Online Appendix for "Restraining the Huddled Masses: Migration Policy and Autocratic Survival"

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The following pages display additional information and robustness checks referenced in the text. For convenience, we list a summary of these checks:

- **Table A1** lists **summary statistics** for the sample of autocratic country-years.
- **Table A2** lists the **119 countries** in our sample of autocracies that have emigration data, with their average values of *Emigration Freedom*, *Polity* (0-1 scale), the actual emigration rate (as share of population), and the average *Polity* score of emigration receivers.
- **Table A3** shows the results for the regression used to **predict expected bilateral migration** (Equation (1) in the paper).
- **Table A4** shows the results of regressions predicting **remittances, exports, and total trade** from our predicted dyadic emigration measure, using a directed-dyad-year sample. All three are strongly predicted by expected dyadic emigration.
- **Table A5** shows the results of regressions predicting **FDI and aid** from our predicted emigration measures, using a country-year sample. Emigration levels predict FDI, but not foreign aid.
- **Table A6** shows results predicting *Polity* change and *Emigration Freedom* with five additional economic controls: fuel dependence (as % of GDP, from Ross 2013), literacy (as % of adults, from Banks 1976; Norris 2008; World Bank 2014), FDI (as % of GDP, from World Bank 2011), foreign aid (as % of GDP, from World Bank 2011), and economic inequality (Gini, interpolated and averaged from Galbraith and Kum 2003; UNU-WIDER 2005; World Bank 2014). Models 5 and 6 include four additional political variables: military size

(military personnel as % of the population, from Correlates of War 2010), *Civil Violence*, a 0-1 measure of workers' rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2010), and a Communist dummy. The main results are robust.

- **Table A7** displays **placebo tests** relating three other measures of freedom to our predicted emigration variables. Out of 36 total coefficients related to emigration predictors (not including the DV average), only four are significant.
- **Table A8** shows results predicting *Polity* change and *Emigration Freedom* controlling for **autocratic regime types** (from Geddes et al. 2014). Military and party-based regimes are accounted for (with personalist regimes as the reference category), plus their interactions with the predicted emigration measures.
- **Table A9** shows results predicting **regime failures** and irregular turnovers (both over the following five years). Regime failures are from Geddes et al. (2014). Irregular turnovers are executive turnovers violating constitutional rules (from Goemans et al. 2009). The expected *Polity* average of emigration receivers is significantly positive for breakdown, whereas the expected emigration level does not have a significant effect.
- **Table A10** shows results predicting *Polity* change and *Emigration Freedom* with predicted values for the level and *Polity* average of both **emigration and immigration**. Although these are highly correlated and thus most results are non-significant, the results generally show a stronger effect for emigration.
- **Table A11** shows results predicting *Polity* change and democratic transition using the **actual** level and *Polity* average of emigrants instead of the predicted values. Results for the *Polity* average of receivers hold.
- **Table A12** shows results predicting democratic survival and *Emigration Freedom* in a sample of **democracies**.
- **Table A13** shows results predicting *Emigration Freedom* in autocracies, with *Emigration Freedom* taken from **V-Dem's measure** of freedom of foreign movement (Coppedge et al. 2016). Results are largely consistent, although the negative effect of the *Polity* average of receivers no longer interacts with sender *Polity*.

