Codebook for "Group Opinion and the Study of Representation" in *Who Gets Represented?**

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This codebook describes the data used to generate Figures 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 in Enns & Wlezien (2011).[1] If you utilize these data, we suggest you cite:

Enns, Peter K. and Christopher Wlezien. 2011. "Group Opinion and the Study of Representation." in *Who Gets Represented?* ed. Peter K. Enns and Christopher Wlezien. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Figure 1.4: Policy Mood by Income Group

The Policy Mood by income group series were originally developed for two projects (Enns & Wlezien 2011, Kelly & Enns 2010). We suggest citing both works when using the mood by income group data.

Details about the Mood-by-Income data

In order to generate a measure of the public's policy mood by income group, we used all questions used in Stimson's (1991) measure of policy mood for which individual data are available. Relying on data from the Roper Center, the General Social Survey, and the American National Election Study we were able to obtain 76 distinct questions, which were each asked multiple times between 1956 and 2006. In total, our measure of mood combines information from 1,032 survey questions.

Prior to generating mood by income level, we first generated an aggregate mood series using these questions. Following Stimson, we calculated the percent offering a liberal response divided by the percent offering a liberal response plus the percent offering a conservative response and combined the series into a single overtime measure with Stimson's dyad ratios Wcalc algorithm.[2] Our aggregate series correlates with Stimson's mood series at an impressive r=0.85.[3] Thus, we are confident that the questions we have used produce a valid proxy of Stimson's policy mood.

In order to generate a separate mood series for each income group, for each survey question we calculated the percent of liberal respondents divided by the percent of liberal respondents plus the percent of conservative respondents for the lowest, middle, and highest income groups. These income groups correspond with the lowest 20 percent, middle 60 percent, and highest 20 percent income levels reported in the survey. Of course, income group categories offered in surveys do not always correspond exactly with income quintiles. Thus, in most cases we actually selected income categories that corresponded

[1]The other figures in the chapter were generated using data from the General Social Surveys. Instructions for how we generated those figures can be found in the chapter.

[2]The algorithm scales each question series to a common metric and then uses a factor analytic approach to produce a measure based on the common overtime variation of the component series. Full details on Wcalc can be found in Stimson (1991) and `http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Software.html`.

[3]The correlation is based on the years 1956 to 2006 using Stimson's Release 2 (5-29-2009) mood5208.prn, available at `http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Data.html`.

with lower incomes than the lowest 20 percent and higher incomes than the highest 80 percent of respondents. This strategy was used to ensure that whenever possible, our income groups are based on more extreme income percentiles than we suggest. In the few surveys where the lowest and highest income groups needed to extend beyond the lowest or upper quintile, coding was done to ensure that the number of respondents in the high or low income category never exceeded 30 percent.

The data include the following variables.

`highinc_mood`: The policy mood among the highest income quintile.

`midinc_mood`: The policy mood among the middle 60 percent.

`lowinc_mood`: The policy mood among the lowest income quintile.

Figure 1.5: Policy Mood by Education Level

This data collection effort builds on Enns & Kellstedt (2008) by extending the time series and the number of survey questions used. As with the mood by income group data, we used all questions used in Stimson's (1991) measure of policy mood for which individual data are available. Relying on data from the Roper Center, the General Social Survey, and the American National Election Study we were able to obtain 76 distinct questions, which were each asked multiple times between 1956 and 2006. In total, our measure of mood combines information from 1,032 survey questions.

As with the income categories, to generate a separate mood series by education group, for each survey question we calculated the percent of liberal respondents divided by the percent of liberal respondents plus the percent of conservative respondents for the lowest, middle, and highest education groups. These education groups correspond with the lowest 20 percent, middle 60 percent, and highest 20 percent education levels reported in the survey. Of course, education group categories offered in surveys do not always correspond exactly with education quintiles. Thus, in most cases we actually selected education categories that corresponded with lower education levels than the lowest 20 percent and higher education levels than the highest 80 percent of respondents. This strategy was used to ensure that whenever possible, our education groups are based on more extreme education percentiles than we suggest. In the few surveys where the lowest and highest education groups needed to extend beyond the lowest or upper quintile, coding was done to ensure that the number of respondents in the high or low education category never exceeded 30 percent.

The data include the following variables.

`highed_mood`: The policy mood among the highest education quintile.

`mided_mood`: The policy mood among the middle 60 percent.

`lowed_mood`: The policy mood among the lowest education quintile.

