Online Appendix for "Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival," by Benjamin A.T. Graham, Michael K. Miller, and Kaare Strøm in *APSR*

Appendix A: Robustness Checks and Additional Models

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Appendix A: Robustness Checks and Additional Models

Varying Lags

Tables 3 and 4 in the paper employ a five-year lag of all independent variables. In Figures A1 and A2, we demonstrate the robustness of our core results across a range of different lags. We rerun the primary specification (Model 1) from Tables 3 and 4, but vary the number of years by which we lag the independent variables. Figure A1 plots the coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) on each dimension of powersharing from the model without *Post-Civil War* interactions (as in Table 3). The coefficient for the five-year lag in Figure A1 matches the coefficient on powersharing in Model 1 of Table 3. Figure A2 plots the effect of each type of powersharing in post-civil war states and peaceful states, as derived from a model with *Post-Civil War* interactions (as in Model 1, Table 4). For clarity, we plot the total effect in each type of state.[1]

We find that the estimated effects of the powersharing dimensions on democratic survival are remarkably stable across different lag lengths. In Figures A1 and A2, constraining powersharing is significantly positive across all lags and all contexts (except just missing significance for the 10-year lag post-civil war). In the full sample, the estimated effect of inclusive powersharing is near zero at all lag lengths. However, consistent with the results in the main paper, Figure A2 shows that inclusive powersharing is significantly positive for survival post-civil war. Similarly, dispersive powersharing has a significantly negative effect post-civil war, but not in non-conflict states.[2] The consistency in our core results across different lag lengths increases our confidence that our results are neither model-dependent nor driven by reverse causation.

[1] Thus, the five-year results confirm that the total effect is significant for each type of powersharing in post-civil war states.

[2] At long lag lengths, the estimated effect of dispersive powersharing is significantly negative in the full sample, but at short lag lengths the estimated effect is positive (albeit not significant).



Figure A1: *Varying lags of independent variables (1-10 years), full sample. Dots represent coefficients on the powersharing variables. Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals.*



Figure A2: *Varying lags of independent variables (1-10 years), divided by Post-Civil War. Dots represent coeffiecients on the powersharing variables. Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals.*

Post-Civil War Definition: Including Lower-Level Conflicts

In the paper, our coding of post-civil war is based on a 1,000 battle-death threshold for identifying civil wars. In Table A1, we re-run the same main models as in Table 4, but replace our *Post-Civil War* variable with a *Post-Conflict* variable that employs a 25 battle-death threshold (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Thus, we expand the number of cases considered post-conflict (while leaving the total number of observations unchanged).

The results in Table A1 are substantively the same as in Table 4. Constraining powersharing has a positive effect on democratic survival; this effect is strongest in post-conflict states but present in all states. Dispersive powersharing has a negative effect on democratic survival in post-conflict states, with the effects in non-post-conflict states close to zero. For inclusive powersharing, we continue to see evidence that it promotes democratic survival in post-conflict states.

Post-Civil War Definition: Including Ongoing Civil Wars

In our paper, we use interaction terms to allow the effect of powersharing to vary by post-civil war status. This is appropriate because we want to estimate the effects of powersharing specific to the post-conflict settings in which they are frequently prescribed. However, this approach lumps together countries still engaged in an active war with states without recent experiences with war since both types of cases are not "post-war." Both current-war and post-war states are likely to be characterized by deep societal rifts. A total of 25 democratic spells in our sample have an ongoing civil war. In Table A2, we interact each type of powersharing with a dummy variable for *Recent War*, which combines countries that have experienced civil war within the past 10 years *and* those currently at war.

For both constraining and dispersive powersharing, the results in Table A2 closely match those presented in the main paper, further bolstering our confidence in these results. For inclusive powersharing, however, we see some differences. For its main effect, which captures its influence in cases with a sustained period without civil war, we estimate a significantly negative effect on democratic survival. This is in the same direction as our estimate in Table 4, but stronger in this narrower subset of countries. The effect of inclusive powersharing in conflictual countries remains positive, although it

narrowly misses significance in the first two models. Our general conclusion regarding inclusive powersharing—that it is advisable primarily in societies plagued by violent civil conflict—remains intact.

Post-Civil War Definition: Varying the Number of Post-War Years

Just as the cutoff of 1,000 battle-deaths is arbitrary, so too is the 10-year window used in the paper to define post-civil war. In Table A3, we vary treating states as post-civil war for 5, 10, and 15-year windows after civil war. Thus, Model 2 in Table A3 matches Model 1 in Table 4. Table A3 displays little variation in our results as the size of the post-civil war window changes, although the negative effect of dispersive powersharing loses significance for the 15-year window. Our confidence in the robustness of our results is thus increased, especially our core results regarding the positive effects of constraining powersharing and the conditional effects of inclusive powersharing.

Controlling for Civil War Types

As discussed in the paper, we want to ensure that the powersharing dimensions in post-civil war states are not proxying for characteristics of the civil war itself. In Table A4, we therefore control for three such characteristics: whether the war was a separatist conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012), whether it resulted in a peace settlement (*Civil War Compromise*) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), and whether international peacekeepers were involved (Fortna 2008). The models in Table A4 otherwise match Model 1 in Table 4. For each model, the powersharing results remain the same.[3] Further, none of the civil war characteristics predict democratic survival independently, further increasing our confidence that the relationship we observe between powersharing and democratic survival in post-civil-war states is not driven by omitted features of the conflict.

[3] With these controls added, the interaction between *Constraining Powersharing* and *Post-Civil War* is no longer statistically significant. However, because the main effect of *Constraining Powersharing* is positive and significant and the interaction effect is also positive, the estimated effects of constraining powersharing in both non-conflict and post-conflict states are positive and statistically significant, consistent with Table 4 in the main paper.

Table A1: Redefining *Post-Civil War*: Including Lower-Level Conflicts

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusive Powersharing	−0.065	−0.054	−0.145
	(−0.83)	(−0.57)	(−1.42)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.025	−0.027	−0.043
	(0.26)	(−0.27)	(−0.42)
Constraining Powersharing	0.396***	0.317***	0.348***
	(4.76)	(3.49)	(3.61)
Post-Conflict	0.678***	0.800***	0.885***
	(4.05)	(4.19)	(4.56)
Inclusive × Post-Conflict	1.966***	2.086***	2.228***
	(4.48)	(3.55)	(3.63)
Constraining × Post-Conflict	0.255	0.326	0.421*
	(1.55)	(1.87)	(2.23)
Dispersive × Post-Conflict	−0.496**	−0.491**	−0.522**
	(−3.02)	(−2.87)	(−3.12)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.484	−0.534	−0.350
	(−1.79)	(−1.87)	(−1.19)
Regional Polity	0.099***	0.097***	0.092***
	(5.71)	(5.33)	(4.83)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.597***	0.515***	0.481***
	(7.51)	(5.42)	(5.15)
GDP Growth	0.008	0.008	0.006
	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.56)
Fuel Dependence	−0.012*	−0.013*	−0.015**
	(−2.16)	(−2.44)	(−2.79)
Population (logged)	−0.078	−0.002	−0.008
	(−1.78)	(−0.03)	(−0.16)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.219***	−0.213***	−0.197**
	(−3.62)	(−3.41)	(−2.95)
Democracy Age	−0.004	−0.008**	−0.008**
	(−1.84)	(−2.71)	(−3.19)
Freedom House		2.050***	1.894***
		(4.94)	(4.35)
Horizontal Constraints		−0.220	−0.215
		(−0.56)	(−0.51)
Recent Regular Turnover			0.361**
			(2.87)
Recent Irregular Turnover			−0.616**
			(−3.28)
Polity			0.038
			(1.37)
Disruption			1.060
			(1.39)
N	2,181	2,137	2,124
Pseudo R^2	0.327	0.348	0.370

