GEBDA. Global Election Boycotts Database 1.0

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1. Why this database?

It has been a long time since Giovanni Sartori encouraged political scientists to overcome the malformation of concepts in comparative politics on a global scale by improving classification systems and articulating stable and accumulable databases of comprehensive and precise information (Sartori, 2011: 32). Since then, comparativists have made great progress in the valid comparative control of institutional phenomena. However, theoretical and operational definitions, as well as classifications and accumulation of data on the behaviour of political actors remain to be refined. These include polarised and contentious politics of opposition political parties. In this particular framework, the comparative study of the election boycott still requires further efforts.

Election boycotts represent a form of 'tragic' protest (Lindberg, 2006) and 'high-risk' action (Ilic, 2022) for three main reasons. They challenges the competitive and participative logic (Lindberg, 2006a), aim to delegitimize practices, policies, authorities, or the entire regime in the eyes of the local and/or international public opinion (Frankel, 2010; Schmidmayr, 2013; Beaulieu, 2014), and may cause unexpected negative changes in the electoral dynamics and results, as internal division and splits within proposing parties, their political marginalization, and greater empowerment of the ruler (Frankel, 2010). However, despite the gravity and utility of the topic' (Smith, 2009:2), the knowledge on electoral boycotts remains very limited and outdated in comparison to other forms of political opposition action (Helms, 2023).

Trying to articulate a comprehensive view of the phenomenon on the basis of previous research is akin to assembling a very complex puzzle. The first reason is the scattered state of the puzzle pieces, given that most studies refer to particular cases (Buttorff and Dion, 2017; Ilić, 2022) or a set of cases that respond to a single type of boycott (Smith, 2014), a single type of regime (Schedler, 2006; Smith, 2014), or a single geographical area - the African continent (Bratton, 1998; Lindberg, 2006a; Lindberg, 2006b) or the Arab world (Schmidmayr, 2013; Buttorff, 2019). A second problem is that the puzzle pieces do not always fit, as the electoral boycott operational definitions and data sources differ among studies.

The Global Election Boycotts Database (GEBDA) aims to facilitate the comparative analysis by collecting and producing indicators that serve to count, locate, classify and contextualize electoral boycotts, to identify their background, and to assess their drivers and their impact. This way it encourages comparisons of both the contextual factors that, in isolation or as a conjuncture, operate as causal routes or condition their relevance, and the post electoral and government formation scenarios promoted by the results of different kinds of election boycott.

2. Country units and cases

GEBDA results from the analysis of 1668 presidential and parliamentary elections held in 179 countries between 2000 and 2022. The list of countries studied is as follows: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma-Myanmar, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malasya, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine / Gaza, Palestine-West Bank, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Rumania, Russia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia (Yugoslavia), Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Somaliland, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, The Gambia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zanzibar, and Zimbabwe.

The product is a universe composed of 356 boycotted elections that have taken place in 70 countries over this period. Table 1 shows the year in which boycotted elections are held in each country.

Table 1

Country	Boycotted Elections	Country	Boycotted Elections	Country	Boycotted Elections
				Nigeria	2003
Afghanistan	2009, 2010, 2014, 2018, 2019	Gabon	2001, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2016	Pakistan	2002, 2008
Albania	2001	Georgia	2000, 2003, 2008, 2020	Palestine-West Bank	2005, 2006
Algeria	2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021	Guinea	2002, 2003, 2013, 2015, 2020	Peru	2000
Armenia	2013	Haiti	2000, 2006, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2016	Republic of the Congo	2002, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2017, 2021, 2022
Azerbaijan	2005, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2018, 2020	Honduras	2009	Russia	2012, 2016, 2018, 2021
Bahrain	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018, 2022	Hong Kong	2021	Rwanda	2003, 2010
Bangladesh	2008, 2014	Iran	2004, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016, 2020, 2021	Sao Tome and Principe	2016
Belarus	2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2019	Iraq	2000, 2005, 2010, 2014, 2018, 2021	Senegal	2007
Benin	2001, 2019, 2021	Ivory Coast	2000, 2001, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2020, 2021	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	2020
Burma - Myanmar	2010	Jordan	2007, 2010, 2013, 2016	Seychelles	2011
Burundi	2010, 2015	Kazakhstan	2007, 2011, 2012, 2015,	Somalia	2017

