Supplementary Files

The Risks of Election Observation: International Condemnation and Post-Election Violence

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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Post-Election Violence	0.084	0.278	0	1	191
Loser Challenge	0.744	0.438	0	1	164
Condemnation	0.142	0.350	0	1	190
Other verdicts	0.595	0.492	0	1	190
Propensity score	0.176	0.189	0.026	0.834	131
Conflicting reports (Western IOs)	0.052	0.223	0	1	191
Conflicting reports (any IOs)	0.068	0.253	0	1	191
Election controls					
IO observers present	0.723	0.449	0	1	191
IO observers present (any)	0.848	0.360	0	1	191
Prior fraud concerns	0.565	0.497	0	1	191
Fraud overall	0.890	0.940	0	2	146
Serious fraud	0.236	0.426	0	1	182
Fraud election-day dummy	0.203	0.404	0	1	138
Fraud election-day level	1.123	1.180	0	3	138
Fraud pre-election level	1.521	1.134	0	3	144
Loser's vote share	23.517	13.465	0	49.77	182
Boycott	0.247	0.433	0	1	190
Poll type	0.853	0.846	0	2	191
Pre-election violence level	0.869	0.894	0	3	191
Country controls					
Leader tenure (log)	1.946	0.911	0	3.638	191
Post conflict	0.346	0.477	0	1	191
GDP pc (log)	6.116	0.931	4.062	8.987	191
Natural resources pc (log)	-5.481	6.309	-9.210	9.492	191
Executive constraints	3.384	1.880	1	7	172
Population size (log)	2.000	1.092	0.336	4.972	191
Ethnic fractionalization	0.674	0.21	0.061	0.944	186

Notes: All country-level controls are lagged by one year.

Additional results referenced in the text

Footnote 42: Condemnations are significantly different from other verdicts
In columns 1-3 of Table 1, the counterfactual to condemnation includes both other observer verdicts and un-observed elections. Follow-up analyses on these models show that condemnation is significantly different from other verdicts (those not alleging significant fraud, i.e. positive and mixed reports). To establish this, I replicated columns 1-3 of Table 1 including variables for both *condemnation* and *other* IO verdicts (technically, non-condemnation, based on nelda47). In these follow-up models, the reference category is un-observed elections, and the variable *IO observers present* is excluded. The difference between the coefficients of *condemnation* and *other* verdicts is statistically significant in all models, as indicated by p-values of two-sided difference-in-means tests ($p<0.05$). Table not shown but code included in the Online replication file.

Table A2: Effect of Condemnation on Loser Challenge (intermediary step)

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	2.098*	1.393	1.232	3.461**	3.510*	3.003
	(1.203)	(1.424)	(1.470)	(1.555)	(1.969)	(1.974)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-0.302	-0.199	0.091			
	(0.707)	(0.837)	(0.767)			
Serious fraud	0.746			0.406		
	(0.720)			(0.962)		
Fraud election-day dummy		1.416			-0.155	
		(1.211)			(1.533)	
Fraud election-day level			0.693**			0.862
			(0.301)			(0.574)
Loser's vote share	0.010	0.006	0.017	0.073*	0.060	0.075
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.065)
Boycott	2.960**	2.784*	3.073*	20.912***	20.222***	20.719***
	(1.463)	(1.597)	(1.825)	(1.837)	(1.915)	(2.380)
Poll type	0.966**	1.082**	1.102***	0.793	0.919	0.936
	(0.391)	(0.437)	(0.389)	(0.586)	(0.613)	(0.635)
Pre-election violence level	0.992**	0.970**	0.919**	2.326***	2.692***	2.228***
	(0.450)	(0.494)	(0.433)	(0.639)	(0.702)	(0.813)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	-0.984**	-0.994***	-1.118***	-2.082***	-1.743**	-1.932**
	(0.391)	(0.341)	(0.341)	(0.754)	(0.770)	(0.873)
Post conflict	0.289	0.199	-0.184	1.534*	1.571*	0.685
	(0.646)	(0.631)	(0.604)	(0.860)	(0.955)	(1.143)
GDP pc (log)	-0.286	-0.142	0.006	-0.487	-0.825	-0.493
	(0.485)	(0.561)	(0.514)	(0.721)	(0.727)	(0.690)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.129*	0.102	0.093	0.109	0.114	0.099
	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.156)	(0.150)	(0.155)
Executive constraints	-0.465**	-0.361*	-0.316*	-0.955***	-0.804**	-0.676**
	(0.213)	(0.202)	(0.184)	(0.349)	(0.388)	(0.331)
Population size (log)	-1.210**	-1.114*	-1.191**	-3.207***	-3.287***	-3.143***
	(0.545)	(0.591)	(0.543)	(0.779)	(0.911)	(0.774)
Ethnic fractionalization	3.966	3.274	3.608	15.435***	13.540***	14.119***
	(2.836)	(3.142)	(2.997)	(3.430)	(3.844)	(3.606)
Constant	5.039	3.829	2.077	3.973	6.126	2.730
	(4.094)	(5.101)	(4.678)	(5.292)	(5.165)	(4.928)
Observations	134	114	114	97	83	83
Number of countries	37	37	37	34	34	34
Percent correctly classified	87.31	88.60	86.84	89.69	87.95	89.16
ROC	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.95	0.95	0.95
Pseudo R2	0.44	0.42	0.44	0.61	0.58	0.60
AIC	115.51	105.01	102.92	68.13	64.46	62.83
BIC	158.98	146.05	143.97	104.18	98.32	96.70
LL	-42.76	-37.50	-36.46	-20.06	-18.23	-17.42

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is loser challenge. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Effect of Loser Challenge on Post-Election Violence (intermediary step)

	All elections		Observed elections only	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Loser Challenge	17.659***	17.209***	17.316***	16.033***
	(1.879)	(1.257)	(1.519)	(1.067)
Election controls				
IO observers present	0.528	0.098		
	(0.996)	(0.874)		
Serious fraud		1.727**		1.404*
		(0.743)		(0.795)
Loser's vote share	0.059***	0.065**	0.095***	0.090***
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Boycott	-0.234	-0.143	0.810	1.128
	(1.132)	(1.204)	(1.350)	(1.218)
Poll type	-0.136	0.045	-0.105	0.164
	(0.466)	(0.538)	(0.600)	(0.679)
Pre-election violence level	-0.054	0.169	-0.197	0.012
	(0.629)	(0.641)	(0.612)	(0.742)
Country controls				
Leader tenure (log)	0.669*	0.894*	0.578	0.727*
	(0.388)	(0.502)	(0.352)	(0.383)
Post conflict	-1.338	-1.189	-1.213	-0.991
	(0.902)	(1.108)	(0.952)	(1.110)
GDP pc (log)	-0.491	-0.841	0.241	-0.045
	(0.603)	(0.652)	(0.647)	(0.654)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.010	0.010	-0.019	-0.029
	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.091)
Executive constraints	0.206	0.408	0.005	0.193
	(0.293)	(0.342)	(0.380)	(0.445)
Population size (log)	0.223	-0.312	0.522	0.065
	(0.535)	(0.640)	(0.532)	(0.701)
Ethnic fractionalization	-2.766	-2.900	-0.678	-0.594
	(2.981)	(2.966)	(4.179)	(3.711)
Constant	-18.778***	-17.159***	-24.997***	-23.084***
	(4.496)	(5.179)	(5.269)	(5.190)
Observations	138	135	101	98
Number of countries	37	37	34	34
Percent correctly classified	91.30	91.85	91.09	90.82
ROC	0.88	0.90	0.87	0.88
Pseudo R2	0.26	0.32	0.27	0.27
AIC	82.70	78.66	70.52	68.48
BIC	120.75	122.23	104.51	104.67
LL	-28.35	-24.33	-22.26	-20.24

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
The dependent variable is post-election violence. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Results are qualitatively similar when using OLS instead of logit models.

Replacing AEVD with SCAD and ACLED

I replaced the violence measure (based on AEVD) with alternate outcome measures (SCAD and ACLED). The results using SCAD and ACLED are substantively similar and shown in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. The coefficients on condemnation are positive in all models and statistically significant in most models.

ACLED and SCAD can be problematic as a measure of electoral violence.[1] To construct a conceptually equivalent measure to the main outcome, I filtered the SCAD data for election-related violence (using the issue filter=election) in the three months after the election (using date information) with at least 1 fatality (using deaths information). Replicating results with ACLED data is more challenging because ACLED data lack a filter for issue area, so that election-related events cannot be clearly distinguished from other events. The analyses use all ACLED events (election-related or not) for the replication. I do not use another replication dataset (e.g. Daxecker 2014) because that measures event counts rather than fatalities.

[1] von Borzyskowski and Wahman 2018.

Table A4: Replacing AEVD with SCAD

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	0.327**	0.333*	0.362*	0.381*	0.313	0.336
	(0.160)	(0.190)	(0.199)	(0.188)	(0.206)	(0.213)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-0.015	0.015	0.017			
	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.080)			
Serious fraud	0.065			0.078		
	(0.074)			(0.090)		
Fraud election-day dummy		0.098			0.106	
		(0.115)			(0.129)	
Fraud election-day level			0.001			0.013
			(0.044)			(0.052)
Loser's vote share	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Boycott	0.083	0.078	0.079	-0.023	-0.040	-0.043
	(0.077)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.084)	(0.116)	(0.120)
Poll type	0.042	0.081*	0.079*	0.037	0.111*	0.111
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.067)
Pre-election violence level	0.125***	0.113**	0.127**	0.104*	0.122	0.130*
	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.018	0.013	0.012
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Post conflict	-0.127	-0.158*	-0.149*	-0.153*	-0.209**	-0.206**
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)
GDP pc (log)	-0.066	-0.064	-0.072	-0.056	-0.083	-0.088
	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.102)	(0.106)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Executive constraints	0.023	0.038	0.037*	0.022	0.032	0.032
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Population size (log)	-0.081*	-0.095	-0.104	-0.099	-0.126	-0.136
	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.175	0.298	0.268	0.330	0.220	0.195
	(0.249)	(0.236)	(0.234)	(0.265)	(0.299)	(0.300)
Constant	0.313	0.209	0.309	0.255	0.536	0.615
	(0.396)	(0.466)	(0.526)	(0.638)	(0.745)	(0.772)
Observations	141	107	107	101	78	78
Number of countries	36	35	35	33	32	32
AIC	93.62	71.00	72.37	78.03	67.55	68.61
BIC	137.85	111.10	112.46	114.64	100.55	101.61
LL	-31.81	-20.50	-21.18	-25.01	-19.78	-20.31

Notes: OLS models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is SCAD election violence (at least one election-related fatality). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Replacing AEVD with ACLED

