CODEBOOK FOR GOVERNMENTAL INCOMPATIBILITIES DATA PROJECT (GIDP 2.0)

The GIDP 2.0 was coded through three main steps. The first was the identification of governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 112 countries (excluding consolidated democracies) from 1960-2012. This resulted in the GIDP, described in Cunningham et al. (2017), which contained a binary indicator of the presence or absence of a governmental incompatibility in each country year.

The second step was to expand this binary coding to all countries in the world for the period 1960-2012, including consolidated democracies, and to extend the global sample through 2020. The third step was to add three additional variables for every year coded as containing a governmental incompatibility. These additional variables indicate which of three claim types is contained within the incompatibility: electoral legitimacy, government composition, and/or regime change.

This codebook describes this coding in two parts. The first part describes the coding to identify the presence of an incompatibility, and the second part describes the identification of claim types within the incompatibility.

Structure of the Data

- The GIDP 2.0 concerns incompatibilities over government — claims made against the central government of the state (1) **over the nature of a regime,** (2) **the composition of a government, or** (3) **the legitimacy of the means by which a government has come to power**.[1] This builds on the definition of a government incompatibility used by the PRIO/UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002; Themner and Wallersteen 2011).[2]

- Coders in the GIDP identify events that are indicative of such claims on a country-year basis. Each observation is a country-year (e.g., Mexico-1960) with a binary indicator coded as 1 if there was evidence that an organized opposition made claims against the government in relation to the nature of a governing regime or political system; the composition of its members; or the legitimacy of the means through which it came to office (more specific definitions follow below).

- The focus of data collection is on the "first events" in an incompatibility in a given country-year; therefore, at this stage, it is not necessary to collect data on subsequent events that pertain to the same incompatibility. Put differently, we only need to identify a single event in a given country-year to justify a code of "1." When coders identify such an event, they may proceed

[1] Such claims are inherently "incompatible" with the position of the government.

[2]Incompatibilities over government are contrasted with territorial incompatibilities, which are over the self-determination or autonomy of specific—usually ethnic—groups within a state, which are the subject of a separate project (see, e.g., Cunningham 2011, 2013, 2014).

to the next country-year. In future iterations of this project, we may focus on density of events, actors involved, etc.

- The data runs from 1960-2020. When assigned a country, coders should begin with 1960, or the first year of the country's independence, whichever comes later. Starting with that first year, coders should consult the relevant secondary and news sources from January 1 (potentially later if it is the year of the country's independence) to December 31 (potentially earlier if it is the last year of the country's existence) of that year. Once they have identified a claim or exhausted the sources, they can move on to the next year for that country and repeat the process, ending on December 31, 2020, or whenever the country ceased to be independent (e.g., East Germany).

List of variables

- *Country Code*: the country's three-digit identifier from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
- *Year*: the year in which an event evidencing the claim took place.
- *Governmental Incompatibility*: binary indicator for the presence of a claim made by an organized opposition organization in the year.
- *Electoral Legitimacy:* binary indicator for the presence of a claim related to the legitimacy of national elections in the year—i.e., elections for the national legislature or the executive branch. These can continue past the year of the election.
- *Governmental Composition:* binary indicator for the presence of a claim related to the removal of high-ranking governmental officials—i.e., the state leader or cabinet-level ministers—outside of regular, institutional processes in the year.
- *Regime Change:* binary indicator for calls for fundamental changes to the political system or political institutions in the year.
- *Notes*: a brief (1-2 sentence) justification for the coding along with a complete reference to the relevant news or secondary source from which the coding was derived.

Definitions

- *Events:* any event that indicates that there is an organization or movement — not just a lone dissident — that has made maximalist claims (see below) against the government. These can include written and verbal statements, as well as public protests and other non-violent and violent mass-mobilizations. The key is that there is some event that provides evidence that a specific claim

against the government is being publicly articulated. A single event of this nature is sufficient for a "1" code.

- *Maximalist claims:* Building on the PRIO/UCDP definition, a maximalist claim is either a call for regime-change or some other fundamental change to the political system (e.g., moving from a parliamentary to a presidential system), a change in government composition at the cabinet level of higher, or claims of electoral fraud or other flaws in the electoral process that have called the outcome of a national election into doubt. It must be public and be made by an identifiable movement or group rather than an individual dissident.

