Opposition Inclusion and Exclusion in the Arab World:

Evidence from a New Dataset

Online Appendix

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Online Appendix 1. The Different Shades of Secularists and Islamists in the Arab World

This research note contributes to the literature by introducing an original dataset: the Arab Opposition Power Relations dataset. The dataset offers the first attempt to comparatively uncover the patterns of secular-Islamist inclusion and exclusion in 13 Arab countries both before and after the Arab uprisings. Before delving into the shades of secularists and Islamists, a note on the rationale behind focusing on those 13 countries is in order. Out of 22 countries that are members of the Arab League, the 13 countries included in the analysis are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. They are similar along three dimensions. First, they have a salient secular-Islamist cleavage, not a dominant sectarian cleavage as in Iraq or Lebanon or no ideological cleavage as in Oman. Second, they are ruled by 'secularegious' regimes (Bayat 2007: 166) rather than an Islamist regime as in Sudan or no sovereignty as is the case in Palestine. Third, they share relevant features such as language, religion, patterns of economic development and geostrategic importance (Brownlee et al. 2015: 8–9), thus distinguishing them from Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia.

Islamists are not a monolithic group; they are divided into several sub-groups. Many attempts have been made to classify the spectrum of Islamists. Volpi & Stein (2015) differentiate between statist and non-statist Islamists according to their attitude towards the state. The classification's main weakness is putting together Salafists and militant Islamists into the non-statist Islamists category. Fattah (2013) also offers an extensive classification of groups based on their view on the public role of Islam in politics. He however considers Salafists to be apolitical, which does not hold anymore after they have entered the electoral politics arena after the Arab

uprisings. He also names the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as partisan, despite not having a party in some countries such as Egypt, before the Arab uprisings.

In response to scholarly calls to go beyond the binary moderate and radical classifications of Islamists (Schwedler 2015), Bokhari & Senzai (2013: 43) offer a good classification of three Islamist groups based on their attitude towards political liberalization and democratization: participatory, conditional and rejectors.[1] First, participatory Islamists accept the democratic rules of the game and compete in elections and form parties, whenever allowed (Bokhari & Senzai 2013: 44–45). Participatory Islamists believe that Islamic Sharia and democracy are compatible. They adopt a bottom-up reformist approach and do not attempt to revolt against existing regimes (Volpi & Stein 2015: 281). With a strong social base and popular appeal, participatory Islamists have become mainstream Islamists after pushing other Islamist groups to the margins (Dekmejian 1995: 211–212). Examples of participatory Islamists include the MB in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia as well as civil parties that have Islamic reference such as al-Wasat Party (Wickham 2004) and the Strong Egypt Party (El-Sherif 2016).

Second, conditional Islamists are generally hesitant to endorse democratic procedures and systems, as seen foreign to religious tradition. Their commitment to democracy, in general, is unclear and questionable. They are mainly concerned with implementing Islamic law and democracy for them is one means to that greater end (Bokhari & Senzai 2013: 46–47). They are ultra-conservative; promote an ascetic lifestyle and work towards establishing an ideal society inspired by earlier religious traditions (Volpi & Stein 2015: 283). Over time, they have accepted

[1] Bokhari and Senzai (2013) originally use the terms Islamist participators and Islamist conditionalists which I label as participatory Islamists and conditional Islamists. Mainly I do this for linguistic reasons since the adjective such as participatory or conditional should precede the noun. I also use participatory instead of participators following its use in the literature Wittes (2008: 12).

and entered electoral politics, as with the Salafists and former Jihadists in Egypt after the 2011 Revolution.

Third, rejector Islamists, who are known in the literature as militant or radical Islamists, have a fundamental problem with democracy for assigning sovereignty to humans rather than God. They do not have problems with elections per se, as a procedure, but rather with the outcome of electing representatives who would enact laws based on majority vote. For them, Islam is a comprehensive system of governance and way of life (Bokhari & Senzai 2013: 45–46). Their project is clear: establishing an Islamic state through violent means (Volpi & Stein 2015: 284). This project, according to Gerges (2013: 75), is dead because of increasing state repression and due to an enduring legitimacy crisis that disabled the formation of a strong social base (Gerges 2013: 75). Examples of rejector Islamists include militant Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Rejector Islamists will be excluded from the analysis given that they are repressed in all Arab countries.