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	0.397**	0.381**	0.410**	0.407**	0.405**	0.454**
	(0.148)	(0.169)	(0.177)	(0.166)	(0.180)	(0.188)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-0.143	-0.156	-0.150			
	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.125)			
Serious fraud	0.082			0.092		
	(0.083)			(0.104)		
Fraud election-day dummy		0.167**			0.127	
		(0.076)			(0.099)	
Fraud election-day level			0.005			-0.024
			(0.042)			(0.047)
Loser's vote share	-0.000	-0.005	-0.006	-0.001	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Boycott	0.029	-0.083	-0.083	-0.097	-0.149	-0.139
	(0.122)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.182)	(0.191)
Poll type	0.037	0.015	0.003	0.051	0.049	0.021
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.087)
Pre-election violence level	0.071	0.084	0.100	0.075	0.096	0.110
	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	-0.055	0.007	0.002	-0.102	-0.007	-0.015
	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.076)
Post conflict	0.089	0.238**	0.244**	0.072	0.183*	0.195
	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.084)	(0.107)	(0.118)
GDP pc (log)	-0.083	-0.012	-0.023	-0.043	0.015	-0.002
	(0.057)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.108)	(0.110)
Natural resources pc (log)	-0.002	-0.011	-0.012	-0.006	-0.015	-0.016
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Executive constraints	0.015	0.014	0.011	0.015	0.010	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Population size (log)	0.074	0.106	0.101	0.029	0.066	0.065
	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.168	0.095	0.106	0.348*	0.124	0.178
	(0.243)	(0.220)	(0.238)	(0.202)	(0.214)	(0.256)
Constant	0.570	-0.016	0.091	0.249	-0.214	-0.064
	(0.487)	(0.704)	(0.712)	(0.643)	(0.833)	(0.857)
Observations	133	97	97	94	69	69
Number of countries	37	35	35	35	33	33
AIC	169.22	112.31	114.52	127.19	90.68	91.43
BIC	212.58	150.93	153.14	162.80	121.96	122.71
LL	-69.61	-41.15	-42.26	-49.60	-31.34	-31.71

Notes: OLS models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is ACLED any violence (at least one fatality). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Robustness

Table 1 in the article presents models predicting whether condemnations are associated with post-vote violence. I ran a number of follow-up analyses to check whether the results are robust to coding changes in IO reports or control variables.

Controlling for conflicting reports

In the main analysis, I focus on whether any Western observer group condemned elections. However, reports can conflict when multiple groups attend and can also be issued by non-Western organizations. I thus replicate Table 1 by adding a control variable for conflicting reports, i.e. whether Western observer groups (Table A6) or any observer groups (including African organizations, Table A7) issued divergent verdicts (DIEM data, a1; Nelda45). Conflicting reports are coded 1 when reputable observers disagreed about election quality, i.e. when several types of verdicts where reached. It is coded 1 in the case of one election getting both negative and positive reports; or negative and ambiguous reports. The coding of *condemnation* does not change because in the rare occasions where African organizations deem elections unacceptable (e.g. EISA in Zimbabwe 2002), their critical judgement aligned with that of Western groups. The results show that condemnations can trigger violence independent of other "noise." In that way, electoral losers are no different from some winning incumbents who also pick and choose the verdicts that suit them best (Kelley 2012, 48).

We can also assess the effect of mixed observer verdicts, i.e. when an election receives both condemnations and non-condemnations. To assess this, I have categorized observed elections into three groups: those receiving only critical reports, those receiving only non-critical reports (or zero critical reports), and those receiving both critical and non-critical reports. The last group (mixed reports) constitutes 4% of observed elections in the dataset. Appendix Table A8 shows that compared to observed elections which are not criticized, observed elections with mixed reports (critical and non-critical) are also associated with a higher risk of violence.

Table A6: Controlling for Conflicting Reports by other Western IO observers

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	2.926***	3.364**	3.250*	3.905**	7.155**	8.075*
	(1.053)	(1.662)	(1.857)	(1.684)	(3.525)	(4.685)
Conflicting reports (Western IOs)	-0.035	0.136	0.388	0.886	1.882	2.494
	(1.168)	(1.565)	(1.957)	(1.328)	(2.519)	(3.145)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-0.404	-1.075	-1.014			
	(1.048)	(1.087)	(1.164)			
Serious fraud	1.767**			1.109		
	(0.816)			(0.675)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.107**			1.236	
		(0.942)			(0.988)	
Fraud election-day level			1.190**			0.820**
			(0.587)			(0.390)
Loser's vote share	0.075***	0.076***	0.085***	0.109***	0.170	0.188
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.115)	(0.129)
Boycott	0.866	1.618	1.504	1.950	6.503	7.437
	(1.301)	(1.721)	(1.616)	(1.450)	(3.955)	(4.589)
Poll type	0.035	0.581	0.535	-0.343	1.491**	1.666**
	(0.616)	(0.611)	(0.716)	(0.928)	(0.602)	(0.679)
Pre-election violence level	0.063	0.031	-0.224	-0.226	-0.424	-0.810
	(0.602)	(0.642)	(0.877)	(0.624)	(0.527)	(0.656)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.711**	1.024***	0.959**	0.843	1.047**	1.124**
	(0.322)	(0.394)	(0.463)	(0.570)	(0.465)	(0.448)
Post conflict	-1.530	-1.640	-1.982	-1.048	0.546	0.368
	(1.359)	(2.309)	(2.068)	(1.393)	(1.291)	(1.231)
GDP pc (log)	-1.017	-1.225	-1.127	-0.054	1.111	1.309
	(0.811)	(1.018)	(0.954)	(0.688)	(1.003)	(1.178)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.025	0.117	0.107	-0.051	-0.028	-0.026
	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.110)
Executive constraints	0.379	0.519	0.692*	0.370	0.804	0.967
	(0.349)	(0.348)	(0.359)	(0.562)	(0.678)	(0.788)
Population size (log)	-0.912	-1.185	-1.227	-0.959	-1.989	-2.288
	(0.644)	(0.887)	(1.032)	(0.882)	(1.296)	(1.689)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.439	-3.199	-2.367	2.666	2.087	1.916
	(2.534)	(2.247)	(2.597)	(3.825)	(3.201)	(4.006)
Constant	0.019	2.635	-0.072	-9.805*	-22.957	-26.009
	(6.170)	(7.839)	(6.471)	(5.750)	(14.050)	(16.527)
Observations	151	114	114	109	83	83
Number of countries	38	37	37	35	34	34
Percent correctly classified	94.70	94.74	94.74	97.25	96.39	95.18
ROC	0.87	0.89	0.91	0.89	0.95	0.95
Pseudo R2	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.41	0.50	0.51
AIC	83.77	69.15	67.87	66.94	51.47	51.00
BIC	132.05	112.93	111.65	107.32	87.75	87.29
LL	-25.89	-18.58	-17.94	-18.47	-10.74	-10.50

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is post-election violence. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Controlling for Conflicting Reports by any IO observers

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	2.732***	2.979**	2.814*	3.369***	4.732***	4.710**
	(0.952)	(1.405)	(1.514)	(1.056)	(1.808)	(1.963)
Conflicting reports (any IOs)	-1.081	-1.332	-1.558	-0.289	-0.092	-0.422
	(1.335)	(1.732)	(2.680)	(1.289)	(1.568)	(2.480)
Election controls						
IO observers present (any)	-0.201	-0.058	-0.210			
	(1.041)	(1.153)	(1.242)			
Serious fraud	1.731**			1.288*		
	(0.761)			(0.682)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.208**			1.342	
		(0.929)			(0.950)	
Fraud election-day level			1.306**			0.966**
			(0.542)			(0.454)
Loser's vote share	0.073***	0.071**	0.086*	0.079***	0.068*	0.085**
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.043)
Boycott	0.686	1.531	1.456	1.373	2.840*	3.192**
	(1.279)	(1.672)	(1.623)	(1.249)	(1.702)	(1.483)
Poll type	0.127	0.821*	0.835	-0.051	1.174***	1.328***
	(0.570)	(0.454)	(0.600)	(0.633)	(0.416)	(0.494)
Pre-election violence level	0.240	0.224	-0.037	-0.033	-0.109	-0.336
	(0.598)	(0.630)	(0.856)	(0.595)	(0.504)	(0.641)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.658**	0.973***	0.867**	0.683**	1.133**	1.067*
	(0.294)	(0.339)	(0.440)	(0.313)	(0.444)	(0.575)
Post conflict	-1.609	-1.925	-2.272	-1.380	-1.668	-1.910
	(1.457)	(2.856)	(2.415)	(1.392)	(3.184)	(2.692)
GDP pc (log)	-0.819	-0.777	-0.634	-0.711	-0.729	-0.511
	(0.706)	(0.801)	(0.790)	(0.704)	(0.896)	(0.800)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.014	0.080	0.078	0.006	0.103	0.100
	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.079)
Executive constraints	0.357	0.531	0.705**	0.420	0.733	0.842**
	(0.335)	(0.334)	(0.343)	(0.365)	(0.447)	(0.420)
Population size (log)	-0.754	-0.899	-0.843	-0.942	-1.608	-1.534
	(0.609)	(0.778)	(0.963)	(0.673)	(1.046)	(1.160)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.286	-4.643	-4.484	-0.096	-3.678	-4.517
	(2.672)	(3.133)	(3.656)	(2.583)	(3.139)	(3.802)
Constant	-0.970	-0.583	-3.318	-2.539	-1.850	-4.472
	(5.198)	(7.304)	(5.997)	(5.178)	(8.329)	(6.746)
Observations	151	114	114	128	95	95
Number of countries	38	37	37	37	36	36
Percent correctly classified	94.70	94.74	94.74	95.31	94.74	93.68
ROC	0.88	0.88	0.92	0.88	0.91	0.93
Pseudo R2	0.35	0.36	0.38	0.36	0.41	0.44
AIC	83.40	69.27	67.73	75.22	59.36	58.15
BIC	131.68	113.05	111.51	118.00	97.67	96.45
LL	-25.70	-18.63	-17.87	-22.61	-14.68	-14.07

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is post-election violence. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: All negative versus mixed reports by other reputable IO observers

