LEFT-RIGHT SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE

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Political Research Quarterly

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Section A. Survey Sampling, Items and Descriptive Statistics

Sampling. The national online survey was fielded by iPanel, the largest opt-in online panel company in Israel. The sample used in our study consisted of 1,538 individuals,[1] most of whom had been surveyed twice. Of the 10,777 invitations, 3,450 individuals (32%) responded, and 1,538 participated (14.2%).[2] The difference between response and participation rates is mainly due to the use of quotas. We used quota sampling to match the sample to the population on several parameters: gender, age, education, religiosity and nativity. Summary statistics of the sample compared to the population are reported in Table A1. To compensate for under-sampling the lowest level of education (Elementary School or less) and the highest age category (60+), we oversampled their closest category, "High School, no matriculation certificate" and ages 50 to 59.

Dates of Administration. In addition to a pre-test (N = 50) in early June, 2018, wave 1 of the panel survey was administered between June 15 and July 8, 2018, while wave 2 was administered approximately three weeks later, between July 9 and July 25, 2018.

Table A1. Summary Statistics of Israeli Population and iPanel Sample

		Population[3]	**Sample**	
		[%]	**[%]**	**[Obs.]**
SEX	Female	51	51.8	805
	Male	49	48.1	748
AGE	18-29	22	22.2	345
	30-39	20	20.1	313
	40-49	18	18.9	294
	50-59	15	19.4	302
	60+	25	19.2	299
RELIGIOSITY	Secular	44	45.2	702
	Traditional	35	32.5	506
	Religious	11	11.9	186
	Ultra-Orthodox	10	10.2	159
EDUCATION	Elementary School or less	5	1.5	24
	High School, no matriculation certificate	22	23.8	370
	High School, with matriculation certificate	20	20.2	315
	Post high school, no academic degree	19	19.4	302
	BA	20	20.6	320
	MA and above	14	14.2	222
Total completed				1553

[1] Completed responses in wave 1 (N = 1,553); also passed the second screener (N = 1,538); plus answered the wave 1 survey in less than half of the median time (under 10 minutes, N = 1,508); plus screened out straight-lining (N = 1,481).

[2] Participation in our study (14.2%) is similar to the expected participation rate of online surveys of 15-20% (e.g., see Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015, p. 988).

[3] Data on sex, age and religiosity was taken from the 2016 social survey of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Data on education was taken from ESS survey 2016.

Table A2. Survey Items and Descriptive Statistics

Item	Mean (0 to 1)	SD
Least-Liked Political Tolerance (r= .68) 1. Members of [group] should be allowed to hold demonstrations. 2. Members of [group] should be allowed to speak on TV.	.41	.30
Arab Citizen Political Tolerance (r= .67) 1. The Arab citizens of Israel should be allowed to hold demonstrations. 2. The Arab citizens of Israel should be allowed to speak on TV.	.60	.28
Arab Civil Liberties (Alpha=.67) 1. The voting rights of Arab citizens of Israel should be conditioned on taking a loyalty oath to the state. 2. The Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than its Arab citizens. 3. Jews committing crimes against Arab citizens should get lighter punishment than Arab citizens committing similar crimes against Jews.	.49	.24
Left, Right Political Identity: With what political tendency do you identify? (Right=0, Left=1)	.24	.43
Left-Right Identity Strength (Alpha=.65) 1. How important is being [rightist/leftist] to you? on a 4-point scale ranging from not at all important (0) to extremely important (3) 2. When I meet someone who supports the political [Right/Left] I feel connected, and 3. When people criticize the [Right/Left], it feels like a personal insult, both of which range from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (3). 4. Moderate Right/Left = 0, Right/Left=1. Note: The first 3 items were coded to a 0 to 1 scale before constructing the additive index to avoid giving them more weight than the fourth binary scale.	.45	.21
Support for Democratic Values (Alpha=.67) 1. I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be. 2. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, they are entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else. 3. People in the minority should be free to try to win majority support for their opinions.	.73	.17
Least-Liked Group Threat (r=.61). Rate whether and to what extent you feel [group] pose a threat to: 1. democracy in Israel—Not threatening at all (1) to Very threatening (5)? 2. the Jewish identity of the state—Not threatening at all (1) to Very threatening (5)?	.69	.30
Israeli Arab Citizen Threat (r=.69) Rate whether and to what extent you feel Arab citizens of Israel pose a threat to: 1. democracy in Israel—Not threatening at all (1) to Very threatening (5)? 2. the Jewish identity of the state—Not threatening at all (1) to Very threatening (5)?	.59	.29
Authoritarianism or Fixed vs Open Worldview (Alpha=.52). Although there are a number of qualities that people feel children should have, every person thinks some are more important than others. For each pair of desirable qualities, indicate which one you think is more important for a child to have: Independence or Respect for elders? Obedience or Self-reliance (reversed)? Curiosity or Good Manners? Being considerate or Being well-behaved?	.40	.30

