Ethnicity, Political Survival, and the Exchange of Nationalist Foreign Policy

Supplementary File

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Details on Coding Nationalist Foreign Policy Exchange

This section provides details on coding nationalist foreign policy exchange. As explained in the main text, the basis of the data on nationalist foreign policy exchange is Thompson and Dreyer's (2012) data on interstate rivalries. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007), an earlier version of Thompson and Dreyer (2012), created a dataset of rivalry dyads based on the definition of rivalry as threatening competitors. They referred to comprehensive historical literature on foreign policy (28-36): "The list of references exceeds some fifty pages" (35). The data have been widely used as a measure of interstate rivalry (Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012; Ghatak, Gold, and Prins 2017; Salehyan 2008; Suzuki and Loizides 2011).

As I explain in the main text, I narrowed the universe of the cases of nationalist foreign policy exchange into the dyads that were prone to violent behavior. States engaged in nationalist foreign policy exchange should be more likely to use violence than bargaining in solving disputed issues because of the importance of nationalism for mass legitimacy (Huth and Allee 2002: 80; Takeuchi 2014). For example, India and Pakistan engaged in a "zero-sum" game over Kashmir (Hagerty 1998: 67). On the one hand, Pakistan's national legitimacy was based on the idea that "the subcontinent's Muslims [can] safeguard their political rights only through the formation of a separate country"; therefore, India's control of Kashmir was unacceptable. On the other hand, India's national legitimacy relied on the "successful incorporation of all minorities, including Muslims, into the Indian political order." This legitimacy would be undermined if Kashmir left the state of India, because it would indicate that Kashmiris, a minority group within India, prefer separation over staying within India. For these reasons, Pakistan supported Kashmiri secessionism while India opposed it for the sake of its territorial integrity, resulting in numerous violent clashes and three wars. In order to capture proneness to violent behavior, I used Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006, updated to ver. 5.20) data, which identify the dyads that experienced multiple militarized interstate disputes

(MIDs) with issue linkage, in reference to the MID dataset version 3.10 (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). In MIDs, states by definition take militarized actions; therefore MIDs capture violent state behavior.

Drawing on Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), I identified the dyad-years that were coded as having both threatening competitors and proneness to violent behavior. Then, during the period when civic-/ethno-nationalist foreign policy was present in these dyad-years, I used the years of the first MID and the last MID as the beginning and end of proneness to violent behavior (MID-proneness). While there are other datasets measuring MID-proneness (see a review in Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007: 36-71), Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are the most up-to-date (up to 2001). Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) data have also been used in a wide range of literature: sanctions (Early 2009), terrorism (Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012), and nuclear proliferation (Kroenig 2009).

I expanded the temporal scope of MID-proneness from 2001 to 2010, by referring to the MID dataset version 4.01 (Palmer et al. 2015). Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006: 337-338) do not set any explicit threshold for temporal proximity between each MID to identify the continuation of MID-proneness, as long as there is an issue linkage. They "consider the beginning of the first dyadic dispute to be the first behavioral sign [of MID proneness] and, similarly, the end of the last dyadic dispute is the last behavioral sign [of MID proneness]" (338). In their operational definition, to be *candidates* for MID-prone dyads, dyads must have experienced at least three MIDs "over the whole 1816-2001 period," while the cases having experienced only one or two MIDs during this period are defined as isolated conflict (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006: 337). Among these candidates, if at least two MIDs have an issue linkage, they are considered as MID-prone dyads.

To follow Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) operationalization and extend the temporal scope up to 2010, I checked two things. First, if a dyad with isolated conflict experienced at least three

MIDs in total during the expanded period of 1816-2010 and at least two of them had an issue linkage, it was upgraded to a MID-prone dyad beginning with the first relevant MID and ending with the last relevant MID. Issue linkage was examined by MID narratives (Palmer et al. 2015; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) and rivalry narratives (Thompson and Dreyer 2012). Only Ethiopia-Eritrea qualified for this upgrading, becoming a MID-prone dyad during the period of 1998-2010 (from MID#4258 till MID#4405). Because during this period Thompson and Dreyer (2012) identified the dyad as threatening competitors and I also found both sides used civic-nationalist policies, Ethiopia-Eritrea in 1998-2010 was subsequently coded as a case of nationalist foreign policy exchange.

