# Appendix for: The Influence Gap: Unequal Policy Responsiveness to Men and Women

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# Appendix A: Policy areas and 'Dont Know' responses

Models broken down by policy area (Table A2) suggest that the inequality in both countries is driven by foreign policy and miscellaneous (uncategorized) issues, and not issues pertaining to morality (sometimes called cultural issues). In the US, economic policy also contributes, while in Norway, economic policy appears to have been biased in the opposite direction (i.e. more in favor of women's preferences). The latter result might reflect the fact that Norway has seen significant welfare state expansion during the period under study (part of the economic policy realm), and such policies tend to receive more support among women than men.

Table A1: Gender gap in responsiveness, by policy area.

| | DV: Policy adopted within 4 years of survey (1, 0) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | U.S. Economy | U.S. Moral | U.S. Foreign | U.S. Other | Norway Economy | Norway Moral | Norway Foreign | Norway Other |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Overall support | 0.563*** | 0.782*** | 0.759*** | 0.317*** | 0.368* | 0.163 | 0.803*** | 0.476* |
| | (0.074) | (0.173) | (0.101) | (0.087) | (0.190) | (0.148) | (0.224) | (0.255) |
| Diff. Men-Women | 0.599** | −0.268 | 1.569*** | 0.672*** | −1.267** | −0.029 | 1.254** | 1.946*** |
| | (0.237) | (0.382) | (0.224) | (0.203) | (0.610) | (0.355) | (0.536) | (0.467) |
| Constant | −0.025 | −0.219** | 0.067 | 0.048 | 0.165* | 0.136* | −0.047 | −0.005 |
| | (0.044) | (0.103) | (0.055) | (0.051) | (0.098) | (0.078) | (0.109) | (0.136) |
| Observations | 944 | 183 | 568 | 560 | 108 | 164 | 68 | 55 |
| $R^2$ | 0.058 | 0.109 | 0.132 | 0.032 | 0.084 | 0.008 | 0.230 | 0.292 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Linear probability models. Variables beginning with 'Diff.' measure the support difference between two groups, calculated as (support of group A) - (support of group B). The 'Economy' area refers to policies partaining to the economy and social welfare (which are treated as seperate categories in Gilens (2012)).

Table A2: How the probability of policy adoption is affected by preference difference between men and women (gender gap in responsiveness), with Dont Know's included (support is then calculated as the number of people who favored the policy divided by the number of people who either favored, opposed, or answered dont know).

| | DV: Policy adopted within 4 years of survey (1, 0) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | U.S. | U.S. | Norway | Norway |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Overall support | 0.359*** | 0.495*** | 0.107 | 0.132 |
| | (0.049) | (0.050) | (0.152) | (0.150) |
| Diff. Men-Women | | 1.114*** | | 0.874*** |
| | | (0.123) | | (0.298) |
| Constant | 0.126*** | 0.044 | 0.195*** | 0.170** |
| | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.075) | (0.074) |
| Observations | 2,255 | 2,255 | 205 | 205 |
| $R^2$ | 0.023 | 0.058 | 0.002 | 0.043 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Linear probability models. Variables beginning with 'Diff.' measure the support difference between two groups, calculated as (support of group A) - (support of group B).

# Appendix B: Policy responsiveness to men and women on the issues where preferences diverge




Figure B1: Policy responsiveness to men and women at different cutoff-points for preference gap. Note: Regression coefficients from bivariate OLS models estimated the same way as the models reported in Appendix Table B1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In Figure B1, it is striking to see for the US panel that on the issues where the preferences of men and women diverge by more than 11 or 12 percentage point, there is little responsiveness to the preferences of men and significant *negative* responsiveness to the preferences of women (in other words, there is low responsiveness to overall opinion: b=-0.32, se=-0.16). What explains this pattern? It is important to keep in mind that small non-random subsets of larger datasets often will have idiosyncrasies on important variables

Table B1: Policy reponsiveness to men and women when their preferences diverge.

| | United States | | Norway | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Effect (OLS coefficient) | 0.29** | -0.22** | 0.84*** | 0.3 |
| Standard error | 0.15 | 0.1 | 0.28 | 0.26 |
| P-value | .046 | .026 | .004 | .249 |
| Predicted probability of policy change at 20% support | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.13 | 0.28 |
| Predicted probability of policy change at 80% support | 0.39 | 0.25 | 0.64 | 0.46 |
| Relative change in probability | 1.8 | 0.7 | 4.8 | 1.6 |
| Observations | 466 | 466 | 98 | 98 |

*Note:*
Bivariate OLS models on subsetted data. Observations are the policy proposals where support diverge by more than 10 percentage points between men and women. For these subsets, the overall adoption rate is 30.9% in the US data, 35.7% in the Norwegian data. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

making them not fully comparable to the larger dataset. This means that one cannot necessarily generalize findings from small subsets to apply for the larger data as a whole. This is one obvious drawback of the subsetting method when estimating responsiveness. What are the idiosyncrasies in this case? The subset of the US data where men and women diverge by more than 12 percentage points have roughly the same adoption rate as the full dataset (28.4% vs. 31.2% in the full data); policy question are distributed very similarly across time ($M$=1990/1991, $Q1$=1982/1983, $Q3$=2000/2000); and the share of 'Dont Know' responses (a plausible measure of saliency) is similar (6.8% vs. 7.9%). Where the subset differs from the mother data is on policy area. It is well known that there tends to be large opinion differences between men and women when it comes to guns and the use of force (Page and Shapiro 1992:295). It is therefore no surprise that the subset contains much larger shares of questions about the topics "foreign policy" (28%) and "guns" (18%) than the full data (foreign policy: 16%; guns: 4%).

