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# Left-Right Party Ideology in 36 Countries

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## Left-Right Party Ideology in 36 Countries

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This Working Paper presents and describes party positions on a left-right dimension (LR) proposed in "Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach" (Jahn, 2011). In addition it gives a more detailed account of constructing the LR than was possible in the original research article.

The LR index combines fundamental issues of Left and Right deduced from political theory and philosophy (LR Core) with general political issues, which temporarily and country-specifically align with the basic dimension (LR Plus) (Jahn, 2017). By visualizing the LR and LR Core indices and showing trends of major parties in 36 countries for the post-World War II era, this Working Paper serves as a description and validity check of LR party scores. Due to its deductive nature the LR allows for answering questions about the importance of the left-right dimension in each country, and helps uncovering so far undetected ideological trends.

Combining party scores with information about governments, parliaments, presidents, and the European Union facilitates the estimation of actor's policy positions. These highly aggregated measures have been successfully applied in macro-comparative studies modeling the interaction of governments and veto players within the framework of an "Agenda Setting Power Model" (ASPM) and their impact on public policies (Jahn, 2016). Accompanying the "ASPM Replication" published on our website this Working Paper further helps in better understanding these measures by looking at the "pure" party scores which form the basis of more sophisticated concepts. For those who are mainly interested in party politics this paper in turn provides a starting point for cross-country and longitudinal analyses of the changing meaning of Left and Right. Party scores as well as aggregated measures of actor's policy positions are available for download as parts of our "Parties, Institutions & Preferences Collection" at:

http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de.

Keywords: party ideology, left-right dimension, LR, LR Core

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# Preface

This Working Paper rests on a decade long research on the topic. It shows party positions and trends in the country- and time-specific left-right dimension introduced in Jahn (2011). The data cover 571 parties in 36 countries and 648 elections from 1945 to the second decade of the new millennium. The indices and party scores have been used to estimate veto player ranges (Jahn, 2010), describe the cohesion of political parties (Jahn and Oberst, 2012), assess *the* position of the EU (Jahn and Düpont, 2015), and analyze the interaction of governments and veto players and their impact on public policies (Jahn, 2016).

All these concepts represent highly aggregated measures applied to many different research questions that one often looses sight of the point of origin – left-right *party* scores. Awareness of positions, movements and trends of particular parties helps in better understanding the "big picture". We therefore decided to present basic descriptive tables and figures so that everyone either working with the previously mentioned concepts and data or the party scores itself gets an easy overview of these "micro-trends". For this reason, the Working Paper is not analytically ambitious but rather a service for researchers interested in, or working with, our indices, concepts and datasets. We hope it fulfills its purpose and we are happy to receive comments for improvement.

We opted for an "online" Working Paper because all figures are best shown as color graphics. It is easier to interpret the data at a screen or to look for a color printer to print this Working Paper (or parts of it) than finding a publisher, who is willing to produce a probably very expensive book in colors. The use of colors allows us to show the position of parties grouped by party families they belong to and the radicalness of "plus-pers" making up the LR index. It further enables the presentation of highly complex graphs for fragmented party systems. The Belgian party system, for instance, is divided alongside the linguistic and ethnic split of the Flemish and Wallonian region. Some may therefore argue that Belgium has two party systems. Because parties from both regions form the Belgian government though, we decided to show all parties in one figure to provide an overview of positions and trends for *all* parties. A gray-scaled version of this figure would be confusing and the risk of confounding parties increases. The online presentation on the contrary enables the interested reader to zoom in and out on parties and particular time periods when s/he is interested in positions and trends of individual parties.

The work has been conducted at the Chair of Comparative Politics at the University of Greifswald under the leadership of Detlef Jahn. Pioneering work by Christoph Oberst, who established highly

complex and colorful excel files in the early years, later automated and standardized by Nils Düpont and Thomas Behm, laid the groundwork for the "Parties, Institutions & Preferences Collection" (PIP) which is available for download on our website as an assemblage of datasets each covering a slightly different aspect. Martin Rachuj, as the most recent entrant, helped in streamlining the data and documentation and put valuable efforts into the making of this Working Paper.

As part of our "PIP Collection" other indices of importance for scholars of comparative politics, such as government positions, party cohesion, veto player ranges, or the median parliamentarian are now available online, but are not covered in this book. We aim to update the presentation on a regular base though, and to present similar information for an environmental policy dimension (GG; Jahn, 2016) in due course.

# 1 Introduction

Not least since Downs (1957) are party positions fundamental for analyses of political competition (Laver, 2001), and (macro-) comparative studies of public policies are almost unthinkable without taking the impact of governments into account since Hibbs (1977) put forward his famous "Partisan Theory". For this reason, locating political parties in an ideological space is not only relevant for researchers dealing with parties, party competition and party politics *per se* but constitutes a necessity for more encompassing operationalizations of other actor's positions like governments and veto players.

Political scientists have come up with several approaches for identifying party positions (Mair, 2001): *a priori* judgments based on party family ascriptions, aggregating mass survey responses, conducting elite studies (interviews or roll-call analysis), or asking experts to locate parties on pre-defined scales. None approach, however, has been able to catch up with the data collection of the Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 1987; Budge and Klingemann, 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Volkens et al., 2013). Several suggestions have been made to infer left-right policy positions from the raw data which are based on a quantitative content analysis of election manifestos (Budge, 2001; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). Yet, the left-right (LR) index proposed in "Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach" (Jahn, 2011) sticks out due to its deductive nature and its context-sensitivity capturing time- and country-specific aspects of the left-right semantic. Although the LR party scores have been applied for operationalizations of more sophisticated concepts a simple, descriptive account of the content – i.e. what is "inside" these measures – has been missing. This online book fills this gap by giving a detailed account of LR and LR Core positions and trends for the major parties in 36 countries in the post-World War II era.

Inferring ideological positions from election manifestos has both advantages as well as disadvantages. A huge advantage is that party manifestos are available for the entire post-World War II era for a large number of parties. This facilitates time-series analyses which have become a standard in comparative research designs. However, party manifestos are not solely written to signal voters where a party stands on an ideological dimension – Pelizzo (2003) even argued that manifestos should be interpreted as indicators of *direction*, not positions. A manifesto often includes issues which are of importance for a specific election, or an individual party is forced to take a stand on an issue because competing parties put them on the agenda – either because they want to or they have

to (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015). A case in point are recent trends in the Austrian party system where the right-wing populist *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) has "forced" other parties to take up their issues. This example puts another disadvantage in the spotlight: Populism is hard to come by with the coding scheme of the Manifesto Project. All Austrian parties, including the FPÖ, take left positions which may be an expression of welfare chauvinism (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016) that claims social benefits – which is a typical left issue of redistribution – but for Austrians only thereby marginalizing foreigners and immigrants (not captured by the coding). Another example is given by the Manifesto Group itself, who caution against using Greek data after the financial crisis in 2008, because obviously left parties like *Syriza* devoted considerable attention to blaming former elites, defined as a right issue in the RILE index, which puts them to the far right on this index (Volkens et al., 2015).[1]

Accordingly, the election-specific nature of the data leads to "surprising" results at times when the data shows that parties take positions – for whatever reasons – which do not fit our common sense judgments. As we will show, in the long run party positions often meet our expectations but temporal trends may seem to be at odd. The question then is if we trust the data which shows that political reality is not as neat as we often assume, or if we interpret deviations to our exceptions as mistakes. Adopting the second position we reject the possibility to learn from our data. Gary King (1986, p. 669), however, reminds us that "the goal of learning from data is as noble as the goal of using data to confirm a priori hypotheses." Learning from data requires a deductive index which clearly defines Left and Right, though.

## 1.1 Deductive and Inductive Reasoning

As has been discussed elsewhere (Jahn, 2011, 2014; Franzmann, 2015) our left-right index LR differs from other approaches in that it is deduced from political theory and philosophy. We wish to emphasize that deductive reasoning is not superior to inductive inferences *per se*.

An inductive approach starts out from empirical observations. By summarizing the observable manifestations of left-right criteria, one looks for patterns in the data and asks if there is an underlying dimension which may be classified as left-right. The obtained left-right dimension is then defined by the patterns of data which emerge from the analysis. The advantage of an inductive approach is that it fits the index to the data, whereas the disadvantage is that it is more vulnerable to validity threats. Most left-right indices therefore use a combination of deductive and inductive

1 Note, that this is not a problem of the time- and country-specific LR though.

reasoning with a different emphasis on one approach or the other (Jahn, 2011).[2]

A major issue when placing parties on a left-right dimension is that the left-right ideology is plagued by the fact that everybody has an intuitive feeling about which party is left or right. However, these deeply rooted feelings are often based on biased presumptions which do not keep pace with ideological shifts in reality (for an empirical "proof" that voters do not acknowledge ideological shifts see e.g. Adams et al., 2011). This in turn often leads to the conclusion that indices are perceived as "wrong" when they do not match held assumptions. More importantly, such a perspective neglects subtle and substantial shifts of party positions. On the contrary, a deductive approach allows for theory testing but is not as well tailored to fit empirical data. In fact it is exactly the point that data might not fit the theory which determines the essence of theory testing. Therefore, a deductive index of Left and Right asks whether the left-right dimension is still a valid tool to analyze programmatic preferences in modern societies.

The major question we pose here is: does the left-right dimension make sense in democratic party systems? For instance, are Japan, the USA, and Ireland from which we know that they do not have a distinctive, and clearly identifiable left-right cleavage as other countries well described in terms of Left or Right? By looking at positions and trends within countries and over time we provide face validity tests for our LR indices. For this reason, we pay attention to special events and ideological party reorientations, and discuss whether our data is able to grasp these changes. In addition, we look at seemingly abnormalities and outliers in our data which may be explained by referring to country specific research. Beyond doubt we are only able to scratch on the surface of individual party histories in such a large number of countries. Grasping more general trends and tracing exceptional changes nevertheless opens the "black box" of aggregated measures and helps

2 The most established right-left index, the RILE of the Manifesto Group (Budge, 2001), uses deductive and inductive elements though the latter clearly dominate. After reshuffling the 54 items at that time to 20 policy categories, a first factor analysis for each country (it was only ten countries at that time) identifies four left and three right items. These items were treated as one variable and "used as input to a second set of exploratory factor analyses together with the remaining unclassified variables" (Laver and Budge, 1992, p. 27). As a result thirteen left and thirteen right items were identified which constitute the RILE. Although it was stated that "a priori theoretical coherence was the prime consideration" (Laver and Budge, 1992, p. 27) no reference whatsoever was made to any political theory. In later publications – step by step – ever greater deductive claims were raised. In Budge and Klingemann (2001, pp. 20-21) it was stated that the left items refer to unspecified Marx writings and the right items are "familiar from the writings and speeches of exponents like Reagan and Thatcher'.' Since the latter personalities are certainly not political theorists, in later writings right positions refer to Edmund Burke (Klingemann et al., 2006, p. 6). So far, the climax of the *ex post* theoretical underpinnings has been expressed by Budge and Meyer (2013) who claimed that the left items refer to Marx', Engels' and Lenin's writings and the right items are connected with the work of Disraeli, Green, and Spencer. Were that mentioned in the original text during the construction of the RILE and if clearly identifiable arguments of the mentioned authors would be consistent with the 26 items dealing with Right and Left, the RILE would have been called deductive, too. Looking at the history of the construction of the RILE though, one can only conclude that inductive motives of finding issues which parties link together (Budge and Klingemann, 2001, p. 20) have been the main driving force. Therefore, it is no wonder that doubts have been raised as to whether all items actually belong to a right-left dimension (Keman, 2007).

in better understanding the political process within these countries.

## 1.2 About this Working Paper

This book is split into two parts: Chapter 2 gives a more detailed and technical account of constructing the LR index than initially presented in the original research article (Jahn, 2011) due to limitations of space. Those familiar with the original work may skip this section; or they may take a closer look if they are interested in the technique, how the LR Core is defined and how additional "plus-pers" are identified making up the LR. Afterwards, we present left-right party positions organized in country chapters. Like Budge and Klingemann (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006) we refer to key events and discuss more general trends. Each chapter contains a table revealing the parties included in the dataset alongside basic descriptive statistics for LR and LR Core positions together with information about the importance of the LR and LR Core issues. The color graphs then compare LR and LR Core positions over time grouped by their party family designation. Finally, we present "heatmaps" of the LR plus statements and their radicalness based on the stimulus scores obtained by the MDS technique. These maps show if a per was a plus-per at all, and whether it was a weak, medium or radical left/right issue for every election. They thus shed light on the differing meaning of Left and Right over time and between countries. All datasets necessary for replicating the analysis are available for download at http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/.

## 2 Deducting a Country- and Time-Specific Left-Right Index

In this chapter we present a more detailed account of constructing the Left-Right (LR) index. Due to limitations of space the focus of the original article (Jahn, 2011) was on the conceptual side, while this chapter puts technical aspects into the spotlight. As a starting point of inferring a deductive scale we draw on Norberto Bobbio's (1996) work "Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction".[3] One may criticize the sole reference to a single author; however we refer to Bobbio for three reasons: First, Bobbio summarizes a huge debate about Left and Right and gives a balanced and theoretically informed overview. Second, discussing the entire debate would be impossible, especially with respect to the fact that the purpose of his book is a means to our end of constructing a theoretically informed left-right index – we do not aim for a scholarly disquisition on political theory and philosophy. Third, if we had deduced the theoretical Left-Right categories ourselves, we would have constructed, as well as tested, our own theoretical concept. In order to ensure construct validity, it is better to rely on concepts which have been developed independently of empirical analysis. In sum, although it looks superficial at first sight to rely on only one theorist, the analysis strongly benefits from being based on a single author than suffering from a lack of conceptual precision. Moreover, as can be seen from Lukes's (2005) "Epilogue", Bobbio's conclusions are valid in political thought.

In his book, Bobbio traces the history of political thought of both Left and Right. He explores this elusive distinction and argues that Left and Right are ultimately divided by different attitudes towards equality. He points out that the Left strives for greater equality and that the Right legitimizes inequality. The policy of the Left aims to make those who are unequal more equal. In order to achieve this goal the Left favors the welfare state and policies such as the right for general education, the right to work, or the right to health care (Bobbio, 1996, p. 71). Bobbio (1996, p. 80) points out that "*the* [sic] principle theme, of the traditional parties and movements of the left [...] has been the removal of that 'terrible right', private property, which has been considered, not only in the last century but since the antiquity, as one of the major obstacles to equality between men."

Defining the Right is more complex. As Bobbio points out there are two ways of legitimizing inequality. Starting out, on the one hand, from Rousseau's (1992) premise that men are born equal but are made unequal by civil society and, on the other, from Nietzsche's (1973) work on the premise that men are by nature born unequal which is good for the structure of society, Bobbio (1996, pp. 68-69) points out: "Just as Rousseau saw inequality as artificial, and therefore to be

3 The following parts are based on Jahn 2011.

condemned and abolished for contradicting the fundamental equality of nature, so Nietzsche saw equality as artificial, and therefore to be abhorred for contradicting the beneficent inequality which nature desired for humanity. The contrast could not be starker: the egalitarian condemns social inequality in the name of natural equality, and the anti-egalitarian condemns social equality in the name of natural inequality." This distinction between the different ways of legitimizing inequality refers to the fact that the Right is not united regarding the concepts of equality and inequality. These different concepts are mirrored in the three great classical ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Conservatism, Liberalism and Scientific Socialism (Bobbio, 1996, p. 49)[4].

While Scientific Socialism (Left) is concerned with equality, Conservatism and Liberalism justify inequality in the ways described above. Conservatives follow Nietzsche's conviction and consider inequality as given by nature. Traditions and a natural social order order men and women in a hierarchical way. This hierarchical order is necessary for an organic community and helps members of society to live in social and physical harmony with each other. Liberalism in contrast follows the idea that human activities determine men and women's own destiny in the ranks of the social order. The unable and lazy are poor and the able and industrial people are rich. Allowing individuals to fulfill their own potential relies on the protection of individual freedom, which implies liberation from state involvement. Therefore, freedom is a key category for Liberalism. Free market economy, free enterprises, or minimal state regulations are basic claims of Liberalism. By referring to the basic concepts of equality and inequality and the various ways of legitimizing them, we obtain a parsimonious way of conceptualizing the core of Left and Right rooted in political theory and philosophy.

### 2.1 Combining Bobbio and Manifesto Data: The Core of Left and Right

Drawing on Bobbio's insights of Left and Right an empirical analysis needs to consider all 56 statements of the Manifesto coding scheme in light of their relation to equality and inequality. By doing so, we can also deduce the degree of leftness or rightness. Although it has often been claimed that the degree of being Left and Right is important and that there is a hierarchy of left and right statements (McDonald et al., 2007, p. 3), many studies using the Manifesto data fail to make a distinction of how strong different left and right statements are.

Without doubt radical statements of the Left include claims of the nationalization of enterprises

4 Besides these "classical" ideologies Bobbio (Bobbio, 1996, p. 49) mentions three additional, romantic ideologies: Anarcho-Liberalism, Fascism, and Traditionalism. Since the three romantic ideologies have considerable less importance in modern societies as the three classical ones we leave the romantic ideologies aside.

and government control of the economy.[5] Additional left arguments – though probably weaker – are claims for economic planning and market regulation. All these statements receive their leftness from the idea of regulating the free market, which means that these four statements are especially directed against the Liberal Right and less against the Conservative Right. Other statements, such as the expansion of the welfare state and education (Bobbio, 1996, p. 71), are much weaker and not unequivocally Left. If at all, these statements lean towards a preference for more equality but they certainly do not represent *the* constitutive part of a left ideology. In particular, welfare state expansion represents a compromise between free market capitalism and socialism and should therefore not be considered as a core left or right statement (Dahrendorf, 1959).

Turning to the Right, it is less easy to identify statements according to their degree of Liberalism and Conservatism. The most radical Liberal statement from a leftist point of view is the rejection or retrenchment of the welfare state as it refuses the compromise between capital and labor and is an affront against Left ideology. The most radical statement that describes Liberalism (and is included as a category in the Manifesto coding scheme) is the claim of "Free Enterprise". Reference to "Economic Orthodoxy" may also belong to a Liberal discourse, though such remarks are presumingly less radical. While these three statements are clearly liberal, it is more difficult to put the statement about Freedom into the Liberal "cluster".[6]

Assertions that meet the criterion of Conservatism should refer to tradition and natural social order. The most radical statement in the Manifesto coding scheme "Traditional Morality: positive". The appeal to "Social Harmony"[7] has some reference to the concept of natural social order, although it is not as clear-cut because its reference to social solidarity meets the claim of social justice and could therefore be used by actors on the left as well. Another statement which may refer to conservative attitudes can be found in the support of the "National Way of Life: positive". We refrained from including statements such as "Law and Order: positive" or "Political Authority: positive" because Authoritarianism as such is beyond the core of conservative ideology. As Bobbio (1996, chapter 7) convincingly demonstrates, authoritarian standpoints better describe the distinction between extremists and moderates of both right and left positions. Interestingly, this points

5 As McDonald et al. (2007, p. 3) state: "Advocating public ownership of industries puts one far to the left; desires to have government closely regulated privately owned firms are not quite as far left."

6 Freedom is certainly a core concept of liberal ideology. However the coding instruction of *per201* "Freedom and Human Rights: positive" is ambiguous: "Favourable mention of the importance of personal freedom and civil right; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and other countries." This ambiguous phrasing makes the statement unsuitable for our analysis, because it combines elements of the concept of individual freedom, which belongs to the liberal discourse, with the idea of human rights, which brings it close to claims of the Left.

7 In Table 1 we use the initial label "National effort and Social Harmony".

Table 1: Core Left-Right Statements

| Left | Right | |
|---|---|---|
| Socialism | Liberal | Conservative |
| Nationalization (per413)<br>Controlled Economy (per412)<br>Economic Planning (per404)<br>Market Regulation (per403) | Welfare State Limitation (per505)<br>Free Enterprise (per401)<br>Economic Orthodoxy (per414) | Traditional Morality (per603)<br>Social Harmony (per606)<br>National Way of Life (per601) |

to the similarities between the Radical Left and the Radical Right: "[A] left-wing extremist and a right-wing extremist share a rejection of democracy [...] Their rejection of democracy brings them together, not because of their position on the political spectrum, but because they occupy the two extreme points of that spectrum. The extremes meet" (Bobbio, 1996, p. 21). This, in turn, means that the reference to democracy cannot have a leaning to the Left or to the Right but is instead a measure to grasp the degree of radicalism. Table 1 summarizes the statements that we use for further analysis of the left-right dimension of political parties in highly developed democratic industrial societies. The statements (pers) are ordered according to their correspondence to the core of the three classical ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth century.

From this theoretical analysis we may derive some assumptions: First, as pointed out above there may be a hierarchy of the importance of the Manifesto categories according to their concurrence to the concept of equality or inequality. Second, if the analytical conclusion is correct that the Left has a one-dimensional claim while the Right is divided in Conservatives and Liberals a triangle should show up in the empirical analysis. This, in turn, would also mean that the very concept of Left and Right is not unidimensional but refers to at least two dimensions which are made up by the three ideologies. The endeavor of constructing a multidimensional left-right scale is left for future research, though.

### 2.2 From Theory to Data

In order to conduct an empirical analysis in line with the theoretical reasoning we apply the multidimensional scaling technique. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a set of data analysis techniques that display the structure of distance-like data as a geometrical picture (Coxon, 1982; Cox and Cox, 2001). Each ideological statement is represented as a point in a multidimensional space. The points are arranged in this space reflecting the distances or similarities between pairs of statements, i.e. two points that are close together represent two similar statements, and two points that are farther from each other represent two dissimilar objects. The space is usually a two- or three-dimensional

Euclidean space. We use this technique to estimate a two-dimensional space while treating the Manifesto raw data as count variables. Basically, MDS starts out from a distance model. The general form is the Minkowski model:

$$d_{ij} = \left[ \sum_{a=1}^{r} \left| x_{ia} - x_{ja} \right|^{p} \right]^{1/p} \tag{1}$$

In the case of a Euclidean space with two dimensions, r is 2 (two dimensions) and p = 2. In the formula d is the distance over all statements i and j. MDS discovers an optimal model by reaping the distance calculation until a certain criterion is satisfied. An appropriate measure of goodness-of-fit is the so-called stress function. The stress function refers the Euclidian distance across all dimensions between statements i and j on a map by estimating the differences $d_{ij}$ and $\delta$. Accordingly, we use the stress criterion as measure for the goodness-of-fit of the model:

$$Stress = \sqrt{\frac{\sum \left[ d_{ij} - f(\delta_{ij}) \right]^2}{\sum d_{ij}^2}} \tag{2}$$

In the formula, $d_{ij}$ stands for the reproduced distances (raw data) given the respective number of dimensions, and $\delta_{ij}$ stands for the input data (observed distances). The expression $f(\delta_{ij})$ indicates a non-metric, monotone transformation of the observed input data (distances) used for reproducing the general rank-ordering of distances between the objects in the analysis. There are several similar related measures that are commonly used. Most common is Kruskal's stress (shown above). For the judgment of the model and the iterations needed Young's stress function has been used though, because it reaches unambiguous results. Stress values vary between 0 and 1. When the MDS map perfectly reproduces the input data, i.e. $f(\delta_{ij}) = d_{ij}$, stress becomes zero. Thus, the smaller the stress value, the better the fit of the model. However, there are no clear thresholds for stress values, but a "poor" stress value is >0.2 and a "good" stress value for a model is supposed to be below 0.05 (Kruskal, 1964, p. 3).

Like factor analysis MDS is sensitive to the input. For this reason, the choice of parties, country and time periods is highly relevant. The RILE (Budge, 2001) is based on an analysis of ten or eleven countries for the period between the second half of the 1940s until around 1983. A reason for this selection has not been provided, except for data availability. Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) use single countries over a period from the 1940s until the late 1990s. The same dataset (though only until the early 1990s) has been used by Gabel and Huber (2000), while they state that pooled data over time and country fits best to other estimates. The sensitivity becomes obvious when looking at

Franzmann and Kaiser's (2006) update: party scores, even for the earlier years, change when cases are added. This is certainly not desirable when analyzing left-right scales. There is no theoretical reason why a change of the British *Labour Party* for instance in the late 1990s should have an effect on the left-right stand of *Labour* in the 1950s. Even if there always remains some ambiguity, we should be clear which countries and time period are appropriate for identifying a general left-right dimension.

In contrast to using a sample of the highly industrialized countries such as Laver and Budge (1992) we include all established and democratic (OECD) countries. We can be sure that the left-right semantic has a meaning in all these countries though it may be of higher relevance in some than in others.[8] Determining the time period for the left-right core scale remains arbitrary in the end. However, we opted for the post-World War II period until the oil crisis in 1973 (the cut-off date is October 1, 1973). The oil crisis represents a date when the continuity of post-war development was questioned to a significant degree for the first time, and some countries experienced major changes in their party systems. This time period excludes the new European democracies Greece, Spain, and Portugal from the calculation of the core left-right statements.[9]

Figure 1 shows the plot of the derived stimulus configuration of the above introduced core statements for the Left, Liberalism, and Conservationism, respectively. The analysis is based on a two dimensional solution. The plot clearly shows a triangle, demonstrating that the Right is divided in a conservative and liberal camp. The model needs five iterations until the S-stress improvement is

8 We experimented with different samples. For instance, it could be argued that the left-right semantic is mainly a European issue and is less relevant to the new world countries and Japan. However, this hypothesis is not convincing since Left and Right has a slightly different meaning even among the European states (Bartolini, 2000). After careful consideration we decided that it is not appropriate to exclude the USA, Japan or other non-European countries, in order to avoid ethnocentrism. In the end we include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Results with subsets, however, always arrived at the triangular pattern between the Left and Conservative/Liberal (see Figure 1).

9 Further analysis with different time periods show that the results are robust. However, in order to anchor the left-right scale an analytically meaningful cut-off point is essential. Determining the cut-off point was guided by substantial and methodological aspects. Substantially, one could also use 1968 as cut-off point since the left-right discourse was severely altered due to the intervention of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia (emergence of Euro-Communism). Another cut-off point could have been 1980 because in the early 1980s a left libertarian discourse gained momentum (Kitschelt, 1994). Furthermore, the liberal discourse was radicalized by the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. From a statistical standpoint, the shorter the core time period the better one can identify changes in the meaning of Left and Right over time. Yet, a short time period contains too few observations rendering a meaningful analysis impossible. For this reason, a compromise between these two claims had to be found. This is less relevant for the analysis of the core statements, because the results remained robust. It alters the period and the number of observations in the subsequent analysis of the extra-statements, though, which is based on country-specific analyses. As it is conducted with moving election periods the core period determines the length (i.e. the number of elections) for the analysis of extra statements. From this perspective, a period from the 1940s until 1980 seems too long. On the other hand, the country with the lowest number of observations alters the regression. This is a case especially for the USA, which has only two observations (Democrats and Republicans) for each election. Including all elections from 1948 until 1972 leads to an N of 14, which is still very low but acceptable for a bivariate regression. It would be 10 if 1968 is the cut-off point and 16 if we would have gone for 1980.




Figure 1: Derived Stimulus Configuration Plot for the Left-Right Dimension

less than 0.001. The final matrix stress value is 0.10459. An RSQ of 0.93755 shows that almost 94 percent of the variance in the MDS space is accounted for by the input data. If we force the analysis on one dimension the model needs seven iterations and the matrix stress value increases to 0.23258 (RSQ = .81540).

Generally speaking, all ideological statements group into the hypothesized categories. The plot shows strikingly that Controlled Economy, Economic Planning and – to a very impressive degree – Nationalization are the most radical left statements. Market Regulation is a more moderate left statement. In the liberal ideology, Welfare State Limitation and the claim for Free Enterprise are, as predicted, the most radical right statements. The three conservative items fall together as well. The plot also demonstrates that the conservative issues constitute an own dimension isolated from the liberal-right statements. In terms of Left and Right the reference to Traditional Morality is the most radical conservative statement and Social Harmony the least radical one.[10] The analysis also shows that left items are much more in opposition to the liberal than to the conservatives ones.