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All condemned	3.549***	3.432**	3.270*	3.935**	7.187**	7.820*
	(1.311)	(1.682)	(1.818)	(1.712)	(3.247)	(4.094)
Mixed reports	4.725**	4.521	4.582	6.544**	10.401**	11.321*
	(2.310)	(3.032)	(3.314)	(3.207)	(5.039)	(6.467)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-0.840	-1.097	-0.984			
	(1.132)	(1.165)	(1.202)			
Serious fraud	1.673**			1.036		
	(0.828)			(0.641)		
Fraud election-day dummy		1.980**			0.898	
		(0.919)			(1.082)	
Fraud election-day level			1.183**			0.698*
			(0.572)			(0.365)
Loser's vote share	0.086***	0.077***	0.088***	0.124**	0.180*	0.193*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.104)
Boycott	1.175	1.660	1.527	1.959	6.383*	7.109*
	(1.458)	(1.708)	(1.620)	(1.419)	(3.449)	(3.742)
Poll type	-0.177	0.391	0.358	-0.618	1.232*	1.383*
	(0.756)	(0.771)	(0.841)	(1.099)	(0.716)	(0.819)
Pre-election violence level	-0.010	0.031	-0.232	-0.310	-0.456	-0.791
	(0.587)	(0.637)	(0.879)	(0.658)	(0.526)	(0.624)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.973**	1.147**	1.111**	1.045	1.116**	1.235**
	(0.447)	(0.452)	(0.533)	(0.674)	(0.482)	(0.512)
Post conflict	-1.619	-1.536	-1.862	-1.072	0.947	0.720
	(1.435)	(2.298)	(2.022)	(1.445)	(1.271)	(1.211)
GDP pc (log)	-1.288	-1.325	-1.224	-0.058	1.133	1.244
	(0.990)	(1.134)	(1.013)	(0.725)	(0.899)	(1.012)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.021	0.106	0.100	-0.068	-0.041	-0.034
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.105)	(0.102)
Executive constraints	0.381	0.513	0.692**	0.412	0.799	0.933
	(0.378)	(0.349)	(0.348)	(0.627)	(0.637)	(0.687)
Population size (log)	-1.077	-1.295	-1.335	-1.056	-2.109*	-2.293
	(0.720)	(0.933)	(1.045)	(0.962)	(1.190)	(1.519)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.631	-2.888	-2.294	2.696	2.359	1.945
	(2.297)	(2.131)	(2.346)	(3.499)	(2.763)	(3.628)
Constant	1.568	3.024	0.278	-10.440*	-23.263*	-25.358*
	(6.404)	(8.302)	(6.817)	(6.031)	(12.228)	(13.346)
Observations	152	115	115	110	84	84
Number of countries	38	37	37	35	34	34
Percent correctly classified	96.71	95.65	95.65	97.27	96.43	96.43
ROC	0.87	0.89	0.91	0.89	0.94	0.96
Pseudo R2	0.37	0.36	0.38	0.42	0.51	0.52
AIC	82.01	69.22	67.78	66.17	51.07	50.63
BIC	130.39	113.14	111.70	106.68	87.53	87.09
LL	-25.00	-18.61	-17.89	-18.09	-10.53	-10.31

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is post-election violence. The excluded group is elections which received no condemnation.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Controlling for different fraud measures

I replicated Table 1 with alternative fraud measures for the pre-election period and overall manipulation. These are the four-point scale *fraud pre-election level* (QED data, sr11cheat), the binary variable *prior fraud concerns* (Nelda11), and the three-point scale *fraud overall* (QED data, sa1). Appendix Tables A9 and A10 show the results of these estimations for the full and restricted sample, respectively. Models 4-6 in these Tables are identical to the models in Table 1 and allow easy comparison to the alternative specifications shown in other columns. The coefficient for *condemnation* remains statistically significant and positive.[2]

[2]In model 8 of Table A10 the coefficient on condemnation loses significance, which is likely due to non-random missingness in the fraud variables sourced from QED (models 3, 5-8). Thus limited weight should be placed on model 8, as it should also raise eyebrows that the usually "favorite" variable to explain post-vote violence (election-day fraud) itself is not-significant.

Table A9: Controlling for Different Fraud Measures (all elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Condemnation	2.484***	2.434***	2.438**	2.934***	3.335**	3.157**	3.051***	3.804**
	(0.869)	(0.852)	(1.074)	(0.914)	(1.475)	(1.575)	(0.952)	(1.547)
Election controls								
IO observers present	0.162	0.130	-0.591	-0.407	-1.058	-0.985	-1.176	-1.641
	(1.220)	(1.222)	(1.062)	(1.054)	(1.097)	(1.142)	(1.059)	(1.143)
Prior fraud concerns		0.280						
		(0.755)						
Fraud overall			0.516					
			(0.580)					
Serious fraud				1.764**				
				(0.828)				
Fraud election-day dummy					2.135**			
					(0.945)			
Fraud election-day level						1.219**		1.128*
						(0.548)		(0.619)
Fraud pre-election level							1.087**	0.817**
							(0.426)	(0.372)
Loser's vote share	0.063***	0.065***	0.069**	0.075***	0.076***	0.085***	0.094**	0.118***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Boycott	0.355	0.276	0.705	0.873	1.608	1.483	0.698	1.812
	(1.082)	(1.140)	(1.459)	(1.255)	(1.670)	(1.560)	(1.337)	(1.259)
Poll type	-0.038	-0.064	0.387	0.032	0.601	0.584	0.393	0.791
	(0.491)	(0.519)	(0.490)	(0.625)	(0.592)	(0.662)	(0.599)	(0.859)
Pre-election violence level	-0.128	-0.146	-0.248	0.059	0.039	-0.201	-0.642	-0.626
	(0.643)	(0.638)	(0.840)	(0.557)	(0.659)	(0.894)	(0.805)	(1.057)
Country controls								
Leader tenure (log)	0.374	0.358	0.569*	0.713**	1.018***	0.927**	0.987**	1.396***
	(0.302)	(0.303)	(0.334)	(0.333)	(0.378)	(0.454)	(0.401)	(0.503)
Post conflict	-1.382	-1.375	-1.594	-1.528	-1.649	-2.014	-1.615	-2.179
	(0.996)	(0.998)	(1.496)	(1.369)	(2.363)	(2.184)	(1.529)	(2.394)
GDP pc (log)	-0.609	-0.608	-0.923	-1.021	-1.204	-1.062	-1.320	-1.489
	(0.729)	(0.723)	(0.849)	(0.816)	(0.959)	(0.872)	(0.863)	(0.927)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.034	0.031	0.123	0.025	0.116	0.104	0.200**	0.180*
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.096)	(0.107)
Executive constraints	0.129	0.136	0.254	0.379	0.521	0.696*	0.328	0.861**
	(0.292)	(0.284)	(0.251)	(0.349)	(0.354)	(0.371)	(0.252)	(0.402)
Population size (log)	-0.216	-0.223	-0.444	-0.916	-1.160	-1.149	-0.687	-1.428*
	(0.654)	(0.649)	(0.631)	(0.634)	(0.749)	(0.844)	(0.623)	(0.777)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.494	-0.446	-2.780	-0.424	-3.272	-2.511	-3.354	-3.154
	(2.544)	(2.628)	(2.482)	(2.488)	(2.337)	(2.479)	(3.282)	(3.604)
Constant	-1.123	-1.292	2.201	0.039	2.481	-0.562	3.348	0.156
	(6.079)	(5.994)	(6.968)	(6.243)	(7.637)	(5.975)	(8.307)	(6.577)
Observations	156	156	119	151	114	114	118	113
Number of countries	38	38	37	38	37	37	37	37
Percent correctly classified	92.95	92.95	93.28	94.70	94.74	94.74	93.22	92.92
ROC	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.89	0.91	0.90	0.92
Pseudo R2	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.31	0.41
AIC	91.41	93.28	77.83	81.77	67.16	65.91	74.05	66.16
BIC	134.10	139.03	119.51	127.03	108.20	106.96	115.61	109.80
LL	-31.70	-31.64	-23.91	-25.89	-18.58	-17.96	-22.03	-17.08

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is post-election violence.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Controlling for Different Fraud Measures (observed elections only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Condemnation	2.791***	2.776***	3.003***	3.621***	6.570**	6.964**	4.709***	18.920
	(1.020)	(0.979)	(1.165)	(1.321)	(2.765)	(3.201)	(1.125)	(12.165)
Election controls								
Prior fraud concerns		0.050						
		(1.172)						
Fraud overall			0.357					
			(0.791)					
Serious fraud				1.223				
				(0.806)				
Fraud election-day dummy					1.799			
					(1.697)			
Fraud election-day level						0.891*		-0.428
						(0.468)		(1.092)
Fraud pre-election level							1.907***	3.521*
							(0.721)	(1.953)
Loser's vote share	0.101***	0.102***	0.110***	0.105***	0.169	0.165*	0.213***	0.626
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.072)	(0.393)
Boycott	1.070	1.056	2.265	1.850	6.541	6.838*	3.629*	18.911
	(1.016)	(1.092)	(1.585)	(1.355)	(4.080)	(3.543)	(2.008)	(11.710)
Poll type	-0.311	-0.318	0.523	-0.238	1.751***	1.891***	0.859	7.149*
	(0.590)	(0.691)	(0.755)	(0.860)	(0.515)	(0.668)	(1.054)	(4.258)
Pre-election violence level	-0.432	-0.434	-0.607	-0.116	-0.369	-0.661	-1.521	-2.195***
	(0.632)	(0.629)	(0.930)	(0.579)	(0.544)	(0.658)	(0.928)	(0.840)
Country controls								
Leader tenure (log)	0.395	0.390	0.401	0.777	1.116**	0.968**	1.435	1.449**
	(0.420)	(0.382)	(0.545)	(0.524)	(0.520)	(0.443)	(1.532)	(0.628)
Post conflict	-1.159	-1.159	-0.749	-1.059	0.297	0.002	-0.868	4.413
	(1.247)	(1.243)	(1.402)	(1.425)	(1.849)	(1.790)	(1.667)	(2.954)
GDP pc (log)	0.297	0.295	0.441	0.043	1.192	1.329	0.287	5.322
	(0.754)	(0.773)	(0.618)	(0.671)	(1.093)	(1.099)	(1.282)	(3.930)
Natural resources pc (log)	-0.018	-0.018	0.040	-0.056	-0.028	-0.025	0.147	0.066
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.146)	(0.080)
Executive constraints	-0.050	-0.048	0.152	0.340	0.802	0.887	0.404	2.121
	(0.369)	(0.372)	(0.403)	(0.519)	(0.720)	(0.728)	(0.629)	(1.370)
Population size (log)	0.089	0.087	-0.039	-0.821	-1.532*	-1.656*	-0.453	-5.338
	(0.722)	(0.734)	(0.671)	(0.776)	(0.787)	(0.967)	(0.667)	(3.760)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.198	1.235	1.002	2.297	1.690	1.985	4.643	16.968
	(2.972)	(3.352)	(3.431)	(3.557)	(3.880)	(5.255)	(5.016)	(14.748)
Constant	-8.895*	-8.939**	-11.462**	-10.142*	-24.216	-25.702	-21.782**	-91.502
	(4.548)	(4.187)	(5.043)	(5.952)	(16.403)	(15.857)	(10.056)	(59.632)
Observations	113	113	86	109	83	83	85	82
Number of countries	35	35	34	35	34	34	34	34
Percent correctly classified	92.04	92.04	93.02	96.33	96.39	93.98	92.94	96.34
ROC	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.89	0.95	0.96	0.93	0.97
Pseudo R2	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.40	0.49	0.49	0.44	0.58
AIC	70.88	72.88	60.84	65.17	49.98	50.01	55.22	47.86
BIC	106.34	111.06	95.20	102.85	83.85	83.88	89.42	83.96
LL	-22.44	-22.44	-16.42	-18.59	-10.99	-11.01	-13.61	-8.93

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is post-election violence.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Controlling for Potential Selection

The article discusses several alternative explanations. The first deals with possible selection: If observer groups attend more volatile elections, their condemnation would reflect these problems but such elections would have been violent independent of the condemnation. To test this selection concern explicitly, I use two-stage models. Specifically, I run three kinds of selection tests to address the following questions: (1) is it just a selection effect? (2) is the result due to observers selecting into more violent elections? and (3) is the result due to observers selecting into more violent elections or withdrawing prematurely? These three tests are described in detail below. In all tests, controlling for potential selection leaves the result intact. There seems to be no evidence that observer selection influences the effect of condemnation on violence.

