Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) Codebook

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Introduction

The Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) project attempts to develop a rigorous, generalizable measure of the effectiveness of military force as a policy instrument and to apply the measure to code the outcomes of all foreign military interventions conducted by five major powers since the termination of World War II. The MIPS dataset provides detailed data on American, British, Chinese, French, and Russian uses of military force against both state and non-state targets between 1946 and 2003. In particular, this project focuses on the political objectives strong states pursue through the use of force, the human and material cost of their military operations, and measures of intervention outcomes relative to the intervening states' objectives. The dataset also includes extensive data on factors commonly hypothesized to be associated with war outcomes like the nature of the target, the type of force used by the intervening state, and military aid and assistance provided to either the intervening state or the target. The military operations contained in this dataset involve uses of force ranging from naval blockades to aerial bombardment to large-scale ground combat.

1. Unit of analysis

The MIPS project defines *military intervention* as a use of armed force that involves the official deployment of at least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air, or naval) to attain immediate-term political objectives through action against a foreign adversary.

- To qualify as a 'use of armed force', the military personnel deployed must either *use* force or be prepared to use force if they encounter resistance (see Tillema, 2001 for a similar definition of 'combat-readiness'). The deployment of military advisors is considered a use of force only if the advisors actually engage in combat.
- To be 'official,' the deployment of national troops must be authorized by a state's political leaders (Pearson and Baumann, 1993).
- The deployment must be intended to attain immediate-term political objectives through military action, or the imminent threat of military action, against another actor. Routine military movements and operations without a defined target like military training exercises, the routine forward deployment of military troops, non-combatant evacuation operations, and disaster relief should be excluded.
- Foreign adversaries can be either state or non-state actors like insurgent groups and terrorist organizations. A military operation that targets a state's own citizens and is conducted within a state's internationally-recognized borders (e.g. China's use of force against Tiananmen Square protestors in 1989) should be excluded *unless* both citizenship and borders are in dispute by an armed independence movement in territory claimed as national homeland by a distinct ethnic group (e.g., France in Algeria, China in Tibet, and Russia in Chechnya).[1]

[1] Other researchers may wish to exclude these operations, which are identified in the dataset as operations to 'Maintain Empire' by the variable *objcode*.

2. Sources and Methods

The research team attempted to identify all military interventions by the five states that are currently permanent members of the UN Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the 'major powers') between April 1945 and March 2003. In order to compile an exhaustive list of all possible major power military interventions, we identified potential cases from Pearson and Baumann (1993) *International Military Intervention, 1946-1988* (updated by Pickering, 1999; Kisangani and Pickering, 2006); Herbert K. Tillema (2001) *Foreign Overt Military Intervention*; Regan's (2002) data on interventions in civil conflicts; the UCDP/PRIO *Armed Conflict Dataset* (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Eriksson et al., 2003); and the Correlates of War *Militarized Interstate Dispute, Intra-State War* and *Extra-State War* datasets (Jones et. al., 1996; Sarkees, 2000; Singer and Small, 1994; Small and Singer, 1982). We then looked for additional cases that met our case selection criteria in reference books including Butterworth's (1976) *Managing Interstate Conflict,* Clodfelter's (2002) *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, Jessup's (1989) *Chronology of Conflict and Resolution,* and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives/Record of World Events*.

The focus of this project is on the ability of states to achieve their own political objectives through the use of military force. We do not create separate intervention cases for each major power state that participates in a multilateral military operation (e.g., the United Kingdom in the Vietnam War) to avoid distorting the data by counting one intervention with one primary objective and one outcome as two or three separate events. An intervention is coded only for the major power that was the primary motivating and contributing force and the contribution of allies is noted in the variable COALITION. We also do not create an intervention case for operations conducted by multilateral organizations (e.g., the UN, NATO, OAS) unless one major power could be identified as the primary motivating and contributing force (e.g., the U.S. in the NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999), or a participating major power had an agenda that was distinct from that of the multinational organization and pursued a particular outcome for its own purposes (e.g., the U.S. in Lebanon in 1983-84).

After a list of intervention cases was created, two coders were assigned to each case. Each coder worked independently using a coding worksheet (Appendix A) and the operational definitions contained in this codebook. A Boolean logic decision procedure was employed to code the political objective category and outcome variables (Appendix B).[2] Each coder consulted at least three sources approved by the Principle Investigator. Sources include scholarly studies, newspapers, chronologies of international events, and government and military records. The dataset indicates which of the over 200 primary and secondary sources were used to code each case and a full bibliography of sources is available at the end of this document (Appendix C).

