Online Appendix for:

"Does State Repression Spark Protests? Evidence from Secret Police Surveillance in Communist Poland"

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Online Appendix

A.1 Historical Background

To explore the effect of physical surveillance on resistance, we draw on evidence from Communist Poland (1947 to 1989). Following World War II, the Soviet Union imposed a Marxist-Leninist government in Poland, called the Polish People's Republic (henceforth, PPR). The PPR was a single party system in which the Polish United Workers' Party was the dominant political force. While the country had more liberal policies than other countries in the Eastern Bloc, economic hardship was commonplace. Life in the PPR represented a constant struggle to make ends meet, and over the years Poles grew increasingly frustrated with the regime.

Resistance against the malfunctioning command economy and corrupt elites began early. Shirking was a common occurrence in state firms. Workers drank alcohol during worktime to celebrate colleagues' "birthdays," which often resulted in non-trivial damages and production outages. A common worker's saying was: "you pretend to pay us, we pretend to work" (*"udajecie, że płacicie, my udajemy, że pracujemy"*). In rural areas, farmers underreported their harvest in order to supplement scarce food ratios with appropriated produce. In cities, workers used their access to state machineries to do private side jobs.

To avert open resistance, in 1944 the Polish regime established the Department of Security (Urząd Bezpieczeństa, henceforth UB[1])—a secret police and espionage service. Its core objective was to expunge any anti-communist elements. The UB created an extensive infiltration and surveillance network comparable to the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). The surveillance network was spearheaded by secret police officers who coordinated all regime agents and informants (Dubiański et al., 2009, 9). The regime hired the majority of its officers from eastern territories—which had been incorporated into Poland after World War II—so as to ensure that the agents had no loyalty to Polish communities (Dziuba and Dziurok, 2009).

The secret police monitored reactionary underground organizations and identified individuals within parties and organizations who opposed the regime (Dubiański et al., 2009). To this end, secret police agents surveilled points of interest, followed suspected individuals, and read citizens' correspondence. Undercover agents also infiltrated and surveilled industrial sites, political parties as well as various transportation and communication firms. To further expand its surveillance capacity, the secret police hired an extensive network of informants who reported on neighbors and work colleagues.

One noteworthy method of surveillance was the corruption of Catholic priests. As we elaborate in "Instrumental Variable" section in the main text, the early days of the regime saw the secret police systematically corrupt Catholic priests using compromising information (*Kompromat*) agents had gathered. Once corrupted, the priests turned out to be a particularly effective mechanism to surveil citizens. Thanks to privileged

[1]In 1956, the UB was rebranded as Służba Bezpieczeństa (SB), which coincided with other destalinization efforts across Poland.

access to parishioners' households, the priests were able to monitor whether farmers stole or underreported agriculture produce. Corrupted priests collected information on parishioners during confessions and shared it with the secret police. The regime then used this information to blackmail citizens and turn them into new spies.

On paper, surveillance in the PPR was conducted in secret. In reality, however, citizens were acutely aware of the regime's espionage activities. In some cases, citizens were confronted with compromising information and later told friends and family about it. In other cases, the regime inadvertently revealed its activities. In one example from our case, Upper Silesia, the secret police had intended to wiretap a university professor in the city of Wrocław, but accidentally entered the flat of a neighbor (Kamiński, 2003, 185). More commonly, citizens learned about surveillance through rumors of photos being taken from hiding, which made their way into the public. Knowledge about surveillance was so widespread that even the First Secretary of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, suspected that he was spied on.

Despite the extensive surveillance measures, Polish citizens did not cease to resist. Large-scale protests began as early as the mid-1950s. Regular changes to production quotas meant that industrial workers saw their incomes dwindle. In 1956 workers in the city of Poznań organized a strike and demanded compensation. Within a few hours, up to 100,000 people joined the workers, turning the strike into a full-fledged uprising. It was not until the government deployed 10,000 troops that the protesters began to disperse. Similar protests took place in 1970 when a sudden increase in food prices led citizens to rise against the regime in a number of coastal cities. Again, the regime reacted with brute force, killing dozens of protesters.

In the early 1980s, protests organized by workers of state firms—sparked, again, by changes to quotas and prices—led to the creation of NSZZ Solidarność, the first independent trade union in Communist Poland. Solidarność created a broad, non-violent, anti-communist social movement, involving over nine million individuals (Kamiński and Waligóra, 2010, vol. 2). The PPR's authorities attempted to counter the movement and declared martial law in 1981. The following years saw bitter fights. The regime was ultimately forced to negotiate with the opposition and agreed to hold (semi-)free elections in 1989. A Solidarność-led coalition won by a large margin, paving the way to Poland's democratic transformation.

Were the regime's extensive surveillance measures successful in muting popular protests and curtailing sabotage? Or was surveillance the cause that led individuals to take to the streets? Given pronounced geographical variation in surveillance, sabotage and protests, Communist Poland is a highly relevant case to study the interplay of surveillance and resistance. The fact that the PPR deployed officers to some, but not other municipalities, creates variation in surveillance. What is more, recently published historic data on Solidarność protests allow us to construct detailed measures of protest behavior. Finally, Poland's command economy created a variety of individual opportunities to sabotage the regime.

Table A1: Summary statistics

		Min	*Max*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Time*
1	Strikes	0	23	0	0.93122	1980 - 86
2	Subbotnik (zl)	0	40500	1877	4299.73607	1975 - 79
3	Officers	0	116	1	5.42331	1945 - 89
4	Corrupted priests	0	7	0	0.82124	1949 - 56
5	Cinemas	0	22	2	2.57761	1975
6	Coal (t)	0	74354288	4264143	11970900.04774	1975
7	Ethnicity (frac.)	0	1	0	0.16097	1948
8	Minerals (%)	0	1	0	0.43259	2005
9	Population	1026	350360	20179	39623.57508	1975
10	Restaurants	0	202	16	25.34483	1975
11	Russian	0	1	0	0.39121	1975
12	Schools	1	54	7	7.64492	1975
13	Shops	20	1734	193	300.60665	1975
14	Income (zl)	72	25024	4189	5018.25723	1976 - 77
15	Coal mines	0	10	0	1.28852	1975 - 86
16	Solidarnosc Delegates	0	6	0	0.56284	1981 - 86
17	Protests 1940s	0	8	0	0.80922	1946 - 48
18	Sabotage 1940s	0	6	0	0.50514	1946 - 48
19	Terror 1940s	0	3	0	0.28037	1946 - 48

Notes: All variables are given as counts, except otherwise indicated.

A.2 Information on strikes

The purpose of the 1980–1986 strikes were manifold. Initially protesters demanded higher wages and improvements in terms of work security. In some cases, they also protested against the unjustified dismissal of colleagues. Gradually, however, the protesters' demands took a more political form. After December 1981, the protests revolved around the introduction of martial law, which many citizens deemed unlawful insofar as it was imposed by the Soviet Union. Protesters demanded early elections and insisted on the introduction of the five-day working week ("strajk o wolne soboty"). Protesters also requested that key communist party members be removed from office, underlining the political nature of the protests. Most of the recorded strikes were organized by Inter-Company Strike Committees (*Międzyzakładowe Komitety Strajkowe*). These committees gathered employees of various companies in the mining, transportation, automobile, metallurgical, chemical, agricultural and construction sectors, to name a few. Employees of local universities—such as the University of Silesia in Katowice—also participated in the strikes. So did members of religious associations and workers of the state retail chain *Społem*. The population of protesters was thus highly heterogeneous.