In sum, the data align themselves impressively with the theoretical deducted positions, support-

10 In exploratory analyses with other time periods and countries, the statement of Social Harmony sometimes lies on the borderline to the Left. However, it was always close to the other two Conservative statements and stood very isolated in the Left-Conservative quadrant.

ing the chosen deductive approach and contradicting earlier arguments that an inductive approach is necessary. In the next step, based on this empirical finding we will infer left-right scores of political parties in highly industrialized democracies. In order to construct a left-right scale of the core statements, we weight the frequency of each statement with the stimulus coordinates of the first (left-right) dimension.[11] This index we call LR Core.

$$\begin{aligned} LR\ Core = &(per413_p * S_{per413}) + (per412_p * S_{per412}) \\ &+(per404_p * S_{per404}) + (per403_p * S_{per403}) \\ &+(per505_p * S_{per505}) + (per401_p * S_{per401}) \\ &+(per414_p * S_{per414}) + (per603_p * S_{per603}) \\ &+(per606_p * S_{per606}) + (per601_p * S_{per601}) \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

*Notes*: $_p$ = Percentage of statement; S = Stimulus coordinate score of the first dimension of the corresponding per.

The LR Core is especially suited to analyze the importance of the left-right dimension across space and time. However, a static index solely based on core issues is not able to grasp the changing meaning of Left and Right, especially *within* countries over time. Further statements might become relevant at times in different contexts. For this reason, we identify additional statements that correlate highly with the core left-right score in specific time periods and countries – the LR Plus.

### 2.3 Identifying "Plus" Statements

In the next step we identify extra left-right-statements. "Plus-pers" are those statements which are country and time variant and which grasp the changing meaning of Left and Right (Jahn, 2017). These statements will be identified by an inductive procedure. However, this inductive part of the construction of the index is theoretically grounded in that we assume that ideologies are changing over time. Ideologies, thus, combine two aspects: on the one hand there is a static and specific core; on the other hand there is a more fluid part which ensures their openness and adaptability to new or re-emerging topics over time. For instance, in some countries European integration is framed into a left ideology referring to social equality and in other countries it is framed in right terms by stressing economic freedom, an open market and anti-state intervention (Jahn, 2014, p. 300).

11 The stimulus coordinates scores for each statement are: Nationalization 2.0978; Controlled Economy 1.5531; Economic Planning 1.1873; Market Regulation 0.4161; National Way of Life -0.5612; Traditional Morality -1.2463; Social Harmony -0.1144; Free Enterprise -1.1010; Economic Orthodoxy -0.7281; Welfare State Limitation -1.5031. In order to make our LR index comparable with other indices we changed the sign by multiplying the stimulus coordinate scores with -1.

For this reason, we will use the remaining statements of the Manifesto coding scheme that are not included in the core index and regress each one on the LR Core. To grasp the changing meaning we employ "moving periods" based on the number of elections included in the core period (range) which in turn determines the observations included in the regressions. If the z-value (coefficient divided by standard error) is above or below +/- 2.0 we include the statement as an extra left-right issue.[12] However, in order to take account of the non-normal distribution of the Manifesto raw data we apply three different regression models: a normal OLS-regression model, a Poisson regression model, and a negative binomial regression model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Hilbe, 2007).

In some instances, count variables come close to a normal distribution. In this case a linear regression is acceptable (Hoffmann, 2004, p. 101) whereby the link function is:

$$\eta = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_K X_K \tag{4}$$

In this equation $\eta$ is the linear predictor (the general expected value E(Y) in a regression equation), $\beta_K$ represents the intercept and the regression coefficients, and the $X_K$ represent multiple independent variables. Most of the time, however, the frequencies of the statements have a rapidly descending tail, i.e. the mentioning of statements are rather rare events. Therefore, the distribution of these variables often peaks at one or two (or the respective percentage value) and flattens out at the tails. Count variables, especially when they are gauge rare events, often follow a Poisson distribution (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). The probability mass function for a Poisson random variable is:

$$P(i) = e^{-\lambda}\frac{\lambda^i}{i!} \tag{5}$$

This means that the probability *P* of observing *i* equals the exponentiated value of -1*$\lambda$ multiplied by $\lambda$ to the *i*th power divided by *i* factorial. However, Poisson regression models are only appropriate if we have rare events and when the variance more or less equals the mean. Closer inspections of the statements show that this is not a case most of the time, though. If the variance is much larger than expected on speaks of overdispersed variables. If a variable is overdispersed an alternative approach for rare events is advisable: the negative binomial regression (NB) model. Similar to binomial distribution, the NB distribution is concerned with "hits". The difference, however, is that in binomial distributions there is a fixed number of trails and the primary concern is analyzing the

12 We use z-values since we do not work with a sample but rather the universe of policy statements at elections (cf. King 1986).

number of hits. In the NB distribution the number of hits is fixed and the number of trials varies. Considering this, the probability mass function for a NB distribution is:

$$P(n) = \binom{n-1}{r-1} p^r (1-p)^{n-r} \tag{6}$$

In this equation *n* is the number of trails, *r* the number of hits, and *p* is the probability. The NB regression model provides estimates of the overdispersion parameter, called "Alpha". If there is no overdispersion in the outcome variable, then Alpha is expected to be zero. As Hoffmann (2004, p. 113) points out, there is no generally accepted rule of thumb about how much extradispersion is allowed before one should switch from Poisson regression to a NB regression. In this case one should estimate both models and compare the results. If Alpha is significantly greater than zero and the results differ, the NB model is preferable (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Comparing Poisson and the NB models in general, the latter is more conservative in identifying significant results (Hoffmann, 2004, Ch. 6). As a rule we used a threshold of Alpha = 1 until we switched from Poisson models to NB. In rare instances where the dependent variable came close to a normal distribution, we used linear OLS.[13]

Those statements that are identified as plus-pers by the regression analyses are entered in a new MDS analysis for the corresponding time periods in the countries using both the core issues as well as the additional pers as input data. Again we opt for a two-dimensional MDS space. Based on set theory evaluating the position of the core issues the dimension which most clearly distinguishes Left and Right is used to obtain the weighing for each statement.[14] Weighing the statements with their stimulus score and summing up the weighted issues we arrive at the LR Plus-index.

$$LR\ Plus = \Sigma(LRX_{per} * LRX_S) \tag{7}$$

*Notes*: LRX = Extra statements identified by regression analyses; per = Percentage of the i's statements; S = stimulus coordinate score of the corresponding per.

13 The "decision tree" works as follows: Include statement if the z-value is above/below +/- 2.0 in the NB model, unless Alpha > 1. Switch to Poisson in this case. Include statement if the z-value is above/below +/- 2.0 in the Poisson model, unless there are parties which did not mention the issue at all ("zeros").

14 In very rare instances – "hard coded" in the syntax files, and thus replicable – even the "decision tree" based on set theory leads to inconclusive results. In this case visual checks of the MDS plot and comparison with previous time periods and final LR scores were employed to reach a decision. Japan is a case in point which is a clear indicator that the core left-right items are no clear demarcation items and that the left-right dimension is of minor importance for Japanese politics.

The final LR index is in line with our assumption that ideologies combine a static core with adaptiveness, as it is the sum of the LR Core and Plus:

$$LR = LR\ Core + LR\ Plus \tag{8}$$

As a unique and fortunate side-effect the conceptualization and construction of the LR allows us to estimate the importance of the left-right dimension by simply summing up the frequencies for those pers which are included in either the LR Core, Plus or LR respectively. Furthermore, a measure of the ideological cohesion of a party can be derived (Jahn, 2012).

In sum, the LR presents a theoretically informed deductive left-right index, whose core is static and well suited for cross-country and longitudinal analyses of the (declining) importance of the left-right semantic. Complemented by an inductive approach for identifying *country- and time-specific* issues which accompany the left-right dimension, the LR is the only index thus far which allows for comprehensive inquiries into the changing meaning of Left and Right and its importance. While we leave these analyses to ongoing and future research (Jahn, 2017), in the following sections we present LR and LR Core party scores for all countries included in the "PIP Dataset" and the "heatmaps" of plus-pers.

# 3 Left-Right Party Ideology in 36 Countries

The following chapter is organized by countries. Like Budge and Klingemann (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006) we refer to key events or peculiarities and discuss more general trends in party ideologies over time. Each chapter contains a simple table revealing the parties included in the dataset alongside basic descriptive statistics for LR and LR Core positions, the importance of LR and LR Core issues, average vote shares and the number of elections covered. It thus gives a first idea about the party system *per se*. The color graphs then compare LR and LR Core positions over time for the "major" parties which gained on average more than three percent of the vote share (technical information about all parties covered in the PIP dataset can be found in the corresponding chapters in the Codebook, included e.g. in the "ASPM Replication" available on our website). The parties are grouped by their party family designation based on the classification of the Manifesto Group (i.e. the third digit of the party code which depicts a party's family). For each party family we consistently use the colors displayed in Figure 2. In addition, we use various levels of line thickness to depict the "importance" of a party regarding its electoral strength *within* a party family. Finally, we present "heatmaps" of the LR Plus statements visualizing their radicalness based on the stimulus scores obtained by the MDS technique. As described in Chapter 2.3 all issues identified by the regressions as a plus-per were entered into a country- and time-specific MDS. For every issue of the Manifesto coding scheme – leaving the core issues aside – these figures indicate for every election (x-axis) if the focal issue was a plus-per. Red dots show that the per turned out to be a left issue while the shading from light to dark red points to its radicalness. Likewise, blue dots indicate the radicalness of right pers aligning with the core of Left and Right.

Figure 2: Colors of Party Families Used in the Graphs

### 3.1 Australia

The Australian party systems mirrors the Westminster model well. Due to the lasting coalition of the *Liberal Party* (LPA) and *National Party* (NPA) on the right side, and the *Australian Labour Party* (ALP) on the left side of the ideological spectrum, it has been described as a "classical" two-party system. As a result of preferential voting minor parties emerged in the past though, and gained considerable influence especially via the Senate. The *Democratic Labour Party* (DLP) is a case in point. Emerged as split off the ALP in 1955 it occupied positions between the two blocs. The DLP has been a anti-communist political party with strong roots in Catholicism which finally dissolved in 1978 after losing all their seats in the 1974 election. Likewise, the *Australian Democrats* (AD) were a party with a social-liberal ideology formed in 1977 as a merger of the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement. It never gained a seat in the House of Representatives, but was seated in the Senate for over thirty years. After the loss of its four remaining Senate seats at the 2007 general election the AD dissolved. The 2004 election saw the rise of the *Australian Greens* filling the vacuum on the left side of the ideological spectrum. Other, smaller parties which emerged in recent years are Clive Palmers' *Palmer United Party* (PUP) and Bob Katters' *Katter's Australian Party*. Both parties have been founded by single persons, are of a populist nature and endorse economic liberalism and a kind of welfare chauvinism.

The ALP constantly occupied the left ideological space but is rather modest regarding left core issues. In the broadest sense it represents the urban working class, although it increasingly obtains

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Australian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Greens | Australian Greens | **4** | **8.88** | **-23.00** | **73.85** | **-0.93** | **3.97** |
| | | | 2.05 | 2.74 | 5.30 | 0.28 | 1.89 |
| ALP | Australian Labor Party | **27** | **43.85** | **-6.60** | **63.21** | **-0.35** | **12.57** |
| | | | 4.59 | 3.53 | 13.28 | 2.48 | 6.86 |
| AD | Australian Democrats | **5** | **6.48** | **-8.49** | **50.72** | **-1.17** | **13.45** |
| | | | 2.90 | 3.33 | 11.08 | 2.27 | 5.64 |
| DLP | Democratic Labor Party | **9** | **5.77** | **4.32** | **58.36** | **3.89** | **23.76** |
| | | | 2.88 | 4.95 | 14.02 | 3.30 | 13.44 |
| PUP | Palmer United Party | **1** | **5.50** | **-5.71** | **67.57** | **5.28** | **21.62** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LPA | Liberal Party of Australia | **27** | **37.01** | **8.60** | **59.43** | **8.48** | **25.79** |
| | | | 3.13 | 5.38 | 10.00 | 3.22 | 9.36 |
| Katter | Katter's Australian Party | **1** | **1.00** | **-4.18** | **58.16** | **0.52** | **11.22** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| NPA | National Party of Australia | **27** | **8.40** | **6.96** | **47.82** | **7.21** | **26.28** |
| | | | 2.11 | 7.69 | 20.34 | 5.70 | 20.78 |




Figure 3: Left-Right Positions of Australian Parties

votes from the middle class. Under the leadership of Bob Hawke (1983-1991) the ALP pursued a liberal economic program which is less reflected in the LR but foremost the LR Core dimension when the ALP "entered" the right side end even leapfrogged the NPA in recent years.

The coalition of the LPA and NPA makes sense when looking at their LR positions, but even more so when looking at their ideological homogeneity regarding core issues. While the LPA is a liberal-conservative party the NPA is traditionally a center-right farmers' party with conservative values occupying the right space. Despite ideological similarities both appeal to different social strata: the LPA allures mainly the (sub)urban middle class, while the NPA builds on the rural population. Both parties show an alternating pattern of moderating positions while in office (especially apparent in the early years until they lost after 23 years in office at the 1972 election), while strengthening their profile when in opposition (e.g. throughout the 1980s until they re-gained office in 1996).

An interesting trend occurs not least since the 2007 election when the two blocs obliterate, making way for three "blocs" with the ALP, NPA and PUP placed in the center, the LPA clearly on the right and the Greens clearly on the left side. The NPA's shift, however, may have consequences for the stability of the historical coalition agreement between the LPA and the NPA in the long run because the ideological gap increased in the most recent years. The strong right shift of the LPA is not reflected by an increase of traditional right issues when looking at their LR Core positions, though. This means that the right image of the LPA is mainly based on country and above all time specific issues. This is also true for the left image of the ALP and the Greens in particular, as both are rather moderate regarding core issues. As becomes obvious throughout this report this is a general pattern of green parties observable in many other countries as well. In sum, Australian voters can choose from a broader range nowadays, but have less choice concerning "classical", core left-right issues.

Figure 4: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Australia

### 3.2 Austria

The Austrian party system was characterized by long-lasting stability and cleavages which formed the political life until the late 1980s when the *Grünen* (Greens) entered the parliament. The two dominant parties, the *Social Democrats* (SPÖ) and the *Austrian People's Party* (ÖVP), were formed alongside the state-church and the labor-capital cleavage. A third cleavage accompanying the previous ones puts the *Freedom Party* (FPÖ) in opposition to the ÖVP on the state-church cleavage, and the SPÖ and ÖVP regarding a german-national vs. an Austrian identity. Since then, like in other Western European countries, electoral volatility increased. Emerged in the early 1990s as a split off the FPÖ due its apparent turn into a right-wing populist party the *Liberal Forum* (LF), and later on the *Alliance for the Future of Austria* (BZÖ) challenged the historical stability of the former two-and-a-half party system.

The SPÖ and the ÖVP constitute the two big camps on the left and right side of the ideological spectrum. Despite their clear left-right positions they often formed a grand coalition (1949-66, 1987-2000, and 2007-). The FPÖ tried to challenge the Austrian "proporz system" but formed a coalition either with the SPÖ (1983-87) or ÖVP (2000-07) only for some years. Although it had strong nationalist roots from the beginning up until the mid-1980s liberal and nationalist elements were in balance, which is best reflected in their LR Core positions. Since 1986, when Jörg Haider became party leader, the FPÖ turned into a right-wing populist party which is not well documented in the data, however. As can be seen from other populist parties, their left-right positions are often ambiguous – a common problem for Manifesto based analyses : "[S]uch parties' rightist policies are often balanced by leftist ones. They too have to appeal in elections to a vote which is substantially

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Austrian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Grüne | The Greens | **8** | **7.51** | **-10.42** | **54.08** | **-0.05** | **3.71** |
| | | | 2.60 | 10.28 | 31.07 | 1.09 | 3.42 |
| KPÖ | Austrian Communist Party | **3** | **0.80** | **-22.47** | **68.50** | **-7.80** | **13.19** |
| | | | 0.20 | 8.29 | 18.08 | 3.14 | 9.27 |
| SPÖ | Austrian Social Democratic | **19** | **41.89** | **-5.24** | **45.55** | **-0.47** | **12.91** |
| | | | 6.21 | 5.75 | 18.40 | 2.63 | 6.01 |
| FPÖ | Austrian Freedom Party | **19** | **11.24** | **2.76** | **49.34** | **3.79** | **18.73** |
| | | | 6.69 | 9.15 | 18.66 | 4.00 | 7.43 |
| LF | Liberal Forum | **2** | **5.75** | **13.11** | **51.55** | **10.06** | **24.71** |
| | | | 0.35 | 0.68 | 2.19 | 2.38 | 6.66 |
| ÖVP | Austrian People's Party | **19** | **39.16** | **6.38** | **49.21** | **7.10** | **20.80** |
| | | | 7.34 | 9.37 | 16.61 | 4.51 | 8.85 |
| BZÖ | Alliance for the Future of Austria | **2** | **7.40** | **-11.29** | **79.76** | **-1.24** | **12.82** |
| | | | 4.67 | 1.48 | 8.53 | 1.62 | 0.97 |




Figure 5: Left-Right Positions of Austrian Parties

more centrist than themselves, so what they actually say is often centrist too" (Volkens et al., 2013, p. 286). What is reflected though especially in the FPÖ's Core positions – and typical for populist parties in general – is their "chameleon-like" behavior: "[P]opulist parties in Austria and Switzerland were instrumental in cutting the welfare state in the 1990s and early 2000s [...]. However, when mainstream parties throughout Western Europe cut popular social policies, populist parties transformed into zealous defenders of the welfare state" (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016, p. 300).

In the mid-1990s the Austrian party system underwent significant changes witnessing an increasing number of parties and growing fractionalization. The notable shift to the right at the 1995 election can be explained with a domination of economic questions and budget stabilization. Almost all parties stressed right issues in their rather short party manifestos for this election. Since then all parties endorse a generous welfare state, but often in a populist fashion, which led to the phenomenon that all Austrian parties moved and stayed on the left. This is a particular situation not observable in other countries, which might be explained by the actual and potential government status of the FPÖ and the clear mark it has left in Austrian politics. All parties, including the right-wing parties FPÖ, BZÖ, and the ÖVP stress welfare and issues of equality in their manifestos to a rather large extent. The latter in a welfare chauvinist way though, demanding that foremost *Austrians* and their families stand to benefit from measures and reliefs.

A look at the LR Core positions shows that Austrian parties are generally more right-leaning, and that even the left-wing parties are rather centrist. Only the SPÖ in the 1960s and 1970s and the Communists stressed core left statements. Like green parties in other countries, the Greens' left image stems from additional issues, but less so due to the "classical" conflict of Left vs. Right. Despite differences between all parties, Austrian voters in general can only choose from a relatively homogeneous set of ideological choices – especially regarding the core left-right dimension.

Figure 6: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Austria

### 3.3 Belgium

Belgium has a multi-party system which is one of the most fragmented party systems in Europe. Belgium's party system rests on a multidimensional, cross-cutting cleavage structure which makes it complex and government building difficult (Kitschelt, 1997). In the 1960s and 1970s most of the Belgium parties split into organizationally independent organizations for Wallonia and Flanders. From this point of view there are two party systems although all parties operate in the Brussels-Capital Region. Furthermore some smaller parties unique to the German community are relatively unimportant despite infrequent participation in coalition governments. Historically there are three party families dominating Belgium politics: the Catholic/Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Liberals.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Belgian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Ecolo | Ecologists | **9** | **4.09** | **2.35** | **60.92** | **-0.94** | **8.14** |
| | | | 1.69 | 7.72 | 11.09 | 1.97 | 3.63 |
| Groen | Green! | **9** | **4.19** | **2.40** | **53.79** | **0.39** | **10.40** |
| | | | 1.38 | 3.12 | 9.84 | 1.84 | 1.83 |
| BSP/PSB | Belgian Socialist Party | **1** | **31.59** | **-9.91** | **61.34** | **-3.12** | **12.40** |
| | | | 4.15 | 4.72 | 9.93 | 2.72 | 8.04 |
| SP | Socialist Party Different | **11** | **12.35** | **-3.71** | **54.41** | **-2.36** | **11.22** |
| | | | 2.01 | 5.40 | 9.02 | 3.32 | 5.19 |
| PS | Francophone Socialist Party | **11** | **13.11** | **-4.15** | **54.52** | **-2.28** | **10.21** |
| | | | 1.60 | 4.98 | 14.17 | 2.11 | 3.09 |
| PVV/PLP | Party of Liberty and Progress | **8** | **14.20** | **11.59** | **69.09** | **8.88** | **26.48** |
| | | | 4.70 | 9.07 | 10.57 | 4.52 | 8.66 |
| VLD | Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats | **13** | **11.22** | **6.08** | **55.39** | **4.50** | **17.31** |
| | | | 2.38 | 7.21 | 13.21 | 5.06 | 9.51 |
| PRL | Liberal Reformation Party | **8** | **6.73** | **7.94** | **55.71** | **4.28** | **15.50** |
| | | | 2.51 | 5.98 | 13.35 | 2.51 | 8.00 |
| PLDP | Liberal Democratic and Pluralist Party | **3** | **1.20** | **6.88** | **59.25** | **5.10** | **12.85** |
| | | | 0.78 | 4.87 | 29.19 | 4.12 | 7.33 |
| MR | Reform Movement | **5** | **10.72** | **-0.03** | **50.23** | **1.07** | **10.38** |
| | | | 1.25 | 4.65 | 10.64 | 2.10 | 3.93 |
| LDD | List Dedecker | **2** | **3.15** | **13.37** | **59.91** | **12.54** | **25.04** |
| | | | 1.20 | 10.62 | 1.51 | 2.89 | 2.54 |
| PSC/CVP | Francophone Christian Social Party | **7** | **42.50** | **3.37** | **59.99** | **4.25** | **20.50** |
| | | | 4.30 | 3.33 | 8.69 | 2.72 | 12.83 |
| CVP | Christian Democratic and Flemish | **14** | **18.49** | **2.13** | **57.33** | **2.24** | **13.03** |
| | | | 3.73 | 6.91 | 10.13 | 2.90 | 4.71 |
| PSC | Christian Social Party | **14** | **8.65** | **0.83** | **55.88** | **1.35** | **11.07** |
| | | | 2.50 | 6.14 | 16.22 | 3.61 | 6.56 |
| RW | Walloon Rally | **6** | **3.27** | **-6.03** | **48.47** | **-1.23** | **10.03** |
| | | | 1.81 | 3.48 | 18.41 | 0.73 | 4.18 |
| FDF | Francophone Democratic Front | **11** | **3.25** | **-0.42** | **52.76** | **0.98** | **7.23** |
| | | | 1.77 | 3.82 | 14.60 | 1.28 | 4.53 |
| VU | People's Union | **15** | **6.99** | **-0.70** | **55.45** | **0.31** | **9.11** |
| | | | 2.99 | 5.19 | 13.73 | 2.43 | 4.30 |
| VB | Flemish Bloc | **1** | **6.15** | **4.81** | **50.50** | **2.35** | **9.21** |
| | | | 4.38 | 3.76 | 9.39 | 1.54 | 3.56 |
| N-VA | New Flemish Alliance | **3** | **7.87** | **4.93** | **59.50** | **1.96** | **8.98** |
| | | | 8.26 | 3.54 | 11.06 | 2.62 | 3.33 |




Figure 7: Left-Right Positions of Belgian Parties

The Christian Democrats have been the most successful in representing the prime minister office. From 1968 to 2015 it held 15 years the prime minister office and has been 17 years in government. In 1968 the party responded to the linguistic tension and split into two independent parties – the *Christian Social Party* (PSC) and the *Christian People's Party* (CVP). Yet, both parties do not substantially differ in their left-right positions (slightly more so regarding core positions) and even made very similar ideological developments since the 1960s. In the late 1960s and 1970s progressive politics left a mark and the PSC/CVP took rather left positions. This has changed since the late 1970s, and from then on both parties retained moderate center-right positions.

The Social Democrats occasionally held the prime minister office in the second half of the 1940s, the second half of the 1950s, a short intermezzo in the early 1970s, and almost three years in the beginning of the New Millennium. The *Belgian Socialist Party* (BSP/PSB) has had a clear left-wing image, which outlasted the split in 1977 until the late 1980s. Afterwards both endorsed centralist positions before moving to the left again in 2010.

Most of the time, the *Party of Liberty and Progress* (PVV/PLP) has been the most right wing party in Belgium politics. They maintained their positions even after the split in 1971, the 1999 election being a sole exception when Guy Verhofstadt became the first liberal prime minister with a clear left party profile.

The linguistic parties – the *Francophone Democratic Front* (FDF), the *People's Union* (VU), and the *New Flemish Alliance* (N-VA) – are quite moderate parties in the left-right dimension with an alternating pattern of left and right positions over time. This is different for the nationalist regional parties. In particular the *Vlaams Belang* (VB) has become a populist right wing party with anti-immigrants positions. Their commonality is their focus on the linguistic issue and its strive for greater autonomy of the regions which is reflected in their rather unspecific use of core issues.

Since the 1980s an additional party family established itself as a relevant actor in Belgian politics – the Greens. Belgium has a strong parliamentary representation of green parties and they belong to the first with parliamentary representation (as early as 1981) (Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990) and government responsibilities (in 1999 both joined the Verhofstadt government). The environmental movement in Flanders (*AGALEV* now *Groen*) had a religious background around the core values of solidarity and soberness combining progressive Catholicism with the environment. The counterpart in Wallonia is *Ecolo*. The religious background of the green parties are reflected on their left-right placements which are most of the time center-right and their unspecific use of core

left or right issues.[15]

Comparing the ideological profiles and movements in Wallonia and Flanders shows that the general trends of the party families are quite similar. However, parties in Wallonia are by and large more left leaning than their counterparts in Flanders. This may be a reaction of the established parties to the right wing populists which are stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia. Another trend is the ideological convergence since the mid-1980s, while the period before the organizational splits was marked by considerable polarization. This trend is even stronger when looking at LR Core positions. This indicates that the "classical" left-right dimension is of less importance nowadays, and that additional "plus" statements account for the corresponding party images.

15 The RILE (Budge, 2001) places both Belgium green parties always on the left which seems inappropriate considering the religious background of the parties.

Figure 8: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Belgium

### 3.4 Bulgaria

At first sight, the Bulgarian party system resembles todays Western European systems with socialist, social democratic, liberal, conservative, agrarian and ethnic parties present in the parliament. Yet, a specific voting behavior in Bulgaria has left a mark on ideological placements, namely the tendency not to vote *for* a party and its program but *against* current policies (Riedel, 2010, p. 696). This results in a less consistent set of clearly identifiable left or right positions; instead parties oscillate from the left to the right and *vice versa*, leapfrogging each other at times. Due to an electoral threshold of 4% Bulgarian parties are often forced to collaborate as an electoral alliance which makes it hard to track positions for individual parties. We therefore focus on the lasting "actors".

