Appendix for
Mass-Elite Differences in New Democracies:
Tunisia as a Case Study (2010-2016)

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1. Using relative difference to identify issue positions at the mass level in Tunisia (2011-2016)

The Arab Barometer surveys the attitudes, values and judgements of Arab citizens on a wide array of topics. It is divided into several sections including: general topics on the economic conditions, safety and trust; evaluation of political institutions and public attitudes; elections and the house of representatives; media; democracy; social, cultural and religious topics; current affairs, the Arab world and international relations; the Tunisian revolution; identity; and demographics and personal information of respondents. It includes on average over 200 questions covering the nine sections. The Tunisian surveys took place in 2011, 2013 and 2016 with an average sample of 1200 representing the 24 governorates.

The Arab Barometer is more extensive and provides more relevant data on Tunisia than its counterparts namely the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Afrobarometer. The Afrobarometer includes Tunisia in its last three waves since 2011. The Afrobarometer for example includes around 100 questions for in their l18 questions in their 2014 Tunisia survey, compared to around 200 by the Arab Barometer. It asks questions on whether Tunisia would be better off should religious people hold public positions, on the compatibility between democracy and Islam and on preferring a system governed by Islamic law. The WVS only includes Tunisia in the seventh and latest wave (2010-2014). It asks questions on the importance of religion, acceptance towards people of different religion, meaning of religion, compatibility between religion and science and teaching religion in public schools. The Arab Barometer's detailed questions on the exact enaction of personal and penal laws according to Islamic sharia, the preference of religious parties and allowing banks to charge interests are better proximate to the Islamist agenda (Brown, Hamzawy and Ottaway, 2006).

To identify the political dimensions dividing the masses, I did the following. First, I went through the three surveys and excluded the questions on non-divisive, valence issues such as the evaluation of government performance or trust in certain political institutions. While important, they are views or opinions but not attitudes that are either normative or value categories (Deegan-Krause, 2007, p. 539). Second, for the remaining questions, I analyzed the relative (not absolute) differences between those who support and those who are against, while excluding the don't know or neutral answers (i.e. 3 on a 1-5 scale or 5 on a 0-10 scale). I used a relative difference threshold of 0.64 (or 64 per cent), which means that the population is divided into *at least* 66 per cent and 34 per cent groups. Questions where respondents are not divided (i.e. 90 to 10 per cent or 70 to 30 per cent) were thus excluded as they did

not meet the threshold of 0.64. Applying the threshold, I was only left with 25 issues, of which eleven were further excluded due to unavailability of data over at least two survey waves or due to these questions not meeting the 0.64 survey threshold in the last available survey.

Calculating relative differences to identify issue positions at the mass level

I opted to use the relative difference rather than difference in means as the latter would have been more suitable if used in conjunction with mass-elite surveys using the same type of data, surveys for example, which is not the case in this paper. Relative difference also has the advantage of being easily understood and interpreted by having the divisions at the mass level clearer in terms of dividing the people into two groups (for and against an issue). In this paper, a relative difference threshold of 0.64 (or 64 per cent) is adopted, which means that the population is divided into at least 66 per cent and 34 per cent groups. Therefore, lower values indicate bigger differences at the mass level and vice versa. The relative difference is calculated using the below equation:

$$\frac{\Delta V}{(\Sigma V/2)} = \frac{V1 - V2}{[(V1+V2)/2]}$$

For ordinal questions like Q512 in Table 1, I combined the groups who think that democracy is suitable (i.e. those who answered 1 -5) and combined the groups who think that democracy isn't suitable (i.e. those who answered 6-10) and calculated the relative differences between them. For nominal questions such as Q516.1 and Q516.3 below, I combined the answers of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed and combined those who strongly disagreed or disagreed and then calculated the relative differences between the two groups, , while excluding the don't know and declined answers.