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A2: Redefining *Post-Civil War*: Including Ongoing Civil Wars

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusive Powersharing	−0.137*	−0.128	−0.208*
	(−2.29)	(−1.58)	(−2.47)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.090	0.030	0.022
	(0.90)	(0.28)	(0.21)
Constraining Powersharing	0.330**	0.286**	0.320**
	(3.23)	(2.65)	(2.95)
Recent War	−0.140	0.133	0.172
	(−0.96)	(0.81)	(1.03)
Inclusive × Recent War	0.488	0.495	0.578*
	(1.73)	(1.94)	(2.55)
Dispersive × Recent War	−0.382**	−0.390**	−0.442**
	(−2.58)	(−2.59)	(−3.01)
Constraining × Recent War	0.362*	0.324*	0.334*
	(2.42)	(2.06)	(2.09)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.349	−0.444	−0.276
	(−1.29)	(−1.57)	(−0.96)
Regional Polity	0.102***	0.107***	0.102***
	(5.71)	(5.80)	(5.20)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.563***	0.480***	0.457***
	(6.92)	(4.82)	(4.72)
GDP Growth	0.009	0.009	0.007
	(0.92)	(0.95)	(0.59)
Fuel Dependence	−0.014*	−0.012*	−0.014*
	(−2.26)	(−2.19)	(−2.52)
Population (logged)	−0.024	0.028	0.021
	(−0.54)	(0.62)	(0.47)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.218***	−0.209**	−0.196**
	(−3.58)	(−3.24)	(−2.89)
Democracy Age	−0.006*	−0.009**	−0.009***
	(−2.29)	(−2.93)	(−3.58)
Freedom House		1.916***	1.637***
		(4.36)	(3.61)
Horizontal Constraints		−0.206	−0.246
		(−0.51)	(−0.58)
Recent Regular Turnover			0.326**
			(2.69)
Recent Irregular Turnover			−0.552**
			(−3.17)
Polity			0.040
			(1.42)
Disruption			−0.003
			(−0.00)
N	2,181	2,137	2,124
Pseudo R^2	0.320	0.333	0.352

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A3: Redefining *Post-Civil War*: Varying Year Range of Post-Civil War

	5 Years (1)	10 Years (2)	15 Years (3)
Inclusive Powersharing	0.019	−0.065	−0.003
	(0.23)	(−0.84)	(−0.02)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.020	−0.013	−0.070
	(0.22)	(−0.14)	(−0.73)
Constraining Powersharing	0.412***	0.397***	0.376***
	(5.16)	(4.73)	(4.31)
Post-Civil War	0.605**	0.593***	0.596***
	(2.81)	(3.38)	(3.78)
Inclusive × Post-Civil War	1.780***	2.113***	2.134***
	(3.43)	(4.69)	(4.85)
Dispersive × Post-Civil War	−0.689***	−0.440**	−0.157
	(−4.28)	(−2.72)	(−0.91)
Constraining × Post-Civil War	0.154	0.250	0.048
	(0.74)	(1.54)	(0.30)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.409	−0.489	−0.566*
	(−1.63)	(−1.86)	(−2.05)
Regional Polity	0.100***	0.099***	0.099***
	(5.77)	(5.72)	(5.90)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.589***	0.597***	0.597***
	(7.81)	(7.56)	(7.00)
GDP Growth	0.009	0.009	0.005
	(0.76)	(0.82)	(0.50)
Fuel Dependence	−0.012*	−0.011	−0.010
	(−2.09)	(−1.89)	(−1.76)
Population (logged)	−0.056	−0.064	−0.064
	(−1.38)	(−1.52)	(−1.42)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.229***	−0.211***	−0.196**
	(−3.76)	(−3.52)	(−3.27)
Democracy Age	−0.006*	−0.005*	−0.003
	(−2.53)	(−2.00)	(−1.40)
N	2,232	2,181	2,116
Pseudo R^2	0.314	0.322	0.329

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A4: Controlling for Civil War Types

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusive Powersharing	−0.063	−0.076	−0.070
	(−0.82)	(−0.90)	(−0.91)
Dispersive Powersharing	−0.011	−0.080	0.004
	(−0.12)	(−0.81)	(0.04)
Constraining Powersharing	0.402***	0.457***	0.403***
	(4.76)	(5.16)	(4.68)
Post-Civil War	0.553**	0.551**	0.663***
	(2.98)	(2.97)	(3.32)
Inclusive × Post-Civil War	2.072***	1.689***	1.913***
	(4.56)	(3.61)	(4.51)
Dispersive × Post-Civil War	−0.428**	−0.335*	−0.476**
	(−2.61)	(−2.00)	(−2.91)
Constraining × Post-Civil War	0.283	0.196	0.241
	(1.60)	(1.17)	(1.45)
Civil War Separatist	−0.017		
	(−0.06)		
Civil War Compromise		−0.256	
		(−1.04)	
Civil War Peacekeepers			−0.327
			(−1.18)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.489	−0.565*	−0.502
	(−1.86)	(−2.02)	(−1.86)
Regional Polity	0.097***	0.106***	0.100***
	(5.60)	(5.90)	(5.84)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.592***	0.606***	0.608***
	(7.52)	(7.09)	(7.72)
GDP Growth	0.012	0.009	0.010
	(1.03)	(0.70)	(0.91)
Fuel Dependence	−0.011	−0.013*	−0.012*
	(−1.81)	(−2.19)	(−2.06)
Population (logged)	−0.064	0.000	−0.053
	(−1.40)	(0.00)	(−1.23)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.201***	−0.266***	−0.229***
	(−3.36)	(−4.02)	(−3.72)
Democracy Age	−0.004	−0.006*	−0.006*
	(−1.80)	(−2.56)	(−2.54)
N	2,172	1,933	2,177
Pseudo R^2	0.324	0.326	0.321

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Alternative Democracy Measures

In the main paper we use a binary measure of democracy from Boix et al. (2013) which does not overlap with our measures of powersharing. Table A5 uses alternative measures of democracy for the dependent variable, as well as for the *Democracy Age* and *Past Democratic Breakdowns* variables. Models 1-2 use a dichotomous democracy measure from Cheibub et al. (2010). Models 3-4 use a dichotomized version of the Polity democracy score, with a cutoff of 6 (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). Models 1-4 are probits predicting five-year democratic survival, parallel to Model 1 from Tables 3 and 4. Models 5-6 in Table A5 are instead regressions predicting an adjusted form of Polity (as a continuous variable). Since Polity includes a measure of executive constraints (*xconst*), we subtract this component out to avoid misleading inferences regarding constraining powersharing. We control for the current level of Polity (minus *xconst*) and predict its value five years later. We use a sample of democracies defined by the dichotomized Polity measure.

The results are highly consistent, especially for post-civil war states. The most notable difference between Table A5 and the results in the Tables 3 and 4 in the main paper is that in Table A5 the estimated effect of inclusive powersharing is more strongly negative in peaceful states, especially using the Cheibub et al. (2010) measure and the continuous Polity measure.

Additional Controls for Inequality, Foreign Aid, and State Capacity

Table A6 shows the results after adding three controls to Model 1 of Tables 3 and 4: economic inequality (Gini, averaged from Galbraith and Kum 2003; UNU-WIDER 2005; World Bank 2014), foreign aid (as a % of GDP, from World Bank 2014), and state capacity (an aggregation of 24 variables capturing administrative and coercive capacity, from Hanson and Sigman 2013). The results are unchanged. In addition, interacting state capacity with each powersharing dimension returns insignificant results, suggesting that even relatively weak democracies can effectively implement powersharing arrangements. In fact, the F-test on the joint significance of these interactions is non-significant. In sum, the results in Table A6 suggest that these additional factors are not sources of omitted variable bias in the analysis in the main paper.

