ONLINE APPENDIX

"Hello, Goodbye: When do States Withdraw from International Organizations?"

Inken von Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulas

Review of International Organizations (2019)

Note: The dataset in this RIO article on membership withdrawals and the dataset in our ISQ article on membership suspensions (2019) are also companion datasets to the COW IGO data (Pevehouse et al. 2019). On the COW website (`http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets`), we provide code files for R and Stata, which can be run to adjust the COW dataset for membership exits and interruptions. If you use the data and/or correction code, please reference both the RIO and ISQ articles:

- von Borzyskowski, Inken and Felicity Vabulas. 2019a. "Credible Commitments? Explaining IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding." *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (1): 139-152.
- von Borzyskowski, Inken and Felicity Vabulas. 2019b. "Hello, Goodbye: When do States Withdraw from International Organizations?" *Review of International Organizations*.

Additional Material

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 1
Table A2. IO Performance 2
Table A3. Adding GDP Growth and Unemployment Change 3
Table A4. Contagion as Withdrawal by Founding Member or Regional Power 4

Robustness Checks – Replicating Table 1

Changing the sample

Table A5. Restricting the Sample to Model 4 Sample 5
Table A6. Restricting the Sample to the Cold War Period 6
Table A7. Restricting the Sample to the Post Cold War Period 7

Changing the model specification

Table A8. Dropping Institutionalization and Government Orientation 8
Table A9. Adding UN Specialized Agency 9
Table A10. Adding more Controls 10

Changing the estimation

Table A11. Logit 11
Table A12. Clustering Standard Errors on Countries 12

Details on Original Data Collection

IGO Membership Withdrawal (Dependent Variable) 13

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Withdrawal	0.0004	0.0197	0	1	486,498
IO institutionalization	1.9044	0.8889	1	3	382,346
IO performance	0.4762	0.2847	0.01	0.89	94,312
IO withdrawal clause	0.5832	0.4930	0	1	486,498
IO average democracy score	2.2148	3.8065	-10	10	444,005
IO issue area politics	0.1519	0.3589	0	1	486,498
IO issue area security	0.3353	0.4721	0	1	486,498
IO issue area economics	0.5128	0.4998	0	1	486,498
Democracy	2.2150	7.3620	-10	10	444,024
Domestic political backsliding	0.3071	0.4613	0	1	486,498
Government orientation change	0.1008	0.3011	0	1	228,444
Nationalist	0.1744	0.3794	0	1	361,820
Preference diversion from IO average	0.6227	0.5563	0	3.9788	432,166
Contagion	0.0017	0.0415	0	1	486,498
Withdrawal by founding state of IO	0.0089	0.0942	0	1	486,498
Withdrawal by regional power	0.0021	0.0457	0	1	486,498
State power	0.0083	0.0255	0	0.3839	456,579
State power change	-0.0035	0.1607	-5.6336	3.9215	456,579
IO size	4.0392	0.9909	0	5.2679	486,498
Membership duration in IO	2.8904	0.9284	0.6931	5.0876	470,020
Nationalist in executive	0.1136	0.3174	0	1	365,280
Nationalist in executive vote share	0.0331	0.1555	0	1	340,203
Nationalist in government	0.1519	0.3589	0	1	333,480
Nationalist in government vote share	0.0629	0.2081	0	1	321,288
Nationalist in opposition	0.0861	0.2804	0	1	272,085
Nationalist in opposition vote share	0.0124	0.0562	0	0.5509	264,249
Populist	0.2520	0.4342	0	1	194,851
Cold War	0.4239	0.4942	0	1	486,498
GDP growth	3.7533	5.8237	-64.0471	149.973	381,356
Unemployment change	0.0010	0.0154	-0.1754	0.2063	316,502
UN specialized agency	0.2521	0.4342	0	1	486,498

Table A2: IO Performance (Without State Power and Issue Area)

	(1) IGO	(2) IGO	(3) All	(4) All
IO performance	-2.348	-2.189	-3.703	-3.781
	(0.533)***	(0.500)***	(0.943)***	(1.075)***
IO institutionalization		0.139		0.504
		(0.205)		(0.577)
IO average democracy score	-0.038	-0.069	0.079	0.064
	(0.090)	(0.124)	(0.144)	(0.156)
Democracy			0.034	0.042
			(0.085)	(0.082)
Government orientation change			0.171	0.137
			(0.516)	(0.545)
Nationalist			0.049	0.188
			(1.114)	(1.167)
Preference diversion from IO average			1.998	2.084
			(0.425)***	(0.492)***
Contagion			2.293	2.023
			(1.087)**	(1.113)*
Membership duration in IO	0.599	0.526	0.205	0.017
	(0.258)**	(0.263)**	(0.444)	(0.445)
IO size	-0.865	-1.033	-0.533	-0.870
	(0.373)**	(0.415)**	(0.872)	(0.884)
Observations	82084	76306	35400	32526
AIC	803.217	798.322	196.051	194.157
BIC	877.741	881.505	306.219	311.614