Secularists in turn are also not a monolithic group when it comes to their attitude towards democracy. There are mainly two types: exclusionary secularists and liberal secularists. Exclusionary secularists are in favor of excluding one or more groups, Islamists in our case, from the political field (Schedler & Sarsfield 2007: 653).[2] Some scholars go as far as to consider exclusionary secularists as liberals, but not democrats (Shehata 2013), given their exclusionary attitude towards Islamists. In other words, their commitment to democracy comes second to their fear of Islamists. This exclusionary tendency has both ideological and pragmatic reasons.

[2] Schedler and Sarsfield actually use the term exclusionary democrats in order to classify mass public attitudes towards democracy. Alternatively, they could be called a loyal opposition given their loyalty to the ruling regime by only opposing policies and not seeking to overthrow the regime, as clarified by Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004: 383); Albrecht (2013: 8–9). However, this is problematic given that participatory Islamists and, in some cases, conditional Islamists can also be loyal to the ruling regime, as outlined by Ahmad and Zartman (1997).

Ideologically, they doubt Islamists' commitment to democracy and fear they would hijack democratic rule to establish an Islamist state as was the case in Iran, Pakistan and Sudan (Crystal 1994: 285–286).

The second type, who are much smaller in number, are liberal secularists, who support the inclusion of Islamists and have defended their right to establish political parties. Members of this group are more committed to democracy and believe in the inclusion-moderation thesis that is the participation in formal politics moderates the behavior and ideology of Islamists (Schwedler 2011, 2013). Liberal secularists are organizationally much weaker than Islamists and are less rooted in society, which increases the chances of Islamists winning free and fair elections. Advocates of such view include both civil society activists and politicians. For example, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a prominent Egyptian liberal figure and academic, asserted that Islamist parties 'should neither be pathologically feared nor cavalierly excluded. Rather, they should be actively engaged and encouraged to evolve into Muslim democratic parties akin to the Christian Democrats in Europe' (Ibrahim 2009). The same can be argued about the few political parties and liberal figures who rejected the 2013 ouster of the late President Mohamed Morsi and designated it as a military coup. Chief among those is Mohamed ElBaradei, Egypt's vice president from 14 July 2013 until his resignation on 14 August 2013. Another prominent figure is Amr Hamzawy, founder of the Egypt Freedom party and a former Carnegie scholar. The same can be said about Moncef Marzouki, former Tunisian president between 2011 and 2014, who agreed to join a coalition with Ennahda, Tunisia's biggest Islamist party. In Yemen, Jarallah Omar, who is also a good example of liberal secularists, managed to transform the YSP towards social democracy (Durac 2011: 354).

It might be argued that some of the ideological groups above cannot be treated as an 'opposition' since they support authoritarian ruling regimes. However, in line with the definition

of opposition adopted in this research note, as explained earlier in this chapter, the attitudes of the opposition towards the regime are distinct from their ideological position and thus will be examined empirically in the next chapter. Along similar lines, it might be argued that some of the Gulf monarchies such as Qatar and the UAE lack the type of Islamists this research note is concerned with. This assertion is not true as Freer (2018) convincingly shows how participatory Islamists, the MB in particular, are influential in both monarchies, albeit lacking the strong institutional, organizational arms in other Arab countries. It might also be argued that some of the Gulf monarchies in general and Saudi Arabia, in particular, lacks secular groups, whether liberal or exclusionary. This view is also not accurate. In fact, Saudi Arabia witnessed a secularist pan-Arabism movement in the 1950s and saw the rebirth of a liberal movement after 2001 culminating in the signature of 104 professors, intellectuals and former officials to a Strategic Vision calling for a constitutional order (Dekmejian 2003; Beranek 2009).

It might also be argued that both regimes and the opposition, both secular and Islamist, are divided internally into factions and wings. Participatory Islamists such as the MB in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have for a long time been internally divided between hardliner 'hawks' and moderate 'doves' (Brown 2012: 102; Fakir 2017: 11). The same can be said about regimes which include hardline and moderate factions (Storm 2014: 6). I however study the regime and the different secular and Islamist groups as singular organizational units. The decision is justified for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, this research note examines the attitudes of both regimes and oppositions towards each other. These attitudes whether to support or oppose regimes, include or repress opposition, are directed towards the whole organization regardless of their internal divisions. For example, when Mubarak's regime in Egypt launched an offensive campaign against the MB in the mid-2000s, it arrested hardliners such as Mahmoud Ezzat and moderate leaders such

as Essam al-Iryan (Albrecht & Wegner 2006: 139). Practically, the theoretical model adopted in this research note, which is explained further below, theorizes dynamics of interaction between the authoritarian regime, two Islamist groups and two secular groups. Taking internal factions into account would complicate the layers of analysis making it very difficult to operationalize and code.