Table A2: Secret police officers and UB personnel

	UB personnel	**UB personnel**
	(1)	(2)
Secret police officers	0.236^{***}	0.052^{***}
	(0.036)	(0.024)
Time FEs	Yes	Yes
Unit FEs	No	Yes
N	195	194

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the size of the overall secret police personnel on the number of secret police officers. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables are standardized.

Table A3: Effect of surveillance on resistance (two-way fixed-effects panel; lags specification)

	Protests								**Sabotage**			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Surveillance	0.063***	0.071***	0.152***	0.152***	0.063***	0.070***	0.063***	0.070***	−0.064***	−0.064***	−0.065***	−0.065***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Lags	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Locality FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
N	2,078	2,077	2,078	2,077	2,078	2,077	2,078	2,077	450	449	450	449
Adjusted R^2	0.265	0.288	−0.030	0.085	0.266	0.286	0.266	0.286	0.295	0.295	0.294	0.294

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers in a given municipality across all available years (see Table A1). Standard errors are given in parentheses. The outcomes are standardized. The models include one or two-period lags for the outcome. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A.3 Robustness

In the main text, we presented panel and IV models. In this section, we report additional models.

A.3.1 Cross-sectional model (OLS)

We begin by analyzing the cross-sectional correlation between the number of secret police officers and the two resistance measures—protests and sabotage. Specifically, we collapse the time-series data at the municipality-level and estimate the following linear model using OLS: $\text{Resistance}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Surveillance}_i + \varepsilon_i$. Where Resistance_i represents the average i) number of protests or ii) level of sabotage in municipality i across the time periods for which the two data sources are available. The variable Surveillance_i measures the average number of secret police officers in community i in the same respective periods. We standardize all outcome variables to ease interpretation.

Table A4: Correlation between surveillance and resistance (OLS)

	Protests	**Sabotage**
	(1)	(2)
Surveillance	0.076^{***}	-0.077^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.008)
Fixed effects	No	No
Controls	No	No
N	297	234
Adjusted R^2	0.400	0.297

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of secret police officers and the respective resistance outcome in any given municipality across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regression of protests and years 1975-79 for the regression of sabotage). Standard errors are given in parentheses. The outcomes are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

In Column 1 of Table A4, we report the coefficient for the repression variable and its accompanying standard error. The Table demonstrates that localities exposed to more secret police officers show substantially *more* protests. On average, any additional secret police officer is associated with an increase in protests by 0.15 SD. The correlation is sizable and statistically significant. At the same time, we find a *negative*

correlation between the presence of secret police officers and sabotage. Any additional officer is associated with a reduction in sabotage by 0.08 SD. Again, the coefficient is precisely estimated and substantively meaningful, suggesting that secret police officers have a pronounced effect on resistance.

A.3.2 Cross-sectional model (OLS; population-normalized)

Next, we estimate the same model, but normalize the number of agents by the population. As Table A5 shows, the results are virtually unchanged. If anything, they re slightly stronger and more precise.

Table A5: Correlation between surveillance and resistance (OLS; normalized)

	Protests	**Sabotage**
	(1)	(2)
Surveillance	0.721^{***}	-0.628^{***}
	(0.040)	(0.051)
Fixed effects	No	No
Controls	No	No
N	297	234
Adjusted R^2	0.518	0.391

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers, which is normalized by the population count per municipality. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of secret police officers and the respective resistance outcome in any given municipality across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regression of protests and years 1975-79 for the regression of sabotage). Standard errors are given in parentheses. The outcomes are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A.3.3 Controlling for confounders

Next, we control for potential confounders that jointly explain the deployment of secret police officers and the incidence of resistance. Based on a review of the historic literature, we distilled six plausible confounders at the community-level: wealth, state capacity, cultural diversity, colonial history, industrialization and grievances. We discuss each confounder in turn and introduce our measurement strategy (see Table A1 for an overview).

First, the regime may have targeted surveillance toward communities with greater levels of **wealth**. Such communities contributed more to the socialist economy; the

state therefore had an incentive to monitor them closely. At the same time, greater wealth also means that a community is better equipped to organize protests. Disparities in income can also be a potential source of grievances, as posited in the literature on civil war (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). In the socialist economy where, on paper, citizens were supposed to earn similar incomes across regions and industries differences in incomes presented a real source of grievance that might lead to dissent (Eckstein, 2004). To measure wealth, we use the number of shops, restaurants, and cinemas (combined to a standardized index), which are plausible proxies for *relative* economic prosperity. To tap into income disparities, we collected data on average wages (in Polish Złoty) using the *Główny Urząd Statystyczny* data. Unfortunately, this data is only available in the Katowickie region (in other regions, average wages are broken by economic sectors but not by localities).[2] Yet, the data is time-varying (1976–1977) and thus allows us to control for a potential time-varying confounder in our panel model.

Second, the regime may have targeted surveillance toward communities with higher levels of **state capacity**. Such communities provide the national government with more opportunities to intervene in local networks. At the same time, communities with greater state capacity may also see less resistance because citizens face fewer hardships and thus harbor fewer grievances against the regime. We measure local state capacity using the number of schools in a given locality.

Third, the regime may have targeted surveillance toward communities with greater **cultural diversity** given that diversity typically correlates with lower levels of trust, opening a pathway for spies to enter local communities. At the same time, greater cultural diversity has been shown to lower the capacity for collective action and organized protest (Charnysh, 2019). To measure cultural diversity, we use data from the Ministry for the Recovered Territories from December 1948 that indicates the number of people who migrated into Upper Silesia after World War II (see Charnysh, 2019). Based on this data we create a fractionalization index measured as the size of a distinct migrant group in a given area relative to the size of the other groups in this area.[3]

This measure, however, only captures diversity *within* the Polish community related to the presence of ethnic Poles who migrated to Upper Silesia from different areas of Poland. Yet, historically, Upper Silesia was a region with a large share of Jews. While relations between Jews and local Poles and Germans were relatively peaceful, there were tensions, including pogroms in the early 19th century. One cause of the tensions were grievances directed against Jews who were relatively wealthy due to the financing of the local industries, particularly mining. What is more, the ethnic tensions reignited after World War II when the Communist state promoted many Jews to prominent government positions (e.g. high-rank secret police officers) instead of choosing ethnic Poles (Dziuba and Dziurok, 2009). Importantly, this social conflict might

[2]We deal with the missing data by imputing "0s" to retain all the observations.

[3]Unfortunately, this data is only available for former German territories, which were incorporated into the Polish state after World War II and subsequently repopulated by Polish citizens. We therefore impute the lowest level of diversity for communities that did not experience these post-World War II population transfers.

have hindered local collective action against the regime, decreasing the authorities' need for tight community surveillance.

To capture the pre-treatment ethnic tensions, we gained access to the Prussian census from 1871 for the region of Upper Silesia. The 1871 census included detailed records on religion and education for over 3,500 municipalities (compared to 297 in our "modern", 1950+ data set). We digitized this data by hand and then constructed a shape file of the Prussia-Silesian municipality borders. Since there are no historic maps on Prussian municipality borders, we reconstructed the likely borders using Voronoi partitions. We then superimposed the historic shape file onto the "modern" shape file in order to aggregate the 1871 census data at the level of our municipalities. Unfortunately, Polish Upper Silesia and Prussian Upper Silesia do not fully overlap (Polish Upper Silesia is larger than Prussian Upper Silesia). Still, using our procedure, we were able to obtain historic covariates for 50% of our municipalities. Based on this data, we calculate the historic share of Jews in a given municipality. While the size of the Jewish community dramatically changed during the Holocaust (the largest Nazi concentration camp, Auschwitz–Oświęcim, was located in Upper Silesia), the variable still offers a reasonable proxy for underlying social tensions that might confound our findings.