(1) Is it just a selection effect?

To assess whether the result is driven by a selection effect, I first run Heckman sample selection models. In this two-stage model, the first stage predicts observer presence, and the second stage estimates the effect of condemnation on post-election violence. The second stage replicates the main analysis in Table 1, column 4. The first stage replicates prior research on observer presence (Hyde 2011, 77), which includes the following variables: whether any previous election was observed in the country, uncertain election (suspended election, transitional government, first multiparty), GDP, GDP per capita, year, the percent of all official development assistance devoted to democracy and governance, and percent of US military assistance received in the previous year.[3]

The results are in Table A11. Even when controlling for selection, the coefficient of condemnation remains positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). The coefficient associated with condemnation is smaller in magnitude than in the main analysis, but it remains robust to accounting for selection. Further, there seems to be no evidence of selection. The parameter ρ measures the correlation between the error terms of the two equations. In three of the four models of Table A11, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ρ=0, meaning that there is no evidence that the two equations are related. Only in the minimal selection model is ρ significant, but that disappears once all explanatory factors of selection are included (per Hyde's models). This suggests that selection models are not necessary, and that the single-equation models from the main analysis (Table 1) are appropriate. However, even when controlling for potential selection, the results hold.

(2) Do observers select into more violent elections?

To assess whether observers select into more violent elections, I run another two-stage model. Here, I first predict anticipated post-election violence based on pre-election covari-

[3]A measure for consolidated democracy is not included since none of the countries in this sample qualify as consolidated democracy according to Hyde's (2011) definition. Data are sourced from Hyde and Marinov 2012; Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2007; and World Bank 2012. For the first-stage model of observer presence, results are consistent with prior studies: observer presence is strongly predicted by observer presence in previous elections and is more likely in poorer countries.

ates, and then include anticipated violence in models of IO observer presence. Thus the second stage models IO observer presence based on prior research (see above) but adds expected violence as the key predictor. A statistically insignificant coefficient on anticipated violence would suggest no evidence that observer decisions are guided by anticipated violence.

In the first stage, I predict post-election violence using all variables from model 1 in Table 1 that are known sufficiently in advance of the election to guide IO deployment decisions. All country-level covariates are known far in advance.[4] Factors *not* usually known months before elections are excluded, i.e. election-day fraud, condemnation, and loser's vote share. Since the timing of boycott announcements and pre-election violence – and thus observer knowledge about these factors – varies, I use two sets of variables to show robustness:

- set 1 captures what is *likely* known months before election day: all country-controls and poll type
- set 2 captures what is *possibly* known months before election day: all country-controls, poll type, pre-election violence level, election boycott, and pre-election fraud.[5]

These first-stage models generate the probability that any given election turns violent.[6]

The results are in Appendix Table A12. Columns 1-4 show results where the first stage is a function of set 1; and columns 5-8 show results where the first-stage is a function of set 2. Columns 9-12 show results where the first stage is a function of set 1 and the second stage also includes pre-election violence level; this addresses the concern that observer groups may make attendance conditional on pre-election violence or withdraw from the country if pre-election violence escalates. The insignificant coefficient on *pre-election violence* indicates that there is no evidence that pre-election violence drives observer attendance decisions. The insignificant coefficient for *predicted post-election violence* indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no observer selection. We cannot rule out no selection. In other words, there is no evidence in favor of selection. These findings cast doubt on the selection concern.

(3) Do observers select into more violent elections or withdraw prematurely?

Table A13 replicates Table A12 but modifies the dependent variable, accounting for whether observers attended but then withdrew or refused to attend. This addresses the concern that monitors may be invited and attend but then pull out when violence escalates.[7] The results in Table A13 are equivalent to results in Table A12: the insignificant coefficient for predicted post-election violence indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selection effect, casting doubt on observer selection into more or less violent elections.

[4] As in Table 1, these are leader tenure, post conflict, GDP pc, natural resources, executive constraints, population size, and ethnic fractionalization.

[5] The latter variable is not used in Table 1 but in the larger set of controls of the robustness checks, see Tables A9 and A10.

[6] Note that even if observers know about pre-election cheating, pre-election violence, whether an election boycott is planned, and country covariates, it often remains difficult to predict *post*-election violence since much depends on what happens on election day and shortly thereafter (election-day cheating, condemnation, loser's vote share, see Table 1). This makes it difficult for observers to base their attendance decision on anticipated *post*-election violence risks.

[7] Data are sourced from Hyde and Marinov 2012, nelda49. This modification affects six elections: Equatorial Guinea 1999, 2004, 2008; and Togo 1993, 1999, 2003.

Table A11: Heckman Sample Selection Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stage 2: Post-Election Violence				
Condemnation	1.599**	1.682**	1.607**	3.458***
	(0.684)	(0.718)	(0.686)	(0.967)
Serious fraud	0.434	0.397	0.446	0.563
	(0.427)	(0.423)	(0.425)	(0.689)
Loser's vote share	0.054***	0.058**	0.054**	0.077***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Boycott	0.892*	0.911*	0.941*	3.152***
	(0.486)	(0.519)	(0.483)	(0.736)
Poll type	-0.086	-0.061	-0.080	1.479***
	(0.365)	(0.358)	(0.370)	(0.466)
Pre-election violence level	0.003	-0.010	-0.001	-0.123
	(0.257)	(0.247)	(0.259)	(0.334)
Leader tenure (log)	0.457	0.506	0.478	0.784***
	(0.374)	(0.372)	(0.396)	(0.263)
Post conflict	-0.401	-0.361	-0.361	-0.092
	(0.735)	(0.737)	(0.750)	(0.773)
GDP pc (log)	-0.195	-0.187	-0.195	-0.316
	(0.509)	(0.488)	(0.521)	(0.628)
Natural resources pc (log)	-0.033	-0.026	-0.038	0.021
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.059)
Executive constraints	0.171	0.157	0.178	0.374
	(0.189)	(0.177)	(0.197)	(0.232)
Population size (log)	-0.505	-0.531	-0.505	-1.506**
	(0.503)	(0.503)	(0.517)	(0.609)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.745	1.665	1.762	1.246
	(1.944)	(1.914)	(1.940)	(1.107)
Constant	-4.506	-4.542	-4.645	-6.080
	(3.246)	(3.018)	(3.250)	(4.434)
Stage 1: Election Observation				
Previously observed	0.555*	0.702**	0.707***	0.368
	(0.284)	(0.278)	(0.257)	(0.349)
Previous election suspended		-0.108		
		(0.461)		
First multi-party election		0.722		
		(0.466)		
Transitional government		0.360		
		(0.516)		
Uncertain election			0.429	0.665
			(0.338)	(0.429)
US military assistance				-4.047
				(5.983)
Democracy and Governance/ODA				-3.087
				(25.274)
GDP (log)	-0.011	-0.005	-0.016	0.031
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.139)
GDP pc (log)	-0.399***	-0.371***	-0.342***	-0.447***
	(0.137)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.131)
Year	-0.016	-0.007	-0.012	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.044)
Constant	34.798	16.321	25.593	-36.796
	(58.646)	(66.340)	(60.599)	(87.885)
p-value for H_0: $\rho = 0$	0.00	0.44	0.28	0.49
Observations	145	145	145	106
Clusters	39	39	39	37
AIC	238.19	241.86	238.54	176.97
BIC	297.72	310.32	301.06	238.23
LL	-99.09	-97.93	-98.27	-65.48

Notes: Heckman probit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Opposition competition drops out because of collinearity. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Testing for Selection

	First stage predictors: set 1				First stage predictors: set 2				First stage predictors: set 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Predicted post-election violence	3.857	4.351	3.410	5.133	2.639	2.927	3.543	2.827	3.820	4.346	3.137	5.213
	(6.235)	(6.085)	(4.168)	(6.392)	(3.477)	(3.690)	(3.412)	(3.644)	(6.301)	(6.143)	(4.311)	(6.185)
Pre-election violence level									0.101	0.081	0.055	0.343
									(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.249)
Previously observed	0.566	0.861*	1.000**	0.578	0.600	0.814	0.963*	0.849	0.554	0.849*	0.991**	0.512
	(0.473)	(0.493)	(0.487)	(0.571)	(0.520)	(0.548)	(0.577)	(0.609)	(0.470)	(0.488)	(0.476)	(0.580)
Previous election suspended		0.464				0.128				0.447		
		(0.824)				(0.891)				(0.824)		
First multi-party election		0.740				1.646				0.718		
		(0.780)				(1.120)				(0.795)		
Transitional government		0.396				0.331				0.419		
		(0.739)				(0.740)				(0.735)		
Uncertain election			1.166*	0.896			1.188**	1.370**			1.160*	0.908
			(0.615)	(0.763)			(0.575)	(0.648)			(0.611)	(0.759)
Democracy and Governance/ODA				-14.920				-16.016				-23.328
				(43.186)				(43.032)				(44.786)
US military assistance				-1.724				-0.485				-0.998
				(8.222)				(7.296)				(8.252)
GDP (log)	-0.060	-0.072		-0.004	0.165	0.159		0.170	-0.087	-0.095		-0.094
	(0.200)	(0.197)		(0.327)	(0.161)	(0.152)		(0.220)	(0.207)	(0.203)		(0.299)
GDP pc (log)	-0.620**	-0.529**	-0.550***	-0.667**	-0.952***	-0.891***	-0.753***	-0.768***	-0.603**	-0.515*	-0.553***	-0.604*
	(0.293)	(0.269)	(0.202)	(0.329)	(0.235)	(0.226)	(0.175)	(0.241)	(0.295)	(0.268)	(0.205)	(0.324)
Year	-0.000	0.008	0.004	0.012	-0.030	0.003	-0.009	-0.008	0.003	0.011	0.006	0.027
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.074)
Constant	5.132	-12.764	-5.412	-18.952	65.412	-1.480	21.525	18.595	-1.390	-17.458	-8.131	-49.061
	(101.889)	(112.418)	(103.855)	(142.899)	(116.423)	(140.858)	(123.926)	(149.415)	(106.835)	(115.895)	(105.691)	(147.706)
Observations	152	152	152	108	108	108	108	106	152	152	152	108
Number of countries	38	38	38	36	36	36	36	36	38	38	38	36
Percent correctly classified	74.34	73.03	74.34	77.78	77.78	77.78	78.70	78.30	75.00	73.68	74.34	76.85
ROC	0.71	0.72	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.77	0.76	0.75	0.71	0.71	0.73	0.74
Pseudo R2	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.15
AIC	176.02	179.48	172.10	128.14	120.41	123.76	118.64	122.57	177.84	181.37	174.04	128.74
BIC	194.16	206.70	190.24	152.28	136.50	147.90	134.74	146.54	199.00	211.61	195.21	155.56
LL	-82.01	-80.74	-80.05	-55.07	-54.20	-52.88	-53.32	-52.28	-81.92	-80.68	-80.02	-54.37