[2] A third coder was assigned if scores on the key variables OBJCODE and ATTAIN1YR did not match after the worksheets were completed. Any remaining ambiguity about the objective and/or outcome code is noted in the dataset under NOTES.

3. Variables

Intervention Identifiers

CASE: Unique three digit code identifying the military intervention. Assigned by the Principle Investigator.

MP: Correlates of War (COW) country code (ccode) for intervening state.

MPALPH: Three letter intervening state identifier.

STDATE: Day, month, and year intervention began. STDATE is the date at least 500 regular troops (ground, air, or naval) from the intervening state arrive at the location of the conflict or, in the event that more than 500 military troops were already stationed at the conflict location, the date the troops begin military operations on location. Military operations could include air, sea, and/or long-range missile fire; small unit raids; commando operations; and/or large-scale ground combat operations. If a precise start day could not be identified, STDATE is coded as the first of the month.

ENDDATE: Day, month, and year intervention was terminated. ENDDATE is coded as the date either, (1) a peace treaty or other agreement between the parties that terminates the intervening state's combat role is signed; (2) the intervening state's combat troops have been withdrawn to less than 30% of their maximum strength; or (3) the intervening state decisively attains its primary political objective and begins to pursue a different objective (see OBJECT below), whichever occurs first. In the event that a peace treaty is signed but the intervening state's combat role does not significantly diminish, the conflict will be considered ongoing until 70% of the intervening state's combat troops have been withdrawn. If the major power terminates an intervention through either a formal agreement or withdrawal of 70% of its combat troops and then re-introduces troops, the two operations are coded as separate interventions.

LOCATION: Location of conflict (state, territory, or area).

LOCALPH: Three letter identifier of primary country in which the intervention takes place.

LOC: Correlates of War (COW) country code for conflict location. Note: The country code for the country that currently exists at the conflict location is given even if the country was not a state at the time of the conflict.

INTERVENTION: Descriptive name of the military intervention. Assigned by the Principle Investigator.

STYR: Year intervention began.

COW: Correlates of War (COW) case number for military interventions that occurred in the context of a war that appears in the COW inter-state war dataset. See http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.

MID: Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) case number for military interventions that occurred in the context of a dispute that is coded in the MID dataset.

UCDP: UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset case number for military interventions that occurred in the context of an armed conflict that is coded in the UCDP/ PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007).

Actors

TARGET: Name of the primary target of the intervention. The target is defined as the state (e.g. Iraq), group (e.g., al Qaeda), or persons (e.g., coup leaders) against which military operations are directed and from which the political objective of the intervention is sought.

STTARG: Correlates of War (COW) country code for the target if the.

TALPHA: Three letter identifier for the target if the target is a state.

TARGTYP:

Coding

0 state and state-supported institutions
1 insurgents/ guerilla movement
2 rioters/ mass movement
3 coup leaders
4 terrorists/ war lords
5 state *and* insurgents

Definitions

State	Any of the official institutions of a sovereign political entity. Following Gleditsch and Ward (1999), we consider an actor to be a state if it 'a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on' (398).
Insurgents	A group of armed, irregular personnel organized along military lines to conduct a systematic campaign of military and paramilitary operations against the established system of government in a state or colonial territory.
Rioters /Mass movement	Groups of individuals engaged in spontaneous or organized protests which could escalate to violence.
Coup leaders	A small group of individuals who have, or are attempting to, remove and replace state leaders through extrajudicial means.
Terrorists	Clandestine groups and individuals who engage in premeditated, politically motivated violence against primarily noncombatant targets.
State and Insurgents	The conventional armed forces of a state fighting a campaign against another state in coordination with an insurgent movement within that state.

STATE: Dummy variable coded 1 if the target is a state as defined above or coup leaders that have seized power in a state.

T_MP: Dummy variable coded 1 if the target is a major power.

COALITION: Dummy variable coded 1 if other major power states committed military troops to assist the primary intervening state (MP).

COUNTER: Dummy variable coded 1 if another major power state committed military troops to assist the intervention target (TARGET).

TARGHELP: Dummy variable coded 1 if any other state committed military troops to assist the intervention target (TARGET).

COLONY: Categorical variable indicating whether the location of the conflict is a current (1) or former (2) colony, protectorate, or possession of the intervening state on the date the intervention began (stdate). The conflict location is considered a colony, protectorate, or possession of the intervening state if the intervening state is the central governing authority for the territory. Colonial or other dependency relationships and independence dates are identified using the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project's Colonial History data set, version 0.4 (http://data.icow.org), the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/), and the U.S. Department of State's Country Background Notes (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/).