Fourth, the regime may have targeted surveillance toward communities, which were formerly under Russian **occupation**. Russia had experience in governing these territories, which should have made it easier to deploy spies. At the same time, former Russian occupation may be associated with less capacity to organize protests due to so-called russification policies, which were intended to destroy Polish communities and identities (Kieniewicz, 1975).[4] To indicate whether a given municipality was formerly occupied by Russia, we digitized a historic map (based on Becker et al. 2014) and created an occupation dummy.

Fifth, the regime may have targeted communities with greater levels of **industrialization**, given that economic costs of non-compliance were particularly high in such areas. At the same time, industrialized communities may have been more likely to experience protests because the Solidarność trade union—the leading actor during strikes of the 1980s—was more present in these communities. To measure micro-level variation in industrialization, we use the presence of mineral deposits (such as zinc, lead, peat, or sulfur) in a given locality. Mineral-rich areas were the sites of industrial production, including the metallurgical industry

Sixth and most important, the regime may have targeted surveillance toward communities with pronounced **grievances**, given that these communities were most likely to voice dissent (Shadmehr, 2014). If this were the case, the observed correlation between surveillance and resistance could be a product of reverse causality. To measure micro-level variation in grievances, we use five variables:

a) First, we use a given locality's size of coal deposits. It is a well-known fact that mine workers in Upper Silesia faced the toughest working conditions, lack-

[4]In the late 18th century the Habsburg, Prussian, and Russian empires defeated Poland, dividing the conquered territory among themselves. While the Habsburgs and Prussians tolerated some cultural autonomy, the Russian Empire attempted to fully "russify" Poles (Kieniewicz, 1975).

ing in protective gear and adequate equipment. They were also the first to lament the dire health and safety situation in their workplaces, and the regime might have thus assumed that they had the strongest reasons to protest (Bortlik-Dźwierzyńska, 2009).

b) Our second measure for grievances related to the aforementioned rancour in the mining industry is the number of active mines in a municipality between 1975 and 1986. While arguably more endogenous, this measure addresses a legitimate concern that not all coal deposits were turned into mines. In the end, miners' grievances were only activated in areas with active coal mines. We collected the data on active mines using the historic Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej data.

c) Third, we use three direct measures of grievances against the Communist state by collecting data on i) protests, ii) sabotage, and iii) terrorist acts that took place in the early days of the regime (1946—1948). The data is based on secret police briefs from the 1940s (*Biuletyn Informacyjny Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*), which we digitized using archival records in the National Library in Warsaw. While the geographic variation is limited, the resultant variables allow us to tap into pre-surveillance protest behavior and associated grievances. All the three variables are measured as count variables.

In Table A6 we re-estimate the OLS model controlling for the six plausible confounders and population size. In addition, we also include fixed effects for the region (voivodship) in order to control for any macro-level confounders. The Table confirms that localities exposed to more secret police officers see greater levels of protests (+0.07 SD). We also confirm the negative correlation between the presence of secret police officers and sabotage. An additional secret police officer means communities are 0.05 SD less likely to engage in sabotage. Controlling for confounders thus does not change the substantive conclusions, while soaking up additional variance and making a causal interpretation of the estimates more plausible.

A.3.4 Geographic matching

Next, we take advantage of the fine-grained variation in repression and construct a micro-level geographic matching design. This allows us to create more suitable counterfactuals, and to control for a variety of potential (unobserved) confounders. Specifically, we match (without replacement) a given locality with secret police officers to the closest municipality without officers and then conduct paired t-tests. We should note that such a matching procedure is rather punishing because it selects a sample that is most likely to suffer from spillovers: a non-repressed community that borders a repressed one may also suffer from surveillance, which dilutes the treatment effect. Moreover, matching bordering communities also reduces the sample size significantly. Table A7 presents the results. Despite a much smaller sample size, we continue to estimate substantively similar coefficients. The presence of secret police officers—here coded as binary (any presence), not continuous—is associated with an increase in protests by 0.49 standard deviations. At the same time, repressed communities see sabotage decrease by 0.70 SD. To further minimize local-level differences between treated and un-treated municipalities, we also examined whether matches within a

Table A6: Effect of surveillance on resistance (OLS with controls)

	Protests	**Sabotage**
	(1)	(2)
Surveillance	0.034^{**}	-0.036^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.011)
Wealth	-0.506^{***}	0.254^{*}
	(0.108)	(0.137)
Income	0.005	−0.026
	(0.036)	(0.044)
State capacity	0.094	-0.327^{**}
	(0.129)	(0.160)
Ethnic diversity	-0.115^{***}	0.036
	(0.044)	(0.053)
Russian occupation	−0.006	−0.059
	(0.061)	(0.077)
Industrialization	−0.044	−0.034
	(0.050)	(0.064)
Grievances (coal)	0.020	−0.0004
	(0.038)	(0.048)
Grievances (mines)	-0.414^{***}	0.151
	(0.082)	(0.101)
Protests (40s)	0.051	−0.007
	(0.060)	(0.073)
Sabotage (40s)	-0.110^{*}	0.139^{*}
	(0.063)	(0.078)
Terror (40s)	−0.058	0.136^{**}
	(0.046)	(0.058)
Jews (1871)	−0.074	0.026
	(0.052)	(0.064)
Population	0.00004^{***}	-0.00002^{***}
	(0.00000)	(0.00001)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes
N	216	206
Adjusted R^2	0.580	0.569

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers in a given municipality. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of officers and the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regression of protests and years 1975-79 for the regression of sabotage). Standard errors are given in parentheses. All outcomes and control variables are standardized. Fixed effects refer to the region (voivodship). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

shorter kilometer radius produce different results (Columns 3 and 4 in Table A7). We do not find evidence for such heterogeneity, underlining the robustness of the matching procedure.

Table A7: Effect of surveillance on resistance (geographic matching)

	Protests	**Sabotage**	**Protests**	**Sabotage**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Surveillance	0.525^{***}	-0.706^{***}	0.533^{***}	-0.724^{***}
	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.114)
Surveillance x Distance			0.175	−0.082
			(0.129)	(0.126)
N	84	71	84	71
Adjusted R^2	−0.409	0.087	−0.381	0.071

Notes: OLS regressions of the indicated resistance outcome on a surveillance indicator (coded as "any secret police officer" in the corresponding time period). The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regressions of protests and years 1975-79 for the regressions of sabotage). The sample is restricted to bordering communities. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All outcomes are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A.3.5 Spatial models

Thus far, we have assumed that municipalities are independent. This assumption is partly based on the map in Figure 1 in the main text, which shows a noticeable absence of spatial autocorrelation. To test this more rigorously, we calculate Moran's I—a widely used measure for spatial autocorrelation—for both protests and sabotage. Reassuringly, there is no significant autocorrelation for strikes (bootstrapped p-value of 0.154). For the sabotage measure, however, we detect significant spatial autocorrelation (p-value of 0.001). If such spatial autocorrelation is present and not adjusted, it leads to incorrect estimates of coefficients and standard errors. To address this concern, Table A8 presents results from spatial error and lag models using a connectivity matrix based on adjacency. We find that coefficients are virtually unchanged when adjusting for spatial autocorrelation.

