Supplemental Appendix for: Female Officeholders and Women's Political Engagement: The Role of Parties

Table A1: OLS Models of Post-Election Political Engagement

	(1) Interest Women	(2) Interest Men	(3) Discussion Women	(4) Discussion Men
Political Interest (t-1)	0.269*	0.247*	0.156*	0.243*
	(0.0468)	(0.0487)	(0.0421)	(0.0439)
Woman district winner	0.0726*	0.0101	0.0539+	-0.0556+
	(0.0271)	(0.0309)	(0.0277)	(0.0317)
JVM vote intention (t-1)	0.0568	0.0444	0.0514	0.0170
	(0.0392)	(0.0427)	(0.0366)	(0.0424)
EPN vote intention (t-1)	0.0999*	0.0602	0.0658+	-0.0136
	(0.0366)	(0.0394)	(0.0335)	(0.0391)
AMLO vote intention (t-1)	0.111*	0.0123	0.116*	0.0220
	(0.0396)	(0.0424)	(0.0405)	(0.0422)
Age 31 - 50	-0.0205	0.0346	0.00113	0.112*
	(0.0304)	(0.0348)	(0.0297)	(0.0336)
Age 51+	-0.0485	-0.0107	0.0206	0.135*
	(0.0412)	(0.0404)	(0.0402)	(0.0381)
Secondary Ed.	0.0257	-0.0227	0.0956*	0.100*
	(0.0326)	(0.0412)	(0.0310)	(0.0376)
Preparatory Ed.	0.0838*	0.0280	0.0932*	0.122*
	(0.0391)	(0.0500)	(0.0395)	(0.0455)
University	0.0717	0.0543	0.168*	0.167*
	(0.0503)	(0.0473)	(0.0488)	(0.0433)
Household Income	-0.0595	-0.0676	0.0507	-0.00179
	(0.0539)	(0.0555)	(0.0518)	(0.0568)
Constant	0.224*	0.310*	0.165*	0.198*
	(0.0485)	(0.0564)	(0.0451)	(0.0524)
Observations	486	379	485	381
R^2	0.140	0.106	0.100	0.154

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A2: OLS Models of Post-Election Political Engagement: Pooled with Gender-Woman Winner Interaction

	(1) Interest	(2) Discussion
Political Interest (t-1)	0.256*	0.189*
	(0.0338)	(0.0304)
Woman=1	-0.0421^{+}	-0.0763*
	(0.0240)	(0.0230)
Woman district winner=1	0.00552	-0.0580^{+}
	(0.0304)	(0.0313)
Woman=1 × Woman district winner=1	0.0694^{+}	0.113*
	(0.0406)	(0.0413)
JVM vote intention (t-1)	0.0546^{+}	0.0414
	(0.0288)	(0.0276)
EPN vote intention (t-1)	0.0823*	0.0309
	(0.0267)	(0.0255)
AMLO vote intention (t-1)	0.0657*	0.0772*
	(0.0290)	(0.0290)
Age 31 - 50	0.00266	0.0488*
	(0.0225)	(0.0222)
Age 51+	-0.0276	0.0711*
	(0.0287)	(0.0279)
Secondary Ed.	0.00749	0.0979*
	(0.0253)	(0.0239)
Preparatory Ed.	0.0584^{+}	0.100*
	(0.0310)	(0.0301)
University	0.0681*	0.166*
	(0.0339)	(0.0318)
Household Income	-0.0643^{+}	0.0320
	(0.0389)	(0.0381)
Constant	0.283*	0.221*
	(0.0400)	(0.0376)
Observations	865	866
R^2	0.122	0.120

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Figure A1: Interactive Effect of Gender and Woman Winning District on Political Engagement



Table A3: OLS Models of Post-Election Political Interest: Interactive Effect of Political Information