    - Regime Change: opposition group demanding regime change, democratization or some other fundamental political change. Examples of this include moving to a system of Islamic law, changing an appointed legislature to an elected one, establishing a multi-party system (including calls for the right to form political parties), moving from a presidential to a parliamentary system — or vice-versa.

    - Electoral Fraud: This includes, for example, claims of vote-buying, voter intimidation or suppression, or gerrymandering, or claims that the process by which leaders are selected in the state are systematically biased, unfair, or fraudulent in some way. This pertains only to national-level elections (e.g., president, national legislature), and not to local, provincial, or regional elections.

    - Government Composition: calling for the state leader or for other high-ranking (cabinet-level or higher) national government officials, or for a bloc of legislators, to be replaced.

        - It is important to note also that calls for changes in government composition through routine, legal means — such as parliamentary no-confidence votes, regular electoral turnover, or calls for snap elections in parliamentary systems, do not count. Put differently, that an opposition party wants voters to vote out the incumbents in the next elections does not qualify. However, if the same party demands non-routine change, such as the resignation or extra-institutional removal of a high official, fundamental change to the political system, or regime change — or states that the incumbents came to power through illegal means (electoral fraud, etc.), then that would be recorded as an incompatibility.

        - Calls for *impeachment* in presidential systems, given their relative rarity relative to no confidence motions in parliamentary systems, are considered to be claims.

        - Calls for new elections that are re-running of past elections — due to some claim of electoral malfeasance — are considered sufficient evidence of a claim.

        - Calls for new elections that are not part of the electoral calendar and not part of normal parliamentary procedure — e.g., snap elections, no confidence votes — are considered sufficient evidence of claims.

- Note that mere calls for policy changes (e.g., a condemnation of austerity measures) does not suffice — unless they contain maximalist claims (e.g., calls for a major government official (cabinet-level or higher) to resign or a fundamental change to the political system).

- Note: while some protests often start out over specific policies (economic issues or austerity measures, often), at times, they evolve to include maximalist claims. It is important therefore to make sure that an event truly only pertains to non-maximalist claims before disregarding it.

    - Disputes pertaining to regional or local government (e.g., mayoral elections, regional legislatures or municipal/local councils) are not considered.

- *Organization:* any named group that articulates a claim against the government. Any entity that is named is assumed to be an "organization" at this stage of the data collection. Accordingly, all named non-governmental entities that are involved in the articulation of claims should be recorded. These may include: political parties, student groups, religious groups, trade unions, governments-in-exile, and terrorist or insurgent groups. This does not include other parts of the government — one part of the government (for example, the military) cannot make a claim on another part. This final point is intended to exclude coups from the data collection, which are a separate phenomena.

- Absent a specific named organization, a claim made by more generally identified non-state organizations should be counted — e.g., "opposition parties," "Leftist militants." Claims made by broader societal groups, such as "university students," or "the dockworkers' union," which can be assumed to have an inherent degree of organization due to their *a priori* networks, are also to be counted.

    - Note: at times, legitimate incompatibilities from outside the government may be labelled as "coups" by the governing authority in order to de-legitimize them. It is important, therefore, that the coder does not take an event merely being labelled a "coup plot" by the government as sufficient evidence that it is *not* indicative of a claim on the government. A coup is defined by the actors involved:

        - The event would be excluded as an actual coup — if all of those involved are from within the government or security forces.

        - The event would be included as evidence of an incompatibility — if there was involvement by any extra-governmental actors (e.g., opposition parties, unions, student groups).

    - Claims made by organizations that clearly include fewer than 25 members are not considered sufficient evidence of claims. This can be determined if the source indicates the number of members in an organization and it is less than 25, or if the source indicates only a "few" or a "couple" members.

    - Evidence that clandestine networks of dissidents are secretly meeting or circulating subversive materials, e.g., *Samizdat*, is not sufficient evidence of a claim. Claims must be publicly articulated. If the dissident networks publish their claims, then that should be coded.