Table A8: Effect of surveillance on resistance (spatial models)

	Protests		**Sabotage**	
	spatial error	*spatial autoregressive*	*spatial error*	*spatial autoregressive*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Surveillance	0.019***	0.019***	−0.021***	−0.022***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No
N	341	341	341	341

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from spatial lag and spatial error regressions, respectively, of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regressions of protests and years 1975-79 for the regressions of sabotage). The surveillance variable measures the average number of secret police officers in the locality per year across the 1945-1986 period. In order to afford a connectivity matrix for the sabotage outcome (which has missingness), missing values are mean-imputed. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Fixed effects refer to the region (voivodship). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A9: Effective sample sizes for fixed effect regressions

	Protests	**Sabotage**
No FEs	2,079	1,485
Year FEs	1,188	451
Locality FEs	182	10

Notes: The Table shows the effective sample sizes that remains when adding the indicated fixed effects in the standard OLS model.

Table A10: Effect of surveillance on resistance (controlling for arrests)

	Protests	**Sabotage**
	(1)	(2)
Surveillance	0.288^{***}	-0.401^{***}
	(0.051)	(0.082)
Arrests	0.616^{***}	-0.441^{***}
	(0.050)	(0.097)
Fixed effects	No	No
Controls	No	No
N	297	234
Adjusted R^2	0.774	0.422

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers and the binary indicator of opposition figures' arrests in a locality. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regression of protests and years 1975-79 for the regression of sabotage). The surveillance variable measures the average number of secret police officers in the locality per year across the 1975-1986 period. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure A1: Randomization inference



Notes: The Figure plots the distribution of effect sizes when randomly assigning municipalities to secret police officers (drawn from the observed cases) and re-estimating the model presented in Table A6 (10,000 simulations). The red vertical line presents the actual observed estimate and the corresponding one-tailed RI p-value.

A.4 Census data

To access the 1871 census data, we proceeded as follows. The census includes over 3,500 municipalities in historic Upper Silesia (compared to 300 in "modern" Upper Silesia). We digitized this data by hand and then constructed a shape file of the Prussia-Silesian municipality borders. Since there are no historic maps on Prussian municipality borders, we reconstructed the likely borders using Voronoi partitions. We then superimposed the historic shape file onto the modern shape file in order to aggregate the 1871 census data at the level of our municipalities. Unfortunately, Polish Upper Silesia and Prussian Upper Silesia do not fully overlap (Polish Upper Silesia is larger than Prussian Upper Silesia). Still, using our procedure, we were able to obtain historic covariates for 50 percent of the 1950 municipalities.

A.5 IV assumptions

To use corrupted priests as an instrumental variable for surveillance, we assume the model shown in Figure 3 in the main text. Our key variable of interest is resistance, which is caused by surveillance. Surveillance and resistance, however, are arguably jointly predicted by prior grievances, to name one example for a potential confounder, which means the correlation between the two variables is not necessarily causal. Above, we have tried to rule out such confounding by including prior grievances as a control variable (Table A6) as well as by using a panel model, which controls for prior grievances (or any other community-level variable) by exploiting variation within communities. Yet, there may still be time-varying confounders, which we were unable to adjust for thus far.

To address this concern, we exploit the fact that the placement of Catholic priests—

who were then turned into spies—is arguably exogenous. As Figure 3 in the main text showcases, the only variable that determines whether a local community is assigned a *corruptible* priest (one that may later be corrupted, say, because he has an extramarital affair) is the Catholic Church. There is, in other words, no causal arrow—e.g., stemming from prior grievances or the local secret police—into corruptible priests. However, we do *not* observe whether a priest is corruptible, but whether priests were corrupted. A critic may therefore object that corrupted priests are not exogenous, but a function of whether there is a strong secret police presence in local communities or that the police is particularly motivated to corrupt priests because of prior grievances (hence, the solid arrows that lead into corrupted priests from the secret police).

To use corrupted priests as an instrumental variable for surveillance, we must therefore invoke five assumptions. In the main text, we focused on two particularly important assumptions: exogeneity and excludability. Below, we discuss the remaining three assumptions.

First stage Third, the IV setup requires a clear direct effect of the presence of corrupted priests on the subsequent number of secret police officers (*first stage*). To measure the number of corrupted priests in local municipalities, we use data provided by Żurek (2009). The data covers the entire Upper Silesia region from 1949 to 1956—the period when priests were actively corrupted. Note that this data is not a panel. Rather, the data set simply captures whether and, if so, how many corrupted priests were present during the period across all 297 localities. We confirm the first stage in Table A11. Using a regression of the number of spies on the number of corrupted priests, we uncover highly significant F-Statistics between 24.2 and 114.8. The correlation is robust to adjusting for the aforementioned confounders and to including region fixed effects.

Monotinicity and SUTVA Fourth, one must assume that there are no communities that somehow select into having a corrupt priest only when their priest was *not* corrupted (*monotinicity*). This assumption needs little justification. For one, communities cannot select into having a corrupted priest (priests are posted to municipalities by the church). Moreover, there are no compelling reasons to believe that communities should want to have a corrupt priest. Last, one must invoke the stable unit treatment value assumption (*SUTVA*). While we cannot rule out that having a corrupt priest in one community has an effect on resistance in another, such spillover likely dampens any treatment effect. What is more, we show below that the results are robust to explicitly adjusting for potential spatial autocorrelation (Table A12).

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A.6 IV robustness

A first robustness test addresses an additional concern about selection. In some instances, priests were reassigned to another congregation while already spying for the regime. The reassignment locations were determined by Church authorities, which did not know about priests' surveillance activities (had they known, the priests would have

Table A11: CORRECTED: Correlation between corrupted priests and secret police officers (first stage)

	Secret police officers					
	1975-1979			1980-1986		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corrupt priests	7.255***	5.877***	4.037***	4.411***	3.676***	4.037***
	(0.499)	(0.714)	(0.642)	(0.344)	(0.461)	(0.642)
Population			0.0001***			0.0001***
			(0.00003)			(0.00003)
Wealth		2.829***	1.825**		1.233***	1.825**
		(0.712)	(0.776)		(0.460)	(0.776)
Income			0.622**			0.622**
			(0.251)			(0.251)
State capacity		−1.560**	−2.804***		−0.369	−2.804***
		(0.751)	(0.884)		(0.485)	(0.884)
Ethnic diversity		−0.571	−0.494		−0.362	−0.494
		(0.357)	(0.306)		(0.231)	(0.306)
Russian occupation		0.011	−0.227		−0.011	−0.227
		(0.508)	(0.427)		(0.328)	(0.427)
Industrialization (old)		−0.557			−0.364	
		(0.379)			(0.245)	
Industrialization (new)			−0.197			−0.197
			(0.353)			(0.353)
Grievances (coal)			−0.330			−0.330
			(0.266)			(0.266)
Grievances (mines)			−2.633***			−2.633***
			(0.540)			(0.540)
Protests (40s)			−1.089**			−1.089**
			(0.423)			(0.423)
Sabotage (40s)			2.565***			2.565***
			(0.406)			(0.406)
Terror (40s)			−0.860***			−0.860***
			(0.317)			(0.317)
Jews (1871)			−0.842**			−0.842**
			(0.361)			(0.361)
Controls	No	Yes (old)	Yes (new)	No	Yes (old)	Yes (new)
Fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
N	297	216	216	297	216	216
Adjusted R^2	0.415	0.538	0.692	0.356	0.504	0.692

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the average number of secret police officers in the indicated time period on the number of corrupted priests. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All control variables are cross-sectional and refer to the period indicated in Table A1. Fixed effects refer to the region (voidvodship). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

been discharged or excommunicated). Focusing on such relocated corrupted priests thus alleviates concerns about endogeneity: While the regime could have potentially tried to compromise priests in disobedient parishes, it could not have determined to which community some corrupted priests would eventually be reassigned to by the Church. In Table A13, we therefore re-estimate the IV model using only relocated priests as an instrument. The Table shows that the baseline coefficients are similar to the benchmark IV model (columns 1 and 5). Again, we confirm that surveillance increased protests, while it decreased sabotage. Adding controls reduces the size of the estimated effect of surveillance on the protest outcome, making the resultant estimate insignificant (column 4). However, the effect on the sabotage outcome remains substantively unchanged (column 8).

