	(2)
Women Delegates (Binary)	0.648***	
	(0.239)	
Women Delegates (Percent)		4.069**
		(1.759)
Constant	0.942***	1.017***
	(0.144)	(0.135)
Observations	108	108
R^2	0.065	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.056	0.039
Residual Std. Error (df = 106)	1.194	1.205
F Statistic (df = 1; 106)	7.328***	5.350**
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I find a significant correlation between women's involvement and substantive provisions for children. A.14d shows complete bivariate models.

A.14e) Women's involvement and other gendered language. GLM Regression:

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Neutral	Men/Boys	Family
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women Delegates (Binary)	0.046	0.082	−0.018
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.098)
Constant	0.159***	0.174***	0.377***
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.059)
Observations	108	108	108
R^2	0.003	0.010	0.0003
Adjusted R^2	−0.006	0.0003	−0.009
Residual Std. Error (df = 106)	0.384	0.405	0.487
F Statistic (df = 1; 106)	0.354	1.036	0.033
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I find no significant correlation between women delegates and provisions for men and boys, families, and the inclusion of gender-neutral language. A.14e shows complete bivariate models.

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research. This research was funded by The Social Science and Humanities Research Council, The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, and the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School. Research documentation and data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MBMU7F.