- **Figures A1 and A2** display the variation in selected coefficients from alternative choices of instruments. Alternative 1 is the original. The other nine remove specific variables in turn from the instrument set. In order, the alternatives remove (2) the contiguity dummies, (3) colonial history, (4) shared language, (5) the year, (6) interactions with bilateral distance, (7) interactions with contiguity, (8) bilateral distance, (9) population, and (10) average income. Figure A1 shows the results for three key estimates for $\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$: the direct effect on *Polity* change, the direct effect on *Emigration Freedom*, and the estimated effect when *Polity* is at 0. Figure A2 shows two further estimates: the direct effects of $\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$ and $\widehat{Em}(GDP/capita\ Average)$ on *Emigration Freedom*. Results are highly consistent with the original findings: Of 45 additional estimates, all retain the same sign and 38 remain significant (at the .05 level). Further, none of the alternatives miss significance for more than two tests.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Emigration Freedom	0.491	0.373	0	1	2,322
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	0.514	0.23	0.058	0.929	2,322
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	0.008	0.018	0	0.173	2,322
$\widehat{Em}(EF\ Average)$	0.586	0.237	0.006	0.993	2,322
$\widehat{Em}(GDP/capita\ Average)$	8.301	0.844	5.882	10.266	2,322
Polity	0.286	0.224	0	0.75	2,322
Regional Polity	0.441	0.193	0.117	0.895	2,322
Neighbor Polity	0.401	0.235	0	0.950	2,107
Trade-Weighted Polity	0.778	0.127	0.023	0.998	2,314
State Capacity	0.522	0.128	0.171	1	2,309
Civil Violence	0.882	1.874	0	10	2,249
Urbanization	43.402	23.076	4.48	100	2,312
Labor Force	66.751	11.524	36.6	90.8	2,283
Durability	18.536	18.814	0	105	2,322
Population (ln)	15.952	1.532	12.426	21.004	2,322
GDP/capita (ln)	7.952	1.078	5.807	11.248	2,322
Economic Growth	1.203	6.292	−32.927	92.14	2,302
Neighbors	3.912	2.451	0	19	2,322
Mean Imports	0.075	0.352	0	7.898	2,322
Mean Exports	0.089	0.42	0	9.162	2,322
Year	1993.918	8.305	1981	2009	2,322

Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the sample of autocracies.

Table A2: Country List and Average Values

Country	Emigration Freedom	Polity (0-1)	Actual Emigration Share	Receiver Polity Mean
Afghanistan	0.44	0.25	0.05	0.35
Albania	0.52	0.42	0.07	0.97
Algeria	0.50	0.31	0.06	0.92
Angola	0.33	0.31	0.03	0.86
Argentina	0.75	0.10	0.01	0.68
Armenia	0.47	0.68	0.28	0.73
Azerbaijan	0.50	0.21	0.19	0.76
Bahrain	0.55	0.06	0.03	0.56
Bangladesh	0.64	0.29	0.05	0.85
Belarus	0.50	0.17	0.18	0.77
Benin	1.00	0.19	0.09	0.30
Bhutan	0.87	0.09	0.02	0.87
Bolivia	0.00	0.15	0.03	0.25
Brazil	1.00	0.34	0.00	0.59
Bulgaria	0.06	0.15	0.04	0.65
Burkina Faso	0.93	0.31	0.11	0.31
Burundi	0.67	0.33	0.04	0.29
Cambodia	0.70	0.56	0.02	0.96
Cameroon	0.28	0.23	0.01	0.53
Central African Rep.	0.63	0.43	0.01	0.44
Chad	0.65	0.34	0.02	0.33
Chile	0.63	0.22	0.03	0.79
China	0.32	0.15	0.00	0.71
Comoros	0.89	0.45	0.05	0.66
Congo Brazzaville	0.72	0.30	0.02	0.64
Congo Kinshasa	0.19	0.39	0.01	0.42
Cuba	0.20	0.15	0.08	0.99
Djibouti	0.65	0.32	0.01	0.71
Dominican Rep.	0.75	0.75	0.06	0.99
Ecuador	1.00	0.75	0.04	0.97
Egypt	0.18	0.23	0.03	0.24
El Salvador	0.83	0.60	0.04	0.87
Equatorial Guinea	0.48	0.21	0.09	0.35
Eritrea	0.33	0.17	0.07	0.55
Ethiopia (1981–1992)	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.60
Ethiopia (1993–2010)	0.56	0.55	0.00	0.84
Fiji	0.93	0.59	0.11	1.00
Gabon	0.25	0.25	0.01	0.75
Gambia	0.65	0.24	0.02	0.78
Georgia	0.71	0.73	0.24	0.77
Ghana	0.77	0.33	0.03	0.46
Guatemala	1.00	0.51	0.02	0.94
Guinea	0.53	0.32	0.06	0.44
Guinea-Bissau	0.85	0.38	0.06	0.55
Guyana	0.77	0.15	0.17	0.98
Haiti	0.75	0.34	0.07	0.92
Honduras	1.00	0.74	0.02	0.84
Hungary	0.50	0.24	0.04	0.94
Indonesia	0.33	0.16	0.00	0.60
Iran	0.12	0.31	0.01	0.80
Iraq	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.49
Ivory Coast	0.67	0.28	0.02	0.44
Jordan	0.15	0.28	0.18	0.19
Kazakhstan	0.50	0.27	0.22	0.72
Kenya	0.33	0.24	0.01	0.68
Kuwait	0.14	0.12	0.09	0.24
Kyrgyzstan	0.53	0.43	0.14	0.64
Laos	0.55	0.15	0.05	0.95
Lesotho	0.68	0.24	0.15	0.68
Liberia	0.53	0.40	0.06	0.64
Libya	0.15	0.15	0.02	0.68

Table A2: Country List and Average Values (cont.)