Second, if a MID-prone dyad experienced at least one other MID during the period of 2002-2010, and the issue of the MID was linked to the nationalist policy of a pre-2002 time, the end year of the MID-prone dyad was extended up to the end year of this MID. For example, the end year of the China-Japan MID-proneness is set as 1999 in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), which is the end year of the last MID in the dyad according to the MID 3.10 data (MID #4180). The MID 4.01 data report an MID between these two states in 2010 (MID #4489), related to the previous nationalist foreign policy exchange (territorial competition over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands). Hence, the period of the Sino-Japanese case was extended to 2010.

To identify a civic-nationalist or ethno-nationalist foreign policy in the threatening-competitor and MID-prone dyads, I used Thompson and Dreyer's (2012) narratives and, when these narratives were suggestive about the presence of a nationalist foreign policy but not enough for an unambiguous coding decision, I referred to other secondary sources.

I coded a state's foreign policy directed at another state as an ethno-nationalist type, if at least one of the following two conditions was met. One is that the state explicitly made its leadership's foreign co-ethnics a diplomatic issue (e.g., claiming part of foreign territory under the name of protecting foreign co-ethnics, or giving political assistance to foreign co-ethnics). The other is that

the state claimed the ownership of a foreign territory where the leadership's foreign co-ethnics lived, and there was no issue other than these co-ethnics that could have motivated the territorial revisionism. I identified foreign co-ethnics as those who lived outside the area that the ethnic parent state controlled with or without interstate recognition.[1] The change of territorial configurations during armed clashes complicated the identification of foreign co-ethnics. During armed clashes, territorial configurations were often temporary because of the repeated attempts at occupation and retrieval by fighting states, making it difficult to decide precisely when co-ethnics were in a territory outside one's own state, being "foreign" co-ethnics. I ignored the change of territorial configurations during armed clashes; the original territorial configuration was used to identify the side where co-ethnics lived. Only after the end of armed clashes was it assumed that the control of the area was established, and the new territorial configuration was used to identify the side where co-ethnics lived.

I coded a state's foreign policy directed at another state as a civic-nationalist one, if foreign policy disputed the territoriality of one's own state (and not that of its dependency) and the leadership's foreign co-ethnics were not a central issue. Whether such foreign co-ethnics were not the central issue was determined by one of the following two conditions. One is that there was clear evidence that the disputed territory was not populated by the leadership's foreign co-ethnics (e.g., the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands for China and Japan). The other is that an issue other than the leadership's foreign co-ethnics (such as strategic importance or economic resources) was the main driving force of interstate hostility (e.g., Iraq-Kuwait over oil reserve). Not all disputed territories constituted

[1] I have no intention of making a political claim for specific states that a disputed territory should belong to one's sovereignty.

civic-nationalist policy; they must have been over the territoriality of one's own state.[2] I did not distinguish the types of territorial values in terms of civic nationalism. In the literature on territorial disputes, the types of territorial values are often distinguished among material, strategic, and symbolic (e.g., Kelle 2017; Toft 2003). While it is often argued that the symbolic value is most likely to cause nationalist claims (Kelle 2017; Shelef 2016; Toft 2003), it does not mean that the material or strategic value is irrelevant to nationalists; in fact, any of these three values can induce nationalist claims over territory, if not necessarily to the same extent (Kelle 2017; Zellman 2018).[3]

The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project also provides data on whether disputed territories are of dependencies or of homelands (Hensel 2001: 94). As a robustness check, I checked the compatibility between my own coding and the ICOW's coding during the period that both datasets cover (1946-2001). There was no disagreement in the distinction in the dyad-years in which both I and the ICOW identified territorial disputes.[4]

[2] I found one case where the disputed territory was a dependency of one state and part of the other's own state (the Dutch-Indonesian case from 1951-62). Only Indonesia could have been coded having nationalist foreign policy. It is more desirable to exclude this case in terms of increasing the unit homogeneity of the data for better causal inference. This is because the nature of strategic interaction in asymmetrical cases is different from that in symmetrical cases (e.g., monadic vs. dyadic democratic peace). Empirically, the inclusion of the Dutch-Indonesian case did not change the main results substantively (see Table A12 in the section of "Robustness-Check Results").