Alternative Duration Models

The paper's models all include a linear term for the democracy's age. In Table A7, we consider alternative duration models that control for different functions of age. Model 1 controls for a cubic function of age. Model 2 includes the logged age. Model 3 is an exponential duration model. Model 4 is a Weibull duration model. Finally, Model 5 is a Cox proportional hazards model. Each model adapts Model 1 of Table 4. Results in Table A7 are consistent with those in Table 4 across all duration models, although constraining powersharing now has a weaker (but still positive) effect in post-civil war states in the Weibull and Cox specifications.[4]

[4] To calculate the estimated effect in post-civil war states, add the coefficient on constraining powersharing to the coefficient on the interaction term between constraining powersharing and the dummy variable for post-civil war.

Table A5: Alternative Democracy Measures

	CGV		Polity (binary)		Polity (no xconst)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inclusive Powersharing	−0.406***	−0.399***	0.013	−0.113	−0.054*	−0.082***
	(−4.73)	(−4.83)	(0.14)	(−1.65)	(−2.40)	(−3.48)
Dispersive Powersharing	−0.005	0.031	0.001	−0.029	−0.054	−0.070
	(−0.05)	(0.26)	(0.01)	(−0.35)	(−1.28)	(−1.67)
Constraining Powersharing	0.329***	0.317**	0.334***	0.262**	0.211**	0.100
	(3.42)	(2.94)	(4.27)	(2.80)	(3.20)	(1.53)
Post-Civil War		0.581**		0.357*		−0.200
		(2.79)		(2.06)		(−1.16)
Inclusive × Post-Civil War		1.094*		2.299***		0.421***
		(2.41)		(5.21)		(4.13)
Dispersive × Post-Civil War		−0.394*		−0.400*		−0.331
		(−2.13)		(−2.05)		(−1.95)
Constraining × Post-Civil War		0.212		0.248		0.512*
		(0.86)		(1.12)		(2.12)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.279	0.166	0.247	0.241	0.087	0.077
	(0.87)	(0.51)	(1.00)	(0.90)	(0.65)	(0.57)
Regional Polity	0.185***	0.184***	0.052***	0.052***	0.032***	0.032***
	(6.90)	(6.67)	(4.03)	(3.95)	(4.28)	(4.14)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.638***	0.622***	0.570***	0.638***	0.408***	0.437***
	(6.14)	(5.53)	(7.64)	(7.59)	(5.75)	(6.34)
GDP Growth	0.012	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.022*	0.012
	(1.42)	(1.51)	(1.58)	(1.38)	(2.21)	(1.84)
Fuel Dependence	−0.015**	−0.012*	−0.023***	−0.021***	−0.016**	−0.016**
	(−2.73)	(−2.16)	(−3.84)	(−3.37)	(−2.85)	(−2.93)
Population (logged)	0.036	0.023	−0.105**	−0.105*	−0.050	−0.032
	(0.73)	(0.44)	(−2.70)	(−2.50)	(−1.78)	(−1.10)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.420***	−0.408***	−0.059	−0.071	−0.126***	−0.143***
	(−6.79)	(−6.50)	(−0.78)	(−0.92)	(−3.31)	(−3.70)
Democracy Age	0.015*	0.016*	0.005	0.003	−0.002*	−0.003**
	(2.03)	(2.04)	(1.37)	(0.99)	(−2.30)	(−3.14)
Lagged Polity (no xconst)					0.778***	0.775***
					(12.54)	(12.40)
N	1,679	1,583	2,130	2,034	2,118	2,022
Pseudo R^2 / Adjusted R^2	0.398	0.408	0.273	0.291	0.462	0.475

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival (Models 1-4) and regressions predicting democracy change (Models 5-6). All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A6: Additional Controls: Inequality, Foreign Aid, State Capacity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inclusive Powersharing	0.099	0.074	−0.052	−0.084
	(0.99)	(0.92)	(−0.48)	(−1.00)
Dispersive Powersharing	−0.093	−0.037	−0.061	−0.034
	(−0.97)	(−0.41)	(−0.58)	(−0.34)
Constraining Powersharing	0.550***	0.539***	0.543***	0.533***
	(6.76)	(7.06)	(6.16)	(6.15)
Post-Civil War			0.591**	0.627***
			(3.08)	(3.54)
Inclusive × Post-Civil War			2.258***	2.296***
			(4.83)	(4.97)
Dispersive × Post-Civil War			−0.406*	−0.452**
			(−2.42)	(−2.73)
Constraining × Post-Civil War			0.154	0.132
			(0.84)	(0.80)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.066	−0.135	−0.122	−0.116
	(−0.27)	(−0.61)	(−0.47)	(−0.49)
Regional Polity	0.104***	0.105***	0.100***	0.107***
	(5.08)	(5.73)	(4.83)	(5.43)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.699***	0.536***	0.714***	0.631***
	(7.74)	(4.21)	(7.18)	(4.50)
GDP Growth	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.004
	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.36)
Fuel Dependence	−0.015*	−0.015**	−0.013*	−0.013*
	(−2.52)	(−2.58)	(−2.07)	(−2.16)
Population (logged)	−0.060	−0.073	−0.096*	−0.092*
	(−1.30)	(−1.70)	(−1.99)	(−2.03)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.235***	−0.220***	−0.226**	−0.239***
	(−3.50)	(−3.44)	(−3.28)	(−3.83)
Democracy Age	−0.006*	−0.006	−0.006*	−0.008**
	(−2.51)	(−1.96)	(−2.32)	(−2.74)
Economic Inequality	−0.001		0.000	
	(−0.11)		(0.01)	
Foreign Aid	0.001		−0.003	
	(0.09)		(−0.52)	
State Capacity		0.123		0.151
		(0.80)		(0.95)
N	2,041	2,132	1,983	2,062
Pseudo R^2	0.334	0.323	0.350	0.352

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A7: Alternative Duration Models

	Cubic	Logged	Exponential	Weibull	Cox
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Inclusive Powersharing	−0.025	−0.027	−0.112	−0.107	−0.023
	(−0.26)	(−0.29)	(−0.53)	(−0.27)	(−0.06)
Dispersive Powersharing	−0.018	−0.012	0.209	0.490	0.426
	(−0.18)	(−0.13)	(1.06)	(1.67)	(1.46)
Constraining Powersharing	0.458***	0.460***	0.824***	1.191***	1.139***
	(5.31)	(5.24)	(6.38)	(6.70)	(6.59)
Post-Civil War	0.654***	0.603***	0.969**	1.267**	1.338**
	(3.65)	(3.42)	(3.11)	(2.89)	(2.95)
Inclusive × Post-Civil War	2.510***	2.356***	4.131***	5.689***	5.468***
	(5.05)	(4.88)	(5.80)	(6.43)	(6.19)
Dispersive × Post-Civil War	−0.390*	−0.390*	−0.552*	−0.880*	−0.884*
	(−2.26)	(−2.32)	(−2.25)	(−2.54)	(−2.42)
Constraining × Post-Civil War	0.217	0.216	−0.263	−1.035**	−0.794*
	(1.32)	(1.26)	(−0.96)	(−2.78)	(−2.29)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.429	−0.406	−0.630	−0.430	−0.610
	(−1.64)	(−1.52)	(−1.23)	(−0.78)	(−1.16)
Regional Polity	0.095***	0.094***	0.186***	0.237***	0.209***
	(4.67)	(4.86)	(7.27)	(7.96)	(6.34)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.705***	0.693***	1.451***	2.181***	1.970***
	(8.32)	(8.11)	(12.54)	(13.16)	(12.93)
GDP Growth	0.009	0.009	0.016	0.016	0.012
	(0.79)	(0.86)	(0.84)	(0.63)	(0.54)
Fuel Dependence	−0.013**	−0.014**	−0.014*	−0.032***	−0.026***
	(−2.58)	(−2.60)	(−2.55)	(−3.82)	(−3.44)
Population (logged)	−0.105*	−0.093*	−0.080	−0.051	−0.106
	(−2.38)	(−2.11)	(−1.05)	(−0.60)	(−1.27)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.213***	−0.217***	−0.553***	−0.834***	−0.653***
	(−3.67)	(−3.68)	(−5.39)	(−6.94)	(−5.75)
N	2,181	2,181	2,184	2,184	2,184
Pseudo R^2	0.341	0.339			