Country	Emigration Freedom	Polity (0-1)	Actual Emigration Share	Receiver Polity Mean
Madagascar	0.62	0.28	0.01	0.80
Malawi	0.44	0.18	0.03	0.45
Malaysia	0.50	0.68	0.03	0.59
Mali	0.95	0.18	0.09	0.20
Mauritania	0.75	0.22	0.04	0.57
Mexico	1.00	0.47	0.04	1.00
Mongolia	0.23	0.23	0.00	0.44
Morocco	0.38	0.15	0.06	0.92
Mozambique	0.67	0.49	0.04	0.60
Myanmar (Burma)	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.85
Nepal	0.77	0.51	0.03	0.87
Nicaragua	0.28	0.38	0.03	0.93
Niger	0.57	0.35	0.02	0.43
Nigeria	0.33	0.43	0.00	0.59
North Korea	0.00	0.05	0.03	0.70
North Yemen	0.45	0.22	0.03	0.24
Oman	0.33	0.05	0.06	0.12
Pakistan	0.44	0.30	0.03	0.69
Panama	1.00	0.19	0.05	0.98
Papua New Guinea	1.00	0.70	0.01	0.98
Paraguay	0.50	0.24	0.08	0.74
Peru	0.94	0.55	0.01	0.97
Philippines	0.92	0.23	0.02	0.81
Poland	0.60	0.27	0.11	0.96
Qatar	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.59
Romania	0.40	0.38	0.05	0.84
Russia	0.29	0.67	0.07	0.63
Rwanda	0.60	0.23	0.04	0.36
Saudi Arabia	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.51
Senegal	0.87	0.45	0.03	0.56
Sierra Leone	0.73	0.36	0.02	0.52
Singapore	0.50	0.40	0.05	0.87
Solomon Islands	1.00	0.50	0.01	0.96
Somalia	0.50	0.38	0.03	0.46
South Africa	0.09	0.71	0.01	0.72
South Korea	0.50	0.29	0.03	0.97
Sri Lanka	0.85	0.75	0.03	0.75
Sudan	0.24	0.21	0.01	0.24
Swaziland	0.23	0.03	0.06	0.79
Syria	0.10	0.09	0.03	0.40
Taiwan	0.55	0.29	0.01	0.96
Tajikistan	0.63	0.34	0.08	0.64
Tanzania	0.35	0.34	0.01	0.55
Thailand	0.75	0.59	0.00	0.84
Togo	0.38	0.29	0.05	0.50
Tunisia	0.48	0.27	0.06	0.84
Turkey	0.50	0.25	0.05	0.97
Turkmenistan	0.37	0.05	0.07	0.61
UAE	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.58
Uganda	0.50	0.35	0.01	0.61
Uruguay	0.50	0.15	0.06	0.58
USSR	0.00	0.23	0.01	0.80
Uzbekistan	0.42	0.05	0.06	0.71
Venezuela	0.80	0.59	0.01	0.97
Vietnam	0.23	0.15	0.02	0.95
Yemen	0.10	0.39	0.03	0.15
Zambia	0.64	0.39	0.02	0.58
Zimbabwe	0.52	0.34	0.03	0.70
Total	0.49	0.29	0.04	0.64

Notes: The table displays the 119 countries in our sample that have emigration data and their average values for several variables.