[3] Kelle (2017) argues that material values are no longer a significant predictor of secessionist claims once symbolic and strategic values are controlled for. However, her empirical result is not a proof that material values are only weakly associated with nationalist claims. Territory can has more than one value at the same time. In such a case, it is difficult to disentangle which value matters most in nationalist claims, particularly because one type of value might cause the emergence of another type of value. For example, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are important in all material, strategic, and symbolic respects for China and Japan. China began to dispute the territoriality of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after it was found that there might be some oil reserve there. Later, the Chinese government started to use the dispute in a more symbolic way to appeal to the public, while it remained interested in the economic as well as strategic values of the Islands.

[4] Relatedly, Shelef (2016) distinguishes homeland territory from non-homeland territory by identifying keywords such as "motherland" or "fatherland" in English or English-translated foreign news media. The limitations of this measure are (a) that it assumes the meaning of those keywords are not lost in translation; (b) that it assumes only those discourses appearing in news media matter in constituting homeland territory; (c) that his data are limited to those dyads that have had an "international border drawn between 1945 and 1996" (46), thus missing the territorial disputes whose origin goes back beyond this time period.

If evidence suggested that a state's foreign policy involved both ethno-nationalist and civic-nationalist types at the same time, I coded the foreign policy as an ethno-nationalist type. This is because, as argued in the main text, the leadership would be concerned primarily with its own ethnic constituency and, therefore, would prioritize an ethno-nationalist policy over a civic-nationalist policy.

If only one side in a dyad had nationalist foreign policy (whether a civic-nationalist or ethno-nationalist type), I did not include the dyad in my data, since it is not the *exchange* of nationalist foreign policy. Put differently, both states must have nationalist foreign policy (either a civic-nationalist or ethno-nationalist type) by definition. In terms of the coding, the Dutch-Indonesian case was the only case where only one side could be coded as using a nationalist foreign policy. As mentioned in footnote 2, the inclusion of the Dutch-Indonesian case did not change the main empirical findings.

Robustness-Check Results

As in the main text, there are models without any control variable and models with all control variables.

Table A1: Probit regression of civic-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (threshold of size of leadership's ethnic group ≤/> .4 and democracy scale ≤/> 6)

	Model A1-1	Model A1-2	Model A1-3	Model A1-4
Small Group Size	0.38**	0.14	0.13	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.11)
High Democracy Level	0.04	0.14	-0.18	-0.04
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Small Group Size ×			0.85***	0.63***
High Democracy Level			(0.31)	(0.22)
Domestic Unrest		0.01		-0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Major Power Status		0.14		0.16
		(0.18)		(0.18)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.11***		0.12***
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Alliance		0.10		0.09
		(0.09)		(0.09)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.10		0.09
		(0.14)		(0.13)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.57**		-0.45*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.23)		(0.25)
Trade Dependence		0.06**		0.06**
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	-1.96***	-1.07***	-1.88***	-1.01***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.14)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	0.80***	0.61***
			(0.28)	(0.190)
AIC	11590.39	1362.20	11384.81	1354.62
Observations	41,030	34,962	41,030	34,962

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A2: Probit regression of ethno-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (threshold of size of leadership's ethnic group ≤/> .4 and democracy scale ≤/> 6)

