Additional Online Appendix for "Peer Effects and Recidivism: Wartime Connections and Criminality among Colombian Ex-combatants"

A Main Effect Clustered at the Individual Level

As a robustness check, in table A.7 I replicate the analysis, but cluster standard errors at the individual rather than the group level to account for the fact that connections in the same municipality may experience similar economic changes. The estimations are equivalent to the main results for red-handed and non-red-handed captures, with and without the additional tests in the main results.

Table A 8: Main Effect Clustered at Individual Level

	Red-handed Captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Economic shock and average shock for the group					
Economic Shock	0.393***	0.394***	0.372***	0.379***	0.380***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Average Shock	0.256**	0.256**	0.275**	0.289**	0.286**
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Panel B: Criminal peer effects					
Peer Effect	0.394***	0.394***	0.425***	0.433***	0.430***
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.156)
Mean of Outcome	0.0242	0.0242	0.0244	0.0243	0.0244
S.D. of Outcome	0.1697	0.1697	0.1703	0.1704	0.1704
Observations	36,746	36,746	36,340	34,868	34,865
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region × Year			✓	✓	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT				✓	✓
Individual Covariates					✓

The dependent variable include red-handed arrests for the 2013—2016 period. Panel A shows the result of estimating Equation 6, where the first row represent the effect of the shock for individual i and the second row represents the average shock for the group g. Panel B shows the estimation explained in Equation 5. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender, and race. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A29 of supplementary material.

B Peacetime Networks, Positive Economic Changes, and Non-criminal Activities

Here I show that changes in the price of gold are not associated with variation in captures for a placebo network of ex-combatants. For the test, I define two peaceful post-conflict networks: the first placebo network defines members on the basis of being affiliated with the same territorial entity of the Colombian Agency of Reincorporation (ARN). That is, two ex-combatants belong to the same network if they are registered with the same agency office. To complement the test, I create another placebo group in which people must be registered not only with the same local office but also live in the same region.

Both tests aim to show that belonging to a wartime network is crucial to explaining the results beyond the connection or other municipal characteristics. The point is that it is unlikely that gold mining affects economic opportunities for people who don't have anything to do with the business or are connected to an affected wartime peer. Results shown in table A.9 support these claims.

Table A 9: Test with Non-criminal Activities

	Number of Actions ARN	Number of New Returns
	(1)	(3)
Economic Shock	0.475	0.216*
	(0.330)	(0.110)
Average Shock	0.340	-0.0214
	(0.251)	(0.110)
Peer Effect	0.417	-0.110
	(0.273)	(0.602)
Mean of Outcome	1.2459	0.2345
S.D. of Outcome	1.4820	0.4929
Observations	46,542	34,906
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓

This table presents results on the impact of a gold-price shock on non-criminal actions. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender, and race. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A30 of supplementary material.

Another placebo test refers to the participation in non-criminal activities such as returns to the agency and the number of interactions with the agency (Acciones con la ARN). In both cases (table A.18), we also have a panel database that enables us to perform the test. Again, we find that gold price changes do not differentially affect people's participation in these activities.

Finally, we show that there is no effect on crime levels due to changes in the price of a legal commodity such as oil for the same period (table A.10 , and also we do not see an effect when we interact local-level production with the price of the following year, reducing selection concerns (table A.11).

Table A 10: Test with Different Post-conflict Networks

	(1)	(2)
	Red-Handed Captures	
	Peacetime group 1: (National Reintegration Office peacetime network)	
Economic Shock	0.178	0.134
	(0.124)	(0.110)
Average Shock	-0.00138	0.00765
	(0.139)	(0.129)
Peer Effect	-0.00782	0.0542
	(0.793)	(0.879)
	Peacetime group 2: (National Reintegration Office and region peacetime network)	
Economic Shock	0.155	0.133
	(0.121)	(0.117)
Average Shock	0.0123	0.0169
	(0.156)	(0.151)
Peer Effect	0.0734	0.113
	(0.892)	(0.951)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓
Time Trends		✓
Region × Year		✓
Municipality Characteristics TT		✓
Individual Covariates		✓

This table presents results on the impact of the economic shock through non-wartime networks. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group and peacetime levels, respectively in top and lower panels. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender, and race. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Tables A31 and A32 of supplementary material.

Table A 11: Placebo Test: Oil Shock and Criminality

	(1) *Red-handed Captures*	(2) *Captures*
Oil Shock	-0.00498	-0.00371
	(0.0139)	(0.0162)
Average Oil Shock	0.000658	0.0103
	(0.00979)	(0.0139)
Peer Effect	-0.152	1.562
	(2.312)	(3.368)
Mean of Outcome	0.0239	0.0371
S.D. of Outcome	0.1711	0.2105
Observations	48,308	48,308
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓

This table presents the results on the impact of economic oil shock on criminality and peer effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-peacetime level. Results follow the estimation of the main results explained in the main text. Oil shock is the interaction of kms of pipelines before the study period with the international price of gold. None of the results are significant.

Table A 12: Placebo Leads of Treatment

	(1) *R-H Captures*	(2) *R-H Captures*	(3) *Captures*	(4) *Captures*
Economic Shock	0.00554	0.00564	0.00733	0.00611
	(0.00546)	(0.00548)	(0.00560)	(0.00536)
Average Group Shock	0.195*	0.149	0.148	0.0506
	(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.142)
Mean of Outcome	0.0269	0.0271	0.0390	0.0391
S.D. . of Outcome	0.1799	0.1808	0.2140	0.2146
Observations	24,388	23,110	24,388	23,110
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends		✓		✓
Region × Year		✓		✓
Municipality Characteristics TT		✓		✓
Individual Covariates		✓		✓

Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A33 of supplementary material.

C Spatial Correlation Test

There exists the possibility that the way in which the economic shock variable is constructed may cause the variable to exhibit a spatial correlation that may confound the peer effect. To reduce this concern, I use Conley's correlation estimation method to account for spatial correlation in the data. Table A.13 shows the results.

Table A 13: Main Results with Auto-correlation Tests

	Red-Handed Captures			
	50 kms	100 kms	150 kms	200 kms
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic Shock	0.385**	0.385**	0.385**	0.385**
	(0.173)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.175)
Average Group Shock	0.227**	0.227**	0.227**	0.227**
	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.0951)	(0.101)
Peer Effect	0.374**	0.374*	0.374**	0.374*
	(0.187)	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.197)
Mean of Outcome	0.0239	0.0239	0.0239	0.0239
S.D. of Outcome	0.1711	0.1711	0.1711	0.1711
Observations	36,366	36,366	36,366	36,366
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses clustered using auto-correlational analysis. Individual controls include age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A34 of supplementary material.

I implement the method, assuming spatial dependence between observations within 50, 100, 150, and 200 km. Although the standard errors are bigger, the results remain similar in magnitude and all are statistically significant.

D Types of Captures: Collective Crimes and Economic Crimes

The division of crimes into collective and individual crimes must be done with care. Especially when we are talking about crimes like drug possession or weapons possession, the collective nature of the crimes may not be obvious.