CONT: Dummy variable indicating that the intervening state shares a land border with the conflict location (LOCATION) or is separated from the conflict location by less than 12 miles of water. The variable coding is generated by the EUGene program based on the COW data (Bennett and Stam, 2000; http://www.eugenesoftware.org).

INTERST: Dummy variable coded 1 if the conflict in which the intervening state intervened was between two internationally recognized states.

Military Intervention Characteristics

FORCEDESCRIP: Brief narrative description of the type of force used by the intervening state.

FORCETYP: Ordinal variable that indicates the type of force used by the intervening state. The highest applicable category is coded.

Coding

1 Display
2 Limited Air/Naval Power
3 Limited Ground Commitment
4 Extensive Airpower
5 Ground Combat

Definitions

Display	The intervening state deployed military personnel that were prepared to use force to the vicinity of the conflict but did not use lethal force or engage in combat operations.
Limited Air/ Naval Power	The intervening state conducted air strikes, engaged in air or naval combat, and/or fired missiles that resulted in fewer than 500 target casualties. No more than 499 ground combat troops were deployed.
Limited Ground Commitment	The intervening state deployed at least 500 but less than 2000 combat-ready ground troops to serve as advisors in combat and/or to conduct small unit raids and commando operations, possibly in combination with the use of limited air/naval power.
Extensive Airpower	The intervening state conducted air strikes, engaged in air or naval combat, and/or fired missiles that resulted in at least 500 target casualties. No more than 1999 ground combat troops were deployed.
Ground Combat	The intervening state deployed more than 2000 combat-ready troops and conducted ground combat operations.

NUMTRPS: Number of intervening state troops at height of intervention. Measured as maximum number of regular military personnel (air, ground, and sea) deployed to the conflict location at any one time during the intervention. When exact numbers cannot be located, coders may estimate from information about the military units, ships, and/or planes deployed. If even estimates are unreliable because of a lack of data or contradictory and ambiguous information, NUMTRPS is coded as missing and only TRPCAT is coded.

TRPCAT: Categorical measure of the number of intervening state troops at height of intervention.

1 Less than 3000 troops
2 3000 to 9999 troops
3 10,000 to 29,999 troops
4 More than 30,000 troops

TRPSRC: Categorical variable indicating the source of the intervening state troops.

1 Troops crossed border or demarcation line into the country or region (see LOCATION)
2 Intervening state troops already present in the country
3 Both 1 and 2

GRNDTRPS: Dummy variable coded 1 if the intervening state deployed any ground troops to the conflict location.

GRNDCMBT: Dummy variable coded 1 if intervening state ground troops engaged in combat.

DAYS: Duration of military intervention in days.

MNTHS: Duration of military intervention in months.

TARG_INIT: Dummy variable indicating that the intervention target initiated the use of military force against citizens and/or military personnel of the intervening state.

MPCAS: Number of intervening state troops killed during the intervention.

CAS500: Dummy variable coded 1 if at least 500 intervening state troops were killed during the intervention.

TARCAS: Number of target actor combatants killed during the intervention.

PREVINT: Dummy variable indicating that the intervening state conducted a military intervention in this country previously.

Objectives and Outcomes

OBJECT: Brief narrative description of the intervening state's primary political objectives. We define a *political objective* as the allocation of a valued good (e.g. territory, political authority, resources, security) sought by the political leaders of a state or of a non-state organization. Examples of political objectives frequently pursued in military operations include: the acquisition of territory, seizure of political authority, and maintenance of an allied government's political authority. A state's *primary* political objectives are the highest-priority tangible political outcomes the state's national leaders have tasked the armed forces with trying to achieve. The attention and resources dedicated to attaining a political objective determine which are primary when a military intervention has several political objectives.

The political objectives of a military intervention can be contrasted with an operation's *military objectives*, policymakers' *motives*, and *grand strategic motivations*.