Table 1: Sample questions from the 2011 Arab Barometer survey

Question code	Question	Type of answer
Q512	Suppose there was a scale from 1-10 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for your country, with 1 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for your country and 10 meaning that democracy is completely appropriate for your country. To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for your country?	Ordinal (1: democracy absolutely inappropriate – 10: democracy completely appropriate)

Q516.1 and Q516.3	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1. Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak. 3. Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.	Ordinal: Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, I don't know, declined to answer)
Q523	To what extent do you think the lack of respect for human rights for security purposes in your country is justified?	Ordinal (1. Justified to a great extent. 2. Justified to a medium extent. 3. Justified to a limited extent. 4. Not justified at all. I don't know. Declined to answer)

Source: Arab Barometer

Issues that divide Tunisians and are included in further analysis

Issues are included when the relative difference meets the 0.64 relative difference threshold in the last survey wave where data is available. This would ensure that only issues that continue to divide or evolve as a dividing issue over time will be included in further analysis. Table 2 summarizes the relative (not absolute) differences of mass attitudes in Tunisia between 2011 and 2016. The codes of includes questions that met the threshold is as follows:

- **2011 survey:** q512, q516.1, q516.3, q523, 910t, q601.01, q601.03, q605.2, q605.3, q6054, q605.5, q607.7, q700.3
- **2013 survey:** q512, q516.1, q516.3, q523, q810a, q601.03, q605.2, q605.3, q6054, q605.5, q605a, q700.3
- **2016 survey:** q512, q516.1, q516.3, q523, q601.01, q601.03, q605, q607.7, q700.3

Under the democratic-authoritarian dimension, the most important issue is the suitability of democracy for Tunisia. In 2016, more Tunisians (38.50 per cent) believed that democracy does not suit Tunisia, compared to only 36.83 per cent believing in its suitability. This is down from 48.91 per cent who believed that democracy is suitable in Tunisia in 2011.It is worth noting that the majority of Tunisians, who think that democracy, from a normative perspective, is the best system of governance rose from 60 per cent in 2011 to 87 per cent in 2016. Benstead (2015, p. 1183) explains this Tunisian and Arab-wide phenomenon by noting that people's acceptance of democracy but rejection of its suitability is based on people's perception that democracy has negative consequences in terms of economic performance and service delivery.

Table 2: Relative mass attitudes in Tunisia that met the 0.64 threshold

	Issue	2011	2013	2016
Democracy				
1	Suitability of democracy for Tunisia.	0.224	0.461	0.044
2	Justifiability of human rights violations by Tunisian government (to maintain stability).	0.568	0.529	0.384
3	Democratic systems have weak economic performance.	1.087	0.267	0.040
4	Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.	1.113	0.002	0.180
5	Feelings of personal victory with regard to the Arab Spring.	1.329	0.274	---
Religion				
6	The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law.	0.62	0.483	---
7	The government and parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with Islamic law.	0.604	0.565	---
8	The government and parliament should enact personal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law.	0.638	0.577	---
9	Laws of Tunisia should be based equally on Sharia and the will of the people.	1.435	1.055	0.581
10	Preference for a religious political party over a non-religious	---	0.793	0.41
11	Banks to be allowed to charge interest to meet the demands of modern economy.	0.080	---	0.184
Gender				
12	Qualification of women as President or Prime Minister in a Muslim country.	0.251	---	0.524
13	Men better than women in political leadership.	0.962	0.279	0.240
Foreign relations				
14	Support for stronger (economic) relations with Iran.	0.606	0.194	0.01

Source: Arab Barometer
Notes: (---) means the question is not included in the Arab Barometer wave. Neutral answers, don't know answers and missing values were disregarded from the analysis.

Issues that did not meet the inclusion criteria and were excluded from further analysis

Table 3 summarizes the issues that do not meet the 0.64 threshold in the last survey or where data was not only available for at least two surveys and were thus removed from further analysis in the paper.