Table A 14: Crime Classification

Crime	Type	Participation	Gang Flag
Drug trafficking, possession and distribution*	Drug	Collective	Yes[2]
Organized Crime/Conspiracy*	Violent	Collective	Yes
Illegal arms possession and trafficking or production*	Violent	Collective	Yes
Homicide	Violent	Collective	Yes
Theft*	Property	Collective	Yes
Attack or assault	Violent	Collective	No
Extortion*	Violent	Collective	Yes
Illegal possession and trafficking of military arms and ammunition*	Violent	Collective	Yes
Domestic violence	Violent	Individual	No
Threat/Intimidation	Violent	Collective	Yes
Illegal use of resources	Property	Collective	Yes
Use of false identification	Property	Individual	No
Terrorism	Violent	Collective	Yes
Kidnapping*	Violent	Collective	Yes
Sexual harassment	Violent	Individual	No
Fraud*	Property	Collective	No
Rebellion	Violent	Collective	Yes
Attack against authority	Violent	Collective	Yes
Forced disappearance	Violent	Collective	Yes
Household food assistance*	Property	Individual	No
Property assault*	Property	Collective	Yes
Animal abuse	Violent	Individual	No
Negligent injuries car accident	Property	Individual	No

This table presents a list of group of crimes and their type, with participation specified as either individual or collective, and point out the crimes that have a high probability of being flagged by the police for a known gang affiliation at the moment of capture based on (Khanna et al., 2019). An * indicates a crime listed in the online appendix table that are related to economic opportunities.

First, it is worth noting that the division comes from the Colombian national police following the study of Khanna et al. (2019). In that case, however, it is easier to separate drug possession from drug trafficking, for example. In our case, the police information was already added for those captures. We present the division based on the data we have.

The classification of participation as collective is based on the following: even

though people can carry out these activities as individuals (for example, using drugs or having a gun), this implies knowing someone in the illegal market who enables one to access drugs or weapons. Neither activity was legal in Colombia during the period of study.

In Warr (2002), collective crimes also refer to those that cannot be achieved without the participation of others. Although our classification follows this premise, it is worth noting that it is not perfect in all cases.

In particular, it is not always the case that crimes such as arms possession and homicide are collective undertakings. For that reason, to complement the analysis with collective crimes, I remove homicides and weapons possession from the 'collective crimes results' in table A.17, and the results remain unchanged in magnitude and significance.

Table A 15: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for Collective Crimes Only — All captures

	All Captures — Collective Crimes				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Economic shock and average shock for the group					
Economic Shock	0.370***	0.370***	0.290***	0.238**	0.239**
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.0986)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Average Shock	0.100	0.100	0.117	0.149	0.147
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Panel B: Criminal peer effects					
Peer Effect	0.214	0.214	0.287	0.386	0.380
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.221)	(0.247)	(0.248)
Mean of Outcome	0.0281	0.0281	0.0280	0.0281	0.0281
S.D. of Outcome	0.1827	0.1827	0.1827	0.1830	0.1830
Observations	36,746	36,746	36,340	34,868	34,865
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region × Year			✓	✓	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT				✓	✓
Individual Covariates					✓

The dependent variable include all ex-combatant collective crimes for the 2013—2016 period. Panel A shows the result of estimating Equation 6, where the first row represents the effect of the shock for individual i and the second row represents the average shock for the group g. The economic shock is defined as the interaction of the natural logarithm of the international price of gold and illegal gold production. Panel B shows the estimation in Equation 5, representing the effect of wartime peers' arrests on $i's$ criminality. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender (female) and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A35 of supplementary material.

Finally, it is worth mentioning other types of capture characteristics that may be relevant to this article's main argument. Some crimes, such as robbery, extortion,

and drug trafficking, may be related to economic opportunities, while other types of crimes, such as sexual harassment and personal attacks, are not. According to this classification, the estimated peer effects come primarily from criminal activities related to economic opportunities.

The division between economic and non-economic crimes is an important one. Therefore, I propose a division of crimes by their economic or non-economic nature. This classification is arbitrary: it is not obvious how to categorize some captures as economic or non economic based on the classification of teh National Police. Table A.14 provides the list of captures used in the analysis. The analysis is presented in table A.18. I find a significant peer effect for offenses classified as economic, but we do not find a definitive result for non-economic crimes.

Table A 16: Economic Shock and Individual Crimes

	Red-handed Captures — Individual Crimes				
Economic Shock	0.00907	0.00916	0.00433	0.0214	0.0215
	(0.0217)	(0.0217)	(0.0256)	(0.0303)	(0.0303)
Average Shock	0.0443*	0.0444*	0.0425	0.0342	0.0342
	(0.0257)	(0.0258)	(0.0262)	(0.0280)	(0.0280)
Mean of Outcome	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010
S.D. of Outcome	0.0321	0.0321	0.0323	0.0321	0.0321
Observations	36,746	36,746	36,340	34,868	34,865
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region × Year			✓	✓	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT				✓	✓
Individual Covariates					✓

The dependent variable include red-handed captures for individual crimes for the 2013—2016 period. Panel A shows the result of estimating Equation 6, where the first row represents the effect of the shock for individual i and the second row represents the average shock for the group g. The economic shock is defined as the interaction of the natural logarithm of the international price of gold and illegal gold production. Panel B shows the estimation in Equation 5, representing the effect of wartime peers' arrests on $i's$ criminality. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include: age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A36 of supplementary material.

Table A 17: Collective Crimes (Without Homicides and Arms Possession)

	(1) *Red-handed captures* (Collective Crimes)
Economic Shock	0.261***
	(0.0773)
Average Shock	0.236**
	(0.0918)
Peer Effect	0.475***
	(0.141)
Mean of Outcome	0.0146
S.D. of Outcome	0.1368
Observations	34,865
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓
Time Trends	✓
Region × Year	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT	✓
Individual Covariates	✓

The dependent variable include only red-handed captures for collective crimes in the 2013—2016 period excluding homicide and arms possession. Table presents the main results of collective crimes in the document. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A37 of supplementary material.

Table A 18: Results for Economic and Non-economic Crimes

	(1) Economic Crimes	(2) Non-economic Crimes
Economic Shock	1.304	0.0354
	(1.189)	(0.0450)
Average Shock	3.168**	0.0448
	(1.501)	(0.0437)
Peer Effect	0.708***	0.559
	(0.228)	(0.492)
Mean of Outcome	0.2717	0.0038
S.D. of Outcome	0.5255	0.0637
Observations	1,844	34,865
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓
Time Trends	✓	✓
Region × Year	✓	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT	✓	✓
Individual Covariates	✓	✓

The dependent variable include only red-handed captures for economic vs. non-economic crimes in the 2013–2016 period excluding homicide and arms possession. The table presents the main results for red-handed captures in this article. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, and * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A38 of supplementary material.