Table A3: Regression Predicting Emigration Stocks

DV = *Actual Emigration Stocks* (ln)	**Total** (1)
Sender Variables	
Population (ln)	0.589^{***}
	(50.96)
GDP/capita (ln)	0.227^{***}
	(16.37)
Receiver Variables	
Population (ln)	1.124^{***}
	(7.33)
GDP/capita (ln)	-0.519^{*}
	(-2.43)
Distance (ln) $\times$ *GDP/capita* (ln)	0.136^{***}
	(5.28)
Distance (ln) $\times$ *Population* (ln)	-0.078^{***}
	(-4.30)
Shared Border $\times$ *GDP/capita* (ln)	-0.459^{***}
	(-3.37)
Shared Border $\times$ *Population* (ln)	-0.350^{***}
	(-3.53)
Dyadic Variables	
Distance (ln)	-1.307^{***}
	(-3.53)
Shared Border	12.035^{***}
	(6.01)
≤ 12 *Miles of Water*	0.847
	(1.10)
≤ 24 *Miles of Water*	2.462^{***}
	(3.33)
≤ 150 *Miles of Water*	1.184^{***}
	(3.57)
≤ 400 *Miles of Water*	0.819^{**}
	(3.11)
Colonial History	3.179^{***}
	(12.55)
Shared Language	1.094^{***}
	(20.26)
Year	-0.015^{***}
	(-19.57)
N	519,615
Sender Countries	126
Adj. R^2	0.461

Notes: The table shows results from the regression used to predict dyadic emigration. t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered by country dyad) are shown in parentheses.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Dyadic Models Predicting Economic Benefits of Emigration

	Remittances		**Exports**		**Trade**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\widehat{Em}(Dyadic)$	0.247^{***}	0.371^{***}	0.056^{***}	0.030^{***}	0.107^{***}	0.060^{***}
	(26.52)	(13.43)	(25.38)	(21.18)	(26.40)	(21.61)
Population (ln) (Sender)		-0.067^{***}		0.043^{***}		0.074^{***}
		(-3.71)		(12.67)		(13.47)
Population (ln) (Receiver)		-0.082^{***}		0.036^{***}		0.061^{***}
		(-5.45)		(17.50)		(19.34)
GDP/*capita* (ln) (Sender)		-0.009		0.056^{***}		0.100^{***}
		(-0.83)		(27.73)		(30.44)
GDP/*capita* (ln) (Receiver)		0.029		0.039^{***}		0.068^{***}
		(1.56)		(18.94)		(20.91)
Distance (ln)		0.318^{***}		0.021^{***}		0.033^{***}
		(6.84)		(6.26)		(5.47)
Year				0.002^{***}		0.005^{***}
				(21.09)		(23.30)
N	7,003	7,003	616,247	616,247	616,247	616,247
Sender Countries	46	46	138	138	138	138
Adj. R^2	0.221	0.245	0.007	0.013	0.009	0.017

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting directed-dyadic remittances (logged, in millions of U.S. dollars, for 2010 only, from World Bank 2011), logged exports (Barbieri and Keshk 2012), and logged total trade from predicted dyadic emigration. The sample includes only autocratic sending countries. Emigration significantly predicts both remittances and trade. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A5: Models Predicting Economic Benefits of Emigration

	FDI (% of GDP)			**Foreign Aid (% of GDP)**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	38.791^{***}	28.703^{**}	28.798^{**}	-2.480	-37.002^{***}	-54.135^{***}
	(3.50)	(2.91)	(2.85)	(-0.26)	(-3.43)	(-5.06)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	2.429^{***}	0.339	-0.590	0.713	-1.291	-3.001^{**}
	(4.01)	(0.56)	(-0.86)	(0.69)	(-1.42)	(-3.08)
Population (ln)		-0.392^{*}	-0.544^{**}		-2.318^{***}	-3.050^{***}
		(-2.46)	(-2.87)		(-13.95)	(-19.03)
GDP/capita (ln)		-0.065	-0.137		-4.280^{***}	-5.825^{***}
		(-0.33)	(-0.63)		(-19.54)	(-27.55)
Mean Imports		7.593^{***}	7.104^{***}		1.209	1.976
		(3.94)	(3.54)		(0.93)	(1.47)
Mean Exports		-5.559^{***}	-5.227^{***}		0.016	0.706
		(-3.72)	(-3.32)		(0.02)	(0.60)
Year		0.126^{***}	0.162^{***}		0.184^{***}	0.017
		(8.43)	(8.59)		(8.49)	(0.74)
Other Controls?	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
N	2,903	2,902	2,086	4,193	4,172	2,257
Countries	123	123	116	136	136	124
Adj. R^2	0.018	0.079	0.096	0.000	0.356	0.450

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting foreign direct investment (FDI) (as % of GDP, from World Bank 2011) and foreign aid (as % of GDP, from World Bank 2011) from predicted emigration, using a country-year sample including only autocratic sending countries. Models 3 and 6 include all controls in Model 2 of Table 2. Emigration levels predict FDI, but not foreign aid. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A6: Models with Additional Controls