Table 3: Relative mass attitudes in Tunisia that failed to meet the inclusion criteria

	Issue	2011	2013	2016
Democracy				
1	Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.	0.975	0.372	0.912
2	Tunisian citizens are not prepared for a democratic system.	0.137	0.827	1.026
3	Democracy's essential characteristics are political.	0.023	0.227	0.515
4	Democracy's essential characteristics are political (2).	0.479	0.463	0.387
5	Suitability of a government that meets citizens' needs without involving them in the political process.	---	---	0.635
6	Suitability of a parliamentary system based on Islamic Law (Sharia) in which only Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections.	---	0.603	---
Religion				
7	Tunisia is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state.	0.772	0.274	1.039
8	Democracy is a (Western) system that contradicts the teachings of Islam.	1.116	0.544	0.707
Gender				
9	Husbands to have final say in all decisions concerning the family.	---	---	0.34
10	It is permissible for a woman to travel abroad by herself.	0.388	---	---
Economic policy				
11	Redistribution by imposing higher taxes.	---	0.244	0.918

Source: Arab Barometer
Notes: (---) means the question is not included in the Arab Barometer wave. Neutral answers, don't know answers and missing values were disregarded from the analysis.

Applying other thresholds for relative differences

The threshold of 0.64 is derived by the empirical data and the theorical importance of some of these issues. Applying a 0.4 relative difference threshold to the last survey, meaning that the population is divided into 60% and 40% groups, would result in excluding a total of six out of the 14 issues: five issues under religion (6, 7, 8, 9, 10) and one issue under gender (12), as shown in Table 4. There are two arguments against reducing the issues subject to subsequent factor analysis to eight, instead of the current 14. First, we would still have issues under the main political dimensions: democracy and religion. Second, and most importantly, this goes against the theoretical content of the Islamist agenda. The secular-Islamist divide revolves around the role of Islam in public life (Belge and Karakoç, 2015, p. 290) with Islamists advocating for a role for Islam in politics and secularists advocating for a separation between religion and politics. Advocating for a role of Islam in politics, Islamists however have six gray zones on the following issues: Islamic law, use of violence, political pluralism, civil and

political rights, rights of women and religious minorities (Brown, Hamzawy and Ottaway, 2006). The divide is deeply rooted to the extent that cooperation with secularists is interpreted as Islamist ideological moderation (Wegner and Cavatorta, 2018, p. 2).

Applying a more restrictive 0.2 relative difference threshold to the last survey, meaning 55% and 45% groups, would actually exclude all issues except for five of them (1, 3, 4, 11 and 14). This would also however keep issues under the main political dimensions namely democracy and religion. This all calls for keeping the current 0.64 relative difference threshold.

Table 4: Relative mass attitudes in Tunisia with different thresholds

	Issue	**2011**	**2013**	**2016**
Democracy				
1	Suitability of democracy for Tunisia.	0.224	0.461	0.044
4	Justifiability of human rights violations by Tunisian government (to maintain stability).	0.568	0.529	0.384
3	Democratic systems have weak economic performance.	1.08	0.267	0.040
4	Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.	1.113	0.002	0.180
5	Feelings of personal victory with regard to the Arab Spring.	1.329	0.274	---
Religion				
6	The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law.	0.62	0.483*	---
7	The government and parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with Islamic law.	0.604	0.565*	---
8	The government and parliament should enact personal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law.	0.638	0.577*	---
9	Laws of Tunisia should be based equally on Sharia and the will of the people.	1.435	1.055	0.581*
10	Preference for a religious political party over a non-religious	---	0.793	0.41*
11	Banks to be allowed to charge interest to meet the demands of modern economy.	0.080	---	0.184
Gender				
12	Qualification of women as President or Prime Minister in a Muslim country.	0.251	---	0.524*
13	Men better than women in political leadership.	0.962	0.279	0.240
Foreign relations				
14	Support for stronger (economic) relations with Iran.	0.606	0.194	0.01

Source: Arab Barometer
Notes: (*) issues that would be excluded under a 0.4 threshold.

2. Factor Analysis of Mass Attitudes using Arab Barometer Data (2011-2016)

Table 5 presents the full analysis of the 14 issues, that met the threshold of 0.64 relative difference, that were subject to factor analysis. While the 14 issues can be grouped inductively under four categories: religion, democracy, gender and foreign relations, there is a need to empirically probe whether they represent underlying latent variables. For example, the gender dimension, although makes sense as separate, might be related to religion. A lot has been written about women's rights in Islam (Grami, 2016; Hopkins and Ibrahim, 1997). The same applies to the dimensions of democracy and religion. Is the difference around democracy related to Islam, Tunisia's official religion? The Muslim exceptionalism (Huntington, 1993; Lakoff, 2004) has influenced scholarly debates for decades but has recently been rejected (Diamond, 2010; Stepan and Linz, 2013; Teorell, 2010).