E Additional Mobility Controls

In this section I include specifications with three additional variables directly related to the labor market: distance from the municipality to the largest local market, number of persons who moved to that municipality between the 1990s and early 2000s, and a measure of mean historic wages in the municipality. These variables control for potential biases coming from differential trends in municipalities that are connected to more-historic labor migration.

Table A 19: Main Results with Mobility Controls

	(1) Historic mobility	(2) Ln Wages	(3) Mobility & wages
	Red-Handed Captures		
Economic Shock	0.471***	0.383***	0.0940
	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.213)
Average Group Shock	0.233	0.356***	0.272*
	(0.157)	(0.127)	(0.163)
Peer Effect	0.330*	0.482***	0.743
	(0.181)	(0.130)	(0.476)
Mean of Outcome	0.0271	0.0258	0.0273
S.D. of Outcome	0.1810	0.1765	0.1815
Observations	19,386	29,311	18,427
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends	✓	✓	✓
Region × Year	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates	✓	✓	✓

The table presents main results including controls for labor mobility. Standard errors in parentheses clustered using auto-correlational analysis. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of share of historic population from outside the municipality and pre-treatment measures of wages. Individual controls include: age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and, * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A39 of supplementary material.

F Descriptive Analysis: Post-conflict Criminality

This section presents some descriptive analyses of ex-combatant criminality in Colombia. The focus is exclusively on paramilitaries and shows the relationship between demographic characteristics of ex-combatants and confidential crime data between 2013 and 2016.

The first part describes the characteristics of those arrested during the study period and their relationship with social networks and criminal opportunities at the municipal level.

Table A 20: Pooled Descriptive Relationships

	Dependent variable:			
	Captures		Red-handed Captures	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Illegal Gold Mines	0.067***		0.051***	
	(0.016)		(0.012)	
Mean Gold Price		0.013***		0.008***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Observations	1,239	2,343	1,239	2,343
R^2	0.013	0.030	0.015	0.026

Note: *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and, * is significant at the 10% level. Complete model results in Table A40 of supplementary material.

Figure A 11: Crime and Reintegration Index



Figure A 12: Crime and Education



Figure A.12 shows the relationship between the average number of flagrant (red-handed) captures and the reintegration index assigned by the Colombian reintegration agency. In both cases, we observe the expected relationship regarding the level of recidivism, years of education, and the index measure used by the reintegration agency to measure the reintegration of ex-combatants.

The second part focuses on the descriptive relationship between changes in returns to illegal activities related to illegal mining at the municipal level and the criminality of ex-combatants. In addition, I study other social network factors central to the literature on social networks and crime.

Finally, tables A.20 and A.21 describe the relationship between the number of illegal gold mines, the price of gold, and a measure of centrality (degree centrality or the size of the group) with the crime outcomes used in this paper (captures and red-handed captures). The results pool the panel's data and show a positive and significant relationship between these variables and the number of captures. Both results are in line with what is argued in this paper about the relationship between gold mining and ex-combatant crime.

The second results confirm other findings of the broader literature on social networks and criminality, even if my analysis here is narrower and only refers to a measure of centrality (degree centrality). In this case, it is worth exploring other alternative measures of centrality and their relationship with criminal behavior.

Table A 21: Degree Centrality and Criminality

	Red-handed Captures				*Total Captures*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Degree Centrality	0.0253***	0.0212***	2.684***	3.270***	0.0186***	0.0152**	3.900***	4.407***
	(0.00536)	(0.00567)	(0.248)	(0.258)	(0.00636)	(0.00672)	(0.292)	(0.304)
Mean of Outcome	0.2165	0.2164	0.2164	0.2164	0.3260	0.3260	0.3260	0.3260
S.D. of Outcome	0.6388	0.6380	0.6381	0.6381	0.7856	0.7850	0.7851	0.7851
Observations	66,977	66,927	66,912	66,909	66,977	66,927	66,912	66,909
Municipality FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Wartime FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Individual Covariates				✓				✓

This table presents OLS estimation of a measure of degree centrality and cumulative number of captures, both red-handed (columns 1–4) and total (columns 5–8). Columns 2 and 4 add municipality fixed effects and columns 3 and 7 include wartime network fixed effects. Individual controls include age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). The period includes all captures recorded by the National Police of Colombia.
*** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and, * is significant at the 10% level.
Complete model results in Table A40 of supplementary material.

G Historic Gold Production

If there are economic opportunities in an activity like gold mining, even if it is legal, one might expect the results to be similar. Most of the mining activity in Colombia is illegal. The gold mining data are based on places where there are potential gold mines identified by the government (only 70 out of more than 600 municipalities have a mines with legal titles).

It is still worth studying whether we can find a similar effect in places where historically more gold is produced. For this reason, I perform an analysis using gold production in 2004 (based on data from Dube and Vargas (2013)). The results are presented in table A.22 . Although there is a positive relationship between the change in price and ex-combatant captures, it is around 15 times smaller and not significant. I also do not find a significant relationship in terms of peer effects. Nevertheless, the analysis using legal gold mines can shed some light on the relevance of illegal mines to my argument: only for illegal mines, and not for places with historical production, do we find an effect of gold price changes on crime.

Table A 22: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for Red-handed captures — Historic Gold Production

	Red-handed Captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.0154	0.0151	0.0298	0.0434	0.0407
	(0.0756)	(0.0756)	(0.0802)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Average Shock	0.0804	0.0804	0.0787	0.100	0.102
	(0.0869)	(0.0868)	(0.0926)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Peer Effect	0.839	0.842	0.725	0.698	0.714
	(0.711)	(0.715)	(0.617)	(0.522)	(0.534)
Mean of Outcome	0.0202	0.0202	0.0200	0.0202	0.0202
S.D. of Outcome	0.1541	0.1541	0.1537	0.1544	0.1544
Observations	26,328	26,328	26,044	23,663	23,663
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trends		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region × Year			✓	✓	✓
Municipality Characteristics TT				✓	✓
Individual Covariates					✓

This table results from a replication of the main analysis but uses an historic measure of gold production at the municipality level that does not distinguish between legal and illegal production. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the group-wartime level. Municipality characteristics include pre-treatment levels of poverty, population, distance to Bogotá, and kms of paved roads. Individual controls include age, gender (female), and race (indigenous and afro). Complete model results in Table A41 of supplementary material.

H Full Model Results of Main Document

For presentation purposes, the results in the main text (Tables 1 and 2) and Supplemental Materials (Tables A2, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10, A12, A13, A15, A16, A17, A18, A19, A21, and A22) do not present estimates for coefficients on the control variables. These full results are presented here.

