Online Appendix for "Ethnic Exclusion and Civil Resistance Campaigns: Opting for Nonviolent or Violent Tactics?" (forthcoming in *Terrorism and Political Violence*)

Table A1. Summary statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Nonviolent onset	7,063	0.01	0.11	0	1
Violent onset	7,084	0.02	0.12	0	1
Ethnic exclusion	7,166	0.19	0.26	0	.99
Violent repression	7,166	0.02	1.21	-3.95	3.13
GDP/cap. (log)	7,013	7.90	1.33	3.44	11.89
Population (log)	7,158	16.03	1.57	12.34	20.99
Polity score	7,074	-0.05	7.51	-10	10
Political instability	7,074	0.45	0.26	0	1
Eth.-ling. frac.	7,160	0.45	0.26	0.00	0.93
Oil/gas (log)	7,158	2.65	3.25	0	12.51

Time coverage is 1950-2006.

Table A2. Correlation matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) Nonviolent onset	1									
(2) Violent onset	-	1								
(3) Ethnic exclusion	0.00	0.07	1							
(4) Violent repression	0.05	0.11	0.34	1						
(5) GDP/cap. (log)	-0.00	-0.07	-0.28	-0.51	1					
(6) Population (log)	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.29	0.08	1				
(7) Polity score	-0.05	-0.04	-0.25	-0.48	0.50	0.13	1			
(8) Political instability	-0.02	0.04	0.04	0.17	-0.17	0.03	-0.01	1		
(9) Eth.-ling. frac.	0.00	0.04	0.41	0.23	-0.41	-0.13	-0.26	0.10	1	
(10) Oil/gas (log)	0.00	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	0.44	0.19	-0.03	-0.08	0.01	1

Time coverage is 1950-2006.

Table A3. Alternative specifications

	Model A1: Multinomial probit *Reference category: No onset*			Model A2. Alternative democracy measure *Reference category: No onset*			Model A3. Ethno-linguistic polarization *Reference category: No onset*		
	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$
Ethnic ex-clusion$_{t-1}$	-.01	0.65**	.06	-.43	1.10**	.04	-.15	1.11**	.08
	(.28)	(.21)		(.57)	(.37)		(.59)	(.35)	
GDP/capita (log)$_{t-1}$	.14	-.25**	<.01	.14	-.36**	.02	.52*	-.45*	<.01
	(.10)	(.07)		(.19)	(.11)		(.21)	(.18)	
Pop. size (log)$_{t-1}$	.22**	.11*	.12	.36**	.19*	.26	.55**	.21*	.01
	(.05)	(.05)		(.10)	(.09)		(.09)	(.09)	
Polity score$_{t-1}$	-.06**	.01	<.01				-.13**	.01	<.01
	(.01)	(.01)					(.03)	(.02)	
DD$_{t-1}$				-1.66**	-.14	<.01			
				(.42)	(.35)				
Political in-stability$_{t-1}$							-.50	.59*	.05
							(.48)	(.29)	
Ethno-ling. polar.							-.04	.35	.62
							(.57)	(.51)	
Oil/cap. (log)$_{t-1}$							-.15**	-.02	.08
							(.05)	(.05)	
Ongoing, nonviolent	-1.06*	-.15		-1.93+	-.29		-2.06+	-.29	
	(.50)	(.36)		(1.04)	(.67)		(1.11)	(.55)	
Ongoing, violent	-.04	.02		-.17	-.08		.15	.02	
	(.17)	(.15)		(.33)	(.27)		(.32)	(.27)	
Constant	-8.85**	-3.54**		-12.07**	-5.85**		-18.82**	-5.65*	
	(1.41)	(.96)		(2.49)	(1.84)		(2.82)	(2.25)	
N^o onsets	80	102		80	99		77	100	
N^o ctr./obs.	157/6,932			156/6,896			149/6,678		

**p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). Region dummies, peace years, and time-trend included (not shown). DD= Democracy-Dictatorship from Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland (2010). The measure of ethno-linguistic polarization is based on Alesina et al. (2003).