As the successor of the *Bulgarian Communist Party* the *Bulgarian Socialist Party* (BSP) is the major leftist party in Bulgaria. It has been in office several times holding the prime minister office from 1995-97 and 2005-09. They were the only ex-communists among the Central and Eastern European countries which managed to win a majority of votes in the first free election after the

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Bulgarian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| DE | Political Club Ekoglasnost | **2** | **0.00** | **3.40** | **58.10** | **-0.90** | **21.65** |
| | | | 0.00 | 3.24 | 17.78 | 0.62 | 9.92 |
| BSP | Bulgarian Socialist Party | **8** | **29.80** | **-2.43** | **48.37** | **0.25** | **15.67** |
| | | | 11.20 | 6.56 | 6.62 | 3.94 | 6.88 |
| KE | Euroleft Coalition | **1** | **5.50** | **9.93** | **44.66** | **7.21** | **25.73** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ODS | United Democratic Forces | **7** | **25.36** | **7.12** | **42.80** | **4.76** | **16.10** |
| | | | 16.95 | 4.22 | 6.75 | 1.41 | 4.88 |
| GERB | Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria | **2** | **35.20** | **-0.47** | **43.27** | **2.97** | **12.58** |
| | | | 6.65 | 8.51 | 4.32 | 3.39 | 3.05 |
| DSB | Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria | **2** | **4.35** | **4.23** | **41.11** | **3.77** | **9.00** |
| | | | 2.90 | 1.32 | 4.49 | 0.10 | 0.30 |
| RZS | Order. Law and Justice | **1** | **4.10** | **-1.52** | **59.79** | **1.69** | **5.15** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ATAKA | National Union Attack | **3** | **8.27** | **-2.85** | **43.64** | **0.98** | **22.26** |
| | | | 1.06 | 8.31 | 6.59 | 3.61 | 17.28 |
| BZNS | Bulgarian Agrarian National Union | **1** | **8.00** | **6.83** | **38.96** | **4.97** | **16.23** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| NS | People's Union | **1** | **6.50** | **1.99** | **39.62** | **2.27** | **15.78** |
| | | | . | 8.67 | 1.64 | 3.75 | 9.27 |
| BZNS AS | Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union "Alexander Stamboliysky" | | **.** | **-3.49** | **40.28** | **-3.71** | **26.39** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| BNS | Bulgarian People's Union | **1** | **5.20** | **3.37** | **45.50** | **3.63** | **14.69** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| BBB | Bulgarian Business Bloc | **2** | **4.80** | **5.33** | **39.14** | **4.16** | **23.25** |
| | | | 0.14 | 3.34 | 1.37 | 0.36 | 12.34 |
| NDSV | National Movement Simeon II. | **2** | **31.30** | **1.30** | **42.09** | **1.68** | **15.44** |
| | | | 16.12 | 1.78 | 0.65 | 1.82 | 2.02 |
| DPS | Movement for Rights and Freedom | **8** | **9.19** | **-4.45** | **48.83** | **1.39** | **14.28** |
| | | | 3.56 | 5.95 | 9.58 | 1.40 | 7.03 |




Figure 9: Left-Right Positions of Bulgarian Parties

transition. In the beginning they endorsed economic liberalization and market reforms – in order to ensure the well-being of the former nomenclature, though. Likewise, the BSP was against EU and NATO membership at first, but latter supported both memberships. Intra-party conflict in the second half of the 1990s between old-line communists and reformist factions further left a mark and contributed to the alternating pattern of center-left and center-right positions.

The *Movement for Rights and Freedom* (DPS) foremost represents the Turkish minority in Bulgaria but ascribes to liberal ideas, which is best reflected in their LR Core positions. Unsurprisingly, given the ideological proximity to the BSP, both parties formed a coalition government in 2005.

The *United Democratic Forces* (ODS) is an electoral alliance led by the *Union of Democratic Forces* (SDS). The latter was founded in 1989 as the major opponent to the ruling Communists. Following electoral ups and downs the SDS joined forces with other parties – among them the *Democrats for a strong Bulgaria* (DSB) – in 2009 and competed as the so-called "Blue Coalition" favoring a strong state with a minimally regulated economy. This position is clearly reflected in both their LR and LR Core positions. The alliance was dissolved in 2012 due to lack of electoral success, though. Meanwhile, the newly founded *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria* (GERB) emerged as the most rightist party combining economic liberalism with conservative attitudes.

Despite the narrow range the data shows that the BSP and DPS constitute a left camp, while the ODS, DSB and GERB make up a center-right camp, and both blocs never leapfrogged.[16] The LR Core in turn shows that parties in Bulgaria are less radical and are generally more right-leaning. "Classical' core left-right statements were almost absent in the early years, and only recently – in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis – regained attention.

In sum, the frequent alternation of left and right positions, the ideological homogeneity in the broadest sense, and the "irrelevance" of the classical left-right dimension especially in the early years indicate that other dimensions than a left-right one might be more important to explain Bulgarian party policies (Klingemann et al., 2006, p. 20), which brings us back to the initial finding, that Bulgarian politics is less about being *for* a party, than *against* it.

16 This is less clear when looking at the RILE which places both left parties on the clear right at times. However, also the RILE places Ataka in the middle.

Figure 10: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Bulgaria

### 3.5 Canada

As part of the Commonwealth of Nations the political system of Canada resembles patterns of Westminster-systems. Yet, observers of the Canadian political party system concluded that Canada has three party systems in the post-World War II era (Patten, 2007), and the data tracks these shifts quite clearly.

Stemming from the pre-War period, the party system was mainly shaped by the *Progressive Conservative Party* (PCP), the *Liberal Party of Canada* (LP) and protest parties like *Social Credit* (Socred) and the *Co-operative Commonwealth Federation*, a predecessor of the social democratic *New Democratic Party* (NDP). On the left-right dimension, the NDP on the left stood opposed to the three other, merely centrist parties. The Conservatives and dominating Liberal Party alternated in government, despite their similarities in ideological positions and movements on both the LR as well as LR Core dimension.

In the second period, the Liberals and Conservatives were challenged by the NDP. From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s Canada's policies were informed by Keynesian economics. Especially the LP, but the NDP as well, shifted their position to the left in conjunction with a left shift regarding "classical" core issues. As a result, the ideological range decreased in both dimensions – yet stronger in the LR Core dimension – compared to the first period.

Neoliberalism and market-oriented policies found their way into Canadian politics in the third period from the mid-1970s onwards replacing Keynesian policies. Again, this shift is obvious for the LP, but even more so for the PCP and the NDP. Especially LR Core positions became less left-leaning

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Canadian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| GPC | Green Party | **2** | **5.35** | **-8.22** | **54.55** | **1.54** | **11.41** |
| | | | 2.05 | 0.04 | 4.00 | 0.40 | 0.12 |
| NDP | New Democratic Party | **22** | **15.77** | **-7.77** | **55.21** | **-4.67** | **13.56** |
| | | | 5.37 | 4.39 | 11.11 | 3.52 | 5.56 |
| LP | Liberal Party of Canada | **22** | **38.23** | **0.01** | **47.46** | **0.43** | **10.82** |
| | | | 7.57 | 4.90 | 11.58 | 2.98 | 5.59 |
| PSP | Progressive Conservative Party | **18** | **32.99** | **5.87** | **41.90** | **2.34** | **11.16** |
| | | | 10.46 | 6.21 | 15.03 | 3.55 | 7.28 |
| RPC | Reform Party of Canada | **3** | **21.20** | **20.38** | **68.15** | **8.36** | **27.18** |
| | | | 3.74 | 11.02 | 10.87 | 7.01 | 9.14 |
| CP | Conservative Party of Canada | **4** | **35.80** | **8.34** | **62.33** | **0.95** | **13.33** |
| | | | 4.35 | 6.49 | 8.58 | 2.07 | 5.32 |
| BQ | Quebec Bloc | **7** | **10.56** | **-0.39** | **46.55** | **-1.00** | **5.12** |
| | | | 2.32 | 5.09 | 11.84 | 1.16 | 4.03 |
| Socred | Social Credit | **9** | **6.50** | **4.64** | **56.48** | **3.36** | **15.86** |
| | | | 3.37 | 5.14 | 11.44 | 2.33 | 5.18 |




Figure 11: Left-Right Positions of Canadian Parties

with the NDP becoming centrist as a case in point. At the same time, up until the new millennium Canadian parties presented clearly distinguishable political positions. Since then, additional issues replaced the "classical" dispute as LR Core positions became quite uniform compared to LR positions.

In 1988, the *Reform Party of Canada* (RPC) emerged as a regional protest movement in Western Canada against the Prime Minister and then party-leader of the PCP, Brian Mulrony. As a partly populist, conservative party favoring decentralization and a smaller government it outpaced the PCP on the right. Lack of electoral success and a recovery of the PCP in electoral terms prepared ground for uniting the right again under the label *Conservative Party* (CP) in 2003. Likewise, in 1993 the Eastern Canadian francophone *Bloc Québécois* (BQ) entered the parliament combining a plea for Quebec sovereignty with a slightly left party image. Their strong focus on Quebecian succession is reflected in their indifferent LR and LR Core positions though. Despite their local presence since the early 1980s the *Green Party of Canada* (GPC) only recently made its way into parliament. Like other green parties, their left image is made up by additional issues as the GPC's LR Core position is even slightly right of the center.

In sum, Canadian party positions show a notable alternation of periods of ideological homogeneity and dissimilarities, while the importance of "classical" left-right issues declined. Like in other countries, they are replaced by additional issues shaping today's party competition.

Figure 12: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Canada

### 3.6 Croatia

Croatia's transition was strongly shaped by the Croatian War of Independence in the early 1990s and the concurrence of state *and* nation building which brought about a mobilization of patriotism and nationalism (Zakošek and Maršić, 2010). National independence (*per1032*) indeed occurs as an important right issue mostly used by the *Croatian Democratic Union* (HDZ), the major opposition party to the former communist nomenclature. Yet, other parties make use of it as well like the neo-fascist *Croatian Party of Rights* (HSP), resulting in a right-leaning multi-party system (Stojarová, 2010, pp. 43-45).

The early post-transition years were marked by the supremacy of the HDZ which – apart from an all-party government during the war – formed single-party majority governments throughout the 1990s. With the death of Franjo Tuđman and the loss of power at the 2000 election the Croatian party system underwent a moderation marked by a decreasing fragmentation, which becomes

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Croatian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| SKH-SDP | Social Democratic Party of Croatia | **7** | **22.04** | **2.04** | **28.87** | **1.67** | **8.62** |
| | | | 11.54 | 1.67 | 10.54 | 1.00 | 3.43 |
| HL | Croatian Labourists - Labour Party | **1** | **5.10** | **-1.32** | **21.33** | **-2.11** | **6.67** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| HSLS | Croatian Social-Liberal Party | **5** | **9.88** | **2.82** | **29.82** | **3.18** | **14.70** |
| | | | 6.83 | 2.95 | 6.45 | 2.86 | 6.32 |
| LP | Liberal Party | **2** | **1.40** | **4.19** | **24.48** | **2.95** | **13.40** |
| | | | 0.28 | 4.74 | 10.36 | 2.38 | 6.79 |
| KNW | Coalition of People's Accord | **1** | **14.90** | **3.21** | **28.04** | **3.82** | **14.67** |
| | | | . | 5.53 | 16.91 | 3.18 | 13.82 |
| Ind. | Independent List of Ivan Grubisic | **1** | **1.30** | **-12.61** | **35.29** | **-8.22** | **23.53** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| HDZ | Croatian Democratic Union | **7** | **35.63** | **5.70** | **32.75** | **2.85** | **11.88** |
| | | | 9.04 | 5.92 | 16.02 | 1.23 | 5.01 |
| HNS | Croatian People's Party | **6** | **5.20** | **0.11** | **37.51** | **1.49** | **10.20** |
| | | | 2.85 | 2.05 | 14.72 | 2.07 | 7.94 |
| HSP | Croatian Party of Rights | **5** | **5.44** | **10.21** | **49.59** | **9.82** | **37.19** |
| | | | 1.42 | 6.63 | 21.50 | 6.15 | 20.51 |
| HSS | Croatian Peasant Party | **6** | **6.63** | **4.36** | **30.78** | **4.14** | **16.02** |
| | | | 4.31 | 4.50 | 9.26 | 3.63 | 10.93 |
| SDSS | Independent Democratic Serbian Party | **3** | **0.00** | **-3.10** | **29.18** | **-1.33** | **2.91** |
| | | | 0.00 | 5.34 | 26.01 | 2.37 | 3.46 |
| HDSSB | Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja | **2** | **2.35** | **0.45** | **25.23** | **0.74** | **7.14** |
| | | | 0.78 | 1.85 | 3.87 | 1.15 | 1.68 |
| IDS | Istrian Democratic Assembly | **6** | **2.48** | **-0.48** | **25.27** | **1.58** | **6.95** |
| | | | 1.02 | 1.94 | 4.35 | 1.81 | 4.76 |
| HSU | Croatian Party of Pensioners | **3** | **3.17** | **2.59** | **29.37** | **3.38** | **11.71** |
| | | | 1.44 | 2.58 | 3.99 | 2.42 | 6.61 |




Figure 13: Left-Right Positions of Croatian Parties

obvious when looking at the decreasing range of LR party scores and the general move to centrist positions. The HDZ itself moderated its positions after a change of leadership – the new party leader Sanader directed the party to a more pro-European position – and due to splits of more extreme factions dissatisfied with the moderation and the EU negotiations led by the HDZ after regaining power in 2003.

Meanwhile all other parties are characterized by moderate, centrist positions without any considerable differences. The most "left" party in Croatia is the *Croatian People's Party* (HNS), a left-liberal, pro-European party (Zakošek and Maršić, 2010, p. 806), unfortunately classified as a nationalist party by the Manifesto Project. Likewise, the *Social Democratic Party of Croatia* (SKH-SDP), the successor of the former communists, disassociated itself from its communist past and became a moderate party as well. Given the small differences in ideological terms unsurprisingly the parties of the "left bloc" successfully formed an electoral alliance in 2011 called *Kukuriku*, consisting of the HNS, SDP, the *Croatian Party of Pensioners* (HSU) and the *Istrian Democratic Assembly*.

The LR Core confirms the trends described above, with the important difference, that the HDZ was far more moderate in the early years than indicated by the LR-index. Yet, given the very low importance scores for the LR Core dimension – the notable exemption is the HSP which very strongly favors a national way of life (*per601*) – shows that the classical left-right dimension is not well suited to describe ideological differences, but that additional plus-pers meaningfully capture aspects of todays' party competition in Croatia.




Figure 14: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Croatia

### 3.7 Cyprus

In Cyprus party politics are strongly shaped by the Cyprus issue and lasting ideological blocs. While the LR Core dimension is of very little importance, and the parties do not substantially differ regarding "classical" left-right issues, issues of separation and immigration often cut across the left-right divide and determine party positions (Charalambous and Christophorou, 2015). The *Democratic Coalition* (DISY) and the *Democratic Party* (DIKO) constitute one bloc opposed to the (communist) *Progressive Party of the Working People* (AKEL), while smaller parties often emerge temporarily as critics against the established parties, but often disappear as quickly as they appeared.

The largest party in parliament is the DISY with center-right positions.[17] The second largest party is the AKEL, which started as a party with a right position in 1996 due to extensive mentioning of the Cyprus issue (*per6014*), which is identified as an additional right issue, but has moved to the left in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis putting strong emphasis on welfare and educational issues, thereby leapfrogging every other party in Cyprus.[18]

Besides the right move in the 2006 election the DIKO took centrist positions. Traditionally, it is the third largest party and has a pivotal role between the two major parties. In addition it held the presidency alternating office with DISY since the 1970s, while the AKEL only lately managed to gain the presidency. For this reason an oscillating ideological position between the AKEL and DISY could be expected, but the short observation period provides only limited evidence for such an assumption.

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Cyprian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| KOP | Ecological and Environmental Movement | **2** | **2.10** | **-30.71** | **67.42** | **-0.56** | **10.93** |
| | | | 0.14 | 12.49 | 2.68 | 0.09 | 0.92 |
| AKEL | Progressive Party of the Working People | **4** | **32.87** | **-0.66** | **46.48** | **0.39** | **8.98** |
| | | | 1.48 | 11.68 | 7.71 | 0.93 | 4.56 |
| EDEK | United Democratic Union of Cyprus | **4** | **8.11** | **-0.27** | **41.69** | **-0.37** | **13.43** |
| | | | 1.14 | 5.47 | 14.66 | 0.49 | 8.72 |
| DIKO | Democratic Party | **4** | **16.21** | **8.61** | **47.11** | **2.18** | **17.02** |
| | | | 1.30 | 15.05 | 22.39 | 3.25 | 13.60 |
| KED | Free Democrats Movement | **1** | **3.70** | **5.78** | **31.91** | **1.14** | **6.64** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| EK | European Party | **2** | **4.84** | **0.65** | **44.17** | **1.52** | **18.56** |
| | | | 1.36 | 7.10 | 0.94 | 0.86 | 6.51 |
| DISY | Democratic Coalition | **4** | **33.27** | **4.95** | **37.62** | **2.23** | **17.26** |
| | | | 1.99 | 10.22 | 12.76 | 1.36 | 9.05 |

17 The LR is more appropriate here then the RILE, because the latter misleadingly plots the DISY as a left party.
18 The RILE comes to a similar conclusion here, with the difference that AKEL is seen as a centrist party in the beginning.




Figure 15: Left-Right Positions of Cypriot Parties

During the economic crisis in the first decade of the new millennium, there is a clear polarization in the left-right dimension among Cypriot parties. In particular the DISY and the AKEL show opposing positions. Yet, this is mainly due to the LR Plus statements indicating that the left-right dimension in general may be contested in Cypriot party politics (Trimikliniotis, 2015, pp. 187-189).

Figure 16: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Cyprus

### 3.8 Czech Republic

The Czech party system is marked by relatively stable cleavages, the alternation of powers between the two main parties – the *Czech Social Democratic Party* (CSSD) and the *Civic Democratic Party* (ODS) – and the presence of all major party families.

The most important cleavage concerns economic policies and the pathway of reforms from planned to market economy. This is reflected in the LR Core positions, but even more so when considering the plus-pers. Most of them indeed concern economic policies, e.g. *per405* and *per406*, i.e. "corporatism/mixed economy" and "protectionism+" are identified as left items, whereas *per301* and *per5031*, i.e. "decentralisation" and favoring a private-public mix in social justice, are right items. The point of view on these issues clearly puts the CSSD on the left side in opposition to the ODS – both in terms of LR Core as well as LR positions.[19]

On the left the CSSD is superseded by the *Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia* (KSCM) – a

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Czech Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| SZ | Green Party | **3** | **3.97** | **-0.42** | **51.82** | **-0.24** | **13.29** |
| | | | 2.06 | 6.85 | 18.84 | 2.3 | 1.2 |
| KSCM | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | **8** | **13.25** | **-5.62** | **44.89** | **-1.97** | **12.69** |
| | | | 2.64 | 3.69 | 11.74 | 1.95 | 4.05 |
| CSSD | Czech Social Democratic Party | **7** | **24.33** | **-4.41** | **49.96** | **-0.75** | **11.83** |
| | | | 9.16 | 4.15 | 11.07 | 1.21 | 5.02 |
| OF | Civic Forum | **1** | **49.5** | **2.89** | **29.34** | **3.82** | **22.16** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ODA | Civic Democratic Alliance | **2** | **6.15** | **5.29** | **38.61** | **4.39** | **15.8** |
| | | | 0.35 | 2.78 | 3.61 | 1.78 | 3.17 |
| ODS | Civic Democratic Party | **7** | **24.97** | **6.34** | **43.58** | **4.66** | **16.68** |
| | | | 8.96 | 4.07 | 11.89 | 1.53 | 4.94 |
| LSU | Liberal Social Union | **1** | **6.5** | **-7.46** | **40.14** | **1.1** | **6.12** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| US | Freedom Union | **2** | **6.6** | **2.71** | **28.18** | **4.14** | **11.61** |
| | | | 2.83 | 2.17 | 0.67 | 0.78 | 1.05 |
| ANO | ANO 2011 | **1** | **18.7** | **-2.64** | **60.5** | **-0.47** | **12.02** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| KDU- CSL | Christian and Democratic Union | **8** | **7.49** | **2.21** | **42.43** | **2.94** | **15.42** |
| | | | 1.69 | 5.22 | 11.75 | 2.77 | 6.07 |
| TOP09 | Tradition. Responsibility. Properity | **2** | **14.35** | **6.08** | **55.27** | **4.17** | **17.64** |
| | | | 3.32 | 10.46 | 7.12 | 2.86 | 0.34 |
| SPR-RSC | Association for the Republic | **4** | **4.73** | **-4.31** | **32.38** | **2** | **8.11** |
| | | | 2.99 | 6.89 | 6.85 | 2.6 | 7.82 |
| USVIT | Dawn of Direct Democracy | **1** | **6.9** | **2.32** | **58.97** | **4.7** | **22.07** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| HSD- SMS | Movement for an Autonomous Demoracy - Society for Moravia-Silesia | **2** | **7.95** | **7.24** | **52.95** | **4.56** | **14.37** |
| | | | 2.9 | 12.07 | 22.35 | 5.52 | 6.19 |
| VV | Public Affairs | **1** | **10.9** | **9.13** | **49.94** | **3.47** | **11.11** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |

19 This is less clear when considering the RILE where the conservative KDU-CSL is often to the left and the CSSD is very centrist.




Figure 17: Left-Right Positions of Czech Parties

rather unique constellation in post-communist Central Europe, because the KSCM not only kept its name but "successfully" circumvent a modernization and transformation into a more social democratic party, making way for the emergence of the CSSD as authentic social democrats (Vodička, 2010, p. 290).

The conservative, catholic *Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party* (KDU-CSL) to the moderate right has been in office for most of the time as the minor coalition partner due to its pivotal position in-between the CSSD and the ODS. With the notable exception of the CSSD and the KSCM at the 2002 election all four parties never leapfrogged each other indicating the enduring consolidation of the Czech party system.

In the early years the right-populist *Coalition for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia* (SPR-RSC) started out with a left program strongly opposing the "dismemberment" of Czechoslovakia. Criticizing political corruption put the SPR-RSC to the far left in 1992; later on it steadily moved to the right by fighting immigration and membership in the EU or NATO. It kept an overall left image most of the time, though – a common phenomenon of right-wing populist parties already discussed with the Austrian FPÖ being a case in point. One of the latest entrants into parliament is the *Green Party* (SZ), an eco-conservative party favoring liberal market economy with a strong focus on environmental protection. This is reflected in their rather moderate right LR Core and LR positions.[20]

Astonishingly the policy distances remained very stable throughout the years with almost all parties moving in accordance and never leapfrogging each other. Taking into account that many of the additional plus-pers concern economic policies the LR Core and the LR dimension are well suited to describe today's party competition in the Czech Republic.

20 The RILE misleadingly places the Greens to the left.

Figure 18: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in the Czech Republic

### 3.9 Denmark

Like the other Nordic countries many cleavages are present in Denmark's multi-party system, although the parties group into two blocs divided by the left-right semantic. The four major parties alternating in office and providing all prime ministers in the post-World War II era are the *Liberal Party of Denmark* (V), the *Danish Social Liberal Party* (RV), the *Conservative People´s Party* (KF), and the *Social Democrats* (SD). However, many other parties are or have been relevant because they either participated as a minor coalition partner or they supported minority governments, which are very common in Denmark: out of 44 governments 41 have been minority governments.

The KF and V are making up the right bloc in terms of LR and LR Core positions and the SD and RV the left bloc. Further to the left is the *Danish Communist Party* (DKP) and the *Socialist People's*

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Danish Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| | Liberal Alliance | **2** | **3.90** | **5.99** | **45.48** | **5.44** | **10.80** |
| | | | 1.56 | 12.88 | 0.50 | 6.90 | 12.32 |
| VS | Left Socialist Party | **8** | **2.38** | **-16.13** | **68.74** | **-3.93** | **12.77** |
| | | | 0.72 | 7.72 | 11.49 | 3.73 | 13.36 |
| DKP | Danish Communist Party | **17** | **3.34** | **-19.07** | **64.27** | **-6.09** | **17.75** |
| | | | 2.97 | 9.32 | 11.87 | 7.25 | 12.70 |
| FK | Common Course | **1** | **2.20** | **-23.35** | **40.21** | **-4.33** | **12.37** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| EL | Red-Green Unity List | **6** | **3.42** | **-15.24** | **58.56** | **-3.66** | **9.02** |
| | | | 1.67 | 6.33 | 15.99 | 3.73 | 5.48 |
| SF | Socialist People's Party | **2** | **8.35** | **-15.09** | **61.36** | **-3.33** | **10.86** |
| | | | 3.07 | 6.68 | 9.22 | 3.75 | 6.95 |
| SD | Social Democratic Party | **26** | **34.42** | **-4.36** | **52.66** | **-0.86** | **11.17** |
| | | | 5.55 | 5.42 | 14.07 | 2.73 | 6.36 |
| CD | Centre Democrats | **13** | **4.38** | **10.20** | **59.59** | **6.31** | **27.83** |
| | | | 2.21 | 7.06 | 18.41 | 5.25 | 18.95 |
| RV | Radical Party | **26** | **7.15** | **-3.90** | **54.18** | **0.10** | **18.03** |
| | | | 2.93 | 4.75 | 11.23 | 3.21 | 16.53 |
| V | Liberals | **26** | **20.00** | **11.41** | **60.88** | **5.98** | **27.44** |
| | | | 6.19 | 8.71 | 10.65 | 4.25 | 14.34 |
| DU | Independents' Party | **6** | **2.00** | **15.08** | **68.41** | **11.53** | **45.39** |
| | | | 0.98 | 6.99 | 19.75 | 7.08 | 19.66 |
| LC | Liberal Centre | **1** | **2.50** | **2.50** | **43.75** | **1.80** | **14.61** |
| | | | . | 4.51 | 8.84 | 1.05 | 0.46 |
| KrF | Christian People's Party | **14** | **2.66** | **16.36** | **62.87** | **13.29** | **34.00** |
| | | | 0.97 | 6.76 | 12.81 | 4.28 | 11.10 |
| KF | Conservative People's Party | **26** | **14.66** | **13.07** | **61.31** | **7.51** | **30.93** |
| | | | 5.01 | 8.01 | 12.08 | 4.94 | 17.73 |
| DF | Danish People's Party | **5** | **11.78** | **12.71** | **62.55** | **5.09** | **20.00** |
| | | | 2.56 | 4.37 | 26.14 | 2.71 | 15.92 |
| FP | Progress Party | **11** | **8.78** | **17.05** | **63.54** | **10.55** | **33.59** |
| | | | 4.56 | 6.35 | 9.74 | 4.94 | 13.82 |
| RF | Justice Party | **17** | **2.89** | **3.13** | **62.72** | **4.65** | **34.30** |
| | | | 2.01 | 8.01 | 13.63 | 5.74 | 12.46 |
| DS | Danish Union | **1** | **3.10** | **-3.33** | **39.09** | **-1.25** | **14.55** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 19: Left-Right Positions of Danish Parties

*Party* (SF). In 1989 the *Red-Green Unity List* (EL) was founded by the *Left Socialist Party* (VS), the DKP and the SF to form a socialist and green party. Since 1994 the party is present in parliament receiving a usual vote share between three and seven percent. After the 2011 election it supported SD's minority government.[21]

On the right spectrum of the Danish party system there are also some (newly) emerging parties bustling. The *Progress Party* (FP) received much media attention through an anti-tax and welfare rhetoric – a type of party common in the Nordic countries. Later it included anti-immigration into their "portfolio". At the end of the 1990s internal struggle about the party's direction led to a split with the *Danish People´s Party* (DF) entering the scene. "Taxes" remained the main issue of the declining FP while those concerned with the immigration issue went to the DF. Starting in 1995 with a right-wing populist image campaigning against immigration and multi-ethnic transformation of Denmark the DF later included some welfare chauvinist standpoints resulting in less radical LR positions. The new rhetoric turned out to be successful as the DF steadily increased it's vote share (leaving the 2011 election aside) and supported all right-wing governments since 2001.

In the early 1970s the *Center Democrats* (CD) entered parliament. The party was a right-wing splinter group of the SD[22] and participated in both center-right (1982-1988) and center-left (1993-1996) governments. The party received between four and 15 seats in the Danish parliament during 1973 and 1998 but unsuccessfully competed afterwards and finally dissolved in 2008. The data show it's right-wing positions which have not been systematically influenced by the shifting coalition involvements.

The data shows an increasing polarization in terms of both LR and LR Core positions up to the 1980s. In contrast, the post-1990 period "classical" left-right issues lost their importance leading to a convergence of party positions. Like in many other countries however, the economic crisis in 2008 seems to have revitalized traditional left-right tensions and the gap between the radical left and the V and above all KF increased at the 2011 election.[23] In sum, although "classical" left-right issues lay at the ground of the Danish party system, many additional issues accompany the left-right dimension accounting for a relatively high importance of LR positions while retaining a stable rank-order of parties through the course of time.

21 The RILE puts the SF further to the left than the EL which seems to be inappropriate (Benoit and Laver, 2006). It also places the KF on the left only overtaken by the EL and SF which seems to be at odds, too.