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Replicating Table 1 with GDP Growth and Unemployment Change

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.059			0.038
	(0.033)*			(0.028)
Government orientation change	0.293			0.418
	(0.301)			(0.354)
Nationalist	0.195			-0.266
	(0.454)			(0.625)
IO institutionalization		-0.162		-0.229
		(0.397)		(0.357)
IO average democracy score		-0.032		-0.102
		(0.033)		(0.037)***
IO issue area politics		0.325		-0.377
		(0.610)		(0.724)
IO issue area economics		0.901		0.617
		(0.570)		(0.493)
Preference diversion from IO average			1.179	1.209
			(0.157)***	(0.217)***
Contagion			3.176	3.226
			(0.387)***	(0.435)***
State power change			-0.569	-0.478
			(0.394)	(0.851)
Membership duration in IO	0.465	0.552	0.068	0.144
	(0.450)	(0.470)	(0.523)	(0.628)
IO size	-0.229	-0.382	-0.627	-0.659
	(0.260)	(0.329)	(0.240)***	(0.338)*
GDP growth	0.013	-0.021	0.003	-0.037
	(0.055)	(0.011)*	(0.021)	(0.027)
Unemployment change	-9.200	-7.785	-11.429	-5.760
	(6.223)	(5.708)	(6.699)*	(9.155)
Observations	174635	221239	273027	127627
AIC	1326.088	1485.818	1772.760	897.216
BIC	1436.863	1609.502	1888.450	1072.840

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Contagion as Withdrawal by Founding Member or Regional Power

	(1) Geopolitics	(2) All	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy		0.058		0.060
		(0.025)**		(0.025)**
Government orientation change		0.534		0.552
		(0.302)*		(0.303)*
Nationalist		-0.454		-0.502
		(0.602)		(0.620)
IO institutionalization		-0.089		-0.182
		(0.288)		(0.340)
IO average democracy score		-0.086		-0.095
		(0.038)**		(0.040)**
IO issue area politics		-0.592		-0.576
		(0.668)		(0.695)
IO issue area economics		0.409		0.485
		(0.424)		(0.450)
Preference diversion from IO average	0.946	1.138	0.946	1.170
	(0.153)***	(0.223)***	(0.154)***	(0.207)***
Withdrawal by founding state of IO	3.133	2.513		
	(0.327)***	(0.359)***		
Withdrawal by regional power			3.462	2.905
			(0.490)***	(0.462)***
State power change	-0.702	-0.975	-0.703	-0.908
	(0.143)***	(0.901)	(0.144)***	(0.917)
Membership duration in IO	-0.500	0.299	-0.550	0.187
	(0.304)	(0.560)	(0.310)*	(0.538)
IO size	-0.654	-0.713	-0.621	-0.641
	(0.162)***	(0.268)***	(0.194)***	(0.320)**
Observations	418898	152158	418898	152158
AIC	2586.132	964.839	2643.387	977.840
BIC	2684.640	1123.762	2741.895	1136.763

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Replicating Table 1 with Sample Restriction to Model 4

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.043			0.060
	(0.033)			(0.025)**
Government orientation change	0.489			0.553
	(0.308)			(0.301)*
Nationalist	-0.816			-0.496
	(0.585)			(0.619)
IO institutionalization		-0.179		-0.180
		(0.354)		(0.334)
IO average democracy score		-0.060		-0.093
		(0.035)*		(0.039)**
IO issue area politics		-0.741		-0.542
		(0.701)		(0.688)
IO issue area economics		0.470		0.511
		(0.489)		(0.435)
Preference diversion from IO average			1.239	1.175
			(0.162)***	(0.207)***
Contagion			3.196	3.166
			(0.475)***	(0.438)***
State power change			-1.030	-0.911
			(0.921)	(0.930)
Membership duration in IO	0.552	0.608	0.285	0.199
	(0.542)	(0.640)	(0.515)	(0.568)
IO size	-0.292	-0.390	-0.608	-0.645
	(0.276)	(0.294)	(0.268)**	(0.317)**
Observations	152158	152158	152158	152158
AIC	1033.842	1032.089	984.897	972.498
BIC	1123.236	1131.416	1074.291	1131.421

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Restricting the Sample to the Cold War Period (1945-1989)