			2019, 2021, 2022		
Cambodia	2018	Kenya	2017	Sri Lanka	2005
Cameroon	2011, 2013, 2018, 2020	Kuwait	2012, 2013, 2016, 2022	Sudan	2000, 2010, 2015
Central African Republic	2005, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2020, 2021	Kyrgyzstan	2020	Syria	2000, 2003, 2007, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2020, 2021
Chad	2001, 2002, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021	Lebanon	2000, 2005, 2009, 2018, 2022	Tajikistan	2000, 2006, 2013, 2020
Comoros	2002, 2009, 2016, 2019, 2020	Liberia	2011	Tanzania	2020
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2006, 2011, 2018	Libya	2014	Thailand	2014
Djibouti	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2018, 2021	Madagascar	2019	The Gambia	2002, 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012
Egypt	2000, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2020	Mauritania	2001, 2013, 2014	Togo	2002, 2003, 2018, 2020
Equatorial Guinea	2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2022	Nepal	2008, 2013, 2017	Tunisia	2004, 2009, 2011, 2022
Eswatini	2003, 2008, 2013, 2018	Nicaragua	2016, 2021	Turkmenistan	2004, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2017, 2018
Ethiopia	2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2021	Niger	2009, 2016	Uzbekistan	2004, 2005, 2007, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2020, 2021
				Venezuela	2005, 2018, 2020
				Zanzibar	2016, 2020
				Zimbabwe	2008

These data reveal that while election boycott is a recurrent practice in some countries between 2000 and 2022, in others it represents a residual phenomenon, or it is totally

absent. The contrast of GEBDA with data offered by previous studies shows that the use of election boycott as a protest tool has increased during the second decade of the 21st century. Schmidmayr's (2012) shows that there were 10.4% of boycotted elections in the period 1971-2005. This percentage rises to 14% according to Hyde and Marinov's data (2012), covering the period 1941-2010. GEBDA finds out that 21.36% of the national elections held between 2000 and 2022 have been boycotted.

3. Cautionary notes

Constructing a multidimensional database on election boycotts involves addressing the dilemma about operational conceptualization. While some authors like Beaulieu (2006, 2014) use a restrictive concept of election boycott that excludes calls for non-electoral participation organized by parties unable to participate in elections, others, like Smith (2014), provide an extensive operationalization that includes the latter.

GEBDA uses a restrictive operational concept. Hence, it registers when political opposition with the right to compete deliberately refrain from presenting candidates and make an explicit and public call for abstention. That is, we do not consider as boycotted elections either those in which the opposition groups chooses neither to run nor to call for electoral abstention or those in which those who call for electoral abstention are not allowed to run.

Another dilemma is the selection of electoral contexts in which to observe the occurrence or absence of electoral boycotts. The cases recorded in GEBDA correspond only to national-level presidential and parliamentary elections that have actually taken place and for which data are available. That is, we do not take into consideration national-level elections that after being called are canceled or postponed for whatever reason. We also do not register election boycotts at regional and local levels.

Thirdly, our study approach determines which variables we include. GEBDA departs from an actor-centered micro-approach that seeks to understand why some actors boycott and others do not in the same elections. That is why it excludes data related to the ideological, religious and ethnic identity, political leadership, popularity and internal cohesion of each of the opposition groups that engage in electoral boycotts. On the

contrary, GEBDA has a macro focus on the opportunity structure generated both by the context of the actors involved in the electoral process and by the boycotting actors themselves. The purpose of GEBDA is to facilitate the comparison of such opportunity structures and the consequences of their exploitation in a large number of cases. That is why GEBDA records data on the institutional, political and social context variables that precede, occur simultaneously with or follow the election boycott within the framework of each electoral process. In order to contribute to the articulation of an stable and accumulable database of comprehensive and precise information to allow for valid comparative control on election boycotts, GEBDA imports data on these contextual conditions from stable and accumulable databases.

