Supplementary Materials

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ADDITIONAL LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptualizations of the firm

Coase (1937, pg. 393) writes, "A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is based on the entrepreneur." Firms are *inherently relational organizations of production* that Coase (1937) notes lies outside of the price mechanism. Importantly, even Coase (1937) concedes that firms are dictatorial in the sense that entrepreneurs use their power to command their employees to produce a certain amount of goods. In other words, the entrepreneur has property rights over the residual labor of their employees (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990).

In contrast to Coase (1937), more conventional theories of the firm maintain that the firm is a "team" of relationships to coordinate the translation of inputs into outputs (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Rather than some exercise in dictatorial power, modern views of the firm see it as a set of free, contractual relationships between employees, managers, and owners (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Rajan and Zingales 1998, 2002). This contractarian view of the firm rests on the argument that firms form rationally to organize production efficiently in the face of transaction costs in the marketplace. Firms are still relationships of production, but where employees rationally and voluntarily enter into contracts that specify the terms of employment. In other words, this view posits that individuals submit themselves to hierarchical authority in the workplace in the hopes that the employment contract will serve as an economic magna carta to check the arbitrary power of the king (management/ownership).

Modern theories of corporate governance now tend to emphasize shareholder value and the primacy of shareholder democracy (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Bebchuk 2005; Lazonick and Shin 2020; Fligstein and Goldstein 2022).[1]. These theories identify the potential for rent-seeking behavior by managers and executives but instead prescribe maximizing shareholder value as the solution. While this might mitigate agency problems that generate rent-seeking behavior by executives, recent evidence on the rise of institutional investors owning shares in multiple companies demonstrates that concentration in investing generates anti-competitive practices within firms (Azar et al. 2018). This generates situations where shareholders, who are becoming increasingly concentrated (Braun 2021), themselves engage in rent-seeking behavior at the detriment of long-term firm value. But the shareholder democracy goal, even when operating at its ideal, fundamentally assumes that employees enter into employment relationships from a position of freedom.

Concerns about firm market power

First, economists have extensively documented that the concentration of employers (monopsony) limits the ability of workers to leave firms thereby reducing their bargaining power when it comes to wages or benefits and that this has become increasingly important over time (Manning 2003; Ashenfelter et al. 2010; Benmelech et al. 2018; Autor et al. 2019; Azar et al. ming; Dube et al. 2020). While there is some "natural" tendency for labor market monopsony as a result of job search frictions, the evidence also suggests that forces such as trade policy (Benmelech et al. 2018), "superstar" firms (Autor et al. 2019), and the rise of legal arrangement such as non-competes (Marx 2011; Krueger and Ashenfelter 2018; Balasubramanian et al. ming; Lipsitz and Starr ming; Starr et al. ming) have generated labor market concentration thereby tilting bargaining power away from workers and toward employers.

Labor market monopsony is not the only force shaping the balance of power between workers and their employers. Labor coercion, where workers are compelled to provide their labor, has historically been quite

[1]Recent work, explicates how the principle of maximizing shareholder value generates pathological behavior by corporations (Davis 2013; Lazonick and Shin 2020; Davis 2020; Fligstein and Goldstein 2022).

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violent and racialized (Chwe 1990; Naidu 2010; Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2011). Though it rarely takes on such violent forms through slavery, lynching, or police prosecution, modern-day labor coercion still exists in significant ways. For instance, one estimate suggests that the total value of wage theft–where minimum wage workers are paid below minimum wage–exceeds the value of all property theft in the United States (Meixell and Eisenbrey 2014). More subtly, Hertel-Fernandez (2018) documents how employers use a combination of their coercive power to fire workers and modern surveillance techniques to pressure their employees to engage in political actions that might run counter to their own political beliefs.

Many structural features of the American economy also make coercion a near-endemic feature of labor markets. Because of the way in which social policy, most notably health insurance, has been privatized and tied to employment (Hacker 2004), workers with employer-provided health insurance are forced to choose between their health and their freedom to leave. Other scholars such as Gourevitch (2018) argue that this issue between the freedom to leave and choosing one's livelihood is in fact a defining feature of modern capitalist economies. Because workers without independent sources of wealth, which consists of the vast majority of workers, must work to survive, any participation in labor markets in a capitalist economy is fundamentally coercive. Thus while the contractarian vision of the modern firm presumes that contracts are made under fundamentally free conditions between employers and employees, the nature of wealth distribution today implies that such a decision to even engage in work at all is a product of coercion.

One way of articulating the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the modern firm revolves around republican political theorist's concept of *domination* (Pettit 1999; Anderson 2017).[2] Lovett and Pettit (2009, pg. 14) characterize domination as follows:

> I dominate you in a particular choice to the extent that I have the capacity, not subject to your direct or indirect check, to interfere in the choice, and I can employ that capacity to make it more probable, defiance apart, that you will choose to my pleasure or taste. I may employ my capacity in any of at least three ways:
>
> 1. I may exercise the capacity in active interference, trying to push you in my desired direction.
> 2. I may hold the capacity in reserve against the possibility that you are not disposed to go in the direction I prefer. That is, I may "invigilate" or monitor your choice for that possibility but allow you otherwise to choose as you are inclined.
> 3. I may make a display of the capacity, thereby intimidating you into making preemptive adjustments in my favor. For example, you may censor your choice so that it conforms to my taste.
>
> If employed in any of these ways, the unchecked capacity to interfere will give me a degree of arbitrary control over your choice.

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[2]Robert Dahl similarly critiques the nature of the firm, but from the perspective of a distributive democratic framework (Dahl 1986). Dahl argues that because humans are fundamentally equal, they deserve equal claims over decisions in the firm. While we do not take up this logic of workplace democracy in much detail in this article, this claim is testable within the empirical framework outlined in this article. Foley and Polanyi (2006) review other arguments for workplace democracy and add that workplace democracy improves employee health.

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STUDY 1

Study 1: Robustness to Weighting

Regression results in Figure S1 can be found in Tables S27 to S40.

FIGURE S1. Main effects on all outcomes



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
Sample weighted to be nationally representative by age, education, gender, and race.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.
An F-test of the equality of codetermination and employee ownership with public ownership for work preference yields a p-value of 0.058.

Study 1: Robustness to Marginal Means

Regression results in Figure S2 can be found in Tables S41 to S52.

Study 1: Benchmarking effects to McConnell et al. (2018)

We standardized our prefer to work variable and their wage variable so they were comparable in units of standard deviations. We then compared our firm copartisan donation patterns coefficient against their copartisan coefficient to baseline our workplace democracy coefficients. We focus on the copartisan estimate because they emphasize the coefficient in their work. We then reconvert the standard deviations back to dollars using the standard deviation of respondents' wage demands. We found that respondents value codetermination, manager elections, and ESOPs at $1.27, $0.69, and $1.72 an hour, respectively. In other words, respondents value economic democracy in the range of $1,400 to $3,600 in annual income. We redo this same procedure when we subset to only income attributes of $80,000 or less to rule out the possibility that large incomes drive our results. In this case, our estimates grow to $1.83, $1.82, and $2.70, an hour, for codetermination, management elections, and ESOPs, respectively. We caution readers from over-interpreting the estimate because we use different samples and their study was conducted in the context of online labor markets, like Amazon Mechanical Turk. Additionally, our research designs are very different with weakly comparable control groups. However, the exercise is helpful for mapping our estimate to real-world reservation wages.

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FIGURE S2. Main effects on all outcomes



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.
An F-test of the equality of codetermination and employee ownership with public ownership for work preference yields a p-value of 0.058.

Study 1: Linearity of Income Assumption

TABLE S1. Labor Elasticities with Respect to Income

	Work	Work	Power	Power	Responsibilities	Responsibilities	Complaints	Complaints
Intercept	0.33*	0.22*	0.42*	0.37*	0.38*	0.31*	0.42*	0.37*
	[0.31; 0.35]	[0.18; 0.25]	[0.40; 0.44]	[0.33; 0.40]	[0.36; 0.40]	[0.28; 0.35]	[0.40; 0.44]	[0.33; 0.40]
Salary	0.01*		0.00*		0.01*		0.00*	
	[0.01; 0.01]		[0.00; 0.01]		[0.01; 0.01]		[0.00; 0.01]	
Log(Salary)		0.11*		0.05*		0.07*		0.05*
		[0.10; 0.12]		[0.04; 0.06]		[0.06; 0.08]		[0.04; 0.06]
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	8016	8016	8016	8016	8016	8016	8016	8016
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50

* 0 outside the confidence interval Column titles correspond to each respective dependent variable.

Study 1: Assessing Mediation Assumptions

More formally, we conduct a mediation analysis with our identifying assumptions captured in Figure S4 to assess the degree to which intrinsic preferences for more power explain the relationship between workplace democracy and work preferences. Particularly, we aim to estimate the *Average Controlled Direct Effect* (ACDE) as well as the *Average Natural Indirect Effect* (ANIE) of each workplace democracy treatment on the outcome as way to assess whether there remains any direct effect of the treatment after accounting for its impact on perceptions of power (Acharya et al. 2016).[3] Our experimental design allows us to recover unbiased estimates of both the

[3]The AMCE of each workplace democracy item can be decomposed into the ACDE, the ANIE, and an interaction between the treatment and the moderator. In Table S2 in the Online Appendix, we demonstrate that there is

FIGURE S3. Linearity of income effect



ACDE and ANIE (assuming no treatment-mediator interaction) by measuring and randomizing a wide set of potential Z thereby making the sequential unconfoundedness assumption plausible in our setting.

FIGURE S4. Directed Acyclic Graph of Identifying Assumption for Controlled Direct Effects



no significant effect moderation by power perceptions for co-determination and management elections thereby allowing us to estimate the ANIE for those treatments. We do find some evidence of effect modification for ESOPs and account for this in our estimates of the ANIE by re-centering as suggested by (Acharya et al. 2016).

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TABLE S2. Assessing the interaction effect assumption for causal mediation estimation

	Dependent variable:		
	Codetermination	Work ESOP	Management elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Workplace dem. proposal	−0.002	0.008	−0.004
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Power question	0.512***	0.512***	0.512***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Workplace dem. proposal × Power question	0.017	0.066**	0.004
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Constant	0.218***	0.218***	0.218***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Observations	2,678	2,652	2,686
R^2	0.273	0.304	0.265
Adjusted R^2	0.272	0.303	0.264
Residual Std. Error	0.426 (df = 2674)	0.417 (df = 2648)	0.428 (df = 2682)
F Statistic	333.915*** (df = 3; 2674)	384.822*** (df = 3; 2648)	322.194*** (df = 3; 2682)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

FIGURE S5. Sensitivity Analysis of Sequential Unconfoundedness Assumption Needed for Mediation Analysis



Notes: The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval. Points represent the total correlation of the predictive power of economic treatments and the outcome.

Study 1: Americans Today are Slightly Less Likely to Prefer Union Shops

An alternative (though not necessarily a substitute) form of empowering workers has historically been unions. Do Americans also prefer to work at union shops? Americans have a slight preference away from working at union shops (p = .12) despite slightly recognizing that unions would provide them more power (p = .007). We note that these effects, again, likely provide lower bounds for the "true" union preference effect since we also manipulate many of the benefits that unions would bring to the workplace with respect to workers. Moreover, recent field experimental evidence suggests that workers not only have preferences for union vs. non-union shops in general, but the specific types of benefits they would receive such as professional benefits as well as community (Hertel-Fernandez and Porter 2021). Thus, we caution against interpreting these results as indicating that unions are not viable forms of labor organizations; instead, public opinion research shows that more Americans want to work in union shops than there are actual workers who are unionized (e.g., Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019; Kochan et al. 2019).

Another reason why we estimate small or even negative effects could be because Americans writ large have lost their faith in unions as an important part of the workplace. We provide evidence that this is likely not the case. These AMCEs, while substantively much lower than the AMCEs associated with workplace democracy proposals, mask a great deal of heterogeneity. The results shown in Figure S6 demonstrate that Democrats want to work at union shops and that they believe that union shops would provide them with more power while Republicans believe the reverse nearly symmetrically. Our results suggest that the partisan polarization around unions relative to other workplace democracy proposals might hinder the mass adoption of labor unions relative to the policies explored in this article.

Regression results for Figure S7 can be found in Tables S53 to S64.

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FIGURE S6. Effect of unionization by partisanship.



Notes: Estimates for the treatment effect for each trial where the comparison is between union vs non-union workplaces are ranked by magnitude and generated via causal forests. The thin vertical line represent the estimated causal effect of each treatment with the vertical shaded regions representing the 95% confidence interval. The horizontal shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals of individual level treatment effect estimates.

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FIGURE S7. Interaction effect of different workplace regimes with union membership.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

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Study 1: Objective Class Moderates Support for Workplace Democracy

Workplace democracy preferences might vary by objective class position. We show this variation across occupation, education, and income. We present the plots in the Appendix to save space. Figure S8 shows that blue-collar workers prefer to work at democratic workplaces more than white-collar workers. Additionally, blue-collar workers were more likely to believe that democratic workplaces would empower workers more. Blue and white-collar workers similarly believed that democratized workplaces came with more workplace responsibilities and that they would better solve workplace complaints. These effects were not statistically significant, but they were in the right theoretical direction.

More highly educated workers seem to prefer workplace democracy. Figures S10 and S9 show that more highly educated workers tend to prefer to work at democratized workplaces. They also seem to believe that democratized workplaces will empower workers and better handle complaints while still recognizing that these workplaces will place more responsibilities on workers. However, most of these effects are not statistically significant.

Higher-income respondents generally opposed democratizing workplaces. Figure S11 shows that higher-paid workers strongly oppose working at firms with codetermination and manager elections compared to lower-paid workers, however, higher-paid workers are just as likely to prefer working for firms using ESOPs as lower-paid workers. Interestingly, they were not more likely to believe that democratizing the workplace would empower workers more. Additionally, they were not more likely to think that democratizing the workplace would lead to firms burdening workers with responsibilities or would better handle workplace complaints. All of the results, besides firm preference, were not statistically significant. In sum, we found that objective class seemed to moderate preferences for workplace democracy.

Regression results for Figure S10 are reported in Tables S65 to S88. Regression results for Figure S11 are reported in Tables S89 to S112. Regression results for Figure S12 are reported in Tables S113 to S124. Regression results for Figure S13 are reported in Tables S125 to S134. Regression results for Figure S14 are reported in Tables S135 to S146.

Study 1: Additional Results

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FIGURE S8. Interaction effect of different workplace regimes by industry.



Notes: Estimates for the treatment effect for each trial where the comparison is against private ownership by non-worker shareholders are ranked by magnitude and generated via causal forests. The thin vertical line represent the estimated causal effect of each treatment with the vertical shaded regions representing the 95% confidence interval. The horizontal shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals of individual level treatment effect estimates.

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FIGURE S9. Interaction effect of different workplace regimes by college education.



Notes: Estimates for the treatment effect for each trial where the comparison is against private ownership by non-worker shareholders are ranked by magnitude and generated via causal forests. The thin vertical line represent the estimated causal effect of each treatment with the vertical shaded regions representing the 95% confidence interval. The horizontal shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals of individual level treatment effect estimates.

FIGURE S10. Interaction effect of different workplace regimes by education level.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

FIGURE S11. Interaction effect of different workplace regimes by income level.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

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FIGURE S12. Main effects when subsetting out income conjoint attributes over $200,000.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.
An F-test of the equality of codetermination and employee ownership with public ownership for work preference yields a p-value of 0.062.

FIGURE S13. Main effects when subsetting out income conjoint attributes over $80,000.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

FIGURE S14. Main effects when subsetting to employed respondents and respondents looking for work.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

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FIGURE S15. Effect of different workplace regimes.



Notes: Estimates for the treatment effect for each trial where the comparison is against private ownership by non-worker shareholders are ranked by magnitude and generated via causal forests. The thin vertical line represent the estimated causal effect of each treatment with the vertical shaded regions representing the 95% confidence interval. The horizontal shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals of individual level treatment effect estimates.

STUDY 2

Study 2: Policy knowledge

Table S3 shows that most respondents regardless of policy and condition understood what the workplace democracy policy entailed. There was lower levels of understanding for codetermination, however, the next most selected option was "Codetermination is where workers and managers collectively decide how to run the company." It seems like respondents may have interpreted that answer to mean that workers sit on the board with management to decide the firm's operations.

TABLE S3. Average proportion of correct knowledge about workplace democracy policies.

Policy condition	Experimental condition	Average correct answer	Standard error
Codetermination	Control	63.93%	2.1%
Codetermination	Cost	58.35%	2.15%
Codetermination	Benefit	58.66%	2.14%
Codetermination	Cost and benefit	58.54%	2.12%
Manager elections	Control	78.5%	1.81%
Manager elections	Cost	81.39%	1.68%
Manager elections	Benefit	83.36%	1.62%
Manager elections	Cost and benefit	81.16%	1.68%
ESOPs	Control	83.4%	1.63%
ESOPs	Cost	83.8%	1.59%
ESOPs	Benefit	82.34%	1.63%
ESOPs	Cost and benefit	80.86%	1.7%

Study 2: Policy framing effects were not larger for workplace democracy proposals compared to other proposals

We have shown that policy framing changed a host of attitudinal outcomes related to workplace democracy, however, respondents remained supportive of workplace democracy. We investigate whether workplace democracy attitudes are more vulnerable to change than attitudes towards other policies. Given the relatively low salience of workplace democracy proposals, people may have fewer considerations to draw on when reporting their preferences. In turn, policy frames may have disproportionately large effects on support.

Recall, that we asked respondents to evaluate a ban on fracking and paid family leave. To test whether there were policy differences, we interacted our treatment variables with a dummy variable indicating whether the policy was a workplace democracy proposal (1) or another policy (0). Additionally, we standardize our dependent variables by mean centering and then dividing by the standard deviation at the policy level. This allows for direct comparability.

Table S4 shows that there is little variation in policy framing effects on policy support between workplace democracy proposals and other policies. We will focus on the interaction effects because we are interested if the type of policy substantively changes the policy framing effect. The cost frame interaction effect was 0.07 (p = .11) and benefit frame interaction effect was 0.07 (p = .18). Both estimates are substantively small, suggesting that there is little evidence that policy framing effects are different for workplace democracy compared to other policies.

We also found little difference in policy framing effects on work preferences. Remember that we asked respondents whether they would want to work at a firm with paid family leave. We use the same model as before with work preferences. We again found little difference. The cost frame interaction was -0.09 (p = .19) and the benefit frame interaction was -0.06 (p = .42). In sum, we found little variation in policy framing effects by

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TABLE S4. Comparing policy framing effects between workplace democracy proposals versus other policies - Standardized measure

	Support All policies	Work All policies
Benefit	−0.011	0.107*
	(0.039)	(0.059)
Cost	−0.183***	−0.022
	(0.039)	(0.060)
Both	−0.093**	0.017
	(0.039)	(0.061)
Workplace policy	−0.047	0.053
	(0.036)	(0.049)
Partisan ID (Republican)	−0.606***	−0.416***
	(0.076)	(0.086)
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.405***	−0.249**
	(0.086)	(0.100)
Benefit × Workplace policy	0.069	−0.056
	(0.051)	(0.069)
Cost × Workplace policy	0.083	−0.092
	(0.053)	(0.070)
Both × Workplace policy	0.039	−0.060
	(0.051)	(0.069)
Benefit × Partisan ID	−0.107	−0.057
	(0.086)	(0.104)
Cost × Partisan ID	−0.228**	−0.124
	(0.092)	(0.111)
Both × Partisan ID	−0.219**	−0.249**
	(0.092)	(0.105)
Benefit × Ideology	0.014	0.021
	(0.098)	(0.117)
Cost × Ideology	0.241**	0.111
	(0.103)	(0.128)
Both × Ideology	0.065	0.123
	(0.104)	(0.122)
Constant	0.071**	−0.026
	(0.028)	(0.043)
N	10,690	8,552
R^2	0.127	0.059
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.057

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.