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics
Democracy	0.022		
	(0.033)		
Government orientation change	0.390		
	(0.492)		
Nationalist	-0.206		
	(0.630)		
IO institutionalization		-0.056	
		(0.300)	
IO average democracy score		0.020	
		(0.054)	
IO issue area politics		-0.159	
		(0.555)	
IO issue area economics		0.160	
		(0.466)	
Preference diversion from IO average			0.796
			(0.259)***
Contagion			3.307
			(0.843)***
State power change			-0.756
			(0.147)***
Membership duration in IO	-0.403	-0.443	-0.717
	(0.584)	(0.414)	(0.486)
IO size	0.001	-0.235	-0.403
	(0.406)	(0.267)	(0.275)
Observations	59626	152969	180714
AIC	450.907	1603.796	1385.735
BIC	531.870	1703.176	1476.677

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Restricting the Sample to the Post Cold War Period (1990-2014)

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.101			0.074
	(0.061)			(0.062)
Government orientation change	0.354			0.656
	(0.339)			(0.388)*
Nationalist	0.216			-0.756
	(0.501)			(0.776)
IO institutionalization		0.089		0.054
		(0.362)		(0.320)
IO average democracy score		-0.028		-0.133
		(0.041)		(0.062)**
IO issue area politics		0.365		-0.130
		(0.733)		(0.799)
IO issue area economics		0.899		0.344
		(0.650)		(0.572)
Preference diversion from IO average			1.302	1.389
			(0.144)***	(0.144)***
Contagion			3.586	3.180
			(0.461)***	(0.508)***
State power change			-0.599	-0.412
			(0.409)	(0.665)
Membership duration in IO	0.954	1.365	0.650	0.907
	(0.481)**	(0.515)***	(0.685)	(0.585)
IO size	-0.307	-0.528	-0.815	-0.817
	(0.240)	(0.269)*	(0.169)***	(0.246)***
Observations	148204	185973	238184	103540
AIC	1014.984	1018.615	1265.209	590.539
BIC	1104.141	1119.949	1358.636	743.303

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Replicating Table 1 without Institutionalization or Govmt. Orientation

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.047			0.056
	(0.018)***			(0.016)***
Nationalist	0.145			0.137
	(0.378)			(0.432)
IO average democracy score		-0.004		-0.045
		(0.033)		(0.039)
IO issue area politics		0.053		0.207
		(0.446)		(0.544)
IO issue area economics		0.669		1.100
		(0.417)		(0.433)**
Preference diversion from IO average			0.950	1.007
			(0.153)***	(0.159)***
Contagion			3.348	2.894
			(0.400)***	(0.468)***
State power change			-0.701	-0.916
			(0.144)***	(0.484)*
Membership duration in IO	0.517	-0.146	-0.536	0.205
	(0.359)	(0.269)	(0.323)*	(0.441)
IO size	-0.382	-0.335	-0.606	-0.630
	(0.229)*	(0.170)**	(0.192)***	(0.237)***
Observations	333446	430306	418898	303338
AIC	2066.242	3053.740	2654.137	1835.292
BIC	2151.979	3152.490	2752.645	1984.008

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Replicating Table 1 with UN Specialized Agency

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.064			0.061
	(0.031)**			(0.025)**
Government orientation change	0.323			0.549
	(0.270)			(0.304)*
Nationalist	0.097			-0.469
	(0.464)			(0.609)
IO institutionalization		-0.297		-0.356
		(0.266)		(0.345)
IO average democracy score		0.007		-0.070
		(0.037)		(0.038)*
IO issue area politics		0.236		-0.458
		(0.437)		(0.699)
IO issue area economics		0.220		0.369
		(0.373)		(0.430)
Preference diversion from IO average			0.969	1.193
			(0.154)***	(0.213)***
Contagion			3.007	2.852
			(0.446)***	(0.553)***
State power change			-0.654	-0.884
			(0.139)***	(0.906)
Membership duration in IO	0.451	-0.188	-0.560	0.147
	(0.379)	(0.272)	(0.305)*	(0.550)
IO size	-0.571	-0.966	-0.978	-0.987
	(0.160)***	(0.181)***	(0.161)***	(0.238)***
UN specialized agency	1.558	2.307	1.561	1.524
	(0.728)**	(0.635)***	(0.580)***	(0.810)*
Observations	207830	338942	418898	152158
AIC	1437.956	2556.634	2617.699	962.164
BIC	1540.401	2674.704	2727.152	1131.020

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses. The excluded/reference category for IO issue area is security.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Adding More Controls:
Backsliding, Withdrawal Clause, State Power