Notes: The table displays probit models and alternative duration models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Instrumental Variables Estimates

To bolster our causal claims, we turn to instrumental variables (IVs) estimates of our results in Table A8. IVs estimate the effect of an endogenous variable *X* when we can identify instruments ***Z*** that only affect an outcome *Y* through *X*, an assumption that must be defended theoretically. As noted in the paper, we use legal and colonial origin as instruments in each model, with an emphasis on their predictive power for constraining powersharing. Specifically, we include a dummy variable for an English common law tradition (*English Common Law*, from La Porta et al. 1999), as well as dummies for British colonial origin (*British Colony)*, U.S. colonial origin *(U.S. Colony)*, and never being colonized (*Never Colonized)*. We expect British and U.S. colonial experience to predict constraints. For constraining powersharing, we additionally include *State History*, a historical measure of the control of territory by centralized states (Hanson and Sigman 2013). Following the logic of Hariri (2012), we expect historically stronger states to be negative for constraining powersharing, as they were able to consolidate authority and forestall the influence of colonizers. For dispersive powersharing, we add *Area* (in millions of square kilometers, from World Bank 2014), *Population Density*, and *Mountainousness* (logged % of mountainous terrain, from Fearon and Laitin 2003). We expect that countries that are larger, more populous, and more difficult to traverse have higher levels of dispersive powersharing because the efficiency gains from decentralized governance are higher (e.g. Graham and Strøm 2016). For inclusive powersharing, we leverage the fact that countries often follow their former colonizer's style of governance. We therefore use a weighted average of inclusive powersharing and PR in the state's former colonizer as our inclusive-specific instrument (*Colonizer Inclusive/PR*).[5] As a result, this model is limited to former colonies.

We run separate IV probit tests for each powersharing measure, with the same controls as Model 1 of Table 3. We focus on testing the robustness of the paper's main findings: a general positive effect for constraining powersharing, a positive post-conflict effect for inclusive powersharing, and a negative post-conflict effect for dispersive powersharing. To avoid interaction terms, which are problematic in an IV context, we restrict the sample based on conflict status. Thus, Model 1 in Table A8 instruments for

[5] The PR measure is 0 for majoritarian systems, 1 for PR, and 0.5 for hybrids. The inclusive measure and PR are first scaled to have the same standard deviation, then these are summed.

inclusive powersharing in democracies with a civil war in the past 10 years.[6] Model 2 does the same for dispersive powersharing, while Models 3-5 use a full democracy sample for each powersharing measure in turn. The controls are included, but not pictured for clarity. The bottom section of Table A8 shows the first stage predicting the endogenous variable and the top section shows its effect on democratic survival. We show the Kleibergen-Paap F values from the first stage, with each model greatly exceeding the common benchmark of 10 indicating strong instruments.

The results confirm the paper's findings. Inclusive powersharing is strongly positive in post-civil war states, but unpredictive in the full sample. Dispersive powersharing has a significantly negative effect on democratic survival in conflictual societies, with an even larger effect size than in our main results. In contrast, dispersive powersharing is positive for democratic survival in peaceful states, although the effect is smaller in magnitude. By comparison, this bolsters the significance of the negative finding for post-civil war states. Finally, with a coefficient very close to our main results, constraining powersharing has a significantly positive effect on democratic survival in the full sample.

Predicting Different Breakdown Types

To confirm our hypothesized causal mechanisms linking powersharing to democratic survival, we now apply our base model (Model 1 of Table 3) to specific types of democratic breakdown. We categorize all breakdowns into three types: military coups (21 cases), self-coups initiated by elected leaders (8 cases), and breakdowns accompanied by civil war or violent protest (8 cases). We then run separate probits predicting whether each occurs within the next five years. Results are shown in Table A9. The findings using multinominal logit are very similar.

We find distinct results for each powersharing dimension that confirm our expectations. Constraining powersharing is significantly negative for violent-opposition breakdowns and military coups. Since both are instigated by political outsiders, this suggests an important role for constraints in reassuring these outside groups against abuse.

[6] To increase the number of observations in the conflict group and achieve convergence, we use the *Recent War* sample, rather than *Post-Civil War*.

Dispersive powersharing predicts the breakdown via civil war or violent protest (significant at the 0.1 level). This is consistent with our theoretical argument that dispersive powersharing increases the capacity of regional leaders to challenge the existing democratic order by force. Dispersive powersharing is also strongly negative for military coups, perhaps because the dispersion of political authority makes successful coups more difficult. Lastly, inclusive powersharing is strongly negative for self-coups, suggesting that having a range of groups in central government facilitates mutual monitoring and coordination against incumbents' abuses of power.

Table A8: Instrumental Variables Analysis

	Recent Civil War		Full Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Outcome Equation					
Inclusive Powersharing	0.595***		0.107		
	(3.42)		(0.79)		
Dispersive Powersharing		−0.941*		0.852***	
		(−2.11)		(4.71)	
Constraining Powersharing					0.528*
					(2.46)
First Stage					
English Common Law	0.802**	0.429***	0.824***	−0.303***	−0.084
	(3.15)	(4.05)	(6.69)	(−6.08)	(−1.66)
British Colony	−0.430	0.566***	0.279*	0.127	0.752***
	(−1.15)	(3.36)	(2.19)	(1.91)	(13.82)
U.S. Colony	0.107	1.332***	0.480***	0.453***	0.713***
	(0.68)	(4.99)	(4.28)	(5.13)	(14.72)
Never Colonized		−0.450***		0.170***	0.188***
		(−3.79)		(3.32)	(3.61)
Colonizer Inclusive/PR	0.322***		0.219***		
	(22.36)		(5.53)		
Area		0.152		0.076***	
		(1.24)		(8.79)	
Population Density		−2.115***		−0.640***	
		(−4.00)		(−4.91)	
Mountainousness		0.015		0.004	
		(0.37)		(0.29)	
State History					−0.426***
					(−5.66)
N	248	332	1,208	2,116	2,116
Kleibergen-Paap F (1st stage)	339.80	18.98	31.08	33.19	135.58

Notes: The table displays instrumental variables analyses, with the first stage at bottom and the outcome equation at top. All models include the standard controls and all powersharing dimensions, but these are omitted for clarity. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A9: Predicting Types of Democratic Breakdown