Table A 23: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for fragrant captures - Full Model Results Table 1

	Red-handed captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.393***	0.394***	0.372***	0.379***	0.380***
	(0.0881)	(0.0882)	(0.0885)	(0.0932)	(0.0932)
Average Shock	0.256**	0.256**	0.275**	0.289**	0.286**
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.114)
time t		0.00373	0.00382	0.00556	0.00519
		(0.0206)	(0.0208)	(0.0209)	(0.0207)
region 2 x time t			-0.00105	-0.00326	-0.00329
			(0.00227)	(0.00527)	(0.00528)
region 3 x time t			0.00177	0.000872	0.000756
			(0.00488)	(0.00499)	(0.00500)
region 4 x time t			0.000209	-0.000431	-0.000356
			(0.00315)	(0.00411)	(0.00413)
region 5 x time t			-0.00790	-0.0155**	-0.0155**
			(0.00519)	(0.00697)	(0.00691)
poverty x time t				0.000902	0.000913
				(0.00923)	(0.00928)
population x time t				-1.38e-09*	-1.38e-09*
				(8.06e-10)	(8.09e-10)
distance Bogota x time t				0.000000825	0.000000854
				(0.0000113)	(0.0000113)
paved roads x time t				0.00000890	0.00000978
				(0.0000205)	(0.0000206)
age					-0.000762***
					(0.000145)
female					-0.0188***
					(0.00216)
black					-0.00359
					(0.00404)
indigenous					0.00420
					(0.00882)
Constant	0.0634***	0.0522	0.0546	0.0467	0.0783
	(0.0144)	(0.0620)	(0.0620)	(0.0641)	(0.0624)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 24: Economic Shock and Peer Effects - Collective Crimes Only - Full Model results Table 2

	Red-handed captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.343***	0.344***	0.315***	0.279***	0.279***
	(0.0777)	(0.0777)	(0.0740)	(0.0776)	(0.0776)
Average Shock	0.167*	0.168*	0.188**	0.210**	0.208**
	(0.0867)	(0.0869)	(0.0894)	(0.0974)	(0.0971)
time t		0.0206***	0.0210***	0.0198***	0.0194***
		(0.00414)	(0.00419)	(0.00623)	(0.00644)
region 2 x time t			-0.00196	-0.00542	-0.00544
			(0.00193)	(0.00442)	(0.00444)
region 3 x time t			0.00360	0.00286	0.00278
			(0.00423)	(0.00430)	(0.00430)
region 4 x time t			-0.00162	0.00103	0.00107
			(0.00263)	(0.00335)	(0.00336)
region 5 x time t			-0.00544	-0.00877	-0.00873
			(0.00475)	(0.00616)	(0.00607)
poverty x time t				-0.00308	-0.00308
				(0.00763)	(0.00765)
population x time t				-4.03e-10	-4.02e-10
				(6.35e-10)	(6.36e-10)
distance Bogota x time t				0.00000808	0.00000810
				(0.00000925)	(0.00000927)
paved roads x time t				0.0000194	0.0000201
				(0.0000175)	(0.0000176)
age					-0.000571***
					(0.000120)
female					-0.0142***
					(0.00219)
black					-0.00646**
					(0.00298)
indigenous					0.00496
					(0.00792)
Constant	0.0436***	-0.0181	-0.0152	-0.0178	0.00659
	(0.0120)	(0.0162)	(0.0169)	(0.0175)	(0.0187)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 25: Economic Shock and Peer Effects - All Captures - Full Model Results Table A2

	Red-handed captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.398***	0.398***	0.327***	0.319**	0.320**
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Average Shock	0.209*	0.209*	0.225**	0.251**	0.247**
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.115)
time t		-0.00433	-0.00384	0.0125	0.0122
		(0.0289)	(0.0290)	(0.0218)	(0.0217)
region 2 x time t			-0.00330	-0.00459	-0.00464
			(0.00258)	(0.00554)	(0.00556)
region 3 x time t			-0.00467	-0.00517	-0.00535
			(0.00694)	(0.00699)	(0.00698)
region 4 x time t			0.00360	0.000601	0.000730
			(0.00432)	(0.00572)	(0.00575)
region 5 x time t			-0.00560	-0.0114	-0.0113
			(0.0149)	(0.0203)	(0.0201)
poverty x time t				0.0117	0.0117
				(0.0137)	(0.0138)
population x time t				-1.09e-09	-1.08e-09
				(1.13e-09)	(1.14e-09)
distance Bogota x time t				-0.00000247	-0.00000238
				(0.0000124)	(0.0000124)
paved roads x time t				0.0000334	0.0000345
				(0.0000287)	(0.0000289)
age					-0.00102***
					(0.000171)
female					-0.0269***
					(0.00322)
black					-0.000502
					(0.00461)
indigenous					0.00890
					(0.0111)
Constant	0.0693***	0.0823	0.0851	0.0212	0.0625
	(0.0154)	(0.0879)	(0.0879)	(0.0667)	(0.0659)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 26: Analysis Excluding Larger Groups - Full Model results

	Red-handed Captures			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)
	> 1,000 Members	> 500 Members	> 250 Members	> 100 Members
Peer Effect	0.409**	0.543**	0.820**	1.038*
	(0.159)	(0.271)	(0.359)	(0.540)
Economic Shock	0.379***	0.244	0.0897	-0.0159
	(0.108)	(0.169)	(0.198)	(0.221)
Average Shock	0.262**	0.290*	0.410**	0.432*
	(0.129)	(0.163)	(0.193)	(0.235)
age	-0.000682***	-0.000662***	-0.000638***	-0.000520***
	(0.000128)	(0.000135)	(0.000164)	(0.000189)
female	-0.0186***	-0.0196***	-0.0207***	-0.0186***
	(0.00230)	(0.00276)	(0.00302)	(0.00334)
black	-0.00316	-0.00525	-0.00260	0.000725
	(0.00424)	(0.00573)	(0.00688)	(0.0107)
indigenous	0.00570	0.00590	-0.00365	-0.000870
	(0.00911)	(0.0105)	(0.00889)	(0.0113)
time t	0.00705	0.0200**	0.0190	0.000733
	(0.0208)	(0.00907)	(0.0133)	(0.0183)
region 2 x time t	-0.00220	-0.00841	-0.00704	-0.00854
	(0.00546)	(0.00774)	(0.00831)	(0.00749)
region 3 x time t	0.00209	-0.00131	-0.00177	-0.000572
	(0.00506)	(0.00590)	(0.00655)	(0.00890)
region 4 x time t	-0.000862	0.00128	-0.00248	-0.000290
	(0.00418)	(0.00545)	(0.00784)	(0.00883)
region 5 x time t	-0.0160**	-0.0188**	-0.0192**	-0.00662
	(0.00707)	(0.00759)	(0.00790)	(0.00539)
poverty x time t	-0.000272	0.00362	0.0184	0.0185
	(0.00980)	(0.0139)	(0.0144)	(0.0177)
population x time t	-1.69e-09**	-1.68e-09*	-4.61e-10	4.10e-10
	(7.70e-10)	(9.67e-10)	(1.10e-09)	(1.31e-09)
distance Bogota x time t	-0.00000110	0.00000800	0.00000539	0.0000190
	(0.0000116)	(0.0000157)	(0.0000186)	(0.0000166)
paved roads x time t	0.00000517	0.00000641	0.0000209	-0.00000671
	(0.0000214)	(0.0000311)	(0.0000387)	(0.0000416)
Constant	0.107	0.0802*	0.0790	0.141*
	(0.0657)	(0.0414)	(0.0562)	(0.0832)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 27: The effect of the economic shock for different levels of gold production - Full model Results