Finally, our approach to election boycotts is based on the logic of the political process. We assume that the drivers of the election boycott may be not only temporally delimited by the framework of the election that is finally boycotted. We understand that such drivers may be related as well to the contrast between the contextual conditions of the boycotted elections and the contextual conditions of previous elections (such as, for example, the emergence of an opportunity factor not previously present in the dynamics of electoral competition). That is why GEBDA also records data on elections prior to the ultimately boycotted elections as well as their contexts, and data that inform on the contrast between the contextual conditions of the boycotted elections and their antecedents. The first kind of data is directly imported, whereas the second refers to own elaboration data based on the analysis of data from our reference databases.

4. Dimensions, variables and indicators

GEBDA organises its data in six dimensions. As table 2 shows, they refer to the geographical, electoral, political and social context in which election boycotts occur, how election boycotts manifest themselves, and their short-term impacts.

The reason for introducing the geographical dimension is to facilitate the selection of cases in area-based comparative studies. The reason for contemplating the electoral, political and social dimensions of the boycott scenario is the introduction of a complex vision of the boycott event and its explanation, assuming that the election boycott can be the result of more than one causal route and that these routes can be articulated by a configuration of conditions of different natures (electoral, political and social). We also

observe how election boycotts manifest themselves in order to facilitate the selection of cases in comparative studies according to the greater or lesser relevance of the boycott . Finally, we consider a dimension referring to the impact of the election boycott in the election results in order to facilitate the classification and selection of cases according to their greater or lesser electoral effects.

Table 2	
Dimensions	**Variables**
Boycott geographical context	Region
	Country
Boycott electoral context	Timing of elections
	Aim of the elections
	Election regulation
	Election observation
	Electoral violence
	Election legitimacy
	Change or continuity in the electoral context with respect to previous elections
Boycott political context	Regime
	Possibility of dissemination of the boycotting message
	Change or continuity in the political context with respect to previous elections
Boycott social context	Opportunity for social reception of the boycotting message
	Change or continuity in the social context with respect to previous elections
Boycott Manifestation	Boycott relevance
Election Outcomes	Electoral results
	Change or continuity in the election outcomes with respect to previous elections
	Presence or absence of riots and protests after the election
	Incumbent replacement or continuity

The first reason for variable selection is to build on accumulated empirical knowledge. Previous studies have predominantly looked at descriptive variables that refer to the political period when the boycott takes place to contemplate the boycott causes. They have tested the explanatory capability of variables that affect the political opposition's assessment of the regime's strength or vulnerability, the calculation of its mobilization costs, and its margin of opportunity for electoral competition. These include the expectation of electoral unfairness or fraud (Brown, 2012; Bratton, 1998; Smith, 2014; Beaulieu, 2006; Beaulieu, 2014), as well as the presence of international election

observers (Kelley, 2011; Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009). Therefore, we collect data about all of them in order to facilitate the replication of past research.

The second reason for the choice of variables is encouraging to test interesting suggestions on the explanatory potential of other variables that has not been verified yet. Among them, the regime´s degree of democratic legitimacy and system of public goods distribution (Bratton, 1998; Lindberg, 2004; Beaulieu, 2014), as well as changes in the power structure between elections (Buttorff and Dion, 2016).Therefore, we collect data about all of them in order to facilitate. the completion of suggested investigations that remain to be undertaken.

The last reason for variable selection is to innovate. In this respect GEBD introduces a retrospective view that also includes observing the election boycott background. To this end, we assume that the possible causal routes of the election boycott may include not only the conditions in which the boycott takes place, but also the variation between these conditions and those of a previous political time. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that certain political opposition groups may be inclined to boycott elections as a strategic decision if they perceive changes in the electoral, political or social sphere that affect their external opportunity structure (Buttorff, 2019). That is the reason why we include a set of variables labeled as "change or continuity in the electoral context with respect to previous elections", "change or continuity in the political context with respect to previous elections", and "change or continuity in the social context with respect to previous elections".