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is observed elections. Opposition competition drops out because of collinearity
. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Testing for Selection, Accounting for Monitors Refusing to Attend or Withdrawing

	First stage predictors: set 1				First stage predictors: set 2				First stage predictors: set 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Predicted post-election violence	3.888	4.490	3.999	5.245	1.765	2.031	2.793	2.000	3.884	4.492	4.093	5.286
	(5.883)	(5.688)	(3.899)	(5.720)	(2.902)	(3.028)	(2.884)	(2.946)	(5.879)	(5.679)	(4.007)	(5.589)
Pre-election violence level									0.010	-0.012	-0.019	0.192
									(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.229)
Previously observed	0.494	0.818*	0.969**	0.636	0.557	0.808	0.962*	0.889	0.493	0.819*	0.972**	0.602
	(0.463)	(0.480)	(0.481)	(0.557)	(0.495)	(0.523)	(0.562)	(0.606)	(0.461)	(0.478)	(0.477)	(0.556)
Previous election suspended		0.512				0.239				0.515		
		(0.822)				(0.905)				(0.821)		
First multi-party election		0.774				1.544				0.778		
		(0.769)				(1.132)				(0.771)		
Transitional government		0.454				0.394				0.451		
		(0.750)				(0.755)				(0.749)		
Uncertain election			1.256**	1.000			1.272**	1.469**			1.258**	1.007
			(0.610)	(0.775)			(0.577)	(0.657)			(0.610)	(0.772)
Democracy and Governance/ODA				-12.663				-12.856				-17.416
				(41.820)				(41.189)				(43.567)
US military assistance				0.338				1.473				0.784
				(8.046)				(7.337)				(8.012)
GDP (log)	-0.032	-0.044		0.018	0.211	0.204		0.203	-0.034	-0.041		-0.034
	(0.190)	(0.188)		(0.315)	(0.155)	(0.146)		(0.218)	(0.193)	(0.190)		(0.291)
GDP pc (log)	-0.582**	-0.481*	-0.480***	-0.576*	-0.901***	-0.826***	-0.671***	-0.695***	-0.580**	-0.483*	-0.479***	-0.538*
	(0.279)	(0.249)	(0.183)	(0.294)	(0.220)	(0.205)	(0.162)	(0.222)	(0.279)	(0.248)	(0.184)	(0.288)
Year	-0.001	0.009	0.006	-0.010	-0.046	-0.015	-0.023	-0.027	-0.000	0.008	0.005	-0.001
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.074)
Constant	5.047	-14.256	-8.724	22.697	96.308	32.516	49.614	56.330	4.397	-13.569	-7.797	5.342
	(97.880)	(108.825)	(100.784)	(142.189)	(116.132)	(140.695)	(123.006)	(149.279)	(101.490)	(111.456)	(102.124)	(147.856)
Observations	152	152	152	108	108	108	108	106	152	152	152	108
Number of countries	38	38	38	36	36	36	36	36	38	38	38	36
Percent correctly classified	73.03	72.37	73.03	75.00	75.00	77.78	75.00	75.47	73.03	72.37	73.03	75.00
ROC	0.69	0.70	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.76	0.74	0.75	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.73
Pseudo R2	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.13
AIC	181.56	184.45	176.78	133.22	126.27	129.45	124.48	127.74	183.56	186.45	178.77	134.74
BIC	199.70	211.67	194.92	157.36	142.37	153.59	140.57	151.71	204.72	216.69	199.94	161.56
LL	-84.78	-83.23	-82.39	-57.61	-57.14	-55.73	-56.24	-54.87	-84.78	-83.23	-82.39	-57.37

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. The dependent variable is observed elections where monitors did not refuse to attend and not withdraw (nelda46, nelda49). Opposition competition drops out because of collinearity. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Accounting for Potential Endogeneity

I run treatment effects models[8] to estimate the effect of the potentially endogenous binary treatment (condemnation) on the outcome (violence). The results in Table A14 show that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, as indicated by the large p-values. Further, even when accounting for potential endogeneity, condemnation remains significantly associated with a higher risk of violence.

Columns 1-4 of Table A14 replicate the main analysis (Table 1 column 4) but allow condemnations to be endogenous to a number of factors identified in previous research. Based on Kelley (2012, 198), the determinants of observer verdicts include pre-election violence and election-day cheating (data as in the main analysis), foreign aid per capita and capacity (proxied with per capita GDP, World Bank 2012), first multiparty election (nelda2), and turnover (Lindberg 2009, nelda24) or transitional election (QED data). These variables are included in columns 1-4 of Table A14. The first stage predicting condemnation explains about 23% of the variation, which is somewhat higher than in previous research but of course there is still variation to be explained.

In this first stage predicting condemnations, using more fine-grained data for the level of pre-election and election-day cheating (QED sr11cheat, sr21cheat) and election capacity (QED sr22cap) does not affect results but reduces the sample due to missingness in these data. Two factors – election-day violence and legal problems – are dropped because many observations have missing data.[9] IO-level measures are dropped because the present analysis is on the country-year level.

In column 5 of Table A14, I exclude the only plausibly exogenous variable (*pre-election violence*) from the second stage. Pre-election violence is plausibly exogenous because it is temporally prior to post-election violence. Also, *pre-election violence* does not directly influence post-election violence in this sample (see Table 1 and Appendix Tables A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A11, A14). *Pre-election violence* significantly and substantively affects *condemnation* (Table A14). However, this potential instrument is weak.[10]

The results in Table A14 show that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, as indicated by the large p-values. Further, even when accounting for potential endogeneity, condemnation remains significantly associated with a higher risk of violence. While it is not possible to rule out endogeneity beyond any doubt, these analyses do not support the concern that the result is due to endogeneity.

[8] I used Stata's treatreg command with maximum likelihood estimates.

[9] Including these two measures does not change the substantive interpretation but further lowers the number of observations. We still cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, with p-values between 0.38 and 0.85 (similar to Table A14).

[10] Since we lack a strong instrument, i.e. a variable strongly correlated with condemnation but not with post-election violence, testing for endogeneity with instrumental variable approaches is not ideal. Using the best candidate (pre-election violence) in several IV models (ivregress, ivprobit, seemingly unrelated bivariate probit) again shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity ($p>0.44$). However, the weak instrument test for the first stage does not pass the conventional threshold ($F=7$), so that these IV tests are not valid and remain suggestive.

Table A14: Testing and Accounting for Potential Endogeneity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Second stage predicting post-election violence					
Condemnation	0.312**	0.269*	0.265*	0.243*	0.280**
	(0.134)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.123)
Election controls					
Serious fraud	0.065	0.063	0.066	0.072	0.062
	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Loser's vote share	0.005**	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Boycott	0.096*	0.093*	0.102*	0.105*	0.095
	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.062)
Poll type	-0.003	0.039	0.035	0.036	-0.003
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Pre-election violence level	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008	-0.005	
	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)	
Country controls					
Leader tenure (log)	0.017	0.018	0.021	0.022	0.017
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Post conflict	-0.071	-0.067	-0.058	-0.058	-0.071
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.060)
GDP pc (log)	0.013	0.004	0.013	0.014	0.012
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.039)
Natural resources pc (log)	-0.003	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Executive constraints	0.010	0.018	0.020	0.019	0.010
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Population size (log)	-0.025	-0.056	-0.056	-0.055	-0.027
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.042)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.083	0.070	0.078	0.077	0.085
	(0.120)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.120)
Constant	-0.262	-0.127	-0.214	-0.228	-0.256
	(0.370)	(0.357)	(0.370)	(0.377)	(0.322)
First stage predicting condemnation					
Pre-election violence level	0.773***	0.675**	0.661**	0.532*	0.734***
	(0.176)	(0.301)	(0.305)	(0.287)	(0.168)
Serious fraud	0.941**	1.055***			
	(0.418)	(0.407)			
Fraud pre-election level			-0.045	-0.217	
			(0.380)	(0.352)	
Fraud election-day level			0.662***	0.640**	
			(0.229)	(0.293)	
GDP pc (log)	-0.286	-0.278			
	(0.217)	(0.300)			
Election-day administrative capacity			0.071	0.085	
			(0.241)	(0.223)	
ODA pc (log)	0.011	0.026	0.107	-0.191	
	(0.260)	(0.395)	(0.370)	(0.369)	
First multi-party election	0.329	-0.004	-0.082	0.252	
	(0.444)	(0.743)	(0.625)	(0.698)	
Turnover	0.082		0.502		
	(0.262)		(0.348)		
Transitional election		-0.733		-0.932	
		(0.647)		(0.729)	
Constant	-0.638	-0.517	-3.362*	-1.518	-1.805***
	(1.754)	(1.942)	(2.022)	(1.724)	(0.246)
athrho	0.030	0.077	0.102	0.161	0.098
	(0.103)	(0.170)	(0.118)	(0.133)	(0.152)
lnsigma	-1.442***	-1.492***	-1.482***	-1.474***	-1.440***
	(0.135)	(0.145)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.134)
p-value for H_0: exogeneity	0.77	0.65	0.39	0.23	0.52
Observations	109	84	82	81	109
Number of countries	35	34	34	34	35
AIC	107.41	86.81	87.09	88.54	104.05
BIC	169.31	142.72	144.85	146.01	149.81
LL	-30.71	-20.41	-19.55	-20.27	-35.03

Notes: Linear regression with binary endogenous variable. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A1: Timing of Election, IO Report, and Result Announcement



Figure A1 shows that observer verdicts tend to be issued almost immediately after voting and precede results announcements in the vast majority of elections. If losers challenge elections, they usually wait until after results are announced, so the timeline at observed elections generally is: voting – IO verdict – results – potential challenge – potential violence.[11]

The two early outliers in terms of report timing are Guinea in 1993 with an IRI statement; and Togo in 1993 with the Carter Center/NDI statement. These are cases where observer groups cancelled or withdrew their missions before voting because the election would not be meaningful, effectively criticizing the election before election-day. In these cases, reverse causality (i.e. post-election violence before condemnations) is a logical impossibility.

The two late outliers in terms of report timing are peaceful elections with *positive* verdicts. Consequently, the endogeneity concern – violence triggering a condemnation – does not arise in these cases. At Mozambique's 1994 election the EU and UN issued their reports only three weeks after polling, intentionally delaying their official judgement until after the vote count was completed. The final verdicts – as well as earlier unofficial statements – were positive, though, and no violence erupted after elections.[12] The IO report at day 9 is Mali 2002. However, this case also followed the normal timeline: the report preceded results by 2 days, it was positive, and no violence erupted.

Thus the weight of the evidence – statistical analyses and further data collection – casts doubt on endogeneity.

