The Causes of State Collapse Project

Coding Guidelines and Data Handbook

Daniel Lambach, Christian Tischmeyer, Eva Johais, Markus Bayer[*]

Universität Duisburg-Essen
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Lotharstraße 65
47057 Duisburg
daniel.lambach@uni-due.de

Download URL:
http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/40-0-Datensaetze.html

Last updated: 28 August 2015

[*] The authors are indebted to Felix S. Bethke, Laura Blomenkemper, Ismail Küpeli, Jörg Langerwisch and Simon von Dahlen for their assistance during various stages of the project.

Description of the Project

Even though academic research has devoted much attention to fragile and collapsed states, we know surprisingly little about why state institutions break down. On the one hand, small-N studies cannot produce representative and reproducible findings due to the complex causal structure of state collapse. On the other hand, quantitative approaches have to deal with very imprecise data and struggle with the equifinality of causal processes. To mitigate these shortcomings, this projects conducts a medium-N comparison which is combined with process-tracing studies of individual cases to identify combinations of conditions that lead to the collapse of fragile states. Our approach is firmly anchored in a Weberian institutionalist understanding of statehood. We use Goertz' (2006) method of concept-building to develop a notion of state collapse that is disaggregated into three essential dimensions: the state's capacity to make and enforce binding rules, to monopolize the means of violence and to collect taxes. Using both synchronic and diachronic comparisons, we develop a causal model of state collapse combining structural and dynamic factors in order to derive general characteristics of collapsing states and to understand the specific timing of collapse events.

Purpose of the Dataset

There are several ongoing projects that strive to quantify state fragility. The best-known ones include the Failed States Index (FSI) (Baker 2006; Fund for Peace 2005), the Index of State Fragility (ISF) (Carment et al. 2006; Carment et al. 2008), the State Fragility Index (SFI) (Marshall / Cole 2008; Marshall / Goldstone 2007) and the Index of State Weakness (ISW) (Rice / Patrick 2008). However, all these attempts to quantify state fragility suffer from methodological shortcomings. This is particularly evident with respect to their validity: By subsuming several different sub-indicators within the concept of state fragility, these approaches measure a random amalgamation of conflict potential, level of development and good governance. Fearon's observation that „good direct measures of a state's administrative capability and integrity are lacking" (Fearon 2005: 502) is as true as it was in 2005.

This dataset collects data on 29 conditions for 15 cases of state collapse, 15 other countries (synchronic control cases) and 13 other historical periods in collapsed states (diachronic control cases). Since data was collected for the purposes of a Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (MVQCA), we use language consistent with QCA methodology (i.e. by speaking of "conditions" instead of "variables"). This is also the reason why most conditions are coded in binary while others have three or four different values. For those conditions which were calculated by simple recoding quantitative information (i.e. GDP/capita), the original data is available upon request.

Our Approach[1]

We define the ideal type of the state as a set of institutions that is characterized by monopolies in the three dimensions of rule-making, violence and taxation within a certain territory and the population living therein. The state's ability to achieve, enforce and defend these monopolies may vary; states can be fragile in different ways, e.g. with little capacity to collect taxes but effective security forces that guarantee internal and external stability. We can represent variation in statehood as a three-dimensional space (see Fig. 1). Theoretically, a state can inhabit any point within this space, although some of the extremes are very hard to imagine. We would expect that deficiencies in one dimension strongly correlate with deficiencies in the other two – but that is ultimately an empirical question.

Fig. 1: Dimensions of Statehood

[1] For details, see Lambach, Daniel; Johais, Eva; Bayer, Markus (2015): *Conceptualizing State Collapse: An Institutionalist Approach*. In: Third World Quarterly, 36:7, 1299-1315.



Source: Lambach / Johais / Bayer 2015: 1306

We derive our concept of state collapse from the definition of the ideal state. We focus on state collapse instead of broader notions of state fragility for two reasons: First, setting a threshold is easier when focusing on extreme cases. In the space depicted in Fig. 1, we look at the (0, 0, 0) corner of the diagram and its immediate surroundings. Second, even though cases of state collapse differ from each other, they still recognizably belong to the same class of object. We thus avoid the problem of grouping different kinds of events under a single, broadly-defined header (see Call 2008 for a sustained critique of the kinds of conceptual stretching that the literature engages in).

We define state collapse as the situation where the state has no meaningful capacities in its three core dimensions of rule-making, violence control and taxation. In the area of rule-making, this may mean that the state no longer passes any laws, that these laws are not implemented or that rival sets of rules (religious or traditional law) dominate. In the violence dimension, the state can no longer exert physical control over large parts of the country while non-state actors of violence establish themselves as local para-sovereigns. With respect to taxation, the state can no longer collect taxes systematically and its fiscal administration will be in disarray.

For the operationalization of state collapse, we use Goertz' three-level method of concept formation (Goertz 2006), which we find a very useful way of breaking down complex concepts. Our first level (the "basic level phenomenon" in Goertz' terminology) is "state collapse" as the polar opposite of the ideal state. We then use the essentialist two-valued logic to define sufficient and necessary conditions (Goertz 2006: 35) of state collapse. This means we establish a threshold between collapsed and non-collapsed states. While this dichotomy might seem hard to reconcile with a multidimensional continuum of statehood (see Fig. 1), this is actually not a problem since our objective is merely to theorize about collapsed states, not about statehood in a more general sense. Therefore, this straightforward distinction is adequate.

The second level contains the various dimensions that make up the basic phenomenon. We have already discussed the three core dimensions of statehood. For state collapse this means that the second-level dimensions are:

- No meaningful capacity to make rules
- No meaningful control over the means of violence
- No meaningful capacity to extract taxes

Jointly, these three dimensions create the necessary and sufficient conditions for state collapse, if they occur over a timespan of at least six months.[2]

The third level consists of the operationalization of these dimensions and the selection of appropriate indicators (see Table 1). Here, we used a combination of the essentialist two-valued logic with the logic of family resemblance (Goertz 2006: 35). Every dimension of state collapse, "Rule-Making", "Means of Violence" and "Taxation", has primary and secondary indicators. Primary indicators are unambiguous signs of state collapse, e.g. when the government leaves the capital or when no official government budget is declared. The presence of any primary indicator was sufficient for a particular dimension to be coded as collapsed. Because these events only occur infrequently, even during state collapse, we added a group of secondary indicators which by themselves were not particularly indicative of collapse but which were looked at jointly. If more than half of the secondary indicators are present, the dimension is also coded as collapsed. For example, in the "means of violence" dimension, if non-state actors command large parts of the country AND if the state's security forces are de facto private militias, this is sufficient to diagnose a lack of meaningful control over the means of violence.