	Violent Opposition	Military Coup	Self-Coup
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusive Powersharing	−0.121	0.057	−1.409***
	(−1.30)	(0.59)	(−4.35)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.269#	−0.376***	−0.100
	(1.84)	(−3.43)	(−0.87)
Constraining Powersharing	−0.403***	−0.475***	−0.148
	(−3.94)	(−5.38)	(−1.46)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.195	−0.227	0.129
	(0.46)	(−0.71)	(0.71)
Regional Polity	−0.099***	−0.111***	0.029#
	(−3.42)	(−5.79)	(1.93)
GDP/capita (logged)	−0.297***	−0.640***	−0.476***
	(−3.40)	(−5.77)	(−3.64)
GDP Growth	0.009	−0.007	−0.002
	(0.79)	(−0.87)	(−0.11)
Fuel Dependence	−0.083	0.011**	0.012#
	(−1.54)	(2.76)	(1.73)
Population (logged)	−0.138*	0.190***	0.247***
	(−2.06)	(3.88)	(6.53)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.112	0.416***	−0.016
	(−1.53)	(5.56)	(−0.17)
Democracy Age	−0.012*	0.011**	−0.000
	(−2.22)	(3.11)	(−0.14)
N	2,259	2,259	2,259
Pseudo R^2	0.276	0.360	0.200

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting types of democratic breakdown. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses.
$^{\#}p < 0.10$,$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Predicting Changes in Powersharing Dimensions

Countries often utilize elements of several different types of powersharing simultaneously. It is possible that having one type of powersharing in place makes the adoption of other types of powersharing more or less likely. Here, we explore this possibility empirically. Table A10 displays results from regressions predicting shifts in each powersharing dimension. The DV is a powersharing dimension, with the standard controls and a one year lag of each powersharing dimension included as a regressor. With the lagged DV included, effects can be interpreted as *changes* in powersharing. The most important feature of the results is how weak the predictors are for each powersharing dimension. None of the dimensions is strongly predicted by any others. Although constraining is (barely) significantly negative for dispersive, the effect is substantively tiny. Shifting up constraining by one standard deviation (within democracies) is estimated to increase dispersive by only 1% of a standard deviation.

Examining the effects of control variables, we see that population size predicts increases in dispersive powersharing, which is consistent with the literature on federalism. The efficiency gains of decentralization are greater in larger countries (Tullock 1960; Graham and Strom 2016). Additionally, democracy age predicts decreased constraints. We expect this is a ceiling effect. Older democracies generally already have high levels of constraining powersharing, which makes further increases in constraints difficult. Thus, when change in constraining powersharing does occur in older democracies, it is more likely to be a reduction in constraints.

Table A10: Predicting Changes in Powersharing

DV =	Inclusive (1)	Dispersive (2)	Constraining (3)
Inclusive Powersharing	0.990***	0.000	−0.005
	(141.75)	(0.16)	(−1.18)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.001	0.983***	0.005
	(0.27)	(222.42)	(1.14)
Constraining Powersharing	−0.020	−0.017*	0.915***
	(−0.93)	(−1.97)	(58.84)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.002	0.016	0.002
	(0.18)	(0.75)	(0.13)
Regional Polity	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(1.15)	(1.64)	(0.78)
GDP/capita (logged)	−0.008	0.005	0.010
	(−0.99)	(0.62)	(1.28)
GDP Growth	0.010	0.002	0.001
	(1.10)	(0.67)	(0.50)
Fuel Dependence	0.000	0.001	−0.001
	(0.60)	(0.83)	(−0.92)
Population (logged)	−0.000	0.010***	0.002
	(−0.30)	(3.61)	(0.50)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.007	−0.001	−0.005
	(−1.28)	(−0.19)	(−0.83)
Democracy Age	−0.000	−0.000	−0.001***
	(−0.91)	(−1.34)	(−3.36)
N	2,145	2,145	2,145
Adjusted R^2	0.973	0.977	0.910

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting each powersharing dimension in the following year. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Interactions of Powersharing Dimensions

Table A11 adds interactions between the powersharing dimensions to Model 1 of Table 3. To avoid excessive interaction terms, the different models in Table A11 use the full sample of democracies, a post-conflict sample, and a non-post-conflict sample. We use post-conflict rather than post-civil war to ensure an adequate sample size. The results are quite rich and deserve further theoretical and empirical analysis in future work. We summarize the results briefly here and suggest several potentially fruitful avenues for further exploration.

Inclusive powersharing by itself is negative for democratic survival, but becomes more positive in combination with other forms of powersharing. This gives further credence to the idea that inclusivity's effect depends strongly on political context, including its interaction with other political institutions. A thorough exploration of these contextual factors falls outside the scope of this analysis, but further examination is clearly warranted.

The interaction between dispersive and constraining powersharing is the only negative interaction term. It is possible that simultaneously high levels of constraining and dispersive powersharing may isolate the central government from key populations too much. A central executive whose powers are constrained at the same time power is dispersed to regional governments may simply be too weak to govern effectively. Considered together, however, the results in Table A11 indicate that powersharing dimensions generally positively reinforce each other.[7]

[7] If a three-way interaction is added, this is significantly positive in the full sample.

Table A11: Interactions of Powersharing Dimensions

	Full (1)	Post-Conflict (2)	Not Post-Conflict (3)
Inclusive Powersharing	−1.268***	−9.066***	−1.649***
	(−5.41)	(−6.59)	(−6.22)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.317	0.974*	0.099
	(1.48)	(2.10)	(0.41)
Constraining Powersharing	0.501***	1.380***	0.359**
	(4.74)	(3.74)	(3.26)
Inclusive × Dispersive	1.026***	6.623***	0.905***
	(7.93)	(3.76)	(6.09)
Inclusive × Constraining	0.611***	−0.241	0.837***
	(5.10)	(−0.18)	(6.05)
Dispersive × Constraining	−0.212*	−0.938***	−0.081
	(−2.19)	(−4.01)	(−0.76)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	−0.517*	1.457	−0.839*
	(−1.96)	(1.47)	(−2.52)
Regional Polity	0.099***	0.115	0.108***
	(5.73)	(1.94)	(5.29)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.648***	1.301***	0.646***
	(6.76)	(3.65)	(5.88)
GDP Growth	0.004	−0.009	0.009
	(0.40)	(−0.69)	(0.52)
Fuel Dependence	−0.014*	−0.013*	−0.017*
	(−2.27)	(−2.30)	(−2.15)
Population (logged)	−0.171***	−0.482***	−0.168**
	(−3.63)	(−3.72)	(−3.13)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−0.169**	−0.071	−0.239***
	(−2.59)	(−0.24)	(−3.29)
Democracy Age	−0.007***	−0.019	−0.007***
	(−3.50)	(−1.51)	(−3.52)
N	2,259	282	1,899
Pseudo R^2	0.346	0.488	0.382

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Democratic Survival in Challenging Environments

Table A12 shows the results for democratic survival in 10 subsamples of "hard cases," which are described in the text. The models are identical to Model 1 in Table 3, although the controls are not shown. Constraining powersharing is positive for survival in every model, whereas the remaining powersharing dimensions vary in their effects by political context. Also see Figure 3 in the paper.