In a second robustness test, we revisit the importance of compromising information. As was highlighted above, the Communist regime managed to corrupt priests whenever it had information about potential wrongdoings. This could be evidence for an affair as in Emanuel Grim's case, alcoholism as in Maksymilian Goszyc's case, or wartime Nazi collaboration as in Józef Miczka's case (detailed biographies of the three corrupted priests are provided in Section A.8). To corroborate the importance of compromising information, we digitized secret police documents (collected by Żurek 2009) that contain individual-level covariates for Catholic priests in Upper Silesia. Unfortunately, we only have this data for 57 priests—18 of which became spies. Based on this data we construct a dummy (*Kompromat*) indicating whether the secret police had compromising information. Not surprisingly, priests are 21.4 percentage points more likely to become spies when the government possessed compromising information. We then use the incidence of compromising information as an alternative instrument for surveillance, given that such information was plausibly exogenous. Table A14 re-estimates the reduced form IV model using compromising information as an instrument for surveillance.[5] The Table shows that the baseline coefficients are similar to the benchmark IV model (columns 1 and 5). Surveillance—instrumented with compromising information—is associated with an (insignificant) increase in protests and a decrease in sabotage. This conclusion is not confirmed once we add control variables (columns 4 and 8). Low statistical power, however, means that the uncertainty around the estimates is large.

A.7 Qualitative data

Own interviews Our interviewees include local Solidarność members and leaders, students from Silesian universities in 1970-80s, historians, politicians, workers, and managers of large industrial complexes. Interview protocol was structured so as to tap into the respondents' engagement in anti-regime opposition, following specific questions probing into the theorized mechanisms. All interviews included the same core questions and main probes. Nine interviews were carried out via email, while others were conducted in person or via phone. All interviewees granted their informed consent. The qualitative data collection was also approved by the Ethics Committee of the Collegio Carlo Alberto. Our subjects were promised confidentiality and therefore

[5]For priests where we have no biographical information, we assume no compromising information.

Table A12: Surveillance and resistance (IV; spatial autocorrelation adjustments)

	Protests		**Sabotge**	
	spatial error	*spatial autoregressive*	*spatial error*	*spatial autoregressive*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corrupted priests	0.467***	0.472***	−0.636***	−0.640***
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No
N	341	341	341	341

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from spatial lag and error regressions, respectively, of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of corrupted Catholic priests. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regressions of protests and years 1975-79 for the regressions of sabotage). In order to afford a connectivity matrix for the sabotage outcome (which has missingness), missing values are mean-imputed. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Fixed effects refer to the region (voivodship). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A13: CORRECTED: Surveillance and resistance (IV; relocated priests)

	Protests				Sabotage			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Commanders	0.121***	0.137***	0.049*	0.004	−0.116***	−0.112***	−0.076***	−0.068**
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.029)
Population			0.00002***	0.00004***				−0.00002**
			(0.00001)	(0.00001)				(0.00001)
Wealth			−0.654***	−0.472***			0.330**	0.359**
			(0.115)	(0.117)			(0.140)	(0.165)
Income				0.021				0.002
				(0.041)				(0.051)
State capacity			0.233	0.031			−0.790***	−0.451**
			(0.151)	(0.150)			(0.119)	(0.193)
Ethnic diversity			−0.074	−0.132***			−0.031	0.010
			(0.051)	(0.049)			(0.056)	(0.058)
Russian occupation			0.008	−0.012			−0.058	−0.063
			(0.065)	(0.062)			(0.079)	(0.079)
Industrialization (old)			−0.045				−0.018	
			(0.049)				(0.059)	
Industrialization (new)				−0.047				−0.036
				(0.051)				(0.065)
Grievances (coal)				0.015				−0.008
				(0.039)				(0.049)
Grievances (mines)				−0.475***				0.052
				(0.109)				(0.132)
Protests (40s)				0.040				−0.028
				(0.062)				(0.076)
Sabotage (40s)				−0.061				0.220**
				(0.085)				(0.105)
Terror (40s)				−0.084				0.086
				(0.055)				(0.073)
Jews (1871)				−0.095				−0.007
				(0.058)				(0.071)
Controls	No	Yes (old)	Yes (old)	Yes (new)	No	Yes (old)	Yes (old)	Yes (new)
Both stages	NA	No	Yes	Yes	NA	No	Yes	Yes
FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	297	216	216	216	234	206	206	206
Adjusted R^2	0.386	0.208	0.497	0.571	0.245	0.260	0.523	0.551

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated resistance outcomes on the number of secret police officers instrumented by the number of corrupted Catholic priests (focusing on relocated priests). The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of secret police officers and the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regressions of protests and years 1975-79 for the regressions of sabotage). All control variables are cross-sectional and refer to the period indicated in Table A1. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All outcomes and control variables are standardized. Fixed effects refer to voivodships.

Table A14: CORRECTED: Surveillance and resistance (IV with compromising information)

	Protests				Sabotage			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Commanders	0.044	0.148***	−0.011	−0.083	−0.068***	−0.115***	−0.027	−0.022
	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.076)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.048)
Population			0.00003***	0.00005***				−0.00002**
			(0.00001)	(0.00001)				(0.00001)
Wealth			−0.579***	−0.376**			0.052	0.208
			(0.132)	(0.150)			(0.210)	(0.206)
Income				0.065				−0.038
				(0.057)				(0.061)
State capacity			0.072	−0.149			−0.687***	−0.272
			(0.193)	(0.215)			(0.132)	(0.243)
Ethnic diversity			−0.126**	−0.180***			0.025	0.047
			(0.064)	(0.066)			(0.064)	(0.065)
Russian occupation			0.006	−0.030			−0.068	−0.057
			(0.069)	(0.072)			(0.079)	(0.078)
Industrialization (old)			−0.067				0.012	
			(0.054)				(0.061)	
Industrialization (new)				−0.055				−0.033
				(0.058)				(0.064)
Grievances (coal)				0.0002				0.003
				(0.046)				(0.049)
Grievances (mines)				−0.647***				0.194
				(0.177)				(0.177)
Protests (40s)				0.011				0.002
				(0.073)				(0.079)
Sabotage (40s)				0.078				0.103
				(0.140)				(0.143)
Terror (40s)				−0.158*				0.158*
				(0.083)				(0.094)
Jews (1871)				−0.154*				0.041
				(0.079)				(0.081)
Controls	No	Yes (old)	Yes (old)	Yes (new)	No	Yes (old)	Yes (old)	Yes (new)
Both stages	NA	No	Yes	Yes	NA	No	Yes	Yes
FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	297	216	216	216	234	206	206	206
Adjusted R^2	0.199	0.182	0.436	0.446	0.295	0.249	0.530	0.565

Notes: OLS regressions of the indicated resistance outcome on the number of secret police officers instrumented with *Kompromat* (compromising information with which Catholic priests were corrupted). Observations for which we lack Kompromat data are coded as 0. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of secret police officers and the respective resistance outcome in any given community across the time periods where outcome data are available (years 1980-86 for the regressions of protests and years 1975-79 for the regressions of sabotage). All control variables are cross-sectional and refer to the period indicated in Table A1. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All outcomes and control variables are standardized.