We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.

The workplace policy variable is 1 when the policy is related to workplace democracy and 0 otherwise.

We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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policy issue.

Study 2: There is little evidence for heterogeneous policy framing effects across attitudinal moderators

We now investigate whether policy framing effects vary depending on the following moderators: support for democracy, position in the workplace hierarchy, working class identity strength, and social dominance orientation. We build on our original analysis by interacting each moderator with each treatment condition in one model. This model, though less parsimonious, guards against potential potentially statistically significant interactions that are a function of another interaction. We also tested whether working class identity moderated policy framing effects in another model by subsetting to only working class identifiers. We report all of these models in the Appendix in Table S5 and S6 in the interest of space.

We found little evidence suggesting that policy framing effects varied according to our moderators. For policy support, most of our interaction effects are close to zero with moderately sized standard errors. We find a similar pattern with respondents' work preferences. In short, policy framing effects show little variation conditional on moderators.

We found some evidence suggesting that policy framing effects vary depending on working class identity strength. The interaction effects suggest that strong working class identifiers may respond more positively to the benefit frame and are less affected by the cost frame, but the estimates are noisy. Future researchers will have to recruit larger samples to more carefully explore these moderators.

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TABLE S5. Investigating heterogeneous policy framing effects - Standardized measure

	Support	Work
	Workplace democracy policies	
Benefit	0.054* (0.031)	0.050 (0.033)
Cost	−0.098*** (0.032)	−0.113*** (0.034)
Both	−0.060* (0.032)	−0.044 (0.033)
Support for democracy	−1.601*** (0.141)	−0.958*** (0.146)
Position in workplace	0.210*** (0.072)	0.363*** (0.076)
Class ID strength	0.136 (0.146)	0.198 (0.150)
Social dominance orientation	−0.758*** (0.158)	−0.607*** (0.166)
Partisan ID (Republican)	−0.391*** (0.081)	−0.301*** (0.088)
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.258*** (0.094)	−0.168* (0.101)
Benefit × Support for democracy	0.078 (0.175)	0.087 (0.188)
Cost × Support for democracy	0.153 (0.187)	−0.069 (0.196)
Both × Support for democracy	0.217 (0.180)	0.230 (0.185)
Benefit × Position in workplace	−0.014 (0.091)	−0.078 (0.097)
Cost × Position in workplace	0.073 (0.093)	−0.011 (0.096)
Both × Position in workplace	0.030 (0.092)	0.017 (0.094)
Benefit × Class ID strength	0.163 (0.183)	0.004 (0.193)
Cost × Class ID strength	0.084 (0.185)	0.219 (0.195)
Both × Class ID strength	0.224 (0.192)	0.231 (0.192)
Benefit × Social dominance orientation	−0.230 (0.203)	0.032 (0.212)
Cost × Social dominance orientation	0.062 (0.202)	0.263 (0.206)
Both × Social dominance orientation	0.165 (0.204)	0.253 (0.209)
Benefit × Partisan ID	−0.109 (0.104)	−0.056 (0.117)
Cost × Partisan ID	−0.220* (0.113)	−0.077 (0.119)
Both × Partisan ID	−0.293*** (0.110)	−0.276** (0.118)
Benefit × Ideology	0.075 (0.117)	0.036 (0.131)
Cost × Ideology	0.150 (0.132)	−0.024 (0.140)
Both × Ideology	0.171 (0.129)	0.126 (0.137)
Constant	0.026 (0.027)	0.026 (0.028)
N	6,414	6,414
R^2	0.190	0.109
Adjusted R^2	0.186	0.105

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.

We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.

We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.

We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S6. Investigating heterogeneous policy framing effects among the working class - Standardized measure

	Support Workplace dem. policies	Work Workplace dem. policies
Benefit	0.081 (0.052)	0.043 (0.057)
Cost	−0.122** (0.053)	−0.138** (0.055)
Both	−0.090* (0.054)	−0.067 (0.055)
Support for democracy	−1.374*** (0.235)	−0.633** (0.250)
Position in workplace	0.049 (0.127)	0.210 (0.136)
Class ID strength	0.228 (0.232)	0.287 (0.238)
Social dominance orientation	−0.794*** (0.280)	−0.512* (0.293)
Partisan ID (Republican)	−0.153 (0.147)	−0.159 (0.164)
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.326* (0.170)	−0.263 (0.189)
Benefit × Support for democracy	0.160 (0.294)	−0.078 (0.332)
Cost × Support for democracy	0.342 (0.304)	0.232 (0.321)
Both × Support for democracy	0.348 (0.295)	0.079 (0.305)
Benefit × Position in workplace	0.119 (0.150)	−0.118 (0.174)
Cost × Position in workplace	0.129 (0.160)	0.009 (0.169)
Both × Position in workplace	0.116 (0.172)	−0.024 (0.171)
Benefit × Class ID strength	0.472 (0.297)	0.323 (0.321)
Cost × Class ID strength	0.094 (0.320)	0.247 (0.329)
Both × Class ID strength	−0.165 (0.310)	0.044 (0.312)
Benefit × Social dominance orientation	−0.432 (0.337)	−0.514 (0.370)
Cost × Social dominance orientation	−0.161 (0.332)	0.228 (0.342)
Both × Social dominance orientation	0.178 (0.357)	0.284 (0.364)
Benefit × Partisan ID	0.086 (0.179)	0.199 (0.238)
Cost × Partisan ID	−0.396* (0.212)	−0.324 (0.221)
Both × Partisan ID	−0.301 (0.205)	−0.089 (0.231)
Benefit × Ideology	−0.130 (0.218)	−0.124 (0.281)
Cost × Ideology	0.246 (0.244)	0.172 (0.250)
Both × Ideology	0.051 (0.244)	−0.134 (0.271)
Constant	0.016 (0.043)	0.038 (0.045)
N	2,505	2,505
R^2	0.158	0.086
Adjusted R^2	0.148	0.075

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.

We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.

We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.

We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

Working class respondents only in these models.

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Study 2: Acquiescence bias

Average support for each policy by policy order and experimental condition. We can see there is no consistent increase in support for workplace democracy as policy order increases.

TABLE S7. Checking Study 2 for acquiescence bias.

Policy condition	Policy order	Experimental condition	Average support	Standard error
Codetermination	First	Control	65.79%	2.37%
Codetermination	Second	Control	68.16%	2.1%
Codetermination	Third	Control	69.37%	2.18%
Codetermination	First	Cost	72.38%	1.86%
Codetermination	Second	Cost	61.58%	2.35%
Codetermination	Third	Cost	61.67%	2.44%
Codetermination	First	Benefit	73.38%	2.06%
Codetermination	Second	Benefit	69.8%	2.36%
Codetermination	Third	Benefit	70.43%	2.24%
Codetermination	First	Cost and benefit	72.81%	2.31%
Codetermination	Second	Cost and benefit	65.56%	2.29%
Codetermination	Third	Cost and benefit	59.66%	2.29%
Manager elections	First	Control	50.99%	2.63%
Manager elections	Second	Control	54.24%	2.4%
Manager elections	Third	Control	58.52%	2.59%
Manager elections	First	Cost	45.04%	2.65%
Manager elections	Second	Cost	52.91%	2.48%
Manager elections	Third	Cost	55.28%	2.46%
Manager elections	First	Benefit	55.14%	2.54%
Manager elections	Second	Benefit	59.99%	2.57%
Manager elections	Third	Benefit	58.11%	2.49%
Manager elections	First	Cost and benefit	52.47%	2.45%
Manager elections	Second	Cost and benefit	56.17%	2.6%
Manager elections	Third	Cost and benefit	54.02%	2.44%
ESOPs	First	Control	59.58%	2.31%
ESOPs	Second	Control	64.98%	2.15%
ESOPs	Third	Control	69.11%	2.05%
ESOPs	First	Cost	57.9%	2.21%
ESOPs	Second	Cost	64.37%	1.99%
ESOPs	Third	Cost	62.16%	2.21%
ESOPs	First	Benefit	63.5%	2.2%
ESOPs	Second	Benefit	62.59%	2.13%
ESOPs	Third	Benefit	65.46%	2.29%
ESOPs	First	Cost and benefit	59.36%	2.18%
ESOPs	Second	Cost and benefit	62.98%	2.19%
ESOPs	Third	Cost and benefit	59.22%	2.4%

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STUDY 1: EXTENDED APPENDIX

Study 1: Example conjoint profile comparison

TABLE S8. Example of a Conjoint Profile

	Transportation and warehouse Firm 3	Transportation and warehouse Firm 4
Hours of Work	60 hours a week	60 hours a week
Racial Diversity Practices	All people of color owned	Majority people of color owned
Type of Task	Largely repetitive work	Largely creative work
Gender Diversity Practices	Majority-men owned	Majority-men owned
Paid Sick Leave	No paid sick leave	No paid sick leave
Parental Leave	No parental leave policy	No parental leave policy
Retirement Matching	Matches 25% of 401k contributions	Matches 75% of 401k contributions
Firm Size	1,000 co-workers	1,000 co-workers
Health Insurance Contribution	Employers pay 50%	Employers pays 50%
Work with Others	Mix of individual and team work	Mix of individual and team work
Corporate Social Responsibility	Commitment to corporate social responsibility	No corporate social responsibility
Corporate Governance Structure	Privately owned by one individual	Workers sit on the corporate board
Workplace Conditions Work From Home	Somewhat friendly and supportive Cannot work from home	Generally unfriendly and unsupportive Cannot work from home
Location	Located in your city	Located in your city
Unionization	Unionized	Not unionized
Job Training Program	Ex-felons training	Ex-felons training
Firm's Political Contributions	Donates to both Democrats and Republicans	Donates to both Democrats and Republicans

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Study 1: Sample Descriptives

TABLE S9. Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N
Male	0.440	0.497	1,002
Female	0.560	0.497	1,002
4-year college	0.228	0.419	1,002
Post-grad	0.142	0.349	1,002
High school graduate	0.227	0.419	1,002
2-year college	0.130	0.336	1,002
Some college	0.250	0.433	1,002
No HS	0.025	0.156	1,002
White	0.762	0.426	1,002
Hispanic	0.074	0.262	1,002
Mixed	0.008	0.089	1,002
Black	0.103	0.304	1,002
Native American	0.010	0.099	1,002
Asian	0.028	0.165	1,002
Other	0.023	0.150	1,002
Retired	0.273	0.446	1,002
Part-time	0.089	0.285	1,002
Unemployed	0.060	0.237	1,002
Full-time	0.353	0.478	1,002
Permanently disabled	0.086	0.280	1,002
Homemaker	0.056	0.230	1,002
Temporarily laid off	0.039	0.194	1,002
Student	0.021	0.143	1,002
Not a union member	0.927	0.260	1,002
Union member	0.073	0.260	1,002

Study 1: Ethics

We asked all respondents to consent to the study before beginning our first survey. If they did not consent, then they could not complete the survey. We paid YouGov to recruit respondents. YouGov pays respondents in "points," which respondents can later exchange for cash or gift cards. Our sample was diverse across race and ethnicity, education, and gender.

We asked all respondents to consent to the study before beginning our second survey. If they did not consent, then they could not complete the survey. We paid Lucid to recruit respondents. Our sample was diverse across race and ethnicity, education, and gender.

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Study 1: Conjoint attributes

TABLE S10. Conjoint Attributes and Levels

Attributes	Values
Corporate Governance Structure	Workers sit on the corporate board
	Workers elect their managers
	Workers are shareholders
	Privately owned by non-worker shareholders
	Publicly owned by shareholders
	Privately owned by one individual
Firm Size	50 co-workers
	250 co-workers
	500 co-workers
	1,000 co-workers
	5,000 co-workers
Paid Sick Leave	No paid sick leave
	Two weeks paid sick leave days
	Unlimited paid sick leave days
Health Insurance Contribution	Employers pays 50%
	Employers pays 75%
	Employers pays 100%
Hours of Work	40 hours a week
	50 hours a week
	60 hours a week
	70 hours a week
	80 hours a week
Racial Diversity Practices	All people of color owned
	Majority people of color owned
	Majority white owned
	All White owned
Gender Diversity Practices	Women owned
	Majority-women owned
	Majority-men owned
	Men owned

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TABLE S11. Conjoint Attributes and Levels

Attributes	Values
Corporate Social Responsibility	No corporate social responsibility
	Commitment to corporate social responsibility
Parental Leave	No parental leave policy
	Generous parental leave policy
Type of Task	Largely repetitive work
	Mix of repetitive and creative work
	Largely creative work
Work with Others	Mostly working alone
	Mix of individual and team work
	Mostly team work
Retirement Matching	Matches 100% of 401k contributions
	Matches 75% of 401k contributions
	Matches 50% of 401k contributions
	Matches 25% of 401k contributions
	Matches 0% of 401k contributions
Location	Located in your city
	Located in a different city
	Located in a different city but pays for relocation
Unionization	Unionized
	Not unionized
Workplace Conditions	Generally friendly and supportive
	Somewhat friendly and supportive
	Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive
	Generally unfriendly and unsupportive
Job Training Program	Veterans training
	Mentally-disabled training
	Ex-felons training
	No special job training program
Work from Home	Primarily work from home
	Sometimes work from home
	Cannot work from home
Firm's Political Contributions	Primarily donates to Democrats
	Donates to both Democrats and Republicans
	Primarily donates to Republicans
Salary	$30,000 to $300,000 in $10,000 increments

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Study 1: Replicating our results with log-transformed income conjoint attribute

TABLE S12. Results replicating main results with log transformed income conjoint attribute

	Work	Power	Responsibilities	Complaints
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Privately owned by one individual	0.026	0.008	0.010	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.057***	0.025	0.022	0.036*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Workers are shareholder	0.098***	0.106***	0.034*	0.089***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.074***	0.123***	0.036*	0.070***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Workers elect their managers	0.045**	0.094***	0.020	0.033*
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.043***	−0.045***	−0.055***	−0.056***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.049***	−0.038***	−0.012	−0.042***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Union firm	−0.017	0.032***	−0.034***	−0.003
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income (logged)	0.150***	0.070***	0.098***	0.068***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	−1.526***	−0.568***	−0.830***	−0.577***
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.115)
N	8,016	8,016	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.091	0.049	0.035	0.059
Adjusted R^2	0.086	0.044	0.029	0.053

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We fielded the survey on YouGov Blue the week of June 29th, 2020.

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Study 1: Interaction effect of different workplace regimes with partisanship

Regression results for Figure S16 in Tables S147 to S158.

FIGURE S16. Interaction effect of different workplace regimes with partisanship.



Notes: Estimates generated via Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
The dark shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval while the light shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

Study 1: Table versions of plots

TABLE S13. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.026	0.008
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.057***	0.026
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Workers are shareholders	0.099***	0.107***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.074***	0.123***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Workers elect their managers	0.045**	0.095***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.001	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	0.029*	−0.005
	(0.016)	(0.017)
500 co-workers	0.008	−0.031*
	(0.017)	(0.018)
1,000 co-workers	−0.005	−0.001
	(0.017)	(0.018)
5,000 co-workers	−0.010	−0.056***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.042***	−0.045***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.049***	−0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S14. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.001	−0.013
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Majority-women owned	0.019	−0.003
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Women owned	0.023	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Employer pays 75%	0.044***	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Employer pays 100%	0.069***	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.013)
50 hours	−0.053***	−0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
60 hours	−0.092***	−0.064***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
70 hours	−0.128***	−0.086***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
80 hours	−0.183***	−0.100***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Veterans training	0.089***	0.058***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mentally-disabled training	0.053***	0.049***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.022	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S15. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city	−0.037***	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.017	0.013
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.050***	0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.090***	0.047***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Generous parental leave policy	0.030***	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Majority white owned	0.055***	0.046***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Majority people of color owned	0.057***	0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
All people of color owned	0.049***	0.055***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.010	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.042**	0.058***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.060***	0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.072***	0.035**
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S16. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$40,000 per year	0.094**	0.098**
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$50,000 per year	0.133***	0.068*
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$60,000 per year	0.103***	0.069*
	(0.036)	(0.040)
$70,000 per year	0.213***	0.123***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$80,000 per year	0.186***	0.131***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$90,000 per year	0.179***	0.096**
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$100,000 per year	0.226***	0.140***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$110,000 per year	0.250***	0.139***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.253***	0.131***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$130,000 per year	0.290***	0.185***
	(0.038)	(0.042)
$140,000 per year	0.280***	0.168***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$150,000 per year	0.289***	0.146***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S17. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$160,000 per year	0.266***	0.126***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$170,000 per year	0.247***	0.203***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$180,000 per year	0.302***	0.176***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$190,000 per year	0.321***	0.135***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$200,000 per year	0.343***	0.168***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$210,000 per year	0.284***	0.105***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$220,000 per year	0.328***	0.185***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$230,000 per year	0.352***	0.201***
	(0.041)	(0.043)
$240,000 per year	0.374***	0.228***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$250,000 per year	0.321***	0.220***
	(0.036)	(0.038)
$260,000 per year	0.378***	0.179***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$270,000 per year	0.364***	0.202***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S18. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$280,000 per year	0.360***	0.178***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$290,000 per year	0.367***	0.152***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$300,000 per year	0.403***	0.214***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.022*	0.037***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Largely creative work	0.012	0.038***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.018	0.032***
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Sometimes work from home	0.022*	0.024*
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Primarily works from home	0.052***	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mix of individual and team work	0.017	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mostly team work	0.006	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S19. Replicating Figure 3 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.007	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.102***	0.101***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.106***	0.118***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	−0.010	0.110**
	(0.044)	(0.048)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.093	0.052
Adjusted R^2	0.085	0.044
Residual Std. Error (df = 7942)	0.478	0.489
F Statistic (df = 73; 7942)	11.191***	6.019***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S20. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.010	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.019	0.036*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Workers are shareholders	0.034*	0.089***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.036*	0.070***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Workers elect their managers	0.021	0.033*
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.010	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	−0.002	0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)
500 co-workers	−0.019	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.017)
1,000 co-workers	−0.034*	−0.019
	(0.018)	(0.017)
5,000 co-workers	−0.016	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.054***	−0.055***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.012	−0.042***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S21. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.002	0.032**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.015	0.050***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Women owned	−0.002	0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Employer pays 75%	0.027**	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Employer pays 100%	0.028**	0.025*
	(0.013)	(0.013)
50 hours	−0.009	−0.044**
	(0.018)	(0.018)
60 hours	−0.002	−0.068***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
70 hours	−0.008	−0.087***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
80 hours	−0.022	−0.117***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Veterans training	0.070***	0.073***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mentally-disabled training	0.053***	0.057***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.006	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S22. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.018	−0.010
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.020	0.053***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.041***	0.073***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Generous parental leave policy	0.028**	0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Majority white owned	0.049***	0.042***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Majority people of color owned	0.036**	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
All people of color owned	0.034**	0.036**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.013	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.012	0.056***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.028*	0.055***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.054***	0.056***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S23. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$40,000 per year	0.054	0.012
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$50,000 per year	0.045	0.052
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$60,000 per year	0.105***	0.061
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$70,000 per year	0.106**	0.117***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
$80,000 per year	0.071*	0.079**
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$90,000 per year	0.067*	0.080*
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$100,000 per year	0.121***	0.119***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$110,000 per year	0.096**	0.114***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.116***	0.121***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$130,000 per year	0.145***	0.096**
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$140,000 per year	0.171***	0.130***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$150,000 per year	0.172***	0.138***
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S24. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$160,000 per year	0.148***	0.126***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$170,000 per year	0.146***	0.129***
	(0.041)	(0.040)
$180,000 per year	0.152***	0.121***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$190,000 per year	0.174***	0.152***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$200,000 per year	0.197***	0.111***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$210,000 per year	0.181***	0.131***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$220,000 per year	0.164***	0.163***
	(0.040)	(0.040)
$230,000 per year	0.223***	0.158***
	(0.042)	(0.044)
$240,000 per year	0.228***	0.200***
	(0.039)	(0.039)
$250,000 per year	0.218***	0.163***
	(0.039)	(0.039)
$260,000 per year	0.217***	0.154***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$270,000 per year	0.218***	0.159***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S25. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$280,000 per year	0.173***	0.135***
	(0.041)	(0.040)
$290,000 per year	0.249***	0.167***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$300,000 per year	0.274***	0.170***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.033**	0.043***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Largely creative work	0.048***	0.044***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.035***	−0.004
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Sometimes work from home	0.002	−0.008
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Primarily works from home	0.016	0.038***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.006	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Mostly team work	−0.029**	−0.00004
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S26. Replicating Figure 3 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.014	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.047***	0.150***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.059***	0.170***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Constant	0.185***	0.111**
	(0.047)	(0.047)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.037	0.060
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.051
Residual Std. Error (df = 7942)	0.493	0.487
F Statistic (df = 73; 7942)	4.202***	6.952***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Replicating Figure 3