To observe the behavior of the variables referred to the election year in which the electoral boycott occurs we import indicators from different sources, as we reflect in Table 3. The reason for choosing these indicators is that they belong to databases that are reputable, freely accessible and regularly updated. These are Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, African Elections Database, Varieties of Democracy and NELDA. In those cases we do not do any original coding to that already contained in their respective codebooks.

We also offer newly created indicators based on imported data. They all refer to changes or continuities in the electoral, political and social contexts between election years (the year in which the boycotted elections were held and the year of the last elections of the same type).

Table 3	
Indicators	**Type of Indicator**
Country	Importation (V-Dem)
Region	Importation (IGN)
Election year	Importation (V-Dem)
Election day	Importation (V-Dem)
Election Type	Importation (V-Dem)
Existence or absence of compulsory vote	Importation (V-Dem)
Election international monitors	Importation (V-Dem)
Election government intimidation[4]	Importation (V-Dem)
Electoral violence[5]	Importation (V-Dem)
Expectation of clean elections in election year	Importation (NELDA)
Election legitimacy in the election year	Importation (V-Dem)
Precedents of election international monitors in the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported data
Trend of expectation of clean election	Own elaboration based on imported data
Trend of election government intimidation with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported data
Trend of other electoral violence with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	own elaboration based on imported data
Trend of election legitimacy with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported data
Precedents of electoral boycott in the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported data
Regime democratic legitimacy in the election year	Importation (V-Dem)

[4] The government, the ruling party, or their agents may exercise repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment on opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers in the campaign period, election day, and post-election process. This indicator refers only to the campaign period and election day. This is the reason why we consider it part of the electoral context conditions.

[5] Electoral violence may be exerted also by other actors not related to the government, the ruling party, or their agents (including electoral boycott defenders) in the campaign period, election day, and post-election process. This indicator refers to the entire process without specifying the concrete moment. Given its indefinite, we consider it part of the electoral context conditions. Hence, we recommend that users of the database check if electoral violence refers to conditions of the election context or the election consequences in the concrete cases of their interest.

Print / Broadcast Media Critical to the incumbent	Importation (V-Dem)
Trend in the regime democratic legitimacy with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported indicator data
Pro democracy demonstrations in the election year	Importation (V-Dem)
Perception of economic growth in the election year	Importation (NELDA)
Public goods distribution model in the election year	Importation (V-Dem)
Trend in prodemocratic demonstrations with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported indicator data
Trend in perception of economic growth with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported indicator data
Trend of the public goods distribution model with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind	Own elaboration based on imported indicator data
Boycott relevance	Importation (V-Dem)
Voter turnout	Importation (V-Dem, IFES Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, African Elections Database)
Change in voter turnout compared to the last previous elections of the same type	Own elaboration based on imported indicator data
Majority candidate/party results (votes)	Importation (V-Dem, IFES Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, African Elections Database)
Majority candidate/party results (percentage)	Importation (V-Dem, IFES Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, African Elections Database)
Change in the majority candidate/party results compared to the last previous election of the same type	Own elaboration based on imported indicator data

Presence or absence of riots and protests after the election	Importation (NELDA)
Incumbent replacement or continuity	Importation (NELDA)

5. Indicators information

In the case of imported indicators we identify the indicator source, denomination, definition and values according to the source as well as its reference in the corresponding codebook, as shown in Example 1. In the case of our own elaborated indicators based on imported data, we identify the source of the data we process as well as our denomination, definition, methodology and values, as shown in Example 2.

Example 1

Denomination: Perception of economic growth.

Source: NELDA 17

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:13). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether in the election year economic growth in the country was said to be good or not.

Values: Yes. No. N/A. Unclear.

Example 2

Denomination: Trend in the perception of economic growth.