Online Appendix 2. Identification of Secularist and Islamist Groups

Any societal cleavage, including the secular-Islamist cleavage examined in this research note, has three elements: first, a social-structural element, such as religious denomination or class; second, a sense of collective identity of this social group; and third, an organizational frame in the form of collective action or a durable organization of the social groups concerned (Bartolini & Mair 1990: 213–220). The first two elements have been intensively studied in the literature as explained in chapter 3. This appendix, therefore, focuses on the third element that is the organizational dimension of the secular-Islamist cleavage.

The identification of the organizations representing the four ideological groups studied in this research note, namely liberal secularists, exclusionary secularists, participatory Islamists and conditional Islamists, takes place over two steps: first, identifying organizations, including political parties, that represent each ideological group and second, deciding on the final list of *relevant* organizations representing each group. Both stages address the rules recommended by Salehyan (2015: 106–107) on source selection: 1) systematic and transparent use of sources in compiling data, 2) thinking about what might be missing from those sources and 3) addressing biases that underpin those sources.[3]

First, secular groups in the Arab world are identified using two main sources. The research note depends on Schlager & Weisblatt's (2006) comprehensive *World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties*, which includes all the 13 Arab countries under examination in this research note. Each chapter is written by a country expert and starts with a brief overview of the system of government and its three branches: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. It also includes a list of the major political parties and groups in each country. Given that the encyclopedia does

[3] Salehyan (2015) focuses on conflict data but the logic of the rules applies to all data collection efforts.

not cover the post-2011 period, I depend on the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly reports which are continuous both before and after the Arab uprisings and thus helps cover the post-2011 period in particular.[4] Both sources are also triangulated by the Party Facts dataset, a global dataset for political parties (Döring & Regel 2019). Coding a group as liberal or exclusionary secularist depends primarily on their behavior towards their Islamist counterparts. When secularists engage in any form of cross-ideological coordination or cooperation, whether tactical or strategic, they are coded as liberal secularists. This was the case of the Revolutionary Socialists in Egypt, coded as liberal secularists, in comparison to the Tagammu and the Egyptian Communist parties coded as exclusionary secularists (Browers 2009: 125). In Morocco, liberal secularists are represented by the Istiqlal Party and the PPS who agreed to join a government coalition led by the PJD in 2012 (Abdel Ghafar & Hess 2018: 18) compared to the leftist USFP who has remained firmly anti-Islamist during the period under examination (Willis 2004: 73; Wegner & Pellicer 2011).[5]

Islamist groups are also identified using two primary sources. The first is Charles Kurzman's list of Islamic Groups, which includes the list of Islamists who have participated in electoral politics in the Islamic world (Kurzman & Naqvi 2010; Kurzman & Türkoğlu 2015).[6] The list is limited in its focus on participatory Islamists, and some conditional Islamists, who compete in elections. Missing from this list are participatory Islamist groups in countries that do not have elections such as the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia (Dekmejian 1994; Lacroix 2011) or the MB in Qatar and the UAE (Freer 2018). Missing from Kurzman's list are conditional Islamists, who willingly choose not to compete in elections such as the AWI in Morocco (Cavatorta 2007)

[4] In using the Economist Intelligence Unit's reports, I follow other datasets such as Vüllers et al. 's (2015) Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries dataset and Ottmann and Vüllers 's (2015) Power-Sharing Event Dataset.
[5] The USFP, however, took part in a larger government coalition led by the PJD in 2017, according to Fakir (2017: 25). This does not affect the coding since this happened outside the time period of this study between 2005-2016.
[6] Kurzman's list of Islamist groups, what he calls Islamic parties despite some of them not being legally registered as parties at the time of election, is available under this link: https://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-parties/. The list also includes links to manifestos of many of those groups.

or Salafists in Jordan (Wiktorowicz 2000; Wagemakers 2016a). Identification of conditional Islamist groups, therefore, is based on Rubin's (2010) *Guide to Islamist Movements*, which is a very comprehensive volume covering all Islamist groups across the globe.