Ambiguous Events/Attributions:

- Where there is an event that very likely indicates an incompatibility, such as a bombing or protest — but no specific claim is articulated — this is not sufficient evidence of a claim/incompatibility. If there is a bombing and an opposition organization claims credit, and in the course of claiming credit, articulates a maximalist claim, that is considered sufficient evidence.

- Continued insurgency or violent attacks on government targets by an organization that has previously articulated a maximalist claim is considered sufficient evidence that the claim is continuing, and the relevant country-years should be coded as "1." For example, if an insurgent group goes public in 1960, stating that it wants to overthrow the government and begins attacking government targets — with attacks identified in 1961-1963 — 1960-1963 would all be coded as "1."

- When the government claims that there has been a plot against the government by extra-governmental actors, but there is no evidence of those actors articulating a claim either before or after the governmental announcement, that is **not** sufficient evidence for an incompatibility. Rather, it is an example of pre-emptive government repression — For example, a government conducting a mass arrest of dissidents/opposition figures and claiming that they were fomenting a "coup plot." Put differently, we cannot take "the government's word for it" that there is an incompatibility. It must be articulated independently by extra-governmental actors.

- General "anti-government" protests are not considered sufficient evidence of a claim if no more specific demand that satisfies the above criteria for a maximalist claim is expressed. If all that is recorded in the source is that the protest was "anti-government," coders should strive to identify additional information with other sources (see list of sources below).

Sources:

The coding procedure should be done with two different types of sources: (1) news reports in relation to a given country for the period of interest (1960-2020); (2) listed secondary sources. Coders should follow the specific instructions below in terms of the sources to be consulted and the order in which they should be consulted — the specific procedure is intended to maximize efficiency as well as uniformity in terms of the procedure used by different coders.

Secondary Sources:

Coders should begin by examining the following secondary sources in the order listed below. E.g., they should first examine the UCDP Encyclopedia for sufficient evidence of claims, coding any 1s indicated by that source, then move onto the NAVCO campaign narratives, coding as many 1s as possible, and so forth. The objective is to code as many "easy 1s" using the secondary sources as possible before moving on to the more time-consuming task of examining news stories. Once a country-year has been coded as 1 using a particular source, it can be skipped for the other sources. I.e., if you are able to code, 1960-65 as 1 using the UCDP Encyclopedia, you can simply start with 1966 when you move on to other sources in the list.

1. **UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia:** http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php
   Examine this source first. Any civil war over government that is not a coup is sufficient evidence of a governmental incompatibility and a "1" code in a country-year. For long-running civil wars (e.g., Afghanistan, Uganda), this will mean being able to quickly code many country-years as 1. In the "notes" section for these country-years it is sufficient to simply indicate that according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, there was an armed conflict over government in this country-year. To determine which civil wars over government are in fact coups, see Powell and Thyne's (2011) Appendix 1a: http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/appendix_T1.pdf

2. **NAVCO campaign narratives:**
   http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/data/navco_1-1_appendix-and-codebook.pdf

Apply the same logic here as in the case of the UCDP Encyclopedia. Do not count non-violent campaigns where the goal is territorial, i.e., secession or regional autonomy.

3. **DADM Intra-State Dispute Narratives:** http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-intratstate-dispute-narratives/
   Read the narrative for the assigned country that is not focused on a territorial dispute (i.e., countries with territorial disputes have separate entries for the territorial dispute and for disputes over government). Any event described that meets the criteria for a governmental incompatibility merits a code of 1 in the relevant country-year.

4. **Global Non-violent Action Database** (check anything relevant to the assigned country): http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/advanced_browse
   Read the narratives for the events in the assigned country. Any event described that meets the criteria for a governmental incompatibility merits a code of 1 in the relevant country-year.

5. **Minorities at Risk Chronologies/Assessments:**
   http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp
   Check to see whether ethnic organizations for a particular country have made claims on the government rather than territorial claims — for example, in some regimes, electoral districting systematically disadvantages a particular ethnic group (e.g., Shi'ites in Bahrain, Palestinians/West Bankers in Jordan). Organizations affiliated with that group may agitate for reform that redresses this, which qualifies as a claim under the "electoral legitimacy" criteria.

6. **Freedom House Country Reports (check all available years):**
   http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012
   These can be repetitive, but scan for new information in each year.