Jewish vs Israeli National Identity Which of the following terms best defines your identity? Rank the terms by moving the one that best defines your identity to the top of the list. _____ A Jew (0) _____ Israeli (1) Note: This item has been used in the Israel National Election Studies since 1999, where more options are sometimes presented.	.45	.50
Religiosity: How would you define yourself religiously—Secular, Traditional, Religious, Ultra-Orthodox? Note: "Nearly all Israeli Jews identify with one of the four categories: Haredi (commonly translated as "ultra-Orthodox"), Dati ("religious"), Masorti ("traditional") or Hiloni ("secular")," (Pew, "Israel's Religiously Divided Society," 2016. An identically worded question has been used by the Israel National Election Studies to measure religiosity among Israeli Jews since 1996.	.30	.33
***Political Engagement*:** An additive index consisting of 3 political knowledge questions and discussing politics (Alpha=.47). Here are 3 questions about political information to see how much information gets out to the public from television, newspapers, and the like. It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. What is the current threshold of representation for Knesset elections? (**3.25%)** Who is the current Justice Minister? (**Ayelet Shaked)** Which party came to the second place in the last election (2015) in terms of number of seats in the Knesset? (**Zionist Camp**) How much do you usually talk with friends and family about political matters—To a large extent, To a certain extent, To a small extent, Not at all (reversed)? *Note: all items were coded to a 0 to 1 scale before adding them in the index.	.54	.24
Education: What is your education--Elementary School or less, High School, no matriculation certificate; High school, with matriculation certificate; Post high school, no academic degree; BA; MA and above?	.43	.35
Family Income: The average gross income per household in the economy is NIS 13,500 per month. How does your household income compare--Far below average (0), A little below average, Similar to average, A little over average, Far above average(1)?	.42	.31
Age: What is your age?	.46	.26
Gender: What is your gender—Male (0), Female (1)?	.52	.50
Wave 2 Terrorist Threat Survey Experiment ***Opposition to Arab Repression*** (r=.67): To prevent terrorist attacks in the future, to what extent do you support or oppose the government: 1. Prohibiting Arab citizens of Israel from demonstrating? 2. Arresting Arab citizens of Israel and holding them in administrative detention without trial?	.41	.30
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions described below. (Different wording across the conditions is in brackets.) • *Baseline (No Attacks) condition*: **[**No introduction.**]** To prevent terrorist attacks in the future, to what extent do you support or oppose the government… • *Suspected Palestinian Attackers:* **[**Suppose there is a series of terrorist attacks in Israel, in which dozens of people are killed and many others are wounded.		

After a few days, the authorities have yet to confirm the identity of the attackers.**]** To prevent terrorist attacks in the future, to what extent do you support or oppose the government… ○ If you had to guess, to which of the following groups did those who carried out the terrorist attack belong--Jewish settlers, Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, Extreme left group, Right-wing group, Other? ○ Note: We restricted individuals in this condition to those who made the most plausible guess that Palestinians were the attackers. See Appendix Section 5. • *Arab Citizen Attackers*: **[**Suppose there is a series of terrorist attacks in Israel, in which dozens of people are killed and many others are wounded. A few days later, the authorities confirm that the attacks were carried out by a small group of Arab citizens of Israel from Umm al-Fahm.**]** To prevent terrorist attacks in the future, to what extent do you support or oppose the government…		
Notes: The Terrorist Threat Experiment is part of a larger experiment designed for a different purpose that included several target groups and conditions. Other target groups, along with ACI, were two left-wing groups (the Islamic Movement and Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the Silence)) and a right-wing group (supporters of Kahane). The order of the groups was randomized. The other groups and conditions have little bearing on the current study.		