Figure 1.6: Policy Mood by Party Identification

As with the previous mood variables, we used all questions used in Stimson's (1991) measure of policy mood for which individual data are available. Relying on data from the Roper Center, the General Social Survey, and the American National Election Study we were able to obtain 76 distinct questions, which were each asked multiple times between 1956 and 2006. In total, our measure of mood combines information from 1,032 survey questions.

When surveys asked about degrees of partisanship, we coded strong Democrats and weak Democrats as Democrats, strong Republicans and weak Republicans as Republicans and independents and independents who lean toward one party or the other as independents.

The data include the following variables.

`dem_mood`: The policy mood among Democrats.

`ind_mood`: The policy mood among independents.

`rep_mood:` The policy mood among Republicans.

Figure 1.7: Kellstedt's Racial Policy Liberalism by Race

Paul Kellstedt's (2000, 2003) Racial Policy Liberalism is a measure of the public's racial policy attitudes. Higher values indicate a more racially liberal public. Following the logic of our replication of Policy Mood, we obtained all questions that Kellstedt used for which individual data are available. Opinion data come from the Roper Center, the General Social Survey, and the American National Election Study. Prior to estimating racial policy liberalism by race, we first estimated the public's aggregate racial policy liberalism. From 1962 to 2006, our aggregate series correlates with Kellstedt's at r=0.68. Although substantial, this correlation actually underestimates the similarity between the series. During the first few years of our series, we have more variability because there are fewer questions with individual data available. The correlation between our measure and Kellstedt's measure jumps to an impressive r=0.80 if we begin the comparison in 1966

instead of 1962 (Enns & Wlezien 2011, 21).[4]

The data include the following variables.

`afam_raclib`: Racial policy liberalism among African Americans.

`wh_raclib`: Racial policy liberalism among Whites.

`all_raclib`: The public's racial policy liberalism. Note, this variable reflects our replication of Kellstedt's racial policy liberalism, not the original measure used in (Kellstedt 2000, Kellstedt 2003).

Question Wording:

Listed below are the 16 questions used to generate the racial liberalism index, the survey house, and the range of years the questions were asked. Percentages were based on the percent offering a liberal response divided by the percent offering a liberal response plus the percent offering a conservative response.

We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, to little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, to little, or about the right amount on improving the conditions of Blacks? (General Social Surveys, 1973-2006)

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Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if prefers not to sell to (Negroes/Blacks/African Americans). The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for? (General Social Surveys, 1973-2006)

In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black/African-American) and white school children from one school district to another. (General Social Surveys, 1972-1996)

[4]Kellstedt's racial policy liberalism series begins in 1950. However, not enough individual-level data are available for the early years, so we cannot begin our series until 1962.

Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans) have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans). Where would you place yourself on this [5-point] scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (General Social Surveys, 1975-2006)

[Some people say that] the government in Washington should see to it that white and black [1962-1966: colored; 1968-1970: Negro] children go to the same schools. Do you agree that the government should do this or do you think that the government should not do it? (American National Election Studies, 1962-2000)

There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their own neighborhoods. Others think letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing. Where would you place yourself on this [7-point] scale, or haven't you thought much about this?(American National Election Studies, 1972-1984)

If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do? (American National Election Studies, 1956-1960)

Some people say that Negroes should be allowed to live in any part of town they want to. How do you feel? Should Negroes be allowed to live in any part of town they want to, or not? (American National Election Studies, 1964-1976)

Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks [1970: Negroes] and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this [7-point] scale? (American National Election Studies, 1970-2004)

Some people feel that if black people [1964, 1968: Negroes] are not getting fair treatment in jobs, the government in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the federal government's business. Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs or should the government in Washington leave these matters to the states and local communities? (American National Election Studies, 1964-2004)

If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased? Should federal spending on programs that assist blacks be increased, decreased, or kept

about the same? (American National Election Studies, 1984-2002)

There are many problems facing our nation today. But at certain times some things are more important than others, and need more attention from our federal government than others. I'd like to know for each of the things on this list whether you think it is something the government should be making a major effort on now, or something the government should be making some effort on now, or something not needing any particular government effort now. Trying to solve the problems caused by ghettos, race and poverty (Roper, 1974-1985)

Do you think the (Kennedy/Johnson) Administration is pushing racial integration too fast, or not fast enough? (Gallup, 1962-1968)

Do you believe that where there has been job discrimination against blacks in the past, preference in hiring or promotion should be given to blacks today? (CBS News/New York Times, 1985-1997)

One the whole do you feel that minority groups in this country are receiving too much attention, too little attention or just about the right amount of attention these days? (Time/Yankelovich, 1974-1981)

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