Source: own variable based on the import of data from NELDA 17.

Definition: This indicator refers to whether the perception of economic growth in the election year is the same, better or worse than in the year of the previous election of the same type.

Values: Improvement. Stagnation. Worsening. Unclear. N/A.

Methodology: We classify as worsening those cases in which no economic growth is perceived in the election year, whereas it was in the previous election year. We classify as improvement those cases in which economic growth is perceived in the election year, whereas it was not in the previous election year. We classify as stagnation the lack of change in perceptions of economic growth between election years.

6. Indicators codification

Denomination: Country name.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:45). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to the country where elections are boycotted.

Values: Name.

Denomination: Geographical location.

Source: Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

Reference: Instituto Geográfico Nacional (s.f.). *Localización geográfica. Concepto, definición y relevancia actual.* Ministerio de Transportes, Movilidad y Agenda Urbana. Available at: https://educativo.ign.es/atlas-didactico/cartografiaeso/localizacin_geogrfica_concepto_definicin_y_relevancia_actual.html

Definition: Geographical region of the country where elections are boycotted.

Values: North America, Central America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Middle. East and North Africa (MENA Region), Oceania.

Denomination: Boycotted election year.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:45). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to the year in which elections are boycotted.

Values: 2000-2022.

Denomination: Date of boycotted elections.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:41). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to the date of boycotted elections.

Values: day-month-year

Denomination: Election type.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:275). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to whether the election is parliamentary or presidential and its round number (if there is more than one round).

Values: Presidential (round number). Parliamentary (round number).

Denomination: Compulsory voting.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:247). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to whether voting is compulsory in national elections.

Values: 0: No. 1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced. 2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter. 3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

Denomination: Election international monitors

Source: NELDA 45.

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:25). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether international election monitors were present or not.

Values: Yes. No.

Denomination: Election government intimidation

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:70). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to whether there were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents.

Values: 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

Denomination: Other electoral violence.
Source: V-Dem
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:70). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf
Definition: This indicator refers to whether there was violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)
Values: 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees. 1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily. 2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small. 3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured. 4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

Denomination: Expectation on elections free and fair.
Source: NELDA 11
Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:11). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook
Definition: This indicator refers to whether before the elections there were significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair.
Values: Yes. No.

Denomination: Election legitimacy in the election year.

Source: V-Dem

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:47). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: The Electoral Democracy Index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices.

Values: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Denomination: Precedents of election international monitors in the last previous elections of the same kind.

Source: Own variable based on the import of data from NELDA 45

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:25). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether international election monitors were present or not in the previous elections of the same kind.

Values: Yes. No.

Methodology: We classify as No those cases in which no international election monitors were present in the previous election of the same kind year. We classify as Yes those cases in which they were present.

Denomination: Trend of expectation of clean election.

Source: Own variable based on the import of data from NELDA 11.

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:11). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether the boycotted election was expected to be more, equal or less clean than the previous elections of the same kind.

Values: Improvement. Stagnation. Worsening.

Methodology: We measure the variation of the indicator "expectation of clean elections" between the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. We classify as Improvement those cases in which there were significant concerns that elections would not be free and fair in the previous elections of the same kind and yet, there are not in the year of the boycotted elections. We classify as Stagnation those cases in which the

concerns that elections would not be free and fair are equally present or absent in the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. We classify as Worsening Those cases in which there were not significant concerns that elections would not be free and fair in the previous elections of the same kind and yet, there are in the year of the boycotted elections.

Denomination: Trend of election government intimidation with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.
Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem.
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:70). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf
Definition: This indicator refers to whether the level of election government intimidation increases, decreases or remains unaltered in the boycotted election with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.
Values: Increase. Stability. Decrease.
Methodology: We measure the variation of the indicator "election government intimidation" between the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. Positive variations are classified as Increase. Negative variations are classified as Decrease. No variations are classified as Stability.