Table A3. Least-Liked Group Selection

Arab LLGs	Full Sample	Right (0)	Left (1)
Joint List	5.48	6.59	2.64
The Islamic movement	16.99	16.89	14.19
Balad	5.55	5.56	3.63
Total Arab LLG	28.02	29.04	20.46
Jewish Leftist LLGs			
B'Tselem	23.15	29.66	7.26
Meretz	11.99	14.52	4.95
Shovrim Shtika (Breaking Silence)	3.42	4.02	2.31
The Reform Movement	3.36	4.43	0.66
Shalom Achshav (Peace Now)	1.92	2.37	0.99
Leftist Misc	0.55	0.72	0.00
Total Left LLG	44.39	55.72	16.17
Jewish Rightist LLGs			
Lehava (anti-miscegenation group)	5.96	0.82	23.43
Yahadut HaTora (ultra-Orthodox parties)	5.96	1.96	20.79
Shas (ultra-Orthodox party)	1.64	1.34	1.98
HaBait Hayehudi (The Jewish Home)	4.79	2.68	8.25
Kach (Kahanistim) (Rabbi Kahane party)	3.15	3.09	4.29
Rightist Misc.	0.89	1.03	0.33
Total Right LLG	22.39	10.92	59.07
Other LLGs			
Yesh Atid (Center)	3.63	3.30	2.64
Other (missing)	1.58	1.03	1.65
Total Other LLGs	5.21	4.33	4.29
Overall Total	100%	100%	100%

Table A4. Correlations between Predictors of Political Tolerance

	L-R Pol ID	L-R ID Strength	Authori-tariansm	Democratic Values	LLG Threat	ACI Threat
L-R Political ID	1.00					
L-R ID Strength	-.17	1.00				
Authoritarianism	-.28	.19	1.00			
Democratic Values	.28	-.12	-.18	1.00		
LLG Threat	-.11	.12	.12	-.06	1.00	
Arab Threat	-.40	.26	.29	-.30	.28	1.00

Note: All correlations significant at .001, N=1,269

Table A5. Variable Means if Respondent Participated in Wave 1 and the Wave 2 Experiment

Variable	Coding	W1 Mean (N=1,280)	W2 Means (N=719)
L, R Pol ID (Right=0)	0, 1	.24	.24
L-R ID Strength	0-1	.45	.45
Authoritarianism	0-1	.40	.41
Democratic Values	0-1	.73	.73
LLG Threat	0-1	.69	.70
ACI Threat	0-1	.58	.59
Age	0-1	.46	.46
Female	0, 1	.52	.53
Religious ID	0-1	.30	.30

Note: Centrists excluded.

Section B. Covariates and Distribution of Left-Right Identity Strength for Rightists and Leftists

In this section, we provide additional insight into the covariates of Left-Right Identity Strength for rightists and leftists to gain some insight into how the *meaning* of social identities among strongly attached rightists and leftists differ from each other and from their weakly attached counterparts. In particular, how do the social identity attachments of rightists and leftists covary with key political orientations (democratic values, views of nationhood, authoritarianism), as well as various demographic factors (e.g., education, religiosity)? In Figure A1 below, we report the OLS results of regressing Left-Right Identity Strength on the predictors in Table 2 in the text. In addition, we add the binary variable measuring *Jewish versus Israeli* views of nationhood, where, like prior studies (Shamir and Arian 1999), respondents were asked, "Which of the following terms best defines your identity? Israeli (coded 1)? A Jew (0)?" (see Table A2 for the exact wording). We also form interactions between the Left-Right Political ID dummy and the three political orientations to distinguish the effects of rightists on these variables from that of leftists.

Figure A1. Coefficient Plot of Predictors of Left-Right Identity Strength, Interactive model.



Note: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. All variables coded from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. Lines around each estimate represent 90 percent (thick line) and 95 percent (thin line) confidence intervals. N=1,177. Higher values indicate: stronger Left-Right identity strength, left political identity, support for democratic values, ranking Israeli above Jewish national identity, and authoritarianism. L-R Pol ID was interacted with democratic values, Jewish versus Israeli national identity, and authoritarianism to provide separate estimates for rightists and leftists. The coefficient for Pol ID is the estimate for Left when all interacted predictors = 0. Demographic controls (education, religiosity, age, female, income) are not shown. Centrists excluded.