Table 1: The Concept of State Collapse

Rule-Making	**Means of Violence**	**Taxation**
First Level Indicators		
• Cessation of the work of the High court • No formal legislation • Government or parliament leaves the capital	• *De jure* dissolution of the security forces • Security forces do not control the whole capital	• No official government budget is declared • Central Bank ceases work
Secondary Indicators		
• Massive corruption • Laws are only rarely enforced • Widespread legal pluralism	• Security forces become *de facto* private militias • Security forces control only small parts of the country • Private non-state actors control large portions of the country	• No organized fiscal administration • Taxation by non-state actors • Tax ratio below 8%

Identifying Cases of Collapse

We used this framework to identify cases of state collapse in the international system between 1960 and 2007. Because there is little quantitative data for most of our indicators, we had to rely on qualitative assessments of potential cases.

Our first aim was to identify all cases where the state had potentially collapsed. We cast a very wide net so as not to miss any „false negatives" – of course this came at the price of increasing the number

[2] We used six months as a threshold to distinguish short-term political instability, e.g. during regime transitions or the final months of civil war, to distinguish the complete failure of state institutions from other forms of disorder.

of „false positive“ cases in the initial sample. To come up with this first sample, we identified all country-periods from 1946 onwards that fulfilled one or more of the following conditions[3]:

- Indicator 1.7 (Polity Fragmentation) = 3 (Polity IV)
- Standardized Authority Code = -66 (Interruption), -77 (Interregnum) or -88 (Transition) (Polity IV)
- Indicator 4.12 (Total Change in POLITY value) = 96 (Polity IV)
- Indicator 4.14 (State Failure) = 1 (Polity IV)
- Index of State Weakness 2008 < 2
- Indicator Q1.1 (State Monopoly of Violence) ≤ 3 (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008)
- „Near-Total Failures of State Authority“ according to State Failure Task Force
- Categorization as „failed“ or „collapsed state“ by Rotberg.
- Personal assessment by project participants.

This resulted in a list of 87 countries that had potentially experienced state collapse at some point after 1946. Many countries fulfilled multiple of the above criteria, often for overlapping time periods. These were then consolidated into continuous periods.

This initial list still contained many cases that were obviously not cases of state collapse in our understanding. These included the dissolution of states under international law (e.g. East Germany 1989, Soviet Union 1990-91), foreign invasions (e.g. Kuwait 1990), regime change (Greece 1974, Portugal 1974-75, Spain 1975-77) or periods of political uncertainty (e.g. Nigeria 1998). There were also many problematic cases from the immediate period after the end of the Second World War (e.g. Czechoslovakia 1947, West Germany 1946-48, East Germany 1946-48, Hungary 1946-47, Japan 1946-51, Romania 1946-47) which also were qualitatively different from our understanding of state collapse. We excluded these cases by shortening our period of observation to 1960-2007 to keep cases comparable.

This narrowed our list to 47 potential country-periods of state collapse. We then conducted desk studies of these candidates and identified 17 cases of state collapse (see Table 2). The other cases did not satisfy all our criteria, or satisfied them only for short periods of time that did not meet our six-month threshold (like Iran 1979, Rwanda 1994 and Ethiopia 1991) or because we could not make a reliable estimate due to a particularly egregious lack of information (Central African Republic 2001).

Table 1: Cases of State Collapse

Cases of State Collapse			
Afghanistan	1979	Iraq	2003
Afghanistan	2001	Laos	1960
Angola	1992	Lebanon	1975
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Liberia	1990
Chad	1979	Sierra Leone	1998

[3] Sources are Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2010 for Polity IV, Rice / Patrick 2008 for the Index of State Weakness and BTI Project 2012 for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. The assessment by the State Failure Task Force is published in Esty et al. 1998: 38 whereas Rotberg's data can be found in Rotberg 2004: 46-49.

Congo-Kinshasa	1960		Somalia	1991
Congo-Kinshasa	1996		Tajikistan	1992
Georgia	1991		Uganda	1985
Guinea-Bissau	1998			

Out of these 17 identified cases of state collapse between 1960 and 2007, we excluded Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003 from our analysis. We consider these two cases to be outliers due to the strong impact of foreign military intervention on the stability of the state.

Selecting Negative Cases

While the group of positive cases was clearly circumscribed, the group of potential negative (or control) cases was almost without limit. As Mahoney and Goertz (2004) rightly point out, it is preferable to choose negative cases where the outcome of interest is distinctly possible (which they call "the possibility principle"). In his primer on fs/QCA, Ragin gave similar advice: "Negative cases should resemble positive cases in as many ways as possible, especially with respect to the commonalities exhibited by the positive cases" (Ragin 2000: 60).

We conducted two separate comparisons with different sets of control cases. In the first analysis, we compared collapsed states with other states from the same period; in the second, we compared periods of collapse with other periods in the same states' history. For the synchronic, or "horizontal", comparison, we chose a control group of countries that were structurally similar to the collapse cases and that also exhibited signs of political instability without fully collapsing. Cases were chosen in a pairwise manner by identifying a negative case that closely corresponded to a positive case according to a Most Similar, Different Outcome logic (as recommended by de Meur / Berg-Schlosser 1994 and Rihoux 2006: 688-689). The most important similarity was that control cases had to experience a phase of political instability (i.e., the onset of civil war, public unrest, a coup, a power struggle) that did not lead to complete state collapse. Other variables we held constant during case selection were the geographic region (continent or sub-continent), a similar time period (no more than +/- 5 years[4]), a similar level of economic development as well as size of population and territory (see Table 2). We excluded some marginal cases from consideration because these could also have been cases of collapse if a few variables had been coded slightly differently.

