**Online Supplementary**

Appendix A

Table A.1 Summary Statistics

| | Min | Max | Count | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Collective labor rights | 0 | 4 | 1164 | 1.234 | 1.277 |
| Substantive labor rights | 0 | 8 | 1203 | 3.180 | 1.829 |
| Party authoritarianism | 0 | 1 | 1229 | 0.315 | 0.465 |
| Leftist government | 0 | 1 | 1229 | 0.257 | 0.437 |
| FDI inflows (% of GDP) | -82.892 | 161.824 | 1122 | 4.205 | 9.479 |
| Trade (% of GDP) | 0.021 | 531.737 | 1136 | 84.801 | 59.690 |
| GDP (ln) | 4.242 | 10.988 | 1139 | 7.145 | 1.384 |
| GDP growth rate | -50.248 | 149.973 | 1155 | 5.160 | 8.424 |
| Natural resources rents (% of GDP) | 0.141 | 89.329 | 1079 | 18.831 | 18.630 |
| Population (ln) | 12.930 | 21.014 | 1228 | 15.987 | 1.532 |
| Civil conflict | 0 | 1 | 1229 | 0.198 | 0.398 |
| Level of democracy | -10 | 5 | 1229 | -2.925 | 4.682 |
| Year | 1994 | 2010 | 1229 | 2001.628 | 4.915 |

Figure A.1 Correlation Matrix



Table A.2 Countries in the Sample

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Kazakhstan | Turkmenistan |
| Albania | Kenya | Uganda |
| Algeria | Korea, North | Uzbekistan |
| Angola | Kuwait | Venezuela |
| Armenia | Kyrgyzstan | Vietnam |
| Azerbaijan | Laos | |
| Bahrain | Lesotho | |
| Bangladesh | Liberia | |
| Belarus | Libya | |
| Bhutan | Madagascar | |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Malawi | |
| Burkina Faso | Malaysia (1966-) | |
| Burundi | Mauritania | |
| Cambodia | Mexico | |
| Cameroon | Morocco | |
| Central African Republic | Mozambique | |
| Chad | Myanmar | |
| China | Nepal | |
| Comoros | Niger | |
| Congo | Nigeria | |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Oman | |
| Croatia | Pakistan (1971-) | |
| Cuba | Papua New Guinea | |
| Djibouti | Peru | |
| Dominican Republic | Qatar | |
| Ecuador | Romania | |
| Egypt | Russia | |
| Equatorial Guinea | Rwanda | |
| Eritrea | Saudi Arabia | |
| Ethiopia (1993-) | Senegal | |
| Fiji | Sierra Leone | |
| Gabon | Singapore | |
| Gambia | Solomon Islands | |
| Georgia | Somalia | |
| Ghana | Sri Lanka | |
| Guatemala | Sudan (-2011) | |
| Guinea | Suriname | |
| Guinea-Bissau | Swaziland | |
| Haiti | Syria | |
| Indonesia | Tajikistan | |
| Iran | Tanzania | |
| Iraq | Thailand | |
| Jordan | Togo | |
| United Arab Emirates | Tunisia | |

Appendix B

Table A.1 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Without Controls)

| DV=Collective labor rights | Model 1 |
|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.101 |
| | (0.158) |
| *Leftist government* | |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | |
| *Economic growth (%)* | |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | |
| *Population (ln)* | |
| *Civil conflict* | |
| *Level of Democracy* | |
| *Collective labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | |
| Constant | 1.287*** |
| | (0.111) |
| Observations | 1,071 |
| R-squared | 0.785 |
| Year FE | yes |
| Country FE | yes |

Table A.2 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Without Controls)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 2 |
|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.579*** |
| | (0.381) |
| *Leftist government* | |
| *Collective labor rights* | |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | |
| *Economic growth (%)* | |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | |
| *Population (ln)* | |
| *Civil conflict* | |
| *Level of Democracy* | |
| *Substantive labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | |
| Constant | 3.327*** |
| | (0.185) |
| Observations | 1,107 |
| R-squared | 0.745 |
| Year FE | yes |
| Country FE | yes |