	Model A2-1	Model A2-2	Model A2-3	Model A2-4
Small Group Size	-0.01	0.06	0.07	0.14
	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.26)	(0.14)
High Democracy Level	-0.44*	0.13	-0.35	0.25
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Small Group Size ×			-0.96**	-0.94***
High Democracy Level			(0.41)	(0.32)
Domestic Unrest		-0.02		-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Major Power Status		0.02		-0.01
		(0.22)		(0.23)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.11**		0.10**
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Alliance		0.18		0.17
		(0.12)		(0.12)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.12		0.12
		(0.19)		(0.19)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.44*		-0.51**
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.25)		(0.25)
Trade Dependence		-0.30*		-0.29*
		(0.15)		(0.15)
Constant	-1.35***	-0.75***	-1.37***	-0.79***
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.17)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	-1.24***	-0.56**
			(0.36)	(0.29)
AIC	4740.83	666.51	4718.62	665.20
Observations	9,171	7,771	9,171	7,771

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A3: Probit regression of civic-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (threshold of size of leadership's ethnic group ≤/> .5 and Polity2 scale </≥ 6)

	Model A3-1	Model A3-2	Model A3-3	Model A3-4
Small Group Size	0.33**	0.13	0.14	0.04
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)
High Democracy Level	0.04	0.12	-0.17	-0.04
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Small Group Size ×			0.64**	0.48**
High Democracy Level			(0.28)	(0.21)
Domestic Unrest		0.00		-0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Major Power Status		0.16		0.17
		(0.18)		(0.18)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.10**		0.10**
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Alliance		0.10		0.10
		(0.09)		(0.09)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.05		0.04
		(0.13)		(0.13)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.52**		-0.41*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.22)		(0.23)
Trade Dependence		0.06**		0.06***
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	-1.98***	-1.05***	-1.89***	-1.00***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	0.61**	0.48***
			(0.26)	(0.17)
AIC	11935.90	1451.28	11799.95	1446.55
Observations	42,336	37,169	42,336	37,169

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A4: Probit regression of ethno-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (threshold of size of leadership's ethnic group ≤/> .5 and Polity2 scale </≥ 6)

	Model A4-1	Model A4-2	Model A4-3	Model A4-4
Small Group Size	-0.19	-0.04	-0.14	0.02
	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.13)
High Democracy Level	-0.50**	0.01	-0.43*	0.11
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.19)
Small Group Size ×			-0.73*	-0.84***
High Democracy Level			(0.40)	(0.31)
Domestic Unrest		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Major Power Status		-0.07		-0.09
		(0.21)		(0.22)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.09*		0.09*
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Alliance		0.11		0.09
		(0.12)		(0.12)
High Democracy Level of Target		-0.24		-0.24
		(0.19)		(0.19)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.19		-0.24
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.28)		(0.28)
Trade Dependence		-0.28**		-0.28**
		(0.14)		(0.14)
Constant	-1.30***	-0.60***	-1.31***	-0.63***
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.17)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	-1.31***	-0.71**
			(0.36)	(0.28)
AIC	4786.15	712.51	4775.05	711.56
Observations	9,420	8,218	9,420	8,218

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A5: Probit regression of civic-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (contiguity defined as ≤ 150miles of water)

	Model A5-1	Model A5-2	Model A5-3	Model A5-4
Small Group Size	0.30**	0.09	0.09	-0.02
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.11)
High Democracy Level	0.05	0.12	-0.17	-0.06
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Small Group Size ×			0.64**	0.52**
High Democracy Level			(0.28)	(0.20)
Domestic Unrest		0.01		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Major Power Status		0.22		0.21
		(0.19)		(0.19)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.08**		0.08*
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Alliance		0.10		0.09
		(0.09)		(0.09)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.10		0.09
		(0.14)		(0.13)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.46**		-0.35
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.23)		(0.23)
Trade Dependence		-0.49***		-0.49***
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Constant	-1.87***	-1.04***	-1.78***	-0.98***
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	0.56**	0.44**
			(0.26)	(0.18)
AIC	10856.22	1282.50	10728.33	1277.33
Observations	32,495	27,820	32,495	27,820

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A6: Probit regression of ethno-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (contiguity defined as ≤ 150miles of water)