[11] I was able to collect data on both the timing of the first IO verdict and the timing of the result announcements for 71 of the 138 observed elections in this sample. Data are coded from observer reports and websites. In 66% of elections, the IO verdict preceds the results announcement; in 17% they take place on the same day; and in the remaining 17% the results announcement precedes the IO verdict.

[12] "Mozambique election gets seal of approval: Three days of voting carried out with little violence or coercion," *The Globe and Mail*, 3 November 1994.

Spuriousness tests

To assess potential spuriousness, I use matching analyses. This section explains details of the matching procedure: its underlying assumption (and why it is met), its limitations (and how they are mitigated), and the actual estimation.

Assumption

Matching relies on the assumption of "ignorable treatment assignment." While this assumption cannot be directly tested,[13] it is reasonable in this context, I include pre-treatment covariates to reasonably satisfy it and assess through sensitivity analysis how violating it would affect conclusions.

It is reasonable to assume that each unit has a positive probability of receiving the treatment (condemnation) because no election is perfect and most African countries face immense challenges for holding clean and credible elections, especially in the 1990s and 2000s. This is illustrated in Appendix Figure A2 using V-DEM data. Figure A2 below documents election quality in Africa compared to advanced democracies in Europe and North America. While no election is perfect, most African countries face immense challenges for holding clean and credible elections, especially in the 1990s and 2000s. For illustrative purposes, consider two measures, where higher values mean higher quality elections. The "clean elections index" ranges between 0 and 1; the average election in Africa has a value of 0.38 compared to 0.95 in Western Europe and North America. The empirical distribution is summarized in the Figure below. Similarly, the "free and fair elections" measure ranges between 0 and 4; the average election in Africa has a value of 2.1 compared to 3.9 in Western Europe and North America. This means virtually all African elections in the sample were at risk of a negative observer assessment.

It is also reasonable to assume that the assignment of treatment (condemnation) is independent of potential outcomes (violence) given the covariates, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. In terms of theory, reputable observers have a mandate to judge election quality as disinterested third parties. If observers would systematically change their verdict in anticipation of possible violence, they would violate their mandate and hurt their reputation. Reputation is their only currency, so such systematic tendencies are unlikely for reputable observers. In terms of empirics, the only unobserved covariates we should be concerned about are those un-correlated with the observed covariates.[14] As explained below, I have conducted sensitivity analyses to address concerns about unobservables. Moreover, observable implications of violating the ignorability assumption do not hold. If ignorability would be violated (if observers would tend to strategically change their verdicts in anticipation of violence), it would imply to things. First, pre-vote violence (potentially indicating greater post-election conflict risk) would make condemnations less likely. That is not the case in the data; instead, pre-election violence increases observer condemnation (Appendix Table

[13]Stuart 2010, 15.
[14]Stuart 2010, 3.

Figure A2: Election Quality



A14). Second, if observers would be systematically less likely to criticize elections prone to post-election violence, then this would make it less likely to find the positive condemnation-violence relationship documented in the manuscript. Finally, to reasonably satisfy the ignorability assumption, the matching process should include pre-treatment covariates known to be related to the outcome or treatment assignment.[15] This is implemented in both genetic matching and coarsened exact matching.

Limitations

While the goal of matching is to reduce imbalance on pre-treatment confounders between treated and control groups, thus reducing bias in the estimated treatment effect, and approximating a randomized experiment, matching also has limitations.[16] Matching potentially increases imbalance and can only match on observables. Regarding the potential imbalance issue, I use propensity scores within genetic matching – an automated procedure that iteratively searches for the best balance – which mitigates this issue.[17] The diagnostic plot in Appendix Figure A3 documents that genetic matching improves covariate balance on all covariates, with differences becoming insignificant between treated and control observations in the matched data. In addition, all standardized differences are smaller than 0.25, a

[15]King and Nielson 2016, 4.
[16]King and Nielsen 2016.
[17]King and Nielson 2016, 1-2; Stuart 2010, 15.

rule-of-thumb for good balance.[18] To further guard against imbalance, I also use coarsened exact matching (CEM) as alternative. Instead of matching on a scalar that summarizes all covariates (propensity score), CEM exact matches on variable ranges/strata and can thus approximate a fully blocked experimental design, which can be better at reducing imbalance.[19] The results of coarsened exact matching are substantively similar and detailed in the estimation section below.

A second limitation of matching is that it only accounts for selection on observables, and we often cannot capture everything. To guard against this and assess the sensitivity of results to unobservables, one can conduct sensitivity analyses.[20] Sensitivity analyses assess how large the effect of unobserved variables would have to be in order to eliminate the estimated effect. Results of the sensitivity analyses are discussed below and summarized in Appendix Figure A4.

Estimation

Table A15 shows the matched pairs from the genetic matching model described in the article. The model generating the propensity score is identical to the first stage in the endogeneity tests (which also predicts condemnation, see notes for Table A13, based on Kelley 2012, 198). Here the standard error is estimated using the procedure by Abadie and Imbens (2006), which corrects for additional uncertainty due to matching.

The coefficient estimate from genetic matching is 0.35 with an Abadie-Imbens standard error of 0.14 and an associated p-value of 0.01. As before, using more fine-grained data for the level of pre-election cheating, election-day cheating, and election capacity does not affect results. Using these variables, the condemnation effect is still significant: the average treatment effect on the treated is 0.29 with a standard error of 0.14. However, the predicted effect is based on fewer matches due to missing values in these additional variables.

As an alternative to genetic matching, we can also use coarsened exact matching. I include the same factors predicting treatment (condemnation) as in genetic matching. The procedure generates weights and a balance score of 0.85, suggesting that the genetic propensity matching approach may yield better balance. The estimated coefficient on condemnation is 0.40 with a standard error of 0.15 and an associated p-value of 0.01. Replicating the weighted regression while controlling for all not-perfectly balanced variables results in a similar estimate: 0.50 with a standard error of 0.19 and an associated p-value of 0.02. Replicating both with *pre-election concerns of fraud* instead of *serious fraud*, results in the same estimates. Thus the coefficient on condemnation remains positive and significant.

[18] Stuart 2010, 11-12, 15.
[19] King and Nielsen 2016.
[20] Stuart 2010.

Table A15: Matched Observed Elections

Treated (condemnation)	Control (no condemnation)
Mauritania 1992 G	Zambia 2006 G
Niger 1996 E	Togo 2003 E
Togo 1998 E	Togo 2003 E
Cameroon 1992 E	Cameroon 2004 E
Cameroon 1997 L	Angola 2008 L
Nigeria 2003 G	Zimbabwe 2000 L
Uganda 2001 E	Tanzania 2000 G
Uganda 2001 L	Ethiopia 2000 L
Uganda 2006 G	Kenya 2002 G
Kenya 1992 G	Togo 2003 E
Kenya 1997 G	Tanzania 2000 G
Kenya 2007 G	Sierra Leone 2007 G
Rwanda 2003 E	Chad 2001 E
Rwanda 2003 L	Guinea 1995 L
Ethiopia 2005 L	Zimbabwe 2000 L
Zimbabwe 2002 E	Zimbabwe 2000 L
Madagascar 2001 E	Zambia 2008 E

Notes: Bold font indicates post-election violence. Abbreviations indicate poll type: L = legislative, E = executive, G = general election.

Figure A3: Covariate Balance Before and After Matching



Notes: Dots mark the mean difference in the empirical cumulative distribution between treated and control observations, before and after matching. Black (gray) dots indicate significant (insignificant) differences in means between treated and control, as estimated by the recommended bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. All mean differences from the pre-matching data become insignificant after matching.

Controlling for more observed, potential confounders

While the above robustness checks and tests for alternative explanations are based on prior research and control for potential confounding variables identified in prior research, concerns about uncaptured variables may remain. In an effort to address concerns about potentially important but uncaptured confounding factors, I replicated the model predicting condemnation (Table A14 first stage) and the models linking condemnation to violence (main analysis Table 1, spuriousness test underlying Table A15) by including three more variables: *incumbent loss, opposition coalition,* and *ethnic tensions.*[21] Including these additional variables reduces the sample size because data on the latter two variables were not available for about 25% of the observations (see Table A16); **thus inference from these smaller samples should be treated with caution.**[22]

Going beyond what previous research has identified as drivers of condemnation and adding another three domestic political variables does not change the substantive interpretation of results:

- Main analysis of Table 1: results are robust. Condemnation remains significantly associated with more post-election violence ($p<0.01$). See Table A17 below.
- Endogeneity tests of Table A14, first stage predicting condemnation: results are robust. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. See Table A18 below.
- Spuriousness tests underlying Table A15: results are robust. The average treatment effect on the treated remains significant and actually increases slightly in magnitude (ATT=0.375; SE=0.148). These results are the same regardless of whether the three additional controls are included only in the model predicting condemnation (generating the propensity score) or also as factors to match on.

Table A16: Descriptive Statistics for Additional Potential Confounders

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Incumbent lost	0.178	0.384	0	1	191
Opposition coalition	0.297	0.458	0	1	145
Ethnic tensions	0.168	0.246	0	0.890	164

[21]Data on incumbent loss is sourced from Hyde and Marinov 2012, nelda24. Ethnic tensions data is sourced from Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, EPR version 3, exclpop lagged. Opposition coalition data is sourced from Arriola 2013; Bogaards 2014, 36-37; Resnick 2013, 741-742; Resnick 2014, 47; and Wahman 2013; in the few cases where data on opposition coalition was conflicting, I relied on Arriola 2013. To avoid high multicolinearity, I dropped *ethnic fractionalization* to include *ethnic tensions*; and I dropped *boycott* to include *opposition coalition*; the presence of opposition coalitions usually means no boycott.

[22]For example, in Table A18 models 3 and 4, condemnation loses significance. This is due to low statistical power. When model 1 is run on the same sample underlying models 3 and 4 (n=65), the coefficient also loses significance, indicating that the issue is the limited sample size rather than particular control variables.