Table A12: Democratic Survival in Challenging Environments

	Recent Civil War (1)	Post-Conflict (2)	Ethnic Conflict (3)	High State Fragility (4)	New Democracy (5)
Inclusive Powersharing	0.467*	4.874***	0.713**	3.001***	0.039
	(2.33)	(5.87)	(2.84)	(5.00)	(0.30)
Dispersive Powersharing	−0.502**	−0.886**	−0.600**	0.006	0.004
	(−3.23)	(−2.78)	(−2.91)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Constraining Powersharing	0.665***	0.687**	0.690***	0.427**	0.628***
	(4.68)	(2.95)	(3.84)	(2.77)	(6.55)
Additional Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	332	282	460	393	700
Pseudo R^2	0.438	0.402	0.464	0.130	0.362

	Low Income (6)	Recent Econ. Crisis (7)	Ethnicity Relevant (8)	High ELF (9)	Survival Unlikely (10)
Inclusive Powersharing	6.734***	1.122*	0.356	0.076	0.403
	(6.28)	(2.46)	(1.39)	(0.58)	(1.12)
Dispersive Powersharing	0.118	−0.553**	−0.062	0.203	0.097
	(0.93)	(−3.08)	(−0.61)	(1.20)	(0.76)
Constraining Powersharing	0.436***	0.720***	0.476***	0.844***	0.458***
	(3.83)	(4.29)	(6.09)	(6.79)	(4.59)
Additional Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	579	773	1,787	572	565
Pseudo R^2	0.333	0.469	0.314	0.315	0.184

Notes: The table displays probit models predicting democratic survival. All models control for non-linear time trends. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Appendix B: Details on the Powersharing Data

In this section, we describe the 19 powersharing indicators that are at the theoretical core of our project, and the process by which these indicators are combined into indices of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing. We also list the countries covered by the IDC data, describe the sources used in data collection, and provide summary statistics on the indicators. This material is adapted from [CITATION REDACTED].

Inclusive Powersharing

The inclusive powersharing variables in this study cover two of Lijphart's components of consociationalism: grand coalitions and the mutual veto. They also include the reservation of seats or executive positions for specific minority groups to ensure their inclusion in central government decision-making (e.g. Lijphart 1969).

Our empirical measures capture two types of grand coalitions: those mandated by constitutions or peace treaties (*mandated grand coalition*); and *de facto* grand coalitions in non-elected governments, *i.e.*, governments of national unity, which are usually installed following violent civil conflict (*unity*).[8]

A mutual or minority veto provision (*mutual veto)* is coded as present whenever there is a constitutional or treaty provision providing for a minority veto over legislation in a particular policy area, such as language or cultural policy. *Reserved executive positions* captures whether any executive positions are reserved for members of specific groups, such as the arrangement in Lebanon, where the president is required to be a Maronite, and the prime minister a Sunni.[9] *Reserved seats* is the proportion of legislative seats (lower house) reserved for minority groups. We also code a binary variable, *Inclusive Military*, which takes a value of one if it is mandated that all major (ethnic, religious, or linguistic) groups

[8] Because mandated grand coalitions and unity governments are mutual substitutes, they are combined into a single measure in the factor analysis. We have also collected data on *de facto* grand coalitions by seat share, but these measures are not included in our index of inclusive powersharing.
[9] The speaker of the parliament is required to be Shi'a.

be represented in the military or its officer corps, or that the armed forces be representative of different regions.

For our *de jure* indicators of mandated grand coalitions, reserved legislative seats, and reserved executive positions we also make a *de facto* assessment of whether these institutions are implemented. We code implementation as binary variables (*gcimp, resimp, resseatsimp*), and then create an additional binary variable, *violation*, which takes a value of 1 any time one or more of these formal institutions is not enforced.[10]

Dispersive Powersharing

Dispersive powersharing refers to institutions that distribute authority among a variety of decision makers in a territorial pattern, such as federalism or Lijphart's notion of segmental autonomy. We capture dispersive powersharing along three dimensions: (1) the powers allocated to sub-national governments, (2) the accountability of subnational governments to citizens, and (3) the representation of sub-national constituencies in the central government.[11]

To assess the powers allocated to subnational governments, we measure whether state/provincial governments have the authority to levy their own taxes (*Subnational Tax Authority*), whether they have shared or sole control over education policy (*Subnational Educational Authority*), which serves as a proxy for non-fiscal domestic policy more broadly, and whether state/provincial or municipal governments control any police or paramilitary forces (*Subnational Police Authority*), which captures decentralization of the legitimate use of force. To measure the accountability of sub-national governments to ordinary citizens, we record whether executives and/or legislatures are directly elected both at the state/provincial level and at the municipal level. To measure the representation of sub-national constituencies in the

[10] We do not code an implementation variable for mutual veto because violations are too difficult to observe reliably.

[11] In developing this coding scheme we are indebted to prior work by Brancati (2006) and Beck et al. (2001). For additional theory and analysis regarding these measures, see Graham and Strøm (2015).

central government, we code a dummy variable for whether states/provinces form the constituencies of more than half the members of the upper house of the national legislature.

Our coding of sub-national elections (*State Elections)* and state/provincial representation in the legislative upper house (*Constituency Alignment*) are based directly on variables first coded by Beck et al. (2001) in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).[12] We both extend the coverage of these variables forward in time, and fill in a large number of previously missing values. Our codings are included in the 2010 release of DPI.

Constraining Powersharing

Constraining powersharing includes a variety of institutions designed to protect the rights of individuals and social groups from encroachments and predation by, for example, politicians or armed forces. Such constraints can take many forms, but we believe that some institutions are especially critical. One is constitutional provisions barring the military from engagement in electoral politics, since in many societies the armed forces (or parts of them) are the players that could most easily renege on their commitments to a collaborative civilian order and resort to force. Moreover, for ordinary citizens and a functioning civil society we believe it is critical to include provisions that protect freedom of speech and religious freedom and that discourage or bar the formation of political parties on explicitly religious or ethnic grounds. Finally, for all such rights to be enforced, there must be strong and independent courts. We therefore include among our measures of constraining powersharing provisions that bar active military personnel from participation in electoral politics, measures of the constitutional protection of religious liberties, bans on explicitly ethnic or religious parties, and an effective rule of law that includes judicial checks on political executives.

We thus code whether the constitution (or peace treaty) in place assures freedom of religious practice and/or freedom from discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. The variables *Religion Protected (Discrimination)* and *Religion Protected (Practice)* take a value of 1 if the constitution

[12] The DPI variable names are "state" and "stconst" respectively.

guarantees freedom from religious discrimination and freedom of religious practice (respectively). We also code whether members of the armed forces are banned from serving in the legislature (*Military Legislator Ban*), and whether there is a ban on ethnic, religious, and/or regional parties (*Ethnic Party Ban*).

The presence of an effective judicial check on the authority of elected officials is assessed by whether the supreme court has the power to void actions of the legislature and executive that violate the constitution (*Judicial Review*), by the tenure of justices of the highest court (*Judicial Tenure*),[13] and by whether the powers of the judiciary are enumerated in the constitution (*Judicial Constitution)*.[14]

Data Structure

Our variables have been coded so as to allow for several different data structures. Time series cross-sectional datasets on governance, such as Polity IV and DPI, regularly employ a country-year unit of analysis. This is also our choice in this analysis, as it allows for easy integration with other governance datasets and with economic and political indicators, such as the World Development Indicators. The Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint variables are thus coded as of January 1st of a given country-year.[15]

Factor Analysis

Beginning with Lijphart (1968, 1977), studies of powersharing have assumed that a set of observable variables, *i.e.*, specific practices and institutions, are associated with one or more unobservable or latent variables (*i.e.*, factors) that we can identify as powersharing. The implication is that

[13] The categories here are: six years or less, more than six years but less than lifelong, or lifelong or until a mandated retirement age.
[14] On this point, we draw on La Porta et al. (2004).
[15] More precise temporal coding may be important for some analytical purposes, and we have therefore coded changes in the core powersharing variables down to the day. A country-day version of the dataset is thus also available. We have also developed a version of the dataset in which the unit of analysis is the period of institutional consistency, or *polity*. Rather than coding all breaks between one unit of analysis and the next as occurring on January 1 of each year, a break in the polity dataset occurs at any time the core political institutions governing the country change. Therefore, polities vary in length, with some lasting only a few weeks, and some stretching across our entire timespan. This polity-based version of our dataset builds on Gates et al. (2006).

powersharing arrangements with similar purposes tend to go together. Constitutions or treaties drafted with the aim of sharing power typically include a variety of specific features that supplement one another. If the aim is to ensure the inclusion of minority groups in elite decision-making, there are multiple institutional mechanisms available. States with the highest levels of inclusive powersharing will include several of these institutional arrangements together. For example, Fiji has since 1998 featured legislative seats reserved for ethnic minorities, similarly reserved executive positions, and a mandated grand coalition executive.