[4] We always made sure not to place collapse cases and their control case on different sides of the "1989" dividing line, since the end of the Cold War was included as a potential explanatory condition. In three cases, we had to exceed this five-year limit slightly to find a suitable comparison. These are: Congo-Kinshasa 1960 and Nigeria 1967; Laos 1960 and Cambodia 1967; Tajikistan 1992 and Uzbekistan 1999.

Table 2: Structural indicators of collapsed states and control cases

Collapsed State / ***Control Case***	**Case Year**	**Year of Independence[5]**	**Region[6]**	**Population[7]**	**Area[8]**	**GDP/ capita[9]**	**Regime Type[10]**	**MEPV total violence[11]**
Afghanistan	1979	1919	South Asia	16,128	647,500	2117.45	Autocracy	7
Sri Lanka	*1983*	*1948*	*South Asia*	*15,417*	*64,740*	*2081.32*	*5*	*5*
Angola	1992	1975	Sub-Saharan Africa	10,609	1,246,699	1269.94	Hybrid	7
Mali	*1991*	*1960*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*9,507*	*1,219,999*	-	*Autocracy*	*1*
Bosnia	1992	1992	Eastern Europe and post USSR	4,409	51,129	1074.32	Democracy	6
Croatia	*1995*	*1991*	*Eastern Europe and post USSR*	*4,669*	*56,414*	*7395.96*	*-5*	*3*
Chad	1979	1960	Sub-Saharan Africa	4,379	1,259,201	667.04	Autocracy	4
Ethiopia	*1974*	-	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*26,782*	-	*500.17*	*Autocracy*	*6*
Congo-Kinshasa	1960	1960	Sub-Saharan Africa	14,106	2,267,599	701.45	Hybrid	4
Nigeria	*1967*	*1960*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*42,305*	*910,771*	*1105.78*	*-7*	*6*
Congo-Kinshasa	1996	1960	Sub-Saharan Africa	46,812	2,267,599	487.76	-8 (1991)	7
Sudan	*1992*	*1956*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*27,323*	*2,376,001*	*1103.72*	*-7*	*6*
Georgia	1991	1991	Eastern Europe and post USSR	5,464	69,700	4593.24	4	3
Moldova	*1992*	*1991*	*Eastern Europe and post USSR*	*4,348*	*33,700*	*2900.68*	*5*	*1*
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1974	Sub-Saharan Africa	1,161	28,000	494.35	5 (1997)	2
Lesotho	*1998*	*1966*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*2,062*	*30,350*	*1843.03*	*8 (1997)*	*0*
Laos	1960	1949	South-East Asia	2,337	230,800	986.75	-1	3

[5] Source: CIA World Factbook.
[6] Source: Teorell / Hadenius 2005.
[7] Size of population in 1000s. Source: Correlates of War Dataset.
[8] International Database, Indicator "Area (Sq. km)", available online: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/.
[9] Estimate of Real GDP per capita in constant US Dollar at base year 2000 (Gleditsch 2002).
[10] Based on Polity IV score (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html). In case of values -66, -77, and -88, the last valid score before case year was considered (reference year noted). If a regime change or independence occurred recently, own coding according to Polity IV coding rules: DEMOC-AUTOC, with Democracy > 5; 5≤ Hybrid ≥-5; Autocracy < -5.
[11] Accumulated measure for intrastate violence (Center for Systemic Peace 2014; indicator "civtot").

Cambodia	*1967*	*1953*	*South-East Asia*	*6,486*	*176,519*	*1794.6*	*-9*	*0*
Lebanon	1975	1943	North Africa & the Middle East	2,767	10,230	3588.05	5 (1974)	5
Iran	*1979*	*1979*	*North Africa & the Middle East*	*37,814*	*1,635,999*	*6316.7*	*-10 (1978)*	*7*
Liberia	1990	1847	Sub-Saharan Africa	2,407	96,320	553.4	-6 (1989)	4
Burundi	*1993*	*1962*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*5,769*	*25,649*	*922.56*	*Democracy*	*4*
Sierra Leone	1998	1961	Sub-Saharan Africa	4,568	71,621	722.57	Hybrid	3
Guinea	*1996*	*1958*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*7,518*	*245,861*	*2323.43*	*-1*	*0*
Somalia	1991	1960	Sub-Saharan Africa	8,753	627,339	1014.84	-7 (1990)	5
Niger	*1990*	*1960*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*7,731*	*1,266,699*	*1001.58*	*-7*	*1*
Tajikistan	1992	1991	Eastern Europe and post USSR	5,571	142,700	2415.21	-6	3
Uzbekistan	*1999*	*1991*	*Eastern Europe and post USSR*	*21,852*	*425,400*	*3782.71*	*-9*	*0*
Uganda	1985	1962	Sub-Saharan Africa	14,762	199,710	680.02	3 (1984)	4
Burkina Faso	*1987*	*1960*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*8,314*	*273,799*	*861.14*	*-7*	*0*

The second control group for the diachronic, "vertical" comparison consists of the same countries as the collapse cases but at different points in time (see Table 3). As with the synchronic comparison, control cases were selected using an MSDO approach. Thus, we were interested in a time of political instability in our case countries between 1960 and 2007 that did not lead to state collapse. We considered such crises which occurred at least ten years before the onset of collapse, or, if the period of independent statehood was too recent for this, at least ten years after the state was no longer collapsed. There are three exceptions:

- In the case of Afghanistan because we could not identify a period of instability prior to 1969 and after the independence of the country. A later period was also out of the question since state authority has never been institutionalized to a sufficient extent and time span. The choice of the year 1973 was the most plausible as the king's cousin, Mohammed Daud, staged a coup d'état and abolished the monarchy. To select a period of time after the collapse was no alternative as state authority has never been institutionalized to a sufficient extent and time span after 1979.
- We did include a control case for Bosnia-Herzegovina because it has been *de facto* under international trusteeship ever since the civil war had come to an end.
- Finally, we only selected one control year per case, thus both collapse cases of Congo-Kinshasa are matched with the same diachronic control year of 1977.