- Military objectives are the operational goals to be accomplished by the armed forces of a state or opposition movement as a *means* to achieve the desired political outcome. Examples include the attrition of enemy combatants, destruction of enemy military capacity, seizure of strategic territory, disruption of enemy lines of command and control, and demoralization of enemy soldiers and/or civilians. Under some circumstances an actor's political objective and military objective are the same. A state may, for example, seek only to re-claim a piece of land along its border with another state. In this case, acquiring territory is both the political objective and the military objective, although the state is likely to pursue other military objectives simultaneously as a means to the desired end.
- The domestic political and personal motives of national leaders include the desire to maintain office, increase their personal political power, or enhance their reputation. As Blechman and Kaplan (1978) note, 'Motives… may be singular or multiple in number, subliminally or consciously held, and future or present-oriented' (59).
- Grand strategic motivations are broader goals such as maintaining the credibility of a country's commitments to its allies, preventing the spread of an ideology, sending a message about foreign aggression, reducing the threat of international terrorism, and similar overarching, long-term foreign policy aims. In contrast, the primary political objective of a military operation is a concrete, observable, immediate-term outcome to be attained through the employment of military force. Long-term strategic goals may be more significant to national leaders or more critical to the overall security and prosperity of a state, but these larger goals are generally not well-served when a state fails to attain even the short-term political objectives of a military intervention. A state may, for example, be more concerned about demonstrating the credibility of its commitments to allies than in defending a particular ally, but failing at an attempt to defend an ally through the use of military force is unlikely to enhance the a state's reputation any more than choosing not to use military force.

Blechman and Kaplan (1978) make a very strong case for focusing on objectives rather than motives, noting that 'Motivation is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine in any situation' (59), but '…operational objectives tend to be expressed in relatively tangible and specific terms and their satisfaction or non-satisfaction can be judged much more easily. There is much greater agreement among public documents, memoirs, and scholarly studies of incidents as to what the decisionmakers' operational objectives were than as to either fundamental strategic objectives or personal motives' (65).

While larger strategic goals and personal political agendas often motivate the use of force, once a decision to employ force is made national leaders must operationalize these goals by giving their armed forces a directive. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, President Bush and other decision-makers had a multitude of motives and rationales for responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, each military operation had a primary political objective; Desert Shield was intended to deter an invasion of Saudi Arabia and Desert Storm was designed to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. The removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, destruction of the Republican Guard, and elimination of the Scud missile threat to Israel were only secondary objectives, notable for the lack of consensus that existed among civilian and military leaders on the time and resources to devote to them (Ciment, 1999; Clodfelter, 2002; Gordon and Trainor, 1995; U.S. Department of Defense, 1992).

Although it happens less frequently than one might expect, the primary political objective of a military intervention can change dramatically during the course of an intervention. When the original objective is attained and the major power decides to pursue another objective, as the United States did, for example, during its involvement in Korea during the 1950s, the intervention is treated as two operations and the first is coded as a success. For the Korean case, the U.S. military intervention to maintain the South Korean regime is one operation. The push North to the Yalu river to 'liberate' North Korea (i.e., to remove and replace the North Korean regime), is considered a second operation. Without such a distinction, whether the U.S. achieved operational success or failure is ambiguous and factors contributing to the success of the first operation cannot be distinguished from factors contributing to the failure of the second. If, however, the major power changes its PPO because it decides it cannot attain its original objective, the intervention is retained as one case and the outcome is coded as a failure if it terminates and the original political objective was not attained.

OBJCODE: Categorical variable that indicates which of seven categories best represents the intervening state's primary political objective. Coders should use the Boolean decision procedure from Appendix B and the operational definitions below to assign a score for each military intervention.

Coding

1 Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority
2 Remove Regime from Power
3 Policy Change
4 Acquire or Defend Territory
5 Maintain Empire
6 Social Protection and Order

Definitions

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., state-building). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state (see STATE).

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which

military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

SQ: Dummy variable indicating that the intervening state sought to maintain (rather than revise) the status quo.

OUTCOME: Categorical variable that describes how the intervening state terminated its military intervention

0	Ongoing	Intervention ongoing.
1	Withdrew	Intervening state withdrew it military forces unilaterally without attaining its primary political objective (OBJCODE)
2	Completed	Intervening state completed a mission with a pre-determined end date without attaining an immediate, observable political objective.
3	Prevailed	Intervening state withdrew its forces after attaining its primary political objective.
4	Negotiated	Intervening state negotiated a settlement that did not result in full attainment of the state's primary political objective.
5	Escalated	Intervening state either attained or abandoned its first primary political objective and increased its war aims.

ATTAIN: Dummy variable coded 1 if the primary political objective of the intervention (see OBJCODE) was attained by the intervening state and maintained for at least 30 days.