7. **African Elections Database:** http://africanelections.tripod.com/ci.html
   Check for election boycotts by named parties, which can indicate an electoral legitimacy claim.

8. **Keesings Record of World Events** (available through institutional subscription)
   Check this source last, as it can be the most time-consuming. Keesings web service recently suffered severe technical problems, so its functionality is severely limited. Simply search by the country name and scroll through all years 1960-2012, clicking on those events which do not relate to trade issues, international relations, etc. Search for events that may indicate a claim/incompatibility.

News Sources:

After hopefully coding a number of country-years as 1 from the secondary sources, the remaining country-years need to be coded using news sources.

1. Using **Proquest** to code 1960-1987 (excluding those years already coded using the secondary sources)
   - *Washington Post*
   - *New York Times*
   - *Christian Science Monitor*

   Search **one year at a time** (i.e., 1/1/1960-12/31/1960) using the following search string, intended to capture a range of activities and events that could be sufficient evidence of a claim being made:

   > ((*Country name*) AND (protest OR demonstrate OR demo OR riot OR violence OR violent OR bomb OR shoots OR battle OR fraud OR attack OR boycott OR strike OR rally OR rallies OR clash OR election OR elect OR opposition OR movement OR overthrow OR challenge OR reform OR occupy OR seize OR sit-in OR demand OR constitution OR contest OR transition OR fight OR referendum OR block OR grievance OR rebel OR declare OR rig OR illegitimate OR legitimate OR dissident OR opponent OR demonstration OR movement OR mobilization))

   Limit the search to the three publications listed above and under publication type, to "Article," "Feature," "General Information," and "Front Page/Cover Story."

   Since this may return hundreds — or even thousands — of news stories, sort by "relevance" and examine the first 100 stories. Ignore obviously irrelevant stories, download and read those

whose titles suggest relevance to a potential governmental incompatibility, coding "1"s where appropriate.

2. Using **Factiva** for 1988-2003 (excluding those years already coded using the secondary sources)

   Search **one year at a time** (i.e.., 1/1/1988-12/31/1988) using the same search string as used in the Proquest searches. In the menu options, limit the "region" to the relevant country and the subject to "political/general news."
   Since this may return hundreds, or even thousands, of news stories, sort by "relevance" and examine the first 100 stories. Ignore obviously irrelevant stories, download and read those whose titles suggest relevance to a potential governmental incompatibility, coding "1"s where appropriate.

3. Using **Factiva** (for 2004-2012) — for this date range, Factiva does a better job of tagging news stories with specific subject headers, so you can search with more targeted subjects than "political/general news."

   Search **one year at a time** (i.e., 1/1/1988-12/31/1988) using the same search string as used in the Proquest searches. In the menu options, limit the "region" to the relevant country and the subjects to (Under Political/General News-National/Public Security) "Armed Forces," "Civil Unrest," "Military Action," "State Security Measures/Policies," and "Terrorism," and (under Politics/International Relations-Domestic Politics) "Armed Rebellion," "Elections," "Government Bodies," and "Political Appointments/Terminations."
   Since this may return hundreds, or even thousands of news stories, sort by "relevance" and examine the first 100 stories. Ignore obviously irrelevant stories, download and read those whose titles suggest relevance to a potential governmental incompatibility, coding "1"s where appropriate.

- For 2013-2020, use Nexis UNI and repeat the same procedure for all country-ears. In NEXIS UNI, you may narrow the search results by specifying the region of the country, excluding trade journals and newsletters from the sources consulted, and by specifying the

subject matter as “National Security and International Relations,” “Government and Public Policy,” “Negative News,” and “Trends and Events”—excluding all other news categories.

Finally, having examined all the sources, for those country-years that you have been unable to find any evidence of claims using all the sources listed above, you may code those as "0."

Double-checking coding using existing datasets

Where possible we double-checked our coding by cross-referencing it with relevant variables in three datasets that pertain to protest and mobilization. Since the mobilization threshold for a governmental incompatibility being articulated is lower than the events captured by these datasets, the concern was not whether or not we had erroneously identified an incompatibility but whether the sources upon which we relied had missed the articulation of an incompatibility. In short, we used these datasets to provide an additional check that our coding captured all possible evidence of governmental incompatibilities—and where possible, the articulation of specific claims.