One striking difference between rightists and leftists is that the coefficients for Democratic Values run in opposite directions. For leftists, greater support for free speech and minority rights is associated with stronger social identification as "leftists" (b = .40), while among rightists, it is associated with *weaker* identities (b = -.13). In addition, consistent with earlier research (Shamir and Arian 1999), strongly attached rightists place a higher value on the "Jewish" versus the "Israeli" identity of the state (b = -.11), while their leftist counterparts

identify more as Israelis (b = .16). Thus, rightists' and leftists' national identities conform to ethnonationalist versus civic national identities. More strongly attached rightists also tend to be more authoritarian, while leftists are not significantly distinguished by either fixed or fluid worldviews. In terms of demographic characteristics, lower affluence is associated with stronger social identities but only among rightists (not shown).

All told, the results in Figure A1 show that Jewish rightists and leftists in Israel who identify more intensely with their group are quite distinct in many important respects, thus providing some confidence for our polarization hypothesis with respect to political tolerance.

We note that while "Jewish" versus "Israeli" national identity effectively distinguishes between leftists' and rights' social identities, its predictive power is expressed entirely through the other predictors in the models, especially Left-Right Political ID.

Finally, comparing the distribution of social identities among rightists and leftists in Figure A2 below, rightists express slightly stronger attachments, on average, than leftists.

Figure A2. Distribution of Social Identities among Rightists and Leftists



Leftist mean = .36 (sd=.18); Rightist mean = .44 (sd=.23) on the 0-1 social identity scale.

Section C. The Effects of Left-Right Identity Strength on Least-Liked Group (LLG) Political Tolerance Are Not Altered by Dropping Arab LLGs.

In this section, we show that Left-Right polarization in tolerating least-liked groups cannot be explained by the fact that rightists and leftists are reacting differently to Arab groups. When Arab groups are excluded from the least-liked analysis, the estimated Social Identity coefficients for rightists, the estimated Social Identity coefficients for rightists (b=-.10) as well as leftists (b=.19) are nearly identical to those estimated in Table 1 and Figure 1 (b=-.08, b=.20, respectively). in the text.

Figure A3. Predicting Least-Liked Group (LLG) Political Tolerance Including & Excluding Arab LLGs.



Note: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. All variables coded from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. Lines around each estimate represent 90 percent (thick line) and 95 percent (thin line) confidence intervals. N=1,262 with Arab groups, 918 without Arab groups. Demographic characteristics and constant not shown.

Section D. Adding Interactions between Left-Right Political ID and Control Variables Does Not Affect the Observational Results

In this section, we provide a more stringent test to rule out the possibility that the impact of Left-Right Identity Strength on political tolerance is spurious, because leftists and rightists differ in their levels of democratic values, authoritarianism and perceived threat. In Figure A2 and Table A5 below, we compare the results of regressing the three political tolerance variables in Table 2 of the text, indicated as Model 1, with results for Model 2 that includes interactions between Left-Right Political ID and the three control variables. Comparing the results across Models 1 and 2 for all three measures of political tolerance in Figure A2 and Table A5, the effects for Left-Right Social ID remain essentially unchanged.

Figure A4. Predicting Political Tolerance Excluding and Including Interactions



Note: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. All variables coded from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. Lines around each estimate represent 90 percent (thick line) and 95 percent (thin line) confidence intervals. N=1,269. Demographic characteristics and constant not shown.

Table A6. The Effects of Left-Right Identity Strength for Rightists and Leftists (Calculated)

	LLG (Demon/Speak)		**ACI (Demon/Speak)**		**ACI (Civil Liberties)**	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Right	-.08* (.04)	-.08* (.0)	-.19** (.04)	-18** (.03)	-.18** (.03)	-.19** (.03)
Left	.20* (.08)	.20* (.09)	.05 (.07)	.06 (.07)	.22** (.06)	.20** (.06)

Note: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$. Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.

Section E. Comparing Results Using Our Four-Item Index of Left-Right Identity Strength with a Three-Item Scale

To make sure our results are robust across different measures of Left-Right Social Identity, we reestimated the equations in Tables 1 and 2 in the text with an alternative measure consisting of only the first three Likert items, thus dropping the fourth binary indicator. Table A7 compares the results using the two measures for the observational analysis of political tolerance (the 4-item results correspond to Table 1), while Table A8 compares the 4- and 3-item scales for the experimental analysis of political tolerance (where the 4-item results correspond to Table 2). As can be seen, the results for the 4-item and 3-item social identity indices are comparable for both the observational (Table A7) and experimental (Table A8) analyses.