ATTAIN6MOS: Dummy variable coded 1 if the primary political objective of the intervention was attained by the intervening state and maintained for at least 6 months after the termination of the intervention (see ENDDATE).

ATTAIN1YR: Dummy variable coded 1 if the primary political objective of the intervention was attained by the intervening state and maintained for at least 1 year after the termination of the intervention (see ENDDATE).

ATTAIN3YRS: Dummy variable coded 1 if the primary political objective of the intervention was attained by the intervening state and maintained for at least 3 years after the termination of the intervention (see ENDDATE).

MAINTAIN: The number of months the primary political objective of the intervention was maintained after the termination of the intervention. This variable varies from zero, when the objective was never attained, to 60, when the objective was maintained for at least five years.

POST_TRPS: Dummy variable indicating that the intervening state maintained a significant troop presence after the intervention end date to enforce the terms of the conflict settlement. Significant = > 5000 troops.

MNF: Dummy variable coded 1 if a multinational peacekeeping force was established and remained in the conflict region after the termination of the intervention.

Sources and Notes

SOURCES: Abbreviated identifier for each source used to code a case. The full source citations are provided with their identifying code below.

NOTES: Brief coder notes on ambiguous, contradictory, and missing data for each case.

Appendix A: **Coding Worksheet**

Coder:	Date:
Major Power:	Case #:
start date:	*end date*:
location:	*target*:

Briefly describe the situation that prompted the major power to use military force:

Describe how force was used. Provide dates for changes in the way force was being used by the major power and numbers of troops whenever possible:

forcetyp:	*numtrps:*
objcode:	*scndobj:*

what was the major power trying to achieve by using force? (reference *objcode* but provide more detail)

was this objective attained by the use of force? (note any cause for ambiguity)

if so, for how long was this objective maintained after the intervention end date (i.e. # of months)? if not, why not?

How did the intervention end?

Did other major powers participate in the conflict? (which ones, on what side, what did they do)

mpcas:	*500cas*:
tarcas:	*500 target casualties?*

who (if anyone) aided the target and how?

Sources:

comments/ questions:

Appendix B

#	Primary Political Objective (objcode)	YES	NO
1	Is the primary target of MP military operations a state?	go to next question	go to question # 9
2	Is the MP attempting to forcibly remove the target government?	objcode=2	go to next question
3	Is the location of the conflict a current colonial possession of the MP?	go to next question	go to question # 5
4	Is the MP fighting to maintain its own political authority over its colony?	objcode=5	go to question # 7
5	Is the MP trying to defend a friendly government against a target state attempting to remove the regime from power?	objcode=1	go to next question
6	Is the MP using military force (or threat of force) to defend, acquire, or reclaim a piece of territory for itself or an ally?	objcode=4	go to next question
7	Is the MP trying to convince the target government to change a specific behavior or government policy?	objcode=3	go to next question
8	Is the MP trying to physically protect civilians from violence or major human rights abuses by the target government?	objcode=6	objcode=.
9	Is the location of the conflict a current colonial possession of the MP?	go to next question	go to question # 11
10	Is the MP fighting to maintain its own political authority over its colony?	objcode=5	go to next question
11	Is the MP trying to defend a friendly government against a group (or groups) trying to remove the regime from power?	objcode=1	go to next question
12	Is the MP trying to create a friendly government in a state without an effective central government?	objcode=1	go to next question
13	Is the MP using military force (or threat of force) to defend, acquire, or reclaim a piece of territory for itself or an ally?	objcode=4	go to next question
14	Is the MP using military force (or threat of force) to convince the target to change a specific behavior?	objcode=3	go to next question
15	Is the MP trying to physically protect civilians from violence, restore law and order, or suppress violence?	objcode=6	objcode=.