In some cases, secularists and Islamists do not have a unified organization but are part of what is called in the literature on the Arab world a 'current' (Sawani 2018; Ghanem 2019: 15) or 'trend' (Ashour 2015: 6; Wagemakers 2016b: 120). In some cases, they are organized in informal arenas such as forums (*majalis* in Arabic) in Qatar or diwaniyat in Kuwait and Bahrain (Moritz 2018: 55; Hafidh & Fibiger 2019: 119). Despite not having a unified institutional frame, they have significant influence and have clear ideological preferences. For instance, Emirati academics, who are members of the exclusionary secularist current in the UAE compare the MB to Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan (Freer 2018: 139). Some, such as Emirati writer Salam Hamid, founder and head of the Al-Mezmaah Studies and Research Center, even go to dehumanize Islamists referring to them as 'machines.' Along similar lines, many exclusionary secularists in Tunisia, where political life is more institutionalized and secularists are organized along party lines, describe Ennahda, the country's largest Islamist party, as 'robots' (Marks 2014: 8: fn 15).

The second step is about short-listing the initial list of organizations representing each of the four ideological groups. The aim here is to identify the relevant ones. Mathematical formulations to identify the effective number of political parties (Laakso & Taagepera 1979; Lijphart 1999: chapter 5) are not suitable being based on the vote or seat shares. On one hand, in the Arab world, elections are *not* always free and fair and vote shares should not be taken at face value. On the other hand, some countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Aram Emirates lack elected institutions (Freer 2018). Also, not suitable is the approach adopted to identify politically-relevant groups in the EPR dataset. This approach depends on counting any

ethnic group as politically-relevant if they are represented by an organization at the national level and/or are repressed by the government (Vogt et al. 2015). Both criteria, however, will bring me back to square one given that many organizations will meet such criteria. Also irrelevant is the approach suggested in Perthes (2004) which identifies politically-relevant elites in the Arab world using their 'reputation.'

Given the shortages of other approaches, I use a revised version Sartori's (2005) rules to identify relevant political parties. Relevant parties, Sartori (2005: 107–110) argues, may be counted using two rules namely coalition-potential and blackmail-potential. I, however, adapt these criteria to suit the context of the Arab world where the political systems are dominated by authoritarian regimes. I, thus, suggest two criteria that capture the essence of regime-opposition dynamics under autocratic rule: *strength* and *influence*. Both are not mutually exclusive. Strength refers mainly to the organizational strength of ideological groups and whether they have a large following and grassroots presence. This is the case with most Islamist groups across the Arab world (Hamzawy 2008: 7). While influence, sometimes, follows from strength, this is not always the case. Most secular groups in the Arab world are influential not because of their grassroots presence but because of their access to media, including their own newspapers, and the relative freedom they enjoy in organizing public activities including electoral campaigns. Table A1 includes the list of secularist and Islamist groups that are coded in the dataset. While some groups include more than one organization, their coding, as will be elaborated in the following Appendix, treats them as a unitary actor, given their similar ideological orientations.

Table A1. List of relevant secularist and Islamist groups in the Arab world

Country	Liberal Secularists	Exclusionary Secularists	Participatory Islamists	Conditional Islamists
Algeria	Socialist Forces Front (FFS)	Rally for Culture and Democracy	Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), Movement for National Reform (Al-Islah) and Ennahda	Dawa Salafiya
Bahrain	National Democratic Action Society (Wa'ad)	National Unity Gathering	Al-Minber Islamic Society	Al Asalah
Egypt	Revolutionary Socialists	Tagammu Party and Nasserist Party	Muslim Brotherhood / Freedom and Justice Party	Dawa Salafiya / Al-Nour Party
Jordan	Secular parties that are members of the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP)	Jordanian Arab Democratic Party, Jordanian National Alliance Party, National Party, Progress and Justice Party	Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood / Islamic Action Front	Salafi current
Kuwait	Popular Action Bloc and Popular Action Movement	National Democratic Alliance and Kuwait Democratic Forum	Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood / Islamic Constitutional Movement (Hadas)	Islamic Salafi Alliance
Libya	National Salvation Front for Libya and National Forces Alliance	Libyan Democratic Gathering	Libyan Muslim Brotherhood / Justice and Construction Party	Islamic Fighting Group / Watan Party and Salafi current
Morocco	Istiqlal Party	Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	Justice and Development Party (PJD)	Justice and Charity movement (AWI)
Qatar	Liberal current	Loyal current	Qatari Muslim Brotherhood	Salafi current
Saudi Arabia	Liberal current	Loyal current	Sahwa Movement	Council of Senior Scholars
Syria	The Syrian Communist Party, National Democratic Gathering and Party of the Future	Arab Socialist Union, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Socialist Union Movement and the Syrian Democratic People's Party	Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Independent Islamic Tendency	Syrian Ulema current