Table A7: Comparing Observational Results for Tolerance Using 4-Item vs 3-Item Left-Right ID Strength Scale

	4-Item Index						**3-Item Index**					
	LLG Dem/Speak		**ACI Dem/Speak**		**ACI Civ Liberties**		**LLG Dem/Speak**		**ACI Dem/Speak**		**ACI Civ Liberties**	
	b	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**
Left-Right Pol ID (Rt=0, Lt=1)	-.04	(.04)	-.04	(.03)	-.03	(.03)	-.06	(.04)	-.07	(.04)	-.02	(.03)
Left-Right Identity Strth	-.08 *	(.04)	-.18 **	(.03)	-.18 **	(.03)	-.09 *	(.04)	-.20 **	(.03)	-.17 **	(.03)
Left-Right Pol ID x Left-Right ID Strth	.28 **	(.09)	.23 **	(.08)	.40 **	(.07)	.28 **	(.09)	.27 **	(.08)	.30 **	(.06)
Democratic Values	.28 **	(.05)	.25 **	(.04)	.14 **	(.03)	.28 **	(.04)	.25 **	(.04)	.15 **	(.03)
Authoritarianism	-.11 **	(.03)	-.09 **	(.02)	-.10 **	(.02)	-.11 **	(.03)	-.10 **	(.02)	-.10 **	(.02)
Threat Perception	-.43 **	(.02)	-.31 **	(.02)	-.21 **	(.02)	-.43 **	(.02)	-.32 **	(.02)	-.22 **	(.02)
Age	-.05	(.03)	-.01	(.02)	-.08 **	(.02)	-.05	(.03)	.00	(.02)	-.08 **	(.02)
Female	-.02	(.01)	-.05 **	(.01)	-.03 *	(.01)	-.02	(.01)	-.05 **	(.01)	-.02 *	(.01)
Religiosity	.02	(.02)	-.07 **	(.02)	-.10 **	(.02)	.02	(.02)	-.07 **	(.02)	-.10 **	(.02)
Education	.11 **	(.02)	.11 **	(.02)	.05 **	(.02)	.11 **	(.02)	.11 **	(.02)	.05 **	(.02)
Income	-.02	(.02)	.02	(.02)	.01	(.02)	-.02	(.02)	.02	(.02)	.01	(.02)
Constant	.56 **	(.05)	.71 **	(.04)	.65**	(.04)	.56 **	(.05)	.72 **	(.04)	.66 **	(.04)
N	1,262		1,269		1,269		1,262		1,269		1,269	
Adj-R^2	.30		.41		.43		.30		.41		.42	

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01. Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. Higher values indicate greater political tolerance, Left political ID, left-right identity strength, support for democratic values, authoritarianism, threat perception (LLG and ACI), age, female, orthodox religiosity, education, and family income. Centrists are excluded.

Table A8: Comparing Experimental Results for Tolerance Using 4-Item vs 3-Item Left-Right ID Strength Scale

	4-Item Social ID Index									***3-Item Social ID Index***								
	Opposition to Arab Repression									**Opposition to Arab Repression**								
Condition (across):	**Baseline Cond**			**Suspected Pal**			**Arab Citizen**			**Baseline Cond**			**Suspected Pal**			**Arab Citizen**		
	(No Attacks)			**Attackers**			**Attackers**			**(No Attacks)**			**Attackers**			**Attackers**		
	b		**se**	**b**		**se**	**b**		**se**	**b**		**se**	**b**		**se**	**b**		**se**
Left-Right Pol ID (Rt=0, Lt=1)	.14		(.08)	-.28	**	(.10)	-.10		(.10)	.13		(.09)	-.38	*	(.11)	-.24		(.11)
Left-Right Identity Strength	-.01		(.08)	-.28	*	(.11)	-.14		(.08)	-.09		(.09)	-.17	*	(.12)	-.12	*	(.08)
*Lt-Rt Pol ID **x** Lt-Rt ID Strth*	.10		(.21)	.90	**	(.24)	.78	**	(.27)	.12		(.19)	.50	**	(.23)	.50	**	(.25)
Democratic Values	.18		(.10)	.11		(.13)	.22	*	(.10)	.10		(.10)	-.23		(.08)	.13	*	(.10)
Authoritarianism	-.07		(.06)	-.11		(.08)	.01		(.06)	-.07		(.06)	.06		(.13)	.01		(.06)
Threat Perception (ACI)	-.31	**	(.07)	-.22	**	(.08)	-.21	**	(.06)	-.28	**	(.07)	-.11	**	(.08)	-.22	**	(.06)
Age	-.07		(.07)	.06		(.08)	-.03		(.06)	-.06		(.07)	.04		(.08)	-.02		(.06)
Female	.01		(.03)	-.09	*	(.04)	-.03		(.03)	.03		(.03)	-.14	*	(.04)	-.03		(.03)
Religiosity	.06		(.06)	-.01		(.07)	-.04		(.05)	.06		(.05)	-.03		(.07)	-.04		(.05)
Education	.14	**	(.05)	.14	*	(.06)	.18	**	(.05)	.16	**	(.05)	.17	*	(.06)	.21	**	(.05)
Income	-.02		(.06)	-.02		(.07)	.00		(.05)	-.03		(.06)	-.01		(.07)	.00		(.05)
Constant	.44	**	(.11)	.56	**	(.14)	.32	**	(.11)	.49	**	(.12)	.58	**	(.14)	.33	**	(.11)
N	272			186			261			272			186			261		
Adj-R^2	.28			.29			.29			.28			.27			.30		