Table 3: Collapsed states and control cases

Collapse Case	Control Year	Control Case
Afghanistan 1979	Afghanistan 1973	Sri Lanka 1983
Angola 1992	Angola 1975	Mali 1991
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992	[no control year]	Croatia 1995
Georgia 1991	Georgia 2003	Moldova 1992
Chad 1979	Chad 1965	Ethiopia 1974
Congo-Kinshasa 1960	Congo-Kinshasa 1977	Nigeria 1967
Congo-Kinshasa 1996	[same as above]	Sudan 1992
Guinea-Bissau 1998	Guinea-Bissau 1980	Lesotho 1998
Laos 1960	Laos 1989	Cambodia 1967
Lebanon 1975	Lebanon 2005	Iran 1979
Liberia 1990	Liberia 1979	Burundi 1993
Sierra Leone 1998	Sierra Leone 1967	Guinea 1996
Somalia 1991	Somalia 1978	Niger 1990
Tajikistan 1992	Tajikistan 2010	Uzbekistan 1999
Uganda 1985	Uganda 1971	Burkina Faso 1987

Coding Procedures

Rothman points out that "(a)lthough assessing data reliability is important for all data, it is especially important for data generated from qualitative evidence. […] Qualitative evidence […] requires some level of interpretation and inference and usually several coding rules" (Rothman 2007: 439).

Similarly, Schedler (2012) defends the measured application of judgment by researchers in classifying cases and assigning numerical scores for abstract variables as long as these follow certain standards of transparency. Following these exhortations, we developed a rigorous and transparent process of quality control. For each condition, coding guidelines were developed and refined over time (see below). Usually, each case was coded by one member of the research team. Coding decisions were then subjected to review by the other researcher and the project leader.

To ensure reliability and to improve the quality of the coding guidelines, the initial case studies were coded two times in a blind process, i.e. with both researchers working independently from one another. The very first case study (Somalia 1991) was conducted in November 2011 using coding guidelines Version 0.5. 27 variables were coded for this case, 16 of which relied on qualitative analysis (the other 11 were recoded from existing datasets). The researchers disagreed on the coding of five variables which gave an intercoder reliability rating of 68.75% (11/16). The findings from both individual case studies were combined in a joint report using a process of arbitration between both researchers and the project leader. The lessons learned from this initial study also led to a revision of the coding guidelines.

The second case study (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992) was conducted in December 2011 and January 2012 using coding guidelines V0.8. Of the 16 variables that were coded by hand the coders agreed in 13 cases, giving an intercoder reliability of 81.25% (13/16). Once more a joint report was produced after arbitration. The coding guidelines were largely retained, with only minor editorial corrections. Due to the high reliability rating, the remaining case studies were only coded by a single researcher and then reviewed by the other two members of the project team. The last case study was finished in June 2013.

Later revisions of the coding guidelines were mainly editorial in nature. Substantial changes to the coding guidelines were retroactively applied to all cases that had already been completed. Upon completion of the data collection phase, all case studies were subjected to a process of quality control to ensure that every case study had been measured with a uniform set of standards. Inconsistencies were discussed in an arbitration session.

Every coding decision was also assigned a confidence score of 1-3. A 1 indicates great confidence, a 2 indicates limited confidence whereas a 3 stands for little confidence. The confidence scores were derived from the number of sources, their quality and the specificity of information regarding a particular variable. In the end, more than 85% of the data had a confidence score of 1 or 2.

List and Description of Conditions

Table 4 contains the list of conditions in the dataset. The name in parentheses in the name of the condition as it appears in the dataset. A more detailed description follows in the next part.

Table 4: List of conditions

Name of condition	Description
Foreign Aid (AID)	Trend of foreign aid (incl. military aid) before case year.
Obstruction of Bureaucracy (BUR_OBSTR)	Regime action to deliberately weaken functionality of state bureaucracy.
Ethnic Minority Rule (ETH_MIN_RULE)	Political monopoly or dominant political position of an ethnic group which constitutes a numerical minority in the country.
External Threat (EX_THR)	Perception of external, military threats to the country's security (state or non-state actors).
Factionalism (FACTIONAL)	Definition according to Polity IV, as political competition shaped by "parochial or ethnic-based political factions [...] promot[ing] particularist agendas" (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2010: 27).

Government Revenues (GOV_REV)	Trend of state revenues, relative to GDP, before case year.
Relative GDP/Capita (INCOME)	Country's GDP per capita, relative to global average GDP of that year.
Informal Politics (INFORMAL)	The government's intentional non-compliance with rules for policy formulation, implementation etc. as outlined in the constitution, laws, and other formal regulations.
Economic Liberalization (LIBERAL)	Economic liberalization shortly prior to case year.
Militarized Opposition Groups (MILIT)	Relevant oppositional actors are organized as armed groups.
Neighbor Civil War (N_CIV_WAR)	Civil War in a neighboring country during or shortly before case year.
Neighbor Collapse (N_COLLAPSE)	Period of state collapse in a neighboring country during or shortly prior to case year.
Newly independent Country (NIC)	Country recently gained independence.
Personal Rule (PERSONAL_RULE)	„[P]ersonal rule can be defined as *a type of state authority structure in which the ruler is an individual leader whose decision-making power is institutionally unconstrained, who presides over a neopatrimonial public administration and who uses the patron-client network as the principal institutional mechanism for wielding political power*" (Guliyev 2011: 585).
Population Density (POP-DENSITY)	Country's population density, relative to global average in that year.
Primary Commodity Exports (PRIM_COMM_EXP)	Primary commodity exports as percentage of GDP.
Polarization (POLAR)	Degree of organization of antagonistic political groups and their readiness to engage in dialogue.
Precolonial Polity (POLITY)	History of political organization on the country's territory prior to colonization/integration into an empire.
Local Precolonial Polity (LOCAL_POLITY)	Existence of a pre-colonial or pre-imperial polity that did not cover the entire territory of the post-colonial state. Recoded from POLITY.
Power Proportions (POWER_PROP)	Opposition's perception of the chance to take over government, based on actual power relations to and attitude towards rulers.
Regime Type (REGIME)	Regime type, classified as "Democracy", "Autocracy", or "Hybrid", coding based on variable 'polity' in Polity IV.
Hybrid Regime (REGIME_1)	Hybrid Regime. Recoded from REGIME
Repression (REPRESSION)	Intensity of state repression against the population.
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)	Implementation of IMF/WB Structural Adjustment Program prior to case year.
Obstruction of Security Forces (SEC_OBSTR)	Regime action to deliberately weaken functionality of state security forces.
Openness to Foreign Trade (TRADE_OPEN)	Openness of the national economy to foreign trade.
Transition (TRANSITION)	Political Transition shortly prior to case year.