Table A15: Repression and resistance (falsification)

	Protests
	(1)
Distance to corrupted priests	−0.013
	(0.195)
Fixed effects	No
Controls	No
N	157
Adjusted R^2	−0.006

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of the average number of strikes per year between 1980 and 1986 in a municipality (scaled) on the municipality's distance in the bordering Lower Silesia region to the closest corrupted Catholic priest in Upper Silesia. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

their names were anonymized. We also ensured that our informants could not be identified by our descriptions of their circumstances or any specific details reported. We occasionally mention some dissidents by their name. This is an indication that we rely on published sources or that we use archival testimonies whose authors expressed their wish to be quoted by full name.

Testimonies We are grateful to Przemysław Miśkiewicz for sharing the archival testimonies with us. These individuals include local Solidarność members and leaders, students from Silesian universities, historians, politicians (including former ministers and leaders of the national government from Upper Silesia), workers, as well as managers of large industrial complexes. These testimonies are based on interviews conducted by Miśkiewicz and Jan Jurkiewicz between 2004 and 2005 for a book project on Solidarność in Upper Silesia (forthcoming). The interviews were conducted with prominent local dissidents and focus on their involvement in Solidarność and their experiences with repression, including surveillance.

A.8 Three biographies of corrupted priests

Józef Miczka was born in Mikulczyce in 1894. After finishing obligatory school in Poland, he migrated to Switzerland where he joined the Congregation of Missionaries of the Holy Family near Lucerne in 1911. His efforts to become a monk were interrupted by World War I. Miczka was conscripted into the army and sent to the frontline. After the war, Miczka could not return to his former congregation, and moved to

Ravengiersburg in Germany, where he obtained a degree in theology. Miczka returned to Poland and was ordained a priest in 1923. Between 1925 and 1931, he served as vicar in parishes in Załęż, Bielszowice, and Chorzów. In 1932, he passed a rector exam and took office in Jankowice, quickly becoming popular within the local community.

While in Jankowice, Miczka built a chapel in a legendary cave, *Studzienka*, where in 1419 a Polish priest escaping from the Hussites allegedly hid the Holy Sacrament. Miczka regularly gathered local believers in the cave for Sunday services. These services became so popular that people from neighboring parishes started to join. This generated conflict with other rectors in the area. After lengthy litigation, the Episcopate decided that Miczka's services in the cave were to be cut to only four meetings a year. This marked his first disappointment with Church authorities. Following the outbreak of World War II, Miczka was forced to abandon the parish in Jankowice and his newly built church. After the war, he was transferred to Łaziska Górne, where he served as parish administrator from 1946 to 1953. This marked his second disappointment.

Considering Miczka's political views, various sources point to the priest's sympathy towards Germans. He even offered refuge to a Nazi officer during the war, which at the time was considered a treacherous act in Poland. Unsurprisingly, the communist authorities exploited this information to blackmail Miczka and force him into collaboration with the secret police. In 1947, he became a regular collaborator and spied on his parishioners and other priests. He filed numerous reports against colleagues unwilling to collaborate (Żurek, 2009, 168, 171, 228) and encouraged German-speaking believers to support the communist party during Christmas radio messages (Żurek, 2009, 255). When official spy priest activities were abandoned in 1956, Miczka was removed from active service. The 1956 abolition of the program coincided with his retirement.

Maksymilian Goszyc was born in a peasant family in Żory in 1915. When he was 20, he joined the Silesian Theological Seminary in Kraków, where he obtained the lower priestly vows. In June 1939, he received his degree in theology from the Jagiellonian University. Yet, he was not able to complete his seminary studies due to the outbreak of World War II. In December 1939, he was arrested and sent to concentration camps in Sachsenhausen and Dachau. He was freed sixteen months later and enrolled at another theological seminary in Sankt Pölten in Austria. Before completing these studies, Goszyc returned to Silesia, where he was arrested, sentenced to forced labor, and subsequently conscripted into the Wehrmacht. While in the army, Goszyc tried to desert multiple times, for which he was eventually transferred to the Afrikacorps. In April 1943, he successfully escaped and reached Tarnowskie Góry using false documents.

After the war, Goszyc continued his seminary studies and received the full priestly vows in 1946. Yet, his early career was marked by regular conflicts with Church superiors. Goszyc condemned the Polish Episcopate and the Pope for their opposition to the removal of German bishops and administrators from former German territories. Given his wartime experiences, the priest nurtured hatred towards Germans and could not accept the Church's protection of German clergy. During his career, he worked in fourteen parishes—including Katowice—and served as chaplain of the Internal Security Corps regiment. At a personal level, Goszyc was a very ambitious man. Besides his priestly duties, Goszyc was also active politically, participating in

numerous demonstrations and rallies.

Yet, alcohol addiction constituted a serious obstacle on Goszyc's career. Due to alcohol abuse, the priest was many times hospitalized. This fact did not pass unobserved to the UB officers, who exploited Goszyc's addiction to force him into collaboration. As a result of multiple threats, Goszyc started spying on his parishioners and began actively recruiting other collaborators (Żurek, 2009, 119). He also took part in a campaign of discrediting the charity organization, *Caritas*, and publicly promoted the Soviet Union's proposal of nuclear disarmament—the so-called Stockholm Appeal—as well as other propaganda initiatives (Żurek, 2009, 237). When the communist authorities dissolved the UB, Goszyc was transferred to the diocesean (civilian) pastoral service and lost his rights to military pension. In the following years, he occupied subordinate positions in small Silesian parishes, working as substitute priest or vicar. Since 1961 until his retirement in 1987, Goszyc served as rector in Mysłowice.

Emanuel Grim was born in 1883 in Karwina and attended middle school in Cieszyn. During his youth, Grim participated in secret separatist organizations, such as the 'Ray and Unity' (*Promień i Jedność*). In 1904, he enrolled at theological seminary and received the priestly vows after four years of studies. Between 1908 and 1938, he worked in various Silesian parishes, including Istebna parish. As a priest, Grim was "very religious, attached to parishioners, but also tolerant and progressive" (IPN, 0648/145: 1, 19). He was a literary man and possessed an impressive library collection.

Before World War II, Grim held a seat in local parliament and closely collaborated with the province governor of Silesian voivodship, Michał Grażyński. According to the UB, Grim's cowardice made him easily coercible and thus exploited by whoever was in the power. On the one hand, he worked for nationalist parties, such as Christian Democrats and National Christian Labor Union. On the other hand, he allied himself with politicians supporting multi-ethnic Silesian society, such as Grażyński and other representatives of the 'Sanation' movement.