	Production below Mean	Production below 25 Percentile	No Gold Production
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Red-Handed Captures	
Average Shock	0.339***	0.255**	0.303
	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.291)
age	-0.000722***	-0.000807***	-0.000206
	(0.000151)	(0.000161)	(0.000282)
female	-0.0169***	-0.0175***	-0.0188***
	(0.00271)	(0.00316)	(0.00474)
black	-0.00394	-0.00577*	-0.0106*
	(0.00407)	(0.00349)	(0.00639)
indigenous	0.00984	0.00804	-0.00335
	(0.0101)	(0.0106)	(0.0112)
time t	-0.00687	-0.00506	0.00498
	(0.0242)	(0.0253)	(0.0280)
poverty x time t	0.0137	0.0179	-0.0107
	(0.0114)	(0.0134)	(0.0502)
population x time t	-8.74e-10	-1.01e-09	1.66e-08
	(8.40e-10)	(8.67e-10)	(5.13e-08)
distance Bogota x time t	-0.00000742	-0.00000818	-0.0000135
	(0.00000570)	(0.00000582)	(0.0000310)
paved roads x time t	0.0000193	-0.000000174	0.00000675
	(0.0000207)	(0.0000203)	(0.000102)
Constant	0.165**	0.155*	0.210
	(0.0714)	(0.0794)	(0.167)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 28: The effect of the economic shock on mobility - Full Model Results

	Moved to gold municipality				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average Shock	0.0418***	0.0418***	0.0406***	0.0397***	0.0396***
	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0110)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)
time t		0.00344***	0.00297**	0.00284	0.00277
		(0.00116)	(0.00127)	(0.00191)	(0.00195)
region 2 x time t			0.000864	0.00145*	0.00145*
			(0.000708)	(0.000823)	(0.000823)
region 3 x time t			-0.000486	-0.000310	-0.000325
			(0.000770)	(0.000745)	(0.000741)
region 4 x time t			0.00110	0.000979	0.000960
			(0.000908)	(0.00124)	(0.00124)
region 5 x time t			0.000674	0.00173	0.00177
			(0.00229)	(0.00332)	(0.00332)
poverty x time t				0.000327	0.000302
				(0.00310)	(0.00311)
population x time t				1.04e-10	1.02e-10
				(2.02e-10)	(2.02e-10)
distance Bogota x time t				-0.00000147	-0.00000148
				(0.00000207)	(0.00000207)
paved roads x time t				0.00000147	0.00000146
				(0.00000802)	(0.00000802)
					(5.45e-12)
age					-0.0000509
					(0.0000428)
female					0.00242
					(0.00205)
black					-0.00251***
					(0.000933)
indigenous					-0.00268
					(0.00300)
Constant	0.00496***	-0.00364	-0.00353	-0.00318	-0.00105
	(0.00000290)	(0.00291)	(0.00290)	(0.00275)	(0.00312)
Mun, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A 29: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for fragrant captures - Cluster at Individual Level - Full Results

	Red-handed Captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.393***	0.394***	0.372***	0.379***	0.380***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Average Shock	0.256**	0.256**	0.275**	0.289**	0.286**
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.123)
time t		0.00373	0.00382	0.00556	0.00519
		(0.0209)	(0.0210)	(0.0224)	(0.0223)
region 2 x time t			-0.00105	-0.00326	-0.00329
			(0.00226)	(0.00490)	(0.00490)
region 3 x time t			0.00177	0.000872	0.000756
			(0.00561)	(0.00566)	(0.00566)
region 4 x time t			0.000209	-0.000431	-0.000356
			(0.00376)	(0.00492)	(0.00492)
region 5 x time t			-0.00790	-0.0155	-0.0155
			(0.00736)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)
poverty x time t				0.000902	0.000913
				(0.0123)	(0.0123)
population x time t				-1.38e-09	-1.38e-09
				(9.01e-10)	(9.01e-10)
distance Bogota x time t				0.000000825	0.000000854
				(0.0000111)	(0.0000111)
paved roads x time t				0.00000890	0.00000978
				(0.0000280)	(0.0000280)
age					-0.000762***
					(0.000124)
female					-0.0188***
					(0.00268)
black					-0.00359
					(0.00409)
indigenous					0.00420
					(0.00899)
Constant	0.0634***	0.0522	0.0546	0.0467	0.0783
	(0.0161)	(0.0645)	(0.0647)	(0.0661)	(0.0662)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 30: Economic Shock and Peer Effects - Other Outcomes - Full Model

	Number of Actions ARN (1)	Number of New Returns (3)
Economic Shock	0.475	0.216*
	(0.330)	(0.110)
Average Shock	0.340	-0.0214
	(0.251)	(0.110)
age	0.00164	-0.00386***
	(0.00209)	(0.000701)
female	0.653***	-0.107***
	(0.0595)	(0.0164)
black	-0.00801	-0.0174
	(0.0502)	(0.0178)
indigenous	-0.0434	0.0339
	(0.114)	(0.0465)
time t	0.0903	0.0473
	(0.156)	(0.0571)
region 2 x time t	-0.0283	-0.00413
	(0.0234)	(0.00562)
region 3 x time t	0.0554***	-0.00486
	(0.0184)	(0.00781)
region 4 x time t	-0.363***	-0.00624
	(0.0526)	(0.00662)
region 5 x time t	0.0557	-0.00650
	(0.0364)	(0.0238)
poverty x time t	-0.0965	-0.0127
	(0.0689)	(0.0146)
population x time t	9.58e-09*	3.01e-09**
	(4.96e-09)	(1.20e-09)
distance Bogota x time t	-0.0000101	0.0000132
	(0.0000646)	(0.0000146)
paved roads x time t	0.000612***	-0.0000624
	(0.000177)	(0.0000425)
Constant	1.011***	0.251
	(0.388)	(0.172)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 31: Test With Different Post-conflict Network — Full Model Results

	(1)	(2)
		Red-Handed Captures
		Peacetime group 1: (National Reintegration Office peacetime network)
Economic Shock	0.178	0.134
	(0.124)	(0.110)
Average Shock	-0.00138	0.00765
	(0.139)	(0.129)
age		-0.000879***
		(0.000193)
female		-0.0202***
		(0.00217)
black		-0.00195
		(0.00385)
indigenous		-0.00143
		(0.00647)
time t		0.00404
		(0.0116)
region 2 x time t		0.00209
		(0.00372)
region 3 x time t		-0.00480*
		(0.00280)
region 4 x time t		0.0145***
		(0.00278)
region 5 x time t		-0.00717**
		(0.00352)
poverty x time t		-0.00664
		(0.00938)
population x time t		-1.71e-10
		(5.82e-10)
distance Bogota x time t		0.00000360
		(0.00000822)
paved roads x time t		0.00000506
		(0.0000211)
Constant	0.0255*	0.0473
	(0.0145)	(0.0351)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 32: Test With Different Post-conflict Network 2 – Full Model results