#	Outcome (attain & attain1yr)	YES	NO
1	If objcode=1, did the friendly government have political authority over the state when intervention was terminated (enddate)?	attain==1; to next question	attain==0; attain1yr==0
2	Did the regime the MP sought to defend still have political authority over the state one year after intervention enddate?	attain1yr==1	attain1yr==0
3	If objcode=2, was the regime the MP sought to remove in power when the intervention was terminated?	attain==0; attain1yr==0	attain==1; go to next question
4	Did the regime the MP removed regain political authority over the state in the year after the intervention was terminated?	attain1yr==0	attain1yr==1
5	If objcode=3, had the adversary changed its behavior/policies in the manner sought when the intervention was terminated?	attain==1; to next question	attain==0; attain1yr==0
6	Did the adversary maintain the behavior/policies the MP sought for at least one year after intervention enddate?	attain1yr==1	attain1yr==0
7	If objcode=4, did the MP have control of the territory sought when the intervention was terminated?	attain==1; to next question	attain==0; attain1yr==0
8	Did the MP still have control of the territory sought one year after intervention enddate?	attain1yr==1	attain1yr==0
9	If objcode=5, did the MP have political authority over the territory it claimed as a colony at intervention enddate?	attain==1; to next question	attain==0; attain1yr==0
10	Did the MP still have political authority over the territory it claimed as a colony one year after intervention enddate?	attain1yr==1	attain1yr==0
11	If objcode 6, did the MP protect civilians from violence, restore law and order, or suppress violence until the intervention enddate?	attain==1; to next question	attain==0; attain1yr==0
12	Did the peace and order the MP had established at intervention enddate hold for at least one year after intervention enddate?	attain1yr==1	attain1yr==0

Appendix C: **Data Sources**

ACED: Armed Conflict Events Data http://www.onwar.com/aced/index.htm

ADE: Adedeji, Adebayo, 1999. *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts*. London: Zed Books.

ALD: Aldrich, Robert, 1993. *France and the South Pacific since 1940*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

ALK: Allard, Kenneth, 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.

ALL: Allen, Kenneth W., Glenn Krumel, & Jonathan D. Pollack, eds., 1995. *China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

ANG: Anglin, Douglas G. & Timothy M. Shaw, 1979. *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

AP: *The Associated Press*

BAR: Barnes, James, 1992. *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

BAU: Baumann, Robert F., Lawrence A. Yates & Versalle F Washington, 2004. '*My Clan Against the World': US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.

BAY: Baynham, Simon, 1988. *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

BDD: Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths', *European Journal of Population* 21(2–3): 145–166.

BEN: Bennett, Norman R., 1978. *A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

BENB: Benton, Barbara, 1996. *Soldiers for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping.* New York: Facts on File Inc.

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Appendix D: **Military Interventions by Powerful States, 1945-2003**

MP	Target	Location	Start date	End date
FRN	Syrian rioters	Syria	2-Apr-1945	15-Apr-1946
FRN	Rioting nationalists/ villagers	Algeria	8-May-1945	31-May-1945
FRN	Viet Minh nationalists	Vietnam	1-Oct-1945	1-Apr-1946
UKG	Indonesian insurgents	Indonesia	1-Oct-1945	29-Nov-1946
RUS	Iranian government	Iran	12-Dec-1945	9-May-1946
RUS	Turkish Government	Turkey	15-Mar-1946	5-Apr-1946
FRN	Lao Issara regime	Laos	17-Mar-1946	1-Oct-1946
FRN	Viet Minh nationalists	Vietnam	20-Nov-1946	7-May-1954
FRN	DMRM Rebels	Madagascar	29-Mar-1947	1-Dec-1948
UKG	Guatemalan army	Belize	1-Feb-1948	28-Feb-1948
USA	Communist guerillas	Greece	28-Feb-1948	16-Oct-1949
UKG	MPLA insurgents	Malaysia	16-Jun-1948	31-Jul-1960
RUS	West Berlin	E. Germany	22-Jun-1948	30-May-1949
UKG	Yemen	Aden, YAR	1-Mar-1949	31-Oct-1963
UKG	Shifta terrorists	Eritrea	3-Jan-1950	31-Aug-1951
CHN	Nationalist army	Hainan Island	18-Apr-1950	2-May-1950
CHN	Tibet	Tibet	1-May-1950	19-May-1951
USA	N. Korea (DPRK)	S. Korea	27-Jun-1950	1-Oct-1950
USA	N. Korea, China	N. Korea	1-Oct-1950	27-Jul-1953
CHN	United States/ UN	N. Korea	19-Oct-1950	24-Dec-1950
CHN	S. Korea/ U.S./ UN	S. Korea	31-Dec-1950	27-Jul-1953
CHN	Chinese Nationalists	Burma	31-Jan-1951	31-Dec-1953
FRN	National Liberation Army	Tunisia	20-Jan-1952	19-Jun-1955
UKG	Mau Mau guerillas	Kenya	20-Oct-1952	19-Oct-1956
FRN	Rioters	Fr. Morocco	7-Dec-1952	31-Dec-1952
RUS	Rioters	E. Germany	16-Jun-1953	17-Jun-1953
CHN	Nationalist army	Taiwan Strait	16-Jul-1953	17-Jul-1953
FRN	Moroccan Liberation Army	Fr. Morocco	15-Aug-1953	2-Mar-1956
UKG	PPP regime	Br. Guiana	6-Oct-1953	26-May-1966
CHN	Khampa guerilla groups	Tibet	1-Apr-1954	31-Dec-1973
CHN	ROC (Nationalist forces)	Taiwan Strait	3-Sep-1954	1-May-1955
CHN	ROC (Nationalist forces)	Taiwan Strait	3-Sep-1954	1-May-1955
USA	China	Taiwan	4-Sep-1954	1-May-1955
FRN	Nationalist movement (FLN)	Algeria	1-Nov-1954	3-Jul-1962
UKG	EOKA	Cyprus	26-Nov-1955	19-Feb-1959
UKG	Rioters	Bahrain	11-Mar-1956	1-Jan-1957
FRN	Independence movement	Tunisia	19-May-1956	26-Oct-1960
RUS	rioters, protesters	Poland	28-Jun-1956	29-Jun-1956
FRN	national liberation movement	Morocco	3-Jul-1956	30-Sep-1961
RUS	rioters, protesters	Poland	20-Oct-1956	24-Oct-1956
RUS	Imre Nagy regime, protesters	Hungary	24-Oct-1956	31-Mar-1958
UKG	Egyptian government	Egypt	31-Oct-1956	6-Nov-1956