Table A1 (continued)

Tunisia	Progressive Democratic Party, Congress for the Republic, Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (Ettakatol) and Workers' Party	Movement of Socialist Democrats, Popular Unity Party and Renewal Movement	Ennahda	Salafi current
United Arab Emirates	Liberal current	Loyal current	Emirati Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Islah)	Salafi current
Yemen	Yemeni Socialist Party and Nasserite Unionist People's Organization	Arab Socialist Rebirth Party	Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah)	Al-Haqq Party

Source: Author

Online Appendix 3. Dataset Coding Procedures

This appendix elaborates on the coding procedures which are built on the coding schemes explained in the research note. In coding the dataset, I have relied on the following secondary sources: the Economist Intelligence Unit's country reports, the CIA World Factbook, Freedom House reports along with complementary academic and policy literature. In the following section, I will explain how the coding was done using examples from the dataset. The coding is guided by a list of criteria that respond to each coding scheme as illustrated in Table A2.

The opposition power relations dataset has a seven-point coding scheme as follows: repressed, informal toleration (powerless), formal recognition (powerless), junior partner, senior partner, dominant and monopoly. Groups are coded as 'repressed' if *at least one* of the following four criteria is met: 1) group members are subject to extra-judicial killing or torture by the regime whether inside or outside detention, 2) group members are detained on charges related to the political activities of their organization, 3) group members are forced to flee home voluntarily or involuntarily because of their political activities or 4) groups offices are shut down by the government, whether following a legal order or arbitrarily. For example, the Emirati MB is coded as repressed starting 2013 after the government stripped seven members, known as the 'UAE7,' who signed the March 2011 petition from their citizenship and detained them after failing to leave the country. By the end of 2012, 94 members have been arrested, with 69 convicted and receiving sentences between seven and 15 years in prison (Freer 2018: 136). In November 2014, the UAE released a list of 82 terrorist organizations, which included Islah, the Emirati MB (Freer 2018: 137).

Table A2. Coding Scheme and Criteria

Scale	Category	Description	Coding Criteria
1	Repressed	Ideological group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted repression by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power.	Groups are coded as 'repressed' if *at least one* of the following four criteria is met: 1) group members are subject to extra-judicial killing or torture by the regime whether inside or outside detention, 2) group members are detained on charges related to the political activities of their organization, 3) group members are forced to flee home voluntarily or involuntarily because of their political activities or 4) groups offices are shut down by the government, whether following a legal order or arbitrarily.
2	Informal toleration (powerless)	The ideological group holds no political power (or does not influence decision-making) at the national level of executive power - although without being explicitly discriminated against.	Groups are coded as 'informally tolerated (powerless)' if they meet one of the first two criteria *and* the third criterion: 1) groups are denied the constitutional and/or the legal right to form a political party, either in line with the constitution or law or arbitrarily by the government or 2) groups willingly choose not to apply for formal registration and 3) despite lack of formal registration, groups are allowed to operate and organize activities without a significant backlash.
3	Formal recognition (powerless)	The ideological group holds no political power (or does not influence decision-making) at the national level of executive power but they are recognized as a legal political player in the form of a political party.	Groups are coded as 'formally recognized (powerless)' if they meet the following three criteria: 1) groups are granted formal registration as a political party, society or bloc depending on the national context, 2) group members are allowed to compete in parliamentary elections and 3) groups are not repressed in a similar manner mentioned under the coding scheme 'repressed' above.
4	Junior partner	The ideological group participates as a junior partner in government.	Groups are coded as 'junior partners' if they meet the following two criteria: 1) group members have an official capacity by occupying public office and 2) group members have *some* degree of influence and control over at least one policy area.
5	Senior partner	The ideological group participates as a senior partner in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement.	Groups are coded as 'senior partners' if they meet the following two criteria: 1) group members have an official capacity by occupying public office and 2) group members have a *significant* degree of influence of and control over some policy areas.