	Model A6-1	Model A6-2	Model A6-3	Model A6-4
Small Group Size	-0.20	-0.03	-0.14	0.04
	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.13)
High Democracy Level	-0.58**	0.08	-0.51*	0.19
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.21)
Small Group Size ×			-0.79*	-0.83***
High Democracy Level			(0.40)	(0.31)
Domestic Unrest		-0.02		-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Major Power Status		0.02		0.01
		(0.22)		(0.22)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.10**		0.09**
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Alliance		0.18		0.16
		(0.12)		(0.12)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.06		0.06
		(0.18)		(0.18)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.44*		-0.50**
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.25)		(0.25)
Trade Dependence		-0.29*		-0.29**
		(0.15)		(0.15)
Constant	-1.20***	-0.69***	-1.22***	-0.72***
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	-1.44***	-0.61**
			(0.36)	(0.28)
AIC	4537.52	657.78	4523.73	656.98
Observations	8,315	7,036	8,315	7,036

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A7: Probit regression of ethno-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (foreign co-ethnics of all senior partners)

	Model A7-1	Model A7-2	Model A7-3	Model A7-4
Small Group Size	-0.21	-0.05	-0.16	0.01
	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.13)
High Democracy Level	-0.56**	0.05	-0.49*	0.14
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Small Group Size ×			-0.74*	-0.80**
High Democracy Level			(0.40)	(0.31)
Domestic Unrest		-0.02		-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Major Power Status		-0.01		-0.02
		(0.22)		(0.22)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.11**		0.10**
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Alliance		0.18		0.17
		(0.12)		(0.12)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.04		0.05
		(0.18)		(0.18)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.40		-0.45*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.24)		(0.25)
Trade Dependence		-0.30*		-0.30*
		(0.15)		(0.15)
Constant	-1.27***	-0.71***	-1.29***	-0.74***
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	-1.39***	-0.65**
			(0.35)	(0.28)
AIC	4726.76	669.00	4715.03	668.48
Observations	9,478	8,040	9,478	8,040

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A8: Probit regression of nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (major power targets included)

	Civic-nationalist policy		Ethno-nationalist policy	
	Model A8-1	Model A8-2	Model A8-3	Model A8-4
Small Group Size	0.12	0.02	-0.02	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)
High Democracy Level	0.09	-0.06	0.08	0.19
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.22)
Small Group Size ×		0.45**		-0.86***
High Democracy Level		(0.21)		(0.32)
Domestic Unrest	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Major Power Status	0.13	0.14	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Major Power Status of Target	0.05	0.03	-1.66***	-1.72***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Capability Ratio (log)	0.10**	0.10**	0.07	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Alliance	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)
High Democracy Level of Target	0.07	0.05	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)
High Democracy Level ×	-0.53**	-0.43*	-0.42*	-0.49*
High Democracy Level of Target	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Trade Dependence	0.06**	0.06**	-0.30*	-0.30*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Constant	-1.06***	-1.01***	-0.70***	-0.74***
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.18)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	0.42**	NA	-0.62**
$+ \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$		(0.17)		(0.29)
AIC	1360.88	1357.00	661.22	660.21
Observations	34,962	34,962	7,771	7,771

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A9: Probit regression of civic-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (additive interaction terms)

	Civic-nationalist policy		Ethno-nationalist policy	
	Model A9-1	Model A9-2	Model A9-3	Model A9-4
Small Group Size, Low Democracy Level	-0.43*	-0.40**	1.25***	0.68**
	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.35)	(0.28)
Large Group Size, High Democracy Level	-0.75***	-0.48***	0.90**	0.80***
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.30)
Large Group Size, Low Democracy Level	-0.57**	-0.42**	1.38***	0.65**
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.35)	(0.28)
Domestic Unrests		0.00		-0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)
Major Power Status		0.15		-0.03
		(0.18)		(0.22)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.10**		0.10**
		(0.04)		(0.05)
Alliance		0.09		0.15
		(0.09)		(0.12)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.05		0.06
		(0.14)		(0.19)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.43*		-0.46*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.23)		(0.25)
Trade Dependence		0.06***		-0.29*
		(0.02)		(0.15)
Constant	-1.31***	-0.59***	-2.66***	-1.38***
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.31)
AIC	11475.06	1355.05	4676.52	665.49
Observations	41,030	34,962	9,171	7,771