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TABLE S27. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.033*	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.046**	0.033
	(0.019)	(0.021)
Workers are shareholders	0.094***	0.103***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.078***	0.143***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Workers elect their managers	0.043**	0.112***
	(0.020)	(0.022)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.002	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)
250 co-workers	0.029	−0.0002
	(0.019)	(0.019)
500 co-workers	0.022	−0.026
	(0.018)	(0.019)
1,000 co-workers	−0.005	−0.001
	(0.019)	(0.021)
5,000 co-workers	−0.006	−0.045**
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.030*	−0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.046***	−0.040**
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Replicating Figure S1

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TABLE S28. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.003	−0.004
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Majority-women owned	0.028*	−0.004
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Women owned	0.031*	−0.006
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Employer pays 75%	0.043***	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Employer pays 100%	0.077***	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)
50 hours	−0.048**	−0.047**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
60 hours	−0.095***	−0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.018)
70 hours	−0.137***	−0.085***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
80 hours	−0.179***	−0.082***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Veterans training	0.084***	0.047**
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Mentally-disabled training	0.055***	0.045**
	(0.016)	(0.018)
No special job training program	0.018	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S29. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
Located in a different city	−0.023	0.029**
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.008	0.016
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.052***	0.035**
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.092***	0.038**
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Generous parental leave policy	0.038***	0.018
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority white owned	0.055***	0.043**
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Majority people of color owned	0.069***	0.051***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
All people of color owned	0.050***	0.044**
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.002	0.028
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.048**	0.052***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.062***	0.070***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.077***	0.040**
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S30. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
$40,000 per year	0.111***	0.090*
	(0.039)	(0.046)
$50,000 per year	0.161***	0.064
	(0.043)	(0.048)
$60,000 per year	0.088**	0.032
	(0.039)	(0.044)
$70,000 per year	0.231***	0.106**
	(0.042)	(0.045)
$80,000 per year	0.209***	0.107**
	(0.040)	(0.045)
$90,000 per year	0.173***	0.072
	(0.041)	(0.047)
$100,000 per year	0.240***	0.125***
	(0.042)	(0.044)
$110,000 per year	0.234***	0.124***
	(0.040)	(0.045)
$120,000 per year	0.266***	0.117**
	(0.044)	(0.045)
$130,000 per year	0.301***	0.193***
	(0.046)	(0.048)
$140,000 per year	0.272***	0.123***
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$150,000 per year	0.282***	0.101**
	(0.043)	(0.045)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S31. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
$160,000 per year	0.287***	0.115**
	(0.041)	(0.046)
$170,000 per year	0.271***	0.204***
	(0.040)	(0.044)
$180,000 per year	0.310***	0.140***
	(0.042)	(0.047)
$190,000 per year	0.335***	0.118***
	(0.041)	(0.045)
$200,000 per year	0.360***	0.145***
	(0.041)	(0.047)
$210,000 per year	0.304***	0.103**
	(0.042)	(0.044)
$220,000 per year	0.334***	0.163***
	(0.041)	(0.046)
$230,000 per year	0.353***	0.179***
	(0.043)	(0.046)
$240,000 per year	0.411***	0.188***
	(0.040)	(0.046)
$250,000 per year	0.329***	0.200***
	(0.039)	(0.044)
$260,000 per year	0.370***	0.152***
	(0.041)	(0.045)
$270,000 per year	0.361***	0.175***
	(0.042)	(0.045)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S32. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
$280,000 per year	0.354***	0.161***
	(0.041)	(0.046)
$290,000 per year	0.393***	0.141***
	(0.040)	(0.044)
$300,000 per year	0.407***	0.186***
	(0.041)	(0.046)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.028*	0.039**
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Largely creative work	0.014	0.041***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Unionized	−0.022*	0.030**
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Sometimes work from home	0.018	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Primarily works from home	0.050***	0.030**
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mix of individual and team work	0.004	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mostly team work	0.002	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S33. Replicating Figure S1 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.012	0.0002
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.092***	0.087***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.100***	0.113***
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant	−0.045	0.110*
	(0.052)	(0.057)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.094	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.086	0.040
Residual Std. Error (df = 7942)	0.478	0.490
F Statistic (df = 73; 7942)	11.334***	5.633***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S34. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.010	0.024
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.016	0.045**
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Workers are shareholders	0.030	0.098***
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.042*	0.086***
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Workers elect their managers	0.019	0.033
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.009	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	−0.007	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.020)
500 co-workers	−0.020	−0.005
	(0.019)	(0.018)
1,000 co-workers	−0.033	−0.027
	(0.021)	(0.020)
5,000 co-workers	−0.017	−0.023
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.046***	−0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.006	−0.039***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S35. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.008	0.033*
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Majority-women owned	0.022	0.048***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Women owned	−0.003	0.033*
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Employer pays 75%	0.029*	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Employer pays 100%	0.043***	0.030*
	(0.015)	(0.016)
50 hours	−0.009	−0.047**
	(0.020)	(0.020)
60 hours	0.004	−0.063***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
70 hours	−0.013	−0.092***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
80 hours	−0.015	−0.104***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Veterans training	0.070***	0.064***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Mentally-disabled training	0.053***	0.057***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
No special job training program	0.001	0.016
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S36. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city	−0.001	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.029*	0.0003
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.028*	0.062***
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.042***	0.067***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generous parental leave policy	0.032**	0.029**
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Majority white owned	0.049***	0.048***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Majority people of color owned	0.039**	0.045**
	(0.018)	(0.018)
All people of color owned	0.030*	0.045**
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.011	0.014
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.011	0.057***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.026	0.061***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.056***	0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S37. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$40,000 per year	0.059	0.028
	(0.046)	(0.044)
$50,000 per year	0.037	0.081*
	(0.046)	(0.047)
$60,000 per year	0.082*	0.054
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$70,000 per year	0.100**	0.120***
	(0.046)	(0.045)
$80,000 per year	0.079*	0.083*
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$90,000 per year	0.049	0.068
	(0.046)	(0.046)
$100,000 per year	0.092**	0.093**
	(0.046)	(0.045)
$110,000 per year	0.064	0.111**
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$120,000 per year	0.095**	0.126***
	(0.045)	(0.045)
$130,000 per year	0.177***	0.104**
	(0.051)	(0.049)
$140,000 per year	0.151***	0.110**
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$150,000 per year	0.116**	0.121***
	(0.046)	(0.043)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S38. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$160,000 per year	0.149***	0.147***
	(0.045)	(0.045)
$170,000 per year	0.155***	0.174***
	(0.046)	(0.044)
$180,000 per year	0.128***	0.130***
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$190,000 per year	0.154***	0.153***
	(0.045)	(0.043)
$200,000 per year	0.205***	0.100**
	(0.049)	(0.047)
$210,000 per year	0.173***	0.125***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
$220,000 per year	0.191***	0.165***
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$230,000 per year	0.211***	0.159***
	(0.046)	(0.046)
$240,000 per year	0.214***	0.183***
	(0.045)	(0.043)
$250,000 per year	0.201***	0.162***
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$260,000 per year	0.210***	0.146***
	(0.045)	(0.044)
$270,000 per year	0.219***	0.166***
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S39. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$280,000 per year	0.150***	0.125***
	(0.047)	(0.042)
$290,000 per year	0.251***	0.182***
	(0.045)	(0.043)
$300,000 per year	0.254***	0.160***
	(0.045)	(0.046)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.030*	0.046***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Largely creative work	0.054***	0.050***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unionized	−0.036***	−0.003
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Sometimes work from home	0.002	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Primarily works from home	0.017	0.036**
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.014	−0.003
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Mostly team work	−0.028*	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S40. Replicating Figure S1 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.004	0.043**
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.042**	0.148***
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.054***	0.168***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Constant	0.175***	0.074
	(0.055)	(0.059)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.039	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.049
Residual Std. Error (df = 7942)	0.492	0.487
F Statistic (df = 73; 7942)	4.368***	6.697***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Replicating Figure S2

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TABLE S41. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for work results

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Privately owned by non-worker shareholders	0.44	0.01
Privately owned by one individual	0.46	0.01
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.49	0.01
Workers are shareholders	0.53	0.01
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.51	0.01
Workers elect their managers	0.48	0.01
No corporate social responsibility	0.49	0.01
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.48	0.01
50 co-workers	0.48	0.01
250 co-workers	0.51	0.01
500 co-workers	0.48	0.01
1,000 co-workers	0.47	0.01
5,000 co-workers	0.48	0.01
Donates to both Democrats and Republicans	0.52	0.01
Primarily donates to Democrats	0.47	0.01
Primarily donates to Republicans	0.47	0.01
Men owned	0.47	0.01
Majority-men owned	0.47	0.01
Majority-women owned	0.49	0.01
Women owned	0.50	0.01
Employer pays 50%	0.44	0.01
Employer pays 75%	0.49	0.01
Employer pays 100%	0.52	0.01
40 hours	0.57	0.01
50 hours	0.52	0.01
60 hours	0.49	0.01
70 hours	0.45	0.01
80 hours	0.40	0.01
Ex-felons training	0.44	0.01
Veterans training	0.53	0.01
Mentally-disabled training	0.49	0.01
No special job training program	0.47	0.01
Located in your city	0.50	0.01
Located in a different city	0.47	0.01
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.49	0.01
No paid sick leave	0.44	0.01
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.49	0.01
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.53	0.01
No parental leave policy	0.47	0.01
Generous parental leave policy	0.50	0.01
All white owned	0.45	0.01
Majority white owned	0.50	0.01
Majority people of color owned	0.50	0.01
All people of color owned	0.50	0.01

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TABLE S42. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for work results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Matches 0% of 401k contributions	0.45	0.01
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.45	0.01
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.49	0.01
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.51	0.01
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.52	0.01
$30,000 per year	0.22	0.02
$40,000 per year	0.32	0.03
$50,000 per year	0.35	0.03
$60,000 per year	0.32	0.03
$70,000 per year	0.43	0.03
$80,000 per year	0.40	0.03
$90,000 per year	0.40	0.03
$100,000 per year	0.45	0.03
$110,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$120,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$130,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$140,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$150,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$160,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$170,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$180,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$190,000 per year	0.53	0.03
$200,000 per year	0.56	0.03
$210,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$220,000 per year	0.54	0.03
$230,000 per year	0.57	0.03
$240,000 per year	0.59	0.03
$250,000 per year	0.53	0.03
$260,000 per year	0.59	0.03
$270,000 per year	0.57	0.03
$280,000 per year	0.58	0.03
$290,000 per year	0.59	0.03
$300,000 per year	0.61	0.03
Largely repetitive work	0.48	0.01
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.49	0.01
Largely creative work	0.49	0.01
Not unionized	0.49	0.01
Unionized	0.47	0.01
Cannot work from home	0.46	0.01
Sometimes work from home	0.48	0.01
Primarily works from home	0.51	0.01
Mostly working alone	0.48	0.01
Mix of individual and team work	0.50	0.01
Mostly team work	0.48	0.01

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TABLE S43. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for work results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Generally unfriendly and unsupportive	0.43	0.01
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.44	0.01
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.53	0.01
Generally friendly and supportive	0.54	0.01

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TABLE S44. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for power results

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Privately owned by non-worker shareholders	0.43	0.01
Privately owned by one individual	0.43	0.01
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.45	0.01
Workers are shareholders	0.53	0.01
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.55	0.01
Workers elect their managers	0.52	0.01
No corporate social responsibility	0.48	0.01
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.49	0.01
50 co-workers	0.51	0.01
250 co-workers	0.50	0.01
500 co-workers	0.47	0.01
1,000 co-workers	0.50	0.01
5,000 co-workers	0.45	0.01
Donates to both Democrats and Republicans	0.52	0.01
Primarily donates to Democrats	0.47	0.01
Primarily donates to Republicans	0.47	0.01
Men owned	0.49	0.01
Majority-men owned	0.48	0.01
Majority-women owned	0.49	0.01
Women owned	0.49	0.01
Employer pays 50%	0.48	0.01
Employer pays 75%	0.48	0.01
Employer pays 100%	0.50	0.01
40 hours	0.55	0.01
50 hours	0.49	0.01
60 hours	0.48	0.01
70 hours	0.46	0.01
80 hours	0.45	0.01
Ex-felons training	0.45	0.01
Veterans training	0.51	0.01
Mentally-disabled training	0.51	0.01
No special job training program	0.48	0.01
Located in your city	0.48	0.01
Located in a different city	0.49	0.01
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.49	0.01
No paid sick leave	0.46	0.01
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.50	0.01
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.50	0.01
No parental leave policy	0.48	0.01
Generous parental leave policy	0.50	0.01
All white owned	0.45	0.01
Majority white owned	0.49	0.01
Majority people of color owned	0.49	0.01
All people of color owned	0.51	0.01

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TABLE S45. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for power results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Matches 0% of 401k contributions	0.45	0.01
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.47	0.01
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.51	0.01
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.51	0.01
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.49	0.01
$30,000 per year	0.34	0.03
$40,000 per year	0.45	0.03
$50,000 per year	0.41	0.03
$60,000 per year	0.41	0.03
$70,000 per year	0.46	0.03
$80,000 per year	0.46	0.03
$90,000 per year	0.44	0.03
$100,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$110,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$120,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$130,000 per year	0.53	0.03
$140,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$150,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$160,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$170,000 per year	0.54	0.03
$180,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$190,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$200,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$210,000 per year	0.43	0.03
$220,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$230,000 per year	0.53	0.03
$240,000 per year	0.56	0.03
$250,000 per year	0.55	0.03
$260,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$270,000 per year	0.53	0.03
$280,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$290,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$300,000 per year	0.54	0.03
Largely repetitive work	0.47	0.01
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.50	0.01
Largely creative work	0.50	0.01
Not unionized	0.47	0.01
Unionized	0.50	0.01
Cannot work from home	0.47	0.01
Sometimes work from home	0.50	0.01
Primarily works from home	0.49	0.01
Mostly working alone	0.48	0.01
Mix of individual and team work	0.50	0.01
Mostly team work	0.48	0.01

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TABLE S46. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for power results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Generally unfriendly and unsupportive	0.43	0.01
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.43	0.01
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.53	0.01
Generally friendly and supportive	0.55	0.01

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TABLE S47. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for responsibility results

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Privately owned by non-worker shareholders	0.47	0.01
Privately owned by one individual	0.48	0.01
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.48	0.01
Workers are shareholders	0.50	0.01
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.50	0.01
Workers elect their managers	0.49	0.01
No corporate social responsibility	0.48	0.01
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.49	0.01
50 co-workers	0.50	0.01
250 co-workers	0.50	0.01
500 co-workers	0.48	0.01
1,000 co-workers	0.47	0.01
5,000 co-workers	0.49	0.01
Donates to both Democrats and Republicans	0.51	0.01
Primarily donates to Democrats	0.45	0.01
Primarily donates to Republicans	0.50	0.01
Men owned	0.48	0.01
Majority-men owned	0.49	0.01
Majority-women owned	0.50	0.01
Women owned	0.48	0.01
Employer pays 50%	0.47	0.01
Employer pays 75%	0.50	0.01
Employer pays 100%	0.50	0.01
40 hours	0.50	0.01
50 hours	0.49	0.01
60 hours	0.50	0.01
70 hours	0.49	0.01
80 hours	0.47	0.01
Ex-felons training	0.46	0.01
Veterans training	0.53	0.01
Mentally-disabled training	0.51	0.01
No special job training program	0.46	0.01
Located in your city	0.48	0.01
Located in a different city	0.48	0.01
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.50	0.01
No paid sick leave	0.47	0.01
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.49	0.01
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.51	0.01
No parental leave policy	0.47	0.01
Generous parental leave policy	0.50	0.01
All white owned	0.46	0.01
Majority white owned	0.51	0.01
Majority people of color owned	0.49	0.01
All people of color owned	0.49	0.01

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TABLE S48. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for responsibility results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Matches 0% of 401k contributions	0.47	0.01
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.48	0.01
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.48	0.01
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.50	0.01
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.52	0.01
$30,000 per year	0.34	0.03
$40,000 per year	0.39	0.03
$50,000 per year	0.38	0.03
$60,000 per year	0.44	0.03
$70,000 per year	0.44	0.03
$80,000 per year	0.41	0.03
$90,000 per year	0.40	0.03
$100,000 per year	0.46	0.03
$110,000 per year	0.44	0.03
$120,000 per year	0.46	0.03
$130,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$140,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$150,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$160,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$170,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$180,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$190,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$200,000 per year	0.53	0.03
$210,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$220,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$230,000 per year	0.56	0.03
$240,000 per year	0.56	0.03
$250,000 per year	0.55	0.03
$260,000 per year	0.55	0.03
$270,000 per year	0.55	0.03
$280,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$290,000 per year	0.59	0.03
$300,000 per year	0.60	0.03
Largely repetitive work	0.46	0.01
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.49	0.01
Largely creative work	0.51	0.01
Not unionized	0.51	0.01
Unionized	0.47	0.01
Cannot work from home	0.48	0.01
Sometimes work from home	0.48	0.01
Primarily works from home	0.50	0.01
Mostly working alone	0.50	0.01
Mix of individual and team work	0.49	0.01
Mostly team work	0.47	0.01