Unofficial Government Militias (UNOFF_MILITIA)	Presence of informal militias under governmental control.
Proportion of Youths (YOUTH)	Proportion of population aged between 15 and 24, relative to global average.

Description of Conditions

Several conditions measure situations or trends within a period of x years before the onset of collapse. Since we usually cannot pinpoint the exact date of collapse onset with any degree of certainty, we only differentiate between those cases where onset occurred in the first six months of the calendar year from those where onset occurred in the latter six months of the calendar year. For those conditions that look at a period prior to collapse, the case year is considered to be part of the period if collapse occurred in the latter half of the year. For instance, the condition AID looks at a five-year period prior to collapse. For a case that collapsed in the first half of 2006, AID would be measured for 2001-2005; for a case that collapsed in the latter half, the period would be 2002-2006.

Name: Foreign Aid (AID)

Description: Trend of foreign aid (incl. military aid) before case year.

Values: 0= constant or increasing aid; 1= declining aid.

Indicators and coding rules: Coded "1" if cutback of financial and/or military aid (i.a. hardware, training, troops) is announced or carried out. Period of five years prior to case is considered.

Source: Variables "ODA" and "AID" by Wejnert (2007); supplemented by qualitative research of secondary literature.

Name: Obstruction of Bureaucracy (BUR_OBSTR)

Description: Regime acts to deliberately weaken functionality of state bureaucracy.

Values: 0= no obstruction; 1= deliberate obstruction of the bureaucracy by ruling regime

Indicators and coding rules: Coded "1" if cuts in salaries, sacking of employees, non-merit appointments occur systematically or frequently, and also have a negative impact on effectiveness of the bureaucracy.

Source: Qualitative research of secondary literature.

Name: Ethnic Minority Rule (ETH_MIN_RULE)

Description: Political monopoly, or dominant political position in politics of an ethnic group which constitutes a numerical minority in the country.

Values: 0= no ethnic minority rule; 1= ethnic minority rule

Indicators and coding rules: Coded "1" if

a) Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) (Cederman / Min / Wimmer 2009) coded case as "Absolute Power" (both variants, "Monopoly" or "Dominant") by an ethnic group which
   - represents less than 50% of the country's total population and is not numerically strongest ethnic group,
   - **or** represents a share of less than 25% of the country's total population.

b) EPR coded case as "Power Sharing Regime" that is additionally
   - stable over a long duration
   - and in which ethnic identity is key determinant to obtain political office.

If EPR did not cover the case, we coded ethnic minority rule based on the criteria used by that project.

Source: Cederman / Min / Wimmer (2009), supplemented by qualitative research of secondary literature.

Name: External Threat (EX_THREAT)

Description: Perception of external, military threats to country's security (by state or non-state actors).

Values: 0= high or increasing external threat; 1= no or low external threat; 2= decreasing external threat.

Indicators and coding rules: Coding is based on development of foreign relations and trend in military spending over the period of five years prior to case year. Coded "0" in case of manifest conflict, and/or UN resolutions directed against the state. Coded "2" if military expenditure declines, and/or refugees return to country.

Sources: Qualitative research based on secondary literature, COSIMO dataset (HIIK 2002) and UN resolutions[12].

Name: Factionalism (FACTIONAL)

Description: Definition according to Polity IV, as political competition shaped by "parochial or ethnic-based political factions [...] promot[ing] particularist agendas" (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2010: 27).

Values: 0= no factionalism; 1= factionalism

Indicators and coding rules: Re-coding from PARCOMP variable, Polity IV dataset (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2010). Coded "1" if PARCOMP= 3, coded "0" if PARCOMP= 0,1,2,4,5. If PARCOMP score was missing from Polity IV, we coded factionalism based on the criteria used by that project.

Source: Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers (2010), or qualitative research based on secondary literature.

Name: Government Revenues (GOV_REV)

Description: Trend of state revenues, relative to GDP, before case year.

Values: 0= increasing or constant state revenues; 1= declining state revenues.

Indicators and coding rules: State revenues/GDP of the year prior to case (year a), divided by state revenues/GDP three years before case year (year b).
0= total revenues (year a)/total revenues (year b) ≥ 100%;
1= total revenues (year a)/total revenues (year b) < 100%.

Source: Calculation based on GSRE dataset (Lucas / Richter 2012; Indicators "Total revenues" and "Gross Domestic Product (GSRE)"); Missing values were supplemented from:

- National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (UNdb no date; Indicator "GDP at current Prices in local currency");
- Penn World Tables (Heston / Summers / Aten 2009; Indicators "Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current price" and "Population");
- World Economic Outlook Database (IMF 2013; Indicator "General government revenue as Percent of GDP");
- Statistical handbook of the states of the former USSR (World Bank 1993, 1994; Indicators "Total revenue and grants" and "Total GDP at market prices"[13]).

Name: GDP/capita (INCOME)

Description: Country's GDP per capita, relative to global average GDP of that year.

Values: 0= Income ≤ 5% of the global average; 1= Income > 5% of global average

Indicators and coding rules: Variable "GDP, Per Capita GDP - US Dollars" (UNdb no date)[14]; divided GDP per Capita by Global Average GDP per Capita of that year.

Source: National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (UNdb no date).