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Political Interest (t-1)	0.244*	0.236*
	(0.0479)	(0.0515)
Political News Consumption (t-1)	0.0101	0.0140
	(0.0133)	(0.0155)
Woman district winner=1	0.0106	0.116
	(0.0610)	(0.0738)
Woman district winner=1 × Political News Consumption (t-1)	0.0309	-0.0409
	(0.0218)	(0.0251)
JVM vote intention (t-1)	0.0836*	0.0510
	(0.0417)	(0.0442)
EPN vote intention (t-1)	0.126*	0.0554
	(0.0389)	(0.0418)
AMLO vote intention (t-1)	0.132*	0.0107
	(0.0429)	(0.0439)
Age 31 - 50	-0.0209	0.0212
	(0.0321)	(0.0356)
Age 51+	-0.0645	-0.0422
	(0.0434)	(0.0421)
Secondary Ed.	0.0232	-0.0175
	(0.0339)	(0.0429)
Preparatory Ed.	0.0867*	0.0237
	(0.0421)	(0.0517)
University	0.0523	0.0552
	(0.0515)	(0.0500)
Household Income	-0.0590	-0.0614
	(0.0559)	(0.0575)
Constant	0.185*	0.290*
	(0.0636)	(0.0701)
Observations	441	353
R^2	0.151	0.104

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Figure A2: Effects of Woman Winning District on Political Interest Moderated by Political Information (Men)



Source: Mexico Panel Study, 2012. Notes: Thick lines indicate 90% confidence interval. Thin lines indicate 95% confidence interval.

Table A4: OLS Models of Post-Election Political Interest: Interactive Effect of Copartisanship with District Winner

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Political Interest (t-1)	0.275*	0.248*
	(0.0457)	(0.0482)
Age 31 - 50	-0.0329	0.0249
	(0.0308)	(0.0341)
Age 51+	-0.0662	-0.0258
	(0.0414)	(0.0413)
Secondary Ed.	0.0208	-0.0192
	(0.0324)	(0.0416)
Preparatory Ed.	0.0916*	0.0209
	(0.0398)	(0.0503)
University	0.0719	0.0510
	(0.0519)	(0.0475)
Household Income	-0.0640	-0.0497
	(0.0531)	(0.0559)
Weak Copartisan	0.0411	-0.00770
	(0.0441)	(0.0466)
Strong Copartisan	0.0688	0.0230
	(0.0451)	(0.0503)
Woman district winner=1	0.0474	-0.00505
	(0.0332)	(0.0340)
Weak Copartisan × Woman district winner=1	0.0174	-0.0205
	(0.0706)	(0.0721)
Strong Copartisan × Woman district winner=1	0.118	0.106
	(0.0767)	(0.104)
Constant	0.283*	0.340*
	(0.0448)	(0.0547)
Observations	486	379
R^2	0.140	0.109

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Figure A3: Effects of Woman Winning District on Political Interest Moderated by Copartisanship



Source: Mexico Panel Study, 2012. Notes: Thick lines indicate 90% confidence interval.
Thin lines indicate 95% confidence interval.

Table A5: Descriptive Statistics for 2012 Panel Data of Mass Public

	mean	sd	min	max	count
Political Interest	0.43	0.30	0	1	889
Political Interest (t-1)	0.44	0.32	0	1	1281
Political Discussion	0.42	0.29	0	1	889
Woman district winner	0.30	0.46	0	1	1288
JVM vote intention (t-1)	0.21	0.41	0	1	1288
EPN vote intention (t-1)	0.32	0.47	0	1	1288
AMLO vote intention (t-1)	0.22	0.41	0	1	1288
age_group==Age 30 and under	0.33	0.47	0	1	1288
age_group==Age 31 - 50	0.42	0.49	0	1	1288
age_group==Age 51+	0.24	0.43	0	1	1288
edr==None or Primary Ed.	0.32	0.47	0	1	1287
edr==Secondary Ed.	0.31	0.46	0	1	1287
edr==Preparatory Ed.	0.21	0.40	0	1	1287
edr==University	0.16	0.37	0	1	1287
Household Income	0.46	0.27	0	1	1260
Woman	0.52	0.50	0	1	1288
Political News Consumption (t-1)	2.78	1.26	1	4	1162
Copartisanship with Winner (t-1)	0.51	0.77	0	2	1288

Table A6: Poisson Model of Number of Pre-Candidates in a District: Excluding Districts with Women-Only Primaries

	(1)
	No. of Women
Woman District Winner 2012	0.368*
	(0.170)
% Women among Neighbor Winners 2012	0.577+
	(0.351)
Safe PAN District	0.682*
	(0.290)
% Women Economically Active	3.540*
	(1.084)
Women-only Primary	1.770*
	(0.188)
Constant	-2.927*
	(0.441)
Observations	224
Pseudo R^2	0.242

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A7: Poisson Model of Number of Pre-Candidates in a District