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TABLE S49. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for responsibility results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Generally unfriendly and unsupportive	0.46	0.01
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.45	0.01
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.51	0.01
Generally friendly and supportive	0.52	0.01

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TABLE S50. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for complaint results

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Privately owned by non-worker shareholders	0.45	0.01
Privately owned by one individual	0.45	0.01
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.48	0.01
Workers are shareholders	0.53	0.01
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.52	0.01
Workers elect their managers	0.48	0.01
No corporate social responsibility	0.48	0.01
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.49	0.01
50 co-workers	0.50	0.01
250 co-workers	0.50	0.01
500 co-workers	0.48	0.01
1,000 co-workers	0.47	0.01
5,000 co-workers	0.48	0.01
Donates to both Democrats and Republicans	0.52	0.01
Primarily donates to Democrats	0.46	0.01
Primarily donates to Republicans	0.48	0.01
Men owned	0.46	0.01
Majority-men owned	0.49	0.01
Majority-women owned	0.51	0.01
Women owned	0.49	0.01
Employer pays 50%	0.47	0.01
Employer pays 75%	0.48	0.01
Employer pays 100%	0.50	0.01
40 hours	0.55	0.01
50 hours	0.50	0.01
60 hours	0.48	0.01
70 hours	0.46	0.01
80 hours	0.43	0.01
Ex-felons training	0.45	0.01
Veterans training	0.52	0.01
Mentally-disabled training	0.51	0.01
No special job training program	0.47	0.01
Located in your city	0.49	0.01
Located in a different city	0.48	0.01
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.48	0.01
No paid sick leave	0.44	0.01
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.50	0.01
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.51	0.01
No parental leave policy	0.47	0.01
Generous parental leave policy	0.50	0.01
All white owned	0.46	0.01
Majority white owned	0.50	0.01
Majority people of color owned	0.49	0.01
All people of color owned	0.50	0.01

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TABLE S51. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for complaint results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Matches 0% of 401k contributions	0.45	0.01
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.47	0.01
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.50	0.01
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.50	0.01
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.51	0.01
$30,000 per year	0.37	0.03
$40,000 per year	0.38	0.03
$50,000 per year	0.41	0.03
$60,000 per year	0.42	0.03
$70,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$80,000 per year	0.45	0.03
$90,000 per year	0.45	0.03
$100,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$110,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$120,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$130,000 per year	0.47	0.03
$140,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$150,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$160,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$170,000 per year	0.50	0.03
$180,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$190,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$200,000 per year	0.48	0.03
$210,000 per year	0.49	0.03
$220,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$230,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$240,000 per year	0.56	0.03
$250,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$260,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$270,000 per year	0.52	0.03
$280,000 per year	0.51	0.03
$290,000 per year	0.54	0.03
$300,000 per year	0.53	0.03
Largely repetitive work	0.46	0.01
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.50	0.01
Largely creative work	0.50	0.01
Not unionized	0.49	0.01
Unionized	0.48	0.01
Cannot work from home	0.48	0.01
Sometimes work from home	0.47	0.01
Primarily works from home	0.51	0.01
Mostly working alone	0.48	0.01
Mix of individual and team work	0.49	0.01
Mostly team work	0.48	0.01

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TABLE S52. Replicate descriptive marginal means in Table S2 for complaint results (cont.)

Attribute level	Estimate	Std. error
Generally unfriendly and unsupportive	0.40	0.01
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.42	0.01
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.55	0.01
Generally friendly and supportive	0.57	0.01

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Replicating Figure S7

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TABLE S53. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union	−0.007	−0.052
	(0.185)	(0.199)
Privately owned by one individual	0.014	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.056***	0.027
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Workers are shareholders	0.091***	0.101***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.070***	0.115***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Workers elect their managers	0.048**	0.089***
	(0.019)	(0.021)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.003	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	0.028*	−0.007
	(0.017)	(0.018)
500 co-workers	0.011	−0.026
	(0.017)	(0.019)
1,000 co-workers	−0.006	−0.001
	(0.018)	(0.019)
5,000 co-workers	−0.011	−0.059***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.051***	−0.050***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.050***	−0.038***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S54. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	−0.003	−0.016
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.016	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Women owned	0.019	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Employer pays 75%	0.045***	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Employer pays 100%	0.070***	0.013
	(0.013)	(0.014)
50 hours	−0.057***	−0.067***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
60 hours	−0.098***	−0.069***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
70 hours	−0.129***	−0.090***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
80 hours	−0.184***	−0.104***
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Veterans training	0.091***	0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Mentally-disabled training	0.058***	0.043***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.027*	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Located in a different city	−0.040***	0.015
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S55. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.019	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.043***	0.037***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.090***	0.051***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Generous parental leave policy	0.028**	0.019*
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority white owned	0.055***	0.044***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Majority people of color owned	0.055***	0.043***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
All people of color owned	0.054***	0.056***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.007	0.015
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.043**	0.064***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.062***	0.063***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.078***	0.043**
	(0.018)	(0.018)
$40,000 per year	0.097**	0.103**
	(0.038)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S56. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$50,000 per year	0.137***	0.065
	(0.037)	(0.042)
$60,000 per year	0.113***	0.072*
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$70,000 per year	0.222***	0.134***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
$80,000 per year	0.178***	0.128***
	(0.037)	(0.042)
$90,000 per year	0.192***	0.112***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$100,000 per year	0.241***	0.156***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$110,000 per year	0.259***	0.148***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$120,000 per year	0.251***	0.122***
	(0.040)	(0.042)
$130,000 per year	0.308***	0.208***
	(0.039)	(0.044)
$140,000 per year	0.276***	0.172***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$150,000 per year	0.283***	0.134***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$160,000 per year	0.264***	0.134***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$170,000 per year	0.253***	0.216***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S57. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$180,000 per year	0.309***	0.186***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$190,000 per year	0.323***	0.135***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$200,000 per year	0.345***	0.171***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$210,000 per year	0.274***	0.100**
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$220,000 per year	0.330***	0.194***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$230,000 per year	0.359***	0.222***
	(0.043)	(0.045)
$240,000 per year	0.379***	0.242***
	(0.038)	(0.042)
$250,000 per year	0.326***	0.224***
	(0.037)	(0.039)
$260,000 per year	0.386***	0.182***
	(0.038)	(0.042)
$270,000 per year	0.375***	0.210***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$280,000 per year	0.367***	0.181***
	(0.039)	(0.043)
$290,000 per year	0.377***	0.147***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$300,000 per year	0.408***	0.219***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S58. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.024*	0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Largely creative work	0.011	0.031**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.022*	0.032**
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Sometimes work from home	0.030**	0.027*
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily works from home	0.059***	0.021
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Mix of individual and team work	0.020	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mostly team work	0.008	0.003
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.012	0.0003
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.095***	0.099***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.101***	0.115***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Union × Privately owned by one individual	0.179**	0.090
	(0.071)	(0.073)
Union × Publicly owned by shareholders	0.031	−0.021
	(0.072)	(0.073)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S59. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union × Workers are shareholders	0.119	0.104
	(0.078)	(0.083)
Union × Workers sit on the corporate board	0.087	0.127*
	(0.071)	(0.073)
Union × Workers elect their managers	−0.016	0.125
	(0.076)	(0.079)
Union × Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.056	0.011
	(0.036)	(0.041)
Union × 250 co-workers	0.047	0.075
	(0.056)	(0.061)
Union × 500 co-workers	−0.002	−0.060
	(0.058)	(0.064)
Union × 1,000 co-workers	0.043	0.027
	(0.061)	(0.065)
Union × 5,000 co-workers	0.047	0.072
	(0.068)	(0.073)
Union × Primarily donates to Democrats	0.102*	0.044
	(0.055)	(0.058)
Union × Primarily donates to Republicans	0.023	−0.021
	(0.049)	(0.054)
Union × Majority-men owned	0.056	0.030
	(0.052)	(0.054)
Union × Majority-women owned	0.061	−0.009
	(0.060)	(0.064)
Union × Women owned	0.047	−0.026
	(0.052)	(0.054)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S60. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union × Employer pays 75%	0.006	0.011
	(0.056)	(0.050)
Union × Employer pays 100%	−0.003	0.072
	(0.048)	(0.054)
Union × 50 hours	0.047	0.093
	(0.060)	(0.069)
Union × 60 hours	0.071	0.060
	(0.063)	(0.068)
Union × 70 hours	0.018	0.056
	(0.069)	(0.073)
Union × 80 hours	0.004	0.041
	(0.059)	(0.062)
Union × Veterans training	−0.032	0.011
	(0.060)	(0.063)
Union × Mentally-disabled training	−0.082	0.033
	(0.056)	(0.066)
Union × No special job training program	−0.096	−0.073
	(0.067)	(0.069)
Union × Located in a different city	0.009	−0.012
	(0.049)	(0.050)
Union × Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.007	−0.023
	(0.045)	(0.051)
Union × Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.098*	0.027
	(0.051)	(0.054)
Union × Unlimited paid sick leave days	−0.010	−0.070
	(0.054)	(0.054)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S61. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union × Generous parental leave policy	0.028	−0.025
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Union × Majority white owned	−0.038	−0.001
	(0.060)	(0.060)
Union × Majority people of color owned	−0.021	−0.024
	(0.059)	(0.060)
Union × All people of color owned	−0.093	−0.053
	(0.062)	(0.063)
Union × Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.029	0.041
	(0.066)	(0.075)
Union × Matches 50% of 401k contributions	−0.016	−0.043
	(0.067)	(0.063)
Union × Matches 75% of 401k contributions	−0.042	−0.055
	(0.065)	(0.066)
Union × Matches 100% of 401k contributions	−0.065	−0.070
	(0.054)	(0.065)
Union × $40,000 per year	−0.060	−0.045
	(0.173)	(0.175)
Union × $50,000 per year	0.029	0.158
	(0.203)	(0.202)
Union × $60,000 per year	−0.102	−0.017
	(0.189)	(0.204)
Union × $70,000 per year	−0.118	−0.162
	(0.211)	(0.222)
Union × $80,000 per year	0.109	0.056
	(0.179)	(0.184)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S62. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union × $90,000 per year	−0.108	−0.193
	(0.187)	(0.193)
Union × $100,000 per year	−0.176	−0.237
	(0.190)	(0.180)
Union × $110,000 per year	−0.057	−0.080
	(0.179)	(0.180)
Union × $120,000 per year	0.081	0.170
	(0.167)	(0.169)
Union × $130,000 per year	−0.176	−0.313*
	(0.175)	(0.177)
Union × $140,000 per year	0.164	0.044
	(0.180)	(0.188)
Union × $150,000 per year	0.096	0.157
	(0.182)	(0.163)
Union × $160,000 per year	0.029	−0.124
	(0.176)	(0.177)
Union × $170,000 per year	−0.005	−0.116
	(0.173)	(0.186)
Union × $180,000 per year	−0.054	−0.198
	(0.188)	(0.208)
Union × $190,000 per year	0.038	0.044
	(0.191)	(0.193)
Union × $200,000 per year	0.018	−0.038
	(0.199)	(0.197)
Union × $210,000 per year	0.094	0.019
	(0.161)	(0.166)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S63. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union × $220,000 per year	−0.016	−0.080
	(0.166)	(0.174)
Union × $230,000 per year	−0.068	−0.215
	(0.168)	(0.174)
Union × $240,000 per year	0.015	−0.104
	(0.171)	(0.167)
Union × $250,000 per year	−0.039	−0.067
	(0.175)	(0.182)
Union × $260,000 per year	−0.035	0.019
	(0.165)	(0.170)
Union × $270,000 per year	−0.128	−0.119
	(0.145)	(0.164)
Union × $280,000 per year	−0.062	−0.004
	(0.156)	(0.155)
Union × $290,000 per year	−0.026	0.059
	(0.164)	(0.168)
Union × $300,000 per year	−0.056	−0.055
	(0.194)	(0.202)
Union × Mix of repetitive and creative work	−0.017	0.029
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Union × Largely creative work	0.007	0.074
	(0.047)	(0.051)
Union × Unionized	0.048	0.013
	(0.046)	(0.048)
Union × Sometimes work from home	−0.134***	−0.062
	(0.051)	(0.048)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S64. Replicating Figure S7 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Union × Primarily works from home	−0.097**	0.008
	(0.049)	(0.047)
Union × Mix of individual and team work	−0.070	−0.077
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Union × Mostly team work	−0.044	−0.013
	(0.059)	(0.062)
Union × Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.084	−0.034
	(0.053)	(0.057)
Union × Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.062	0.029
	(0.053)	(0.056)
Union × Generally friendly and supportive	0.059	0.056
	(0.059)	(0.049)
Constant	−0.008	0.116**
	(0.046)	(0.050)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.101	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.084	0.043
Residual Std. Error (df = 7868)	0.478	0.489
F Statistic (df = 147; 7868)	6.016***	3.447***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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Replicating Figure S10