Table A2 (continued)

6	Dominant	The ideological group holds dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of 'token' members of other groups who however do not have a real influence on decision making.	Groups are coded as dominant if they meet the following three criteria: 1) group representatives occupy the highest executive posts in the presidency, government and parliament, 2) group representatives have *a significant* degree of influence of and control over the *majority* of policy areas and 3) group hands token positions to other actors.
7	Monopoly	The ideological group holds monopoly over power in the executive to the exclusion of members of all other groups.	Groups are coded as 'monopoly' if they meet the following two criteria: 1) group representatives occupy all executive posts in the presidency, government and parliament and 2) group representatives have *an unlimited* degree of influence of and control over *all* policy areas.

Groups are coded as 'informally tolerated (powerless)' if they meet one of the first two criteria *and* the third criterion: 1) groups are denied the constitutional and/or the legal right to form a political party, either in line with the constitution or law or arbitrarily by the government or 2) groups willingly choose not to apply for formal registration and 3) despite lack of formal registration, groups are allowed to operate and organize activities without a significant backlash. For instance, the AWI in Morocco is coded as informally tolerated in the time period under study between 2005 and 2016. Since the 19990s, the AWI has been informally tolerated by the regime and never faced the systematic repression of Tunisia's Ennahda Islamist movement or Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (Willis 2013: 537). This toleration of activities and structures, along with the movement's organizational strength and ideological indoctrination, allowed the movement to grow (Masbah 2014: 2). For example, the movement built around 200 social and cultural associations, providing social services and established the Union League, a labor union that was influential among railway workers. The AWI's membership, therefore, exceeds that of the PJD and is estimated at around 30,000 members (Enhaili 2010: 341).

Groups are coded as 'formally recognized (powerless)' if they meet the following three criteria: 1) groups are granted formal registration as a political party, society or bloc depending on the national context, 2) group members are allowed to compete in parliamentary elections and 3) groups are not repressed in a similar manner mentioned under the coding scheme 'repressed' above. For example, in Bahrain, even though parties are illegal, the four ideological groups are coded as formally recognized for meeting all three criteria including their legal registration as political societies, representation in parliament and the lack of systematic repression by the government (Abdulla 2011: 161; Gengler 2012). In Kuwait, political parties are also not legally recognized but all four ideological groups organize themselves as officially recognized political blocs (Barany 2013: 23; Hafidh & Fibiger 2019: 110).

Groups are coded as 'junior partners' if they meet the following two criteria: 1) group members have an official capacity by occupying public office and 2) group members have *some* degree of influence and control over at least one policy area. For instance, conditional Islamists in Saudi Arabia are coded as 'junior partners' for occupying most of the posts of the Council of Senior Scholars. The inclusion of conditional Islamists, Al-Rasheed & Al-Rasheed (1996: 97) argue, is part of 'the historical alliance between the Saudis and the Wahabi ulema [religious scholars]. It highlights the interconnection between government and Islam, which has underlined foundation of the country's political system.' According to Steinberg (2005: 22), religious scholars have been always been 'a junior partner, an arrangement that persisted after the independence of the Saudi state and has become even more lopsided since the government became the recipient of substantial oil rents beginning in the 1950s.'

Groups are coded as 'senior partners' if they meet the following two criteria: 1) group members have an official capacity by occupying public office and 2) group members have a

significant degree of influence of and control over some policy areas. For instance, liberal secularists, participatory Islamists and conditional Islamists in Yemen are coded as 'senior partners' in the post-2011 period. In fact, after the resignation of President Salih of Yemen in 2012, following the initiative of the GCC, a national unity government was formed which brought together liberal secularists, participatory Islamists and conditional Islamists (Lackner 2016: 8–9). By being part of the government, they met the two criteria by having access to public office and through their executive powers had control over various policy areas.

Groups are coded as dominant if they meet the following three criteria: 1) group representatives occupy the highest executive posts in the presidency, government and parliament, 2) group representatives have *a significant* degree of influence of and control over the *majority* of policy areas and 3) group hands token positions to other actors. For example, the MB in Egypt is coded as dominant in 2013. During this time, MB members occupied the presidency, the parliament (both the lower and upper houses) and held many ministerial posts (Brown 2013). The cabinet itself only included members of the MB's political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, along with some token positions for close allies (Abdel Ghafar & Hess 2018: 21). During this period, the MB had almost unlimited control over the state as exemplified by the decision of President Morsi to sack the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, who were both at the helm of the SCAF that ruled Egypt after Mubarak's fall.