Table A.3 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Without Controls)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 3 |
|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.740*** |
| | (0.402) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | -0.128 |
| | (0.102) |
| *Leftist government* | |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.153** |
| | (0.068) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | |
| *Economic growth (%)* | |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | |
| *Population (ln)* | |
| *Civil conflict* | |
| *Level of Democracy* | |
| *Substantive labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | |
| Constant | 3.230*** |
| | (0.203) |
| Observations | 1,066 |
| R-squared | 0.754 |
| Year FE | yes |
| Country FE | yes |

Table A.4 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Ordered Probit)

| DV=Collective labor rights | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | -0.244 | -0.124 | -0.128 |
| | (0.351) | (0.346) | (0.125) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.631** | 0.525** | 0.207** |
| | (0.248) | (0.245) | (0.099) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.005 | -0.006 | 0.010 |
| | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.006) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.002 |
| | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | -0.239 | -0.240* | -0.036 |
| | (0.146) | (0.135) | (0.056) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.004 | -0.006 | -0.009 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.005 | -0.001 | 0.001 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.003) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.218*** | -0.286*** | -0.040 |
| | (0.084) | (0.090) | (0.039) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.361 | 0.315 | -0.137 |
| | (0.232) | (0.217) | (0.160) |
| *Level of democracy* | | 0.083*** | |
| | | (0.023) | |
| *Collective labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 1.766*** |
| | | | (0.123) |
| Observations | 847 | 847 | 844 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Region FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Ordered Probit)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.941*** | 0.919*** | 0.272*** |
| | (0.223) | (0.224) | (0.095) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.382** | 0.402** | 0.128 |
| | (0.192) | (0.190) | (0.090) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.213*** | 0.246*** | 0.006 |
| | (0.071) | (0.072) | (0.035) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.017** | -0.017** | -0.013** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.006) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.300*** | 0.306*** | 0.107** |
| | (0.101) | (0.102) | (0.052) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.004 | -0.004 | 0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.001 | -0.002 | 0.001 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.002) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.196* | -0.173 | -0.079* |
| | (0.104) | (0.106) | (0.047) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.278 | -0.260 | -0.114 |
| | (0.238) | (0.239) | (0.107) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.027 | |
| | | (0.019) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.953*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Observations | 844 | 844 | 844 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Region FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Ordered Probit)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.680** | 0.667** | 0.079 |
| | (0.306) | (0.307) | (0.144) |
| *Party authoritarianism × FACB rights* | 0.174 | 0.168 | 0.130* |
| | (0.140) | (0.138) | (0.072) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.382** | 0.401** | 0.129 |
| | (0.183) | (0.182) | (0.086) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.160* | 0.194** | -0.033 |
| | (0.082) | (0.080) | (0.043) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.019** | -0.019** | -0.015** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.006) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.259** | 0.266** | 0.077 |
| | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.058) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.004 | -0.004 | 0.003 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.002 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.002) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.193* | -0.171 | -0.078* |
| | (0.102) | (0.105) | (0.046) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.275 | -0.258 | -0.112 |
| | (0.239) | (0.240) | (0.109) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.027 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.952*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Observations | 844 | 844 | 844 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Region FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.7 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Alternative