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01. Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. Higher values indicate greater opposition to Arab repression, Left political ID, left-right identity strength, support for democratic values, authoritarianism, greater threat perception of ACI, age, female, orthodox religiosity, education, and family income. Centrists are excluded.

Section F. Using Hainmueller et al.'s (2019) Interflex to Verify Interactions in the Terrorism Experiment

Because the three experimental conditions divide respondents in the second wave into 3 groups, we used Hainmueller et al.'s (2019) interflex program to verify that the estimates from the multiplicative models in the two treatment conditions are linear and not affected by excessive extrapolation of the functional form to an area where there is no data. For both treatment conditions below, we estimate the binning estimator model, which helps identify the functional form and rule out excessive extrapolation and interpretation, and the Kernel estimator model, which flexibly estimates the functional form of the marginal effect and easily incorporates control variables. The results show that the interactions are in fact linear and the predictions fall within the observed range of the social identity variable.

Figure A5. Binning and Kernel Estimators for the Treatment Conditions

Condition	Binning estimator (red dots)	Kernel estimator
Suspected Palestinian Attackers		
ACI Attackers		

Section G. Justification for Using Respondents Who Guessed Palestinians Were the Attackers in the Terrorist Threat Experiment

As described in Table A2, respondents in the Terrorist Threat Experiment were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) the Baseline (No Attacks) condition, 2) an Unidentified Attackers condition where the terrorists who launched lethal attacks were not identified, and 3) an Arab Citizen Attackers condition where a small group of Arab citizens launched attacks (see Table A2 for the complete wording). In the second condition, after assessing the dependent variable (i.e., opposition to repressing Arab citizens), respondents were asked to guess the identity of the attackers.

Given that most respondents in the second condition guessed "Palestinians from the Occupied Territories" were the attackers, we dropped the minority (21%) of respondents in this condition in Table 2 and Figure 2 to make the results more interpretable. As can be seen in **Table A9** below, 79% of non-missing respondents in this condition guessed "Palestinians from the Occupied Territories" were the attackers, doubtless because most of the terrorist attacks in Israel are, in fact, perpetrated by Palestinian terrorist groups in the occupied territories.

Table A9. Most Respondents Guess the Attackers were Palestinians from the Occupied Territories

If you had to guess, to which of the following groups did those who carried out the terrorist attack belong?	Freq.	Percent (Not missing)
Jewish settlers	5	1.86
Arab citizens of Israel	28	10.41
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories	213	79.18
Extreme left group	10	3.72
Right-wing group	13	4.83
Don't know (Missing)	20	
Total	289	100.00%

In **Table A10** and **Figure A6** below, we show that when we include in the analysis the 21% of respondents who guessed an array of other groups carried out the attacks (Jewish settlers, Arab citizens of Israel, Extreme left group, or a Right-wing group), the effects of Left-Right Identity Strength on political tolerance are slightly smaller but still significant and strongly polarized across leftists and rightists. This is undoubtedly because even when including all respondents, a large majority (79%) guessed "Palestinians in the occupied territories" carried out the attacks. Thus, on the one hand, reporting the results for all respondents in Table 2 and Figure 2 would be misleading. It is not the case that leftists and rightists polarize in their tolerance toward Arab citizens no matter what group they guess carried out the attacks. Rather, the results suggest that they polarize precisely because most suspect "Palestinians in the occupied territories" were the attackers.