Groups are coded as 'monopoly' if they meet the following two criteria: 1) group representatives occupy all executive posts in the presidency, government and parliament and 2) group representatives have *an unlimited* degree of influence of and control over *all* policy areas. None of the ideological groups studied is coded as such.

Online Appendix 4. Group Coding Example: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (2005-2016)

To elaborate on the coding decisions, I present the full coding trajectory of one group namely the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The MB is a representative of participatory Islamists. More than any other group, the MB is illustrative for showing variance in power relations from informal toleration to repression before 2011, and from formal recognition to dominance and once again repression after 2011, which is useful to illustrate the logic of coding for each coding scheme.

The MB is coded as *informally tolerated* between 2005-2006.[7] Despite being denied the right to form a political party, the regime tolerated both the social and political activities of the MB prior to 2007. They had a sophisticated, hierarchical organizational structure. The Supreme Guide and his two deputies led the group. The Guidance Bureau, a 15-member body, served as the executive arm. Additionally, smaller units worked at the governorate, city, village and even settlement levels all over Egypt (Albrecht & Wegner 2006: 130). Moreover, the MB operated a network of social organizations including hospitals, schools and charities across Egypt (Brooke 2019).

Most importantly, the MB were allowed to field individual candidates in elections including the 2005 parliamentary elections and in elections of professional syndicates (Fattah 2013: 299; Allinson 2015: 304). In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the MB won 17 seats before winning 88 parliamentary seats (20 percent of total seats) in the 2005 parliamentary elections. While MB members were subject to harassment particularly during elections times, they never faced a repressive reflex similar to that in the 1960s or to what happened in late 2006 (Albrecht 2005: 386).

[7] Similar to the EPR and other datasets, changes in status of one group are recorded in the dataset in the following year. For example, the movement of the MB from repressed to formally recognized, while happened in 2011 after the fall of Mubarak and the registration of their Freedom and Justice Party, it only appears in the dataset in 2012.

The MB is coded as *repressed* between 2007-2011. The background for such change in status started in December 2006 following a student demonstration at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. At the demonstration, some student members of the MB dressed in black; covered their faces ;and had headbands that read “steadfast” (*samidun* in Arabic). A few other students performed martial arts similar to those performed by Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. State-run media labeled the demonstrators as "al-Azhar militias" with Ruz al-Yusuf, a pro-government newspaper, referring to them as "The Brothers' Army" (Stacher & Shehata 2007). This put the backstage for a wider repressive campaign against the MB. Just four days after the student demonstration, the government arrested 17 senior MB members including Khairat Al-Shatir, the second deputy guide and the third highest-ranking leader.

The MB leaders were charged with money laundering, financing banned political activity and trying to revive the Brotherhood's paramilitary wing. A month later, the government confiscated the assets of several MB senior members (Albrecht 2013). Mubarak even ordered the military trial of Al-Shatir and 39 other MB leaders. This was an escalatory step given that no civilians had been tried in front of military courts since 2001 (al-Awadi 2009). This hard stance of the regime towards the MB continued until the fall of Mubarak in 2011.

In 2012, the MB is coded as *formally recognized*. After the January 25 Revolution in 2011, the MB for the first time in their history founded their own political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, in April 2011. The party was headed by senior MB members who left their positions in the MB’s Guidance Bureau. This formal recognition, argues Tadros (2017: 272), was part of a political settlement between the MB and the Senior Council for Armed Forces (SCAF).

In 2013, the MB is coded as *dominant* for occupying the presidency, the parliament (both the lower and upper houses) and for holding several ministerial posts (Brown 2013). The cabinet

itself only included members of the MB's political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, along with some token positions for close allies (Abdel Ghafar & Hess 2018: 21). During this period, the MB had almost unlimited control over the state. This is exemplified by the decision of President Morsi to sack the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, who were both at the helm of the SCAF that ruled Egypt after Mubarak's fall (Brown 2013).

Finally, the MB is coded again as *repressed* between 2014-2016. Following the ouster of President Morsi, the regime raged an unprecedented violent backlash against the MB, killing 1,150 demonstrators in five open-fire, mass killings which amount to be crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch 2014: 5). Between July 2013 and January 2014, more than 17,000 Egyptians were wounded in 1,100 demonstrations and clashes (Dunne & Williamson 2014). Later in 2013, the Egyptian government banned the MB and seized its assets, based on a court ruling that labeled the MB as a terrorist organization (Kingsley 2013). The Egyptian government seems determined, El-Sherif (2014) argues, to completely dismantle the MB as an organization.