22 Probably for this reason the Manifesto Project erroneously lists the CD as a Social Democratic party despite its right positions.

23 Contrary to the findings of the LR and LR Core the RILE sees the RV and V on the left. Actually, the V even leapfrogged the SD and has become the most radical left party leaving the two communist parties aside. Considering the history of the Danish party system this result seems to be inappropriate.

Figure 20: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Denmark

### 3.10 Estonia

After Estonia gained independence a highly fragmented party system emerged characterized by the rise and fall of many new parties, electoral alliances and party splits and mergers. In terms of the left-right positions the parties are rather homogeneous though, because political parties did not emerge along deep-rooted cleavages but were rather unified in their anti-Russian attitudes. Only later did they strengthen their profiles. Of the few lasting parties the *Estonian Center Party* (KESK), the social democratic *People's Party Moderates* (Moodukad), today known as *Social Democratic Party* (SDE), the Estonian Reform Party (ER) and the conservative *Isamaa* stick out.

Isamaa has been in government in the early 1990s and started a strong reform program dismantling the social security systems. The center right positions of the other parties show that they supported the "big bang reforms", despite rhetorical differences leading to frequent changes of governments. Considering the economic context and the urge for liberal market reforms unsurprisingly all political parties took center-right positions in the 1990s both in the LR and LR Core dimension.

Since then there has been a left shift in party ideologies with party positions moving to the cen-

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Estonian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| EER | Estonian Greens | **2** | **5.45** | **-3.22** | **35.24** | **0.18** | **7.87** |
| | | | 2.33 | 1.32 | 1.59 | 1.08 | 3.65 |
| Moodukad | People's Party Moderates | **6** | **10.93** | **0.59** | **35.73** | **1.58** | **10.65** |
| | | | 4.42 | 4.76 | 7.34 | 1.61 | 3.58 |
| KESK | Estonian Center Party | **6** | **20.77** | **0.24** | **32.15** | **1.26** | **9.85** |
| | | | 6.00 | 3.65 | 6.14 | 2.01 | 3.25 |
| ER | Estonian Reform Party | **5** | **21.24** | **3.61** | **35.97** | **3.67** | **13.08** |
| | | | 6.40 | 3.94 | 4.23 | 2.52 | 4.96 |
| VKRE | Republican and Conservative People's Party | **1** | **5.00** | **4.60** | **35.62** | **2.48** | **10.83** |
| | | | . | 0.72 | 3.62 | 0.73 | 3.12 |
| ResP | Pro Patria and Res Publica | **3** | **21.00** | **2.91** | **33.61** | **4.33** | **15.82** |
| | | | 3.38 | 0.54 | 10.47 | 0.84 | 4.86 |
| Rahvaliit | Estonian People's Union | **4** | **7.38** | **0.38** | **40.94** | **2.42** | **18.46** |
| | | | 4.46 | 2.88 | 7.03 | 2.14 | 3.17 |
| Isamaa | National Coalition Pro Patria | **4** | **13.33** | **8.16** | **46.60** | **6.23** | **22.03** |
| | | | 7.04 | 4.37 | 11.95 | 3.99 | 14.26 |
| ERSP | Estonian National Independence Party | **1** | **8.80** | **4.92** | **37.33** | **1.88** | **6.84** |
| | | | . | 2.37 | 8.34 | 0.92 | 3.10 |
| EK | Estonian Citizen Coalition | **1** | **6.90** | **16.22** | **52.17** | **7.49** | **30.43** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| EKK | Coalition Party | **2** | **10.60** | **6.51** | **40.35** | **5.03** | **17.63** |
| | | | 4.24 | 1.59 | 1.70 | 1.84 | 3.00 |
| KMÜ | Coalition Party and Rural Union | **1** | **32.20** | **4.73** | **38.67** | **3.25** | **16.75** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| IR | Independendent Royalists | **1** | **7.10** | **0.00** | **0.00** | **0.00** | **0.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| NDE | Our Home - Estonia! | **1** | **5.90** | **-2.69** | **50.52** | **-6.56** | **19.59** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| EÜRP | Estonian United People's Party | **1** | **6.10** | **-12.08** | **30.77** | **-2.07** | **8.97** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 21: Left-Right Positions of Estonian Parties

ter.[24] Especially, the first election after becoming a EU member changed the ideological landscape in Estonia. For the first time parties took (moderate) left positions. This is true for the *Estonian Greens* (EER), the *Coalition Party and Rural Union* (KMÜ), the KESK and the SDE. At the same time the ideological distances slightly increased paving the way to more distinct party profiles along the lines of a left-right dimension on which the conservative parties are clearly on the right and the Greens and SDE on the left. Yet, LR Core positions remained stable indicating the persistence of their core ideology while taking additional plus-pers on board in the aftermath of the economic crisis.

Taking the very low importance of LR Core positions and the still low importance of additional left-right issues into account it is fair to say that the left-right dimension is less suited to explain Estonian party competition and that the Estonian party systems "lacks" a left-right cleavage providing a pronounced dividing line of political parties (Saarts and Lumi, 2013).

24 The LR thus differs from the RILE, where the SDE and the KESK are left leaning in the first two elections in Estonia. From 2007 onwards, the KESK is the party most to the left. Locating the KESK at the most radical left end in the Estonian party – as the RILE does – systems seems to be a bit at odd, because the KESK mixes progressive and conservative issues while pushing for market reforms running counter to social liberalism (Lagerspetz and Maier, 2010, p. 99).

Figure 22: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Estonia

### 3.11 Finland

Like in other Nordic countries the huge number of political parties in parliament, which frequently changed ideological positions and leapfrogged each other (Jahn et al., 2006; Karvonen, 2014), resembles the many cleavages which have been relevant in Finnish politics. Nevertheless, in the long run parties formed two blocs. The left bloc is made up of the communist *Finnish People's Democratic Union* (SKDL) and the *Democratic Alternative* (DEVA), which later merged and became the *Left Wing Alliance* (VAS), and the Finnish Social Democrats (SSDP), partly joined by the agrarian *Finnish Centre* (SK). The right-wing bloc encompasses the conservative *National Coalition* (KK), the *Liberal People's Party* (LKP), the *Christian Democrats in Finland* (SKL), the ethnic *Swedish People's Party* (RKP/SFP), and finally the *Finnish Rural Party* (SMP).

The three largest parties – SSDP, KK and SK – have always managed to build government coalitions at times even crossing the boundaries of the left-right blocs. These coalitions more often than not included many other parties and it is a special characteristic of Finnish politics that coalitions are often oversized. This pragmatic policy style is mirrored in the ideological flexibility regarding

Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Finish Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| VIHR | Green Union | **8** | **6.23** | **-1.83** | **37.39** | **-0.75** | **10.89** |
| | | | 2.37 | 3.01 | 16.09 | 1.53 | 9.19 |
| SKDL | Finnish People's Democratic Union | **13** | **18.95** | **-15.47** | **46.00** | **-8.54** | **20.67** |
| | | | 4.07 | 6.27 | 16.84 | 4.74 | 12.80 |
| DEVA | Democratic Alternative | **1** | **4.20** | **-12.10** | **31.39** | **-9.66** | **18.85** |
| | | | . | 4.32 | 6.12 | 8.09 | 16.28 |
| VAS | Left Wing Alliance | **6** | **9.83** | **-4.53** | **40.14** | **-3.92** | **11.10** |
| | | | 1.20 | 5.64 | 10.45 | 5.73 | 10.03 |
| TPSL | Social Democratic League of Workes and Smallholders | **3** | **2.83** | **2.05** | **3.74** | **2.05** | **3.74** |
| | | | 1.38 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| SSDP | Finnish Social Democrats | **19** | **24.26** | **-7.78** | **49.50** | **-4.92** | **27.10** |
| | | | 2.49 | 9.01 | 22.11 | 7.21 | 19.38 |
| LKP | Liberal People's Party | **13** | **4.74** | **2.79** | **33.05** | **2.72** | **19.37** |
| | | | 2.20 | 9.15 | 20.35 | 4.14 | 5.94 |
| NSP | Young Finnish Party | **1** | **2.80** | **8.19** | **30.00** | **3.99** | **12.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SKL | Christian Democrats in Finland | **12** | **3.48** | **17.83** | **57.20** | **15.01** | **35.00** |
| | | | 1.20 | 9.98 | 17.06 | 9.33 | 14.99 |
| KK | National Coalition | **19** | **18.11** | **4.82** | **38.62** | **2.52** | **19.67** |
| | | | 3.11 | 9.73 | 20.88 | 7.29 | 14.33 |
| SK | Finnish Centre | **19** | **20.73** | **-3.14** | **37.74** | **-0.30** | **19.77** |
| | | | 3.17 | 9.32 | 18.81 | 6.95 | 9.36 |
| SMP | Finnish Rural Party | **13** | **5.91** | **8.40** | **40.70** | **4.03** | **16.77** |
| | | | 5.16 | 8.88 | 17.84 | 4.04 | 6.36 |
| RKP/ SFP | Swedish People's Party | **19** | **5.58** | **2.71** | **27.39** | **2.63** | **12.47** |
| | | | 1.08 | 4.02 | 12.73 | 3.12 | 4.68 |




Figure 23: Left-Right Positions of Finnish Parties

LR and LR Core party position. From this point of view Finland symbolizes a consensus system *par excellence*. In the post-war period there has been a clear left leaning of the Finnish parties caused by the pressure of the Soviet Union during this period, while the 1970s and 1980s have been characterized by a strong polarization. During the 1990s started a process of ideological convergence, which reached its peak in the 2011 election.

Despite the large number of parties only four parties existed during the whole period from 1945 onwards – the SSDP, the often dominant SK, the KK and the party of the Swedish minority. The SSDP often took clearly left, sometimes even leapfrogging the communists. The conservatives have always been to the right with the notable exception of the 1958 election when it appears to be the most left wing party in Finland. The Swedish minority party took very moderate position slightly leaning to the right. Most interesting is the shifting party position of one of the most dominant parties in Finland, the SK.

The communist SKDL and the liberal LKP existed from 1945 but disappeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the disappearance of the LKP there is no liberal party anymore in the Finnish party system. The SKDL has often been the most radical left leaning party in Finland, while the liberal party has been mostly moderate right but moved to more extreme right positions in the 1970s. Before its disappearance the party made very strong ideological changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The populist rural party SMP has been a splinter of the SK and had its highest support in the 1970s and 1980s. The True Finns party, recently called Finns Party, is the successor of the Rural Party which gained slightly below 20 percent of the votes in the 2011 election and became the second strongest party. The Christian democrats entered the political landscape in 1970 with a very strong catholic- traditional image which made the party appear quite right wing on the scale. However, the party lost much of its appeal and steadily moved to the political center.

The *Green Union* (VIHR) has been the first green party entering parliament and also government in Western Europe. However, the Finnish Greens are very moderate on the left-right scale thereby differing from most other Green parties in Europe which have a stronger left image. Looking at the importance of both the LR Core and LR dimension Finnish parties are strongly competing over traditional left-right issues. As such the LR dimension is well suited to analyze party competition in Finland.

Figure 24: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Finland

### 3.12 France

As a consequence of the deteriorating situation in Algeria and the political instability caused by that event, France changed it constitution in 1958. This marks the end of the Forth and the beginning of the Fifth Republic. Therefore comparison over time have to take different political systems (parliamentary vs. semi-presidential) into account. The Fourth republic was characterized by an inherent political instability, clearly marked by the high number of 23 prime ministers in just 22 years (Kempf, 2009, p. 350). The country was on the verge of civil war when General de Gaulle became prime minister again and started to draft a new constitution. Party positions reflect the uncertainty with landslide moves to the left regardless of party family membership. After the constitutional reforms in 1958 this development came to a halt. While the left-right dimension has been highly relevant in the Fourth Republic it became less salient in the Fifth Republic (Jahn, 2017)

The *Gaullists* (Gaul) and the *Popular Republican Movement* (MRP) took more right positions in

Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for French Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Verts | The Greens | **5** | **5.52** | **-4.62** | **52.73** | **-0.97** | **7.16** |
| | | | 1.76 | 4.08 | 9.66 | 1.02 | 4.82 |
| GE | Ecology Generation | **1** | **1.80** | **2.90** | **42.86** | **2.22** | **13.33** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PCF | French Communist Party | **17** | **16.40** | **-14.56** | **71.57** | **-6.30** | **12.26** |
| | | | 7.92 | 9.96 | 11.10 | 3.77 | 4.92 |
| PS | Socialist Party | **17** | **21.57** | **-10.11** | **63.67** | **-4.31** | **11.60** |
| | | | 8.50 | 8.26 | 11.81 | 2.71 | 4.23 |
| RRRS | Radical Party | **8** | **8.41** | **-0.74** | **63.79** | **0.32** | **12.84** |
| | | | 3.71 | 13.88 | 13.54 | 3.89 | 4.62 |
| MRP | Popular Republican Movement | **7** | **13.36** | **6.33** | **63.47** | **3.90** | **15.41** |
| | | | 5.71 | 7.54 | 15.52 | 3.05 | 9.53 |
| CDP | Centre. Democracy and Progress | **1** | **3.90** | **8.91** | **57.18** | **7.12** | **17.01** |
| | | | . | 0.80 | 5.01 | 2.93 | 7.72 |
| MR | Reformers' Movement | **1** | **13.10** | **4.59** | **57.70** | **5.30** | **15.53** |
| | | | . | 7.11 | 4.62 | 5.26 | 9.27 |
| Gaul | Union of Democrats for the Republic - Gaullists | **17** | **23.85** | **10.05** | **61.80** | **3.44** | **16.17** |
| | | | 10.36 | 6.29 | 11.58 | 3.10 | 6.93 |
| Cons | National Centre of Independents and Peasants- Conservatives | **12** | **8.22** | **9.37** | **66.00** | **6.11** | **20.30** |
| | | | 6.67 | 5.39 | 3.48 | 1.71 | 2.64 |
| Pouj | Union for the Defence of Traders and Artisans - Poujadists | **1** | **12.30** | **6.95** | **58.38** | **1.17** | **7.61** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| UDF | Democratic Movement | **9** | **14.13** | **5.84** | **53.55** | **6.21** | **18.51** |
| | | | 7.73 | 5.80 | 10.08 | 4.68 | 8.51 |
| NC | New Centre | **2** | **1.90** | **-2.32** | **45.58** | **0.88** | **10.56** |
| | | | 0.42 | 4.10 | 0.36 | 2.02 | 11.00 |
| AC | Centrist Alliance | **1** | **0.60** | **-1.43** | **52.78** | **0.27** | **22.22** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| FN | National Front | **7** | **10.89** | **15.67** | **62.45** | **11.17** | **32.14** |
| | | | 3.45 | 5.91 | 6.55 | 3.75 | 6.33 |




Figure 25: Left-Right Positions of French Parties

the following election. In contrast the parties on the left side of the political spectrum continued on their way towards extreme left positions. The most striking example is the *Radical Socialist Party* (RRRS) despite the party being already "on the verge of disappearance" (Wilson, 1971, p. 69). Torn between right and left forces within the party many members finally left: "Guy Mollet of the SFIO said of the Radical Party: 'That's a species that has disappeared. The good ones came to us, and most other went to the reactionaries. Among those that remain you find the most divergent tendencies'" (Wilson, 1971, p. 69). The left policy of the RRRS can be explained with it's engagement in the federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left founded to support Mitterrand as a candidate of the united left in the 1965 presidential elections.

Throughout the 1970s French politics were characterized by an increasing polarization leading to two clearly identifiable ideological blocks. On the one hand, the left block was formed by the *Socialist Party* (PS) and the *French Communist Party*. On the other hand, the Gaullists (later *Rally for the Republic* and *Union for a Popular Movement*) and the *Union for French Democracy* (UDF) made up the right block. Consequently, party competition can be seen as "a contest between Left and Right as a whole, not between individual parties" (Budge and Klingemann, 2001, p. 33). Noteworthy is the occasional leapfrogging of the PS and the Communists which reflects Mitterrand's intention to ally both parties in order to take the leading role within the left block. After winning the 1981 presidential elections and leaving opposition after the parliamentary elections the PS moderated it's positions indicating the transformation of France towards a more urban, industrial society (Kempf, 2009, p. 380). During the 1980s the former blocks still existed but an ideological convergence took place.

Contrary to the left, the right block was characterized by a division and disunity between the individual parties. The weakness of the Right in France was a key factor for the electoral success of the PS. The 2007 election changed this situation, though: with positions equally attractive to centrist voters and voters of the extreme right Sarkozy strikingly became president. Figure 25 reflects these programmatic changes indicating that the parties on the right became more centrist since the early 1990s.

Besides the "block parties" a relatively new entrant in France are *Les Verts* (Verts), a green party associated with left positions (Villalba and Vieillard-Coffre, 2003, p. 73) but unclear positions regarding "classical" left-right core issues. They entered government after forming an alliance with other left parties in the 1997 parliamentary election and merged with Europe Écologie later on forming the new party Europe Écologie-Les Verts.

On the other hand the *Front National* (FN) resides in the extreme right spectrum. The party is well-known for its nationalist and populist positions. In the 2000s the party steadily moved towards more centrist positions. An important development was the detachment of the long-lasting chairman Jean-Marie LePen through his daughter Marine LePen in 2011. Already in 2007, Marine LePen tried to modernize the FN in order to appeal to voters of the center.

Finally, when looking at LR Core positions the range is considerably smaller; yet, both blocks remain clearly identifiable which confirms the importance of the distinction between left- and right-wing parties as a whole in France.




Figure 26: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in France

### 3.13 Germany

The German party system represents a moderate to left-leaning spectrum with an overall range of nearly 40 points on the LR-scale and clearly identifiable party positions. Both major parties, the *Social Democratic Party of Germany* (SPD) and the *Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union* (CDU/CSU) never leapfrogged. The pivotal party however, the *Free Democratic Party* (FDP) was much more flexible crossing the other parties at times.

In the early period after the Second World War the CDU presented a rather left party program (Ahlener Programm) moderated soon after and later endorsing a social market economy. However, the economic recovery and the cold war led to a re-orientation of the Christian Democrats documented by the rather extreme move to the right in 1957. This helped the CDU in marginalizing the minor bourgeois *Center Party* and *German Party* (DP) by incorporating most of their members and voters.

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for German Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Grüne | Alliance 90/Greens | **9** | **7.21** | **-11.14** | **60.09** | **-0.79** | **8.33** |
| | | | 2.66 | 3.41 | 13.46 | 0.47 | 4.65 |
| KPD | Communist Party of Germany | **1** | **5.70** | **0.92** | **17.05** | **0.37** | **6.82** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PDS/ Linke | Party of Democratic Socialism | **7** | **6.44** | **-16.57** | **64.75** | **-2.54** | **8.14** |
| | | | 3.36 | 3.20 | 9.98 | 1.98 | 3.30 |
| SPD | Social Democratic Party of Germany | **18** | **35.93** | **-3.04** | **51.32** | **0.20** | **11.72** |
| | | | 6.32 | 5.32 | 14.99 | 2.90 | 5.75 |
| FDP | Free Democratic Party | **18** | **8.94** | **2.85** | **48.22** | **4.22** | **15.04** |
| | | | 2.56 | 5.26 | 13.06 | 2.09 | 4.93 |
| CDU/ CSU | Christian Democratic Union | **18** | **42.54** | **5.75** | **54.43** | **4.91** | **20.38** |
| | | | 5.63 | 5.23 | 14.00 | 2.70 | 8.96 |
| Zen- trum | Centre Party | **2** | **1.95** | **5.80** | **25.30** | **4.30** | **21.36** |
| | | | 1.63 | 3.17 | 2.79 | 2.92 | 1.93 |
| DP | German Party | **3** | **3.57** | **5.31** | **30.76** | **4.45** | **17.40** |
| | | | 0.38 | 2.72 | 8.02 | 1.86 | 4.51 |
| WAV | Economic Reconstruction League | **1** | **2.90** | **-0.04** | **32.88** | **0.40** | **21.92** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| DRP | German Reich Party | **1** | **1.60** | **10.25** | **31.58** | **11.88** | **21.05** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| BP | Bavarian Party | **1** | **4.20** | **16.92** | **40.00** | **17.92** | **35.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SSW | South Schleswig Voters' Union | **1** | **0.30** | **5.82** | **21.05** | **4.22** | **15.79** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| GB/ BHE | All-german bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights | **1** | **5.90** | **5.33** | **20.00** | **5.28** | **13.33** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Pi | Pirates | **1** | **2.20** | **-10.44** | **61.71** | **-1.59** | **11.68** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| AfD | Alternative for Germany | **1** | **4.70** | **4.31** | **83.33** | **8.99** | **22.22** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 27: Left-Right Positions of German Parties

Looking at the left-right positions of the Social Democrats, the "famous" Bad Godesberg Conference in 1959 was *not* the starting point as a post-Marxism catch-all party, but rather the endpoint of a ten years rightward shift. The following election manifesto of the SPD in 1961 two years after Bad Godesberg marked the rightmost position of the SPD in the whole post-war period. The 1960s saw moderate right positions, while especially the early 1970s – the years of the first social-liberal coalition (1969-1974) between SPD and FDP – witnessed a left turn. Given the German unification all parties stressed issues of social integration. In particular the SPD under Lafontaine moved strongly to the left. After loosing the 1990 and 1994 elections and the rise of "New Labour" in the UK, the SPD under Schröder steadily moved to the center-right resulting in victories in the 1998 and 2002 elections. Interestingly, the SPD on average has the lowest importance score regarding "classical" left-right issues resulting in a moderate center-right position on the LR Core dimension.

The *Alliance '90/ The Greens* (Grüne) took positions in the very left spectrum up until 1994.[25] Yet, when looking at their LR Core positions the pattern already found in many other Western European countries emerges once again that green parties compete via plus-pers instead of "classical' left-right issues. With the establishment of the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (PDS, later renamed to *Die Linkspartei* and *Die Linke* a new competitor within the left block emerged thereby increasing the ideological range of the German party system as a whole.

In sum, the data impressively capture the convergence of ideological positions up until the early 1980s when the Greens entered the scene and a process of ideological polarization – visible even in terms of LR Core positions – took off, reinforced by the emergence of the PDS and most recently by the newly founded *Alternative for Germany* (AfD) as the most right-wing party.

25 On average the German Greens are indeed one of the most left wing Green parties in our sample accompanied by the GPS in Switzerland, KOP in Cyprus, the Australian Greens and the Greens in New Zealand.

Figure 28: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Germany

### 3.14 Greece

The Greek party system is made up of three, relatively stable, ideological blocks with the smaller Marxist-Leninist *Communist Party of Greece* (KKE) on the left, and the two major parties, the *Panhellenic Socialist Movement* (PASOK) on the moderate-to-center-left and the *New Democracy* (ND) on the right. Party competition thus is well-structured along a left-right dimension; yet, it is not about "classical" left-right issues. Illustrated by the very low LR Core importance scores and the almost indistinguishable LR Core positions – the ND being the sole exception – the left-right divide is more about traditions vs. a western-style modernization (Zervakis, 2003).

The ND is a center-right liberal-conservative party with a Christian democratic background formed immediately after the collapse of the military junta in 1974. It held the government from 1974 to 1981, thereby guiding Greece through the transition phase. Later the ND has been frequently in power. Strongly endorsing the need for political authority – an issue identified as a right-wing plus-per – puts the ND clearly to the right.

On the other side of the spectrum the KKE usually receives between five and ten percent of the vote share and was a member of some short lived coalition governments in 1989. It focuses on freedom, human rights and democracy while at the same time being negative on international co-

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Greek Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| SYRIZA | Coalition of the Radical Left | **4** | **9.95** | **-5.9** | **39.24** | **-2.5** | **11.7** |
| | | | 11.32 | 5.85 | 15.35 | 0.54 | 7.78 |
| KKE | Communist Party of Greece | **11** | **7.4** | **-8.69** | **64.25** | **-0.68** | **11.49** |
| | | | 2.31 | 8.14 | 26.74 | 1.73 | 7.14 |
| SAP | Progressive Left Coalition | **6** | **7.6** | **-2.6** | **60.05** | **-0.34** | **11.98** |
| | | | 4.4 | 3.35 | 9.27 | 1.55 | 6.37 |
| DIMAR | Democratic Left | **1** | **6.3** | **0.9** | **22.79** | **1.63** | **15.66** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PASOK | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | **14** | **37.02** | **-4.35** | **44.97** | **-0.36** | **9.4** |
| | | | 11.58 | 5.85 | 20.04 | 1.38 | 3.39 |
| DIKKI | Democratic Social Movement | **1** | **4.4** | **-12.63** | **58.81** | **0.69** | **8.2** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| EDIK | Union of the Democratic Centre | **2** | **16.2** | **-3.55** | **63.77** | **0.39** | **9.27** |
| | | | 5.94 | 5.98 | 3.93 | 2.19 | 3 |
| ND | New Democracy | **14** | **41.49** | **10.03** | **58.01** | **4.4** | **22.9** |
| | | | 6.16 | 8.04 | 25.34 | 3.26 | 14.67 |
| Pola | Political Spring | **2** | **3.9** | **2.66** | **49.83** | **3.36** | **15.75** |
| | | | 1.41 | 5.57 | 1.31 | 0.03 | 1.34 |
| EP | National Alignment | **1** | **6.8** | **6.35** | **74.1** | **3.64** | **24.46** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LAOS | Popular Orthodox Rally | **3** | **3.67** | **2.57** | **30.26** | **2.75** | **17.52** |
| | | | 2 | 0.5 | 2.97 | 0.64 | 4.42 |
| XA | Golden Dawn | **1** | **6.9** | **5.16** | **45.7** | **5.21** | **26.88** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ANEL | Independent Greeks | **1** | **7.5** | **2.23** | **36.13** | **3.28** | **28.39** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 29: Left-Right Positions of Greek Parties

operation and Europeanization which puts the KKE on the extreme left. Despite the right move in the early 2000s the KKE is still one of the most hardline communist parties in Europe.[26]

Greek's second largest party, the social democratic PASOK is placed in-between the ND and the KKE. In 1981 it replaced the ND in office with a rather left reform program. However, in the following decades the PASOK moderated its program and even crossed the line towards right positions. All in all, both the ND and the PASOK show considerable policy moves sometimes leapfrogging each other.

Noteworthy is the impact of the 2008 economic crisis on the political landscape and party positions of Greek parties. The LR-index clearly captures the ideological polarization in Greek politics as a consequence of the government-debt crisis. Even the LR Core shows a considerable move of the ND to the right and the KKE to the left, because the KKE strongly blamed the elites (captured by *per305*).[27] In 2004 several smaller parties and other actors from civil society formed an electoral alliance better known as *Syriza*. Its mixture of (radical) left, feminist and environmentalist issues (reflected in the flag colors of their logo) unsurprisingly puts it to the left, particularly when considering the LR instead of the LR Core. While they managed to clear the electoral threshold in the beginning the (aftermath of the) crisis pushed its support on a new level by quadrupling their vote share from 2009 to 2012, accompanied by a moderation of positions. The LR thus seems more appropriate showing the exact opposite tendency, because *per305* is not part of the LR index in Greek for that period at all. In sum, the LR index confirms Greek "block politics" while at the same time capturing the different meaning of the left-right divide, which is not based on the "classical" issues but rather additional ones.

26 Comparing the RILE with the LR shows some significant discrepancies. The RILE places the KKE during the 1980s and 1990s on the right which seems inappropriate. Furthermore, the ND is placed to the left from 1996 to 2009. The RILE confirms the leapfrogging between ND and PASOK in 1994 but sees the same situation again in 2012. This differs sharply from the LR which sees the ND moving to the right.

27 Interesting is the fact that the RILE places the KKE to the extreme right in the 2009 election because *per305* is a right issue within the RILE. For this reason Volkens et al. (2015) even "advise to use other estimates than the rile to measure left-right positions in Greece".