	ΔPolity (5-year)	**EF**	**ΔPolity (5-year)**	**EF**	**ΔPolity (5-year)**	**EF**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	0.175^{***}	-0.801^{**}	0.197^{***}	-1.448^{***}	0.169^{***}	-0.835^{**}
	(5.84)	(−3.08)	(5.83)	(−4.70)	(5.90)	(−3.12)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	−0.074	11.855^{***}	−0.057	10.788^{***}	−0.295	6.588^{*}
	(−0.18)	(4.05)	(−0.13)	(3.45)	(−0.74)	(2.55)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average) \times$ *Polity*		2.669^{***}		3.556^{***}		3.445^{***}
		(4.07)		(4.78)		(4.98)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share) \times$ *Polity*		−1.598		4.066		1.346
		(−0.15)		(0.38)		(0.15)
Fuel Dependence	-0.001^{**}	−0.003	-0.001^{**}	-0.006^{*}		
	(−2.84)	(−1.40)	(−2.73)	(−2.23)		
Literacy	0.001^{**}	-0.005^{**}	0.001^{***}	-0.006^{**}		
	(3.24)	(−2.86)	(3.45)	(−2.98)		
FDI	−0.001	0.002	−0.002	−0.002		
	(1.73)	(0.51)	(−1.95)	(−0.31)		
Foreign Aid	0.003^{***}	0.008^{*}	0.003^{***}	0.003		
	(4.07)	(2.51)	(3.83)	(0.66)		
Economic Inequality			0.001	0.009		
			(1.45)	(1.77)		
Military Size					-0.026^{***}	-0.485^{***}
					(−5.64)	(−8.47)
Civil Violence					−0.004	-0.037^{*}
					(−1.47)	(−2.21)
Workers' Rights					0.061^{***}	0.437^{***}
					(3.67)	(4.57)
Communist					0.025	-0.330^{*}
					(0.90)	(−2.41)
Other Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1,695	1,951	1,413	1,546	1,874	2,008
Countries	108	110	101	104	121	119
Adj./Pseudo R^2	0.129	0.181	0.138	0.185	0.098	0.243

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting the five-year change in *Polity* (Models 1-2, 4-5) and ordered probits predicting *Emigration Freedom* (Models 3, 6). The models add selections of nine additional controls, with further controls from the main models omitted for space. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A7: Placebo Tests Predicting Other Freedoms

	Association		**Religion**		**Speech**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	0.389	0.670*	−0.202	−0.027	−0.663*	−0.567
	(1.25)	(2.11)	(−0.78)	(−0.10)	(−2.18)	(−1.84)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	4.901	3.423	2.807	1.040	−0.768	−1.878
	(1.61)	(1.08)	(0.87)	(0.32)	(−0.25)	(−0.59)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average) \times$ ***Polity***	−0.092	−1.008	−0.535	−1.093	2.115***	1.730**
	(−0.15)	(−1.61)	(−0.83)	(−1.67)	(3.36)	(2.73)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share) \times$ ***Polity***	0.572	−0.405	0.118	3.177	−4.683	−5.013
	(0.05)	(−0.03)	(0.01)	(0.32)	(−0.51)	(−0.52)
$\widehat{Em}(EF\ Average)$	0.073	−0.239	0.151	−0.040	0.050	−0.121
	(0.40)	(−1.27)	(0.92)	(−0.24)	(0.29)	(−0.69)
$\widehat{Em}(GDP/capita\ Average)$	0.069	0.031	−0.043	−0.081	0.025	−0.004
	(1.25)	(0.55)	(−0.80)	(−1.51)	(0.44)	(−0.07)
$\widehat{Em}(DV\ Average)$	0.168	0.211	1.133***	1.182***	0.127	0.185
	(0.81)	(1.01)	(8.01)	(8.36)	(0.55)	(0.86)
Emigration Freedom		1.044***		0.629***		0.545***
		(10.91)		(7.35)		(5.90)
Other Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2,160	2,160	2,254	2,254	2,164	2,164
Countries	120	120	121	121	120	120
Pseudo R^2	0.198	0.233	0.199	0.211	0.180	0.190