Denomination: Trend of other electoral violence with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.
Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem.
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:70). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf
Definition: This indicator refers to whether the level of other electoral violence increases, decreases or remains unaltered in the boycotted election with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.
Values: Increase. Stability. Decrease.
Methodology: We measure the variation of the indicator "other electoral violence" between the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. Positive variations are classified as Increase. Negative variations are classified as Decrease. No variations are classified as Stability.

Denomination: Precedents of electoral boycott in the last previous elections of the same kind.

Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:71). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to whether registered opposition candidates or parties boycotted the last previous elections of the same kind.

Values: Yes. No.

Methodology: We classify as Yes those cases where the previous election of the same kind was also boycotted. We classify as No the cases where the previous election of the same kind was not boycotted.

Denomination: Regime democratic legitimacy.

Source: V-Dem

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:48). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to the level of Liberal Democracy Index in the election year.

Values: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Denomination: Existence or absence of Print / Broadcast Media Critical to the incumbent.

Source: V-Dem

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:208). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to whether major print and broadcast outlets routinely criticize the government.

Values: 0: None. 1: Only a few marginal outlets. 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do. 3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally

Denomination: Trend of regime democratic legitimacy with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.

Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:48). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to the variation of the level of Liberal Democracy Index between the election year and the year of the previous election of the same kind.

Values: Improvement. Stagnation. Worsening.

Methodology: We measure the variation of the indicator "regime democratic legitimacy" between the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. Positive variations are classified as Improvement. Negative variations are classified as Worsening. No variations are classified as Stagnation.

Denomination: Pro democracy demonstrations in the election year.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:235). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to whether there are events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims in the election year.

Values: 0: There have been virtually no events. 1: There have been several small-scale events. 2: There have been many small-scale events. 3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events. 4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

Denomination: Perception of economic growth in the election year.

Source: NELDA 17

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:13). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether in the election year economic growth in the country was said to be good or not.

Values: "yes," "no", "N/A", "unclear".

Denomination: Public goods distribution model in the election year.

Source: V-Dem.

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:49). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicators refers to whether in the electoral year rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power

Values: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Denomination: Trend in prodemocratic demonstrations with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.
Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem.
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:235). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf
Definition: This indicator refers to the variation of the indicator "pro democracy demonstrations" between the year of the boycotted election and the year of the previous election of the same kind.
Values: Increase. Stability. Decrease.
Methodology: We measure the variation of the indicator "pro democracy demonstrations" between the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. Positive variations are classified as Increase. Negative variations are classified as Decrease. No variations are classified as Stability.

Denomination: Trend in the perception of economic growth.
Source: own variable based on the import of data from NELDA 17.
Definition: This indicator refers to whether the perception of economic growth in the election year is the same, better or worse than in the year of the previous election of the same type.
Values: Improvement. Stagnation. Worsening.
Methodology: We classify as worsening those cases in which no economic growth is perceived in the election year, whereas it was in the previous election year. We classify as improvement those cases in which economic growth is perceived in the election year, whereas it was not in the previous election year. We classify as stagnation the lack of change in perceptions of economic growth between election years.

Denomination: Trend of the public goods distribution model with respect to the last previous elections of the same kind.
Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem.
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:49). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to the variation of the public good distribution model indicator between the year of the boycotted election and the year of the previous election of the same kind.

Values: Improvement. Stagnation. Worsening.

Methodology: We measure the variation of the indicator "Egalitarian Democracy Index" between the boycotted elections and the previous elections of the same kind. Positive variations are classified as Improvement. Negative variations are classified as Worsening. No variations are classified as Stagnation.

Denomination: Election boycott relevance.

Source: V-Dem

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:71). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf

Definition: This indicator refers to how many registered opposition candidates or parties boycotted the elections.

Values: 0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election. 1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force. 2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force. 3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones. 4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

Denomination: Voter turnout.

Source: V-Dem as main source. When V-Dem does not provide data we resort to alternative sources (IFES- Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and African Elections Database).