Figure 30: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Greece

### 3.15 Hungary

The Hungarian party system is characterized by the absence of a western-style social democratic party and the relevance of the (historic) conflict of liberalism vs. nationalism. As a result left parties in Hungary are rather left-liberal ones – or clearly communistic. In addition to the "obligatory" transition cleavage of the old nomenclature vs. anti-communists a religious and the center-periphery cleavage emerged structuring the party system and party idelogies (Körösényi et al., 2010, p. 387-388).

The early years were marked by blocks made up of the *Hungarian Democratic Forum* (MDF), the *Independent Smallholders' and Civic Party* (FKgP), and the *Christian Democratic People's Party* (KDNP) to the right. Interestingly though, the MDF strongly emphasized environmental issues putting it rather to the left and resulting in huge ideological moves thereby leapfrogging all other parties at times.

On the left the *Hungarian Socialist Party* (MSzP) was one of the most influential parties in Hungary until it lost most of its support during the economic crisis. Nowadays the MSzP is the biggest opposition party. Founded as a successor of the communist party its political ideology can be described as center-orientated. Especially in the 1990s the party has been an advocate for liberal market reforms endorsing a cosmopolitan version of an economic modernization. Thus, mapping

Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for Hungarian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| LMP | Politics Can Be Different | **2** | **6.40** | **-5.49** | **40.37** | **-0.85** | **15.91** |
| | | | 1.56 | 2.68 | 1.30 | 1.39 | 2.67 |
| MSzP | Hungarian Socialist Party | **7** | **28.70** | **0.69** | **32.23** | **2.08** | **14.12** |
| | | | 12.35 | 3.00 | 8.74 | 2.30 | 5.61 |
| DK | Democratic Coalition | **1** | **2.70** | **2.78** | **34.69** | **3.09** | **15.23** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| E14-PM | Together 2014 -Dialogue for Hungary | **1** | **2.00** | **0.76** | **29.48** | **2.14** | **14.92** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| FiDeSz | Federation of Young Democrats | **7** | **28.91** | **1.42** | **40.57** | **3.88** | **21.27** |
| | | | 15.08 | 5.72 | 9.13 | 3.00 | 12.70 |
| SzDSz | Alliance of Free Democrats | **5** | **12.02** | **4.98** | **32.78** | **6.82** | **18.29** |
| | | | 7.82 | 5.92 | 12.36 | 5.14 | 11.62 |
| MDF | Hungarian Democratic Forum | **5** | **9.88** | **1.77** | **45.91** | **4.79** | **25.50** |
| | | | 8.93 | 8.27 | 9.13 | 6.31 | 7.04 |
| KDNP | Christian Democratic People | **7** | **5.50** | **2.31** | **44.46** | **4.90** | **27.27** |
| | | | 1.70 | 7.99 | 6.15 | 6.19 | 12.44 |
| MIEP | Hungarian Justice and Life Party | **1** | **5.50** | **0.31** | **45.27** | **4.96** | **33.11** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| JOBBIK | Movement for a Better Hungary | **2** | **18.45** | **0.70** | **41.18** | **2.36** | **24.02** |
| | | | 2.47 | 1.16 | 1.05 | 1.37 | 2.46 |
| FKgP | Independent Smallholders' and Civiv Party | **4** | **8.62** | **8.51** | **32.25** | **8.29** | **21.98** |
| | | | 5.53 | 10.24 | 10.90 | 4.76 | 7.99 |
| Asz | Agrarian Alliance | **2** | **2.60** | **-0.11** | **16.90** | **1.00** | **7.90** |
| | | | 0.71 | 0.43 | 14.35 | 0.03 | 10.69 |




Figure 31: Left-Right Positions of Hungarian Parties

the party as center-right seems appropriate, even though the RILE shows a more left-leaning position.

Contrary, the *Federation of Young Democrats* (FiDeSz) is in favor of interventionist economic instruments in line with a rather national version of economic modernization. Consequently, the FiDeSz is rather left at times. Under the recent leadership of Orbán right-wing national issues gained importance though; as a result, the FiDeSz emerges as the most rightist party in Hungary. For a long time the KDNP did not play any role, but since the 2000s emerged as a close co-operation partner of FiDeSz oftentimes competing on the same list and similar manifestos. With the main competition taking place between the MSzP and FiDeSz, thereby marginalizing other parties in-between, Hungary represents a rather unusual case regarding the economic left-right divide.

In sum, party policy in Hungary is clearly right-leaning, especially in the early 1990s, irrespective of either LR or LR Core positions. When looking at the rather low importance scores of both the LR and LR Core dimension it becomes clear though, that party competition is less about (classical) left-right issues and other dimension like a left-conservative dimension may be better suited to capture today's party competition in Hungary.

Figure 32: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Hungary

### 3.16 Iceland

Iceland has very "classical" Nordic multi-party system with clearly distinguishable party positions. At the same time, parties behave in line with expectations derived from party family membership.

One of the two biggest parties in Iceland's parliament Alþingi – the *Independence Party* (SJ) – is a center-right party. The SJ remained within its ideological corridor throughout the entire period never leapfrogging any other party. Yet, within its space there is considerable volatility of right positions ranging from moderate-center to clearly right-wing positions both in the LR and the LR Core dimension.

Historically an agrarian party, the *Progressive Party* (F) is a pragmatic, center-oriented party with notable internal struggle presenting itself as a rather incoherent organization. This is underlined by the ideological movements the F made throughout the years: Starting as a center right party, very similar to the SJ, the party took center-left positions until the mid-1970s followed by another

Table 17: Descriptive Statistics for Icelandic Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| VGF | Left Green Movement | **5** | **12.96** | **-5.47** | **46.97** | **-0.17** | **7.29** |
| | | | 5.35 | 3.45 | 12.79 | 1.13 | 3.72 |
| AB | People's Alliance | **16** | **17.29** | **-6.20** | **39.74** | **-2.87** | **13.13** |
| | | | 2.49 | 4.66 | 13.26 | 3.67 | 7.33 |
| A | Social Democratic Party | **16** | **14.96** | **-2.57** | **41.70** | **-0.90** | **17.75** |
| | | | 3.31 | 5.27 | 12.42 | 3.90 | 9.22 |
| BJ | Social Democratic Federation | **1** | **7.30** | **-0.02** | **30.25** | **-1.14** | **16.77** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SFVM | Union of Liberals and Leftists | **3** | **4.50** | **-26.91** | **88.89** | **-8.22** | **11.11** |
| | | | 4.45 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Þjóðvaki | Awakening of the Nation | **1** | **7.20** | **0.28** | **31.98** | **1.08** | **5.57** |
| | | | . | 0.18 | 8.49 | 0.10 | 0.20 |
| S | Social Democratic Alliance | **5** | **25.46** | **-4.35** | **49.25** | **-0.74** | **9.70** |
| | | | 7.26 | 5.85 | 10.32 | 1.77 | 4.41 |
| FF | Liberal Party | **3** | **6.30** | **3.75** | **36.37** | **4.85** | **16.14** |
| | | | 1.82 | 2.48 | 9.28 | 1.81 | 3.69 |
| B-H | Citizens' Movement | **1** | **7.20** | **-8.54** | **64.52** | **1.12** | **3.23** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Bf[13] | Bright Future | **1** | **8.30** | **-5.54** | **51.79** | **-0.81** | **20.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Sj | Independence Party | **21** | **36.64** | **9.46** | **43.80** | **7.16** | **22.90** |
| | | | 5.29 | 5.14 | 15.46 | 3.81 | 10.38 |
| Bf | Citizens' Party | **1** | **10.90** | **11.58** | **47.31** | **5.24** | **10.58** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Tf | National Preservation Party | **1** | **6.00** | **-1.52** | **39.05** | **2.64** | **12.81** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| F | Progressive Party | **21** | **21.57** | **-0.36** | **32.45** | **0.76** | **14.48** |
| | | | 4.70 | 3.67 | 16.01 | 3.09 | 9.63 |
| Kv | Women's Alliance | **4** | **7.20** | **0.09** | **26.10** | **0.71** | **4.78** |
| | | | 2.44 | 2.27 | 9.00 | 0.96 | 2.13 |
| P | Pirate Party | **1** | **5.10** | **-10.77** | **69.92** | **-3.57** | **23.31** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 33: Left-Right Positions of Icelandic Parties

center-right phase. In the early 2000s the party moved to the left again way more extreme than in the 1950s and 1960s.

On the left side, the *People's Alliance* (AB) had its roots in Eurocommunism underlined by their clear-cut left position in both the LR and LR Core dimension. Their steady moderation in ideological terms, the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Communism prepared ground for the *Social Democratic Alliance* (S) – the 1999/2000 merger of the AB, the *Social Democrats* (A) and the *Women's Alliance* (Kv). From an ideological perspective the merger made sense due to the enduring convergence of all three parties' positions since the 1980s. With its left positions the S gained a majority of seats in the 2009 election.

Yet, not all members were satisfied with the merger, the moderation and pragmatism of the new alliance. The AB's left wing split up and founded the *Left-Green Movement* (VGF) endorsing the unity of welfare and environmental policies with feminism. As a result, the VGF is clearly left-leaning regarding the LR dimension, yet moderate regarding the "classical" left-right issues.

When looking at the rather low importance scores for the LR Core dimension compared to the relatively high importance scores for the LR dimension it becomes clear that party competition in Iceland is mainly made up of additional plus-pers. Yet, these align with the LR Core dimension as one would expect solely based on party family membership lending the LR very suitable to analyze party competition in Iceland.

Figure 34: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Iceland

### 3.17 Ireland

Three distinct periods can be distinguished in the evolution of the Irish party system after World War II (McBride, 2006). At the same time, party competition is mainly structured along the nationalist question and less according to the left-right dimension (Kissane, 2005) with the populist-nationalist *Fianna Fáil* ("Soldiers of Destiny", FF) as the historically anti-treaty party on the one hand, and the conservative *Fine Gael* ("Family of the Irish", FG) on the other hand. Trying to avoid the national question in the beginning, the *Labour Party* (LP) put a focus on the working-class but remained the "poor third". The comparatively low LR importance scores and the even lower LR Core importance scores underline this impression. At the same time, as one would expect from it's party family membership, Labour constantly occupied the left spectrum in both the "classical" LR Core and LR dimension.

The first phase from 1944 to 1961 saw a rise in electoral fragmentation and the presence of some minor parties in parliament well captured by the LR index with increasing volatility of party positions and an expanding ideological range. Throughout the 1960s up until the early 1980s the party system stabilized. Fianna Fáil tried to build up a catch-all image by moving to the center. With

Table 18: Descriptive Statistics for Irish Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| ULA | United Left Alliance | **1** | **1.60** | **-37.36** | **50.00** | **-9.01** | **9.37** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Greens | Green Party | **6** | **2.67** | **-3.76** | **29.61** | **-1.00** | **5.91** |
| | | | 1.35 | 4.36 | 9.84 | 2.33 | 2.43 |
| WP | Workers' Party | **5** | **3.16** | **-2.48** | **11.96** | **-0.94** | **2.00** |
| | | | 1.31 | 1.71 | 5.18 | 0.59 | 0.40 |
| DLP | Democratic Left Party | **2** | **2.65** | **-5.35** | **45.61** | **-3.26** | **8.79** |
| | | | 0.21 | 1.04 | 10.74 | 1.16 | 0.81 |
| SP | Socialist Party | **1** | **1.10** | **-50.36** | **67.14** | **-14.46** | **17.14** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LP | Labour Party | **19** | **11.97** | **-6.49** | **38.06** | **-4.96** | **15.08** |
| | | | 3.51 | 5.63 | 16.71 | 4.82 | 7.19 |
| PD | Progressive Democrats | **6** | **5.57** | **0.38** | **39.30** | **2.05** | **16.80** |
| | | | 3.19 | 4.77 | 9.12 | 3.63 | 6.94 |
| FG | Family of the Irish | **19** | **30.41** | **1.48** | **35.81** | **2.23** | **20.36** |
| | | | 5.39 | 6.25 | 11.39 | 5.14 | 10.53 |
| FF | Soldiers of Destiny | **19** | **43.09** | **0.80** | **27.52** | **0.46** | **12.79** |
| | | | 6.90 | 4.11 | 13.93 | 3.16 | 9.45 |
| CnP | Republican Party | **6** | **4.12** | **3.96** | **30.00** | **3.61** | **18.00** |
| | | | 4.66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| CnT | Party of the Land | **5** | **3.08** | **3.30** | **10.43** | **3.30** | **10.43** |
| | | | 1.49 | 0.25 | 1.00 | 0.25 | 1.00 |
| SF | Ourselves Alone | **4** | **6.47** | **-10.82** | **53.55** | **-5.33** | **16.33** |
| | | | 3.00 | 2.17 | 7.53 | 1.59 | 0.84 |




Figure 35: Left-Right Positions of Irish Parties

the publication of "Just Society" Fine Gael took over social democratic values, emphasized social issues and redistribution and thus approached the LP. FG and Labour thus offered an alternative to Fianna Fáil and consequently entered a government coalition in the mid-1970s.

While the early 1980s were marked by a narrow ideological range around the center FF and FG's electoral support declined paving way for the emergence and establishment of a multi-party system. On the right FF and FG were challenged by the *Progressive Democrats* (PD) responding with moves to the right again. Fianna Fáil eventually settled and started to enter coalition governments with the PD, while the Fine Gael in turn suffered from this "alliance". On the left *Sinn Féin* ("Ourselves Alone", SF), being engaged in both the Republic and Northern Ireland and striving for unity, gained a seat in parliament in the 1997 election for the first time. Strongly emphasizing equality and welfare issues the SF established itself as the most left-wing party.

An interesting note is the right move of all parties except the SF at the 2011 election in the middle of the economic crisis under the impression of Ireland requesting financial assistance from the EU. At the same time Sinn Féin and Labour moved to the left on the LR Core dimension which indicates a resurgence of "classical" left-right issues. In sum, the LR and LR Core capture the ideological development of Irish party competition quite well.

Figure 36: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Ireland

### 3.18 Italy

If anything, the Italian multi-party system is characterized by a "constant volatility" with many party renames, splits and mergers. A watershed in Italian politics is the change from the First (1946–1994) to the Second Republic (1994–present). Yet, the left-right policy dimension is well suited to describe the ideological space of Italian parties.

During the First Republic parties are quite clearly divided in parties of the left and the right, with the communist PCI, the socialist PSI, and the Social democratic PSDI on the left, and the Christian democratic DC, the neo-fascist MSI[28], and the Liberal PLI on the right side of the spectrum. The DC, as the ruling party in the First Republic, incorporated some Social democratic and liberal elements. It thus comes at no surprise that the DC takes a moderate center right position.[29]

The major opposition party – the PCI – is clearly placed to the left. It has been a Moscow-oriented communist party until the leadership of Berlinguer (1972-1984) who broke with Moscow at an International Conference in 1969. This shift towards Eurocommunism is well documented in the data as well as the left shift of Berlinguer's successor Natta who tried to improve the tense relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With the Fall of the Iron Curtain the PCI under Occhetto (1988-1991) moved to the center, and dissolved in the early 1990s in order to compete under the new label *Democratic Party of the Left* (PDS), characterized by a progressive left-wing stance. The data also document the ideological convergence of the DC and PCI in the 1970s which is called the "historic compromise" in Italian politics. The *Italian Socialist Party* (PSI), a moderate left party compared to the PCI, shifted to the center in order to distance itself from the PCI under the leadership of Craxi (1976-1993). The *Italian Democratic Socialist Party* (PSDI), though a minor social democratic party, was the longest serving partner in DC-governments given the ideological closeness of both parties over the whole period.

The liberal parties in the First Republic were divided by the left-right dimension. The *Liberal Party* (PLI) had strong roots in nationalism and the *Republican Party* had a left tradition. Yet, during the so-called Pentapartito both were part of a stable government alliance between DC, the PSI, the PRI, the PLI and the *Italian Democratic Socialist Party* (PSDI) from 1983 to 1991.

Already in the event of the Second Republic ideological polarization increased and many small and short-lived parties emerged which often gained a small number of seats leading to a fragmentation of the parliament. On the left the green FdV and the RC emerged while the *Forza Italia* (FI)

28 Later renamed to *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN)

29 In contrast, the RILE often places the DC to the left while the LR index almost exclusively puts it to the right, which seems to be more appropriate given the DC's actual policies.

Table 19: Descriptive Statistics for Italian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| NCD | New Center-Right | | . | 1.82 | 71.90 | 0.84 | 11.90 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| RC? | Civil Revolution | 1 | 2.30 | -11.77 | 68.36 | 0.05 | 5.56 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PdL | People of Freedom | 2 | 29.50 | 6.09 | 68.95 | 1.70 | 8.75 |
| | | | 11.17 | 6.05 | 4.18 | 1.21 | 4.46 |
| FdV | Green Federation | 6 | 2.47 | -8.35 | 56.21 | -1.84 | 9.48 |
| | | | 0.27 | 10.02 | 19.65 | 3.84 | 3.10 |
| PdUP | Proletarian Unity Party for Communism | 1 | 1.40 | -0.51 | 42.20 | 1.60 | 13.13 |
| | | | . | 2.58 | 13.65 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| DP | Proletarian Democracy | 2 | 1.60 | -2.52 | 44.86 | -2.10 | 14.04 |
| | | | 0.14 | 10.09 | 4.80 | 5.77 | 0.61 |
| RC | Communist Refoundation Party | 5 | 6.20 | -7.51 | 53.09 | -3.52 | 12.39 |
| | | | 1.39 | 7.92 | 8.76 | 5.11 | 4.37 |
| PdCI | Party of Italian Communists | 2 | 2.00 | -1.74 | 55.35 | -0.84 | 12.28 |
| | | | 0.42 | 8.09 | 8.71 | 5.33 | 2.43 |
| DS | Democratic Party of the Left | 15 | 24.09 | -3.57 | 53.24 | -1.01 | 12.25 |
| | | | 5.21 | 4.47 | 10.65 | 2.57 | 5.83 |
| RnP | Rose in the Fist | 1 | 2.60 | -0.53 | 59.21 | 1.47 | 12.16 |
| | | | . | 11.71 | 11.89 | 5.21 | 0.56 |
| SEL | Left Ecology Freedom | 1 | 3.20 | -13.68 | 76.38 | -1.70 | 2.51 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PR | Pannella-Sgarbi List | 6 | 2.33 | -2.16 | 31.35 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | 1.08 | 2.21 | 14.59 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PSI | Italian Socialist Party | 12 | 11.73 | -2.00 | 53.03 | -0.83 | 11.57 |
| | | | 4.41 | 3.10 | 16.06 | 1.92 | 5.30 |
| RI | Italian Renewal | 1 | 1.90 | 7.13 | 64.32 | 7.67 | 19.43 |
| | | | . | 6.96 | 13.02 | 9.24 | 14.12 |
| PSU | Unified Italian Socialist Party | 1 | 14.50 | -3.63 | 66.00 | -1.54 | 8.00 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PSDI | Italian Democratic Socialist Party | 1 | 4.42 | -1.59 | 60.08 | -1.06 | 13.51 |
| | | | 1.39 | 4.07 | 11.49 | 2.82 | 3.78 |
| PRI | Italian Republican Party | 12 | 2.96 | 0.82 | 48.96 | 0.91 | 11.26 |
| | | | 1.25 | 4.34 | 8.66 | 2.79 | 6.67 |
| PLI | Italian Liberal Party | 12 | 3.73 | 5.48 | 52.45 | 5.19 | 22.24 |
| | | | 1.87 | 4.54 | 15.74 | 4.17 | 14.24 |
| Daisy | Daisy - Democracy is Freedom | 1 | 14.50 | -3.30 | 61.37 | -0.53 | 11.00 |
| | | | . | 7.79 | 8.84 | 2.37 | 2.20 |
| PD | Democratic Party | 3 | 29.97 | 0.28 | 55.15 | 0.89 | 10.04 |
| | | | 4.07 | 6.89 | 8.94 | 3.15 | 2.78 |
| CD | Democratic Centre | 1 | 0.50 | 4.52 | 60.36 | 2.02 | 15.86 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SC | Civic Choice | 1 | 8.30 | 1.84 | 55.95 | 4.17 | 12.50 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PPI | Italian Popular Party | 14 | 33.86 | 3.17 | 47.03 | 3.27 | 14.96 |
| | | | 11.47 | 2.49 | 13.26 | 3.02 | 8.52 |
| CCD | Christian Democratic Centre | 1 | 1.70 | 7.03 | 56.77 | 8.41 | 21.14 |
| | | | . | 3.24 | 8.16 | 4.24 | 13.06 |
| PI | Pact for Italy | 1 | 4.60 | 5.65 | 48.71 | 5.14 | 28.08 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| AD | Democratic Alliance | 2 | 4.00 | 4.10 | 52.52 | 6.11 | 23.43 |
| | | | 3.96 | 6.44 | 15.76 | 6.44 | 11.18 |
| UDC | Union of the Center | 4 | 4.35 | 8.26 | 54.34 | 4.28 | 12.42 |
| | | | 2.26 | 5.75 | 12.53 | 1.66 | 5.60 |
| FI | Go Italy | 4 | 23.68 | 7.12 | 55.50 | 6.06 | 14.16 |
| | | | 4.06 | 2.90 | 7.84 | 3.28 | 7.33 |
| NPSI | New Italian Socialist Party | 2 | 0.90 | 5.90 | 50.94 | 4.87 | 11.95 |
| | | | 0.14 | 3.68 | 3.72 | 1.46 | 6.19 |
| FDI-CDN | Brothers of Italy | 1 | 2.00 | 3.58 | 78.04 | 4.09 | 13.26 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| AN | National Alliance | 15 | 7.59 | 3.47 | 46.55 | 2.67 | 17.29 |
| | | | 3.94 | 2.91 | 13.29 | 1.75 | 11.76 |
| LN | Northern League | 7 | 6.87 | 5.32 | 57.44 | 3.50 | 13.98 |
| | | | 2.58 | 4.07 | 11.55 | 1.55 | 5.33 |
| DE | European Democracy | | . | 4.27 | 54.81 | 3.56 | 14.21 |
| | | | . | 5.99 | 1.76 | 3.31 | 2.99 |
| LdV | List Di Pietro - Italy of Values | 2 | 3.35 | -0.47 | 64.42 | 0.13 | 15.58 |
| | | | 1.48 | 8.58 | 3.61 | 2.75 | 2.75 |
| ALD | Autonomy Liberty Democracy | | . | -8.81 | 67.62 | -2.21 | 12.56 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SVP | South Tyrolean People's Party | 3 | 0.43 | -5.62 | 65.60 | 0.04 | 16.97 |
| | | | 0.06 | 5.52 | 3.51 | 3.88 | 7.64 |
| LR | The Network/Movement for Democracy | 2 | 1.90 | -0.97 | 58.57 | 4.17 | 20.00 |
| | | | 0.00 | 0.33 | 6.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| UDEUR | Popular Democratic Union for Europe | 1 | 1.40 | -8.81 | 67.62 | -2.21 | 12.56 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| MS5 | Five Star Movement | 1 | 25.60 | -19.07 | 84.52 | -5.03 | 24.52 |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 37: Left-Right Positions of Italian Parties

became the strongest party on the right. The Olive Tree Coalition, an electoral alliance of a couple of center-left parties was formed, later founding the *Partito Democratico* (PD). Interestingly, at the 2008 election the main candidates Berlusconi (FI) and Veltroni (PD) announced such similar policies that they were dubbed "Veltrusconi", and the data impressively track the ideological closeness of both parties.

Considering the LR Core dimension movements resemble those within the LR dimension. This comes at no surprise given the very low LR Core importance scores. Yet, the importance of the LR dimension sticks out, meaning that Italian parties make excessive use of additional left-right issues. The ability of the LR index to capture them makes it especially suited to analyze today's Italian party competition.

Figure 38: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Italy

### 3.19 Japan

Japan sticks out in many regards as it "really is a one-off case [...], since it is the only instance of a country of non-European antecedents to become an advanced capitalist democracy" (Castles, 1998, p. 8) and it is common sense that the left-right dimension is of minor relevance to Japanese politics. At the same time, factions – especially within the largest *Liberal Democratic Party* (LDP), which shaped politics for decades – are at least as important as competitor parties. In light of these peculiarities it comes at no surprise that Japan is among those countries with the lowest LR and LR Core importance scores.

Party positions oscillated between right and left in the post-World War II era. Starting out on the right from 1960[30] to 1967 parties moved to the left in the 1970s. The 1980s saw a time of strong

Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for Japanese Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| JCP | Japanese Communist Party | **16** | **8.30** | **-2.08** | **37.63** | **-2.33** | **12.04** |
| | | | 2.74 | 8.49 | 13.92 | 5.32 | 6.25 |
| JSP | Social Democratic Party | **16** | **18.15** | **-1.07** | **37.95** | **-1.61** | **8.54** |
| | | | 7.88 | 4.30 | 14.70 | 3.14 | 4.52 |
| DSP | Democratic Socialist Party | **12** | **6.65** | **3.53** | **36.94** | **-1.62** | **11.59** |
| | | | 1.38 | 7.74 | 16.72 | 3.46 | 5.63 |
| SDF | Social Democratic Federation | **5** | **0.76** | **2.79** | **35.28** | **-0.59** | **7.11** |
| | | | 0.09 | 3.99 | 10.29 | 0.33 | 3.98 |
| CGP | New Clean Government Party | **11** | **9.37** | **1.50** | **40.77** | **-1.06** | **12.03** |
| | | | 1.97 | 7.80 | 17.52 | 4.57 | 5.98 |
| LDP | Liberal Democratic Party | **16** | **43.88** | **4.72** | **40.34** | **0.76** | **13.38** |
| | | | 7.93 | 8.56 | 16.84 | 3.46 | 7.04 |
| NLC | New Liberal Club | **5** | **2.88** | **8.40** | **37.60** | **2.89** | **7.89** |
| | | | 0.89 | 4.04 | 16.85 | 0.52 | 2.21 |
| JRP | Japan Renewal Party | **1** | **10.10** | **2.16** | **27.35** | **1.92** | **11.70** |
| | | | . | 1.59 | 27.52 | 2.71 | 16.55 |
| NFP | New Frontier Party | **1** | **28.00** | **3.28** | **46.81** | **3.83** | **23.40** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| DPJ | Democratic Party of Japan | **4** | **27.45** | **1.25** | **34.30** | **0.70** | **10.07** |
| | | | 9.00 | 5.42 | 8.22 | 1.83 | 1.72 |
| LP | Liberal Party | **1** | **11.00** | **4.66** | **44.12** | **3.39** | **17.17** |
| | | | . | 11.04 | 8.51 | 5.68 | 9.71 |
| NCP | New Conservative Party | **2** | **0.20** | **12.65** | **43.46** | **8.01** | **21.31** |
| | | | 0.28 | 8.61 | 5.17 | 4.20 | 4.86 |
| PNP | People's New Party | **1** | **1.70** | **-9.53** | **45.29** | **-7.53** | **18.24** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| IC | Independent's Party | **1** | **0.00** | **-2.27** | **33.33** | **-0.75** | **9.09** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| NP | New Party Harbinger | **2** | **1.80** | **0.91** | **15.40** | **-0.12** | **5.73** |
| | | | 1.13 | 3.19 | 3.17 | 1.70 | 4.38 |
| JNP | Japan New Party | **1** | **8.10** | **2.58** | **29.65** | **1.92** | **11.70** |
| | | | . | 0.99 | 24.26 | 2.71 | 16.55 |

30 For Japan, there is no party manifesto data before 1960




Figure 39: Left-Right Positions of Japanese Parties

right positions which weakened in the 1990s and 2000s.[31] Yet, the ideological range remained quite narrow and all parties moved in accordance most of the time.

The major LDP, which has been described as a moderate conservative party, has almost exclusively been the leading government party in the post-war period and often took an ideological lead in polarized periods. This is true no matter if the positions were left or right. Looking at the LR Core dimension the LDP is much more centrist than in the LR dimension. The LR Core also shows that the LDP is mainly center-right and that the left parties are mainly center-left. The waves, which were obvious in the LR-index, disappear when looking at the core left-right issues. The only exception is the sharp shift of the *Japanese Communist Party* JPC in the 2005 election. This left trend is caused by the emphasis of classical as well as other left issues. With this radicalism, the JCP clearly distinguishes itself from the other Japanese parties.