Following the outbreak of the war, Grim was first imprisoned in Cieszyn and then deported to the General Governorate—a German zone of occupation with Warsaw as a capital. Upon deportation, Grim's unique library collection was confiscated, and he could not return to Istebna until May 1945. After his return, he abandoned political engagement and fully dedicated himself to pastoral work and writing. Using various literary pseudonyms, he published theatrical dramas, collections of regional fairy tales, and historical novels about Silesian uprisings.

Despite his political disengagement after the war, the communist authorities did not forget Grim's political past. The UB threatened to punish him for participation in secret organizations as well as his close links to anti-communist politicians. The authorities also possessed compromising information about Grim's secret lover and illegitimate child (Żurek, 2009, 182). Although some sources question the veracity of this evidence, it sufficed to turn the priest into spy (Żurek, 2009, 23). Apart from reporting on his parishioners and colleagues, Grim published newspaper articles criticizing the Pope (Żurek, 2009, 81-2) and spoke publicly against the Polish Episcopate (Żurek, 2009, 182). Despite these high-profile public activities, Grim's collaboration with the UB was kept strictly secret. This helped preserve his good reputation within

the local community (Żurek, 2009, 190-1). Grim died in 1950.

Figure A2: Spy Priests

(a) Maksymilian Goszyc



(b) Emanuel Grim

Notes: Retrieved from https://silesia.edu.pl/.

A.9 Protests in the 1970s

Unfortunately, we do not have systematic information on protests in Upper Silesia before 1980. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that these protests were frequent in the 1970s, i.e., in the period for which we have sabotage data. In the Katowickie voivodship, for example, in 1978, there were over a dozen protests in coal mines in Jastrzębie, Katowice, Tychy, and other unnamed localities (Kamiński and Waligóra, 2010, 173). These protests intensified in the aftermath of the Polish Pope's, Karol Wojtyła, visit to the region in 1979. Notably, on that occasion, the Pope delivered a speech inviting Polish citizens to resist oppression. In the Opolskie voivodship protests in the 1970s are more systematically documented. IPN archival data mentions ten localities in which in December 1970 people protested against increase in food prices. These places include Opole, Nysa Racibórz, Tworków, Skoroszyce, Koźle, Wołczyn, Górażdże, and Ozimek (Kamiński and Waligóra, 2010, 574). In the Bielskie voivodship, by constrast, we only have evidence of protests in Bielsko-Biała. Reportedly, in the late 1970s some tensions had also emerged in Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, Oświęcim, and Wadowice—the places visited by the Pope Wojtyła during his visit to Poland in 1979 (Kamiński and Waligóra, 2010, 656-7). In the Częstochowskie voivodship, the available information is again very limited. IPN archival data only reports some instances of Catholic student movements (*Duszpastwrstwo Akademickie*) being involved in organizing protest before 1980 (Kamiński and Waligóra, 2010, 827). The sources do not specify location of these protests, however. Given the scarcity of available information, we only use the

above data as qualitative evidence. In the case of Opolskie voivodship, we can validate the protest measure in the 1980s with data on protest from 1970. Reassuringly, both measures are correlated (see Table A16).

Table A16: Protests in 1970 and protests in the 1980s

	Protests in the 1980s
	(1)
Protests in the 1970s	0.317***
	(0.098)
Fixed effects	No
Controls	No
N	63
Adjusted R^2	0.185

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regression of the number of strikes per year in a municipality in the 1980s (scaled) on the number of strikes in 1970. The analysis is limited to municipalities in the Opolskie voivodship. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A.10 Quantitative text analysis

Tracing emotions in dissident testimonies We analyzed the 62 dissident testimonies using natural language processing in order to assess what emotions are commonly used when describing surveillance. To do so, we translated the testimonies, and then stemmed them including the removal of stop words and pre- and suffixes. We then defined a list of words that likely capture surveillance[6] as well as a dictionary of words that capture salient emotions (using the Active Emotion Vocabulary). Thereafter, we extracted all surveillance terms and their immediate textual context (+/- 20 words). We then analyzed the most frequent emotions mentioned in the context of the surveillance terms and conducted a similar placebo-analysis in the remaining contexts of the testimonies. Doing so ensures that we trace emotions that are unique to surveillance and not simply mentioned frequently in the testimonies (i.e., we estimate the term frequency–inverse document frequency of a given emotion (or tf-idf), which evaluates how relevant a word is to the context compared to the rest of the document). More specifically, tf-idf filters out the emotional words that are unique to surveillance when

[6]Specifically, we included the words spy, investigate, search, surveil, agent, espionage, infiltrate, observe, intelligence, watch, patrol, scrutinize, monitor, inspect, inquire (using the stem of the word).

Table A17: Surveillance and protests in the 1970s

	Protests in the 1970s
	(1)
Surveilance	0.753***
	(0.250)
Fixed effects	No
Controls	No
N	63
Adjusted R^2	0.115

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regression of the number of strikes in the 1970s on the surveillance measure in the Opolskie voivodship. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of secret police officers in any given community across years 1975-79. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

compared to the "placebo"-text by shrinking the importance of words that occur both around surveillance and in the placebo text towards zero.) Reassuringly, the only emotional word that reliably predicts surveillance is "wściekły", which is best translated as "angry" or "mad."

Analyzing repression characteristics using DoS Human Rights Reports We used the Human Rights Practices country reports published by the U.S. Department of State (see Fariss, 2019) to assess the characteristics of different repressive tactics around the globe. We gained access to all reports from 1981 to 2016. The reports discuss six types of repression in Section A: killings; disappearances; torture; arrests and detentions; lack of access to fair justice; and surveillance. We digitized all reports, stemmed them (including the removal of stop words and pre- and suffixes) and then defined a list of words that likely capture the six types of repression, including surveillance, as well as a dictionary of words that capture the three scope conditions: comprehensiveness, continuity, and secrecy. Thereafter, we extracted all repression terms and their immediate textual context (+/- 20 words). We then analyzed to what degree the repressive strategies were described as continuous, comprehensive and secret and conducted a similar placebo-analysis in the remaining contexts of the reports (more above). Doing so ensures that we trace descriptors of repression that are unique to repression and not simply mentioned frequently in the reports.

Table A18: Upper Silesia and the Rest of Poland: Descriptive Statistics

	Upper Silesia (mean)	**Poland** (mean)
Average salary 1980 (in PLZ)	5965	5789
Employed in industry 1975	0.380	0.348
Employed in industry 1980	0.372	0.346
Employed in agriculture 1975	0.018	0.024
Employed in agriculture 1980	0.018	0.027
Urban population 1975	0.550	0.557
Urban population 1980	0.586	0.587
Pensioners	0.374	0.340
NSZZ members 1981	0.261	0.265
SB agents 1975 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.492	0.544
SB agents 1976 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.532	0.596
SB agents 1977 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.616	0.681
SB agents 1978 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.674	0.758
SB agents 1979 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.722	0.823
SB agents 1980 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.778	0.865
SB agents 1981 (per 1,000 pop.)	0.893	0.987
SB agents 1982 (per 1,000 pop.)	1.144	1.272
SB agents 1983 (per 1,000 pop.)	1.435	1.556
SB agents 1984 (per 1,000 pop.)	1.790	1.949

Notes: The Table reports the mean of the indicated variables for Upper Silesia and the entire Poland, respectively. All variables are in percentages, unlesss indicated otherwise. The Upper Silesia data comes from averaging data from four voivodships: Bielskie, Częstochowskie, Katowickie, and Opolskie. The underlying data is only available at the voivodship level. NSZZ stands for Solidarność (Polish acronym). SB stands for secret police (literally, Służba Bezpieczeństwa).