In the *Mass Mobilization Data Project (MMDP)*, we were able also able to identify country-years with governmental incompatibilities using information on protest events. The Mass Mobilization data captures protests events that target the national government of a country and include at least 50 participants—the data includes events from 162 countries, both democracies and non-democracies (Clark and Regan 2016). In the MMDP, we used the *protesterdemand* string variables to identify protest events in which a governmental incompatibility was expressed.

The *Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Dataset (MMAD*) contains protest events in autocracies that include at least 25 participants and relate to the central, regional, or local governments of the state. (Weidmann and Rød 2019). From MMAD, we were able to determine whether events in the MMAD dataset—i.e, protest events in autocracies that met the threshold for inclusion in the MMAD data pertained to governmental incompatibilities. We did so using the *Issue* string variable in the data that details the dispute or issue driving the protest event.

Finally, we were able to use the National Elections Across Democracies and Autocracies (NELDA) dataset. NELDA contains two variables—*Nelda14* and *Nelda30*—that pertain directly to electoral legitimacy claims. *Nelda14* is an indicator that captures the boycott of national election by opposition leaders. *Nelda30* captures whether there were protests or riots over allegations of fraud in

elections. Where either of these indicators in NELDA was coded as "1", we considered there to be evidence of a governmental incompatibility.

GIDP 2.0 Second Stage Coding: Claim-Type Indicators

We further disaggregate our indicator for the presence of a governmental incompatibility into three categories: electoral legitimacy, government composition, and regime change. Electoral legitimacy refers to claims by organized political groups that national elections or referenda were fraudulent, rigged, or otherwise flawed in such a way as to put the outcome in doubt. Examples of this include claims by much of the leadership of the Republican Party in the United States that the 2020 presidential election was fraudulent or the claims by supporters of Alassane Ouattara during the Ivorian presidential election of 2000 who reacted against his disqualification from running by the country's supreme court over allegations of non-citizenship.

Government composition claims are those in which there are calls by opposition organizations for the removal or resignation of the country's leaders or cabinet-level officials. As noted previously, these exclude no-confidence votes and calls for snap elections that may occur in parliamentary systems but do include calls for impeachment that may occur in presidential democracies. An example of this are the calls by the opposition Botswana Congress Party for several cabinet members to resign from the government due to allegations of corruption.[3] Another example would be calls by various opposition groups in 2011 and 2012 for the resignation of Malawi's president and establishment of a caretaker government—a claim that calls for a change in the leadership of the country but not a fundamental change to its political institutions.[4]

Finally, the most extreme category is regime change. Regime change claims represent calls for a fundamental change to the national political system, regime type, or institutions. These can include calls for democratization of a non-democratic regime, shifts from one autocratic regime-type to

[3] APA News. 11/29/2012. "Botswana rejects calls to sack ministers implicated in corruption."
[44] APANEWS. 5/11/2011. "Opposition plans civil disobedience in Malawi." Global Insight. 3/12/2012. "Malawian Civil Society Group Calls for President's Resignation or Referendum"; Malawi Today. 7/22/2011. "July 20 Protesters Demands." http://www.malawitoday.com/news/896-july-20-protesters-demands. Accessed 1/10/2014.

another, post-coup protests calling for a return to civilian rule, shift to a different democratic regime type—e.g., moving from a parliamentary to a presidential system—or the imposition of a system of religious law in the country. An example of this last type includes the formation in exile of the Guinea-Bissau Bafata Resistance Movement with the goal of establishing democracy in Guinea-Bissau[5] or the Ansar al-Sunnah Group, active in the internal armed conflict in Mozambique from 2016 onwards, which seeks the establishment of an Islamically-based system of government in the country.[6] We assume that such claims inherently entail a concurrent governmental composition claim—e.g., regime change in the country would necessarily entail a change in national leadership.

Sources

After we identified a government incompatibility in a country-year of *either* an electoral legitimacy, government composition, or regime change claim in the first stage of coding, we conducted subsequent searches of news reports as well as select secondary sources and datasets to confirm whether or not claims of the other two types were present.