By looking at the oscillation and leapfrogging of the parties on the left-right scale, which concerns both the LR and the LR Core index, one can conclude that the left-right semantic indeed is not a major demarcation line of the political discourse in Japanese politics. Proof of this assumption is also given by the MDS analysis of the LR Plus statements which are often difficult to interpret.

31 These waves have not been identified by the RILE. In general the RILE places all parties strongly to the left in contrast to the LR.

Figure 40: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Japan

### 3.20 Latvia

Like the other Baltic States, Latvia's party system shows a high degree of fragmentation. New parties emerge, compete for votes and perish again. This makes it difficult to track policy moves because only very few parties competed more than once in the elections. In terms of ideology, it can be stated that clear-cut positions like in Western Europe are not very common. The degree of party organizations and voter alignment are on a low level, hence larger position changes of parties are likely to occur.

Clear-cut leftist parties were rare in Latvia, the exception being the communist successor *Latvian*

Table 21: Descriptive Statistics for Latvian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| ZZS | Greens' and Farmers' Union | **1** | **9.50** | **-0.05** | **51.16** | **2.55** | **20.93** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LSP | Latvian Socialist Party | **2** | **5.70** | **-8.57** | **61.78** | **-1.92** | **14.95** |
| | | | 0.14 | 5.34 | 19.17 | 2.49 | 3.85 |
| LSDA | Latvian Social Democratic Alliance | **1** | **12.90** | **2.76** | **41.83** | **0.47** | **9.60** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LVP | Latvian Unity Party | **1** | **7.20** | **2.57** | **68.97** | **0.87** | **15.52** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LC | Latvian Way Union | **4** | **17.60** | **7.39** | **47.05** | **3.96** | **15.66** |
| | | | 11.39 | 2.87 | 8.34 | 3.05 | 6.19 |
| DPS | Democratic Party "Saimnieks" | **2** | **10.00** | **4.48** | **58.15** | **3.21** | **13.01** |
| | | | 7.35 | 0.39 | 26.36 | 0.29 | 1.81 |
| TSP | National Harmony Party | **3** | **10.60** | **-4.39** | **49.80** | **0.29** | **11.07** |
| | | | 4.47 | 7.70 | 17.75 | 1.57 | 6.53 |
| PCTVL | For Human Rights in a United Latvia | **1** | **19.10** | **-6.21** | **33.87** | **0.70** | **6.45** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| JL | New Era | **1** | **24.00** | **3.42** | **44.78** | **2.38** | **7.46** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| JP | New Party | **1** | **7.30** | **10.43** | **50.59** | **8.63** | **34.12** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LKDS | Christian Democratic Union | **1** | **5.00** | **15.32** | **53.21** | **12.33** | **30.10** |
| | | | . | 11.28 | 20.42 | 10.43 | 28.14 |
| LPP | Latvia's First Party | **1** | **9.60** | **7.31** | **47.62** | **3.35** | **19.05** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| TP | People's Party | **2** | **18.95** | **2.97** | **41.70** | **0.72** | **5.55** |
| | | | 3.18 | 2.10 | 4.40 | 1.48 | 5.36 |
| LNNK | Latvian National Independence Movement of Latvia | **2** | **9.85** | **7.18** | **44.51** | **3.51** | **18.29** |
| | | | 5.02 | 4.99 | 5.27 | 3.06 | 5.49 |
| TB | For Fatherland and Freedom | **2** | **8.70** | **5.61** | **45.41** | **2.92** | **17.06** |
| | | | 4.67 | 2.45 | 14.49 | 3.13 | 10.01 |
| TKL | Popular Movement for Latvia | **1** | **15.00** | **6.61** | **44.44** | **2.88** | **8.89** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| TB-LNNK | For Fatherland and Freedom - National Indepence Movement of Latvia | **2** | **10.05** | **4.54** | **40.55** | **2.68** | **11.47** |
| | | | 6.58 | 0.74 | 2.99 | 0.46 | 1.13 |
| LZS | Latvian Farmers' Union | **1** | **10.70** | **17.38** | **56.39** | **14.31** | **36.46** |
| | | | . | 10.25 | 19.50 | 9.35 | 23.45 |
| ZS-LKDS-LDP | Coalition of Latvian Farmer | **1** | **6.40** | **23.30** | **67.65** | **19.71** | **50.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 41: Left-Right Positions of Latvian Parties

*Socialist Party* (LSP) which is clearly on the left. The *National Harmony Party* (TSP) started as a center-right party, leapfrogged the former communists of the LSP and then moved to a center-left, social democratic position in the 1998 election again.[32] Another leapfrogging competitor is the *People's Party* (TP). It has a center-right position in 1998 and moved towards the center in 2002, while both *Latvia's Way* (LC) and *For Fatherland and Freedom/National Independence Movement of Latvia* (TB/LNNK) moved to the right. The LC had it's roots in the independence movements of the 1980s and early 1990s. It merged in 2007 with *Latvia's First Party* (LPP) but lost importance until it was disbanded.

The *National Independence Movement of Latvia* (LNNK) was the radical right-wing of the national movement and an important opposition party after the 1993 election. The party became more moderate in the following elections and merged in 1997 with the other major right party *For the Fatherland and Freedom* forming the new party TB/LNNK (Schmidt, 2010, p. 155). The TB/LNNK moved slightly to the right again, promoting a negative attitude towards the naturalization of non-Latvian citizens.

Given the very low LR Core importance scores party positions on the LR Core dimension unsurprisingly show a moderate-center orientation and a narrow range with a slight tendency to the right; core left position are rare. Yet, the LR importance scores are much higher indicating that party competition is rather shaped by additional plus-pers. The TSP and LSP show the biggest differences of LR and LR Core positions due to their lax position towards citizenship of non-Latvians. In terms of classical left-right issues both parties are way more center-oriented. Given that the topic of naturalization is seen as the only relevant cleavage in Latvia (Schmidt, 2010, p. 154) the LR index indeed identifies it as an additional left plus-per which makes it well suited to describe Latvian party positions.

32 The RILE is not showing the leapfrogging of the LSP by the TSP, because RILE placed the LSP as center-right party in the first election.




Figure 42: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Latvia

### 3.21 Lithuania

Lithuania's party system resembles the Estonian and Latvian party systems: Party positions are rather homogeneous and center-oriented with a slight tendency to the right. Even in a long-term perspective radical policy moves are rare. Yet, a moderate increase of center positions in the last decade is noticeable, which may be caused by Lithuania's accession to the European Union in 2004 (Dorussen and Nanou, 2006).

The major center-right party in Lithuania is the *Homeland Union* (TS). Especially in the early years of Lithuania's independence the party gained a majority of seats with its combination of Christian democratic, nationalist and conservative-liberal positions. With its strong emphasis on governmental efficiency and the urge to modernize the economy on the one hand, and its use of classical right issues like traditional morality and law and order-policies on the other hand, the TS demar-

Table 22: Descriptive Statistics for Lithuanian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| LDDP | Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party | **2** | **27.00** | **3.04** | **36.98** | **1.63** | **10.33** |
| | | | 24.04 | 1.83 | 6.28 | 1.42 | 0.69 |
| LSDP | Lithuanian Social Democratic Party | **6** | **14.58** | **1.47** | **31.93** | **0.34** | **9.42** |
| | | | 9.37 | 2.37 | 9.64 | 0.83 | 2.08 |
| NS-SL | New Union (Social Liberals) | **3** | **10.40** | **2.58** | **36.04** | **-0.39** | **7.39** |
| | | | 8.27 | 3.43 | 13.03 | 0.76 | 1.83 |
| LCS | Lithuanian Centre Union | **3** | **4.70** | **4.91** | **42.58** | **2.53** | **16.92** |
| | | | 3.47 | 2.61 | 16.06 | 2.53 | 5.04 |
| LLS | Lithuanian Liberal Union | **1** | **17.30** | **5.79** | **36.37** | **2.88** | **9.38** |
| | | | . | 0.53 | 22.28 | 0.57 | 0.59 |
| LbCS | Liberal and Centre Union | **2** | **7.25** | **3.55** | **20.36** | **2.98** | **9.98** |
| | | | 2.76 | 2.65 | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.26 |
| DP | Labour Party | **3** | **19.37** | **-0.37** | **21.65** | **0.42** | **6.96** |
| | | | 9.77 | 3.57 | 0.89 | 0.41 | 1.51 |
| LRLS | Liberal Movement | **2** | **7.35** | **3.65** | **19.64** | **4.07** | **10.85** |
| | | | 2.33 | 2.04 | 6.28 | 1.99 | 4.70 |
| PTT | Order and Justice | **3** | **10.57** | **2.18** | **29.99** | **1.57** | **16.20** |
| | | | 2.65 | 1.80 | 13.55 | 1.19 | 10.41 |
| LKDP | Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party | **2** | **6.75** | **6.80** | **47.19** | **4.98** | **23.38** |
| | | | 5.16 | 0.88 | 3.87 | 0.70 | 4.37 |
| LPKTS | Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees | **2** | **0.80** | **8.47** | **53.65** | **5.34** | **16.59** |
| | | | 1.13 | 3.27 | 5.61 | 4.36 | 13.83 |
| LKDPK | Lithuanian Christian Democrratic Party Coaliton | **1** | **12.60** | **7.80** | **50.98** | **5.13** | **18.35** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| TS | Homeland Union | **6** | **18.55** | **8.24** | **42.73** | **6.26** | **20.26** |
| | | | 7.64 | 4.25 | 13.55 | 3.71 | 9.62 |
| TPP | National Resurrection Party | **1** | **15.10** | **1.64** | **23.80** | **3.20** | **13.00** |
| | | | . | 0.04 | 5.24 | 0.75 | 4.01 |
| LTSS | Lithuanian National Union List | **2** | **2.10** | **7.39** | **58.70** | **2.94** | **18.32** |
| | | | 0.14 | 9.67 | 11.62 | 8.02 | 7.37 |
| LVP | Lithuanian Agriarian Party | **1** | **4.10** | **4.74** | **38.91** | **-0.09** | **4.29** |
| | | | . | 0.66 | 19.42 | 0.33 | 0.47 |
| LVŽS | Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union | **3** | **4.80** | **-0.69** | **31.59** | **0.35** | **5.60** |
| | | | 1.57 | 8.58 | 11.10 | 0.35 | 2.84 |
| LLRA | Union of Poles of Lithuania | **6** | **2.83** | **5.82** | **38.86** | **3.70** | **7.87** |
| | | | 1.31 | 2.92 | 21.40 | 1.24 | 4.62 |
| DK | The Way of Courage | **1** | **8.30** | **4.18** | **22.88** | **5.67** | **14.39** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 43: Left-Right Positions of Lithuanian Parties

cates the right of the ideological spectrum. An important party on the other side of the political spectrum is the *Social Democratic Party of Lithuania* (LSDP) which dates back to the 19th century. For a decade the party represented center-positions, meanwhile occupying the left of Lithuanian party positions.

Apart from the TS and LSDP a number of highly relevant, but often short-lived competitors exist. The *Labour Party* (DP) is a case in point. Founded in 2003, just one year later the party gained the majority of seats in the 2004 elections to the European parliament, lost heavily in the 2008 election but recovered in 2012. It's ideology can be described as centrist with a tendency to the left in recent years. Given the ideological congruence of left-right party positions, unsurprisingly the DP formed a coalition with the LSDP in 2004. There is a slight tendency to the left in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis resulting in left party positions for the first time in post-transitional Lithuania. Only lately environmentalism (*per501*) found its way into party competition as an additional left issue; while this issue has been used by almost all parties on a low level the *Lithuanian Peasent and Greens Union* (LVZS) made extensive use of this topic which puts it to the very left in recent years.

When looking at the raw data (pers), Lithuanian parties indeed refer to classical LR Core issues – but not the left ones. From this perspective, the LR and LR Core are suited to analyze Lithuanian party positions precisely because they are able to capture the country-specific characteristics of the issue competition.




Figure 44: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Lithuania

### 3.22 Luxembourg

The Luxembourgian party system is a typical Beneluxian party system with the presence of a major Christian-democratic catch-all party, the *Christian Social People's Party* (CSV), the social democratic *Socialist Workers' Party* (LSAP), the liberal *Democratic Party* (PD) and, though of minor importance regarding vote and seat share in parliament, the *Communist Party of Luxembourg* (KPL). Apart from that only two minor parties, the *Alternative Democatic Reform Party* (ADR) and the Greens (GLEI/GAP) managed to successfully enter party competition and stabilize their share, which makes the Luxembourgian party system a very stable one. At the same time the willingness to compromise is very pronounced and the three major parties formed government coalitions of any combination. It therefore comes at no surprise that party positions are rather center orientated and the LR Core importance is comparatively low.

The most important party in the post-war period was the CVP, which governed nearly all the time, with its center-right orientation and without any considerable swings in the last decades. The LSAP shows a very similar pattern with differences only in the early post-war period. Both are good examples for the low levels of polarization in Luxembourg. The PD follows the overall trend of the other parties, although it leapfrogged the CSV in 1982. Henceforth, the PD was the most right party until the 1999 election when the right-wing populist ADR took over, demarcating the right end of the party system.

The Greens, though slightly to the left, appear very similar to the LSAP in ideological terms, whereas the KPL occupies the left end of the party system. After a time of moderation it had an

Table 23: Descriptive Statistics for Luxembourgian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| GLEI | Green Left Ecological Initiative | **1** | **3.70** | **1.79** | **17.78** | **0.26** | **1.91** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| GAP | Green Alternative | **2** | **4.45** | **0.61** | **18.95** | **-0.86** | **2.10** |
| | | | 1.06 | 1.11 | 2.38 | 1.22 | 0.95 |
| GLEI/GAP | The Greens | **5** | **10.68** | **0.57** | **45.38** | **-0.13** | **6.15** |
| | | | 1.09 | 4.82 | 18.47 | 0.36 | 2.73 |
| KPL/ PCL | Communist Party of Luxembourg | **11** | **9.57** | **-7.17** | **37.46** | **-5.69** | **17.20** |
| | | | 4.69 | 12.16 | 17.10 | 12.26 | 20.32 |
| Lénk | The Left | **2** | **4.25** | **-8.93** | **53.19** | **-5.67** | **14.69** |
| | | | 0.92 | 8.05 | 27.99 | 0.19 | 8.86 |
| LSAP/POSL | Socialist Workers' Party | **16** | **29.37** | **-1.58** | **36.22** | **-2.40** | **12.13** |
| | | | 6.51 | 5.83 | 16.21 | 4.55 | 8.24 |
| DP/PD | Democratic Group | **16** | **16.96** | **4.34** | **38.56** | **2.43** | **13.01** |
| | | | 4.15 | 4.39 | 18.60 | 2.67 | 7.29 |
| CSV/PCS | Christian Social People's Party | **16** | **35.10** | **5.04** | **44.39** | **4.02** | **18.43** |
| | | | 4.13 | 5.64 | 13.66 | 5.62 | 7.94 |
| ADR | Alternative Democatic Reform Party | **6** | **8.75** | **7.72** | **56.86** | **3.06** | **12.62** |
| | | | 1.65 | 2.29 | 11.95 | 2.09 | 5.40 |




Figure 45: Left-Right Positions of Luxembourgian Parties

extreme left profile in the 1979 election, which, however, has been a sole exception.[33] Like other communist parties in Western Europe, with the Fall of the Iron Curtain the party dissolved over internal struggles. Reformers instead formed the *Lénk* which first entered parliament in 1999 but never gained more than two seats in the elections.

In sum, the projection of the left-right scale confirms the rank-order of parties as expected from party family ascriptions. Interesting though is the fact that both the Greens and the *Lénk* (The Left) are less radical regarding "classical" left-right issues; they rather compete over plus-pers – a typical pattern found with many Western European green parties.

33 The Manifesto codings show an unusually high value of nearly 75% of all sentences devoted to *per404* ("economic planning+") which is a left core-item. Yet, some doubts remain if this is due to a coding error.

Figure 46: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Luxembourg

### 3.23 Malta

Strongly shaped by its Westminster heritage the party system of Malta is a classical two-party system, whereby smaller parties practically have no chance to win seats due to the complex electoral system. The main contenders for power are the *Labour Party* (PL) on the left, and the *Nationalist Party* (PN) on the right. Sparse Manifesto data makes it difficult to meaningfully interpret Maltese party positions. Yet, the data for the two elections in 1996 and 1998 show that both parties are moderate in their positions but that there is a left-right divide in the expected direction.

Both parties have a stable voter base, swing voters are rare and voting behavior is heavily influenced by the preferences of parents and grandparents. From this point of view it comes at no surprise that party manifestos do not really matter (Bestler and Waschkuhn, 2009, p. 883) and the LR and LR Core importance are among the lowest levels of all 36 countries taken into account. This indicates that the left-right dimension is less suited to describe the ideological party competition of Malta; rather it is patronage shaping the political contest.

Table 24: Descriptive Statistics for Maltese Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| PL | Labour Party | **2** | **48.85** | **-4.38** | **16.19** | **-1.41** | **11.59** |
| | | | 2.62 | 1.74 | 1.16 | 1.16 | 0.27 |
| PN | Nationalist Party | **2** | **49.80** | **1.68** | **9.41** | **2.03** | **8.87** |
| | | | 2.83 | 0.13 | 0.91 | 0.36 | 1.68 |




Figure 47: Left-Right Positions of Maltese Parties

Figure 48: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Malta

### 3.24 The Netherlands

The Dutch party system is neatly divided on the left-right dimension although there has been a convergence of left-right party positions in recent times. At the same time party competition is less fought on "classical" ground rather than on additional plus-pers accompanying the core-dimension, indicated by the notable difference of the LR and LR Core importance scores and the fact that the Netherlands are among those countries with the highest average number of plus-pers. On the right are the liberal *People's Party for Freedom and Democracy* (VVD), several Christian democratic parties (KVP, ARP, CHU, and from 1977 onwards the *Christian Democratic Appeal* (CDA), a merger of the former), and most recently the populist *Party for Freedom* (PVV). On the left are the Social democrats (PvdA), the *Democrats' 66* (D66), the *Socialist Party* (SP), and the *Green Left* (GL).

The post-World War II era saw a strong shift from the right to the left caused by the depillarization and a general consensus to create a comprehensive Dutch welfare state. The PvdA, KVP, CHU, and

Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Dutch Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| GL | Green Left | **8** | **5.07** | **-2.71** | **51.58** | **0.14** | **6.83** |
| | | | 1.80 | 7.86 | 15.85 | 1.02 | 1.88 |
| SP | Socialist Party | **7** | **7.59** | **-4.57** | **53.14** | **-1.28** | **9.40** |
| | | | 5.02 | 4.07 | 9.83 | 1.84 | 2.17 |
| PPR | Radical Political Party | **6** | **2.22** | **-20.50** | **72.48** | **-2.41** | **6.82** |
| | | | 1.29 | 6.45 | 10.76 | 1.78 | 2.28 |
| PvdA | Labour Party | **21** | **27.06** | **-8.77** | **65.38** | **-1.98** | **11.88** |
| | | | 4.70 | 9.08 | 13.65 | 3.06 | 4.37 |
| D66 | Democrats'66 | **15** | **6.73** | **-6.84** | **57.86** | **0.35** | **9.51** |
| | | | 3.33 | 9.87 | 16.40 | 2.25 | 2.77 |
| VVD | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy | **21** | **15.23** | **7.54** | **61.45** | **6.49** | **20.11** |
| | | | 5.69 | 7.86 | 12.05 | 3.20 | 6.99 |
| LN | Livable Netherlands | **2** | **1.00** | **3.02** | **65.88** | **1.59** | **6.79** |
| | | | 0.85 | 1.96 | 18.81 | 0.26 | 0.31 |
| CDA | Christian Democratic Appeal | **12** | **25.63** | **1.16** | **56.38** | **3.33** | **15.67** |
| | | | 8.37 | 5.42 | 10.37 | 2.06 | 4.34 |
| KVP | Catholic People's Party | **9** | **27.98** | **5.22** | **74.90** | **5.56** | **20.33** |
| | | | 5.06 | 12.26 | 4.85 | 4.69 | 5.37 |
| ARP | Anti-Revolutionary Party | **9** | **10.30** | **8.66** | **75.02** | **5.19** | **19.46** |
| | | | 1.77 | 13.64 | 6.43 | 3.41 | 5.33 |
| DS'70 | Democratic Socialists'70 | **3** | **3.37** | **-8.10** | **64.51** | **1.34** | **10.89** |
| | | | 2.39 | 4.05 | 2.58 | 1.94 | 4.49 |
| CHU | Christian Historical Union | **9** | **7.80** | **5.54** | **68.95** | **6.38** | **21.12** |
| | | | 1.40 | 12.33 | 10.13 | 4.71 | 6.82 |
| CU | Christian Union | **5** | **2.98** | **8.83** | **58.08** | **7.32** | **22.53** |
| | | | 0.73 | 5.97 | 14.34 | 2.42 | 1.85 |
| LPF | List Pim Fortuyn | **2** | **11.35** | **7.64** | **68.60** | **3.13** | **9.38** |
| | | | 7.99 | 2.76 | 3.92 | 1.32 | 4.41 |
| PVV | Party of Freedom | **3** | **10.37** | **17.86** | **59.38** | **4.86** | **15.02** |
| | | | 4.83 | 10.37 | 14.46 | 2.74 | 4.68 |
| PvdD | Party for the Animals | **3** | **1.67** | **-7.80** | **71.51** | **-0.41** | **4.07** |
| | | | 0.32 | 5.26 | 10.39 | 0.66 | 0.79 |
| SGP | Reformed Political Party | **3** | **1.80** | **17.97** | **57.44** | **15.67** | **30.32** |
| | | | 0.26 | 0.15 | 1.58 | 0.30 | 1.33 |
| 50+ | 50Plus | **1** | **1.30** | **-8.40** | **52.43** | **0.30** | **8.25** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 49: Left-Right Positions of Dutch Parties

the VVD or ARP formed the first governments from 1948-1958 under PvdA prime minister Drees. At this time the foundation of the Dutch welfare state was laid and all other parties approached the position of the PvdA. Once in opposition the PvdA strongly moved left initiated by an internal group called the "New Left" in the 1960s. Afterwards it steadily moved to the right advocating neoliberal economic policies under the leadership of Kok from 1994 to 2002 visible by the moderate right positions in the period after 1994.[34]

Another party located in the left spectrum is the D66 – a social-liberal party founded in 1966 which generally moves in close tandem with the PvdA, though a bit more to the right. An additional competitor – the *Socialist Party* (SP) – entered the scene in the early 1990s after getting rid of its Marxist-Leninist coat paving way for more moderate left positions since then.

The 1994 election is exceptional since both major parties, the PvdA and the CDA seriously lost votes, the CDA, which governed the Netherlands for nearly 18 years due to its pivotal position in the ideological spectrum, was excluded from government, and a "purple coalition" made up by the PvdA, VVD and D66 entered office. At the same time, the right shift of the PvdA opened up an ideological niche for the SP and the GL.

Throughout the 1980s all parties moved in accordance but stayed on the left, whereas the 1990s saw a strong right move culminating in the 2003 election. As a result of the earthquake election 2002 and the emergence of the right-wing populist *List Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) all parties responded by moving to the right as well (van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2004, p. 160). Interestingly, the GL even leapfrogged the other parties from a left to the most right position and back again in 2006. These shifts occurred under party leader Halsema who initiated an ideological debate within the party in which she stressed freedom and pragmatism. The LR position of the LPF confirms the impression that its party leader Fortuyn was nationalist regarding opposition against multiculturalism and immigration but that he was not as far right as the FPÖ in Austria, the FN in France, or as a matter of fact the *Party for Freedom* (PVV) in the Netherlands founded in 2006 by Wilders. Like other populist parties in Europe the PVV utilizes welfare chauvinism which makes the party more left-leaning than their actual profile is.

To sum up, when looking at the actual placements, the importance of the LR compared to the LR Core and the movements, the LR is well suited to capture Dutch party competition precisely because it grasps the additional issues parties compete for.

34 In contrast, the RILE found an "unprecedented leapfrogging of the CDA by the PvdA" (Budge and Klingemann, 2001, p. 44) as a result of the ideological rapprochement of the PvdA and the VVD in the first coalition without the CDA in 1994. The LR confirms the rapprochement but not to the degree that the PvdA leapfrogged the CDA.

Figure 50: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in the Netherlands

### 3.25 New Zealand

Traditionally, party competition in New Zealand is fought between the *Labour Party* (Labour) on the left hand, and the center-right, socially conservative *National Party* (NP) on the other hand. Both parties stayed within their ideological range and never leapfrogged throughout the post-World War II era. Due to the typical Westminster First-Past-the-Post election system smaller parties had hard times entering parliament, but the *Social Credit Party* (SC) made it as late as 1966. As a result of the introduction of a mixed-member proportional voting system in 1996 more parties entered parliament leading to a diversification of ideological profiles. This is true for the liberal parties *ACT New Zealand* (ACT) and *United Future* on the right and the *Green Party of Aotearoa* (Greens) on the left. This indicates that electoral engineering indeed has a profound effect on the number of parties and positions taken by these parties.

According to the LR the Labour Party in New Zealand is a moderate social democratic party. The data also documents the shift of Labour to the right in the 1987 election.[35] In the aftermath of this election, Labour introduced free market reforms and sought to implement sweeping reforms to the

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics for New Zealand Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Greens | Green Party of Aotearoa | **5** | **7.06** | **-14.15** | **65.95** | **0.33** | **10.95** |
| | | | 2.40 | 4.30 | 9.29 | 0.90 | 6.08 |
| Labour | New Zealand Labour Party | **23** | **41.23** | **-4.83** | **53.23** | **-3.19** | **13.64** |
| | | | 6.19 | 5.09 | 17.00 | 3.43 | 7.31 |
| Alliance | The Alliance | **3** | **12.00** | **-5.39** | **27.87** | **-2.79** | **14.50** |
| | | | 5.50 | 1.81 | 9.94 | 2.70 | 5.94 |
| ACT | ACT New Zealand | **6** | **4.42** | **22.35** | **67.89** | **13.50** | **29.77** |
| | | | 2.71 | 4.77 | 11.00 | 2.40 | 4.20 |
| UF | United Future New Zealand | **4** | **2.72** | **19.21** | **60.36** | **17.09** | **45.46** |
| | | | 2.81 | 9.27 | 10.27 | 8.04 | 16.77 |
| PP | Progressive Party | **3** | **1.27** | **-0.36** | **54.59** | **2.33** | **23.97** |
| | | | 0.40 | 3.30 | 8.37 | 1.59 | 4.96 |
| NP | New Zealand National Party | **23** | **42.34** | **7.20** | **63.69** | **4.23** | **16.17** |
| | | | 7.47 | 5.46 | 14.31 | 3.72 | 9.13 |
| NZPF | New Zealand First Party | **7** | **7.56** | **-1.17** | **49.83** | **0.89** | **16.11** |
| | | | 3.41 | 4.66 | 20.44 | 1.74 | 6.44 |
| Maori | Maori Party | **3** | **1.97** | **1.33** | **48.84** | **4.05** | **12.95** |
| | | | 0.51 | 1.01 | 5.45 | 1.63 | 5.22 |
| Mana | Mana Party | **1** | **1.10** | **-14.26** | **69.55** | **-0.84** | **14.25** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SC | New Zealand Democratic Part | **13** | **9.56** | **-5.92** | **56.96** | **-4.32** | **25.50** |
| | | | 4.97 | 9.58 | 25.40 | 7.10 | 23.69 |

35 In contrast to the LR the RILE sees a move to the right in 1981 when Labour was still in opposition. In the 1984 and above all the 1987 election the RILE identifies a strong move to the left. Because the RILE does not capture the rightward shift, Budge and Klingemann (2001, p. 29) state that the party had an "extremely orthodox and restrictive stance in the government of the late 1980s. Indeed its actual taking of power was accompanied by a move Left so far as the programme was concerned. This could cast doubt on the accuracy of our estimate were it not that many commentators also saw government action as inconsistent with their mandate."