Measure of Party Authoritarianism)

| DV=Collective labor rights | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.149 | 0.090 | 0.005 |
| | (0.099) | (0.101) | (0.082) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.136 | 0.119 | 0.064 |
| | (0.114) | (0.115) | (0.088) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.001 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.004* | 0.003* | 0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.251 | 0.246 | -0.119 |
| | (0.273) | (0.273) | (0.207) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.004) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.011*** | 0.011*** | 0.004 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.642 | 0.544 | -0.084 |
| | (0.609) | (0.614) | (0.364) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.397*** | 0.400*** | 0.160* |
| | (0.099) | (0.099) | (0.084) |
| *Level of democracy* | | 0.018 | |
| | | (0.015) | |
| *Collective labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.679*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Constant | -11.166 | -9.452 | 2.416 |
| | (10.547) | (10.601) | (6.547) |
| Observations | 741 | 741 | 738 |
| R-squared | 0.806 | 0.806 | 0.886 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Alternative Measure of Party Authoritarianism)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.252* | 0.367** | 0.178 |
| | (0.151) | (0.162) | (0.139) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.081 | 0.116 | 0.010 |
| | (0.202) | (0.199) | (0.159) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.132** | 0.143** | -0.008 |
| | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.053) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.004 | -0.005 | -0.006 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.004* | -0.004* | -0.003 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.707* | 0.711* | 0.321 |
| | (0.394) | (0.396) | (0.308) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010* | -0.005 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.142 | 0.051 | 0.105 |
| | (0.807) | (0.820) | (0.651) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.312** | -0.321** | -0.149 |
| | (0.131) | (0.129) | (0.122) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.036* | |
| | | (0.020) | |
| *Substantive labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.504*** |
| | | | (0.037) |
| Constant | 1.755 | -1.585 | -1.639 |
| | (14.411) | (14.643) | (11.503) |
| Observations | 738 | 738 | 738 |
| R-squared | 0.771 | 0.772 | 0.831 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.9 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Alternative Measure of Party Authoritarianism)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.520** | 0.618** | 0.340* |
| | (0.234) | (0.245) | (0.205) |
| *Party authoritarianism × FACB rights* | -0.149 | -0.142 | -0.090 |
| | (0.110) | (0.111) | (0.092) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.092 | 0.125 | 0.017 |
| | (0.203) | (0.200) | (0.160) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.227** | 0.232** | 0.049 |
| | (0.101) | (0.102) | (0.080) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.004 | -0.005 | -0.006 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.004* | -0.004* | -0.003 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.710* | 0.713* | 0.323 |
| | (0.393) | (0.394) | (0.307) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.001 | -0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.010* | -0.010* | -0.005 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.176 | 0.013 | 0.084 |
| | (0.806) | (0.819) | (0.652) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.318** | -0.327** | -0.153 |
| | (0.131) | (0.130) | (0.122) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.035* | |
| | | (0.020) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.502*** |
| | | | (0.037) |
| Constant | 2.152 | -1.113 | -1.389 |
| | (14.365) | (14.589) | (11.508) |
| Observations | 738 | 738 | 738 |
| R-squared | 0.771 | 0.773 | 0.831 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Excluding China and Vietnam)