To distinguish between these three types of claims among governmental incompatibilities, we first consulted the initial coding decision on the presence of an incompatibility and coder notes for whether the basis of the initial determination was an electoral legitimacy claim, government composition, or regime change. Based on these notes, we were able to code at least one of the claim-type indicators. In some cases, this initial determination allowed us to code more than one of the claim-type indicators. For example, we assume that any regime change claim necessarily includes also changes in government composition—therefore, all cases where regime claims were found were also coded as having government composition claims. In other cases, the notes indicated that an electoral

[5] Keesings Record of World Events. 3/1/1987. "Guinea-Bissau, Africa"
[6] UCDP conflict encyclopedia, Mozambique

legitimacy claim escalated to include calls for regime change or that an organization that maintained a regime change claim also labeled national elections as fraudulent. For electoral legitimacy claims, we supplemented the initial determination by consulting the NELDA's variables on election boycotts and fraud claims by opposition groups (the *Nelda14* and *Nelda30* variables). In cases where the initial determination regarding the presence of an incompatibility had been made using the ACD, we consulted the relevant state-based conflict's entry in the UCDP Armed Conflict Encyclopedia. These entries often provided details on grievances of the organizations in state-based conflicts.

In addition to using the MMAD and NELDA data to confirm the presence of governmental incompatibilities, we were able to use these datasets in some cases to identify also the presence of specific claims types. From MMAD, we were able to determine whether events in the MMAD dataset—i.e, protest events in autocracies that met the threshold for inclusion in the MMAD data—pertained to governmental incompatibilities, and if so, whether they reflected claims related to electoral legitimacy, government composition or regime change. We did so using the text of the *Issue* string variable in the data that details the dispute or issue driving the protest event. Specifically, we identified electoral legitimacy claims from protest events where the MMAD recorded the issue driving the protest as either

- "election fraud"
- "election without opposition"
- "violations in legislative elections"
- "violations in executive elections"
- "vote rigging"
- "falsification of results"

From MMAD we identified regime change claims where the issue driving the protest was recorded as containing any of the following terms:

- "against:regime"
- "Egypt style uprising"
- "for:democracy"

- “fundamental reforms”
- “against:king”
- “against:dictator”
- “against:dictatorship”
- “against:monarch”
- “against:junta”
- “against:military regime”
- “for:regime change”
- “for:Caliphate”
- “for:Islamic law”
- “for:Islamic regime”
- “for:elected government”
- “end of regime”
- end of ruling [party or ruler, etc] “
- "Communism”

From MMAD we identified government composition claims where the issue driving the protest was recorded as containing any of the following terms:

- “resignation”
- “replacement of government”
- “stepping down”
- “resign”
- “resigning”
- “downfall”

Finally, we were able to use the National Elections Across Democracies and Autocracies (NELDA) dataset to both confirm our coding of governmental incompatibilities as well as identify specific electoral legitimacy claims. We used the *Nelda14* and *Nelda30* variables for this purpose. *Nelda14* is an indicator that captures the boycott of national by opposition leaders. *Nelda30* captures whether there were protests or riots over allegations of fraud in elections. Where either of these indicators in NELDA was coded as “1”, we considered there to be evidence of an electoral legitimacy claim.

For all observations where we had not been able to code all three claim-type indicators from the above process, we conducted a secondary series of searches of news reports. At this stage, what remained were cases where we had identified whether or not there was an electoral legitimacy claim,

had identified the presence of a government composition claim, but were unsure of whether or not the government composition claim had escalated to include regime change claims. This comprised 1,406 country-years. For these country-years, we then conducted another series of searches of news stories using a different search string focused on claims targeting the entire political and governmental system in order to determine the presence of a regime change claim and coded the regime-change indicator based on the results of these searches. This was the search string focused on identifying regime change claims—it includes verbs associated with regime change claims as well as common ideological terms that we found associated with regime change claims:

> *("Country name") AND ("regime" OR "revolution" OR "overthrow" OR "uprising" OR "insurrection" OR "revolt" OR "civilian rule" OR "seizure" OR "coup" OR "putsch" OR "seizure" OR "Islamic Law" OR "Shari'a*" OR "Caliph*" OR "Mao*" OR "Marx*" OR "Lenin*" OR "Communis*")*