Figure 51: Left-Right Positions of New Zealand Parties

economy and tax system under Finance Minister Roger Douglas ("Rogernomics"). The reforms of the Labour government turned politics in New Zealand upside down: "Between 1984 and 1993, New Zealand underwent radical economic reform, moving from what had probably been the most protected, regulated and state-dominated system of any capitalist democracy to an extreme position at the open, competitive, free-market end of the spectrum" (Nagel, 1998, p. 223). A Labour-splinter, the *Alliance*, was clearly left from Labour in the 1993 and 1996 elections but moved back to the center in 1999 which went hand in hand with its electoral decline. The *Green Party* occupies the left end in New Zealand since its appearance in parliament in 1999. Furthermore, the Greens in New Zealand are one of the most extreme left leaning Green parties in the sample; yet, in line with the common pattern, the Greens are very centrist to moderate right regarding "classical" left-right core issues.

For the *National Party* the data show the strong anti-communist campaign in the 1951 election with a peak of a rightist LR Core position. The moderate position in 1990 in turn reflects Bolger's promise of delivering a "Decent Society" following the previous Labour government's economic reforms. Like Labour, the NP saw splinters as well, with *New Zealand First* (NZF) taking more centrist positions than the NP.

After the introduction of the new electoral system ideological polarization increased culminating after the 2008 economic crisis: the ideological distance between the NP and Labour has never before been as great as in the 2011 election. Interestingly, this increase is confirmed – and partly based on – the LR Core dimension, indicating that party politics in New Zealand moved to a party competition fought on a traditional left-right ground unknown to the same extent since the first decade after World War II. In the end, capturing these trends makes the LR and LR Core well suited to analyze party positions in New Zealand.

Figure 52: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in New Zealand

### 3.26 Norway

Like the other Nordic countries Norway has a relatively large number of parties in line with Rokkan's (1966) cleavage theory. The rank-order of parties both on the LR and LR Core dimension neatly corresponds to their party family membership. Developed with Norway as the blueprint for his theory six parties mirror the cleavages: the *Conservative Party* (H), the *Christian People's Party* (KrF), the *Center Party* (SP), the *Liberal Party* (V), the *Norwegian Labour Party* (DNA) and the *Socialist Left Party* (SV).

Both the DNA and the SV are firmly to the left whereby the SV and its predecessors on the left such as the *Norwegian Communist Party* (NKP) are left to the DNA. Yet, coalition formation is rather deadlocked, a pattern better known from two-party than from multi-party systems. The DNA, as the biggest party in parliament, mostly held the government. Since the 1980s government alternates between a left Labour government and a center-right coalition led by the Conservative Party.

Besides occasional leapfrogging, like the KrF and H in 1981, party ideology is very stable yet diverse, showing a wide ideological range.[36] More precisely, the relative differences between the parties remain on the same level for most of the time, because all parties move in accordance. This trend was interrupted by the *Progress Party* (FRP), an additional right wing party which promi-

Table 27: Descriptive Statistics for Norwegian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| NKP | Norwegian Communist Party | **4** | **6.55** | **-10.72** | **69.65** | **-2.33** | **17.80** |
| | | | 3.71 | 5.02 | 12.51 | 1.57 | 7.69 |
| SV | Socialist Left Party | **13** | **6.85** | **-14.57** | **71.69** | **-4.34** | **9.76** |
| | | | 3.04 | 4.78 | 7.99 | 3.83 | 4.90 |
| DNA | Norwegian Labour Party | **17** | **39.55** | **-8.47** | **62.32** | **-3.73** | **11.33** |
| | | | 6.44 | 2.85 | 10.23 | 3.30 | 5.08 |
| DLF | Liberal People's Party | **1** | **3.40** | **1.94** | **55.87** | **1.01** | **8.40** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| V | Liberal Party | **17** | **6.69** | **-1.60** | **64.89** | **0.55** | **9.18** |
| | | | 3.74 | 5.46 | 11.77 | 2.53 | 4.05 |
| KrF | Christian People's Party | **17** | **9.49** | **7.54** | **66.34** | **8.19** | **19.81** |
| | | | 2.19 | 9.03 | 8.44 | 4.07 | 6.41 |
| H | Conservative Party | **17** | **20.22** | **7.78** | **60.56** | **6.41** | **18.70** |
| | | | 4.88 | 4.41 | 9.78 | 3.00 | 5.18 |
| SP | Centre Party | **17** | **8.61** | **1.50** | **59.70** | **3.27** | **12.38** |
| | | | 2.62 | 10.07 | 9.35 | 5.74 | 8.46 |
| FrP | Progress Party | **1** | **10.93** | **18.37** | **75.99** | **13.91** | **33.05** |
| | | | 7.72 | 6.52 | 6.27 | 6.48 | 15.18 |

36 The RILE substantially deviates from the LR index in many respects. First, the liberal party joins the left camp during the whole post-World War II era and the SV and the DNA are leapfrogging. The RILE also identifies a left wing trend of the "bourgeois" parties in the 1950s and 1960s. However, since then all parties except the FRP and occasionally the H are on the left side.




Figure 53: Left-Right Positions of Norwegian Parties

nently fights the Norwegian welfare state. Recently though there have been signs of convergence – especially in the aftermath of the economic crisis – as the Conservatives took more centrist positions while the parties on the left moved towards the right.

The amount of differences between the parties appears smaller regarding LR Core positions. The basic pattern and rank-oder upholds, but much more leapfrogging can be seen. An interesting case is the DNA, because it has the reputation of being one of the most radical left-wing social democratic parties in the Western World. However, its LR Core positions show that the left image is mainly build on plus-pers rather than on a "classical" left issues. Like other social democratic parties neoliberal aspects found their way into the program indicated by the steady move to the center-right.

Given the empirical fit of LR and LR Core positions, the rank-order, and party family designations confirming Rokkan's cleavages, the LR index ultimately seems to be well suited to describe Norwegian party positions.

Figure 54: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Norway

### 3.27 Poland

Polish party competition is characterized by a large number of parties but often with a very limited life span (Klingemann et al., 2006, p. 13), which makes it difficult to meaningfully interpret changes and policy moves. Even long-time existing parties like the *Democratic Left Alliance* (SLD) can quickly lose importance, while relatively new parties like *Law and Justice* (PiS) suddenly gained a majority of seats (both in 2005). In terms of ideology though, the LR confirms the expectations of observers of the political party system in Poland: the communist and social democratic parties like the *Union of Labour* (UP) or the SLD appear left, while right-wing parties like PiS appear right.

An interesting case is the *Polish Peasant Party* (PSL). Originally, center-left it moved to a center-right position in the mid-1990s. After a substantial loss of seats in the 1997 election it swung back to its previous position, but never reached its electoral strength again.

In the last years, all polish parties considerably moved to the right. This is mainly a result of the emergence of three issues which are unsurprisingly – taking the Polish debate over the last few years into account – identified as additional plus-pers: *per110* and *per204*, i.e. negative references to the European Union and opposition to the constitution as right ones, and *per203*, i.e. positive reference to the constitution as a left issue. The landmark victory of the PiS in the 2015 election seemed to justify the right-wing strategies of the major parties.

Despite of that the importance of the left-right dimension for the Polish parties should not be overstated when looking at the relatively low LR and especially the low LR Core importance scores. Compared to Western European democracies, only a small share of the party manifestos deals with topics of the (classical) left-right dimension. Yet, considering party family designations, the left-right divide demarcates the ideological space: The LR Core elucidates that parties – all in all – still refer to classical left-right issues as one would expect meaning left parties remain left and, with exception of the populist *Self Defense of the Republic of Poland* (SRP), right-wing parties stay right. Taken together, despite the low importance especially the LR-index is able to capture additional issues Polish parties struggle over and is therefore suited to locate Polish parties in the ideological space.

Table 28: Descriptive Statistics for Polish Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| SLD | Democratic Left Alliance | **7** | **18.60** | **-4.88** | **27.37** | **-2.00** | **6.66** |
| | | | 10.69 | 6.24 | 9.57 | 4.94 | 5.82 |
| SD | Democratic Party | **1** | **1.40** | **-5.80** | **33.55** | **-2.97** | **16.13** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| NSZZ | Independent Self-governing | **2** | **5.00** | **-0.23** | **30.98** | **1.81** | **15.03** |
| | | | 0.14 | 0.46 | 11.41 | 1.69 | 6.33 |
| UP | Union of Labour | **4** | **4.27** | **-7.78** | **33.70** | **-2.33** | **7.33** |
| | | | 2.29 | 6.02 | 6.45 | 3.49 | 3.41 |
| DU | Democratic Union | **2** | **11.45** | **0.57** | **33.61** | **3.70** | **12.33** |
| | | | 1.20 | 4.72 | 6.05 | 2.91 | 6.68 |
| KLD | Liberal-Democratic Congress | **1** | **7.50** | **7.76** | **17.32** | **7.38** | **15.75** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PPPP | Polish Beer-Lovers' Party | **1** | **3.30** | **-6.06** | **52.63** | **1.40** | **21.93** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| UPR | Union of Real Politics | **1** | **2.30** | **9.74** | **24.83** | **9.92** | **23.81** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PPG | Polish Economic Program | | **.** | **6.21** | **32.14** | **8.12** | **21.43** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| UW | Freedom Union | **1** | **13.40** | **-4.17** | **40.57** | **0.87** | **7.74** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PO | Civic Platform | **4** | **29.38** | **1.39** | **30.91** | **2.64** | **9.01** |
| | | | 13.53 | 4.92 | 9.32 | 1.99 | 6.30 |
| PiS | Law and Justice | **4** | **24.62** | **2.19** | **28.21** | **2.32** | **8.81** |
| | | | 10.30 | 1.09 | 6.59 | 0.72 | 2.15 |
| RP: | Palikot's Movement | **1** | **10.00** | **1.48** | **7.50** | **1.70** | **4.58** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ChD | Christian Democratic Labour Party | **1** | **2.40** | **14.64** | **45.16** | **10.89** | **29.03** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| POC | Centre Citizens' Alliance | **1** | **8.70** | **-0.73** | **29.05** | **2.82** | **11.73** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PChD | Party of Christian Democrats | **1** | **1.10** | **8.05** | **38.75** | **8.82** | **25.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| WAK | Catholic Electoral Action | **1** | **8.70** | **19.57** | **43.66** | **17.93** | **36.62** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| AWS | Electoral Action "Solidarity" | **1** | **33.80** | **0.30** | **44.15** | **3.76** | **22.34** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ROP | Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland | **1** | **5.60** | **2.39** | **38.96** | **5.24** | **17.16** |
| | | | . | 2.29 | 2.30 | 1.09 | 5.90 |
| SRP | Self-Defence of the Polish Republic | **2** | **10.80** | **-7.83** | **39.59** | **-5.05** | **9.54** |
| | | | 0.85 | 3.24 | 11.33 | 4.67 | 11.01 |
| KPN | Confederation for an Independent Poland | **2** | **6.65** | **-2.37** | **19.07** | **1.63** | **4.00** |
| | | | 1.20 | 5.16 | 12.50 | 0.35 | 2.37 |
| PZZ | Polish Western Union | **1** | **0.20** | **2.65** | **44.97** | **6.35** | **32.18** |
| | | | . | 12.25 | 24.13 | 7.02 | 42.21 |
| PX | Party X | **1** | **0.50** | **-2.49** | **30.36** | **1.34** | **3.57** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LPR | League of Polish Families | **2** | **7.95** | **3.88** | **49.62** | **5.12** | **25.55** |
| | | | 0.07 | 0.18 | 17.37 | 1.25 | 5.96 |
| PL | Peasant Accord | **1** | **5.50** | **0.53** | **23.64** | **1.84** | **14.55** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PSL | Polish Peasants' Party | **7** | **9.24** | **0.85** | **21.20** | **1.58** | **10.57** |
| | | | 2.83 | 2.23 | 10.71 | 1.96 | 8.35 |
| BBWR | Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms | **1** | **5.40** | **-0.27** | **35.05** | **2.28** | **19.01** |
| | | | . | 0.80 | 12.87 | 2.09 | 4.71 |
| RAS | Movement for the Autonomy of Silasia | **1** | **0.40** | **0.39** | **5.00** | **0.45** | **3.75** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| MN | German Minority | **7** | **0.44** | **0.32** | **14.97** | **1.34** | **3.55** |
| | | | 0.35 | 1.53 | 7.10 | 1.20 | 2.65 |




Figure 55: Left-Right Positions of Polish Parties

Figure 56: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Poland

### 3.28 Portugal

Portugal has an eventful history and the early 1970s saw the end of the *Estado Novo* and a turbulent transition phase including the initial military coup in 1974, two attempted coups in late 1974 and early 1975, the first free elections in 1975, another coup attempt in late 1975 and the new constitution finally being enacted in April 1976. For this reason party policy positions from the 1970s must be treated with care. Nevertheless, the electoral system led to a "freezing" of a four-to-five party system whereby smaller parties have a hard time entering parliament.[37]

When looking at the LR and LR Core index Portugal turns out to be an interesting case with very low importance scores and hardly any variance of LR Core positions, although there are slight indications of a revival of a "classical" left-right divide in the late 2000s against the background of the economic crisis. At the same time Portugal is among those countries in the sample which, on average, has the highest number of additional plus-pers leading to above-average LR importance scores.

Based on those issues the rank-order of parties, however, turns out as one would expect from party family designations in line with the expectation of observers of the Portugese party system (Claro de Fonseca, 2009): to the left, the *Portuguese Communist Party* (PCP) demarcates the extreme left end of the ideological space. On the other side, the conservative *Popular Party* (PP) incorporated

Table 29: Descriptive Statistics for Portugese Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| PEV | Ecologist Party - The Greens | **9** | **1.34** | **-10.08** | **46.83** | **-3.77** | **6.48** |
| | | | 0.89 | 6.87 | 14.20 | 5.54 | 6.58 |
| UDP | Popular Democratic Union | **7** | **1.26** | **-26.47** | **83.17** | **-0.86** | **1.63** |
| | | | 0.58 | 6.46 | 5.90 | 1.01 | 0.92 |
| BE | Left Bloc | **5** | **5.42** | **-14.69** | **46.39** | **-5.72** | **11.48** |
| | | | 3.12 | 6.39 | 9.51 | 3.10 | 4.23 |
| PCP | Portuguese Communist Party | **14** | **10.63** | **-13.68** | **59.51** | **-2.29** | **5.98** |
| | | | 4.50 | 7.50 | 18.73 | 2.64 | 4.29 |
| MDP | Popular Democratic Movement | **5** | **1.70** | **-16.85** | **66.59** | **-2.53** | **5.29** |
| | | | 1.35 | 4.53 | 9.11 | 1.57 | 3.04 |
| PS | Socialist Party | **14** | **33.84** | **-2.27** | **51.01** | **0.06** | **9.70** |
| | | | 7.90 | 9.20 | 17.95 | 2.18 | 3.24 |
| PRD | Democratic Renewal Party | **2** | **11.40** | **0.03** | **54.55** | **1.43** | **7.27** |
| | | | 9.19 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PSD | Social Democratic Party | **14** | **33.66** | **1.44** | **49.70** | **1.88** | **12.31** |
| | | | 8.47 | 6.12 | 13.48 | 2.79 | 3.73 |
| CDS/ PP | Social Democratic Center-Popular Party | **14** | **10.21** | **5.79** | **53.67** | **4.50** | **16.96** |
| | | | 3.88 | 4.82 | 14.59 | 2.72 | 8.22 |
| PPM | Popular Monarchist Party | **4** | **1.22** | **5.70** | **55.21** | **3.81** | **12.14** |
| | | | 0.85 | 0.96 | 9.64 | 2.60 | 7.78 |
| PSN | National Solidarity Party | **1** | **1.70** | **3.16** | **46.96** | **4.30** | **11.60** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |

37 Apart from the larger constituencies like Lisbon and Porto where the factual threshold is much lower.




Figure 57: Left-Right Positions of Portugese Parties

Christian-democratic elements, yet included right-wing populist issues in recent years.

In-between the PCP and PP are the two major parties, the social democratic *Portuguese Socialist Party* (PS) and – despite its name – the rather liberal *Social Democratic Party* (PSD). Both are quite similar in ideological terms which is the result of their catch-all strategies. From this point of view, the Portugese party system is both polarized and homogeneous at the same time, with two extreme parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum, but two major parties encompassing the bulk of voters – at times the PS and PSD received up to 80% of the combined votes – in the center. Interestingly, in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis party positions converged, yet became even more polarized in the 2012 election. This is true even for the LR Core. Particularly both left parties moved to radical left positions.

Considering the peculiarity of the Portugese party system, especially the LR-index seems to capture policy positions quite well making it suitable to analyze Portugal's contemporary party competition.




Figure 58: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Portugal

### 3.29 Romania

The electoral system of Romania, and especially the electoral threshold, has been the focus of many reforms. This has led to a fluid party system with many short-lived parties, a large number of electoral alliances, party mergers and splits. Initially, Romania had the most repressive political system of all CEE countries before the breakdown in 1989. The orientation of parties to the right in the first election can therefore by interpreted as an attempt of distinction from the former regime and its policy. Indeed, many parties strongly referred to freedom and human rights turning *per201* into an additional right-wing plus-per. Even the *National Salvation Front* (FSN), the party of the former Communists, pursued that strategy. Likewise, welfare issues (*per504*, also a right plus-issue) played an important role. Later on, all parties moved to the left but swung back to center-left positions in recent years.

Interesting is the ideological movement of the *Greater Romania Party* (PRM), known for its right-wing nationalist ideology. While its projection is appropriate, the sharpness of the left move in

Table 30: Descriptive Statistics for Romanian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| PUR | Romanist Humanist Party | **3** | **3.12** | **-5.56** | **42.08** | **-3.09** | **13.60** |
| | | | 2.22 | 8.49 | 9.25 | 4.11 | 3.36 |
| UNPR | National Union for the Progreess of Romania | **1** | **2.40** | **1.47** | **35.42** | **-0.34** | **12.53** |
| | | | . | 3.41 | 5.20 | 2.00 | 5.31 |
| MER | Ecological Movement of Romania | **1** | **2.60** | **2.74** | **29.17** | **2.80** | **12.50** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PER | Romanian Ecological Party | **3** | **1.57** | **-0.24** | **43.28** | **0.56** | **10.61** |
| | | | 0.12 | 8.55 | 18.31 | 2.89 | 11.65 |
| PD | Democratic Party | **7** | **22.29** | **-2.07** | **42.55** | **0.94** | **14.72** |
| | | | 21.11 | 8.04 | 13.13 | 3.66 | 9.66 |
| PStDR | Romanian Socialist Democratic Party | **1** | **1.00** | **15.91** | **40.00** | **2.66** | **10.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PDSR | Party of Social Democracy | **6** | **30.96** | **-3.54** | **43.56** | **-2.06** | **13.45** |
| | | | 5.72 | 8.22 | 7.33 | 3.67 | 7.31 |
| PSDR | Romanian Social Democratic Party | **3** | **2.10** | **-3.95** | **40.20** | **-1.04** | **15.35** |
| | | | 1.47 | 7.92 | 17.79 | 3.79 | 10.58 |
| PNL | National Liberal Party | **7** | **11.87** | **-0.31** | **49.19** | **2.22** | **20.00** |
| | | | 8.23 | 9.72 | 9.53 | 5.24 | 15.88 |
| PNTCD | National Christian Democratic Peasants' Party | **4** | **10.07** | **-1.18** | **38.51** | **0.81** | **8.87** |
| | | | 10.43 | 6.52 | 18.07 | 2.41 | 10.34 |
| GDC | Democratic Group of the Centre | **1** | **0.50** | **7.02** | **33.48** | **3.07** | **9.62** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PUNR | Romanian National Unity Party | **3** | **4.73** | **0.39** | **32.80** | **1.85** | **16.41** |
| | | | 2.81 | 6.44 | 9.32 | 3.27 | 7.00 |
| PRM | Greater Romania Party | **4** | **10.19** | **-9.52** | **45.22** | **-4.34** | **23.62** |
| | | | 7.43 | 17.29 | 22.18 | 9.63 | 11.21 |
| PSM | Socialist Labour Party | **1** | **3.00** | **-3.82** | **39.77** | **-6.34** | **25.00** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PDAR | Democratic Agrarian Party | **2** | **2.40** | **1.67** | **27.18** | **1.33** | **18.93** |
| | | | 0.85 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| UDMR | Hungarian Democratic Alliance | **7** | **6.51** | **2.91** | **33.51** | **1.61** | **10.45** |
| | | | 0.79 | 7.42 | 7.25 | 3.70 | 5.34 |
| PP-DD | People's Party - Dan Dianco | **1** | **14.00** | **9.58** | **48.12** | **3.76** | **11.28** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 59: Left-Right Positions of Romanian Parties

the 2000 election is surprising at first sight. The PRM, however, strongly favored a nationalist but planned economy – visible in their stark left move on the LR Core dimension. Later on, the party moved to a more centrist position, because it stopped to engage in anti-Jewish discourses.

Another important party in Romania is the *Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania* (UDMR). The party represents the Hungarian minority and is characterized by a center-right position with considerable swings from right to left and back again. The *Party of Social Democracy of Romania* (FDSN), a FSN-splinter, is neatly captured as a left-wing party, thereby reflecting the overall tendency of Romania's party system towards the center. The remaining part of the FSN, later renamed to *Democratic Party*, and the *National Liberal Party* (PNL) formed electoral alliances at times thus resembling each other's movements.

In sum, the left-right dimension neatly represents party policy positions in Romania, whereby the LR Core confirms the centrist tendency of the party system, while the LR captures the country-specific issue structure of Romania's party competition.

Figure 60: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Romania

### 3.30 Slovakia

The electoral system of Slovakia is not enshrined in the constitution and has been subject to many reforms. While the early years saw the rise and fall of many short-lived parties, the 1998 reform led to a short phase of consolidation due to an encompassing electoral threshold of 5% which applied even to parties within an electoral alliance. As a result, many smaller parties merged and stabilized. The reform was withdrawn however, and the Slovak party system (re-) entered a new phase of fragmentation. Therefore, only few parties competed regularly rendering an analysis of positions and movements meaningful.

The successor of the former Communists, the *Party of the Democratic Left* (SDL) can be viewed as the only left-wing party from 1990 to 2002. In 2004 the party merged with the social democratic *Direction-Social Democracy* (Smer), which in turn is a 1999 breakaway from the SDL. Both are not "classical" left-wing parties as they hardly refer to core issues. They favor decentralization (i.e. *per301*, a right plus-per) but also equality and the welfare state (*per503* and *per504* are identified

Table 31: Descriptive Statistics for Slovak Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| SZ | Green Party of Slovakia | **1** | **3.50** | **2.36** | **21.56** | **2.62** | **6.59** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| ZRS | Workers' Association of Slovakia | **1** | **7.30** | **-1.96** | **20.25** | **-1.23** | **3.80** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SDL | Party of the Democratic Left | **5** | **10.90** | **-3.70** | **33.44** | **-0.98** | **9.74** |
| | | | 5.59 | 2.32 | 6.91 | 1.21 | 4.89 |
| KSS | Communist Party of Slovakia | **1** | **6.30** | **-2.40** | **29.29** | **-0.72** | **18.21** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| DS | Democratic Party | **1** | **4.40** | **5.20** | **35.36** | **5.24** | **17.68** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| DU | Democratic Union of Slovakia | **1** | **8.60** | **4.03** | **37.07** | **4.86** | **18.74** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SOP | Party of Civic Understanding | **1** | **8.00** | **-0.64** | **31.09** | **0.68** | **6.40** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Smer | Direction-Social Democracy | **4** | **30.45** | **-2.87** | **45.11** | **-0.67** | **9.16** |
| | | | 12.94 | 2.68 | 15.74 | 1.30 | 4.99 |
| ANO | Alliance of the New Citizen | **1** | **8.00** | **5.85** | **27.17** | **3.42** | **12.92** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| VPN | Public Against Violence | **1** | **29.30** | **2.84** | **26.29** | **1.54** | **7.32** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SAS | Freedom and Solidarity | **2** | **9.00** | **16.63** | **72.37** | **12.30** | **23.70** |
| | | | 4.38 | 7.62 | 1.78 | 1.08 | 3.42 |
| KDH | Christian Democratic Movement | **7** | **10.37** | **8.42** | **43.79** | **7.46** | **19.42** |
| | | | 3.94 | 6.01 | 10.71 | 4.35 | 8.65 |
| SDKU | Slovak Democratic and Christian Union | **5** | **16.26** | **6.20** | **42.66** | **5.86** | **15.27** |
| | | | 7.26 | 3.08 | 16.14 | 2.56 | 6.41 |
| OL'anNO | Ordinary People and Independent Personalities | **1** | **8.60** | **6.19** | **62.18** | **7.08** | **17.40** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SNS | Slovak National Party | **8** | **7.62** | **8.42** | **49.93** | **6.17** | **25.05** |
| | | | 3.73 | 7.35 | 17.34 | 4.14 | 11.86 |
| HZDS | Movement for a Democratic Slovakia | **6** | **21.98** | **2.65** | **34.68** | **3.18** | **15.72** |
| | | | 13.58 | 1.73 | 9.29 | 1.90 | 8.54 |
| SMK- MKP | Hungarian Coalition | **6** | **9.72** | **2.24** | **26.59** | **2.13** | **7.14** |
| | | | 1.62 | 2.27 | 7.33 | 1.91 | 3.27 |
| Bridge | Bridge | **2** | **7.40** | **2.94** | **50.30** | **4.34** | **15.18** |
| | | | 0.99 | 2.65 | 4.80 | 1.48 | 0.59 |




Figure 61: Left-Right Positions of Slovak Parties

as left plus-pers) which puts both parties to the moderate left.

On the right are the *Christian Democratic Movement* (KDH) and the liberal conservative *Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party* (SDKU-DS) as well as the nationalist *Slovak National Party* (SNS) and the national conservative *People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia* (HZDS). The latter emerged out of the democratic opposition in the early 1990s led by Mečiar which established a rather authoritarian style of leadership (Kipke, 2010, p. 337). The HZDS mixes Christian democratic elements with nationalism and liberal economic policies with calls for an encompassing welfare state resulting in very centrist LR and LR Core positions.

The SNS describes itself as a socialist, nationalist party based on what it calls the European Christian system of values. It therefore strongly emphasizes a national way of life – a right core item – putting the party to the end of the right spectrum at times. The Christian democratic, conservative KDH shares some similarities with the SNS, whereby both either moved in accordance or leapfrogged each other. The SDKU-DS in turn aims at being a catch-all party with the German CDU as the archetype, which is reflected in their moderate-right positions and it's middle position. Finally, another party which lasted for some years is the *Party of the Hungarian Coalition* (SMK-MKP) representing the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It has been described as a neoliberal or liberal conservative party (Kipke, 2010, p. 338). In so far its moderate right-wing position seems to be appropriate.[38]

In sum, the LR and LR Core dimension seem to describe Slovak party positions reasonably well. At the same time, given the rather low LR Core importance scores, Slovak party competition is less about "classical" left-right than additional issues that accompany – or replace as one might say – the left-right dimension.

38 In contrast, the RILE places the SMK-MKP mainly on the left in the left-right dimension.

Figure 62: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Slovakia

### 3.31 Slovenia

Like any other Central and Eastern European party system, the Slovak one saw a strong fragmentation in the early years, but consolidated in the meantime showing a number of parties which regularly compete in the elections. The triangle of liberalism vs. socialism vs. catholicism shapes the cleavage structure in Slovakia and consequently the party system (Lukšič, 2010).

The *Liberal Democracy of Slovenia* (LDS) emerged as a left-liberal party and was the largest and ruling party until the mid-2000s. It was founded by members of the socialist youth organization and incorporated or merged parts of the *Democratic Party of Slovenia* (DSS) and the Greens (ZS) which results in huge ideological moves and frequent leapfrogging of other parties. After loosing office in 2004 the party dramatically diminished though and lost importance.

To the left the *Social Democratic Party* (SD, former ZL and ZLSD) presents the catholic part, while the *Slovenian Democratic Party* (SDS, former SDSS) appears as the anti-catholic pole. Both barely refer to "classical" left-right issues though and only loosely to additional plus-pers resulting in center-oriented party positions. The *Democratic Party of Pensioners* (Desus) is another but minor party to the left which often moves in accordance with the SD and participated in SD-led governments.