Notes: The table displays placebo tests predicting freedoms of association, religion, and speech. Models 1, 3, and 5 are otherwise identical to Model 4 in Table 4, except with the addition of the dependent variable's average in expected emigration receivers as a control. Models 2, 4, and 6 add *Emigration Freedom* as a control. Few of the predicted emigration variables predict these other freedoms. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A8: Models with Autocratic Regime Types

	ΔPolity (5-year)		**Emigration Freedom**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military Regime	0.129^{***}	0.011	0.004	-0.170
	(5.73)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(-0.60)
Party-Based Regime	0.002	0.017	-0.194^{**}	0.205
	(0.17)	(0.55)	(-3.23)	(1.21)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	0.168^{***}	0.169^{***}	-0.341	-0.211
	(6.13)	(5.38)	(-1.83)	(-0.98)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	-0.329	-1.218^{**}	9.279^{***}	11.025^{***}
	(-0.85)	(-2.98)	(5.85)	(4.76)
Party $\times$ $\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$		-0.065		-0.709^{*}
		(-1.21)		(-2.39)
Military $\times$ $\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$		0.182		0.059
		(1.76)		(0.14)
Party $\times$ $\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$		2.388^{**}		-5.576^{*}
		(3.03)		(-1.98)
Military $\times$ $\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$		2.787		30.627
		(0.59)		(1.62)
Other Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1,866	1,866	2,124	2,124
Countries	116	116	114	114
Adj./Pseudo R^2	0.109	0.124	0.163	0.165

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting the five-year change in *Polity* (Models 1-2) and ordered probits predicting *Emigration Freedom* (Models 3-4). All models use a sample of autocracies. The additional controls match those included in the main models. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A9: Models Predicting Regime Failure

	Regime Failure		**Irregular Turnover**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	0.837^{***}	0.755^{***}	0.362^{*}	0.260
	(4.35)	(3.88)	(2.10)	(1.49)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	4.053	3.725	2.647	2.266
	(1.91)	(1.89)	(1.58)	(1.35)
Polity	0.432^{**}	0.265	0.186	-0.008
	(2.62)	(1.50)	(1.15)	(-0.05)
Year	-0.039^{***}	-0.037^{***}	-0.031^{***}	-0.028^{***}
	(-8.40)	(-7.89)	(-6.91)	(-6.23)
Emigration Freedom		0.346^{***}		0.445^{***}
		(3.31)		(4.68)
Other Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2,117	2,117	2,300	2,300
Countries	116	116	125	125
Pseudo R^2	0.078	0.084	0.099	0.109

Notes: The table displays probit results predicting regime failures (Models 1-2) and irregular turnovers (Models 3-4) within the following five years. All models use a sample of autocracies. The additional controls match those included in the main models. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A10: Models Including Emigration and Immigration

	ΔPolity (5-year)		**Emigration Freedom**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	0.136	0.115	−0.769	−1.195*
	(1.89)	(1.55)	(−1.62)	(−2.30)
$\widehat{Imm}(Polity\ Average)$	0.077	0.091	0.514	1.120
	(0.96)	(1.11)	(1.06)	(1.84)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	−0.185	0.720	8.841*	−1.397
	(−0.26)	(0.93)	(2.58)	(−0.38)
$\widehat{Imm}(Pop.\ Share)$	−0.053	−0.184	−0.183	1.465
	(−0.49)	(−1.62)	(−0.28)	(1.93)
Polity	−0.195***	−0.243***	1.287***	1.280***
	(−9.08)	(−10.12)	(10.02)	(9.63)
$\widehat{Em}(EF\ Average)$			0.522	0.891
			(1.15)	(1.78)
$\widehat{Imm}(EF\ Average)$			0.661	0.138
			(1.54)	(0.29)
Regional Polity			0.364*	0.793***
			(2.38)	(3.86)
Trade-Weighted Polity			1.067***	0.933***
			(4.92)	(3.84)
Year	−0.003***	−0.003***		−0.022***
	(−5.26)	(−4.23)		(−4.71)
Other Controls?	N	Y	N	Y
N	2,010	1,990	2,314	2,259
Countries	124	123	126	121
Adj./Pseudo R^2	0.071	0.084	0.087	0.166

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting the five-year change in *Polity* (Models 1-2) and ordered probits predicting *Emigration Freedom* (Models 3-4). All models use a sample of autocracies. The additional controls match those included in the main models. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A11: Models Predicting Democratization Using Actual Stocks