	(1)	(2)
		Red-Handed Captures
		Peacetime group 2: (National Reintegration Office and region peacetime network)
Economic Shock	0.155	0.133
	(0.121)	(0.117)
Average Shock	0.0123	0.0169
	(0.156)	(0.151)
age		-0.000879***
		(0.000192)
female		-0.0202***
		(0.00217)
black		-0.00195
		(0.00387)
indigenous		-0.00143
		(0.00646)
time t		0.00401
		(0.0116)
region 2 x time t		0.00209
		(0.00390)
region 3 x time t		-0.00429
		(0.00320)
region 4 x time t		0.0145***
		(0.00278)
region 5 x time t		-0.00725**
		(0.00351)
poverty x time t		-0.00651
		(0.00947)
population x time t		-1.78e-10
		(5.83e-10)
distance Bogota x time t		0.00000366
		(0.00000846)
paved roads x time t		0.00000465
		(0.0000213)
Constant	0.0262*	0.0478
	(0.0142)	(0.0346)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 33: Placebo Leads of Treatment – Full Model results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	R-H Captures	*R-H Captures*	*Captures*	*Captures*
Economic Shock	0.00554	0.00564	0.00733	0.00611
	(0.00546)	(0.00548)	(0.00560)	(0.00536)
Average Group Shock	0.195*	0.149	0.148	0.0506
	(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.142)
age		-0.000826***		-0.00110***
		(0.000193)		(0.000229)
female		-0.0206***		-0.0304***
		(0.00293)		(0.00403)
black		-0.00318		0.00253
		(0.00568)		(0.00641)
indigenous		0.000914		-0.00293
		(0.0103)		(0.0150)
3.time t		-0.182		-0.172
		(0.180)		(0.183)
3.time tc.pobreza		0.00579		0.0169
		(0.0245)		(0.0244)
3.time tc.pobl_tot		-1.22e-09		3.11e-10
		(1.78e-09)		(2.11e-09)
3.time tc.disbogota		0.0000194		0.0000221
		(0.0000215)		(0.0000217)
3.time tc.paved_roads		0.0000476		0.0000323
		(0.0000664)		(0.0000752)
3.time t2.region		-0.0194**		-0.0226**
		(0.00943)		(0.00979)
3.time t3.region		-0.00152		-0.0192
		(0.0105)		(0.0128)
3.time t4.region		-0.00759		-0.000596
		(0.00826)		(0.0102)
3.time t5.region		-0.0188		-0.0509
		(0.0241)		(0.0396)
Constant	0.0552***	0.170*	0.0605***	0.172*
	(0.0158)	(0.0891)	(0.0183)	(0.0906)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 34: Main Results with Auto-correlation Tests - Full Model results

	Red-Handed Captures			
	50 kms	100 kms	150 kms	200 kms
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic Shock	0.385**	0.385**	0.385**	0.385**
	(0.173)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.175)
Average Group Shock	0.227**	0.227**	0.227**	0.227**
	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.0951)	(0.101)
time t	0.000620	0.000620	0.000620	0.000620
	(0.00141)	(0.00122)	(0.00133)	(0.00111)
age	-0.000726***	-0.000726***	-0.000726***	-0.000726***
	(0.000159)	(0.000156)	(0.000149)	(0.000153)
female	-0.0196***	-0.0196***	-0.0196***	-0.0196***
	(0.00232)	(0.00235)	(0.00230)	(0.00183)
black	-0.00268	-0.00268	-0.00268	-0.00268
	(0.00386)	(0.00395)	(0.00385)	(0.00379)
indigenous	0.00352	0.00352	0.00352	0.00352
	(0.00839)	(0.00825)	(0.00716)	(0.00766)
Constant	-8.63e-14	-8.63e-14	-8.63e-14	-8.63e-14
	(0.000882)	(0.000850)	(0.000869)	(0.000757)
Mun, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 35: Economic Shock and Peer Effects - Collective Crimes (all Crimes) – Full model results

	All Captures — Collective Crimes				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.370***	0.370***	0.290***	0.238**	0.239**
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.0986)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Average Shock	0.100	0.100	0.117	0.149	0.147
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.109)
time t		0.0116	0.0124	0.0242**	0.0239**
		(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.00936)	(0.00955)
region 2 x time t			-0.00417*	-0.00761	-0.00766
			(0.00223)	(0.00472)	(0.00474)
region 3 x time t			-0.00196	-0.00242	-0.00256
			(0.00636)	(0.00641)	(0.00640)
region 4 x time t			0.00286	0.00388	0.00396
			(0.00393)	(0.00481)	(0.00484)
region 5 x time t			-0.00131	-0.00212	-0.00210
			(0.0121)	(0.0177)	(0.0176)
poverty x time t				0.00970	0.00968
				(0.0118)	(0.0119)
population x time t				1.34e-10	1.37e-10
				(9.70e-10)	(9.73e-10)
distance Bogota x time t				0.00000740	0.00000746
				(0.0000104)	(0.0000104)
paved roads x time t				0.0000396	0.0000405
				(0.0000270)	(0.0000271)
age					-0.000820***
					(0.000151)
female					-0.0204***
					(0.00284)
black					-0.00441
					(0.00372)
indigenous					0.0105
					(0.0110)
Constant	0.0452***	0.0103	0.0130	-0.0457*	-0.0121
	(0.0145)	(0.0632)	(0.0632)	(0.0233)	(0.0241)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 36: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for Individual Crimes - Full Model Results

	Red-handed Captures — Individual Crimes				
Economic Shock	0.00907	0.00916	0.00433	0.0214	0.0215
	(0.0217)	(0.0217)	(0.0256)	(0.0303)	(0.0303)
Average Shock	0.0443*	0.0444*	0.0425	0.0342	0.0342
	(0.0257)	(0.0258)	(0.0262)	(0.0280)	(0.0280)
time t		0.00280***	0.00288***	0.00578**	0.00577**
		(0.000694)	(0.000757)	(0.00272)	(0.00273)
region 2 x time t			-0.000262	0.000895	0.000893
			(0.000607)	(0.00165)	(0.00165)
region 3 x time t			-0.00153***	-0.00155***	-0.00155***
			(0.000349)	(0.000470)	(0.000471)
region 4 x time t			0.000818	-0.000794	-0.000790
			(0.00129)	(0.00160)	(0.00160)
region 5 x time t			-0.00185***	-0.00208***	-0.00207***
			(0.000385)	(0.000647)	(0.000648)
poverty x time t				-0.00141	-0.00140
				(0.00399)	(0.00399)
population x time t				-6.07e-10**	-6.06e-10*
				(3.09e-10)	(3.09e-10)
distance Bogota x time t				-0.00000462	-0.00000461
				(0.00000404)	(0.00000404)
paved roads x time t				0.00000139	0.00000142
				(0.00000613)	(0.00000613)
age					-0.0000341
					(0.0000208)
female					-0.000780
					(0.000692)
black					0.000249
					(0.000562)
indigenous					-0.000843
					(0.000521)
Constant	0.00734**	-0.00105	-0.00128	-0.00391	-0.00253
	(0.00354)	(0.00358)	(0.00377)	(0.00402)	(0.00404)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 37: Collective Crimes (without homicides and arm possession) - Full Model Results