Table 32: Descriptive Statistics for Slovenian Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| ZS | Greens of Slovenia | **2** | **6.25** | **-2.86** | **7.13** | **0.00** | **2.00** |
| | | | 3.61 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| SD | Social Democratic Party | **7** | **14.73** | **-2.61** | **31.42** | **-0.94** | **11.67** |
| | | | 7.43 | 4.66 | 19.88 | 3.02 | 3.61 |
| SDS | Slovenian Democratic Party | **7** | **18.27** | **-1.72** | **36.09** | **0.31** | **13.41** |
| | | | 10.57 | 4.39 | 22.45 | 2.86 | 3.23 |
| LZI-PS | Zoran Jankovic's List - Positive Slovenia | **1** | **28.51** | **-5.81** | **54.68** | **-0.01** | **17.63** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LDS | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia | **7** | **18.68** | **-1.36** | **40.03** | **1.60** | **15.01** |
| | | | 12.35 | 9.00 | 17.06 | 6.20 | 3.69 |
| DSS | Democratic Party of Slovenia | **2** | **7.30** | **0.52** | **8.07** | **0.97** | **6.44** |
| | | | 3.11 | 0.51 | 5.01 | 0.27 | 2.20 |
| Zares | For Real | **2** | **5.02** | **-2.43** | **53.30** | **-1.60** | **11.22** |
| | | | 6.19 | 1.39 | 7.17 | 2.28 | 1.26 |
| LGV | Gregor Virant's Civic List | **1** | **8.37** | **-6.95** | **66.67** | **-1.29** | **17.42** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| SKD | Slovenian Christian Democrats | **3** | **12.37** | **5.82** | **21.87** | **5.59** | **19.37** |
| | | | 2.51 | 1.65 | 2.25 | 2.24 | 3.91 |
| SLS | Slovenian People's Party | **7** | **9.86** | **2.32** | **42.07** | **3.06** | **17.24** |
| | | | 4.83 | 5.60 | 19.97 | 4.97 | 5.05 |
| Nsi | New Slovenian Christian People's Party | **4** | **6.52** | **-1.50** | **46.31** | **0.22** | **24.25** |
| | | | 2.82 | 5.25 | 16.02 | 4.55 | 5.53 |
| SNS | Slovenian National Party | **6** | **5.18** | **4.54** | **38.25** | **3.00** | **17.06** |
| | | | 2.85 | 6.48 | 10.15 | 3.66 | 5.20 |
| Desus | Democratic Party of Pensioners | **5** | **5.57** | **-5.62** | **35.95** | **-3.36** | **12.27** |
| | | | 1.54 | 5.77 | 23.69 | 4.05 | 9.25 |
| SMS | Party of Slovenian Youth | **1** | **4.30** | **0.21** | **25.45** | **1.41** | **7.27** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 63: Left-Right Positions of Slovenian Parties

Two Christian democratic parties, the *Slovenian Christian Democrats* (SKD) and the *Slovenian People's Party* (SLS), mainly derive their support from rural areas. Especially the SKD, and to a lesser extent the SLS, indeed emphasize the "classical" conservative core items (*per601*, *per603* and *per606*), which puts both parties to the right in LR and LR Core terms. In 2000 both parties merged accompanied by a split of dissatisfied SKD-members, who founded the *New Slovenia-Christian People's Party* (NSi). In economic terms the NSi is liberal but it also favors a social market economy putting it to the moderate left.

Given the complex cleavage structure the LR and LR Core index capture Slovak party positions reasonably well. Considering the rather low importance scores the prominence of the left-right dimension should not be overemphasized though.

Figure 64: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Slovenia

### 3.32 Spain

Unlike other Western European party systems the Spanish system does not reflect deep-rooted cleavages stemming from the 18th century. While the state vs. church and labor vs. capital-cleavage were almost pacified in the initial years, the center vs. periphery cleavage is still visible by the huge amount of regional parties present in parliament. At the same time, party competition in Spain is centripetal-orientated reflecting center-left positions of the average Spanish voter (Barrios, 2009, p. 739).

The *Union of the Democratic Center* (UCD) won the first, free elections in 1977 but collapsed in

Table 33: Descriptive Statistics for Spanish Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| GBAI | Future Yes | **1** | **0.17** | **-4.61** | **44.18** | **0.32** | **6.35** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Amaiur | Amaiur | **1** | **1.37** | **-9.29** | **48.28** | **-1.09** | **5.17** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| Compromis-Q | Commitment-Q | **1** | **0.51** | **-9.96** | **62.44** | **-0.88** | **8.84** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| PCE-IU | United Left | **11** | **7.19** | **-11.38** | **50.06** | **-3.32** | **7.64** |
| | | | 2.72 | 3.01 | 8.07 | 1.73 | 2.22 |
| PSOE | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | **11** | **37.94** | **-1.02** | **50.69** | **-1.00** | **7.82** |
| | | | 6.58 | 2.24 | 8.19 | 1.40 | 2.90 |
| UCD | Union of the Democratic Centre | **3** | **25.33** | **4.12** | **46.59** | **1.34** | **11.41** |
| | | | 16.05 | 1.53 | 4.64 | 1.54 | 1.63 |
| PDP | Popular Democratic Party | **2** | **5.60** | **11.91** | **56.55** | **5.86** | **16.25** |
| | | | 0.57 | 4.79 | 2.93 | 3.88 | 11.15 |
| PL | Liberal Party | **1** | **2.70** | **8.52** | **54.48** | **3.11** | **8.37** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| UpyD | Union. Progress and Democracy | **1** | **4.69** | **0.16** | **53.30** | **-0.38** | **11.22** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| CDS | Centre Democrats | **4** | **5.77** | **1.71** | **54.89** | **-1.08** | **11.99** |
| | | | 3.98 | 2.33 | 5.03 | 0.80 | 2.90 |
| PP | Popular Party | **11** | **28.99** | **8.50** | **54.83** | **3.62** | **13.69** |
| | | | 14.03 | 3.91 | 4.97 | 2.82 | 5.68 |
| CiU | Convergence and Union | **10** | **4.05** | **6.23** | **52.07** | **1.59** | **10.22** |
| | | | 0.86 | 4.24 | 5.64 | 1.47 | 2.48 |
| FAC | Forum Asturias | **1** | **0.40** | **-0.06** | **50.23** | **0.38** | **5.87** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| EE | Basque Left | **5** | **0.46** | **-4.42** | **40.22** | **0.08** | **2.23** |
| | | | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PNV/EAJ | Basque Nationalist Party | **11** | **1.46** | **1.13** | **46.71** | **0.44** | **7.40** |
| | | | 0.23 | 4.76 | 7.50 | 1.19 | 4.39 |
| EA | Basque Solidarity | **6** | **0.45** | **-2.09** | **49.27** | **0.10** | **4.58** |
| | | | 0.19 | 0.75 | 6.19 | 0.70 | 1.05 |
| PAR | Aragonese Party | **4** | **0.40** | **-3.08** | **60.57** | **-3.32** | **18.29** |
| | | | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| ERC | Catalan Republican Left | **11** | **0.91** | **-4.97** | **39.99** | **-0.92** | **5.92** |
| | | | 0.58 | 2.80 | 6.16 | 0.97 | 2.80 |
| PA | Andalusian Party | **8** | **0.77** | **-0.10** | **52.95** | **-2.32** | **7.71** |
| | | | 0.47 | 0.18 | 6.14 | 0.68 | 1.83 |
| CC: | Canarian Coalition | **6** | **0.85** | **1.36** | **43.83** | **-0.34** | **3.98** |
| | | | 0.18 | 0.85 | 4.91 | 0.28 | 2.02 |
| BNG | Galician Nationalist Bloc | **5** | **0.91** | **-4.43** | **32.67** | **-1.14** | **3.82** |
| | | | 0.22 | 3.76 | 11.80 | 0.92 | 3.49 |
| CHA | Aragonist Council | **2** | **0.30** | **-4.62** | **42.54** | **-1.87** | **4.51** |
| | | | 0.14 | 1.36 | 10.87 | 1.05 | 0.05 |




Figure 65: Left-Right Positions of Spanish Parties

the early 1980s. Since then the main competitors are the *Popular Party* (AP/PP) with moderate-conservative positions on the right and the moderate-left *Spanish Socialist Workers' Party* (PSOE). The communist *United Left* (PCE-IU) demarcates the left end of the ideological spectrum, but was never contested by one of the other important parties in ideological terms.

Among the many regional parties the *Convergence and Union* (CiU), which is deeply rooted in Catalonia, sticks out as a lasting actor of relative weight. The CiU combines the demand for decentralization with strong calls for efficient government administration (*per303*) which puts it to the right of the LR dimension. Although opposed to the CiU regarding the question of regional autonomy, the newly founded social-liberal *Union.Progress and Democracy* (UPyD) conforms with the CiU regarding administrative efficiency, and is therefore located at the center-right. Yet, the UPyD sees itself as an alternative between the PSOE and PP, which our data clearly confirms.

Overall, party policy positions in Spain are highly stable without any leapfrogging or huge ideological moves of the main parties. The LR dimension plots the rank-order of parties in line with expectations based on party family membership. Yet, Spain – like Portugal – sticks out due to its above-average importance scores for the LR dimension, but very low LR Core importance scores. This way, Spain is among those countries which, on average, have the highest number of additional plus-pers.

Regarding LR Core positions the centripetal orientation of the Spanish parties becomes even more clear confirming that party competition is not fought over "classical" left-right issues rather than additional ones. Differences between the parties shrink to a minimum, though the relative positions of the parties on the LR Core scale remain. Having this said, the LR Core seems unsuitable to meaningfully analyze Spanish party competition, but the LR – precisely because of its country-specificity – accurately locates Spanish parties in the ideological spectrum.




Figure 66: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Spain

### 3.33 Sweden

Compared to other countries Swedish parties have quite distinct left-right positions; compared to their Nordic neighbors though, Sweden does not stick out. The left-right positions neatly depict the rank-order of the classical five party system according to the political cleavages outlined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). To the left are the *Left Party* (VP) and the *Social Democratic Labour Party* (SAP). The "bourgeois' bloc is made up of the conservative *Moderate Unity Party* (MSP) as the most radical right party, the liberal *People's Party* (FP), and the agrarian *Center Party* (CP) with moderate-right positions. In the 1980s two additional parties entered the scene, one in each bloc: the *Greens* (MP) and the *Christian Democratic Community Party* (KdS). Despite "bloc politics" some leapfrogging took place, especially of the three moderate bourgeois parties.[39]

In Sweden almost the whole party system moved from center-right in the 1940s to center-left, particularly during the 1960s, which has been described as the "left wave" (*vänstervågen*) in Swedish party politics. Especially the communist SKP[40] and the liberal FP changed their positions by 30-35 points to the left within 12 years from 1958 to 1970. Afterwards, all parties changed their position back to more centrist or (moderate) right positions.

During the 1960s, the CP and the FP were close to the Social Democrats due to the consensus of creating a universal welfare state. In contrast to this ideological homogeneity, the conservative

Table 34: Descriptive Statistics for Swedish Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| Greens | Green Ecology Party | **7** | **5.07** | **-8.30** | **74.64** | **-0.22** | **7.61** |
| | | | 1.19 | 5.86 | 23.64 | 1.47 | 8.29 |
| VP | Left Communists Party | **21** | **5.63** | **-12.60** | **68.99** | **-6.44** | **19.61** |
| | | | 1.86 | 8.77 | 14.62 | 6.14 | 12.48 |
| SdaP | Social Democratic Labour Party | **21** | **43.26** | **-1.82** | **68.55** | **1.05** | **14.29** |
| | | | 4.75 | 4.96 | 11.02 | 2.68 | 8.40 |
| FP | Liberal People's Party | **21** | **13.31** | **7.26** | **68.81** | **5.36** | **17.36** |
| | | | 5.80 | 8.33 | 11.82 | 5.03 | 9.40 |
| KdS | Christian Democratic Community Party | **8** | **6.06** | **10.05** | **76.38** | **8.86** | **21.18** |
| | | | 3.39 | 3.84 | 10.64 | 1.76 | 4.74 |
| MSP | Moderate Coalition Party | **21** | **18.36** | **20.45** | **79.59** | **13.07** | **37.29** |
| | | | 4.91 | 9.48 | 11.49 | 7.00 | 21.77 |
| SD | Sweden Democrats | **1** | **5.70** | **7.77** | **80.88** | **6.45** | **17.65** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| CP | Centre Party | **21** | **12.72** | **4.96** | **59.59** | **4.38** | **16.13** |
| | | | 5.53 | 5.65 | 15.37 | 3.00 | 7.57 |
| NyD | New Democracy | **1** | **6.70** | **27.89** | **84.73** | **11.91** | **33.21** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |

39 In this respect the RILE comes to a different conclusion: it sees the FP as the party most to the left in 1968 which seems to be a bit odd when looking at party histories in Sweden. Furthermore, the RILE locates the SAP clearly left of the VP in 1960.

40 *Sveriges Kommunistiska Partiet* (SKP) was renamed in 1967 to *Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna* (VK), and further renamed to *Vänsterpartiet* (VP) in 1990.




Figure 67: Left-Right Positions of Swedish Parties

MSP on the right and the VP on the left side of the ideological spectrum are clearly distinguishable for most of the time. The data also show the moderation of the MSP in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which was associated with a change of name from *Högerpartiet* to *Moderata Samlingspartiet*. In 1976 Sweden saw the first government coalition without Social democratic participation since 1936: interestingly though, the FP and the CP leapfrogged the SAP. This led some commentators of the first non-socialist government to state, that the first bourgeois government in the post-World War II era in Sweden was more "social democratic" than any social democratic government before (Webber, 1983).

Against the background of a severe economic crisis and a restructuring of the economy in the early 1990s all parties, except the Greens and VP, moved to the right. During the second and third period of bourgeois governments (1991-1994 and 2006-2014), the coalition parties moderated their positions. However, the data also document that the MSP moved to the far right and pursued neoliberal policies which challenged the Swedish welfare state. This was particularly pronounced under the leaderships of Adelsohn, Bildt, and Lundgren.

The LR Core dimension complements the picture. It shows, that the VP quite strongly refers to "classical statements" of the left particularly in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Similarly, the MSP devotes much attention to "classical" statements of the right. At the same time, the data shows that the SAP is a very pragmatic left party often leaning to the moderate-right regarding the core dimension while upholding a left image by referring to plus-pers. The same is true for the Greens which often take neutral positions on the LR Core dimension, and which resembles the pattern of green parties in many Western European countries.

Overall, the LR and LR Core are useful tools to analyze Swedish party policy positions as they reveal interesting trends in the Swedish party system such as the clear trend of decreasing radicalism of "classical" core issues used by the parties which started in the late 1960s. Astonishingly – and in contrast to many other European countries – after the 2008 economic crisis all left parties (SAP, VP, and the Greens) moderated their LR Core position. Uncovering these trends surely is one of the main advantages of applying a time-sensitive left-right index.




Figure 68: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Sweden

### 3.34 Switzerland

Parties in Switzerland do not play such an important role like in other Western Democracies, which is as much a result of the federal structure of the country as it is a result of the important role of plebiscitary elements. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that party position can vary significantly between different federal states (*Kantone*). And finally, Switzerland is a concordance democracy whereby the four most important parties – the *Social Democratic Party* (SP), the *Christian Democratic People's Party* (CVP), the *Swiss People's Party* (SVP), and *Radical Democratic Party* (FDP) – form some kind of an oversized, collegial coalition government composed by the *Zauberformel* ("magic formula").

On the left, the SP represents clear-cut leftist positions without leapfrogging other parties except the *Green Party of Switzerland* (Greens) in recent years. In 1955 they strongly favored a controlled economy – a core left-right item – but also made many negative references to the military,

Table 35: Descriptive Statistics for Swiss Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| GPS/ PES | Green Party of Switzerland | **9** | **5.43** | **-13.25** | **54.83** | **-0.30** | **2.94** |
| | | | 2.89 | 6.59 | 17.97 | 0.57 | 2.78 |
| GLP/PVL | Green Liberal Party | **2** | **7.50** | **-9.95** | **68.04** | **0.75** | **6.05** |
| | | | 2.97 | 3.09 | 15.11 | 0.53 | 6.48 |
| PdA/PST | Swiss Labour Party | **5** | **0.88** | **-10.52** | **44.66** | **0.34** | **6.29** |
| | | | 0.22 | 3.59 | 13.59 | 1.03 | 1.36 |
| SPS/PSS | Social Democratic Party | **17** | **23.12** | **-13.39** | **56.17** | **-4.60** | **15.06** |
| | | | 2.94 | 7.49 | 15.28 | 3.59 | 6.30 |
| LdU/ADI | Independents' Alliance | **14** | **4.71** | **1.92** | **58.57** | **2.50** | **20.77** |
| | | | 2.16 | 5.03 | 8.41 | 1.35 | 3.08 |
| FDP/PRD | Radical Democratic Party | **17** | **21.44** | **8.27** | **54.31** | **4.93** | **18.77** |
| | | | 2.92 | 5.06 | 11.34 | 2.04 | 4.12 |
| CVP/PDC | Christian Democratic People's Party | **17** | **19.44** | **7.41** | **54.87** | **5.33** | **20.08** |
| | | | 3.47 | 8.38 | 10.21 | 4.08 | 9.54 |
| EVP/OEO | Protestant People's Party | **11** | **2.05** | **3.44** | **58.64** | **8.41** | **26.06** |
| | | | 0.20 | 5.72 | 20.48 | 2.82 | 8.27 |
| LPS/PLS | Liberal Party of Switzerland | **5** | **2.40** | **14.47** | **54.42** | **12.68** | **33.73** |
| | | | 0.46 | 4.90 | 3.20 | 3.63 | 8.52 |
| CSP/PCS | Christian Social Party | **2** | **0.35** | **-12.08** | **80.44** | **-0.86** | **10.18** |
| | | | 0.07 | 4.90 | 9.33 | 0.48 | 2.89 |
| SD | Swiss Democrats | **9** | **3.41** | **8.17** | **57.75** | **7.37** | **37.82** |
| | | | 2.03 | 1.66 | 8.14 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| EDU/UDF | Federal Democratic Union | **5** | **1.24** | **29.75** | **75.46** | **28.96** | **55.40** |
| | | | 0.13 | 2.27 | 6.81 | 0.49 | 1.62 |
| SVP/UDA | Swiss People's Party | **17** | **15.12** | **9.16** | **53.70** | **5.23** | **21.39** |
| | | | 6.51 | 8.13 | 11.54 | 4.31 | 9.13 |
| BDP/PBD | Civic Democratic Party | **1** | **5.40** | **9.83** | **54.32** | **9.03** | **25.61** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| LdT | Ticino League | **2** | **0.80** | **7.09** | **52.34** | **2.94** | **18.22** |
| | | | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| MCG | Geneva Citizens' Movement | **1** | **0.40** | **-4.72** | **57.89** | **0.29** | **5.26** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |
| FPS/PSL | Freedom Party of Switzerland | **3** | **3.90** | **23.88** | **70.03** | **13.39** | **35.78** |
| | | | 1.25 | 9.51 | 19.94 | 0.00 | 0.00 |




Figure 69: Left-Right Positions of Swiss Parties

i.e. *per105*, which is identified as an additional left plus-per for Switzerland. In sum, this moved the SP to the extreme left. Until 1959 the party stayed in opposition; by entering government, through the modernization and the introduction of women's suffrage its election base shifted to encompass women, the well-educated and urban people, which led to a moderation of LR and LR Core positions.

On the other side of the political spectrum bourgeois parties like the CVP, SVP or the FDP took over their place. The parties only slightly differ in their overall left-right positions, and they often move in accordance. The *Independent's Alliance* (LdU) has been described as a social-liberal party located between the SP and the bourgeois bloc. Yet, and contrary to the SP, it made strong positive references to the military (*per104*, an additional right plus-per) which puts it nevertheless to the right. After the death of its founder and leader Duttweiler the LdU moderated it's positions which led to internal struggle over the future direction, fading electoral success and finally the dissolution in the 1990s.

Like in other Western European countries green parties entered parliament in the 1980s. The *Green Party of Switzerland* (Grüne) joined the Social Democrats on the left, sharing similar ecological aims; the Greens are much more centrist regarding "classical" core issues – a common pattern of Western European green parties. Later on, a second green party, the *Green Liberal Party* (GPL), was founded in 2007, which sees itself as party of the center.

Considering the LR Core, the rank-order of parties remains, with the main differences between the SP and the bourgeois bloc. When looking at the importance of LR and LR Core positions Swiss parties resemble other continental European countries in that both are important and parties refer to a mixture of "classical" core as well as additional plus-pers. Capturing both aspects lends both indices suited to analyze Swiss party positions.

Figure 70: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in Switzerland

### 3.35 United Kingdom

Developed in the United Kingdom the British party system is the blueprint of the Westminster model, dominated by the *Labour Party* to the left and the *Conservatives* to the right. Both parties never leapfrogged and were strongly rooted in their camp until the early 1990s when Labour set out for the "Third Way" under party leader Tony Blair. The data also show a "left phase" during the post-war consensus from the early 1950s to the late 1970s when all major parties agreed on an encompassing welfare state, a mixed economy, Keynesianism and a broad set of social and economic policies. Accepting the welfare state and most of Labour's nationalizations moved the Conservatives to the left. Afterwards, they steadily moved to the right since the early 1970s culminating in very rightist positions under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. Later on, her successors moved the party back to more center-right positions.

The first 1974 election moved Labour radically to the left, a record score for a government party, due to it's strong emphasize of a nationalized economy (*per413*, which is the most radical left core item) and many negative references to the European Economic Community which reflects the internal struggle over Britain's membership. Under the leadership of Blair Labour crossed the center line in 1997 and stayed on the right since then. This move made the *Liberal Party* the party most to the left, although it is still right of the center. In so far the data are consistent with the way analysts and commentators have seen party history unfolding.

Movements on the LR Core dimension resemble those trends. Apart from the notable exception of

Table 36: Descriptive Statistics for British Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| SF | Ourselves Alone | **2** | **0.55** | **2.84** | **24.25** | **1.24** | **6.55** |
| | | | 0.21 | 0.38 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Labour | Labour Party | **18** | **40.12** | **-6.18** | **41.03** | **-4.86** | **16.95** |
| | | | 6.69 | 8.45 | 7.73 | 5.66 | 7.81 |
| SDP | Social Democratic Party | **2** | **5.85** | **1.75** | **34.21** | **-0.25** | **11.75** |
| | | | 1.06 | 1.23 | 9.16 | 0.40 | 5.75 |
| Liberals | Liberal Party | **13** | **11.08** | **1.08** | **38.66** | **-0.78** | **17.29** |
| | | | 5.96 | 5.17 | 9.60 | 4.00 | 9.82 |
| LDP | Liberal Democrats | **5** | **19.56** | **2.99** | **33.09** | **0.71** | **8.82** |
| | | | 2.77 | 2.47 | 7.56 | 1.25 | 3.74 |
| Conservatives | Conservative Party | **18** | **40.93** | **5.02** | **44.02** | **2.23** | **18.26** |
| | | | 5.85 | 6.00 | 9.76 | 3.63 | 6.07 |
| UUP | Ulster Unionist Party | **3** | **0.80** | **7.82** | **32.18** | **0.68** | **3.45** |
| | | | 0.00 | 0.57 | 1.38 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| SNP | Scottish National Party | **3** | **1.87** | **3.50** | **35.75** | **2.39** | **8.36** |
| | | | 0.12 | 1.28 | 4.62 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| DUP | Democratic Unionist Party | **3** | **0.43** | **4.68** | **33.51** | **2.70** | **9.63** |
| | | | 0.23 | 1.25 | 5.21 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| UKIP | United Kingdom Independence Party | **1** | **1.50** | **-12.63** | **60.00** | **4.09** | **12.50** |
| | | | . | . | . | . | . |




Figure 71: Left-Right Positions of British Parties

the 1970 election the rank-order of parties endures. At the same time LR and LR Core positions are very close meaning that British politics is strongly determined by "classical" left-right statements and less by additional issues. Indeed, the UK is among those countries with the lowest number of plus-pers. In recent years however, both the LR and LR Core dimension find it difficult to ideologically distinguish British parties starting with the late 1990s reaching well into the new millennium, which casts doubt on the relevance of the left-right dimension for 21st century UK.

Figure 72: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in the United Kingdom

### 3.36 United States

The party system of the United States shows the expected chart of two clearly distinguishable centrist parties with no leapfrogging at all. Yet, given the very low importance scores one may question the meaning of the left-right dimension as the main ideological party cleavage.

For the *Republicans* there is an overall trend from more rightist to more centrist positions. Under the candidacy of Nixon (1960, 1968 and 1972) the party took moderate centrist positions. On the contrary, the manifestos of Eisenhower in 1952 and Goldwater in 1964 represented the most right positions of the Republican Party during the whole post-World War II era up until the 2012 election. The Second Red Scare polarized the party system in the US and moved the Republicans strongly to the right. After McCarthy's death in 1957, however, the Republicans moved back to less radical positions.

The *Democrats* are steadily drifting from a left-center position in the first post-war elections to very constant center positions until 1996. The 1980 election campaign sticks out, though. Carter, at the time incumbent president, was uncommonly challenged by Edward Kennedy, Senator of Massachusetts, as incumbents rarely face a competitor from within their own party. Although President Carter won the nomination he had to compromise with Kennedy forcing him to make many policy concessions to the liberal senator. Much of the Democratic platform actually reflected Kennedy's views. This explains the strong – at least for US-politics – left-leaning manifesto of the Democrats in 1980. Later on, especially since the late 1980s, the "New Democrats" gained influence within the Democrats endorsing the "Third Way" during the Clinton-era. Afterwards, the party swung back to more left-centered positions in the unsuccessful candidacies of Gore in 2000 and Kerry in 2004. Turning to the right again, Obama successfully managed the 2008 campaign and closed the gap to the Republicans.

Probably as a result of different views on how to overcome the 2008 economic crisis both parties moved in opposite directions, leading to a polarization not experienced since the McCarthy-era in

Table 37: Descriptive Statistics for US-American Parties

| | Party | Elections covered | ⌀Vote share | Left-Right Index | | Left-Right Core Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. | ⌀Pos. | ⌀Imp. |
| DEM | Democratic Party | **18** | **50.90** | **-1.63** | **34.41** | **0.90** | **10.31** |
| | | | 3.19 | 4.44 | 9.09 | 1.93 | 4.21 |
| REP | Republican Party | **18** | **46.77** | **7.49** | **38.73** | **6.44** | **17.82** |
| | | | 2.47 | 4.65 | 8.76 | 2.72 | 5.60 |




Figure 73: Left-Right Positions of US-American Parties

the first half of the 1950s.[41]

Considering the LR Core dimension, it becomes even more clear that policy positions of both parties are rather right-leaning. Yet, because both parties are often on the right, it seems doubtful if the left-right core dimension is an appropriate indicator for US-American parties. Obviously, the Republicans are clearly on the right. However, this is also true for the Democrats except under the presidencies of Trueman and Carter, who slightly emphasized left core issues. Clinton in turn quite strongly "intruded" the right wing. Interesting is also the fact that Jimmy Carter in his 1976 campaign slightly stressed left core issues but the overall LR index was on the right. The phenomenon that plus-pers make the Democrats more right-leaning can also be seen in the unsuccessful 1956 campaign of Stevenson, who emphasized "classical" left issues to the strongest degree in the whole post-World War II era in the US so far.

The LR and LR Core index seem to capture the overall tendencies and the peculiarities of single campaigns reasonably well although they cannot cover the fact that US-American party positions rather seldom concern a left-right and even to a lesser extent the "classical" left-right divide.

41 The RILE also documents these changes of the Republicans but places the party to the left from 1956 to 1960, which seems to be overstated. Likewise, the RILE sees the Democrats until the 1990s clearly to the left.

Figure 74: Heatmap of LR Plus-Pers in the United States

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