On the other hand, dropping respondents in the second condition detracts from the random assignment of respondents in the experiment and the ability to estimate unbiased treatment effects across the conditions. This is most problematic when estimating the statistical significance of treatment effects across the baseline and second condition for leftists and rightists. To allay these concerns, we show in **Appendix Section H** that the estimates of treatment (i.e., contrast) effects do not differ when excluding or including respondents who guessed other groups. We still find that levels of political tolerance differ significantly for stronger rightists and weaker leftists across the baseline and treatment conditions.

As a final robustness check, in Table A11 below, we compare the results of equations estimated in Table 2 that include most control variables (on the left) and exclude them (on the right), while keeping in mind Kam and Trussler's (2017) argument for including controls in survey experiments that include an observed (as opposed to randomly-assigned) moderator like left-right social identity strength. The results show that the effects of left-right identity strength reported in Table 2 are conservative estimates obtained with stringent controls.

Table A10. Results for the Guessing Attackers Condition Are Not Altered by Including All Respondents

	Suspected Palestinians Attacked Only		All Groups Guessed	
	b	**se**	**b**	**se**
Lt-Rt Pol ID (Right=0)	-.28**	(.10)	-.18*	(.09)
Left-Right Identity Strength	-.28*	(.11)	-.21*	(.09)
Lt-Rt Pol ID x Left-Right ID Strth	.90**	(.24)	.63**	(.21)
Threat Arab Citizens	-.22**	(.08)	-.24**	(.07)
Democratic Values	.11	(.13)	.13	(.11)
Authoritarianism	-.11	(.08)	-.12	(.07)
Age	.06	(.08)	.02	(.07)
Female	-.09*	(.04)	-.05	(.03)
Religiosity	-.01	(.07)	-.02	(.06)
Education	.14*	(.06)	.17**	(.05)
Income	-.02	(.07)	.02	(.06)
Constant	.56**	(.14)	.48**	(.12)
N	186		232	
Adj-R^2	.29		.30	

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01. Entries OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1.

Figure A6. Comparing Predicted Values for Left-Right Identity Strength for Guessing Palestinian vs All Groups



Note: Predicted values based on estimates from Table Al0, with 95% confidence intervals.

Table A11. The Results for the Experiment Hold When We Exclude Most Control Variables

	With Controls						Without Most Controls					
	Baseline		**Suspected Pal Attack**		**Arab Cit Attack**		**Baseline**		**Suspected Pal Attack**		**Arab Cit Attack**	
	b	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**	**b**	**se**
Left-Right Pol ID (Rt=0, Lt=1)	.14	(.08)	-.28**	(.10)	-.10	(.10)	.13	(.09)	-.24*	(.10)	-.12	(.10)
Left-Right Identity Strength	-.01	(.08)	-.28*	(.11)	-.14	(.08)	-.18*	(.08)	-.40**	(.10)	-.30**	(.08)
*Lt-Rt Pol ID*Lt-Rt ID Strth*	.10	(.21)	.90**	(.24)	.78**	(.27)	.42*	(.21)	1.14**	(.24)	1.05**	(.29)
Democratic Values	-.31**	(.07)	-.22**	(.08)	-.21**	(.06)						
Authoritarianism	.18	(.10)	.11	(.13)	.22*	(.10)						
Threat Arab Cit	-.07	(.06)	-.11	(.08)	.01	(.06)						
Age	-.07	(.07)	.06	(.08)	-.03	(.06)						
Female	.01	(.03)	-.09*	(.04)	-.03	(.03)						
Religiosity	.06	(.06)	-.01	(.07)	-.04	(.05)						
Education	.14**	(.05)	.14*	(.06)	.18**	(.05)						
Income	-.02	(.06)	-.02	(.07)	-.00	(.05)						
Constant	.44**	(.11)	.56**	(.14)	.32**	(.11)	.47**	(.04)	.52**	(.05)	.44**	(.04)
N	272		186		261		272		186		261	
Adj-R^2	.28		.29		.29		.17		.18		.20	

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01. Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
All variables coded 0 to 1. Higher values indicate greater political tolerance, Left political ID, left-right identity strength, support for democratic values, authoritarianism, threat from Arab Citizens of Israel (ACI), age, female, orthodox religiosity, education, and family income. Centrists are excluded.