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.069			0.069
	(0.035)*			(0.036)*
Government orientation change	0.339			0.558
	(0.273)			(0.305)*
Nationalist	0.097			-0.489
	(0.465)			(0.610)
IO institutionalization		0.018		-0.194
		(0.276)		(0.329)
IO average democracy score		-0.027		-0.102
		(0.033)		(0.040)***
IO issue area politics		-0.040		-0.498
		(0.464)		(0.705)
IO issue area economics		0.324		0.475
		(0.409)		(0.420)
Preference diversion from IO average			0.987	1.122
			(0.158)***	(0.239)***
Contagion			3.348	3.160
			(0.400)***	(0.438)***
State power change			-0.833	-0.788
			(0.217)***	(0.931)
Membership duration in IO	0.539	-0.042	-0.547	0.252
	(0.385)	(0.281)	(0.325)*	(0.535)
IO size	-0.221	-0.439	-0.618	-0.661
	(0.235)	(0.208)**	(0.199)***	(0.311)**
Domestic political backsliding	0.319			0.267
	(0.336)			(0.479)
IO withdrawal clause		0.393		0.399
		(0.383)		(0.420)
State power			-1.967	1.545
			(2.255)	(3.859)
Observations	207830	338942	418898	152158
AIC	1457.697	2622.767	2655.240	976.474
BIC	1560.142	2740.837	2764.694	1165.195

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Logit

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.058			0.063
	(0.029)**			(0.025)**
Government orientation change	0.298			0.521
	(0.270)			(0.301)*
Nationalist	0.066			-0.603
	(0.467)			(0.619)
IO institutionalization		0.033		-0.190
		(0.273)		(0.334)
IO average democracy score		-0.019		-0.093
		(0.035)		(0.039)**
IO issue area politics		-0.078		-0.664
		(0.459)		(0.688)
IO issue area economics		0.373		0.543
		(0.416)		(0.435)
Preference diversion from IO average			0.947	1.154
			(0.153)***	(0.207)***
Contagion			3.254	3.016
			(0.400)***	(0.438)***
State power change			-0.620	-0.915
			(0.144)***	(0.930)
Membership duration in IO	0.482	-0.097	-0.559	0.125
	(0.385)	(0.286)	(0.323)*	(0.568)
IO size	-0.222	-0.409	-0.606	-0.634
	(0.234)	(0.218)*	(0.192)***	(0.317)**
Observations	207830	338942	418898	152158
AIC	1456.37	2625.54	2654.14	972.50
BIC	1548.57	2732.88	2752.65	1131.42

Note: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Clustering Standard Errors on Countries

	(1) Domestic	(2) IGO	(3) Geopolitics	(4) All
Democracy	0.056			0.060
	(0.027)**			(0.027)**
Government orientation change	0.333			0.553
	(0.316)			(0.413)
Nationalist	0.090			-0.496
	(0.262)			(0.503)
IO institutionalization		0.035		-0.180
		(0.121)		(0.174)
IO average democracy score		-0.019		-0.093
		(0.020)		(0.029)***
IO issue area politics		-0.063		-0.542
		(0.243)		(0.672)
IO issue area economics		0.365		0.511
		(0.196)*		(0.285)*
Preference diversion from IO average			0.950	1.175
			(0.121)***	(0.131)***
Contagion			3.348	3.166
			(0.472)***	(0.584)***
State power change			-0.701	-0.911
			(0.255)***	(0.364)**
Membership duration in IO	0.543	-0.074	-0.536	0.199
	(0.543)	(0.198)	(0.271)**	(0.588)
IO size	-0.223	-0.412	-0.606	-0.645
	(0.102)**	(0.083)***	(0.082)***	(0.142)***
Observations	207830	338942	418898	152158
AIC	1456.366	2625.544	2654.137	972.498
BIC	1548.566	2732.880	2752.645	1131.421

Note: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Details on Original Data Collection:

IGO Membership Withdrawal (Dependent Variable)

Methodology and Sources

We collected an original dataset of all IGO withdrawals in the set of active IGOs in the Correlates of War data from 1946 to 2018. The COW data contain 493 IGOs in that period, but we only evaluate active IGOs which we define as having a website or internet presence. This set of 308 active IGOs provides the basis for our sample.

Our dataset includes information that is uniform across all IGOs: actual withdrawals, which are announced publicly either through the IGO (e.g. website, press releases), through the news media, by a state government, or available through inquiries to the IGO (e.g. by email). The withdrawal must follow the correct procedures as outlined in the IGOs charter or other documents including the state issuing an official announcement and any relevant waiting period.