| DV=Collective labor rights | (1) Model 2 | (2) Model 3 | (3) Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.334 | 0.414 | 0.115 |
| | (0.306) | (0.312) | (0.167) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.195 | 0.179 | 0.046 |
| | (0.289) | (0.292) | (0.130) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.004) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.001 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.254 | 0.213 | 0.088 |
| | (0.458) | (0.461) | (0.201) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.003 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.003) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.003 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.004) |
| *Population (ln)* | 1.027 | 0.882 | 0.262 |
| | (0.848) | (0.845) | (0.334) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.481*** | 0.482*** | 0.159 |
| | (0.168) | (0.163) | (0.109) |
| *Level of democracy* | | 0.025 | |
| | | (0.019) | |
| *Collective labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.638*** |
| | | | (0.049) |
| Constant | -17.258 | -14.602 | -4.408 |
| | (14.661) | (14.594) | (6.022) |
| Observations | 815 | 815 | 812 |
| R-squared | 0.774 | 0.775 | 0.857 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Excluding China and Vietnam)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.444*** | 1.357*** | 0.634** |
| | (0.493) | (0.486) | (0.310) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.269 | 0.284 | 0.122 |
| | (0.202) | (0.199) | (0.157) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.137** | 0.146** | 0.031 |
| | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.051) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.004 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.775** | 0.817** | 0.351 |
| | (0.325) | (0.326) | (0.265) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.003 | -0.003 | 0.000 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010* | -0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.718 | 0.867 | 0.695 |
| | (0.654) | (0.661) | (0.539) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.296** | -0.302** | -0.140 |
| | (0.134) | (0.134) | (0.123) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.025 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.505*** |
| | | | (0.035) |
| Constant | -12.674 | -15.411 | -11.405 |
| | (11.760) | (11.886) | (9.640) |
| Observations | 812 | 812 | 812 |
| R-squared | 0.738 | 0.738 | 0.805 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.12 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Excluding China and Vietnam)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.722*** | 1.649*** | 0.759* |
| | (0.566) | (0.558) | (0.388) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | -0.141 | -0.150 | -0.063 |
| | (0.118) | (0.118) | (0.102) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.242 | 0.255 | 0.110 |
| | (0.202) | (0.199) | (0.159) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.177** | 0.189** | 0.049 |
| | (0.073) | (0.075) | (0.064) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.003 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.824** | 0.870*** | 0.373 |
| | (0.326) | (0.328) | (0.269) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.004 | -0.003 | 0.000 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010* | -0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.690 | 0.843 | 0.683 |
| | (0.656) | (0.662) | (0.541) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.293** | -0.299** | -0.139 |
| | (0.134) | (0.134) | (0.123) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.026 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.504*** |
| | | | (0.035) |
| Constant | -12.644 | -15.479 | -11.393 |
| | (11.768) | (11.880) | (9.651) |
| Observations | 812 | 812 | 812 |
| R-squared | 0.738 | 0.739 | 0.805 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.13 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Controlling for Structural Adjustment Programs)

| DV=Collective labor rights | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.307 | 0.385 | 0.102 |
| | (0.303) | (0.307) | (0.168) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.194 | 0.178 | 0.043 |
| | (0.292) | (0.294) | (0.131) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.004) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.001 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.306 | 0.271 | 0.128 |
| | (0.426) | (0.427) | (0.194) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.003 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.003) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.003 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.004) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.995 | 0.853 | 0.235 |
| | (0.839) | (0.837) | (0.339) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.470*** | 0.472*** | 0.156 |
| | (0.161) | (0.157) | (0.105) |
| *Level of democracy* | | 0.024 | |
| | | (0.019) | |
| *Recipient of World Bank or IMF SAP* | 0.142* | 0.136* | 0.068 |
| | (0.074) | (0.074) | (0.053) |
| *Collective labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.637*** |
| | | | (0.048) |
| Constant | -17.356 | -14.764 | -4.332 |
| | (14.717) | (14.655) | (6.166) |
| Observations | 847 | 847 | 844 |
| R-squared | 0.784 | 0.786 | 0.863 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.14 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Controlling for Structural Adjustment Programs)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.435*** | 1.343*** | 0.634** |
| | (0.482) | (0.475) | (0.307) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.272 | 0.288 | 0.125 |
| | (0.200) | (0.198) | (0.156) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.128** | 0.137** | 0.027 |
| | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.051) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.004 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.800** | 0.839*** | 0.408 |
| | (0.318) | (0.319) | (0.269) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.004 | -0.003 | -0.000 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010* | -0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.691 | 0.852 | 0.677 |
| | (0.657) | (0.665) | (0.540) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.329** | -0.336** | -0.158 |
| | (0.135) | (0.135) | (0.122) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.027 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *Recipient of World Bank or IMF SAP* | 0.210** | 0.216** | 0.139 |
| | (0.105) | (0.106) | (0.086) |
| *Substantive labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.497*** |
| | | | (0.035) |
| Constant | -12.678 | -15.606 | -11.679 |
| | (11.898) | (12.027) | (9.732) |
| Observations | 844 | 844 | 844 |
| R-squared | 0.735 | 0.736 | 0.801 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.15 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Controlling for Structural Adjustment Programs)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.709*** | 1.632*** | 0.763** |
| | (0.560) | (0.551) | (0.388) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | -0.139 | -0.148 | -0.065 |
| | (0.118) | (0.118) | (0.103) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.245 | 0.260 | 0.113 |
| | (0.201) | (0.198) | (0.157) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.168** | 0.179** | 0.046 |
| | (0.073) | (0.075) | (0.064) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.003 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.846*** | 0.889*** | 0.430 |
| | (0.320) | (0.321) | (0.272) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.005 | -0.004 | -0.001 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010* | -0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.664 | 0.828 | 0.665 |
| | (0.659) | (0.666) | (0.541) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.327** | -0.333** | -0.157 |
| | (0.135) | (0.135) | (0.121) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.028 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *Recipient of World Bank or IMF SAP* | 0.211** | 0.217** | 0.140 |
| | (0.105) | (0.106) | (0.086) |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.497*** |
| | | | (0.035) |
| Constant | -12.645 | -15.670 | -11.666 |
| | (11.901) | (12.016) | (9.743) |
| Observations | 844 | 844 | 844 |
| R-squared | 0.736 | 0.737 | 0.801 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.16 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Controlling for Human Rights Organizations)