	(1) R-H Collective Crimes
Economic Shock	0.261***
	(0.0773)
Average Shock	0.236**
	(0.0918)
age	-0.000543***
	(0.000101)
female	-0.0110***
	(0.00205)
black	-0.00453*
	(0.00247)
indigenous	0.00259
	(0.00656)
time t	0.0156**
	(0.00632)
region 2 x time t	-0.00681
	(0.00434)
region 3 x time t	0.00186
	(0.00318)
region 4 x time t	0.00266
	(0.00292)
region 5 x time t	-0.00995*
	(0.00601)
poverty x time t	0.000802
	(0.00739)
population x time t	-1.11e-10
	(5.55e-10)
distance Bogota x time t	0.00000999
	(0.00000917)
paved roads x time t	0.0000179
	(0.0000190)
Constant	0.0111
	(0.0176)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 38: Main Results for Non-Economic Crimes - Full Model Results

	(1) Economic Crimes	(2) Non-economic Crimes
Economic Shock	1.304	0.0354
	(1.189)	(0.0450)
Average Shock	3.168**	0.0448
	(1.501)	(0.0437)
age	-0.00367**	0.00000608
	(0.00147)	(0.0000499)
female	-0.0157	-0.00253***
	(0.0786)	(0.000885)
black	-0.0566*	-0.0000545
	(0.0336)	(0.00134)
indigenous	-0.0483	0.00557
	(0.0957)	(0.00615)
time t	0.355***	0.0112***
	(0.131)	(0.00366)
region 2 x time t	-0.0891	0.00113
	(0.0933)	(0.00272)
region 3 x time t	0.105	-0.00212
	(0.0685)	(0.00219)
region 4 x time t	-0.183**	-0.00144
	(0.0900)	(0.00184)
region 5 x time t	0.137	-0.00995*
	(0.138)	(0.00536)
poverty x time t	-0.284*	-0.00300
	(0.163)	(0.00566)
population x time t	-8.76e-09	-1.14e-09***
	(1.43e-08)	(3.51e-10)
distance Bogota x time t	0.0000832	-0.00000600
	(0.000219)	(0.00000631)
paved roads x time t	-0.000895**	0.00000599
	(0.000351)	(0.0000116)
Constant	0.0115	-0.0111
	(0.311)	(0.00713)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 39: Main Results with Mobility Controls - Full Results

	(1) Historic mobility	(2) Ln Wages	(3) Mobility & wages
		Red-Handed Captures	
Economic Shock	0.471***	0.383***	0.0940
	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.213)
Average Group Shock	0.233	0.356***	0.272*
	(0.157)	(0.127)	(0.163)
age	-0.000978***	-0.000828***	-0.000963***
	(0.000203)	(0.000160)	(0.000204)
female	-0.0230***	-0.0204***	-0.0239***
	(0.00281)	(0.00241)	(0.00292)
black	-0.00507	-0.00259	-0.00501
	(0.00496)	(0.00453)	(0.00504)
indigenous	0.00806	0.00360	0.00921
	(0.0116)	(0.0100)	(0.0120)
time t	-0.00557	0.0292	-0.496*
	(0.0228)	(0.0535)	(0.263)
moved x time t	0.0229**		0.0436***
	(0.0102)		(0.0167)
region 2 x time t	0.00239	-0.00145	0.00411
	(0.00333)	(0.00277)	(0.00333)
region 3 x time t	0.00682	0.00383	0.0108
	(0.00649)	(0.00523)	(0.00674)
region 4 x time t	0.00928	0.00205	0.0231*
	(0.00612)	(0.00595)	(0.0120)
region 5 x time t	-0.00867	-0.0144**	0.000182
	(0.00684)	(0.00683)	(0.00935)
ln wages x time t		-0.00360	0.0611*
		(0.00619)	(0.0331)
Constant	0.0279	0.0748	0.0961
	(0.0747)	(0.0640)	(0.0848)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 40: Degree Centrality and Criminality - Full Model Results

	Red-handed Captures				*Total Captures*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Degree Centrality	0.0253***	0.0212***	2.684***	3.270***	0.0186***	0.0152**	3.900***	4.407***
	(0.00536)	(0.00567)	(0.248)	(0.258)	(0.00636)	(0.00672)	(0.292)	(0.304)
age				-0.00583***				-0.00503***
				(0.000576)				(0.000729)
female				-0.184***				-0.266***
				(0.0110)				(0.0147)
indigenous				-0.0735*				-0.0871
				(0.0430)				(0.0626)
black				0.0203				0.0213
				(0.0190)				(0.0234)
Constant	0.216***	0.216***	0.215***	0.449***	0.326***	0.326***	0.324***	0.535***
	(0.00480)	(0.00469)	(0.00461)	(0.0237)	(0.00590)	(0.00580)	(0.00568)	(0.0293)
Municipality and Group FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 41: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for fragrant captures - Historic Gold Production - Full model

	Red-handed Captures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Economic Shock	0.0154	0.0151	0.0298	0.0434	0.0407
	(0.0756)	(0.0756)	(0.0802)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Average Shock	0.0804	0.0804	0.0787	0.100	0.102
	(0.0869)	(0.0868)	(0.0926)	(0.103)	(0.103)
time t		0.0195***	0.0205***	0.0177*	0.0180*
		(0.00678)	(0.00695)	(0.00916)	(0.00935)
region 2 x time t			-0.000876	-0.00211	-0.00215
			(0.00260)	(0.00333)	(0.00334)
region 3 x time t			-0.00207	-0.00145	-0.00151
			(0.00428)	(0.00450)	(0.00451)
region 4 x time t			-0.00175	0.00385	0.00383
			(0.00331)	(0.00410)	(0.00411)
region 5 x time t			-0.00800	-0.0116*	-0.0115*
			(0.00506)	(0.00641)	(0.00639)
poverty x time t				0.0000777	-0.000119
				(0.0120)	(0.0120)
population x time t				9.41e-09	9.30e-09
				(2.01e-08)	(2.02e-08)
distance Bogota x time t				0.00000738	0.00000741
				(0.00000988)	(0.00000988)
paved roads x time t				0.0000433	0.0000441
				(0.0000305)	(0.0000306)
age					-0.000561***
					(0.000139)
female					-0.0121***
					(0.00321)
black					-0.00401
					(0.00516)
indigenous					-0.00454
					(0.00937)
Constant	0.0210***	-0.0376*	-0.0387*	-0.0433**	-0.0210
	(0.000759)	(0.0202)	(0.0203)	(0.0212)	(0.0223)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 42: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for Strong Ties – Full Model Results