For each IGO in our universe of 308 organizations, we used the Factiva database to search historical newspaper accounts that included both an IGO name and the word "withdr*". We also included searches using similar terminology to "withdrawal" including "exit" and "terminated membership." We used both the full IGO name as well as its acronym as search terms in the Factiva database. Our search produced many extraneous accounts, especially when the term "withdr" was not used to refer to membership withdrawal but instead to refer to other topics like "withdrawing troops," "withdrawing funding," or "withdrawing aid" etc. We did not include these instances in our dataset. After reading the relevant portion of over 50,000 articles, we documented each unique occurrence of an IGO membership withdrawal (because as one would expect, a single withdrawal often resulted in several articles from different newspapers on the same instance).

We supplemented the Factiva research by scraping each IGO's website for mentions of

withdrawals that occasionally added new records to the dataset. Most IGOs record membership information on their website including details on how the membership has fluctuated over time; sometimes this information could be found in an organizational history section for the IGO. We also supplemented the Factiva research with news articles, general internet and library searches, academic journals as well as the following sources:

- The White House Office of Records Management Subject Files: International Organizations (IT) (through the Ronal Reagan Presidential Library)
- US Congressional reports including Congressional Research Service documents
- CIA memos, including those that are declassified, and those readily available via Wikileaks

Last, a team of research assistants reached out individually via email to each IGO to obtain any supplemental or clarification information. In sum, we documented the IGO, the country that withdrew, the start and end date (if applicable) of the withdrawal, detailed information about the withdrawal including source documents, and the reason for withdrawal. We use information about the reason for withdrawal to assemble Table 1.

We code an IGO-member state-year as 1 in withdrawal announce years, and 0 otherwise. For example, the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries-Indonesia-2008 is coded "1" whereas Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries-Indonesia for years prior to withdrawal are coded "0" (as that was the first and only instance of Indonesia withdrawing from OPEC). Years after withdrawal are coded missing (omitted) until the year that the state joins again (withdrawal coded 0).

There are two potential weaknesses of the data. First, our data collection efforts largely rely on public announcements of IGO withdrawals. While a case can be made for most of these instances to be public (since countries usually have to submit a written statement for withdrawal), some withdrawals may go under the radar if the country or IGO prefers not to draw attention to the withdrawal. That said, over the 100 year period for which we

document withdrawals, we have not come across any cases which were covert at the time and later revealed (through Wikileaks, for example). This increases our confidence in the comprehensiveness of the data.

Second, we are less confident about records and data quality prior to the start of WW2. This is not an issue for our paper's analysis given that we only analyze records after 1945 because of the availability of control variables. Still, we record all the pre-1945 cases (for example from the League of Nations) that we can find to maximize comprehensiveness and understand trends over time.

Variables

Country_name

- Name of the exiting state
- Only includes states with valid COW codes. As a result, we do not include, for example, the following:
  - Taiwan's withdrawals (It was an Interpol member as the Republic of China until 1984, when it was replaced by the People's Republic of China. Taiwan was offered an option to continue as China's sub-bureau under the name "Taiwan, China" but as this could imply that Taiwan was part of the People's Republic of China, it refused and withdrew from the organization.) [link]
  - Hong Kong withdrew from the Asian Productivity Organization in 1997 [link]
  - Greenland withdrew from the European Economic Community in 1985 [link]

IGO_long

- Name of the IGO from which a state has exited
- Only includes IGOs with valid COW codes (informal IGOs, for example, are not included)
  - We do not count as a withdrawal when a state announces a withdrawal but the

IGO has not yet officially started. For example, in 2001, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright submitted an official withdrawal announcement from the Organization of Vine and Wines (OIV), but even though the OIV agreement was created in 2001, the organization did not go into effect until 2004 [link]

  - Emanations and various UN specialized agencies that are not considered independent IGOs are not listed but recorded separately. Examples:
    * Colombia withdrew from UNASUR but UNASUR is not in COW [link]
    * US withdrew from UNHRC [link], Paris Climate Accord [link], Iran Nuclear Deal [link] but these are not formal IGOs in COW
    * Venezuela withdrew from Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2012 (which is not a formal IGO in COW) [link]

- In a correction from the COW IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2019), we do include several withdrawals even though the COW dataset does not have the countries listed as being members of the formal IGO. These are only included after thorough documentation. For example, China, Liberia, Lebanon, and Syria all withdrew from the GATT in the first five years of its existence, according to official WTO documents [link], though these countries are not listed as founding members of the GATT according to COW data.

IGO_short

- Acronym of the IGO according to COW

IGO_num

- Unique IGO number according to COW

Withdrawal

- Coded 1 when a state makes a unilateral decision to fully end membership in an IO,

and 0 otherwise.