Our expectation is that our 19 indicators cluster empirically around three latent variables that match the type of powersharing with which they are theoretically associated. Thus, we expect all the indicators of constraining powersharing to load on the same factor (latent variable), and so forth.

Table B1: Factor Loadings					
Variable	**Constraining Powersharing**	**Dispersive Powersharing**	**Inclusive Powersharing**	**Factor 4**	**Uniqueness**
Subnational Education Authority	0.20	**0.60**	0.03	0.01	0.54
Subnational Tax Authority	0.23	**0.61**	0.10	0.18	0.51
Subnational Police Authority	0.07	**0.53**	0.00	0.06	0.66
Constituency Alignment	0.14	**0.58**	0.11	0.08	0.61
State Elections_1	0.13	**0.62**	0.00	0.06	0.53
State Elections_2	0.12	**0.62**	-0.08	-0.02	0.52
Religion Protected (Discrimination)	**0.55**	0.07	-0.13	0.27	0.52
Religion Protected (Practice)	**0.59**	0.04	-0.05	0.29	0.50
Military Legislator Ban	**0.37**	-0.09	0.11	0.02	0.79
Ethnic Party Ban	0.10	-0.09	0.01	0.31	0.82
Judicial Constitution	**0.73**	0.11	0.06	0.01	0.41
Judicial Review	**0.50**	0.09	0.17	0.29	0.56
Judicial Tenure_1	**0.75**	0.24	0.00	**-0.38**	0.24
Judicial Tenure_2	**0.54**	0.27	0.00	**-0.54**	0.34
Mandated Grand Coalition or Unity Government	0.02	-0.04	0.12	0.02	0.92
Mutual Veto	0.03	0.23	**0.48**	-0.05	0.65
Reserved Seats	0.01	-0.01	**0.69**	-0.04	0.45
Inclusive Military	0.03	0.05	**0.52**	0.03	0.67
Reserved Executive Positions	0.00	-0.01	**0.77**	0.00	0.38

*Note: Factor loadings greater than 0.3 are in bold.

The factor analysis generates three significant and interpretable factors, each corresponding to one of our theoretical conceptions. Table 1 presents the factor loadings for the first four factors in our analysis. The first three factors extracted correspond neatly to our three forms of powersharing and are labeled accordingly. We include the fourth factor in the table for comparison, though it is much weaker and less interpretable. As predicted by our theory, the first three factors explain most of the association between the institutional measures in our analysis.

The grouping of the indicators around the theoretically appropriate latent variables is remarkably strong, stable and clean. Consistent with our expectation, every one of our indicators loads most heavily on the factor (*i.e.*, latent variable) with which it is theoretically associated. Moreover, these results are robust to a range of alternative specifications.

The weakest associations between any indicators and the latent variable with which they are theoretically associated are between Grand Coalition or Unity Government and inclusive powersharing, and between Ethnic Party Bans and constraining powersharing. Note, however, that even these particular indicators do not load on one of the "wrong" factors. Rather, these are the indicators with the highest uniqueness scores, which means that they often occur independently of any other form of powersharing. Thus, while reserved legislative seats, reserved executive positions, and military inclusiveness mandates are often used in conjunction with one another, grand coalition/unity governments more often stand alone as the sole inclusive powersharing arrangement.[16] Similarly, ethnic party bans are simply not highly correlated with any other form of powersharing.

All in all, our empirical analysis provides strong empirical confirmation for our theoretical expectations. Political powersharing comes in three distinct forms, which are consistent with our theoretical distinction between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining mechanisms. Almost all of our nineteen empirical indicators do in fact load significantly on one of these three factors, and in a pattern that is consistent with our expectations. Other than these inclusive, dispersive, and constraining forms, no

[16] Governments of national unity, in particular, often emerge as negotiated settlements to specific crises, such as the conflict between the Orange Democratic Movement and the Party of National Unity following the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya.

other significant dimension of powersharing emerges from our analysis. Specific forms of powersharing thus tend to cluster within our three powersharing dimensions, whereas as Table A2 (Appendix) shows, correlations across the various dimensions are rather weak. As a general rule, the indicators associated with inclusive powersharing, such as mandated grand coalitions and reserved executive positions, are less common than those associated with constraining or dispersive powersharing. Table B2 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics on all indicators.

To create an index of each of our three types of powersharing, we run a separate factor analysis for each latent variable, the weights from which create the index. Because of their low factor loadings, Ethnic Party Ban and Grand Coalition/Unity Government are assigned almost no weight in these indices.

Countries Included in the IDC Dataset[17]

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde Islands, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoro Islands, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, FRG/Germany, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, People's Republic of China, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic Of Korea, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Is., Somalia, Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, UK, USA, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Western Samoa, Yemen, Yemen (Arab Republic), Yemen (People's Democratic Republic), Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[17] This list exceeds 180 country names because we do not double-count countries such as Yugoslavia and Serbia considered to be direct successors within the Gleditsch-Ward system of country ID numbers.

Sources and Data Collection

Coders on this project employed a mix of primary and secondary source material. Primary sources included constitutions and peace treaties, as well as official government websites and the text of individual laws.[18] Secondary sources included the *Political Handbook of the World* (various years) and *Europa World Yearbook* (various years),[19] as well as the website of the International Parliamentary Union (Parline, www.ipu.org), library of congress country studies (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/), the World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems (1989; 2006), and *Freedom in the World* (various years).

The greatest challenge facing coders involved assessing the precise dates on which different institutional forms were adopted or abandoned. Constitutional provisions are easy in this regard: there is a date when a constitution enters into force and a date when it is nullified, amended, or superseded. With some rules, however, it is difficult to identify the precise date at which a law was first enacted or the date at which it was superseded.

In all cases of uncertainty, coders were directed to employ a "preponderance of the evidence" standard rather than a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Instances where the necessary information to make an informed coding is unavailable are coded as missing. Instances where information is available but the coder was uncertain were flagged for discussion in regular meetings of the coding team and a group decision was made on how to code the variable. Complicated institutional arrangements and codings perceived to be potentially controversial are discussed in the coder notes, which are available online, along with the full codebook, list of sources, and the dataset itself.[20]

[18] In many cases, coders relied on English translations of these documents. See Melton et al. (2013) for a discussion of the effects of language and culture on the interpretability of constitutions.
[19] Both print and online versions were used for both *Europa World Yearbook* and the *Political Handbook of the World*.
[20] https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/29421

Summary Statistics on Powersharing Indicators

Summary statistics are given in Table B2 and pairwise correlations between the component indicators of powersharing are given in Table B3.