Several analyses were run and the two factors was the best fitting model. Separate analysis was done for each survey as the interest in examining whether the issues will group along similar dimensions in the different surveys. This is also due to the fact the data on some issues are available only for one or two surveys but not uniformly in all. The best model fitting the data groups the different issues under three factors representing two political dimensions namely democratic-authoritarian and secular-Islamist.

The exploratory factor analysis was run by R Studio (version 1.2.1335) using the R packages *GPArotation* and *psych* by following the below script:

```
install.packages('psych')
install.packages('GPArotation')
library(GPArotation); library(psych)
parallel <- fa.parallel(data, fm = 'minres', fa = 'fa')
twofactor <- fa(data,nfactors = 2,rotate = "oblimin",fm="minres")
print(twofactor)
print(twofactor$loadings,cutoff = 0.3)
fa.diagram(twofactor)
```

Table 5: Exploratory factor analysis of mass attitudes in Tunisia (2011-2016)

Year	**2011**		**2013**		**2016**	
Factor	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**
Democracy is suitable for Tunisia	0.490		0.634		0.464	
Weak economic performance of democracy	0.868		0.875		0.732	
Democracy is not stable	0.909		0.898		0.712	
Human right violations justifiable	0.451					
Feeling of personal victory or victory for Arab Spring						
Women accepted as president or prime minister						
Men better in political leadership						0.447
Laws should be based on Islamic Sharia		0.872		0.817		
Penal laws should be based on Islamic Sharia		0.890		0.886		
Personal status laws based on Islamic Sharia		0.838		0.824		
Laws should be based on Islamic Sharia and people will		0.813		0.896		0.436
Religious political party preferred						
Banks to continue to charge interests	0.477					0.479
Support for foreign (economic) relations with Iran	0.384		0.337			
N: Total number of observations	1196		1199		1200	
RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation	0.086		0.091		0.039	
TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index	0.905		0.897		0.954	

Source: Author calculations using Arab Barometer data.
Notes: (---) factors that were not included in the Arab Barometer survey for this particular year and thus not data is available. Cut-off point is 0.3 and thus loadings above this point are included in the table.

3. Coding of 2014 manifestos of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes political parties

I coded the manifestos of both Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes released ahead of the 2014 parliamentary elections using the Manifesto Project's coding instructions (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens, 2015). As political parties' primary statements, the analysis quantifies the number of messages and positions (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens, 2015, p. 2). The coding answers the following question: "What message is the party/presidential candidate trying to convey to voters? Which are the issues the party/presidential candidate regards as important?" (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens, 2015, p. 5). The basic unit of analysis is the quasi-sentence that delivers a certain, differentiated message which should not in any case exceeds a grammatical sentence (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens, 2015, p. 6). The Manifesto Project coding includes 56 sub-categories representing seven major policy domains. Table 6 presents the findings of analyzing the manifestos of both Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes.

Table 6: Analysis of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes party manifestos based on the Manifesto Project's methodology

Party policy domains	**Ennahda (absolute)**	**Ennahda (%)**	**Nidaa Tounes (absolute)**	**Nidaa Tounes (%)**
Domain 1: External Relations				
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	5	1%	3	0%
103.2 Foreign Financial Influence	1	0%	0	0%
104 Military: Positive	3	0%	0	0%
106 Peace: Positive	0	0%	1	0%
107 Internationalism: Positive	24	3%	11	2%
108 European/LA Integration: Positive	3	0%	5	1%
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy				
201.1 Freedom	8	1%	1	0%
201.2 Human Rights	8	1%	1	0%
202.1 Democracy General: Positive	28	3%	18	3%
202.2 Democracy general: Negative	0	0%	0	0%
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	10	1%	1	0%
204 Constitutionalism: Negative	0	0%	0	0%
Domain 3: Political System				
301 Decentralisation: Positive	14	2%	8	1%
302 Centralisation: Positive	1	0%	0	0%
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	53	7%	22	4%
304 Political Corruption: Negative	9	1%	1	0%
305.1 Political Authority: Party Competence	13	2%	12	2%
305.3 Political Authority: Strong government	4	0%	2	0%
305.4 Pre-democratic elites: Positive	0	0%	0	0%