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TABLE S65. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education	−0.009	−0.055
	(0.046)	(0.047)
Privately owned by one individual	0.024	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.056***	0.026
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Workers are shareholders	0.098***	0.107***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.071***	0.122***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Workers elect their managers	0.044**	0.097***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.0002	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	0.026	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.017)
500 co-workers	0.009	−0.031*
	(0.017)	(0.018)
1,000 co-workers	−0.005	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.018)
5,000 co-workers	−0.009	−0.054***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.039***	−0.043***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.046***	−0.036***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S66. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.001	−0.017
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.018	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Women owned	0.023	−0.001
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Employer pays 75%	0.042***	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Employer pays 100%	0.068***	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.013)
50 hours	−0.053***	−0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
60 hours	−0.094***	−0.065***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
70 hours	−0.127***	−0.084***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
80 hours	−0.185***	−0.101***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Veterans training	0.089***	0.057***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mentally-disabled training	0.053***	0.049***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.021	0.019
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Located in a different city	−0.036***	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S67. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.017	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.051***	0.040***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.091***	0.048***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Generous parental leave policy	0.032***	0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Majority white owned	0.055***	0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Majority people of color owned	0.053***	0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
All people of color owned	0.049***	0.055***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.010	0.019
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.041**	0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.058***	0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.072***	0.035**
	(0.017)	(0.017)
$40,000 per year	0.094**	0.097**
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$50,000 per year	0.135***	0.067
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S68. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.100***	0.070*
	(0.036)	(0.040)
$70,000 per year	0.216***	0.116***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
$80,000 per year	0.186***	0.133***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$90,000 per year	0.182***	0.098**
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$100,000 per year	0.226***	0.139***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$110,000 per year	0.254***	0.141***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.252***	0.130***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$130,000 per year	0.288***	0.183***
	(0.038)	(0.042)
$140,000 per year	0.278***	0.166***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$150,000 per year	0.291***	0.147***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$160,000 per year	0.266***	0.126***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$170,000 per year	0.247***	0.204***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$180,000 per year	0.300***	0.173***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S69. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.320***	0.133***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$200,000 per year	0.345***	0.167***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$210,000 per year	0.283***	0.101**
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$220,000 per year	0.326***	0.183***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$230,000 per year	0.351***	0.200***
	(0.041)	(0.043)
$240,000 per year	0.374***	0.224***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$250,000 per year	0.324***	0.219***
	(0.036)	(0.038)
$260,000 per year	0.381***	0.182***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$270,000 per year	0.363***	0.201***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$280,000 per year	0.358***	0.178***
	(0.038)	(0.042)
$290,000 per year	0.375***	0.154***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$300,000 per year	0.401***	0.212***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S70. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.023*	0.037***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Largely creative work	0.012	0.038***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.017	0.033***
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Sometimes work from home	0.020	0.023*
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Primarily works from home	0.051***	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mix of individual and team work	0.018	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mostly team work	0.006	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.005	−0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.099***	0.099***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.106***	0.117***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × Privately owned by one individual	0.007	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Education × Publicly owned by shareholders	0.017	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Education × Workers are shareholders	0.011	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S71. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education × Workers sit on the corporate board	0.012	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Education × Workers elect their managers	0.015	0.020
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Education × Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.010	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education × 250 co-workers	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Education × 500 co-workers	0.004	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × 1,000 co-workers	−0.006	−0.001
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × 5,000 co-workers	−0.001	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education × Primarily donates to Democrats	0.028**	0.010
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Primarily donates to Republicans	0.00003	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education × Majority-men owned	0.024	−0.017
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Education × Majority-women owned	0.013	−0.014
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × Women owned	0.003	−0.008
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S72. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education × Employer pays 75%	−0.023*	−0.012
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education × Employer pays 100%	0.007	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education × 50 hours	−0.006	0.0004
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × 60 hours	−0.011	0.024
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × 70 hours	0.003	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education × 80 hours	−0.026	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education × Veterans training	−0.002	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Education × Mentally-disabled training	0.004	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Education × No special job training program	0.002	0.009
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × Located in a different city	0.009	−0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.002	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education × Two weeks paid sick leave days	−0.015	0.010
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education × Unlimited paid sick leave days	−0.023*	−0.006
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S73. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education × Generous parental leave policy	−0.001	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education × Majority white owned	−0.013	−0.008
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Education × Majority people of color owned	0.014	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × All people of color owned	−0.006	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.001	0.006
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × Matches 50% of 401k contributions	−0.019	−0.006
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education × Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.006	0.003
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × Matches 100% of 401k contributions	−0.022	−0.013
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education × $40,000 per year	0.012	−0.011
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Education × $50,000 per year	0.006	−0.011
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Education × $60,000 per year	−0.019	−0.022
	(0.038)	(0.041)
Education × $70,000 per year	−0.011	0.021
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Education × $80,000 per year	0.046	0.026
	(0.038)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S74. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education × $90,000 per year	−0.022	−0.016
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Education × $100,000 per year	−0.056	−0.053
	(0.038)	(0.037)
Education × $110,000 per year	−0.027	−0.022
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Education × $120,000 per year	0.036	−0.010
	(0.040)	(0.039)
Education × $130,000 per year	−0.052	−0.088**
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Education × $140,000 per year	0.021	−0.006
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Education × $150,000 per year	0.0004	−0.048
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Education × $160,000 per year	0.021	0.003
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Education × $170,000 per year	0.012	−0.009
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Education × $180,000 per year	0.013	0.016
	(0.041)	(0.043)
Education × $190,000 per year	0.034	0.027
	(0.041)	(0.043)
Education × $200,000 per year	0.0002	−0.022
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Education × $210,000 per year	−0.029	−0.066*
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S75. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education × $220,000 per year	−0.010	−0.046
	(0.041)	(0.044)
Education × $230,000 per year	−0.033	−0.035
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Education × $240,000 per year	0.015	−0.013
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Education × $250,000 per year	−0.003	−0.045
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Education × $260,000 per year	0.012	−0.039
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Education × $270,000 per year	0.027	0.028
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Education × $280,000 per year	−0.009	−0.067*
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Education × $290,000 per year	0.078**	0.026
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Education × $300,000 per year	0.018	0.038
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Education × Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.004	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education × Largely creative work	0.008	0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education × Unionized	−0.008	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S76. Replicating Figure S10 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Education × Sometimes work from home	0.015	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education × Primarily works from home	0.003	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education × Mix of individual and team work	0.010	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education × Mostly team work	−0.007	−0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.004	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Education × Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.023	0.011
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × Generally friendly and supportive	−0.004	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	−0.009	0.110**
	(0.044)	(0.048)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.101	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.084	0.043
Residual Std. Error (df = 7868)	0.478	0.489
F Statistic (df = 147; 7868)	6.009***	3.456***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S77. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education	−0.009	−0.042
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Privately owned by one individual	0.011	0.004
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.020	0.035*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Workers are shareholders	0.034*	0.087***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.035*	0.069***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Workers elect their managers	0.019	0.032
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.010	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	−0.005	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.017)
500 co-workers	−0.017	−0.012
	(0.018)	(0.017)
1,000 co-workers	−0.033*	−0.018
	(0.018)	(0.017)
5,000 co-workers	−0.014	−0.019
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.052***	−0.051***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.010	−0.038***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S78. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	−0.001	0.031**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.014	0.049***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Women owned	−0.003	0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Employer pays 75%	0.029**	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Employer pays 100%	0.030**	0.026*
	(0.013)	(0.013)
50 hours	−0.007	−0.044**
	(0.018)	(0.018)
60 hours	−0.0002	−0.067***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
70 hours	−0.005	−0.084***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
80 hours	−0.023	−0.117***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Veterans training	0.069***	0.073***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mentally-disabled training	0.051***	0.059***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.005	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Located in a different city	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S79. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.018	−0.012
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.020	0.054***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.041***	0.073***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Generous parental leave policy	0.028**	0.024**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Majority white owned	0.050***	0.042***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Majority people of color owned	0.035**	0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
All people of color owned	0.034**	0.035**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.012	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.013	0.057***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.028	0.055***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.055***	0.057***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
$40,000 per year	0.054	0.010
	(0.042)	(0.041)
$50,000 per year	0.044	0.055
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S80. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.107***	0.061
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$70,000 per year	0.108**	0.117***
	(0.042)	(0.043)
$80,000 per year	0.073*	0.080**
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$90,000 per year	0.073*	0.080*
	(0.040)	(0.042)
$100,000 per year	0.120***	0.121***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$110,000 per year	0.097**	0.121***
	(0.040)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.122***	0.121***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$130,000 per year	0.143***	0.094**
	(0.043)	(0.044)
$140,000 per year	0.172***	0.129***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$150,000 per year	0.173***	0.141***
	(0.040)	(0.040)
$160,000 per year	0.150***	0.126***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$170,000 per year	0.148***	0.134***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$180,000 per year	0.147***	0.119***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S81. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.176***	0.152***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$200,000 per year	0.199***	0.110***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$210,000 per year	0.176***	0.134***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$220,000 per year	0.161***	0.159***
	(0.041)	(0.040)
$230,000 per year	0.224***	0.158***
	(0.043)	(0.044)
$240,000 per year	0.227***	0.197***
	(0.040)	(0.039)
$250,000 per year	0.220***	0.166***
	(0.040)	(0.039)
$260,000 per year	0.221***	0.152***
	(0.042)	(0.041)
$270,000 per year	0.216***	0.158***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$280,000 per year	0.173***	0.134***
	(0.041)	(0.040)
$290,000 per year	0.251***	0.165***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$300,000 per year	0.273***	0.167***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S82. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.032**	0.041***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Largely creative work	0.046***	0.040***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.036***	−0.004
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Sometimes work from home	0.002	−0.010
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Primarily works from home	0.016	0.037***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.004	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Mostly team work	−0.027*	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.016	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.045***	0.146***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.058***	0.169***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × Privately owned by one individual	0.012	0.008
	(0.018)	(0.020)
Education × Publicly owned by shareholders	0.016	0.042**
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Education × Workers are shareholders	0.017	0.020
	(0.020)	(0.020)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S83. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education × Workers sit on the corporate board	0.019	0.035*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Education × Workers elect their managers	0.022	0.053***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Education × Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.008	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education × 250 co-workers	−0.017	−0.014
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education × 500 co-workers	−0.016	−0.013
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education × 1,000 co-workers	−0.049***	−0.020
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education × 5,000 co-workers	−0.031*	−0.007
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education × Primarily donates to Democrats	0.039***	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.004	0.0005
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Majority-men owned	0.011	0.025*
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Education × Majority-women owned	−0.004	−0.011
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × Women owned	0.001	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S84. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education × Employer pays 75%	−0.013	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Employer pays 100%	0.014	0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education × 50 hours	−0.0004	−0.009
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education × 60 hours	−0.014	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education × 70 hours	0.022	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education × 80 hours	0.003	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education × Veterans training	−0.005	−0.009
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × Mentally-disabled training	0.008	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × No special job training program	0.007	−0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × Located in a different city	0.022	0.011
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.012	−0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.009	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Unlimited paid sick leave days	−0.008	−0.017
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S85. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education × Generous parental leave policy	0.006	0.020*
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education × Majority white owned	0.006	−0.013
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × Majority people of color owned	0.017	0.030*
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education × All people of color owned	0.008	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Education × Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.002	−0.014
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education × Matches 50% of 401k contributions	−0.013	−0.031*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education × Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.003	−0.002
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education × Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.006	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education × $40,000 per year	−0.025	0.009
	(0.042)	(0.041)
Education × $50,000 per year	−0.066	0.018
	(0.042)	(0.041)
Education × $60,000 per year	−0.070*	0.002
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S86. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education × $70,000 per year	−0.043	0.012
	(0.045)	(0.044)
Education × $80,000 per year	−0.066*	0.009
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Education × $90,000 per year	−0.079*	0.005
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Education × $100,000 per year	−0.085**	−0.010
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Education × $110,000 per year	−0.032	−0.047
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Education × $120,000 per year	−0.077*	0.019
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Education × $130,000 per year	−0.061	0.003
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education × $140,000 per year	−0.032	0.024
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Education × $150,000 per year	−0.011	−0.026
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Education × $160,000 per year	0.002	0.032
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Education × $170,000 per year	−0.029	−0.001
	(0.043)	(0.042)
Education × $180,000 per year	−0.002	0.007
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Education × $190,000 per year	0.002	0.053
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S87. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education × $200,000 per year	−0.035	−0.007
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Education × $210,000 per year	−0.087**	0.011
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Education × $220,000 per year	−0.067	−0.043
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education × $230,000 per year	−0.061	−0.008
	(0.045)	(0.048)
Education × $240,000 per year	−0.028	0.001
	(0.041)	(0.039)
Education × $250,000 per year	−0.033	0.034
	(0.040)	(0.039)
Education × $260,000 per year	−0.021	0.020
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education × $270,000 per year	−0.016	0.052
	(0.045)	(0.041)
Education × $280,000 per year	−0.043	−0.005
	(0.041)	(0.039)
Education × $290,000 per year	0.007	0.032
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Education × $300,000 per year	−0.033	0.035
	(0.042)	(0.044)
Education × Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.017	−0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Largely creative work	0.041***	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S88. Replicating Figure S10 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Education × Unionized	0.001	−0.012
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Education × Sometimes work from home	0.004	−0.003
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education × Primarily works from home	0.019	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education × Mix of individual and team work	−0.026*	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education × Mostly team work	−0.034**	−0.010
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education × Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.015	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Education × Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.019	0.029*
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education × Generally friendly and supportive	0.018	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Constant	0.183***	0.110**
	(0.047)	(0.048)
Observations	8,016	8,016
R^2	0.048	0.069
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.052
Residual Std. Error (df = 7868)	0.492	0.487
F Statistic (df = 147; 7868)	2.675***	3.994***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S89. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income	0.012	−0.048
	(0.048)	(0.049)
Privately owned by one individual	0.025	−0.0004
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.053***	0.027
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Workers are shareholders	0.104***	0.107***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.070***	0.116***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Workers elect their managers	0.041**	0.095***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.002	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.012)
250 co-workers	0.021	−0.005
	(0.017)	(0.018)
500 co-workers	0.005	−0.029
	(0.018)	(0.019)
1,000 co-workers	−0.015	−0.004
	(0.018)	(0.019)
5,000 co-workers	−0.007	−0.049***
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.039***	−0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Replicating Figure S11

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TABLE S90. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.050***	−0.046***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Majority-men owned	0.008	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.020	−0.004
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Women owned	0.025	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Employer pays 75%	0.051***	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Employer pays 100%	0.069***	0.021
	(0.014)	(0.014)
50 hours	−0.037**	−0.053***
	(0.018)	(0.019)
60 hours	−0.083***	−0.062***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
70 hours	−0.113***	−0.073***
	(0.018)	(0.019)
80 hours	−0.178***	−0.091***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Veterans training	0.086***	0.054***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Mentally-disabled training	0.049***	0.042**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.017	0.016
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Located in a different city	−0.042***	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S91. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.017	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.055***	0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.090***	0.045***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Generous parental leave policy	0.028**	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority white owned	0.051***	0.036**
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Majority people of color owned	0.048***	0.041**
	(0.016)	(0.017)
All people of color owned	0.040**	0.051***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.011	0.017
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.040**	0.051***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.059***	0.053***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.076***	0.043**
	(0.018)	(0.019)
$40,000 per year	0.089**	0.127***
	(0.039)	(0.043)
$50,000 per year	0.147***	0.088**
	(0.040)	(0.043)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S92. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.094**	0.083*
	(0.038)	(0.043)
$70,000 per year	0.206***	0.135***
	(0.041)	(0.045)
$80,000 per year	0.202***	0.152***
	(0.039)	(0.043)
$90,000 per year	0.188***	0.119***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$100,000 per year	0.232***	0.140***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$110,000 per year	0.256***	0.163***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$120,000 per year	0.251***	0.146***
	(0.041)	(0.043)
$130,000 per year	0.304***	0.216***
	(0.041)	(0.045)
$140,000 per year	0.298***	0.190***
	(0.040)	(0.040)
$150,000 per year	0.294***	0.176***
	(0.040)	(0.042)
$160,000 per year	0.264***	0.160***
	(0.041)	(0.043)
$170,000 per year	0.244***	0.222***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$180,000 per year	0.312***	0.203***
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S93. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.330***	0.162***
	(0.042)	(0.044)
$200,000 per year	0.348***	0.197***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
$210,000 per year	0.281***	0.118***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$220,000 per year	0.327***	0.211***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
$230,000 per year	0.360***	0.233***
	(0.043)	(0.045)
$240,000 per year	0.378***	0.246***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$250,000 per year	0.333***	0.256***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$260,000 per year	0.385***	0.207***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$270,000 per year	0.351***	0.208***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$280,000 per year	0.370***	0.185***
	(0.040)	(0.044)
$290,000 per year	0.372***	0.173***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
$300,000 per year	0.401***	0.231***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.016	0.030**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S94. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Largely creative work	0.015	0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.008	0.034***
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Sometimes work from home	0.015	0.027*
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily works from home	0.048***	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mix of individual and team work	0.003	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mostly team work	−0.013	−0.005
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.005	−0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.102***	0.095***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.108***	0.121***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income × Privately owned by one individual	0.015	−0.004
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Income × Publicly owned by shareholders	−0.021	−0.008
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Income × Workers are shareholders	−0.011	0.032
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Income × Workers sit on the corporate board	−0.038*	0.018
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S95. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income × Workers elect their managers	−0.034*	0.014
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Income × Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.018	−0.012
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Income × 250 co-workers	−0.026	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Income × 500 co-workers	−0.004	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Income × 1,000 co-workers	−0.023	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Income × 5,000 co-workers	−0.035*	−0.015
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.0003	−0.014
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income × Primarily donates to Republicans	0.029**	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Income × Majority-men owned	0.021	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income × Majority-women owned	0.008	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income × Women owned	0.017	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income × Employer pays 75%	−0.012	−0.031**
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Income × Employer pays 100%	−0.006	−0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S96. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income × 50 hours	0.016	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × 60 hours	−0.010	0.011
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × 70 hours	−0.001	0.020
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Income × 80 hours	−0.032*	−0.008
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × Veterans training	0.007	0.0002
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income × Mentally-disabled training	0.029*	0.035**
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Income × No special job training program	−0.003	0.010
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Income × Located in a different city	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.001	−0.005
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Income × Two weeks paid sick leave days	−0.016	−0.006
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Income × Unlimited paid sick leave days	−0.022	−0.008
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Income × Generous parental leave policy	0.005	−0.008
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Income × Majority white owned	−0.011	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S97. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income × Majority people of color owned	0.012	−0.0001
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income × All people of color owned	−0.011	−0.007
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income × Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.003	−0.008
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income × Matches 50% of 401k contributions	−0.022	−0.035*
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income × Matches 75% of 401k contributions	−0.015	−0.028
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × Matches 100% of 401k contributions	−0.015	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Income × $40,000 per year	−0.037	−0.012
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Income × $50,000 per year	−0.013	0.050
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Income × $60,000 per year	−0.068*	0.012
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Income × $70,000 per year	−0.016	−0.011
	(0.041)	(0.046)
Income × $80,000 per year	0.033	0.027
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income × $90,000 per year	0.003	0.009
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Income × $100,000 per year	0.019	−0.028
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S98. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income × $110,000 per year	−0.016	0.021
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Income × $120,000 per year	0.019	−0.022
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Income × $130,000 per year	−0.051	−0.039
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Income × $140,000 per year	0.053	0.070*
	(0.040)	(0.039)
Income × $150,000 per year	0.001	−0.025
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Income × $160,000 per year	0.023	0.009
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Income × $170,000 per year	0.050	0.053
	(0.042)	(0.041)
Income × $180,000 per year	−0.021	0.019
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income × $190,000 per year	0.065	0.024
	(0.042)	(0.045)
Income × $200,000 per year	0.029	0.037
	(0.042)	(0.045)
Income × $210,000 per year	0.008	−0.004
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Income × $220,000 per year	0.043	−0.003
	(0.042)	(0.044)
Income × $230,000 per year	0.031	0.020
	(0.046)	(0.046)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S99. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income × $240,000 per year	0.020	0.029
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Income × $250,000 per year	0.057	0.026
	(0.037)	(0.039)
Income × $260,000 per year	0.082**	0.048
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Income × $270,000 per year	0.021	0.054
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Income × $280,000 per year	0.064	−0.001
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income × $290,000 per year	0.081**	0.030
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Income × $300,000 per year	0.034	0.046
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Income × Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.012	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Largely creative work	0.015	0.040***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Income × Unionized	−0.023**	−0.013
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Income × Sometimes work from home	0.003	0.024*
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Primarily works from home	0.006	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Mix of individual and team work	0.004	0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S100. Replicating Figure S11 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Income × Mostly team work	0.011	0.019
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income × Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.023	0.032**
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Income × Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.018	0.026*
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income × Generally friendly and supportive	−0.005	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Constant	−0.003	0.097*
	(0.047)	(0.050)
Observations	7,080	7,080
R^2	0.107	0.063
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.043
Residual Std. Error (df = 6932)	0.477	0.489
F Statistic (df = 147; 6932)	5.645***	3.165***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S101. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income	0.005	−0.017
	(0.050)	(0.049)
Privately owned by one individual	0.011	−0.009
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.018	0.033*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Workers are shareholders	0.034	0.084***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.033	0.061***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Workers elect their managers	0.017	0.029
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.010	0.015
	(0.012)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	0.003	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.017)
500 co-workers	−0.016	−0.014
	(0.019)	(0.019)
1,000 co-workers	−0.029	−0.022
	(0.019)	(0.019)
5,000 co-workers	−0.005	−0.012
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.051***	−0.049***
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.017	−0.044***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S102. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.015	0.043***
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.020	0.045***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Women owned	0.001	0.034**
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Employer pays 75%	0.029**	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Employer pays 100%	0.029**	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
50 hours	−0.006	−0.040**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
60 hours	0.001	−0.068***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
70 hours	0.013	−0.072***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
80 hours	−0.008	−0.116***
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Veterans training	0.071***	0.068***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Mentally-disabled training	0.056***	0.054***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
No special job training program	0.002	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Located in a different city	−0.016	−0.015
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S103. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.011	−0.012
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.023	0.054***
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.045***	0.078***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generous parental leave policy	0.023*	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority white owned	0.043***	0.032*
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority people of color owned	0.025	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)
All people of color owned	0.026	0.025
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.021	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.020	0.046**
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.033*	0.046**
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.073***	0.058***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
$40,000 per year	0.053	0.036
	(0.044)	(0.044)
$50,000 per year	0.071	0.054
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S104. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.096**	0.051
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$70,000 per year	0.092**	0.109**
	(0.044)	(0.045)
$80,000 per year	0.074*	0.101**
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$90,000 per year	0.062	0.089**
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$100,000 per year	0.105**	0.124***
	(0.043)	(0.044)
$110,000 per year	0.088**	0.127***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
$120,000 per year	0.137***	0.136***
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$130,000 per year	0.174***	0.113**
	(0.045)	(0.046)
$140,000 per year	0.183***	0.155***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
$150,000 per year	0.189***	0.166***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
$160,000 per year	0.160***	0.142***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
$170,000 per year	0.162***	0.141***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
$180,000 per year	0.176***	0.139***
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S105. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.188***	0.176***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
$200,000 per year	0.183***	0.125***
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$210,000 per year	0.168***	0.144***
	(0.043)	(0.044)
$220,000 per year	0.163***	0.171***
	(0.043)	(0.042)
$230,000 per year	0.223***	0.159***
	(0.045)	(0.046)
$240,000 per year	0.222***	0.201***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
$250,000 per year	0.217***	0.181***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$260,000 per year	0.209***	0.165***
	(0.044)	(0.043)
$270,000 per year	0.219***	0.159***
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$280,000 per year	0.181***	0.145***
	(0.043)	(0.042)
$290,000 per year	0.244***	0.183***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$300,000 per year	0.270***	0.172***
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.027*	0.034**
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S106. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Largely creative work	0.048***	0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.024*	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Sometimes work from home	0.012	−0.014
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Primarily works from home	0.021	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.014	−0.003
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Mostly team work	−0.037**	−0.013
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.017	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.046***	0.153***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.059***	0.173***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income × Privately owned by one individual	0.018	0.027
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Income × Publicly owned by shareholders	0.006	0.022
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Income × Workers are shareholders	0.025	0.032
	(0.022)	(0.020)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S107. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income × Workers sit on the corporate board	0.001	0.018
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Income × Workers elect their managers	0.015	0.015
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Income × Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.011	−0.010
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income × 250 co-workers	−0.025	−0.030*
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Income × 500 co-workers	−0.032*	−0.018
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Income × 1,000 co-workers	−0.051***	−0.025
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × 5,000 co-workers	−0.037*	−0.024
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Income × Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.004	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Primarily donates to Republicans	0.009	0.024
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Income × Majority-men owned	0.008	0.009
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Income × Majority-women owned	0.018	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S108. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income × Women owned	0.027*	0.026
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Income × Employer pays 75%	−0.028*	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Employer pays 100%	−0.013	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income × 50 hours	0.012	−0.001
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Income × 60 hours	−0.003	−0.013
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × 70 hours	0.019	0.014
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × 80 hours	0.001	−0.022
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × Veterans training	0.007	−0.007
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income × Mentally-disabled training	0.034**	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Income × No special job training program	0.033**	−0.013
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income × Located in a different city	0.015	−0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income × Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.013	−0.014
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S109. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income × Two weeks paid sick leave days	−0.014	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income × Unlimited paid sick leave days	−0.006	−0.012
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income × Generous parental leave policy	0.001	0.006
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income × Majority white owned	−0.016	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Income × Majority people of color owned	−0.013	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Income × All people of color owned	−0.025	0.0001
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Income × Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.001	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income × Matches 50% of 401k contributions	−0.033*	−0.034*
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income × Matches 75% of 401k contributions	−0.029	−0.029
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Income × Matches 100% of 401k contributions	−0.013	−0.003
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income × $40,000 per year	−0.036	−0.058
	(0.044)	(0.042)
Income × $50,000 per year	−0.058	−0.00002
	(0.044)	(0.043)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S110. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income × $60,000 per year	−0.093**	−0.023
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Income × $70,000 per year	−0.041	−0.018
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Income × $80,000 per year	−0.038	0.029
	(0.043)	(0.045)
Income × $90,000 per year	−0.054	−0.010
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income × $100,000 per year	−0.055	−0.007
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Income × $110,000 per year	−0.028	−0.045
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Income × $120,000 per year	−0.050	−0.021
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income × $130,000 per year	−0.048	0.001
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Income × $140,000 per year	0.035	0.018
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Income × $150,000 per year	−0.020	−0.027
	(0.041)	(0.040)
Income × $160,000 per year	−0.043	0.027
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Income × $170,000 per year	0.011	0.023
	(0.044)	(0.043)
Income × $180,000 per year	0.012	−0.027
	(0.043)	(0.045)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S111. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income × $190,000 per year	−0.034	0.034
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Income × $200,000 per year	−0.024	−0.012
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Income × $210,000 per year	−0.055	0.016
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Income × $220,000 per year	−0.015	0.015
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income × $230,000 per year	0.008	0.055
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Income × $240,000 per year	−0.046	0.021
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Income × $250,000 per year	−0.049	0.050
	(0.041)	(0.040)
Income × $260,000 per year	0.065	0.044
	(0.043)	(0.041)
Income × $270,000 per year	0.002	0.001
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Income × $280,000 per year	−0.020	0.003
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Income × $290,000 per year	0.039	0.011
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Income × $300,000 per year	0.056	0.022
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Income × Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.005	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Note:		$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