Name: Informal Politics (INFORMAL)

Description: The government's intentional non-compliance with rules for policy formulation, implementation etc. as outlined in the constitution, laws, and other formal regulations.

[12] List of resolutions: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

[13] For cases Georgia 1991, Moldova 1992 and Tajikistan 1992.

[14] As this provides data starting 1970 only, we used the value of 1970 for cases between 1960 and 1969.

Values: 0= No substitution of formal state institutions through informal ones; 1= Informal structures are more important than formal ones in many policy fields; 2= Government decision-making and policy implementation takes place almost exclusively via informal structures.
Indicators and coding rules:
0= decision-making follows formal procedures, as regulated by constitution and laws; independent supervisory bodies (supreme court etc.) work unimpeded;
1= little transparency in the decision-making process; sporadic assembly of the parliament; deficient supervisory bodies; regime decisions partly enacted via private networks;
2= no transparency in the decision-making-process; no supervisory bodies, or completely dependent ones; enactment of regime decisions via private networks
Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Economic Liberalization (LIBERAL)
Description: Economic liberalization shortly prior to case year.
Values: 0= no recent economic liberalization program conducted; 1= recent economic liberalization.
Indicators and coding rules: Economic liberalization means, e.g. signing of free trade agreements, reduction of tariffs and/or subsidies, devaluation of the national currency, WTO accession etc. We coded any such program during the five years before case. If case occurs in second half of the year, case year is part of these five years.
Source: Qualitative research.

Name: Militarized Opposition Groups (MILIT)
Description: Relevant oppositional actors are organized as armed groups.
Values: 0= relevant opposition groups are unarmed; 1= relevant opposition groups are armed.
Indicators and coding rules: Armed individual group members are *not* factored in; coding refers to *systematic* armament of oppositional groups, in form of militias, armed wings, youth groups, security forces. Coded "1" only if all relevant parties are armed in case year.
Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Neighbor Civil war (N_CIV_WAR)
Description: Civil War in a neighboring country during or shortly before case year.
Values: 0= no civil war in neighboring country; 1= civil war in at least one neighboring country.
Indicators and coding rules: Civil wars in neighbouring country are considered which began max. five years before case year, or ended max. three years before case year. If case is dated to second half of the year, case year is included in these five resp. three years. If a conflict started in case year, the exact starting point has to be *before* case date to be cosidered.
Source: Onset of Intrastate Armed Conflict, 1946-2011 (Themnér / Wallensteen 2012).

Name: Neighbor Collapse (N_COLLAPSE)
Description: Period of state collapse in a neighboring country during or shortly prior to case year.
Values: 0= no collapsed neighboring country; 1= collapse of at least one neighboring country.
Indicators and coding rules: Collapse of neighboring country is considered when beginnig max. five year before case year or ending max. three years before case year. If case is dated to second half of the year, case year is included in these five resp. three years.
Source: Based on this research's measurement of state collapse (cf. table 1 for cases).

Name: Newly Independent Country (NIC)
Description: Country gained independence shortly before case year.
Values: 0= Country did not become independent recently; 1= Country recently became independent.
Indicators and coding rules: Coded "1" if independence took place within five years prior to case year. Case year is part of these five years, if case is dated to second half of that year.
Source: "Year of independence" from CIA World Factbook (no date).

Name: Personal Rule (PERSONAL_RULE)

Description: Following Guliyev (2011: 585) "personal rule can be defined as *a type of state authority structure in which the ruler is an individual leader whose decision-making power is institutionally unconstrained, who presides over a neopatrimonial public administration and who uses the patron-client network as the principal institutional mechanism for wielding political power*."

Values: 0= no personalist regime; 1= partially personalist regime; 2= personalist regime.

Indicators and coding rules:

0= Head of government has no direct access to the budget beyond formally assigned funds; individual career chances and economic success do not depend on a personal relationship to the head of government; political ideologies or programs are not built around specific individuals.

1= Head of government partially controls budget (partial control means that there is an official budget and (b) at least one department resists informal access to its assigned budget); individual career chances and economic success benefit from, but do not depend on personal relationship to the head of government; regime's inner circle accumulates offices.

2= Head of government has direct control over almost the entire budget; regime's inner circle accumulates offices; career and economic success depend on personal relationship; personality cult; quasi-dynastic succession.

Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Population Density (POP_DENSITY)

Description: Country's population density, relative to global average in that year.

Values: 0= population density is lower than 15% of global average;

1= population density is at least 15%, but no more than 75% of global average;

2= population density is higher than 75% of the global average.

Indicators and coding rules: Country's population density in case year, as percentage of the global average population density in that year.

Source: International Database (US Census Bureau, no date; Variable "Density (persons per sq. km.)"); missing value for Ethiopia 1974 supplemented by United Nations Demographic Yearbook (UN 1974).

Name: Primary Commodity Exports (PRIM_COMM_EXP)

Description: Primary commodity exports as percentage of GDP.

Values: 0= primary commodity exports represent less than 5% of GDP;

1= primary commodity exports represent more than/equal to 5% of GDP, but less than/ equal to 20%

2= primary commodity exports represent more than 20% of GDP.

Indicators and coding rules: Exports of Primary Commodities, including Fuels, as percentage of GDP. In case of missing values for exports in case year, mean average of adjacent years.

Source: UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook 2003, supplemented by issues from 1989, 1991, and 1995.

Name: Polarization (POLAR)

Description: Degree of organization of antagonistic political groups and their readiness to engage in dialogue.

Values: 0= no, or some polarization; 1= Polarized political system.

Indicators and coding rules: A polarized political system is characterized by political camps, lacking the willingness to negotiate, or even communicate, with each other. We use 'political camp' as an umbrella term for more or less organized groups, representing a collective political position. Coding is based on a systemic perspective, considering the following aspects:

- Existence of different political camps, distinct primarily in ideology, identity;

- Breadth of membership base, inclusiveness and formalization of membership status;
- Openness for dialogue;
- Actors' preferences of choosing confrontational or cooperative strategies vis-à-vis their opposition.
- Power balance between moderate and extremist camps.