| DV=Collective labor rights | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.411 | 0.482 | 0.144 |
| | (0.289) | (0.303) | (0.161) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.201 | 0.185 | 0.043 |
| | (0.277) | (0.279) | (0.127) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.002 | 0.003 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.040 | 0.002 | 0.052 |
| | (0.359) | (0.367) | (0.190) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.002 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.003) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.002 |
| | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.004) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.848 | 0.724 | 0.176 |
| | (0.824) | (0.818) | (0.359) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.418** | 0.422** | 0.148 |
| | (0.164) | (0.161) | (0.112) |
| *Level of democracy* | | 0.022 | |
| | | (0.022) | |
| *HRO Presence (ln)* | -0.314 | -0.280 | -0.190 |
| | (0.395) | (0.398) | (0.201) |
| *Collective labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.626*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Constant | -12.007 | -9.783 | -2.227 |
| | (14.306) | (14.228) | (6.428) |
| Observations | 767 | 767 | 765 |
| R-squared | 0.783 | 0.784 | 0.859 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.17 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Controlling for Human Rights Organizations)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.420*** | 1.377*** | 0.619** |
| | (0.486) | (0.487) | (0.301) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.254 | 0.261 | 0.102 |
| | (0.203) | (0.202) | (0.158) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.165** | 0.169*** | 0.039 |
| | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.056) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.005 | 0.005 | -0.000 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
| | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.845** | 0.867** | 0.496 |
| | (0.358) | (0.361) | (0.304) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.002 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.010 | -0.010 | -0.005 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.674 | 0.745 | 0.693 |
| | (0.664) | (0.669) | (0.549) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.338** | -0.342** | -0.140 |
| | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.127) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.012 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *HRO Presence (ln)* | -0.222 | -0.239 | -0.169 |
| | (0.355) | (0.359) | (0.279) |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.516*** |
| | | | (0.037) |
| Constant | -12.032 | -13.308 | -12.104 |
| | (12.061) | (12.169) | (9.881) |
| Observations | 765 | 765 | 765 |
| R-squared | 0.739 | 0.739 | 0.806 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.18 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Human Rights Organizations)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.726*** | 1.693*** | 0.858** |
| | (0.593) | (0.590) | (0.422) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | -0.148 | -0.154 | -0.115 |
| | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.122) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.231 | 0.238 | 0.084 |
| | (0.203) | (0.202) | (0.159) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.196*** | 0.202*** | 0.063 |
| | (0.075) | (0.076) | (0.065) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.002 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.849** | 0.873** | 0.500 |
| | (0.359) | (0.361) | (0.306) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.002 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010 | -0.005 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.649 | 0.724 | 0.673 |
| | (0.666) | (0.671) | (0.549) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.340** | -0.345** | -0.142 |
| | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.127) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.013 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *HRO Presence (ln)* | -0.213 | -0.232 | -0.163 |
| | (0.353) | (0.357) | (0.278) |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.515*** |
| | | | (0.037) |
| Constant | -11.737 | -13.104 | -11.876 |
| | (12.093) | (12.184) | (9.887) |
| Observations | 765 | 765 | 765 |
| R-squared | 0.739 | 0.739 | 0.806 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.19 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Dropping Collective Labor Rights from the Control Variables)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.469*** | 1.405*** | 0.646** |
| | (0.495) | (0.490) | (0.305) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.300 | 0.313 | 0.118 |
| | (0.205) | (0.203) | (0.156) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.003 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.004** | -0.003* | -0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.883*** | 0.914*** | 0.313 |
| | (0.299) | (0.300) | (0.258) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.002 | -0.002 | 0.001 |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.009 | -0.010* | -0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 1.253** | 1.348** | 0.682 |
| | (0.533) | (0.535) | (0.447) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.237* | -0.238* | -0.130 |
| | (0.127) | (0.127) | (0.120) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.020 | |
| | | (0.018) | |
| *Substantive labor rights*$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.511*** |
| | | | (0.034) |
| Constant | -21.665** | -23.431** | -10.938 |
| | (9.590) | (9.641) | (8.093) |
| Observations | 841 | 841 | 837 |
| R-squared | 0.750 | 0.751 | 0.815 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.20 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions

| | Model 1 Collective labor rights | Model 2 Substantive labor rights | Model 3 Collective labor rights | Model 4 Substantive labor rights |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 0.134 | 0.581* | 0.134 | 0.755** |
| | (0.200) | (0.328) | (0.200) | (0.379) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | | | | -0.088 |
| | | | | (0.097) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.037 | 0.136 | 0.037 | 0.119 |
| | (0.086) | (0.141) | (0.086) | (0.142) |
| *Collective labor rights* | 0.637*** | 0.040 | 0.637*** | 0.066 |
| | (0.029) | (0.047) | (0.029) | (0.055) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.007 | -0.023* | 0.007 | -0.023* |
| | (0.008) | (0.013) | (0.008) | (0.013) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.004 | -0.004 | 0.004 | -0.004 |
| | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.104 | 0.417* | 0.104 | 0.447* |
| | (0.149) | (0.243) | (0.149) | (0.245) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | 0.000 | -0.003 | 0.000 |
| | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| *Population (ln)* | 0.003 | -0.004 | 0.003 | -0.004 |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.193 | 0.815 | 0.193 | 0.801 |
| | (0.331) | (0.539) | (0.331) | (0.539) |
| *Level of democracy* | 0.160** | -0.161 | 0.160** | -0.160 |
| | (0.070) | (0.114) | (0.070) | (0.114) |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | 0.492*** | | 0.491*** |
| | | (0.029) | | (0.029) |
| Constant | -3.518 | -13.880 | -3.518 | -13.847 |
| | (5.700) | (9.264) | (5.700) | (9.261) |
| Observations | 844 | 844 | 844 | 844 |
| R-squared | 0.863 | 0.801 | 0.863 | 0.801 |
| year FE | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| country FE | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.22 Using Averages