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TABLE S112. Replicating Figure S11 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Income × Largely creative work	0.021	0.028*
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income × Unionized	−0.002	−0.026**
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Income × Sometimes work from home	−0.002	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Primarily works from home	0.034**	0.023*
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income × Mix of individual and team work	−0.001	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income × Mostly team work	0.015	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income × Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.021	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income × Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.010	0.016
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income × Generally friendly and supportive	0.020	0.0004
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Constant	0.169***	0.132***
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Observations	7,080	7,080
R^2	0.051	0.070
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.050
Residual Std. Error (df = 6932)	0.492	0.487
F Statistic (df = 147; 6932)	2.513***	3.548***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S113. Replicating Figure S12 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.032	0.012
	(0.022)	(0.023)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.079***	0.036
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Workers are shareholders	0.100***	0.107***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.063***	0.112***
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Workers elect their managers	0.032	0.081***
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.011	0.029**
	(0.013)	(0.014)
250 co-workers	0.040*	0.001
	(0.021)	(0.022)
500 co-workers	0.014	−0.027
	(0.021)	(0.022)
1,000 co-workers	0.006	0.005
	(0.020)	(0.022)
5,000 co-workers	−0.009	−0.059***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.045***	−0.041**
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.061***	−0.032*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Replicating Figure S12

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TABLE S114. Replicating Figure S12 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	−0.004	−0.008
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Majority-women owned	0.018	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Women owned	0.020	0.022
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Employer pays 75%	0.019	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Employer pays 100%	0.046***	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)
50 hours	−0.045**	−0.060***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
60 hours	−0.081***	−0.064***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
70 hours	−0.127***	−0.091***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
80 hours	−0.201***	−0.111***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Veterans training	0.087***	0.068***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Mentally-disabled training	0.044**	0.042**
	(0.019)	(0.020)
No special job training program	0.010	0.014
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Located in a different city	−0.036**	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S115. Replicating Figure S12 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.034**	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.046***	0.047***
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.089***	0.055***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Generous parental leave policy	0.025*	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Majority white owned	0.041**	0.039**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Majority people of color owned	0.055***	0.055***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
All people of color owned	0.057***	0.069***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.017	0.014
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.038*	0.067***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.050**	0.055***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.051**	0.025
	(0.021)	(0.021)
$40,000 per year	0.096***	0.097**
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$50,000 per year	0.135***	0.070*
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S116. Replicating Figure S12 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.103***	0.070*
	(0.036)	(0.040)
$70,000 per year	0.213***	0.121***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$80,000 per year	0.184***	0.128***
	(0.036)	(0.041)
$90,000 per year	0.181***	0.097**
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$100,000 per year	0.225***	0.139***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$110,000 per year	0.254***	0.141***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.255***	0.131***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$130,000 per year	0.292***	0.184***
	(0.038)	(0.043)
$140,000 per year	0.280***	0.166***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$150,000 per year	0.292***	0.148***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$160,000 per year	0.268***	0.127***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$170,000 per year	0.251***	0.204***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$180,000 per year	0.305***	0.176***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S117. Replicating Figure S12 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.321***	0.134***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$200,000 per year	0.341***	0.165***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	−0.002	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Largely creative work	0.003	0.029*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unionized	−0.017	0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Sometimes work from home	0.014	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Primarily works from home	0.053***	0.027
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Mix of individual and team work	0.019	0.011
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Mostly team work	0.005	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S118. Replicating Figure S12 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.025	−0.012
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.084***	0.110***
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.086***	0.112***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	0.055	0.117**
	(0.051)	(0.055)
Observations	5,108	5,108
R^2	0.091	0.054
Adjusted R^2	0.080	0.042
Residual Std. Error (df = 5044)	0.476	0.488
F Statistic (df = 63; 5044)	8.010***	4.594***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S119. Replicating Figure S12 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	−0.009	0.008
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.008	0.034
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Workers are shareholders	0.025	0.088***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.009	0.060**
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Workers elect their managers	0.002	0.023
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.025*	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.013)
250 co-workers	−0.001	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.022)
500 co-workers	−0.019	0.018
	(0.022)	(0.022)
1,000 co-workers	−0.038*	−0.006
	(0.022)	(0.021)
5,000 co-workers	−0.014	−0.010
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.058***	−0.046***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.011	−0.031*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S120. Replicating Figure S12 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	−0.001	0.033*
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Majority-women owned	0.034*	0.053***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Women owned	0.009	0.045**
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Employer pays 75%	0.021	−0.006
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Employer pays 100%	0.004	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.017)
50 hours	0.006	−0.027
	(0.022)	(0.022)
60 hours	0.001	−0.051**
	(0.023)	(0.022)
70 hours	0.006	−0.078***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
80 hours	−0.003	−0.114***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Veterans training	0.095***	0.077***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Mentally-disabled training	0.054***	0.058***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
No special job training program	0.011	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Located in a different city	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S121. Replicating Figure S12 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.002	−0.015
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.002	0.053***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.038**	0.070***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Generous parental leave policy	0.033**	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Majority white owned	0.038**	0.030
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Majority people of color owned	0.036*	0.032
	(0.020)	(0.020)
All people of color owned	0.062***	0.025
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.021	0.029
	(0.022)	(0.023)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.018	0.067***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.047**	0.062***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.056**	0.057***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
$40,000 per year	0.052	0.015
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$50,000 per year	0.044	0.056
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S122. Replicating Figure S12 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.105***	0.063
	(0.040)	(0.040)
$70,000 per year	0.101**	0.119***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$80,000 per year	0.063	0.081**
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$90,000 per year	0.065	0.083**
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$100,000 per year	0.119***	0.121***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$110,000 per year	0.093**	0.117***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.114***	0.123***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$130,000 per year	0.140***	0.098**
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$140,000 per year	0.169***	0.130***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$150,000 per year	0.166***	0.143***
	(0.040)	(0.040)
$160,000 per year	0.145***	0.129***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
$170,000 per year	0.148***	0.131***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$180,000 per year	0.153***	0.123***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S123. Replicating Figure S12 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.172***	0.153***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$200,000 per year	0.193***	0.113***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.011	0.031*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Largely creative work	0.037**	0.042**
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unionized	−0.044***	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Sometimes work from home	−0.006	−0.027
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Primarily works from home	0.015	0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.001	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Mostly team work	−0.018	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S124. Replicating Figure S12 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.034*	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.053***	0.140***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.047**	0.147***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	0.202***	0.126**
	(0.056)	(0.055)
Observations	5,108	5,108
R^2	0.037	0.056
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.044
Residual Std. Error (df = 5044)	0.492	0.488
F Statistic (df = 63; 5044)	3.036***	4.741***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S125. Replicating Figure S13 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.030	−0.010
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.072*	0.066
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Workers are shareholders	0.134***	0.115***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.079**	0.087**
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Workers elect their managers	0.050	0.085**
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.043*	0.042*
	(0.023)	(0.026)
250 co-workers	0.040	0.024
	(0.035)	(0.037)
500 co-workers	0.055	0.006
	(0.037)	(0.038)
1,000 co-workers	0.006	0.013
	(0.034)	(0.038)
5,000 co-workers	−0.004	−0.065*
	(0.035)	(0.037)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.059**	−0.039
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.052*	0.004
	(0.028)	(0.030)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Replicating Figure S13

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TABLE S126. Replicating Figure S13 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.004	0.006
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Majority-women owned	0.035	0.033
	(0.031)	(0.033)
Women owned	0.063*	0.071**
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Employer pays 75%	0.002	−0.040
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Employer pays 100%	0.029	−0.011
	(0.027)	(0.030)
50 hours	−0.074**	−0.076**
	(0.037)	(0.037)
60 hours	−0.076**	−0.053
	(0.038)	(0.040)
70 hours	−0.128***	−0.098***
	(0.035)	(0.037)
80 hours	−0.164***	−0.085**
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Veterans training	0.059*	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.035)
Mentally-disabled training	0.027	0.050
	(0.033)	(0.035)
No special job training program	−0.022	−0.035
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Located in a different city	−0.068**	0.012
	(0.027)	(0.030)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S127. Replicating Figure S13 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.081***	−0.008
	(0.027)	(0.030)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.051*	0.031
	(0.026)	(0.029)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.108***	0.086***
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Generous parental leave policy	0.009	−0.003
	(0.022)	(0.024)
Majority white owned	0.020	−0.007
	(0.032)	(0.035)
Majority people of color owned	0.031	0.041
	(0.032)	(0.034)
All people of color owned	0.063*	0.037
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.002	0.026
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.052	0.050
	(0.035)	(0.038)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.037	0.013
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.021	−0.010
	(0.035)	(0.038)
$40,000 per year	0.097***	0.099**
	(0.036)	(0.041)
$50,000 per year	0.132***	0.071*
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S128. Replicating Figure S13 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.096***	0.060
	(0.036)	(0.041)
$70,000 per year	0.216***	0.122***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
$80,000 per year	0.178***	0.122***
	(0.036)	(0.041)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.0004	0.016
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Largely creative work	0.005	0.045
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Unionized	−0.027	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Sometimes work from home	−0.017	0.017
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Primarily works from home	0.036	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.018	−0.012
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Mostly team work	−0.036	−0.019
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S129. Replicating Figure S13 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.014	−0.019
	(0.031)	(0.034)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.033	0.079**
	(0.032)	(0.035)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.105***	0.117***
	(0.031)	(0.033)
Constant	0.116	0.175**
	(0.080)	(0.084)
Observations	1,690	1,690
R^2	0.085	0.059
Adjusted R^2	0.056	0.029
Residual Std. Error (df = 1638)	0.459	0.486
F Statistic (df = 51; 1638)	2.968***	2.006***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S130. Replicating Figure S13 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	−0.027	−0.005
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.024	0.023
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Workers are shareholders	−0.007	0.095**
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.031	0.055
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Workers elect their managers	0.042	0.059
	(0.042)	(0.045)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.054**	0.027
	(0.025)	(0.024)
250 co-workers	−0.007	0.026
	(0.037)	(0.037)
500 co-workers	0.003	0.072*
	(0.037)	(0.037)
1,000 co-workers	−0.031	−0.003
	(0.038)	(0.036)
5,000 co-workers	−0.039	0.025
	(0.038)	(0.037)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.038	−0.038
	(0.030)	(0.031)
Primarily donates to Republicans	0.021	−0.002
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S131. Replicating Figure S13 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.042	0.083**
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Majority-women owned	0.019	0.085***
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Women owned	0.041	0.082**
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Employer pays 75%	0.027	−0.035
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Employer pays 100%	−0.021	0.009
	(0.028)	(0.029)
50 hours	−0.053	−0.040
	(0.039)	(0.038)
60 hours	−0.054	−0.068*
	(0.039)	(0.040)
70 hours	−0.082**	−0.071*
	(0.036)	(0.037)
80 hours	−0.048	−0.093**
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Veterans training	0.052	0.031
	(0.036)	(0.035)
Mentally-disabled training	0.057*	0.068*
	(0.034)	(0.035)
No special job training program	−0.038	−0.013
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Located in a different city	−0.054*	−0.025
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S132. Replicating Figure S13 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.043	−0.025
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	−0.011	0.047*
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.039	0.060**
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Generous parental leave policy	0.023	0.022
	(0.025)	(0.024)
Majority white owned	0.030	0.010
	(0.033)	(0.035)
Majority people of color owned	0.049	−0.003
	(0.034)	(0.035)
All people of color owned	0.062*	0.018
	(0.034)	(0.035)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.061	0.065
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.050	0.049
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.077**	0.033
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.063*	0.030
	(0.038)	(0.038)
$40,000 per year	0.054	0.021
	(0.041)	(0.041)
$50,000 per year	0.043	0.056
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S133. Replicating Figure S13 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.110***	0.061
	(0.040)	(0.041)
$70,000 per year	0.109***	0.121***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
$80,000 per year	0.071*	0.080**
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.027	0.033
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Largely creative work	0.061**	0.047
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Unionized	−0.037	−0.011
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Sometimes work from home	0.010	−0.020
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Primarily works from home	0.028	0.019
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Mix of individual and team work	0.011	−0.012
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Mostly team work	−0.040	−0.028
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S134. Replicating Figure S13 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.032	0.013
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	−0.006	0.091***
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.038	0.134***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	0.230***	0.139
	(0.086)	(0.086)
Observations	1,690	1,690
R^2	0.044	0.053
Adjusted R^2	0.015	0.023
Residual Std. Error (df = 1638)	0.486	0.488
F Statistic (df = 51; 1638)	1.494**	1.781***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S135. Replicating Figure S14 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.032	0.016
	(0.025)	(0.027)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.051*	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.027)
Workers are shareholders	0.118***	0.139***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.083***	0.140***
	(0.027)	(0.028)
Workers elect their managers	0.032	0.126***
	(0.026)	(0.027)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.022	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.015)
250 co-workers	0.010	−0.014
	(0.024)	(0.024)
500 co-workers	0.012	−0.020
	(0.024)	(0.024)
1,000 co-workers	0.001	0.002
	(0.024)	(0.025)
5,000 co-workers	−0.007	−0.019
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.028	−0.048**
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.022	−0.048**
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Replicating Figure S14

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TABLE S136. Replicating Figure S14 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	−0.006	0.005
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Majority-women owned	−0.013	−0.003
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Women owned	0.008	−0.005
	(0.022)	(0.023)
Employer pays 75%	0.036*	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Employer pays 100%	0.072***	0.030
	(0.018)	(0.019)
50 hours	−0.044*	−0.052**
	(0.024)	(0.025)
60 hours	−0.067***	−0.031
	(0.025)	(0.025)
70 hours	−0.099***	−0.076***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
80 hours	−0.170***	−0.094***
	(0.025)	(0.026)
Veterans training	0.097***	0.046**
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Mentally-disabled training	0.057**	0.052**
	(0.022)	(0.023)
No special job training program	0.025	0.017
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Located in a different city	−0.030	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S137. Replicating Figure S14 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.010	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.051**	0.030
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.089***	0.020
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Generous parental leave policy	0.009	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority white owned	0.025	0.036
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Majority people of color owned	0.041*	0.047**
	(0.021)	(0.022)
All people of color owned	0.022	0.035
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.013	0.034
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.027	0.023
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.038	0.037
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.044*	0.021
	(0.026)	(0.026)
$40,000 per year	0.044	0.063
	(0.052)	(0.059)
$50,000 per year	0.156***	0.104*
	(0.053)	(0.058)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S138. Replicating Figure S14 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.086	0.086
	(0.054)	(0.055)
$70,000 per year	0.185***	0.092
	(0.056)	(0.059)
$80,000 per year	0.206***	0.148**
	(0.054)	(0.059)
$90,000 per year	0.178***	0.086
	(0.054)	(0.056)
$100,000 per year	0.209***	0.076
	(0.053)	(0.053)
$110,000 per year	0.246***	0.125**
	(0.052)	(0.056)
$120,000 per year	0.267***	0.097*
	(0.054)	(0.055)
$130,000 per year	0.233***	0.124**
	(0.053)	(0.060)
$140,000 per year	0.323***	0.167***
	(0.056)	(0.056)
$150,000 per year	0.284***	0.152***
	(0.053)	(0.054)
$160,000 per year	0.247***	0.132**
	(0.052)	(0.056)
$170,000 per year	0.252***	0.255***
	(0.051)	(0.054)
$180,000 per year	0.326***	0.170***
	(0.054)	(0.055)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S139. Replicating Figure S14 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.303***	0.175***
	(0.054)	(0.057)
$200,000 per year	0.381***	0.194***
	(0.056)	(0.059)
$210,000 per year	0.297***	0.142**
	(0.053)	(0.055)
$220,000 per year	0.399***	0.215***
	(0.050)	(0.056)
$230,000 per year	0.353***	0.203***
	(0.055)	(0.057)
$240,000 per year	0.360***	0.173***
	(0.054)	(0.055)
$250,000 per year	0.304***	0.249***
	(0.051)	(0.055)
$260,000 per year	0.393***	0.132**
	(0.053)	(0.056)
$270,000 per year	0.436***	0.295***
	(0.052)	(0.053)
$280,000 per year	0.420***	0.213***
	(0.051)	(0.055)
$290,000 per year	0.427***	0.169***
	(0.052)	(0.056)
$300,000 per year	0.438***	0.291***
	(0.053)	(0.056)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S140. Replicating Figure S14 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.034*	0.034*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Largely creative work	0.023	0.052***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Unionized	−0.004	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Sometimes work from home	0.003	0.038**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Primarily works from home	0.026	0.011
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Mix of individual and team work	0.009	0.019
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Mostly team work	0.0001	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.007	−0.020
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.093***	0.089***
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.089***	0.106***
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Constant	0.025	0.111*
	(0.061)	(0.064)
Observations	3,856	3,856
R^2	0.100	0.062
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.044
Residual Std. Error (df = 3782)	0.479	0.489
F Statistic (df = 73; 3782)	5.760***	3.414***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S141. Replicating Figure S14 responsibility and complaint results