Table A17: Replicating Main Analysis (Table 1) with Additional Controls

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	4.123**	3.951*	4.603	5.064*	5.643***	5.082***
	(1.642)	(2.089)	(3.253)	(2.809)	(2.001)	(1.809)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-1.025	-0.763	-0.424			
	(1.101)	(0.966)	(0.996)			
Serious fraud	1.234			1.222		
	(0.871)			(1.423)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.019			1.690	
		(1.232)			(2.027)	
Fraud election-day level			2.077**			1.429
			(1.056)			(1.046)
Loser's vote share	0.095***	0.070**	0.100***	0.153*	0.111*	0.110***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.042)
Poll type	0.156	0.604	0.949*	0.605	1.477***	1.408**
	(0.536)	(0.512)	(0.560)	(0.650)	(0.415)	(0.563)
Pre-election violence level	-0.027	-0.290	-1.090*	-0.451	-0.570	-0.969*
	(0.485)	(0.377)	(0.617)	(0.468)	(0.481)	(0.568)
Incumbent lost	-0.982	0.258	0.429	-1.728	-0.315	-0.145
	(0.955)	(1.280)	(1.865)	(1.630)	(0.990)	(1.228)
Opposition coalition	1.814	1.444	2.542*	3.596	2.716	3.541
	(1.225)	(0.976)	(1.399)	(2.902)	(1.964)	(2.448)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.738*	1.097*	1.455*	0.583	1.367**	1.080***
	(0.403)	(0.655)	(0.841)	(0.406)	(0.595)	(0.364)
Post conflict	-1.782	-1.558	-3.061	-1.150	-0.256	-1.351
	(2.005)	(2.803)	(3.884)	(2.219)	(1.969)	(2.473)
GDP pc (log)	-0.957	-0.968	-0.808	0.754	0.310	0.515
	(1.145)	(0.986)	(1.014)	(0.532)	(0.533)	(0.579)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.091	0.151*	0.132	0.083	0.136**	0.088
	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.115)	(0.088)	(0.060)	(0.080)
Executive constraints	0.634	0.942	1.579	0.474	0.996	1.167
	(0.452)	(0.582)	(1.028)	(0.385)	(0.675)	(0.711)
Population size (log)	-1.380**	-1.766**	-2.152	-1.265	-2.134**	-2.023**
	(0.681)	(0.886)	(1.509)	(0.944)	(0.834)	(0.923)
Ethnic tensions	4.542*	5.686*	7.850	6.361	6.889	6.854*
	(2.693)	(3.444)	(5.122)	(4.744)	(4.235)	(3.939)
Constant	-1.717	-2.605	-10.145*	-15.940**	-14.604**	-17.227**
	(7.190)	(7.522)	(5.870)	(7.167)	(7.383)	(8.064)
Observations	109	86	86	81	66	66
Number of countries	33	32	32	31	29	29
Percent correctly classified	93.58	95.35	97.67	96.30	96.97	96.97
ROC	0.90	0.89	0.92	0.93	0.91	0.92
Pseudo R2	0.42	0.40	0.47	0.51	0.49	0.51
AIC	73.19	63.68	59.95	57.95	50.37	49.61
BIC	116.25	102.95	99.22	93.87	83.22	82.45
LL	-20.60	-15.84	-13.97	-13.98	-10.19	-9.80

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A18: Replicating Endogeneity Tests (Table A14) with Additional Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Second stage predicting post-election violence					
Condemnation	0.480*	0.535*	0.450	0.386	0.280**
	(0.281)	(0.298)	(0.384)	(0.318)	(0.123)
Election controls					
Serious fraud	0.030	-0.002	0.024	0.039	0.062
	(0.097)	(0.129)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.063)
Loser's vote share	0.008**	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Boycott	0.140	0.151	0.143	0.139	0.095
	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.062)
Poll type	-0.030	0.015	0.025	0.025	-0.003
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.036)
Pre-election violence level	-0.050	-0.053	-0.037	-0.026	
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.092)	
Country controls					
Leader tenure (log)	0.017	0.002	0.010	0.014	0.017
	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.023)
Post conflict	-0.058	-0.057	-0.059	-0.041	-0.071
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.060)
GDP pc (log)	0.053	0.031	0.030	0.031	0.012
	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.039)
Natural resources pc (log)	-0.008	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Executive constraints	0.007	0.022	0.021	0.021	0.010
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Population size (log)	-0.025	-0.062	-0.059	-0.060	-0.027
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.042)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.222	0.158	0.116	0.114	0.085
	(0.238)	(0.257)	(0.263)	(0.246)	(0.120)
Constant	-0.643	-0.352	-0.340	-0.363	-0.256
	(0.505)	(0.527)	(0.573)	(0.564)	(0.322)
First stage predicting condemnation					
Pre-election violence level	0.809***	0.634*	0.635	0.478	0.734***
	(0.298)	(0.336)	(0.396)	(0.346)	(0.168)
Serious fraud	1.149***	1.329***			
	(0.439)	(0.479)			
Fraud pre-election level			-0.226	-0.425	
			(0.352)	(0.470)	
Fraud election-day level			0.946***	0.884***	
			(0.272)	(0.334)	
GDP pc (log)	-0.178	-0.081			
	(0.265)	(0.237)			
Election-day administrative capacity			0.191	0.200	
			(0.332)	(0.275)	
ODA pc (log)	0.050	-0.069	0.060	-0.414	
	(0.371)	(0.458)	(0.408)	(0.429)	
First multi-party election	0.123	0.536	0.087	0.410	
	(0.724)	(0.722)	(0.845)	(0.962)	
Turnover	0.273		0.989		
	(0.351)		(0.657)		
Transitional election		-1.242*		-1.457*	
		(0.695)		(0.815)	
Incumbent lost	-0.162	0.533	-0.636	0.318	
	(0.698)	(0.566)	(0.629)	(0.716)	
Opposition coalition	0.744	1.032	1.526*	1.313*	
	(0.628)	(0.635)	(0.868)	(0.671)	
Ethnic tensions	0.441	0.949	0.904	1.287	
	(0.932)	(0.774)	(1.054)	(1.084)	
Constant	-1.807	-1.827	-4.022*	-1.339	-1.805***
	(1.895)	(1.488)	(2.317)	(1.819)	(0.246)
athrho	-0.269	-0.620	-0.414	-0.233	0.098
	(0.494)	(0.595)	(0.789)	(0.583)	(0.152)
lnsigma	-1.314***	-1.333***	-1.354***	-1.369***	-1.440***
	(0.167)	(0.215)	(0.197)	(0.166)	(0.134)
p-value for H_0: exogeneity	0.59	0.30	0.60	0.69	0.52
Observations	81	66	65	65	109
Number of countries	31	29	29	29	35
AIC	121.93	101.14	100.64	100.74	104.05
BIC	184.19	158.08	159.34	159.45	149.81
LL	-34.97	-24.57	-23.32	-23.37	-35.03

Notes: Linear regression with binary endogenous variable. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A19: Controlling for Strategic Importance

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	3.085***	3.027*	2.774	4.841*	7.884**	8.129**
	(1.052)	(1.639)	(1.756)	(2.877)	(3.069)	(3.318)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-1.347	-1.402	-1.369			
	(1.186)	(1.268)	(1.348)			
Serious fraud	2.635**			1.842*		
	(1.227)			(0.963)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.813*			1.794	
		(1.562)			(1.264)	
Fraud election-day level			1.357***			0.682**
			(0.462)			(0.335)
Loser's vote share	0.118***	0.125**	0.129**	0.149*	0.208**	0.187***
	(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.057)
Boycott	1.354	1.701	1.373	2.963	7.741**	7.580***
	(1.460)	(2.427)	(1.592)	(2.257)	(3.487)	(2.616)
Poll type	0.855	1.812**	1.484**	0.371	2.884***	2.902***
	(0.525)	(0.728)	(0.707)	(0.712)	(0.727)	(0.922)
Pre-election violence level	-0.101	0.078	-0.153	-0.493	-0.245	-0.395
	(0.540)	(0.491)	(0.606)	(0.534)	(0.518)	(0.622)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	1.346***	1.233**	1.059**	2.294	1.409*	1.362
	(0.464)	(0.557)	(0.497)	(2.103)	(0.786)	(0.894)
Post conflict	-1.978	-1.938	-2.346	-1.280	-0.523	-0.796
	(2.017)	(2.795)	(2.559)	(1.985)	(2.752)	(2.594)
GDP pc (log)	-2.327*	-2.210	-2.066*	-1.413	0.873	0.683
	(1.251)	(1.554)	(1.161)	(1.564)	(1.116)	(1.264)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.052	0.172	0.164	-0.092	0.060	0.055
	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.132)	(0.100)	(0.118)
Executive constraints	0.493	0.525	0.678	0.704	0.761	0.828
	(0.384)	(0.431)	(0.464)	(0.765)	(0.693)	(0.707)
Population size (log)	-1.773*	-1.955*	-1.927**	-2.406	-2.572	-2.924
	(0.914)	(1.109)	(0.873)	(2.200)	(1.740)	(2.189)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.834	-5.841*	-3.824	4.734	1.352	2.135
	(2.688)	(3.050)	(3.964)	(6.448)	(3.518)	(5.028)
US affinity	9.411	13.013	10.306	3.592	3.531	1.093
	(5.970)	(10.942)	(12.851)	(7.186)	(12.130)	(14.547)
Former British/French colony	-2.657	12.579***	13.827***	-3.569	15.690***	15.883***
	(2.212)	(2.982)	(1.898)	(2.929)	(3.467)	(3.704)
Aid per capita	-12.349**	-7.690	-5.828	-20.303	17.919*	16.210
	(5.645)	(9.366)	(4.938)	(14.125)	(9.473)	(10.531)
Constant	8.593	-5.499	-9.312	-2.514	-40.853***	-38.882***
	(8.534)	(11.284)	(7.060)	(4.960)	(10.415)	(10.974)
Observations	148	111	111	106	80	80
Number of countries	38	37	37	35	34	34
Percent correctly classified	95.27	95.50	94.59	95.28	96.25	93.75
ROC	0.91	0.92	0.93	0.92	0.95	0.95
Pseudo R2	0.41	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.54	0.54
AIC	81.91	68.20	67.43	67.00	53.53	53.81
BIC	135.86	116.98	116.20	112.28	94.03	94.31
LL	-22.95	-16.10	-15.72	-16.50	-9.77	-9.91

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A20: Controlling for First Monitored Election

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	2.872***	3.424**	3.263*	3.554***	6.473**	6.790**
	(0.940)	(1.643)	(1.730)	(1.355)	(2.840)	(3.246)
Election controls						
First monitored election	0.799	1.107	1.300	0.791	0.386	0.586
	(0.916)	(0.901)	(1.069)	(1.026)	(1.286)	(1.692)
IO observers present	-0.586	-1.515	-1.486			
	(1.131)	(1.122)	(1.198)			
Serious fraud	1.776**			1.171		
	(0.836)			(0.735)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.001**			1.663	
		(0.961)			(1.687)	
Fraud election-day level			1.163**			0.808*
			(0.529)			(0.468)
Loser's vote share	0.075***	0.073**	0.079**	0.105***	0.160	0.152*
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.117)	(0.089)
Boycott	0.912	1.629	1.553	1.829	6.334	6.524*
	(1.288)	(1.788)	(1.654)	(1.455)	(4.076)	(3.455)
Poll type	-0.085	0.347	0.279	-0.404	1.536*	1.560
	(0.586)	(0.630)	(0.704)	(0.776)	(0.792)	(1.154)
Pre-election violence level	0.085	0.124	-0.088	-0.074	-0.324	-0.567
	(0.579)	(0.681)	(0.980)	(0.608)	(0.552)	(0.680)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.643*	0.901**	0.782*	0.692	1.072**	0.931**
	(0.334)	(0.356)	(0.471)	(0.545)	(0.491)	(0.458)
Post conflict	-1.535	-1.833	-2.243	-1.074	0.179	-0.165
	(1.335)	(2.402)	(2.211)	(1.369)	(1.933)	(2.062)
GDP pc (log)	-1.008	-1.270	-1.115	0.065	1.145	1.232
	(0.811)	(0.933)	(0.857)	(0.698)	(1.081)	(1.036)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.023	0.115	0.099	-0.062	-0.034	-0.033
	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.118)	(0.124)
Executive constraints	0.402	0.536	0.700*	0.375	0.802	0.883
	(0.350)	(0.365)	(0.382)	(0.523)	(0.722)	(0.741)
Population size (log)	-0.826	-1.088	-1.041	-0.685	-1.462*	-1.545
	(0.685)	(0.786)	(0.903)	(0.854)	(0.873)	(1.029)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.412	-3.068	-2.425	2.287	1.492	1.568
	(2.479)	(2.214)	(2.226)	(3.498)	(3.844)	(4.800)
Constant	-0.145	3.119	0.203	-10.607*	-23.387	-24.231*
	(6.320)	(7.208)	(5.996)	(6.358)	(16.091)	(14.727)
Observations	151	114	114	109	83	83
Number of countries	38	37	37	35	34	34
AIC	83.23	68.41	67.03	66.69	51.94	51.90
BIC	131.51	112.19	110.81	107.06	88.22	88.19
LL	-25.61	-18.20	-17.51	-18.35	-10.97	-10.95