Table A4. Alternative specifications

	Model A4: Control for territorial camp. *Reference category: No onset*			Model A5. Only governmental onsets *Reference category: No onset*			Model A6. Control for radical flank *Reference category: No onset*		
	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$
Ethnic exclusion$_{t-1}$	-.29	1.09**	.06	-.32	1.01*	.08	-.17	1.18**	.06
	(.60)	(.37)		(.61)	(.42)		(.58)	(.37)	
GDP/capita (log)$_{t-1}$	.25	-.42*	<.01	.19	-.35*	.02	.24	-.43**	<.01
	(.19)	(.12)		(.19)	(.14)		(.21)	(.11)	
Pop. size (log)$_{t-1}$	.35**	.06	.03	.34**	-.03	<.01	.39**	.19*	.24
	(.10)	(.08)		(.09)	(.10)		(.13)	(.09)	
Polity score$_{t-1}$	-.11**	.003	<.01	-.12**	-.20	<.01	-.12**	.02	<.01
	(.03)	(.02)		(.03)	(.03)		(.03)	(.02)	
Territorial camp.	-.44	3.28**	<.01						
	(1.06)	(.59)							
Radical flank							6.76**	-13.00**	<.01
							(.56)	(.56)	
Ongoing, nonviolent	-1.91+	-1.32+		-1.81+	-13.62**		-6.91**	.11	
	(1.03)	(.78)		(1.07)	(.31)		(.97)	(.04)	
Ongoing, violent	.10	-1.90**		-.04	-.20		-1.58*	.04	
	(.49)	(.61)		(.30)	(.32)		(.68)	(.26)	
Constant	-13.71**	-3.45**		-13.33**	-3.11**		-14.60**	-5.39**	
	(2.49)	(1.76)		(2.56)	(2.05)		(1.41)	(1.75)	
N^o onsets	80	102		74	67		80	102	
N^o ctr./obs.	157/6,932			157/6,891			157/6,932		

**p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). Region dummies, peace years, and time-trend included (not shown). Both the measure of territorial campaign and radical flank is based on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013).

Table A5. Mediation analysis

	Model A4a: Main model		Model A4b: Ethnic exclusion as mediator	
	Equation 1 (OLS) DV: Violent repression	Equation 2 (logit) DV: Violent onset	Equation 1 (OLS) DV: Ethnic Exclusion	Equation 2 (logit) DV: Violent onset
Ethnic exclusion$_{t-1}$	.43**	.54		.54
	(.15)	(.37)		(.37)
Violent repression$_{t-1}$		1.00**	.04**	1.00**
		(.17)	(.02)	(.17)
GDP/capita (log)$_{t-1}$	-.27**	-.30*	.02	-.30*
	(.06)	(.13)	(.02)	(.13)
Population size (log)$_{t-1}$	.28**	-.04	.003	-.04
	(.03)	(.11)	(.01)	(.11)
Polity score$_{t-1}$	-.04**	.04*	-.002	.04*
	(.01)	(.02)	(.002)	(.02)
Ongoing, nonviolent	.24*	-.26	.02	-.26
	(.09)	(.67)	(.04)	(.67)
Ongoing, violent	.89**	-.75*	.05+	-.75*
	(.34)	(.34)	(.03)	(.34)
Constant	-2.94**	-2.31	-.06	-2.32
	(.92)	(1.93)	(.24)	(1.93)
N^o onsets	102	102	102	102
N^o ctr./obs.	157/6,852		157/6,852	
Total effect	.021 [.003; .045]*		.016 [.008; .028]**	
Avg. mediation effect	.09 [.002; .018]**		.0004 [-.0002; .001]	
Avg. direct effect	.011 [-.004; .028]		.016 [.008; .028]**	
Total effect mediated	46%		2%	

**p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). Region dummies, peace years, and time-trend included (not shown). The analysis is conducted in Stata 14 using 'medeff' (see Hicks and Tingley, 2011).