	12 Months	18 Months	24 Months	30 Months	36 Months	42 Months	48 Months	54 Months	60 Months
gold_shock_r	0.350***	0.303***	0.317***	0.263*	0.273	0.380	0.399*	0.215	0.240
	(0.0994)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.156)	(0.166)	(0.238)	(0.239)	(0.287)	(0.290)
mean_gold_shock_r	0.304**	0.373**	0.365**	0.303*	0.329*	0.437*	0.446*	0.609*	0.581*
	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.158)	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.248)	(0.254)	(0.336)	(0.339)
age	-0.000751***	-0.000891***	-0.000922***	-0.000839***	-0.000905***	-0.000853***	-0.000705**	-0.000995***	-0.00100***
	(0.000153)	(0.000162)	(0.000170)	(0.000198)	(0.000208)	(0.000294)	(0.000297)	(0.000288)	(0.000287)
female	-0.0183***	-0.0198***	-0.0191***	-0.0193***	-0.0195***	-0.0133*	-0.0183***	-0.0186**	-0.0169**
	(0.00239)	(0.00270)	(0.00310)	(0.00388)	(0.00411)	(0.00701)	(0.00501)	(0.00723)	(0.00723)
black	-0.00231	-0.00325	-0.00265	0.00450	0.00369	0.00794	0.00757	0.0118	0.0107
	(0.00443)	(0.00465)	(0.00470)	(0.00700)	(0.00654)	(0.00803)	(0.00798)	(0.0102)	(0.0104)
indigenous	0.00660	0.00660	0.00841	0.0261	0.0264	0.0153	0.0152	0.0304	0.0299
	(0.0101)	(0.0105)	(0.0121)	(0.0210)	(0.0211)	(0.0195)	(0.0196)	(0.0267)	(0.0266)
poverty x time t	0.00142	0.00374	0.00820	-0.00779	-0.00777	-0.0240	-0.0221	-0.0205	-0.0226
	(0.0104)	(0.0127)	(0.0140)	(0.0171)	(0.0168)	(0.0236)	(0.0228)	(0.0241)	(0.0242)
population x time t	-1.26e-09	-1.28e-09	-8.63e-10	-1.64e-09	-1.62e-09	-2.59e-09*	-2.49e-09*	-2.32e-09	-2.17e-09
	(9.06e-10)	(1.05e-09)	(1.08e-09)	(1.20e-09)	(1.19e-09)	(1.39e-09)	(1.38e-09)	(1.46e-09)	(1.47e-09)
distance Bogota x time t	0.00000542	0.00000502	0.0000103	0.00000950	0.00000977	0.0000127	0.00000881	0.0000121	0.0000230
	(0.0000122)	(0.0000141)	(0.0000149)	(0.0000184)	(0.0000169)	(0.0000185)	(0.0000194)	(0.0000202)	(0.0000197)
paved roads x time t	0.0000142	0.00000808	0.00000130	-0.0000284	-0.0000290	-0.00000471	-0.00000111	0.0000485	0.0000341
	(0.0000227)	(0.0000293)	(0.0000306)	(0.0000378)	(0.0000402)	(0.0000522)	(0.0000489)	(0.0000517)	(0.0000527)
Constant	0.0836***	0.0975***	0.0848***	0.0979***	0.104***	0.128**	0.122**	0.148***	0.137**
	(0.0233)	(0.0291)	(0.0313)	(0.0359)	(0.0360)	(0.0498)	(0.0482)	(0.0564)	(0.0564)
Peer Effect	0.465***	0.552***	0.536***	0.536**	0.547**	0.535**	0.528**	0.739**	0.707**
	(0.150)	(0.162)	(0.166)	(0.243)	(0.247)	(0.253)	(0.248)	(0.319)	(0.324)
N	31,391	27,262	24,781	17,819	16,964	12,146	11,786	8,304	8,081
Mun, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 43: Economic Shock and Peer Effects for Weak Ties – Full Model Results

	(1) Captures	(2) Captures	(3) Captures	(4) R-H Captures	(5) R-H Captures	(6) R-H Captures
Economic Shock	0.422***	0.376***	0.379***	0.414***	0.411***	0.413***
	(0.128)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.0815)	(0.0904)	(0.0903)
Average Shock (Weak)	0.173	0.191*	0.188*	0.230**	0.252**	0.250**
	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.0969)	(0.104)	(0.104)
time t		0.0150	0.0156		0.00657	0.00691
		(0.0210)	(0.0209)		(0.0199)	(0.0198)
poverty x time t		0.0101	0.0101		-0.000533	-0.000508
		(0.0141)	(0.0142)		(0.00815)	(0.00824)
population x time t		-1.42e-09*	-1.42e-09*		-1.55e-09**	-1.55e-09**
		(8.21e-10)	(8.27e-10)		(6.33e-10)	(6.36e-10)
distance Bogota x time t		-0.0000112*	-0.0000112*		-0.00000536	-0.00000540
		(0.00000572)	(0.00000574)		(0.00000446)	(0.00000446)
paved roads x time t		0.0000443*	0.0000451*		0.0000173	0.0000179
		(0.0000245)	(0.0000248)		(0.0000181)	(0.0000183)
age			-0.00107***			-0.000843***
			(0.000210)			(0.000178)
female			-0.0281***			-0.0194***
			(0.00264)			(0.00177)
black			0.000873			-0.00226
			(0.00407)			(0.00304)
indigenous			0.00163			-0.00109
			(0.0107)			(0.00708)
Constant	0.0656***	0.0120	0.0528	0.0614***	0.0442	0.0769
	(0.0157)	(0.0620)	(0.0612)	(0.0140)	(0.0585)	(0.0572)
Peer Effect	0.290	0.337*	0.332*	0.357***	0.380***	0.377***
	(0.178)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Mean of Outcome	0.0368	0.0367	0.0367	0.0368	0.0367	0.0367
S.D of Outcome	0.2071	0.2071	0.2071	0.2071	0.2071	0.2071
Observations	36,754	34,875	34,872	36,754	34,875	34,872
Mun, Year, and Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 44: Regression Results for Counterfactual Experiment

	(1)
	R-H Captures (IHS)
Economic Shock	0.000741***
	(0.000164)
Average Shock	0.000966**
	(0.000387)
Constant	-0.230**
	(0.0936)
Municipality, Year, and Group FE	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for network, year, and municipality omitted because of space limitations.

Table A 45: Survey Figure Results

	(1) crime_acceptable
Aftedemo_Security	0.0985
	(0.0744)
Aftedemo_Econsecurity	-0.0896
	(0.0843)
Aftedemo_Image	0.0369
	(0.0507)
Aftedemo_friends	-0.0212
	(0.0927)
Aftedemo_socialstatus	-0.0618
	(0.0758)
Aftedemo_Adventure	-0.00762
	(0.0547)
Aftedemo_Knoledge	0.0834
	(0.155)
Aftedemo_Money	0.0677
	(0.0698)
Obligation_contact	0.0262
	(0.132)
Obligation_excombatant	0.347***
	(0.0790)
Obligation_family	0.172**
	(0.0815)
Distance_to_commander	-0.0290
	(0.0294)
Time_message_commander	-0.0320
	(0.0817)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed effects for municipality and enumerator omitted because of space limitations.