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Privately owned by one individual	0.015	0.014
	(0.026)	(0.027)
Publicly owned by shareholders	−0.003	0.063**
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Workers are shareholders	0.050*	0.122***
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.039	0.085***
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Workers elect their managers	0.023	0.072**
	(0.027)	(0.028)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.015)
250 co-workers	−0.027	−0.009
	(0.026)	(0.024)
500 co-workers	−0.052**	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.024)
1,000 co-workers	−0.064**	−0.016
	(0.025)	(0.025)
5,000 co-workers	−0.027	−0.001
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.048**	−0.040**
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.030	−0.040**
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S142. Replicating Figure S14 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Majority-men owned	0.033	0.021
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Majority-women owned	−0.013	0.011
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Women owned	−0.010	0.027
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Employer pays 75%	0.013	0.023
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Employer pays 100%	0.021	0.031
	(0.019)	(0.019)
50 hours	0.022	−0.041
	(0.025)	(0.026)
60 hours	0.049*	−0.058**
	(0.025)	(0.025)
70 hours	0.055**	−0.078***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
80 hours	0.023	−0.116***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Veterans training	0.061***	0.076***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Mentally-disabled training	0.043*	0.056**
	(0.022)	(0.024)
No special job training program	0.006	0.027
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Located in a different city	−0.007	0.00002
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S143. Replicating Figure S14 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.026	−0.005
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.034	0.065***
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.048**	0.071***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Generous parental leave policy	0.022	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Majority white owned	0.006	0.011
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Majority people of color owned	0.013	0.038*
	(0.023)	(0.022)
All people of color owned	−0.003	0.030
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.006	−0.004
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.012	0.036
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.025	0.045*
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.060**	0.057**
	(0.025)	(0.025)
$40,000 per year	0.005	−0.023
	(0.060)	(0.059)
$50,000 per year	−0.008	0.105*
	(0.056)	(0.057)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S144. Replicating Figure S14 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.052	0.118**
	(0.058)	(0.059)
$70,000 per year	0.022	0.136**
	(0.060)	(0.057)
$80,000 per year	0.028	0.164***
	(0.056)	(0.058)
$90,000 per year	−0.021	0.086
	(0.058)	(0.058)
$100,000 per year	0.036	0.108*
	(0.057)	(0.056)
$110,000 per year	0.073	0.127**
	(0.055)	(0.056)
$120,000 per year	0.070	0.172***
	(0.054)	(0.058)
$130,000 per year	0.142**	0.075
	(0.061)	(0.061)
$140,000 per year	0.161***	0.182***
	(0.057)	(0.057)
$150,000 per year	0.136**	0.165***
	(0.056)	(0.056)
$160,000 per year	0.092	0.159***
	(0.057)	(0.056)
$170,000 per year	0.123**	0.168***
	(0.058)	(0.057)
$180,000 per year	0.113**	0.180***
	(0.056)	(0.055)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S145. Replicating Figure S14 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.162***	0.176***
	(0.058)	(0.057)
$200,000 per year	0.159***	0.177***
	(0.061)	(0.058)
$210,000 per year	0.161***	0.178***
	(0.055)	(0.056)
$220,000 per year	0.147**	0.200***
	(0.057)	(0.053)
$230,000 per year	0.142**	0.203***
	(0.059)	(0.058)
$240,000 per year	0.168***	0.212***
	(0.056)	(0.054)
$250,000 per year	0.117**	0.182***
	(0.056)	(0.056)
$260,000 per year	0.178***	0.146**
	(0.058)	(0.057)
$270,000 per year	0.250***	0.273***
	(0.057)	(0.055)
$280,000 per year	0.096*	0.186***
	(0.056)	(0.053)
$290,000 per year	0.280***	0.237***
	(0.057)	(0.055)
$300,000 per year	0.279***	0.270***
	(0.057)	(0.058)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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TABLE S146. Replicating Figure S14 responsibility and complaint results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	More responsibilities	Better handle complaints
	(1)	(2)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.039**	0.046**
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Largely creative work	0.065***	0.046**
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Unionized	−0.029*	−0.018
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Sometimes work from home	−0.023	−0.033*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Primarily works from home	0.007	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Mix of individual and team work	−0.019	0.014
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Mostly team work	−0.026	−0.010
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.033	0.009
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.041**	0.147***
	(0.020)	(0.022)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.060**	0.152***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Constant	0.256***	0.099
	(0.064)	(0.065)
Observations	3,856	3,856
R^2	0.051	0.069
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.051
Residual Std. Error (df = 3782)	0.492	0.487
F Statistic (df = 73; 3782)	2.760***	3.830***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE S147. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican)	0.056***	0.057***
	(0.018)	(0.020)
Privately owned by one individual	0.017	−0.001
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Publicly owned by shareholders	0.049***	0.014
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Workers are shareholders	0.099***	0.102***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Workers sit on the corporate board	0.072***	0.116***
	(0.018)	(0.020)
Workers elect their managers	0.040**	0.088***
	(0.018)	(0.020)
Commitment to corporate social responsibility	0.001	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)
250 co-workers	0.026	−0.009
	(0.016)	(0.017)
500 co-workers	0.003	−0.034*
	(0.017)	(0.018)
1,000 co-workers	−0.007	−0.003
	(0.017)	(0.018)
5,000 co-workers	−0.014	−0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.046***	−0.049***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Replicating Figure S16

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TABLE S148. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Primarily donates to Republicans	−0.045***	−0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Majority-men owned	0.001	−0.016
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Majority-women owned	0.021	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Women owned	0.024	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Employer pays 75%	0.050***	0.012
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Employer pays 100%	0.067***	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.013)
50 hours	−0.053***	−0.060***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
60 hours	−0.085***	−0.060***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
70 hours	−0.125***	−0.085***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
80 hours	−0.183***	−0.100***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Veterans training	0.091***	0.058***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mentally-disabled training	0.049***	0.046***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
No special job training program	0.021	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Located in a different city	−0.036***	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S149. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Located in a different city but pays for relocation	−0.017	0.012
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Two weeks paid sick leave days	0.051***	0.040***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Unlimited paid sick leave days	0.089***	0.046***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Generous parental leave policy	0.030***	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Majority white owned	0.053***	0.044***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Majority people of color owned	0.052***	0.042***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
All people of color owned	0.043***	0.048***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Matches 25% of 401k contributions	−0.013	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.040**	0.060***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Matches 75% of 401k contributions	0.063***	0.062***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.071***	0.030*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
$40,000 per year	0.098***	0.104**
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$50,000 per year	0.120***	0.069*
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S150. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$60,000 per year	0.106***	0.078*
	(0.036)	(0.040)
$70,000 per year	0.215***	0.128***
	(0.039)	(0.043)
$80,000 per year	0.185***	0.132***
	(0.036)	(0.041)
$90,000 per year	0.185***	0.104***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$100,000 per year	0.225***	0.152***
	(0.037)	(0.039)
$110,000 per year	0.257***	0.148***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$120,000 per year	0.256***	0.138***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$130,000 per year	0.282***	0.184***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$140,000 per year	0.282***	0.172***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$150,000 per year	0.282***	0.147***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$160,000 per year	0.264***	0.131***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$170,000 per year	0.252***	0.204***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
$180,000 per year	0.302***	0.181***
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S151. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
$190,000 per year	0.332***	0.150***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$200,000 per year	0.351***	0.174***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$210,000 per year	0.288***	0.110***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
$220,000 per year	0.328***	0.189***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$230,000 per year	0.359***	0.208***
	(0.041)	(0.043)
$240,000 per year	0.372***	0.241***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
$250,000 per year	0.332***	0.229***
	(0.036)	(0.038)
$260,000 per year	0.381***	0.188***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
$270,000 per year	0.377***	0.216***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
$280,000 per year	0.359***	0.175***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
$290,000 per year	0.378***	0.165***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
$300,000 per year	0.410***	0.228***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
Mix of repetitive and creative work	0.020	0.036***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S152. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Largely creative work	0.012	0.036***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Unionized	−0.023**	0.031**
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Sometimes work from home	0.023*	0.025*
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Primarily works from home	0.053***	0.021
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mix of individual and team work	0.016	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mostly team work	0.004	−0.0004
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	0.008	−0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Somewhat friendly and supportive	0.102***	0.103***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generally friendly and supportive	0.104***	0.117***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Party (Republican) × Privately owned by one individual	−0.006	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × Publicly owned by shareholders	−0.013*	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × Workers are shareholders	−0.022***	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × Workers sit on the corporate board	−0.026***	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S153. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican) × Workers elect their managers	−0.026***	−0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × Commitment to corporate social responsibility	−0.001	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Party (Republican) × 250 co-workers	0.007	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × 500 co-workers	0.003	−0.010
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × 1,000 co-workers	0.006	−0.003
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × 5,000 co-workers	0.009	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × Primarily donates to Democrats	−0.035***	−0.027***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Primarily donates to Republicans	0.033***	0.011*
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Majority-men owned	−0.0001	−0.002
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Majority-women owned	−0.013*	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Women owned	−0.012*	−0.010
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Employer pays 75%	−0.005	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Employer pays 100%	−0.012**	−0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S154. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican) × 50 hours	−0.012*	−0.011
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × 60 hours	0.0003	−0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × 70 hours	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × 80 hours	−0.015**	−0.010
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Party (Republican) × Veterans training	0.009	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Mentally-disabled training	−0.003	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × No special job training program	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Located in a different city	0.003	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Located in a different city but pays for relocation	0.003	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Two weeks paid sick leave days	−0.009*	−0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Unlimited paid sick leave days	−0.013**	−0.018***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Generous parental leave policy	−0.004	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE S155. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican) × Majority white owned	−0.002	−0.0001
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Majority people of color owned	−0.017***	−0.020***
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × All people of color owned	−0.028***	−0.022***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Matches 25% of 401k contributions	0.005	−0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Matches 50% of 401k contributions	0.004	−0.0005
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Matches 75% of 401k contributions	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Matches 100% of 401k contributions	0.014*	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × $40,000 per year	0.015	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $50,000 per year	0.007	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $60,000 per year	0.003	0.003
	(0.015)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $70,000 per year	0.009	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Party (Republican) × $80,000 per year	−0.020	−0.013
	(0.015)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $90,000 per year	0.022	0.013
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S156. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican) × $100,000 per year	0.019	0.0004
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Party (Republican) × $110,000 per year	−0.010	−0.001
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $120,000 per year	0.004	0.010
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Party (Republican) × $130,000 per year	0.016	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Party (Republican) × $140,000 per year	−0.0003	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Party (Republican) × $150,000 per year	0.001	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $160,000 per year	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $170,000 per year	−0.009	0.015
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Party (Republican) × $180,000 per year	0.020	0.020
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $190,000 per year	−0.005	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Party (Republican) × $200,000 per year	0.006	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $210,000 per year	0.028	0.025
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $220,000 per year	−0.002	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$	

TABLE S157. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican) × $230,000 per year	−0.010	0.020
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Party (Republican) × $240,000 per year	0.003	0.027
	(0.015)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $250,000 per year	0.013	0.023
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Party (Republican) × $260,000 per year	0.024	0.029*
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $270,000 per year	0.016	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $280,000 per year	−0.006	0.024
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Party (Republican) × $290,000 per year	−0.001	0.035**
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × $300,000 per year	−0.007	−0.001
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party (Republican) × Mix of repetitive and creative work	−0.005	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Largely creative work	−0.005	−0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Unionized	−0.018***	−0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Party (Republican) × Sometimes work from home	−0.005	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Primarily works from home	0.005	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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TABLE S158. Replicating Figure S16 work and power results (cont.)

	Dependent variable:	
	Prefer to work	More power
	(1)	(2)
Party (Republican) × Mix of individual and team work	−0.005	−0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Mostly team work	0.005	−0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Somewhat unfriendly and unsupportive	−0.001	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Party (Republican) × Somewhat friendly and supportive	−0.008	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Party (Republican) × Generally friendly and supportive	−0.003	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	−0.003	0.117**
	(0.044)	(0.048)
Observations	7,896	7,896
R^2	0.126	0.072
Adjusted R^2	0.110	0.054
Residual Std. Error (df = 7748)	0.472	0.486
F Statistic (df = 147; 7748)	7.609***	4.066***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

STUDY 2: EXTENDED APPENDIX

Study 2: Sample Descriptives

TABLE S159. Descriptive statistics - Study 2

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N
Man	0.438	0.496	2,105
Woman	0.562	0.496	2,105
Less than $14,999	0.125	0.331	2,104
$20,000 to $24,999	0.053	0.225	2,104
Prefer not to answer	0.025	0.155	2,105
$55,000 to $59,999	0.027	0.161	2,104
$15,000 to $19,999	0.059	0.236	2,104
$70,000 to $74,999	0.032	0.177	2,104
$100,000 to $124,999	0.067	0.250	2,104
$65,000 to $69,999	0.026	0.160	2,104
$95,000 to $99,999	0.027	0.162	2,104
$150,000 to $174,999	0.031	0.173	2,104
$250,000 and above	0.024	0.154	2,104
$125,000 to $149,999	0.047	0.211	2,104
$30,000 to $34,999	0.057	0.231	2,104
$50,000 to $54,999	0.051	0.221	2,104
$175,000 to $199,999	0.017	0.128	2,104
$60,000 to $64,999	0.032	0.177	2,104
$35,000 to $39,999	0.052	0.222	2,104
$75,000 to $79,999	0.024	0.154	2,104
$25,000 to $29,999	0.056	0.229	2,104
$90,000 to $94,999	0.010	0.097	2,104
$40,000 to $44,999	0.041	0.199	2,104
$200,000 to $249,999	0.015	0.121	2,104
$80,000 to $84,999	0.021	0.143	2,104
$45,000 to $49,999	0.057	0.232	2,104
$85,000 to $89,999	0.011	0.106	2,104
High school graduate	0.183	0.387	2,105
Bachelor's degree	0.248	0.432	2,105
Completed some college, but no degree	0.216	0.412	2,105
Master's or professional degree	0.142	0.349	2,105
Doctorate degree	0.031	0.174	2,105
None of the above	0.004	0.065	2,105
Associate's degree	0.100	0.300	2,105
Other post high school vocational training	0.052	0.223	2,105
Some high school or less	0.022	0.148	2,105

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TABLE S160. Descriptive statistics - Study 2 (cont.)

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N
Other services (except public administration)	0.314	0.464	2,105
Retail trade	0.058	0.235	2,105
Educational services	0.068	0.252	2,105
Finance or insurance	0.056	0.230	2,105
Manufacturing	0.051	0.221	2,105
Real estate or rental and leasing	0.009	0.095	2,105
Utilities	0.011	0.104	2,105
Management of companies or enterprises	0.011	0.104	2,105
No answer	0.004	0.062	2,105
Transportation or warehousing	0.033	0.178	2,105
Admin, support, waste management or remediation services	0.014	0.119	2,105
Unclassified establishments	0.052	0.222	2,105
Arts, entertainment or recreation	0.021	0.145	2,105
Professional, scientific or technical services	0.062	0.241	2,105
Accommodation or food services	0.031	0.173	2,105
Health care or social assistance	0.087	0.282	2,105
Information	0.038	0.190	2,105
Construction	0.056	0.229	2,105
Mining	0.001	0.038	2,105
Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support	0.007	0.081	2,105
Wholesale trade	0.005	0.072	2,105
Government	0.041	0.198	2,105
Unemployed	0.161	0.368	2,105
Sales and office	0.053	0.224	2,105
Management, professional, and related	0.140	0.347	2,105
Other	0.432	0.496	2,105
Service	0.081	0.273	2,105
Production, transportation, and material moving	0.033	0.179	2,105
Construction, extraction, and maintenance	0.051	0.221	2,105
Farming, fishing, and forestry	0.004	0.062	2,105

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TABLE S161. Descriptive statistics - Study 2 (cont.)

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N
Yes, I am a member of a labor union	0.115	0.319	2,105
No, and I have never been a member of a labor union	0.702	0.457	2,105
No, but I was a member of a labor union	0.183	0.387	2,105
White	0.821	0.384	2,105
Black	0.084	0.278	2,105
Some other race	0.036	0.185	2,105
Pacific Islander	0.002	0.044	2,105
Asian	0.026	0.158	2,105
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.005	0.072	2,105
Not Hispanic	0.930	0.255	2,105
Hispanic	0.045	0.208	2,105
Lean Republican	0.109	0.311	2,105
Neither Democrat nor Republican	0.183	0.387	2,105
Lean Democrat	0.098	0.298	2,105
Republican	0.253	0.435	2,105
Democrat	0.356	0.479	2,105

Study 2: Ethics

We did not handle direct recruitment or payment to survey respondents. We hired Lucid Theorem for $1 per response.

Study 2: Experimental conditions

Codetermination

- Control: Codetermination is a policy where a company is required to have worker representatives on their board of directors. Workers at the company vote for their own representatives on the board. The worker representatives, alongside company shareholders, vote on how to run the company.
- Benefit: Codetermination is a policy where a company is required to have worker representatives on their board of directors. Workers at the company vote for their own representatives on the board. The worker representatives, alongside company shareholders, vote on how to run the company. Some say that giving workers a voice on corporate boards will make sure the company better reflects what workers want instead of only what executives and shareholders want.
- Cost: Codetermination is a policy where a company is required to have worker representatives on their board of directors. Workers at the company vote for their own representatives on the board. The worker representatives, alongside company shareholders, vote on how to run the company. Some say that giving workers seats on corporate boards would make running the firm less efficient because workers will have to spend more time thinking about how the firm runs in addition to their normal duties.
- Both: Codetermination is a policy where a company is required to have worker representatives on their board of directors. Workers at the company vote for their own representatives on the board. The worker representatives, alongside company shareholders, vote on how to run the company. Some say that giving workers seats on corporate boards would make running the firm less efficient because workers will have to spend more time thinking about how the firm runs in addition to their normal duties. Others say that

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giving workers a voice on corporate boards will make sure the company better reflects what workers want instead of only what executives and shareholders want.

Manager elections

- Control: Manager elections is a policy where workers directly elect their managers. The managers then supervise the workers under them and make decisions about how to run the company. Managers have to win re-election from their workers just like representatives for political office.
- Benefit: Manager elections is a policy where workers directly elect their managers. The managers then supervise the workers under them and make decisions about how to run the company. Managers have to win re-election from their workers just like representatives for political office. Some say that allowing workers elect their own managers will make sure that companies are run the way that workers think is best.
- Cost: Manager elections is a policy where workers directly elect their managers. The managers then supervise the workers under them and make decisions about how to run the company. Managers have to win re-election from their workers just like representatives for political office. Some say allowing workers to elect their own managers might lead to less efficient companies because workers will have to think about managing the whole company instead of just focusing on their own work.
- Both: Manager elections is a policy where workers directly elect their managers. The managers then supervise the workers under them and make decisions about how to run the company. Managers have to win re-election from their workers just like representatives for political office. Some say allowing workers to elect their own managers might lead to less efficient companies because workers will have to think about managing the whole company instead of just focusing on their own work. Others say that allowing workers elect their own managers will make sure that companies are run the way that workers think is best.