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Collective labor rights | Substantive labor rights | |
| *Party authoritarianism* | -0.123 | 0.666* | 0.263 |
| | (0.291) | (0.353) | (0.629) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | | | 0.339 |
| | | | (0.323) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.353 | 0.617 | 0.604 |
| | (0.307) | (0.371) | (0.363) |
| *Collective labor rights* | | 0.436** | 0.354 |
| | | (0.201) | (0.241) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.009 | 0.017 | 0.012 |
| | (0.032) | (0.050) | (0.049) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.004 | -0.001 | -0.000 |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | -0.191** | 0.488*** | 0.443** |
| | (0.095) | (0.158) | (0.173) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.047 | -0.061 | -0.062 |
| | (0.034) | (0.052) | (0.051) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.006 | -0.004 |
| | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.334*** | -0.019 | 0.000 |
| | (0.080) | (0.163) | (0.162) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.073 | -0.982 | -1.007* |
| | (0.340) | (0.601) | (0.603) |
| *Level of democracy* | 0.077*** | -0.024 | -0.026 |
| | (0.024) | (0.049) | (0.049) |
| Constant | 8.718*** | -0.229 | -0.154 |
| | (1.396) | (3.304) | (3.272) |
| Observations | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| R-squared | 0.421 | 0.291 | 0.301 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.23 The Weight of the Past

| | (1)<br>Model 1 | (2)<br>Model 2 | (3)<br>Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | -0.381 | 1.485*** | 1.507*** |
| | (0.370) | (0.513) | (0.562) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | | | -0.011 |
| | | | (0.138) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.285* | 0.053 | 0.051 |
| | (0.165) | (0.224) | (0.227) |
| *Collective labor rights* | | 0.058 | 0.061 |
| | | (0.068) | (0.082) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.007 | -0.006 | -0.006 |
| | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | 0.004* | -0.004* | -0.004 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | -0.092 | 0.008 | 0.013 |
| | (0.284) | (0.355) | (0.359) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.004 | -0.015** | -0.015** |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.007* | -0.007 | -0.007 |
| | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.057 | 0.588 | 0.587 |
| | (0.599) | (0.735) | (0.736) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.244* | -0.228 | -0.227 |
| | (0.124) | (0.145) | (0.145) |
| *Level of democracy* | 0.014 | -0.060** | -0.060** |
| | (0.014) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Collective labor rights (moving average) | 0.405*** | | |
| | (0.085) | | |
| Substantive labor rights (moving average) | | 0.436*** | 0.435*** |
| | | (0.077) | (0.078) |
| Constant | 2.153 | -7.750 | -7.772 |
| | (10.814) | (13.175) | (13.185) |
| Observations | 597 | 605 | 605 |
| R-squared | 0.810 | 0.750 | 0.750 |
| year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.24 GMM Estimation

| | (1)<br>Model 1 | (2)<br>Model 2 | (3)<br>Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | -0.560 | 2.735*** | 1.828** |
| | (0.364) | (0.742) | (0.815) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | | | 0.598 |
| | | | (0.470) |
| *Leftist government* | 1.010*** | 2.278*** | 1.582*** |
| | (0.380) | (0.671) | (0.572) |
| *Collective labor rights* | | | 0.511*** |
| | | | (0.187) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.018* | -0.003 | -0.009 |
| | (0.010) | (0.014) | (0.013) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.003 | -0.000 | -0.007 |
| | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | -0.498*** | 0.732*** | 0.862*** |
| | (0.137) | (0.179) | (0.237) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.019** | -0.012 | 0.004 |
| | (0.009) | (0.017) | (0.014) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | 0.020*** | -0.018** | -0.013 |
| | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.011) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.373*** | -0.542** | -0.414** |
| | (0.134) | (0.206) | (0.199) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.072 | 0.528 | 0.008 |
| | (0.230) | (0.386) | (0.389) |
| *Level of democracy* | 0.155*** | -0.050 | -0.045 |
| | (0.033) | (0.055) | (0.058) |
| Constant | 11.238*** | 5.551* | 2.860 |
| | (2.152) | (3.137) | (3.985) |
| Observations | 857 | 882 | 857 |
| *P-value* for Sargan test | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *P-value* for Hansen test | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.24 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Collective Labor Rights (Mosley and Uno's Data)