Table 6 (continued)

305.6 Rehabilitation and Compensation	4	0%	0	0%
Domain 4: Economy				
401 Free-Market Economy: Positive	1	0%	15	2%
402 Incentives: Positive	27	3%	31	5%
403 Market Regulation: Positive	12	1%	4	1%
404 Economic Planning: Positive	11	1%	4	1%
405 Corporatism: Positive	1	0%	9	1%
406 Protectionism: Positive	4	0%	1	0%
408 Economic Goals	50	6%	58	9%
410 Economic Growth	6	1%	13	2%
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	65	8%	84	13%
412 Controlled Economy: Positive	3	0%	3	0%
413 Nationalisation: Positive	0	0%	1	0%
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	5	1%	2	0%
416.2 Sustainability: Positive	0	0%	11	2%
417 Islamic Finance	6	1%	0	0%
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life				
501 Environmental Protection: Positive	21	3%	27	4%
502 Culture: Positive	36	4%	4	1%
503 Equality: Positive	44	5%	55	9%
504 Welfare State Expansion	35	4%	24	4%
505 Welfare State Limitation	1	0%	0	0%
506 Education Expansion	10	1%	9	1%
Domain 6: Fabric of Society				
601.1 National Way of Life: Positive General	32	4%	14	2%
602 National way of life: Negative	0	0%	0	0%
603 Traditional Morality: Positive	23	3%	0	0%
604 Traditional morality: negative	0	0%	0	0%
605.1 Law and Order: Positive	33	4%	21	3%
606 Civic Mindedness: Positive General	21	3%	3	0%
Domain 7: Social Groups				
701 Labour Groups: Positive	11	1%	10	2%
703.1 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive	15	2%	32	5%
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	1	0%	0	0%
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	20	2%	23	4%
H Headings	37	5%	6	1%
0 No meaningful category applies	96	12%	77	12%
Sum	**815**	**100%**	**627**	**100%**

Source: Author calculations based on the Manifesto Project's methodology.

Notes: Sub-categories not included in the table means that they were not mentioned in the manifestos. 417 Islamic Finance was added to reflect the Islamic finance issues in Ennahdah's manifesto.

4. Issue salience of Tunisian masses (2011-2016)

Table 7 includes the most important challenge identified by Tunisian respondents in the 2011, 2013 and 2016 Arab Barometer surveys when asked "What is the two most important challenges facing Tunisia today?"

Table 7: Most important challenges facing Tunisia in 2011, 2013 and 2016

Problem	**2011**		**2013**		**2016**	
	Absolute	%	Absolute	%	Absolute	%
The economic situation (poverty, unemployment, and price increases)	**821**	**68.65**	**1062**	**88.57**	**518**	**43.17**
Financial and administrative corruption	**153**	**12.79**	**99**	**8.26**	**226**	**18.83**
Religious extremism	--	--	--	--	218	18.17
Achieving stability and internal security	88	7.36	11	0.92	111	9.25
Enhancing (strengthening) democracy	--	--	10	0.83	16	1.33
Resolution of the Palestinian question	10	0.84	8	0.67	--	--
Curbing foreign interference	5	0.42	7	0.58	43	3.58
Fulfilling democratic transition	23	1.92	--	--	--	--
Trying figures of the former regime	24	2.01	--	--	--	--
Return of looted funds	12	1.00	--	--	--	--
Conducting elections for the constituent assembly	17	1.42	--	--	--	--
Drafting a new constitution	2	0.17	--	--	--	--
Decreasing economic and social variation between the regions	2	0.17	--	--	--	--
Maintaining the ban on polygyny and gender equality	1	0.08	--	--	--	--
Other	--	--	--	--	59	4.92
Don't know	38		2	0.17	8	0.67
Declined to answer	--	--	--	--	1	0.08
Total	1196	100	1199	100	1200	100

Source: Arab Barometer

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