Section H. Contrast Effects in Predicted Political Tolerance for the Baseline versus Treatment Conditions

In **Figure A7a** below, we graph the predicted mean *difference* in tolerance for leftists and rightists along the Left-Right Identity scale for the baseline versus each of the two treatment conditions. The left-hand graph compares predicted tolerance for the Baseline (No Attacks) versus the Suspected Palestinian Attackers condition that drops respondents that did not guess Palestinians in the occupied territories carried out the attacks. In both graphs, rightists with *stronger* social identities become significantly more supportive of repressing Arab citizens in both treatment conditions. Among leftists, however, it is *weaker* identifiers who significantly reduce their tolerance toward Arab citizens in the two treatment conditions that elevate terrorist threat. As Figure A7 makes plain, significant shifts in support for repressing Arab citizens in the two treatment conditions occur among strongly attached rightists (consistent with H2a) and weakly attached leftists (consistent with H2b).

Figure A7a. Contrast between Baseline (No Attacks) and the Treatment Conditions



Notes: The graphs display the average predicted difference in political tolerance (i.e., opposition to Arab repression) across the baseline versus treatment conditions (Y-axis) at different values of Left-Right Identity Strength among rightists and leftists. 95% Confidence Intervals. All other variables held constant at their means. Graphs are based on estimates in Table 2. Centrists omitted.

Figure A7b below presents a graph comparing tolerance for the Baseline (No Attacks) condition versus the Guessed Attackers condition that includes all respondents in the second condition. The contrast effects are almost identical to those for the Suspected Palestinian Attackers condition on the left-hand side of Figure A7a.

Figure A7b. Contrast between Baseline (No Attacks) and the Guessed Attackers Conditions



Notes: The graphs display the average predicted difference in opposition to Arab repression across the baseline versus Guessed Attackers conditions (Y-axis) at different values of Left-Right Identity Strength among rightists and leftists. 95% Confidence Intervals. All other variables held constant at their means. Graphs are based on estimates in Table A10 (right-hand side). Centrists omitted.

Given the size of our sample and the actual small number of strongly attached leftists in Israel, we lack the statistical power to test whether the increase for strong leftists is significant across the conditions of the experiment.

Section I. Rightists' and Leftists' Political Tolerance of Each Other is Polarized Too

Although not the primary focus of our study, we also find that when rightists were asked specifically whether "leftists" should be allowed to "hold demonstrations" and "speak on TV," and leftists were asked about "rightists" in a third wave of the survey in April 2019, more intense social identities continue to produce polarized levels of political tolerance in **Figure A8** and **Table A12** below. Using the same controls, strongly attached leftists are *more* likely to be politically tolerant of rightists and their rightist counterparts are *less* likely to be tolerant of leftists.

Interestingly, the average level of tolerance toward opposition groups, labelled "rightists" and "leftists," presumably *Jewish* rightists and leftists, is much higher than it is for least-liked groups and Arab Citizens (Table 1, Figure 1). An important question for future research is whether political tolerance toward partisan or ideological opposition groups (e.g., Democrats and Republicans, leftists and rightists) is as inflated compared to disliked target groups in other countries as it is in Israel.

Figure A8. Leftists' and Rightists' Political Tolerance of Each Other



Note: Predicted values and 95 percent confidence intervals, based on estimates from Table A12 below.

Table A12. Rightists' and Leftists' Political Tolerance of Each Other

	Leftists' Tolerance of "Rightists"		**Rightists' Tolerance of "Leftists"**	
	b	**se**	**b**	**se**
Left-Right ID Strength	.15*	(.06)	-.08*	(.04)
Democratic Values	.15	(.09)	.13*	(.05)
Authoritarianism	-.09*	(.04)	-.11**	(.03)
Perceived Threat	-.10*	(.04)	-.50**	(.03)
Age	-.07	(.04)	.06	(.03)
Female	-.01	(.02)	-.04*	(.02)
Religious ID	-.02	(.02)	.02	(.01)
Education	.10**	(.04)	.09**	(.03)
Income	.01	(.04)	.01	(.03)
Constant	.69**	(.08)	.81**	(.06)
N	190		605	
Adj-R^2	.17		.46	

†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01. Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. Predictors were assessed in the first wave (June/July 2018), while political tolerance and perceived threat toward opposition groups were measured in the third wave of the study (April 2019). Centrists excluded.

Political Tolerance and Perceived Threat were measured with the same format used to assess tolerance and threat toward least-liked groups (i.e., LLG Dem/Speak) and Arab citizens (ACI Dem/Speak) in Table 1, but substituting the targets, "leftists" and "rightists," for rightist and leftist respondents, respectively. To measure Perceived Threat, respondents were asked whether the rival political group posed a threat to "the Jewish identity of the state" and "democracy in Israel."