- Successful withdrawal requires the correct procedure for withdrawal in the IO, if one exists. For example, the Chapter VI of the African Development Bank, Article 43 states "1. Any member may withdraw from the Bank at any time by transmitting a notice in writing to the Bank at its principal office. 2. Withdrawal by a member shall become effective on the date specified in its notice but in no event less than six months after the date that notice has been received by the Bank." [link]
- Our dataset only counts actual withdrawals. To ensure consistency with the standard definition of withdrawal (see above) and avoid conceptual stretching, the dataset omits the following which fall short of membership withdrawal:
  - States not following the correct withdrawal protocol: We do not count as a withdrawal when states say they are withdrawing from an IGO but do not follow the correct protocol as the withdrawal is not official.
    - For example, in 1965, Indonesia was the first member to attempt to withdraw from the UN, due to a feud with the new Federation of Malaysia. [link] It announced that it would withdraw from the UN if Malaysia were to take a seat on the Security Council. Three weeks later, Indonesia officially confirmed its withdrawal in a letter to the Secretary-General, who merely noted the decision and expressed hope that Indonesia would soon "resume full cooperation" with the organization. After a coup later that year, Indonesia sent a telegram to the Secretary-General saying the country would "resume full cooperation with the UN and [...] resume participation in its activities." Pointing to the telegram as proof that Indonesia saw its absence from the UN as a "cessation of cooperation" rather than a true withdrawal, the General Assembly's president recommended that the administrative procedure for reinstating Indonesia be taken with a minimum of fuss. No objections were raised, and Indonesia immediately resumed its place in the General Assembly. Thus, the

UN treated this case as if it had not been a withdrawal at all, and we follow suit.

- States that threaten to withdraw but do not follow through: We do not count as a withdrawal when a state threatens to withdraw from the IGO but does not follow through with the correct protocol.
  - For example, the United Kingdom threatened to withdraw from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2011 after an internal review "found the organization wanting" but it did not follow through on the threat [link]
- States lowering participation: We do not count as a withdrawal when countries lowered their participation (for example by withholding funding, failing to send representatives to meetings, etc).
  - For example, Venezuela announced in 2007 that it was quitting the IMF and has not had formal engagement since, but did not follow any protocol to officially withdraw. The IMF has retained Venezuela's voting rights [link]
- IGOs not knowing which representative to seat: We do not count as a withdrawal when an IGO does not know which government to seat. This is covered under rejection of credentials.
  - For example, during the Khmer Rouge, the Non Aligned Movement did not know which government from Cambodia to seat [link]
- States renouncing membership: We do not count as a withdrawal when states passively renounce membership. ICCROM Statute Article 10 declares, "A Member State shall be deemed to have renounced its membership if it has omitted to pay its contributions that have fallen due during four consecutive calendar years." This is a very passive act. We therefore consider this a case of "renouncing membership" rather than submitting notice and withdrawing. In fact, there may be many cases of countries that just do this (and some organizations may not keep documentation). "Renouncing membership" should be studied separately as a

withdrawal of funding [link]

- States leaving due to IO death at the same time or successor organization creation: We do not count as a withdrawal when states are "forced" to withdraw because the organization is dissolving.
  - For example, ICNWAF starts to dissolve; becomes a new IO named NAFO by 1979. "The Special Meeting adopted a resolution recommending that all Members of ICNAF withdraw from the Commission effective 31 December 1979, in accordance with Convention Article XVI, thereby terminating ICNAF" [link]
- States leaving due to IO membership upgrade: We do not count as a withdrawal when a country had to withdraw because it joined an organization like the EU which would get its own membership. Because this is not a unilateral move, we do not evaluate it as a "withdrawal" here but we document it as a different kind of membership exit.
  - For example, a meeting of the Standing Committee at the International Cotton Advisory Committee, which occurred at the end of the 74th Plenary, has approved rule changes which will allow the European Union (EU) to become a member, which will lead to an expected withdrawal of individual memberships from countries which belong to the EU [link]
  - Also, the individual Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) had to cease membership in NEAFC, but we code this as a separate kind of exit. From 1990 the interests of the former German Democratic Republic are covered by the EU; Sweden and Finland acceded to the European Union in January 1995 and at the same time discontinued their membership of the Commission; Poland and Estonia acceded to the European Union in 2005 and discontinued their membership of the Commission in 2006 [link]

- We do not count as a withdrawal (and record separately) when

- States withdrew from one IO because it became a member of an IO (like the EU) that now has its own membership.
- States left without being a full member:
  - We do not count as a withdrawal when a state announces a withdrawal but it has not yet ratified the agreement underlying the IGO (because it was not officially a member yet). For example, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Rome Statute, underlying the International Criminal Court (ICC), but it was not yet officially a member of the ICC because the US Congress had yet to ratify the agreement.
  - We do not count withdrawal of associate or observer membership. For example, Ukraine withdrew its associate membership in 2018 from CIS [link]

Year

- Calendar year
- For withdrawals, we note this variable is the announce year as explained in the paper. There is usually a waiting period following the announcement for the withdrawal to become official.