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:76).Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf; IFES- Election Guide. Available at: https://www.electionguide.org/elections/type/past/; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline. Available at: https://data.ipu.org/; African Elections Database. Available at: https://africanelections.tripod.com

Definition: This indicator refers to the percentage of all registered voters who cast a vote according to official results

Values: Percent. When none of the sources provide data, we code the case as No Data .

Denomination: Change in voter turnout compared to the last previous elections of the same type.
Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem as main source. When V-Dem does not provide data we resort to alternative sources (IFES- Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and African Elections Database).
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:76). Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf; IFES Election Guide. Available at: https://www.electionguide.org/elections/type/past/; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline. Available at: https://data.ipu.org/; African Elections Database. Available at: https://africanelections.tripod.com
Definition: This indicator refers to the variation of the percentage of all registered voters who cast a vote according to official results between the boycotted elections and the last previous elections of the same kind.
Values: Percent. When none of the sources provide data, we code the case as No Data.

Denomination: Winner candidate/party results (Number of votes).
Source: V-Dem as main source. When V-Dem does not provide data we resort to alternative sources (IFES- Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and African Elections Database).
Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:76).Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf; IFES- Election Guide. Available at: https://www.electionguide.org/elections/type/past/; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline. Available at: https://data.ipu.org/; African Elections Database. Available at: https://africanelections.tripod.com
Definition: This indicator refers to the number of Presidential Votes and Parliamentary Seats of the majority candidacy.
Values: Number.

Denomination: Winner candidate/party results (Percentage).
Source: V-Dem as main source. When V-Dem does not provide data we resort to alternative sources (IFES- Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and African Elections Database).

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:76).Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf; IFES- Election Guide. Available at: https://www.electionguide.org/elections/type/past/; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline. Available at: https://data.ipu.org/; African Elections Database. Available at: https://africanelections.tripod.com

Definition: This indicator refers to the percentage of Presidential Votes and Parliamentary Seats of the majority candidacy

Values: Percentage.

Denomination: Change in the Winner candidate/party results (percentage).

Source: Own variable based on the import of data from V-dem as main source. When V-Dem does not provide data we resort to alternative sources (IFES- Election Guide, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and African Elections Database).

Reference: Coppedge et al. (2024:76).Available at: https://v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf; IFES- Election Guide. Available at: https://www.electionguide.org/elections/type/past/; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline. Available at: https://data.ipu.org/; African Elections Database. Available at: https://africanelections.tripod.com

Definition: This indicator refers to the variation of the percentage of votes for the majority candidate between the boycotted election and the last previous election of the same type.

Values: Percentage.

Denomination: Riots and protests after the election.

Source: NELDA 29

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:19). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether there were riots and protests after the boycotted election.

Values: Yes. No.

Denomination: Incumbent replacement or continuity

Source: NELDA 39.

Reference: Hyde and Marinov (2019:22-23). Available at: https://nelda.co/#codebook

Definition: This indicator refers to whether if the incumbent leader of the country changed after the boycotted election, even if the election did not involve the leadership position but led to events that dislodged the leader from power

Values: Yes. No. N/A

7. Missingness in the Data

There are two reasons for missingness in the GEBDA. In the case of directly imported data that refer to the boycotted elections and their contexts, it is due to the lack of data in our reference source. Secondly, in the case of data that refer to variation between the time of the boycotted elections and the previous elections, the absence of data responds to a lack of data at one of the two points in time in our reference source.

To illustrate the first case, consider Bahrain's boycotted elections in 2014. Election Guide does not provide data on the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the majority force, nor does Nelda provide data on whether there were riots and protests after the election.

As an example of the second case, V-dem gives us the data on whether there was international election observation in the boycotted elections held in Bahrain in 2022, but does not give us the data on whether there was international election observation in the previous elections. In this case, the indicator on the trend in international election observation registers 'No Data'. In the same vein, and for the same elections in Bahrain, Nelda provides data on the perception of economic growth among the population, but does not provide data on the same item in the previous elections. Therefore, the value of the indicator on the trend in the perception of economic growth between consecutive elections is 'No Data'.

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