0= No rival camps can be distinguished, or distinct political camps do exist, but are either poorly organized or willing to engage in dialogue.

1= Distinct political camps exist, are well-organized, and refuse dialogue.

Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Precolonial Polity (POLITY)

Description: History of political organization on the country's territory prior to colonization/ integration into an empire.

Values: 0= no precolonial/-imperial institutionalized, independent polity;

1= local precolonial/-imperial polity, or polities ruling over parts of current state territory;

2= precolonial/-imperial polity largely congruent with state territory;

3= no period of colonial/imperial domination

Indicators and coding rules:

1= Local Polity has to cover a significant part of the current state territory, but is not congruent with it.

2= Precolonial/-imperial Kingdoms, empires or states are characterized by a hierarchical order, a minimum degree of institutionalization and persistence beyond the personal reign of a ruler. Polity must be largely congruent with today's state territory.

Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Local Precolonial Polity (LOCAL_POLITY)

Description: Existence of a pre-colonial or pre-imperial polity that did not cover the entire territory of the post-colonial state. Recoded from POLITY.

Values: 0= other; 1= local precolonial polity or polities on state's territory.

Indicators and coding rules: Coded 1 if Precolonial Polity= 1 (a local Polity has to cover a significant part of the current state territory, but is not congruent with it).

Source: Re-coded POLITY condition from this dataset.

Name: Power Proportions (POWER_PROP)

Description: Opposition's perception of the chance to take over government, based on actual power relations to and attitude towards rulers.

Values: 0= opposition does not see any chance for a regime change/secession; 1= Opposition is doubtful of the chance for a regime change/secession; 2= opposition is convinced of a good chance for a regime change/secession.

Indicators and coding rules: Coding is based on

- Objective power resources of oppositional, relative to ruling group.
- Propagation of regime change in political programs.
- Do leadership and organizational structure facilitate alternate strategies (negotiation, cooperation, struggle).

Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Regime Type (REGIME)

Description: Regime type, classified as "Democracy", "Autocracy", or "Hybrid", coding based on variable 'polity' in Polity IV.

Values: 0= democracy; 1= hybrid regime; 2= autocracy.

Indicators and coding rules: Re-coding of Polity IV (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2010):

0= democracy; polity score > 5;

1= hybrid regime; 5 ≥ polity score ≥ -5;
2= autocracy; polity score < -5;
Assessment is based on polity score of the year before case, if the case is dated in first half of the year. If the case is dated in second half of the year, the score of case year is used.
If score is -77, we take last different value prior to case year.
If score is -88 we coded the case ourselves, according to Polity IV coding rules (DEMOC - AUTOC).
Source: Polity IV dataset (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2010).

Name: Hybrid Regime (HYBRID_REGIME)
Description: Political system is a hybrid regime. Recoded from REGIME.
Values: 0= No hybrid regime; 1= hybrid regime.
Indicators and coding rules: Coded "1" if Regime Type= 1/ hybrid (polity score is lower than 6, but higher than -6).
Source: Re-coded REGIME condition from this dataset.

Name: Repression (REPRESSION)
Description: Intensity of state repression against the population.
Values: 0= no or low level of repression; 1= intermediate to high level of repression
Indicators and coding rules: For cases since 1976, average of PTS (2014) data for the three-year period prior to case year is re-coded:
0 = PTS score 1-2 (no repression); 1= PTS score 3-5.
Cases before 1976 are coded based on literature research. Additional cases have been coded thus, when relevant literature differs significantely from PTS assessments (Amnesty International or US State Department).
Source: PTS (2014; Qualitative research.

Name: Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
Description: Implementation of IMF/WB Structural Adjustment Program prior to case year.
Values: 0= no SAP; 1= SAP
Indicators and coding rules: Coding is based on the *implementation* of IMF/WB Structural Adjustment Program within the five years before case year. If case is dated to second half of the year, case year is included in these five years. Only official agreements with IMF and WB for structural adjustment are considered (such as SAF, ESAF, SAL, PubSec etc).
Source: Qualitative research, based on IMF country reports and relevant literature.

Name: Obstruction of Security Forces (SEC_OBSTR)
Description: Regime action to deliberately weaken functionality of security forces.
Values: 0= no obstruction of security forces by regime; 1= slight obstruction; 2= massive obstruction.
Indicators and coding rules:
0= no intentional obstruction of the security forces by government (unintended effects of budget cuts may occur); no observable conflicts between government and security forces;
1= cuts in salaries, sacking of employees, non-merit appointments, as well as direct interference occur on a single case basis and have negative impact on the efficiency of the security forces;
2= *systematic* occurrences of cuts in salaries, sacking of employees, non-merit appointments, and direct interference. Noteworthy numbers of desertions; security forces almost unable to operate; very low level of trust from population.
Source: Qualitative, literature-based research.

Name: Openness to Foreign Trade (TRADE_OPEN)
Description: Openness of the national economy to foreign trade.

Values: 0= Foreign Trade less than/ equal to 25% of GDP;
1= Foreign Trade more than 25%, but less than 70% of GDP;
2= Foreign Trade more than/ equal to 70% of GDP.
Indicators and coding rules: Indicators "Exports of goods and services" plus "Imports of goods and services", divided by "GDP, at current prices - National currency" (UNdb).
Source: United Nations – National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (UNdb).

Name: Political Transition (TRANSITION)
Description: Political Transition shortly prior to case year.
Values: 0= Case year does not follow a transition period;
1= Case year follows directly after a transition-period.
Indicators and coding rules: A transition is coded if the Polity Score of the preceding year is
a) coded as -88
b) changes at least 3 points compared to the previous year
Years coded -77 were left out.
If we were uncertain about the exact timing of the transition, scores from the case year and the preceding year were both taken into account.
Source: Polity IV

Name: Unofficial Government Militias (UNOFF_MILITIA)
Description: Presence of informal militias under governmental control.
Values: 0= no informal militias under governmental control; 1= informal militias under governmental control
Indicators and coding rules: Unofficial government militias are armed groups, controlled by the government or associates, which are:
- without official mandate,
- not wearing uniforms with state insignia,
- and not being financed from official budget.