	(1) No. of Women
PANista woman won district (t-1)	0.430
	(0.396)
PANista woman won in neighboring district (t-1)	-0.0536
	(0.261)
Safe PAN District	0.251
	(0.278)
% Women Economically Active	2.453*
	(1.025)
Constant	-1.212*
	(0.369)
Observations	224
Pseudo R^2	0.018

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A8: Descriptive Statistics for PAN 2015 Candidate Selection and Primaries Analyses

	mean	sd	min	max	count
(sum) pan_precand_women	0.71	0.98	0	5	224
(sum) pan_precand_men	0.92	1.14	0	7	224
Woman District Winner 2012	0.30	0.46	0	1	300
% Women among Neighbor Winners 2012	0.30	0.22	0	1	300
Safe PAN District	0.06	0.24	0	1	300
% Women Economically Active	0.33	0.09	0	1	300

Table A9: Descriptive Statistics for Time-Series Cross-Sectional Election Analysis

	mean	sd	min	max	count
% Women	40.73	21.21	0	100	900
% Women (t-1)	33.84	21.33	0	100	900
% Women among Neighbor Winners (t-1)	20.97	20.30	0	100	900
Woman District Winner (t-1)	0.21	0.41	0	1	900
PAN win (t-1)	0.29	0.45	0	1	900
PRD and Left win (t-1)	0.23	0.42	0	1	900
PRI-PVEM win (t-1)	0.48	0.50	0	1	900

Table A10: Logistic Fixed Effects Model of PAN Female Candidate in a District (2009-2015)

	(1) PAN Female Candidate
PAN female candidate indicator	
PANista woman won district (t-1)	-1.004*
	(0.439)
% PANista Women among Neighbor Winners (t-1)	0.684
	(0.865)
year=2012	0.262
	(0.182)
year=2015	0.723***
	(0.191)
Observations	582
Pseudo R^2	0.055

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A11: Multinomial Logit of PAN Selection Method in 2015

	Selection Method 2015
Open_Primary	
PAN Share 2012	3.962*
	(1.920)
Constant	-4.801*
	(1.103)
Woman_Reserved_Primary	
PAN Share 2012	-1.764
	(1.287)
Constant	-0.0184
	(0.443)
Designation	
PAN Share 2012	-6.643*
	(2.798)
Constant	1.107
	(0.711)
Observations	300

Closed Primary is the reference category.

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Contagion Effects

In the conventional conceptualization of role model effects, Matland and Studlar (1996) argue that parties may respond to female nominees by their ideologically proximate competitor parties with more female candidates of their own in subsequent elections. This typically involves a center-left party responding to more a left-wing challenger running on more gender parity. Such a test is complicated in the Mexican case since the parties of the left frequently form electoral alliances in presidential election years (i.e. every other legislative election). The best test of the theory is offered by Morena's candidate selection decisions in 2015 in response to the leftist coalition's candidacies in 2012 (Morena not being a party in 2012). Table A12 breaks down the gender composition of Morena's candidacies in 2015 by the gender of the leftist candidate in 2012 as well as the electoral strength of the left in 2012. The distinction between the left being competitive or not competitive is simply whether the leftist coalition was in the top-two parties in the district in 2012. What the tables shows is that in areas where the left is electorally viable, there is no difference between a male or female leftist candidate in 2012 on the likelihood that the Morena candidate in 2015 is a woman (i.e. no contagion effects). When looking at areas where the left is weak, there does appear to be some contagion effect. In districts where the left fielded a female candidate in 2012, Morena's cadidates are 64% women, constrasted with 46% women in districts where a man was the leftist candidate in 2012. Thus it appears that contagion effects are present, but only in electorally non-viable districts. This demonstrates that role model effects and contagion effects likely do not work in tandem in the Mexican case, since role model effects entail female candidates winning their seat and that is what leads to more female candidates in subsequent elections.

Table A12: Contagion Effects among Left Parties: Morena 2015 Candidacies

	Left Not Competitive Male Cand. 2012	Left Not Competitive Female Cand. 2012	Left Competitive Male Cand. 2012	Left Competitive Female Cand. 2012	Total
Morena Man	53.75	35.62	56.00	53.19	50.00
	(43)	(26)	(56)	(25)	(150)
Morena Woman	46.25	64.38	44.00	46.81	50.00
	(37)	(47)	(44)	(22)	(150)
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(80)	(73)	(100)	(47)	(300)

Numbers in parentheses indicate total number of districts per column.

Figure A4: Distribution of PAN Performance in 2012