Table B2: Summary Statistics for Powersharing Indicators

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Subnational Education Authority	0.316	0.465	0	1	5077
Subnational Tax Authority	0.3	0.458	0	1	5278
Subnational Police Authority	0.306	0.461	0	1	5514
Constituency Alignment	0.194	0.396	0	1	5749
State Elections_1	0.497	0.5	0	1	5440
State Elections_1	0.211	0.408	0	1	5440
Inclusive Powersharing	0	0.853	-0.197	7.350	5937
Dispersive Powersharing	0	0.878	-0.784	2.103	5937
Constraining Powersharing	0	0.918	-1.493	1.228	5937
Religion Protected (Discrimination)	0.658	0.475	0	1	5526
Religion Protected (Practice)	0.767	0.423	0	1	5555
Military Legislator Ban	0.502	0.5	0	1	5495
Ethnic Party Ban	0.102	0.303	0	1	5544
Judicial Constitution	0.687	0.464	0	1	5195
Judicial Review	0.595	0.491	0	1	5286
Judicial Tenure_1	0.783	0.412	0	1	4064
Judicial Tenure_2	0.568	0.495	0	1	4064
Mandated GC or Unity	0.013	0.113	0	1	5636
Mutual Veto	0.033	0.178	0	1	5686
Reserved Seats	0.016	0.078	0	0.75	5672
Inclusive Military	0.022	0.147	0	1	5594
Reserved Executive Positions	0.029	0.168	0	1	5647

Table B3: Pairwise Correlations Between Powersharing Indicators

Variables	SE	ST	SP	CA	SE1	SE2	RPD	RPP	MLB	EPB	JC	JR	JT1	JT2	GC	MV	RS	IM	REP
Subnational Ed	1.00																		
Subnational Tax	0.46	1.00																	
Subnational Police	0.39	0.34	1.00																
Constituency Align	0.36	0.46	0.39	1.00															
State Elections_1	0.33	0.42	0.33	0.34	1.00														
State Elections_2	0.37	0.36	0.26	0.36	0.54	1.00													
Rel Protect (Discrim)	0.18	0.17	0.09	0.10	0.15	0.13	1.00												
Rel Protect (Practice)	0.12	0.20	0.07	0.11	0.14	0.12	0.57	1.00											
Military Leg. Ban	-0.04	0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.17	0.18	1.00										
Ethnic Party Ban	-0.11	0.05	-0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.09	0.12	0.10	0.07	1.00									
Judicial Constitution	0.26	0.23	0.11	0.18	0.14	0.12	0.33	0.41	0.30	0.05	1.00								
Judicial Review	0.17	0.29	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.07	0.27	0.30	0.24	0.17	0.49	1.00							
Judicial Tenure_1	0.26	0.27	0.14	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.33	0.32	0.24	-0.04	0.59	0.31	1.00						
Judicial Tenure_2	0.26	0.19	0.17	0.20	0.23	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.16	-0.14	0.40	0.09	0.74	1.00					
GC or Unity	0.00	-0.05	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.02	-0.01	1.00				
Mutual Veto	0.14	0.19	0.13	0.19	0.11	0.12	-0.02	-0.05	0.04	-0.06	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.09	0.06	1.00			
Reserved Seats	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.03	-0.08	-0.08	0.03	0.08	-0.02	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.25	1.00		
Inclusive Military	0.06	0.11	-0.01	0.11	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.11	0.07	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.38	0.31	1.00	
Reserved Executive	-0.02	0.07	-0.02	0.06	0.03	-0.04	-0.11	-0.00	0.06	-0.01	0.06	0.12	-0.00	-0.01	0.10	0.38	0.66	0.38	1.00

Powersharing in Autocracies

Some commenters on our work have questioned whether powersharing in general, and constraining powersharing in particular, are best conceptualized as features of democracy, rather than as institutions that may facilitate democratic survival. However, as noted in the body of the paper, we conceptualize powersharing as a bundle of related institutions, of which virtually all modern polities contain some components. Thus, there exist a substantial number of autocracies with high levels of each type of powersharing.

In Figure B1 we illustrate this point graphically, showing the distribution of each type of powersharing separately in autocracies and democracies. The plots in the right column show the distribution of powersharing in democracies, the plots in the left column show the distribution of powersharing in autocracies. Constraining and dispersive powersharing are, in general, more prevalent than in democracies than autocracies, while inclusive powersharing is equally common in both regime types. Most importantly, however, we see that, for each type of powersharing, there are substantial numbers of autocracies with high levels of powersharing and democracies with low levels of powersharing.



Figure B1: Powersharing in Autocracies and Democracies

Kenya prior to 2002 provides a useful illustration of what it looks like when an autocracy has high levels of constraining powersharing in particular. Kenya emerged from colonial rule as a one-party autocratic state, ruled first by Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) and then by Daniel Moi, who remained in power until 2001. Despite the autocratic nature of the government, the 1969 Kenyan constitution provided substantial protections for religious freedom and prohibited members of the armed forces from holding elected office. Kenya also maintained a strong high court throughout the pre-2002 period, with the role of the court clearly delineated in the constitution and judges serving lifetime appointments (until retirement age). The high court was frequently unable or unwilling to prevent the president from contravening the constitution, but the *de jure* powers of the high court remained largely intact under both the Kenyatta and

Moi governments (e.g., Mutua 2001). For example, while President Moi pushed through a constitutional amendment limiting the tenure of judges in 1988, security of tenure was restored in 1990.

As noted in the main paper, our measures of powersharing focus primarily on *de jure* rules rather than *de facto* practices, and *de jure* rules are not always followed. In autocratic contexts in particular, powersharing institutions present in the constitution are sometimes contravened by powerful autocrats. However, these *de jure* rules continue to serve an important role, delineating the autocrat's actions as illegitimate and allowing regime opponents to coordinate around the demand that constitutional rules be followed. In Kenya, even though for decades the high court often failed to exercise the independence it was granted by the constitution, the judiciary nevertheless emerged as an important player in the democratization process when it unfolded, eventually managing to assert itself as a *de facto* constraint on the ruler.

While we use Kenya to illustrate our case, it is far from unique as an autocracy with high levels of constraining powersharing. The 1993 Kyrgyz constitution provided for a powerful, independent constitutional court, even though the country remained autocratic until 2005. Same too, with the 1946 constitution in Taiwan, which established the Judicial Yuan, a similarly powerful high court. Even though Tanzania has remained an autocracy throughout its existence, its governance is characterized by a range of constraining institutions including a strong high court, constitutional protections for religious freedom, a constitutional ban on religiously or ethnically-based political parties and a ban on members of the military joining political parties or serving in the legislature. Like inclusive and dispersive powersharing, constraining powersharing exists in a wide range of autocracies including countries that score extremely low on Polity IV and other continuous measures of democracy. While constraining powersharing does much to secure the stability and survival of democratic governance, constraining powersharing is not, itself, a feature of democracy.

The Separability of Powersharing Dimensions

While our three powersharing dimensions do co-vary (pairwise correlations range from 0.05 to 0.40), it is important to demonstrate that these three dimensions are separable from one another. One way to do this is to show that countries exist with every possible combination of high and low values on different powersharing dimensions. Table B4 is a contingency table that demonstrates exactly this. We denote a country-year as high or low on a given dimension of powersharing based on whether it scores above or below the mean on that dimension.

Table B4: Contingency Table: Combinations of Powersharing

Low Inclusive Powersharing

	Low Dispersive Powersharing	High Dispersive Powersharing
Low Constraining Powersharing	1834	535
High Constraining Powersharing	1197	1336

High Inclusive Powersharing

	Low Dispersive Powersharing	High Dispersive Powersharing
Low Constraining Powersharing	101	57
High Constraining Powersharing	106	220

The most common combination in the data is a low score on all three dimensions (1,834 country years), while countries scoring high on all three dimensions are much less common (220 country-years). The least common combination is a high score on inclusive and dispersive powersharing with a low score on constraining powersharing. However, this least-common combination still accounts for 57 country-years spread across 7 distinct countries.[21] By showing that all possible combinations of high and low values exist in the data, we are able to demonstrate empirically that our three dimensions of powersharing are separable.

[21] Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Namibia, Sudan, Iraq, and Tajikistan.

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