ESOPs

- Control: Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are a policy where workers can purchase stocks in the company in which they work. They can slowly accrue more stocks in the company the longer they stay at the company. The shares rarely provide workers voting rights that other types of stocks usually provided to other shareholders.
- Benefit: Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are a policy where workers can purchase stocks in the company in which they work. They can slowly accrue more stocks in the company the longer they stay at the company. The shares rarely provide workers voting rights that other types of stocks usually provided to other shareholders. Some say that ESOPs ensure that companies listen to their workers because they have to listen to workers like how they listen to other shareholders.
- Cost: Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are a policy where workers can purchase stocks in the company in which they work. They can slowly accrue more stocks in the company the longer they stay at the company. The shares rarely provide workers voting rights that other types of stocks usually provided to other shareholders. Some say that in order for ESOPs to be effective, workers have to spend time voicing their concerns to shareholders in addition to the work they do for the company.
- Both: Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are a policy where workers can purchase stocks in the company in which they work. They can slowly accrue more stocks in the company the longer they stay at the company. The shares rarely provide workers voting rights that other types of stocks usually provided to other shareholders. Some say that in order for ESOPs to be effective, workers have to spend time voicing their concerns to shareholders in addition to the work they do for the company. Others say that ESOPs ensure that companies listen to their workers because they have to listen to workers like how they listen to other shareholders.

Fracking ban

- Control: A federal ban on fracking would prohibit oil-and-gas companies from fracking on both private

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and public lands. Fracking is when companies shoot water into the ground to break apart rock to extract gas and oil. A ban would stop current and future fracking.

- Benefit: A federal ban on fracking would prohibit oil-and-gas companies from fracking on both private and public lands. Fracking is when companies shoot water into the ground to break apart rock to extract gas and oil. A ban would stop current and future fracking. Some say that the federal ban would help reduce the severity of climate crisis by moving the country away from fossil fuels.
- Cost: A federal ban on fracking would prohibit oil-and-gas companies from fracking on both private and public lands. Fracking is when companies shoot water into the ground to break apart rock to extract gas and oil. A ban would stop current and future fracking. Some say that the federal ban would increase the price of oil and gas because of reduced production.
- Both: A federal ban on fracking would prohibit oil-and-gas companies from fracking on both private and public lands. Fracking is when companies shoot water into the ground to break apart rock to extract gas and oil. A ban would stop current and future fracking. Some say that the federal ban would increase the price of oil and gas because of reduced production. Others say that the federal ban would help reduce the severity of climate crisis by moving the country away from fossil fuels.

Parental leave

- Control: A four-week paid-leave policy would provide new mothers with four weeks of paid leave from their jobs. It would also provide anyone who must perform caregiving duties for a loved one four weeks of paid leave.
- Benefit: A four-week paid-leave policy would provide new mothers with four weeks of paid leave from their jobs. It would also provide anyone who must perform caregiving duties for a loved one four weeks of paid leave. Some say that the paid leave would provide much needed flexibility to workers who need to recover from having children or take care of loved ones.
- Cost: A four-week paid-leave policy would provide new mothers with four weeks of paid leave from their jobs. It would also provide anyone who must perform caregiving duties for a loved one four weeks of paid leave. Some say that the paid leave would place a burden on employers and coworkers because work would have to be reallocated to the remaining employees.
- Both: A four-week paid-leave policy would provide new mothers with four weeks of paid leave from their jobs. It would also provide anyone who must perform caregiving duties for a loved one four weeks of paid leave. Some say that the paid leave would place a burden on employers and coworkers because work would have to be reallocated to the remaining employees. Others say that the paid leave would provide much needed flexibility to workers who need to recover from having children or take care of loved ones.

Study 2: Measures

Support is measured using a seven-point scale from "strongly support" to "strongly oppose." Below is the wording for each policy:

- Codetermination: Would you support or oppose a government policy requiring codetermination at large companies?
- Manager elections: Would you support or oppose a government policy requiring manager elections at large companies?
- ESOPs: Would you support or oppose a government policy requiring ESOPs at large companies?
- Fracking ban: Would you support or oppose a federal ban on fracking?
- Parental leave: Would you support or oppose a four weeks paid-leave policy?

Work is measured using a seven-point scale from "Very likely" to "Very unlikely." Below is the wording for each policy:

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- Codetermination: How likely or unlikely are you to want to work at a company that had codetermination?
- Manager elections: How likely or unlikely are you to want to work at a company that had manager elections?
- ESOPs: How likely or unlikely are you to want to work at a company that had ESOPs?
- Parental leave: How likely or unlikely are you to want to work at a company that had a four weeks paid-leave policy?

Power is measured using a seven-point scale from "much more power" to "much less power." Below is the wording for each policy:

- Codetermination: Do you think workers will have more or less power over how the company is run in firms with codetermination?
- Manager elections: Do you think workers will have more or less power over how the company is run in firms with manager elections?
- ESOPs: Do you think workers will have more or less power over how the company is run in firms with ESOPs?

Responsibility is measured using a seven-point scale from "much more time" to "much less time." Below is the wording for each policy:

- Codetermination: Do you think workers will have to spend more or less time thinking about management decisions (e.g., what other workers should do, how best to spend companies' funds, future of companies, etc.) in companies with codetermination?
- Manager elections: Do you think workers will have to spend more or less time thinking about management decisions (e.g., what other workers should do, how best to spend companies' funds, future of companies, etc.) companies with manager elections?
- ESOPs: Do you think workers will have to spend more or less time thinking about management decisions (e.g., what other workers should do, how best to spend companies' funds, future of companies, etc.) companies with ESOPs?

Cost is measured using a five-point scale from "a great deal" to "nothing at all." Below is the wording for each policy:

- Fracking ban: Do you think the ban on fracking would personally cost you a great deal or nothing at all?
- Parental leave: Do you think a four-week paid-leave policy would personally cost you a great deal or nothing at all?

Benefit is measured using a five-point scale from "a great deal" to "nothing at all." Below is the wording for each policy:

- Fracking ban: Do you think the ban on fracking would personally benefit you a great deal or none at all?
- Parental leave: Do you think a four-week paid-leave policy would personally benefit you a great deal or none at all?

We measured social dominance orientation with four items on seven-point scales from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." They are:

- In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.
- We should not push for group equality.
- Group equality should be our ideal.
- Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

We measured support for democracy using five items on seven-point scales from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." They are:

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections

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- Having experts, not elected officials, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
- Having the army rule
- Electing representatives to make policies
- Having a democratic political system

We measure racial resentment using two items on five-point scales from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Note that we deviated from our pre-analysis plan because the survey was longer than we expected during pre-testing. They are:

- Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

We measure class identity by asking:

- Which social class do you identify with?
  - Lower class
  - Working class
  - Middle class
  - Upper class

We measure class identity strength with two questions on seven-point scales. Note that we deviated from our pre-analysis plan because the survey was longer than we expected during pre-testing. They are:

- When talking about the [respondent class], I usually use "they" instead of "we."
- Being [respondent class] is important to me.

We measured place in the workplace using the following items:

- Which of the following best describes the position which you hold within your business or organization? Would it be a managerial position, a supervisory position, or a non-management position
  - Managerial
  - Supervisory
  - Non-management/Non-supervisory
- If they choose "Managerial": Would that be a top, upper, middle, or lower managerial position?
  - Lower
  - Middle
  - Upper
  - Top
- The next question concerns policymaking at your workplace; that is, making decisions about such things as the products or services delivered, the total number of people employed, budgets, and so forth. Do you participate in making these kinds of decisions, or even provide advice about them?
  - Yes
  - No
- As an official part of your main job, do you supervise the work of other employees or tell other employees what work to do?
  - Yes
  - No

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We measure union membership by asking:

- Are you a member of a labor union?
  - Yes, I am a member of a labor union
  - No, but I was a member of a labor union
  - No, and I have never been a member of a labor union

We measure ideology using the standard seven-point scale from "very liberal" to "very conservative."

We received the following covariates from Lucid: ethnicity, Hispanic, age, education, household income, and party identification.

Study 2: Policy knowledge wording

We asked the following questions to assess whether respondents understood the policies. These questions were also written to ensure that one would need to read carefully to correctly answer the questions. We also randomized the order of the answers.

Codetermination: Which statement best describes codetermination?

- Codetermination is where workers directly elect their managers
- Codetermination is where workers elect representatives to sit on the corporate board
- Codetermination is where workers and managers collectively decide how to run the company
- Codetermination is where workers become shareholders of their firm

Manager elections: Which statement best describes manager elections?

- Correct: Manager elections are where workers vote for their managers
- Manager elections are where workers vote for a representative on a corporate board
- Manager elections are where workers become shareholders of the firm
- Manager elections are where workers vote on their companies' policies

ESOPs: Which statement best describes employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)?

- Correct: ESOPs are where workers accrue stock in the companies they work for
- ESOPs are where workers can vote for their managers
- ESOPs are where workers can vote for a worker representative on the corporate board
- ESOPs are where workers can become members of the corporate board

Fracking ban: Which statement best describes a ban on fracking?

- A ban on fracking would prohibit all oil drilling on federal and private lands
- Correct: A ban on fracking would prohibit shooting water into the ground to extract oil and gas
- A ban on fracking would prohibit drilling in the Alaskan wilderness
- A ban on fracking would close extracting oil and gas from the Gulf of Mexico

Parental leave policy: Which statement best describes the four-week paid-leave policy?

- Workers would have four weeks of paid leave for new motherhood or caring for a loved one
- Correct: Workers would have four weeks of paid leave for only caring for a loved one
- Workers would have four weeks of paid leave for any reason whatsoever
- Workers would have four weeks of paid leave for mothers and fathers

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Study 2: Results using standardized outcome measures

The following results use outcome measures that we mean-centered and divided by their standard deviations. Therefore, the coefficients represent standard deviation changes.

TABLE S162. Policy framing effects on support for workplace democracy - Standardized measure

	Support			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.058*	0.116*	0.089	−0.030
	(0.034)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Cost	−0.096***	−0.081	−0.104*	−0.105*
	(0.035)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Cost and benefit	−0.073**	−0.063	−0.015	−0.140**
	(0.036)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Constant	0.028	0.007	0.007	0.069
	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.003
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.005	0.003	0.002

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.

We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.

We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.

We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S163. Policy framing effects on work preferences for workplace democracy - Standardized measure

	Workplace policies	Work Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.051	0.049	0.107*	−0.004
	(0.034)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Cost	−0.111***	−0.166***	−0.067	−0.100*
	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Cost and benefit	−0.055	−0.104*	−0.035	−0.026
	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Constant	0.029	0.055	−0.001	0.033
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.043)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.002
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.0002

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S164. Policy framing effects on perceptions of worker power in workplace democracy - Standardized measure

	Power			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.104***	0.034	0.123**	0.155***
	(0.034)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Cost	−0.028	−0.038	−0.077	0.032
	(0.036)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Cost and benefit	0.011	−0.080	−0.070	0.182***
	(0.035)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Constant	−0.022	0.021	0.006	−0.092**
	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.0004	0.005	0.005

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S165. Policy framing effects on perceptions of worker responsibilities in workplace democracy - Standardized measure

	Responsibility			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.047	−0.003	−0.010	0.155***
	(0.035)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Cost	0.086**	−0.013	0.113*	0.158***
	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Cost and benefit	0.025	−0.148**	0.004	0.219***
	(0.036)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Constant	−0.039	0.041	−0.027	−0.133***
	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.007
Adjusted R^2	0.0002	0.002	0.001	0.005

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We mean-centered and divided by the standard deviation at the policy level for each outcome variable.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

Study 2: Predictors of policy attitudes

TABLE S166. Predictors of support for workplace democracy - Unstandardized measure

	Support	
	Workplace democracy policies	
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.053***	−0.057***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Party ID (Republican)	−0.161***	−0.116***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Support political democracy (index)	−0.482***	
	(0.028)	
Oppose a strong leader ignoring Congress and elections		−0.142***
		(0.019)
Oppose experts, not elected officials, making decisions		−0.152***
		(0.019)
Oppose having the army rule		−0.124***
		(0.020)
Support electing representatives		0.012
		(0.025)
Support having a democratic political system		0.022
		(0.023)
Social dominance orientation	−0.253***	−0.247***
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Place in workplace hierarchy	0.047***	0.031**
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Household income	0.058***	0.035*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Education	0.052**	0.032
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	1.122***	1.034***
	(0.024)	(0.026)
N	6,414	6,414
R^2	0.213	0.235
Adjusted R^2	0.211	0.234

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S167. Predictors of support for each workplace democracy proposal - Unstandardized measure

	Support		
	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.067***	−0.076***	−0.027
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Party ID (Republican)	−0.104***	−0.141***	−0.102***
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Oppose a strong leader ignoring Congress and elections	−0.111***	−0.188***	−0.127***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Oppose experts, not elected officials, making decisions	−0.173***	−0.163***	−0.119***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Oppose having the army rule	−0.072***	−0.179***	−0.119***
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Support electing representatives	0.006	−0.002	0.031
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Support having a democratic political system	0.061**	−0.014	0.019
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Social dominance orientation	−0.311***	−0.202***	−0.229***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Place in workplace hierarchy	0.025	0.016	0.052***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Household income	0.024	0.031	0.050**
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Education	0.056**	−0.015	0.056**
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Constant	0.968***	1.061***	0.891***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.031)
N	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.223	0.247	0.193
Adjusted R^2	0.219	0.243	0.189

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

TABLE S168. Predictors of support for benchmark policies - Unstandardized measure

	Support Benchmark policies	
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.128***	−0.124***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Party ID (Republican)	−0.227***	−0.202***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Support political democracy (index)	−0.242***	
	(0.026)	
Oppose a strong leader ignoring Congress and elections		−0.030*
		(0.018)
Oppose experts, not elected officials, making decisions		−0.131***
		(0.016)
Oppose having the army rule		−0.074***
		(0.021)
Support electing representatives		0.050**
		(0.023)
Support having a democratic political system		0.004
		(0.022)
Social dominance orientation	−0.277***	−0.267***
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Place in workplace hierarchy	0.012	0.003
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Household income	0.039**	0.028
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education	0.051***	0.033*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	0.940***	0.876***
	(0.023)	(0.025)
N	4,276	4,276
R^2	0.341	0.353
Adjusted R^2	0.340	0.351

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S169. Predictors of support for each benchmark policy - Unstandardized measure

	Support	
	Fracking	Parental leave
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.192***	−0.056***
	(0.027)	(0.019)
Party ID (Republican)	−0.301***	−0.104***
	(0.025)	(0.018)
Oppose a strong leader ignoring Congress and elections	−0.004	−0.057***
	(0.028)	(0.020)
Oppose experts, not elected officials, making decisions	−0.167***	−0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.019)
Oppose having the army rule	−0.102***	−0.047**
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Support electing representatives	0.052	0.048*
	(0.033)	(0.026)
Support having a democratic political system	0.045	−0.037
	(0.030)	(0.026)
Social dominance orientation	−0.182***	−0.353***
	(0.038)	(0.034)
Place in workplace hierarchy	0.024	−0.017
	(0.020)	(0.016)
Household income	0.037	0.019
	(0.025)	(0.020)
Education	0.062**	0.004
	(0.028)	(0.023)
Constant	0.898***	1.107***
	(0.034)	(0.029)
N	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.330	0.194
Adjusted R^2	0.327	0.189

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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Study 2: Results using ordinal logistic regression

Tables S170 to S173 match Tables S174 to S177 but use logistic regression. We prefer the OLS estimates in the main text because they are easily interpretable and transparent, however, we also want to provide these results for readers who prefer different modeling strategies.

TABLE S170. Policy framing effects on support for workplace democracy - Ordinal logistic regression

	Support			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.129**	0.257**	0.165	−0.048
	(0.063)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Cost	−0.183***	−0.156	−0.195*	−0.202*
	(0.061)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.106)
Cost and benefit	−0.117*	−0.077	−0.035	−0.254**
	(0.063)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.110)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

TABLE S171. Policy framing effects on work preferences for workplace democracy - Ordinal logistic regression

	Work			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.100	0.088	0.200*	−0.009
	(0.062)	(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.107)
Cost	−0.195***	−0.291***	−0.126	−0.180*
	(0.063)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Cost and benefit	−0.088	−0.153	−0.076	−0.035
	(0.063)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.110)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S172. Policy framing effects on perceptions of worker power in workplace democracy - Ordinal logistic regression

		Power		
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.187***	0.030	0.201*	0.357***
	(0.061)	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.110)
Cost	−0.024	−0.072	−0.120	0.132
	(0.064)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.120)
Cost and benefit	0.016	−0.145	−0.169	0.400***
	(0.062)	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.112)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

TABLE S173. Policy framing effects on perceptions of worker responsibilities in workplace democracy - Ordinal logistic regression

		Responsibility		
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.093	0.016	−0.034	0.324***
	(0.063)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.113)
Cost	0.165***	−0.005	0.170	0.361***
	(0.063)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.111)
Cost and benefit	0.036	−0.255**	−0.029	0.430***
	(0.065)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.115)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

Study 2: Table versions of plots

TABLE S174. Policy framing effects on support for workplace democracy - Unstandardized measure

	Support			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.019*	0.035*	0.030	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Cost	−0.030***	−0.025	−0.035*	−0.031*
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Cost and benefit	−0.022*	−0.019	−0.005	−0.041**
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Constant	0.684***	0.678***	0.547***	0.647***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.033	0.006	0.005	0.003
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.005	0.003	0.002

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

TABLE S175. Policy framing effects on work preferences for workplace democracy - Unstandardized measure

	Work			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.015	0.014	0.034*	−0.001
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Cost	−0.031***	−0.046***	−0.021	−0.026*
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Cost and benefit	−0.015	−0.029*	−0.011	−0.007
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Constant	0.683***	0.691***	0.563***	0.675***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.034	0.007	0.004	0.002
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.006	0.003	0.0002

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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TABLE S176. Policy framing effects on perceptions of worker power in workplace democracy - Unstandardized measure

	Power			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.022***	0.007	0.028**	0.032***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Cost	−0.006	−0.008	−0.017	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Cost and benefit	0.002	−0.016	−0.016	0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Constant	0.697***	0.706***	0.676***	0.594***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.032	0.002	0.006	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.031	0.0004	0.005	0.005

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

TABLE S177. Policy framing effects on perceptions of worker responsibilities in workplace democracy - Unstandardized measure

	Responsibility			
	Workplace policies	Codetermination	Elections	ESOPs
Benefit	0.009	−0.001	−0.002	0.030***
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Cost	0.017**	−0.003	0.025*	0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Cost and benefit	0.004	−0.030**	0.001	0.043***
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Constant	0.669***	0.685***	0.664***	0.597***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)
N	6,414	2,138	2,138	2,138
R^2	0.014	0.004	0.003	0.007
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.002	0.001	0.005

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors at the respondent level are in the parentheses.
We include policy-level fixed effects but do not show them to preserve space.
We fielded the survey on Lucid from January 19th to February 11th, 2022.

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