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A10: Rare-event logit regression of civic-nationalist policy, 1950-2007

	Model A10-1	Model A10-2	Model A10-3	Model A10-4
Small Group Size	0.78**	0.14	0.30	-0.06
	(0.35)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.24)
High Democracy Level	0.08	0.27	-0.45	-0.07
	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Small Group Size ×			1.36**	1.02**
High Democracy Level			(0.57)	(0.47)
Domestic Unrest		0.02		0.00
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Major Power Status		0.13		0.17
		(0.44)		(0.44)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.19*		0.18*
		(0.10)		(0.10)
Alliance		0.30		0.29
		(0.20)		(0.20)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.18		0.15
		(0.30)		(0.30)
High Democracy Level ×		-1.25**		-1.01*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.50)		(0.53)
Trade Dependence		0.21***		0.21***
		(0.06)		(0.05)
Constant	-3.69***	-1.29***	-3.46***	-1.18***
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.32)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	1.21**	0.88**
			(0.51)	(0.39)
Observations	41,030	34,962	41,030	34,962

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
AIC not possible to estimate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table A11: Rare-event logit regression of ethno-nationalist policy, 1950-2007

	Model A11-1	Model A11-2	Model A11-3	Model A11-4
Small Group Size	-0.34	-0.06	-0.24	0.07
	(0.44)	(0.27)	(0.46)	(0.29)
High Democracy Level	-1.15**	0.25	-0.99*	0.47
	(0.54)	(0.41)	(0.57)	(0.44)
Small Group Size ×			-1.87*	-1.43**
High Democracy Level			(1.06)	(0.64)
Domestic Unrest		-0.04		-0.04
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Major Power Status		0.22		0.20
		(0.44)		(0.45)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.25**		0.23*
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Alliance		0.31		0.28
		(0.27)		(0.26)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.12		0.13
		(0.39)		(0.39)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.86*		-1.01*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.52)		(0.52)
Trade Dependence		-0.45		-0.45
		(0.31)		(0.31)
Constant	-2.18***	-0.55	-2.21***	-0.62
	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.39)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	-3.09*** (1.02)	-0.90† (0.63)
Observations	9,171	7,771	9,171	7,771

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
AIC not possible to estimate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests
† The total effect is statistically significant at the p<0.1 level by a one-tailed test

Table A12: Probit regression of civic-nationalist policy, 1950-2007 (Indonesia coded as directing a civic-nationalist policy against the Netherlands)

	Model A12-1	Model A12-2	Model A12-3	Model A12-4
Small Group Size	0.34**	0.12	0.13	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.11)
High Democracy Level	0.02	0.09	-0.19	-0.06
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Small Group Size ×			0.62**	0.46**
High Democracy Level			(0.27)	(0.21)
Domestic Unrest		0.01		0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Major Power Status		0.14		0.15
		(0.18)		(0.18)
Capability Ratio (log)		0.10**		0.10**
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Alliance		0.09		0.09
		(0.09)		(0.09)
High Democracy Level of Target		0.06		0.05
		(0.14)		(0.14)
High Democracy Level ×		-0.53**		-0.43*
High Democracy Level of Target		(0.22)		(0.23)
Trade Dependence		0.06***		0.06***
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	-1.97***	-1.06***	-1.88***	-1.01***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.15)
$\beta_{\text{Small Group Size}} + \beta_{\text{High Democracy Level}} + \beta_{\text{Small Group Size} \times \text{High Democracy Level}}$	NA	NA	0.57**	0.42**
			(0.25)	(0.18)
AIC	11605.47	1359.00	11475.06	1355.05
Observations	41,030	34,962	41,030	34,962

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Time controls not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

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