	ΔPolity (5-year)			**Democratic Transition**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$Em(Polity\ Average)$	0.098^{***}	0.091^{***}	0.001	0.476^{**}
	(4.80)	(4.54)	(0.04)	(2.70)
$Em(Pop.\ Share)$	0.144	0.237^{*}	-0.295	1.018
	(1.30)	(2.10)	(-1.87)	(0.91)
Emigration Freedom			-0.022	
			(-0.58)	
$Em(Polity\ Average) \times$ ***EF***			0.132^{**}	
			(2.68)	
$Em(Pop.\ Share) \times$ ***EF***			0.906^{**}	
			(3.20)	
Polity	-0.161^{***}	-0.238^{***}	-0.298^{***}	1.325^{***}
	(-7.42)	(-9.60)	(-10.96)	(6.45)
Year	-0.003^{***}	-0.002^{*}	-0.001	-0.028^{***}
	(-4.07)	(-2.50)	(-1.49)	(-5.04)
Other Controls?	N	Y	Y	Y
N	1,882	1,881	1,881	1,806
Countries	116	116	116	117
Adj./Pseudo R^2	0.042	0.072	0.098	0.126

Notes: The table displays regressions predicting the five-year change in *Polity* (Models 1-3) and a probit predicting democratization over five years (Model 4) from actual emigration (rather than predicted emigration). All models use a sample of autocracies. The additional controls match those included in the main models. t statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A12: Models Using a Sample of Democracies

	Democratic Survival	**Emigration Freedom**
	(1)	(2)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	1.133^{***}	0.389
	(2.14)	(1.14)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	181.181^{***}	16.781^{***}
	(3.88)	(3.33)
Polity	1.686	2.222^{***}
	(1.89)	(4.08)
$\widehat{Em}(EF\ Average)$		1.594^{***}
		(5.28)
Other Controls?	Y	Y
N	1,634	1,937
Countries	101	106
Pseudo R^2	0.206	0.123

Notes: The table displays a probit predicting democratic survival (using Boix et al. 2013) (Model 1) and an ordered probit predicting *Emigration Freedom* (Model 2). Both models use a sample of democracies. The additional controls include year and *Regional Polity*. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A13: Ordered Probits Predicting Emigration Freedom (V-Dem)

DV = *EF (V-Dem)*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$	-0.207^{***}	-0.228^{***}	-0.193^{***}	-0.130^{**}
	(-6.27)	(-5.10)	(-4.16)	(-3.02)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share)$	1.268^{***}	1.013	0.372	-1.149^{***}
	(5.38)	(1.90)	(0.72)	(-3.99)
$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average) \times$ ***Polity***		0.073	0.200	0.083
		(0.66)	(1.79)	(0.78)
$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\ Share) \times$ ***Polity***		0.846	-0.785	0.938
		(0.77)	(-0.67)	(1.26)
$\widehat{Em}(EF\ Average)$	0.371^{***}	0.372^{***}	0.268^{***}	0.248^{***}
	(7.97)	(7.98)	(5.74)	(5.36)
Other Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	4,066	4,066	2,254	2,235
Countries	131	131	118	117
Pseudo R^2	0.271	0.271	0.296	0.374

Notes: The table displays ordered probits predicting *Emigration Freedom* (measured by V-Dem) in autocracies. The additional controls match those in Models 1–4 of Table 4. t statistics (based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Figure A1: Variations in Coefficients from Alternative IV Sets

$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$ on Polity Change (Table 2, Model 2)



$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$ on Emigration Freedom (Table 4, Model 1)



$\widehat{Em}(Polity\ Average)$ on EF at Lowest Polity (Table 4, Model 4)



Notes: The figures show the variation in selected coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals, based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) from alternative sets of instruments. Alternative 1 is the original. Results from nine additional sets of instruments are shown, showing high consistency with the original. See the notes above for the list of alternatives.

Figure A2: Variations in Coefficients from Alternative IV Sets

$\widehat{Em}(Pop.\,Share)$ on Emigration Freedom (Table 4, Model 1)



$\widehat{Em}(GDP/capita\ Average)$ on Emigration Freedom (Table 4, Model 4)



Notes: The figures show the variation in selected coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals, based on two-stage bootstrapped standard errors) from alternative sets of instruments. Alternative 1 is the original model. Results from nine additional sets of instruments are shown, showing high consistency with the original. See the notes above for the list of alternatives.

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