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A21: Controlling for Domestic Observation

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnation	3.039***	3.391**	3.219**	3.627***	7.793*	8.225*
	(0.982)	(1.543)	(1.635)	(1.310)	(4.169)	(4.813)
Election controls						
Domestic monitoring	0.717	0.384	0.523	-0.673	-2.967	-2.616
	(1.574)	(1.068)	(1.064)	(1.301)	(2.936)	(2.355)
IO observers present	-0.371	-0.991	-0.863			
	(1.015)	(1.021)	(1.052)			
Serious fraud	1.818**			1.202		
	(0.925)			(0.797)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.166**			2.454	
		(1.010)			(2.250)	
Fraud election-day level			1.252**			1.201
			(0.588)			(0.854)
Loser's vote share	0.078***	0.078***	0.088***	0.105***	0.186	0.191
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.173)	(0.154)
Boycott	0.969	1.748	1.737	1.787	6.839	7.502
	(1.260)	(1.736)	(1.499)	(1.228)	(5.081)	(5.226)
Poll type	0.035	0.630	0.620	-0.254	2.183***	2.279***
	(0.662)	(0.595)	(0.657)	(0.883)	(0.846)	(0.820)
Pre-election violence level	0.118	0.077	-0.168	-0.190	-1.041	-1.348
	(0.523)	(0.648)	(0.912)	(0.421)	(0.921)	(0.999)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.808**	1.121***	1.063***	0.741	1.191*	0.897
	(0.325)	(0.416)	(0.397)	(0.461)	(0.630)	(0.559)
Post conflict	-1.668	-1.727	-2.110	-1.016	0.369	-0.169
	(1.499)	(2.470)	(2.212)	(1.484)	(1.696)	(1.997)
GDP pc (log)	-1.042	-1.223	-1.070	0.049	1.442	1.698
	(0.817)	(0.957)	(0.876)	(0.664)	(1.764)	(1.735)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.022	0.116	0.103	-0.057	-0.062	-0.065
	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.115)	(0.099)	(0.197)	(0.178)
Executive constraints	0.367	0.536	0.716*	0.357	0.954	1.084
	(0.376)	(0.368)	(0.383)	(0.507)	(0.881)	(0.975)
Population size (log)	-0.987	-1.203	-1.185	-0.780	-1.659**	-1.793*
	(0.669)	(0.788)	(0.906)	(0.682)	(0.748)	(1.031)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.004	-3.622	-3.092	3.366	8.064	8.553
	(2.739)	(2.721)	(2.380)	(4.974)	(14.032)	(13.526)
Constant	-0.323	2.123	-1.189	-10.364	-29.698	-32.777
	(5.658)	(7.257)	(6.064)	(6.739)	(29.127)	(28.224)
Observations	151	114	114	109	83	83
Number of countries	38	37	37	35	34	34
AIC	83.45	69.08	67.79	66.98	51.25	51.42
BIC	131.73	112.86	111.57	107.35	87.53	87.70
LL	-25.73	-18.54	-17.90	-18.49	-10.63	-10.71

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A22: Restricting to Condemnations that Reached the Mass Public

	All elections			Observed elections only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Condemnations that reached the mass public	2.938***	3.335**	3.157**	3.626***	6.566**	6.957**
	(0.912)	(1.474)	(1.573)	(1.315)	(2.774)	(3.208)
Election controls						
IO observers present	-0.401	-1.058	-0.984			
	(1.059)	(1.098)	(1.142)			
Serious fraud	1.751**			1.199		
	(0.834)			(0.809)		
Fraud election-day dummy		2.130**			1.797	
		(0.948)			(1.702)	
Fraud election-day level			1.217**			0.890*
			(0.547)			(0.469)
Loser's vote share	0.074***	0.076***	0.085***	0.103***	0.169	0.165*
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.118)	(0.094)
Boycott	0.868	1.605	1.479	1.833	6.534	6.826*
	(1.252)	(1.671)	(1.560)	(1.353)	(4.098)	(3.557)
Poll type	0.027	0.599	0.581	-0.252	1.749***	1.887***
	(0.623)	(0.591)	(0.661)	(0.858)	(0.513)	(0.666)
Pre-election violence level	0.060	0.039	-0.201	-0.113	-0.369	-0.660
	(0.555)	(0.659)	(0.893)	(0.573)	(0.544)	(0.658)
Country controls						
Leader tenure (log)	0.714**	1.018***	0.928**	0.781	1.116**	0.968**
	(0.333)	(0.378)	(0.454)	(0.525)	(0.520)	(0.443)
Post conflict	-1.518	-1.645	-2.008	-1.045	0.297	0.002
	(1.370)	(2.367)	(2.185)	(1.419)	(1.848)	(1.789)
GDP pc (log)	-1.019	-1.204	-1.062	0.037	1.190	1.327
	(0.815)	(0.959)	(0.871)	(0.671)	(1.097)	(1.102)
Natural resources pc (log)	0.025	0.116	0.104	-0.057	-0.028	-0.025
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.097)	(0.121)	(0.115)
Executive constraints	0.379	0.520	0.695*	0.342	0.801	0.886
	(0.347)	(0.354)	(0.371)	(0.513)	(0.721)	(0.729)
Population size (log)	-0.915	-1.159	-1.147	-0.819	-1.531*	-1.654*
	(0.631)	(0.749)	(0.843)	(0.769)	(0.789)	(0.969)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.391	-3.262	-2.500	2.357	1.692	1.988
	(2.506)	(2.350)	(2.483)	(3.548)	(3.874)	(5.248)
Constant	0.012	2.480	-0.556	-10.106*	-24.196	-25.668
	(6.253)	(7.637)	(5.971)	(5.934)	(16.456)	(15.891)
Observations	151	114	114	109	83	83
Number of countries	38	37	37	35	34	34
AIC	81.75	67.15	65.91	65.11	49.98	50.01
BIC	127.01	108.20	106.95	102.79	83.85	83.88
LL	-25.87	-18.58	-17.95	-18.56	-10.99	-11.01

Notes: Logit models with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Sensitivity Analysis: Assessing Bias from Unobserved, Potential Confounders

While the main analysis (manuscript Table 1) includes a rich set of control variables, and follow-on analyses add more controls, it remains possible that unobserved confounders unduly bias the estimated effect of condemnation on post-election violence. To assess the robustness of the estimates to the presence of omitted variables, I run sensitivity analyses as developed by VanderWeele (2011). His proposed method assumes that some binary variable, U, is omitted from the model used to estimate the effect of the explanatory variable X on the outcome variable Y (here: condemnation on post-vote violence). In the case of violence, the biasing variable U may represent some underlying country propensity for social conflict or other unobserved or unobservable factors.

The sensitivity analysis requires assumptions about two relationships: (1) the effect of U on Y, denoted γ, and (2) the relationship between U and X. The latter captures the difference in prevalence in U=1 associated with a one-unit increase in X (VanderWeele 2011, 245). I choose conservative values for both. For the latter, I assume a strong positive relationship between X and U: an 80 percentage point higher prevalence of the biasing variable U=1 for condemned elections (X=1) relative to endorsed elections (X=0). That is, the prevalence of U is assumed to be 0.1 for endorsed elections and 0.9 for condemned elections. I allow γ – the effect of U on Y – to vary from 1 (corresponding to no effect on the probability of Y=1) to 5, an effect of U corresponding to a 5-fold increase in the probability of Y=1.[23] I allow γ, the effect of U on Y, to vary and observe the condemnation estimates I would have obtained had I been able to control for U.

Figure A3 presents the results, estimated for the condemnation coefficient from the main analysis (Table 1, columns 1 and 4). The results suggest the estimates are robust to strong levels of bias arising from underlying conflict propensity or other unobserved or unobservable factors. As γ – the effect of the omitted variable on violence – increases, the corrected estimate of condemnation on violence decreases. However, the estimates are all robust to omitted variables with assumed effects approaching a 5-fold increase in violence. That is, if the omitted variable U produced a 5-fold increase (γ=5) in the odds of violence=1, the corrected estimates suggest that condemned elections still have 5 times higher odds of violence (corrected condemnation estimate = 5.41) than endorsed elections. In fact, the Figure A3 estimates are robust to levels of bias exceeding those displayed in the Figure. In addition to the corrected estimate itself, the confidence interval around the estimate does not reach the zero line; that is, the lower bound of the corrected estimate for condemnation on violence does not become insignificant. To explain away the condemnation estimates, these results suggest that the omitted biasing variable would need to have a powerful effect on violence.

[23] When γ=1, this corresponds to no effect of U on Y. Due to the positive coefficients associated with the uncorrected condemnation estimates, the corrected estimates of condemnation decrease as γ increases. With values of γ less than one, the corrected estimates of condemnation are larger than the uncorrected estimates and thus I focus only on instances where γ is greater than or equal to 1.

Figure A4: Sensitivity Analysis
to Test the Robustness of Condemnation Estimates to Bias from Unobservables



Note: The Figure displays how the coefficients associated with condemnation would change in the presence of bias from a binary omitted variable, U. Gamma represents the odds ratio for the assumed effect of U on Y. These estimates also assume U=1 is eighty percentage points more prevalent in condemned elections than in endorsed elections. The estimates are for Table 1, models 1 (all elections) and 4 (observed elections only), and show the corrected estimates along with the lower bound of the confidence interval.

Table A23: Similarity of Kenya and Sierra Leone's 2007 Elections

	Kenya	**Sierra Leone**
IO observers present	yes	yes
* Serious fraud	yes	yes
Boycott	no	no
Poll type	general	general
Pre-election violence level	low	low
* Loser's vote share in percent	44	45
* Leader tenure in years	4	8
Post-conflict	no	yes
GDP pc in USD	441	242
Natural resources	no	no
Executive constraints	6	5
Population size in million	37	6
Ethnic fractionalization	0.86	0.78

Notes: Significant drivers of post-election violence in this sample are marked with *. All country-year variables are lagged by one year.

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