Source: Qualitative, literature-based research, and Pro-Government Militias dataset (Carey / Mitchell / Lowe 2013).

Name: Proportion of Youths (youth)
Description: Proportion of the country's population aged between 15 and 24, relative to global average.
Values: 0= Youth proportion ≤ 90 % of the global average; 1= 90% < Youth proportion < 120 %; 2= youth proportion ≥ 120% of global average
Indicators and coding rules: Population between 15 and 24 as share of the whole population; this number as percentage of global average population between 15 and 24[15].
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010).

[15] As the dataset offers a value for each five years only, we used the value closest to case date; taking into account which half of the year the case was dated, if necessary.

References

Baker, Pauline H. 2006. The Conflict Assessment System Tool - An Analytical Model for Early Warning and Risk Assessment of Weak and Failing States. Washington, Fund for Peace.

BTI Project. 2008. "Bertelsmann Transformation Index". Data for 2008 available under http://www.bti-project.de/atlas/ [3 March 2014].

Call, Charles T. 2008: The Fallacy of the "Failed State". Third World Quarterly 29(8): 1491-1507.

Carey, Sabine C; Mitchell, Neil J; Lowe, Will. 2013. States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government Militias. Journal of Peace Research 50(2): 249-258.

Carment, David; El-Achkar, Souleima; Prest Stewart; Samy, Yiagadeesen. 2006. The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada. Canadian Foreign Policy 13(1): 1-35.

Carment, David, Yiagadeesen Samy, and Stewart Prest. 2008. State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Empirical Analysis. Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(4): 349–373.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer. 2009. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. Version UNF:5:k4xxXC2ASI204QZ4jqvUrQ== V1. Available online: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796 [5 November 2014].

Center for Systemic Peace. 2014. Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) And Conflict Regions, 1946-2013. Dataset available online: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPV2013.xls; Codebook: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2013.pdf [12 January 2015].

CIA World Factbook, no date. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

de Meur, Giséle; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. 1994. Comparing Political Systems: Establishing Similarities and Dissimilarities. European Journal of Political Research 26(2): 193-219.

Esty, Daniel C.; Goldstone, Jack A.; Gurr, Ted R.; Harff, Barbara; Levy, Marc; Dabelko, Geoffrey D.; Surko, Pamela T.; Unger, Alan N. 1998. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings. McLean, Science Applications International Corporation.

Fearon, James D. 2005. Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 485-507.

Fund for Peace. 2005. The Failed State Index. Foreign Policy, No. 149: 56–65.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 2002. Expanded GDP and Trade Data; available online: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html [12 January 2015].

Goertz, Gary. 2006. Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Guliyev, Farid. 2011. Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies. Democratization 18 (3): 575–601.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2009. Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009, available at: https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php [8 July 2013].

HIIK. 2002. COSIMO 1 Dataset, available at: http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo1.html [12 January 2015].

IMF. 2013. World Economic Outlook Database (April 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx [18 November 2014].

Lambach, Daniel; Johais, Eva; Bayer, Markus. 2015. Conceptualizing State Collapse: An Institutionalist Approach. In: Third World Quarterly, 36:7, 1299-1315.

Lucas, Viola; Richter, Thomas. 2012. Taxation, Distribution and Authoritarian Regime Longevity: Evidence from the Global State Revenues and Expenditures Data Set. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 30 August – 2 September 2012. http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/project/stability-and-change-of-authoritarian-regimes-a-systematic-comparison-of-institutional-and [7 November 2014].

Mahoney, James; Goertz, Gary. 2004. The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research. American Political Science Review 98(4): 653-669.

Marshall, Monty G.; Cole, B.R.. 2008. Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2008. Foreign Policy Bulletin 18(1): 3-21.

Marshall, Monty G.; Goldstone, Jack. 2007. Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007: Gauging System Performance and Fragility in the Globalization Era. Foreign Policy Bulletin 17(1): 3-21.

Marshall, Monty; Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith. 2010. Polity IV Project Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. Dataset User's Manual, 30 April 2010. Vienna, Center for Systemic Peace. Dataset and codebook available online: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html [18 November 2014].

PTS. 2014. Political Terror Scale 1976-2013 [dataset]. Available online: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php [19 November 2014].

Ragin, Charles (2000): Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rice, Susan E.; Patrick, Stewart. 2008. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Washington D.C., Brookings Institution.

Rihoux, Benoît. 2006. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Systematic Comparative Methods: Recent Advances and Remaining Challenges for Social Science Research. International Sociology 21(5): 679-706.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair. In: Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.): When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1-49.

Rothman, Steven B. 2007. Understanding Data Quality Through Reliability: A Comparison of Data Reliability Assessment in Three International Relations Datasets. International Studies Review 9(3): 437-456.

Schedler, Andreas. 2012. Judgment and Measurement in Political Science. Perspectives on Politics 10(1): 21-36.

Themnér, Lotta; Wallensteen, Peter. 2012. Armed conflict, 1946-2011. Journal of Peace Research 49(4): 565-575.

Teorell, Jan; Hadenius, Axel. 2005. Determinants of Democratization: Taking Stock of the Large-N Evidence. Mimeo, Department of Government, Uppsala University.

United States Census Bureau. No Date. International Data Base (IDB): http://www.census.gov/population/international/

UNCTAD. Various years. UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook (1989, 1991, 1995, 2003). Geneva, UNCTAD.

UN. 1974. United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1974. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm

UNdb. No date. United Nations - National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. Available Online: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp [18 November 2014].

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2010. World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. http://esa.un.org/wpp/

Wejnert, Barbara. 2007. Nations, Development, and Democracy, 1800-2005. ICPSR20440-v1; available online: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/20440 [5 November 2014].

World Bank. 1993. Statistical Handbook 1993: states of the former USSR, Volume 1, available at: http://go.worldbank.org/Z9OEQ51350 [18 November 2014].

World Bank. 1994. Statistical Handbook 1994: states of the former USSR, Volume 1, available at: http://go.worldbank.org/LBI41HMFP0 [18 November 2014].