General Reason

This variable categorizes exit reasons based on the narrative in source documents. These categories were developed inductively after assessing the historical record. In order to code the public reason for withdrawal, we searched online for and read the following:

- The official withdrawal letter/statement issued by the government to the IGO
- Government-issued press releases around the time the withdrawal was announced
- Government statements/interviews related to the withdrawal
- Journal articles and books analyzing the withdrawal
- Newspaper articles related to the withdrawal

After reading these documents, we inductively created the following categories, and coded

the set of withdrawals into one of the categories detailed below.

We gave priority to primary source documents in the order listed above. When these were not available, we noted the reason for withdrawal from an experts analysis. Still, there were several cases when we had to mark the reason as "unclear," though we tried to limit these cases for grouping purposes.

Mutually exclusive groupings are inherently difficult. Sometimes an IGO/state cited several reasons for exit. When that was the case, we tried to read multiple articles and find common reasoning. Alternatively, we took the first cited reason if there was a laundry list in the official letter/announcement. Also, some of the "general reason" groups are very similar at times:

- Pre-emptive could be similar to domestic politics shifts
- Cost and Dissatisfaction often go hand-in-hand
- Some "overlapping IOs" are not just about the EU being created (but feeling like another IO can handle things better)
- A "change in domestic politics" can sometimes be linked to "internal IO politics." See Cuba & the IMF/WB for example [link]
- The "no longer wanted to comply" is not always nefarious; sometimes because of functional reasons (i.e. the country no longer produced enough oil to make the limitations make sense). See Tunisia and OAPEC for example [link]
- Internal IO politics can sometimes be similar to "no longer wanting to comply." See Chile & the Andean Pact. [link] As mentioned above, at times, analysis showed that while one reason was stated in official documents, another might be the "real" cause. See USSR withdrawing from WHO for example. [link] In this case, we took the official cause, so political reasons [link] are probably under-documented in this dataset (but may be revealed by statistical analysis).

We provide the following additional examples from our coding:

- Overreach/sovereignty: State claimed that the IO has over-extended its mandate and

has encroached on sovereign, internal affairs. Examples:

  - Gambia withdrew from the Commonwealth in 2013 [link] calling it a "neo-colonial institution" after it accused the UK of interfering in its elections and backing the political opposition.
  - Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968 [link] saying that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia violated international law and the Warsaw Pact's principle of noninterference in internal affairs.
  - South Africa withdrew from UNESCO in 1955 [link] on the grounds that some UNESCO publications on race relations constituted an intervention in the internal affairs of a member state.

- Domestic politics: This includes a shift in domestic sentiment at home which is usually signified by a new political leader or the growing power of a vocal group that dislikes IO membership. These withdrawals often come after elections (looking at IO withdrawal as fulfilling a mandate/campaign promise), or following a significant policy change at home. Examples:
  - Turkey withdrew from the Council of Europe in 1981 following a military coup. [link]
  - Cuba withdrew from the IMF in 1964 after the early 1960's [link] process of converting the island into a communist state had disrupted both its internal organization and its economic relations with the Western world.
  - Iran withdrew from CENTO (The Central Treaty Organization) in 1979 [link] after the Iranian revolution led to the overthrow of the shah.
- Cost: This includes cases where the country states that it cannot pay the membership fees (and it wants out, rather than re-negotiating a new budgetary contribution) or that the organization's benefits no longer outweigh its costs. Examples:
  - Ireland withdrew from the International Organization for Wine and Vine in 2011 [link] saying the cutback was part of a cost-saving measure and part of the de-

partment's expenditure review.

  - Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Canada, Portugal and Slovakia withdrew from the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) between 1993-2017 citing a cash crunch. [link]
  - Seychelles withdrew from the Southern African Development Community in 2004 [link] stating that it could not meet its monetary obligations to the body, while the body's numerous meetings had also taken a toll on the different ministers who had to attend.