FRN	UPC independence mvmnt	Fr. Cameroun	15-Dec-1957	1-Jan-1960
FRN	Moroccan Liberation Army	Sp. Sahara	24-Feb-1958	30-May-1958
USA	UAR (Syria), leftist insurgents	Lebanon	15-Jul-1958	24-Oct-1958
UKG	U.A.R., communist insurgents	Jordan	17-Jul-1958	29-Oct-1958
CHN	ROC (Nationalist forces)	Taiwan Strait	23-Aug-1958	19-Dec-1958
USA	China	Taiwan	23-Aug-1958	31-Dec-1958
CHN	Nepal	Nepal	22-Apr-1959	31-Jul-1960
FRN	UPC guerillas & rioters	Cameroun	12-Jan-1960	31-Dec-1962
UKG	Rioters	Zanzibar	3-Jun-1961	28-Feb-1963
USA	new Trujillista regime	Dominican Rep	3-Jun-1961	16-Nov-1961
UKG	Iraqi Army	Kuwait	1-Jul-1961	19-Oct-1961
FRN	Tunis govt., demonstrators	Tunisia	18-Jul-1961	22-Jul-1961
CHN	India	India	2-Nov-1961	21-Nov-1962
USA	new Trujillista regime	Dominican Rep	16-Nov-1961	30-Jan-1962
USA	NVA and VietCong	Vietnam	1-Feb-1962	27-Jan-1973
USA	Pathet Lao, N. Vietnam, PRC	Thailand	16-May-1962	23-Jul-1962
USA	USSR/ Cuba	Cuba	22-Oct-1962	20-Nov-1962
UKG	TNKU rebels & Indonesia	Brunei	10-Dec-1962	31-May-1963
UKG	Indonesian army/ guerillas	Malaysia	19-Apr-1963	19-May-1965
UKG	rioters from labor movement	Swaziland	13-Jun-1963	30-Nov-1966
UKG	Tribes in the Radfan	Yemen AR	3-Aug-1963	18-Apr-1965
FRN	opposition rioters	Congo (FR)	13-Aug-1963	17-Aug-1963
UKG	Turkish & Greek communities	Cyprus	17-Dec-1963	27-Mar-1964
UKG	Muntinying military troops	E. African sts	25-Jan-1964	31-Jul-1964
FRN	coup leaders/ provisional govt	Gabon	19-Feb-1964	31-Dec-1965
USA	NVA, VC, and Pathet Lao	Laos	30-Apr-1964	14-Aug-1973
UKG	NLF, FLOSY	South Arabia	25-Nov-1964	30-Nov-1967
USA	leftist opposition	Dominican Rep	28-Apr-1965	20-Sep-1966
UKG	S. Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	Zambia	3-Dec-1965	30-Apr-1966
RUS	North and South Yemen	Yemen AR	30-Nov-1967	15-Mar-1968
RUS	Dubcek government	Czechoslovakia	20-Aug-1968	17-Apr-1969
FRN	FROLINAT insurgents	Chad	28-Aug-1968	30-Aug-1971
RUS	China	China	2-Mar-1969	11-Sep-1969
CHN	USSR	China	1-May-1969	11-Sep-1969
UKG	IRA, PIRA, rioters	N. Ireland	1-Sep-1969	22-May-1998
UKG	Guatemalan army	Br. Honduras	1-Jan-1970	31-Dec-1973
RUS	Israel	Egypt	31-Mar-1970	7-Aug-1970
USA	Khmer Rouge	Cambodia	30-Apr-1970	14-Aug-1973
USA	Palestinian fedayeen, Syria	Turkey	10-Sep-1970	25-Sep-1970
RUS	Rioters	Poland	15-Dec-1970	20-Dec-1970
RUS	Anya-Nya guerillas	Sudan	1-Jan-1971	31-Aug-1971
RUS	Iraqi Kurds	Iraq	15-Mar-1973	30-Mar-1975
CHN	Republic of Vietnam	China	15-Jan-1974	20-Jan-1974
RUS	UNITA, FNLA	Angola	14-Nov-1975	31-Dec-1988
UKG	Guatemalan army	Br. Honduras	7-Jul-1977	7-Aug-1977