Online Appendix 5. Arab Opposition Power Relations Dataset[8]

Country	Country Code	Year	Liberal Secularists	Exclusionary Secularists	Participatory Islamists	Conditional Islamists
Algeria	DZA	2005	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2006	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2007	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2008	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2009	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2010	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2011	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2012	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2013	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2014	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2015	3	3	3	2
Algeria	DZA	2016	3	3	3	2
Bahrain	BHR	2005	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2006	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2007	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2008	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2009	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2010	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2011	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2012	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2013	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2014	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2015	3	3	3	3
Bahrain	BHR	2016	3	3	3	3
Egypt	EGY	2005	1	3	2	2
Egypt	EGY	2006	1	3	2	2
Egypt	EGY	2007	1	3	1	2
Egypt	EGY	2008	1	3	1	2
Egypt	EGY	2009	1	3	1	2
Egypt	EGY	2010	1	3	1	2
Egypt	EGY	2011	1	3	1	2
Egypt	EGY	2012	3	3	3	3
Egypt	EGY	2013	3	3	6	3
Egypt	EGY	2014	3	5	1	3
Egypt	EGY	2015	1	3	1	3
Egypt	EGY	2016	1	3	1	3
Jordan	JOR	2005	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2006	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2007	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2008	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2009	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2010	3	3	3	2

[8] The dataset in excel format is available on the website of *Mediterranean Politics.*

Jordan	JOR	2011	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2012	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2013	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2014	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2015	3	3	3	2
Jordan	JOR	2016	3	3	3	2
Kuwait	KWT	2005	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2006	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2007	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2008	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2009	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2010	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2011	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2012	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2013	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2014	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2015	3	3	3	3
Kuwait	KWT	2016	3	3	3	3
Libya	LBY	2005	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2006	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2007	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2008	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2009	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2010	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2011	1	1	1	1
Libya	LBY	2012	5	5	5	3
Libya	LBY	2013	5	5	5	3
Libya	LBY	2014	5	5	5	3
Libya	LBY	2015	5	5	5	3
Libya	LBY	2016	5	5	5	3
Morocco	MAR	2005	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2006	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2007	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2008	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2009	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2010	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2011	4	3	3	2
Morocco	MAR	2012	4	3	4	2
Morocco	MAR	2013	4	3	4	2
Morocco	MAR	2014	4	3	4	2
Morocco	MAR	2015	4	3	4	2
Morocco	MAR	2016	4	3	4	2
Qatar	QAT	2005	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2006	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2007	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2008	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2009	2	2	2	2

Qatar	QAT	2010	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2011	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2012	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2013	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2014	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2015	2	2	2	2
Qatar	QAT	2016	2	2	2	2
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2005	1	2	2	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2006	1	2	2	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2007	1	2	2	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2008	1	2	2	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2009	1	2	2	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2010	1	2	2	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2011	1	2	1	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2012	1	2	1	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2013	1	2	1	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2014	1	2	1	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2015	1	2	1	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2016	1	2	1	4
Syria	SYR	2005	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2006	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2007	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2008	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2009	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2010	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2011	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2012	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2013	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2014	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2015	1	3	1	2
Syria	SYR	2016	1	3	1	2
Tunisia	TUN	2005	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2006	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2007	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2008	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2009	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2010	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2011	1	3	1	1
Tunisia	TUN	2012	5	3	5	3
Tunisia	TUN	2013	5	3	5	3
Tunisia	TUN	2014	6	3	3	3
Tunisia	TUN	2015	5	5	4	3
Tunisia	TUN	2016	5	5	4	3
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2005	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2006	2	2	2	2

United Arab Emirates	ARE	2007	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2008	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2009	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2010	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2011	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2012	2	2	2	2
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2013	1	2	1	1
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2014	1	2	1	1
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2015	1	2	1	1
United Arab Emirates	ARE	2016	1	2	1	1
Yemen	YEM	2005	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2006	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2007	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2008	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2009	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2010	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2011	3	3	3	3
Yemen	YEM	2012	5	3	5	5
Yemen	YEM	2013	5	3	5	5
Yemen	YEM	2014	5	3	5	5
Yemen	YEM	2015	5	3	5	5
Yemen	YEM	2016	1	1	1	1

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