- Dissatisfaction: This includes cases where the withdrawing state states that the IO is not performing up to par (particularly after a sustained effort at improvement), is bogged down in bureaucracy, or does not do what is set out in its mandate. Examples:
  - The United Kingdom withdrew from UNESCO in 1985 [link] following the lead of the United States because, it said "the 160-nation organization is inefficient, spendthrift and "harmfully politicized."
  - A set of countries including Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia withdrew from the International Tin Association in 1997 on the grounds that its activities had ceased to be effective in maintaining price levels favorable to tin-producers. [link]
  - Between 1949-1950, a set of Communist countries including Ukraine, Belarus, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania all withdrew from the World Health Organization [link] because they were "not satisfied with the work of the WHO. Tasks connected with international measures for prevention and control of diseases and with the spread of medical science achievements are not being accomplished by the Organization satisfactorily."
- Internal politics in IO: This includes cases where the member state believes that polarization/politicization within the IO is preventing the IO from working beneficially. Examples:

  - Argentina withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement in 1991 stating that "Argentina can't belong to a movement that doesn't respect human rights, freedom of the press or political pluralism." [link] It also said the group had no reason to exist following the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower.
  - In 1975, the USA withdrew from the ILO [link] citing four reasons including some labor groups being dominated by their governments, selective concern for human rights and double standards, a trend to disregard due process toward politically targeted states, and increasing and excessive politicization of the IO.
  - A number of countries including Brazil, Japan, Germany, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Italy, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Spain, Hungary, Romania, and Haiti, all withdrew from the League of Nations [link] due to internal politics between the two World Wars.
- Obsolete: This includes cases where the member state argues the IO has achieved the mandate it set out to do and that the IO is no longer needed. Examples:
  - Canada withdrew from the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission in 1984 [link] when the Canadian purse seine fleet ceased to exist.
  - Canada withdrew from the International Organization for Migration in 1962 [link] because it felt that the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), as it was then called, had been established as a temporary organization and that its main purpose – to bring under control the refugee problem that had emerged following World War II – had been achieved.
- Noncompliance: This includes instances when the state no longer thinks the terms of the IO make sense – either because circumstances have changed in the issue area or within the member state. Examples:
  - North Korea withdrew from the IAEA in 1994 [link] stating that it was no longer obliged to allow the inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards Agreement.

  - In May 2008, Indonesia announced that it would leave OPEC [link] when its membership expired at the end of that year, having become a net importer of oil and being unable to meet its production quota.
  - In 1978, Mexico withdrew from the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission [link] "in large part due to disagreements over conservation measures adopted by the commission." Mexico said it would suspend its participation in a year-old international agreement to hold down dolphin kills.
- Overlapping institutions: This includes cases where the member state believes it to be inefficient to belong to two organizations that accomplish a similar task, or that because of membership in another IO that it must withdraw. Examples:
  - In 2007, Rwanda withdrew from the Economic Community of Central African States. [link]in favor of reinforcing its current memberships to the EAC and COMESA.
  - In 1997, Lesotho and Mozambique withdrew membership in COMESA [link] due to concerns that it could be incompatible with SADC membership.
- Pre-emptive to avoid punishments: This includes instances when the IO has warned (either implicitly or explicitly) that the country may face suspension to punish them for actions such as political backsliding, racist policies/apartheid, etc. Examples:
  - In 2018, the Philippines withdrew from the International Criminal Court [link] pointing to "the well-orchestrated campaign to mislead the international community, to crucify President Duterte and the Philippines by distorting the human rights situation in the country... The attempt to place me under the jurisdiction of the ICC is (a) brazen display of ignorance of the law. The ICC has no jurisdiction nor will I acquire jurisdiction over my person," Mr. Duterte's statement said. [link]
  - In 2016, the Maldives withdrew from the Commonwealth [link] after the IO talked about potential of suspension/other sanctions for non-democratic behavior. The

Maldives said this was unfair/unjust.

  - South Africa withdrew from both the ILO and FAO in 1964 [link] to preempt ostracism and sanctions due to apartheid.

- Status of another member state: This includes a state withdrawing to protect an ally (i.e. it does not like the IO's policies toward a particular state) or standing up against an enemy that is arguably receiving "special" treatment within the IO. Examples:
  - In 2018, the USA withdrew from UNESCO, noting "anti-Israel bias" [link] and "the need for fundamental reform" within the organization.
  - Morocco withdrew from the Organisation of African Unity in 1984 [link] after the OAU granted membership to the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic set up by the independence movement in the disputed territory of Western Sahara.
  - Indonesia withdrew from a number of organizations including the FAO, ILO, and UNESCO in 1965 [link] in furtherance of a dispute stemming from the election of Malaysia to a seat on the Security Council.
- War: This includes cases where war (such as WWII, the Cold War) have created dynamics within the IO that are inimical to its functioning. Examples:
  - Tajikistan during its civil war withdrew from the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, [link] a state of affairs that lasted until 1998 (the war's end).
  - Georgia withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2008 (finalized 2009) following its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. [link]
  - The international crises preceding the Second World War, and the war itself, caused the withdrawal from the ILO of Germany (1935), Italy (1939), Japan (1940), Spain (1941), Romania (1942), and six Latin American countries. [link]
- Unclear: no stated reason can be verified to document why the state has withdrawn from the IO.