FRN	POLISARIO/ SPLA rebels	Mauritania	12-Dec-1977	30-May-1978
RUS	Somalian army and WSLF	Ethiopia	31-Dec-1977	9-Mar-1978
FRN	FROLINAT	Chad	28-Apr-1978	16-May-1980
FRN	Congolese rebels (FLNC)	Zaire	19-May-1978	22-Jun-1978
CHN	Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Vietnam	17-Feb-1979	17-Mar-1979
FRN	Bokassa regime	CAR/CAE	20-Sep-1979	21-Sep-1979
RUS	Mujahideen rebels	Afghanistan	25-Dec-1979	15-Feb-1989
UKG	Argentina	Argentina	25-Apr-1982	14-Jun-1982
USA	Govt opposition forces; Syria	Lebanon	29-Sep-1982	26-Feb-1984
FRN	Libya & GUNT/FAP rebels	Chad	9-Aug-1983	9-Nov-1984
USA	New Jewel/ PRG regime	Grenada	25-Oct-1983	12-Dec-1983
CHN	Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Vietnam	2-Apr-1984	12-Jul-1984
FRN	Libya & GUNT/ FAP rebels	Chad	16-Feb-1986	11-Sep-1987
USA	Libyan govt (Qaddafi)	Libya	23-Mar-1986	27-Mar-1986
USA	Nicaraguan govt (Sandinista)	Honduras	17-Mar-1988	31-Mar-1988
USA	Panamanian govt (Noriega)	Panama	11-May-1989	20-Dec-1989
USA	Panamanian govt (Noriega)	Panama	20-Dec-1989	31-Jan-1990
RUS	Azerbaijani Popular Front	Azerbaijan	20-Jan-1990	1-Feb-1990
USA	Iraqi government (Hussein)	Saudi Arabia	14-Aug-1990	28-Feb-1991
USA	Iraq government	Kuwait	16-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991
USA	Iraqi government	Iraq	6-Apr-1991	19-Mar-2003
FRN	Habre rebels	Chad	1-Dec-1991	7-Jan-1992
USA	Iraqi government	Iraq	27-Aug-1992	19-Mar-2003
USA	warring clans	Somalia	3-Dec-1992	4-May-1993
USA	Somali Natl Alliance (Aidid)	Somalia	4-May-1993	31-Dec-1993
RUS	Rebels in breakaway republic	Chechnya	1-Jan-1994	30-Apr-1996
USA	Haitian regime (Cedras)	Haiti	19-Sep-1994	31-Mar-1995
USA	Iraqi government (Hussein)	Kuwait	14-Oct-1994	21-Dec-1994
CHN	Taiwan	Taiwan Strait	21-Jul-1995	25-Mar-1996
USA	Bosnian Serbs	Bosnia	30-Aug-1995	21-Sep-1995
FRN	FR mercenaries/ coup leaders	Comoros	15-Sep-1995	15-Oct-1995
USA	China	Taiwan	8-Mar-1996	25-Mar-1996
FRN	army mutineers	CAR	23-May-1996	2-Jun-1997
USA	Iraqi government (Hussein)	Kuwait	3-Sep-1996	19-Mar-2003
USA	Iraqi government	Iraq	1-Feb-1998	20-Dec-1998
USA	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia	24-Mar-1999	10-Jun-1999
USA	Taliban regime	Afghanistan	7-Oct-2001	31-Mar-2002