Table A19: Sabotage and Trade Union Membership: Individual-Level Analysis

	Sabotage (1988)
	(1)
Trade union member	-0.032**
	(0.016)
Engineers and technical specialists	0.178
	(0.145)
Farmers	-0.373***
	(0.125)
High level officials and managers	-0.096
	(0.172)
Laborers in agriculture	-0.174
	(0.160)
Laborers in production and construction	-0.041
	(0.130)
Laborers in services and trade	0.007
	(0.133)
Middle-level administrative workers	0.005
	(0.128)
Professionals	0.541***
	(0.150)
Routine office workers	-0.091
	(0.136)
Sales and service workers	-0.059
	(0.127)
Skilled manual workers	-0.101
	(0.121)
Small business owners	-0.241*
	(0.144)
Technicians	0.054
	(0.131)
Professional class: Not applicable	-0.067
	(0.149)
Reference category: Foremen	
Female	-0.381***
N	5817

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a regression of the engagement in irregular, casual job on the membership in trade union (predominantly, Solidarność). Standard errors are given in parentheses. For more information on POLPAN data, see (Słomczyński and Tomescu-Dubrow, 2012). The sabotage outcome and the trade union membership variable are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A20: Repression and Sabotage: Sabotage officers

	Sabotage	**Sabotage**
	(1)	(2)
Surveillance	-0.413^{***}	-0.224^{***}
(sabotage officers)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Surveillance		-0.386^{***}
(all officers)		(0.059)
N	234	234
Adjusted R^2	0.199	0.321

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of sabotage on the average number of secret police officers per year in a municipality across the 1975-1979 period, distinguishing between officers instructed to monitor sabotage and those charged with other tasks. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of the sabotage outcome in any given community across years 1975-79. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A21: Repression, Sabotage, and Solidarność's strength

	Sabotage
	(1)
Surveillance	-0.124^{*}
	(0.066)
Local Solidarność's strength	-0.529^{***}
	(0.066)
N	234
Adjusted R^2	0.434

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from regressions of sabotage on the average number of secret police officers per year in a municipality across the 1975-1979 period and a proxy for Solidarność's organizational strength at the local level. The time series data was collapsed by taking the average of the sabotage outcome in any given community across years 1975-79. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A.11 Generalizability

Characterizing surveillance How does the PPR's use of surveillance compare to other surveillance as undertaken by other regimes around the globe? While providing a precise answer is beyond the scope of this study, we can begin to answer this question by making use of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights. In Part A of its country reports, the DoS delineates six types of repression: killings; disappearances; torture; arrests and detentions; lack of access to fair justice; and privacy invasions (i.e., surveillance). We gained access to all country reports[7]—spanning all countries from 1979 to 2014 (>20.000 pages of text)—and applied natural language processing to them (see Section A.10). Specifically, we assessed to what degree surveillance is commonly described as i) open; ii) comprehensive; and iii) continuous. Figure A4 shows that, around the globe, the DoS describes surveillance, on average, in such terms. The analysis thus implies that Poland's use of surveillance was not highly unusual. Interestingly, the data also demonstrate that surveillance is distinct from other types of repression, particularly when it comes to the second and third conditions. That said, we recommend caution in interpreting these results. We cannot fully rule out the possibility that cases where surveillance was not widespread and open are not mentioned in the reports because observers were not aware of any surveillance activities. We believe that this problem is attenuated by the nature of the data (the DoS reports partly rely on intelligence sources) and the fact that we use binary measurement (it is fairly unlikely that surveillance was so perfectly covert that not a single case was discovered in a given place). Yet, some doubts inevitably remain.

Surveillance and protests in the 1980s Where does Poland fall in the global distribution of surveillance and protests? To answer this question, we used the same DoS country reports and constructed a country-year panel, with indicators for the same six types of repression in 202 countries around the world in the period between 1981 and 1986 (coinciding with the period of our protest analysis). We built binary indicators of killings; disappearances; torture; arrests and detentions; lack of access to fair justice; and surveillance. Protest data come from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT). The GDELT tracks news reports of human conflict around the world (e.g. protests, violence, and changes in military and police posture) since 1979 until the present. We focus on protest events between 1981 and 1986. We complement our dataset with population estimates and autocracy scores from Polity IV data. The last variable allows us to identify authoritarian regimes to which our findings are most likely to generalize. Our unit of analysis are contemporary states, which offer the most fine-grained data. We thus treat former Soviet republics and Yugoslavia states as separate countries, and impute missing data accordingly.

Figure A3 shows that there is a positive correlation between surveillance and protests in the 1980s across the globe. More importantly, Poland is no outlier, particularly when focusing on former Communist countries. Both Latvia and Moldova, for instance, show higher levels of protest activity, while surveillance was a common feature across all Communist countries. Reassuringly, the positive correlation between surveillance and protests also holds when estimating a rather stringent two-way

[7]We would like to sincerely thank Chris Fariss for making this data available to us.

Figure A3: Surveillance and protests



Notes: Global correlation between surveillance and protests between 1981 and 1986. Former Communist countries are highlighted. See Section A.11 for details.

Figure A4: Classifying surveillance



Notes: Frequency with which the six types of repression are described as comprehensive, continuous, and secretive across 202 countries from 1981 - 2018. See Section A.10 for details.

fixed-effects panel model using all 202 countries from 1981 to 1986 (see Table A22). Indeed, surveillance is the only significant predictor even as other forms of repression are held constant. And, as shown below the positive correlation between surveillance and protest, controlling for other types of repression, is also detectable when using conflict and surveillance data from 2019.

Table A22: Surveillance and Protests (two-way fixed-effects panel)

	Protests
	(1)
Surveillance	0.003*
	(0.002)
Disappearances	0.001
	(0.001)
Killings	−0.001
	(0.001)
Political Prisoners	0.0005
	(0.001)
Torture	0.0002
	(0.001)
Autocracy	−0.00001
	(0.001)
Year fixed effects	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes
N	851
Adjusted R^2	0.204

Notes: Correlation between protests and six types of repression in a panel of 202 countries from 1981 to 1986. Standard errors are given in parentheses.*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Surveillance and protests in 2019 To answer whether surveillance also predicts protests today, we use country-level protest data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) dataset, focusing on the last available year—2019. Table A23 shows the results of a regression of the number of protests in a country on six binary indicators of the above-mentioned forms of repression, that is: killings; disappearances; torture; arrests and detentions; lack of access to fair justice; and surveillance (all variables coded using the Human Rights Practices country reports). Interestingly, we find that surveillance is the only significant predictor of the intensity of protests, even after controlling for the co-occurring violent repression. This correlational evidence thus

attests to the generalizability of our findings, even almost 40 years after the Polish events that we focused on in this study.

Table A23: Surveillance and Protests in 2019

	Protests (2019)
	(1)
Political killing	−0.005
	(0.029)
Disappearance	0.216
	(0.132)
Torture	0.003
	(0.027)
Arbitrary arrest	−0.012
	(0.041)
Unfair trial	−0.0004
	(0.037)
Surveillance	0.108*
	(0.064)
N	134

Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a regression of the number of protests in a country in 2019 on surveillance. We control for the presence of other types of repression. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables are standardized. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

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