| DV=Collective labor rights | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | -0.791 | -0.501 | -0.262 |
| | (0.838) | (0.857) | (0.822) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.958 | 0.847 | 0.649 |
| | (0.868) | (0.852) | (0.741) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | 0.016 | 0.017 | 0.014 |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.002 | -0.003 | 0.002 |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | 0.130 | 0.895 | 0.595 |
| | (1.182) | (1.169) | (1.097) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.025 |
| | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.010 | -0.009 | -0.022 |
| | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.035) |
| *Population (ln)* | -0.172 | -0.553 | -0.132 |
| | (4.044) | (4.028) | (4.011) |
| *Civil conflict* | 0.856 | 0.904 | 0.799 |
| | (0.591) | (0.592) | (0.551) |
| *Level of democracy* | | 0.210*** | |
| | | (0.070) | |
| *Collective labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.369*** |
| | | | (0.039) |
| Constant | 28.607 | 30.601 | 14.831 |
| | (64.451) | (63.916) | (64.159) |
| Observations | 892 | 892 | 892 |
| R-squared | 0.673 | 0.677 | 0.718 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.25 How Institutionalized Authoritarianism Affects Substantive Labor Rights (Mosley and Uno's Data)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.798*** | 1.330** | 1.181** |
| | (0.482) | (0.529) | (0.463) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.471* | 0.524* | 0.261 |
| | (0.256) | (0.266) | (0.251) |
| *Collective labor rights* | -0.019* | -0.016 | -0.014 |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.023** | -0.024** | -0.022* |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | -0.875 | -1.034 | -0.527 |
| | (1.069) | (1.088) | (0.945) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.010 | -0.004 | -0.009 |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.008) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.037** | -0.040** | -0.030* |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| *Population (ln)* | -6.583*** | -6.478*** | -5.219** |
| | (2.511) | (2.481) | (2.457) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.235 | -0.192 | -0.203 |
| | (0.209) | (0.199) | (0.200) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.077* | |
| | | (0.041) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.270*** |
| | | | (0.067) |
| Constant | 117.594*** | 116.795*** | 91.944** |
| | (44.486) | (44.112) | (42.794) |
| Observations | 261 | 261 | 261 |
| R-squared | 0.872 | 0.875 | 0.883 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.26 How Collective Labor Rights Protection Moderates the Effect of Institutionalized Authoritarianism on Substantive Labor Rights (Mosley and Uno's Data)

| DV=Substantive Labor Rights | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Party authoritarianism* | 1.837** | 1.193 | 1.521** |
| | (0.762) | (0.831) | (0.674) |
| *Party authoritarianism × Collective labor rights* | -0.001 | 0.005 | -0.013 |
| | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.020) |
| *Leftist government* | 0.469* | 0.532** | 0.236 |
| | (0.258) | (0.269) | (0.256) |
| *Collective labor rights* | -0.018 | -0.019 | -0.007 |
| | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| *FDI (% of GDP)* | -0.023** | -0.024** | -0.022* |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) |
| *Trade (% of GDP)* | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *GDP per capita (ln)* | -0.880 | -1.022 | -0.560 |
| | (1.080) | (1.099) | (0.945) |
| *Economic growth (%)* | -0.010 | -0.004 | -0.009 |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.008) |
| *Natural resources rents (% of GDP)* | -0.037** | -0.039** | -0.031* |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| *Population (ln)* | -6.594*** | -6.439** | -5.293** |
| | (2.524) | (2.487) | (2.471) |
| *Civil conflict* | -0.236 | -0.189 | -0.209 |
| | (0.210) | (0.200) | (0.199) |
| *Level of democracy* | | -0.079* | |
| | | (0.042) | |
| *Substantive labor rights$_{t-1}$* | | | 0.276*** |
| | | | (0.068) |
| Constant | 117.790*** | 116.130*** | 93.196** |
| | (44.756) | (44.256) | (43.103) |
| Observations | 261 | 261 | 261 |
| R-squared | 0.872 | 0.875 | 0.883 |
| Year FE | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | yes | yes |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1