What is puzzling however, is that for the full dataset, these areas do not show particularly low responsiveness to overall opinion (b_foreign=0.54; b_guns=0.49). It is thus something about the specific policies where men and women disagree on these topics that makes for the low overall responsiveness. To find out which specific policies are driving the low responsiveness, we must look at the adopted policies with low overall support, and the non-adopted policies with high support. A qualitative assesment of these proposals suggest that in the adopted category, they largely consist of military aid and US military missions that had very low popular support (<30%; such as aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and bombing in Vietnam). The non-adopted category largely consists of proposals to restrict gun laws (e.g. by mandating safety locks) that were very popular (>70%), but were still not adopted.

Because of these differences in topical distribution and overall responsiveness between the high disagreement subsets and the overall dataset, these subsets are probably not very informative about the *levels* of responsiveness to men and women in general. However, they can still be informative about the *inequality* of responsiveness between the genders;

and, consistent with the results presented in the manuscript, policy outcomes appear to be considerably *more* out of tune with the preferences of women than the preferences of men.

# Appendix C: Policy responsiveness at the intersections of income and gender

Because of the structure of mine and Gilens' (2012) data, estimating policy responsiveness at particular combinations of income and gender is not as straightforward as it may seem. Specifically, the datasets have an aggregate structure in which observations are survey items, and not respondents. For each survey item, the datasets contain information about 1) the number of respondents who support/oppose a policy change by household income percentile, and 2) that same information broken down by gender; bot no information about the relationship between income and gender. In order to estimate policy preferences for combinations of income and gender, I adopted a solution that is equivalent to the one Gilens used when looking at combinations of income and education (Gilens 2012:93–95). Hence, I estimated the joint relationship between gender and income on policy support from a variance-covariance matrix for every survey item. The datasets contain almost all the necessary components for this: they have the covariance of gender and policy support, and income and policy support. What is missing is the covariance between gender and income. I estimated this from each of the countries' national election study series (NES) for all the relevant years. While Gilens (2012) used the General Social Survey (GSS) for the covariance between income and education, there is no such equivalent for Norway, and since the GSS only goes back to 1972, I used the election studies instead. Since these are only implemented in tandem with elections, I imputed the gender-income covariance for the in-between years using locally estimated scatter plot smoothing (LOESS).

How reliable is the approach of using income-gender-covariances from NES data in the variance-covariance matrices? One way to get at this, is to compare the variances obtained from the election study data with those that are in the opinion-policy datasets. Such a comparison is shown in Figure C1. We see that the variances for gender are virtually identical across the two data sources. Income also shows quite similar variances across the

two sources, albeit in both countries the variances from the NES are somewhat lower.[1] This could have something to do with the NES surveys typically using larger samples, and a higher number of income categories, than the commercial polls that constitute the opinion-policy datasets. The NES variances are also somewhat more stable over time, but this is at least partially an artifact of the LOESS method used to fill in non-election years. Overall, the variances from the NES data appear to be fairly good approximations of the variances in the opinion-policy datasets, which is one indication that the covariances between income and gender might not be so different across the two sources.




Figure C1: Variances for income and gender from two different data sources. Note: NES variances for every year estimad using LOESS, opinion-policy dataset variances are the average variances each year.

For each survey item then, I used the now complete variance-covariance matrix to estimate an OLS regression model with policy support as DV, and income, income squared, and gender as IV's. From this model, I predicted the policy support of men and women at the 10th, 50th and 90th income percentile. In a second application of this approach, I predicted support from a model that also included the interactions *income and gender* and

[1]The income variable categories have been transformed to percentile midpoints in both survey income distributions for comparability.

*income squared and gender*.

Before estimating policy responsiveness to these combinations of income and gender, in order to deal with the high correlation between the opinion measures, I adopted the same solution as Gilens (2012) did for education and income: namely subsetting the data to only include policy proposals where preferences diverged by more than 10 percentage points either between men and women, or between the 90th and the 10th income percentile. This leaves us with 1161 observations for the US and 207 observations for Norway.

Table C1 shows the full regression results for the 12 bivariate linear probability models where I regress policy outcome on the imputed support of each combination of gender and income and country (visualized in Figure 4 in the manuscript). Table C2 shows this same table, but with imputed support based on the alternative model that include the interactions *income and gender* and *income squared and gender*. As shown in Table C3, average preference divergence is actually *higher* among affluent women and men than middle-class women and men, in both the US and Norway. Because of this, responsiveness is in fact more gender equal at the top of the income distribution when holding the men-women preference divergence constant across income groups (i.e. Table C1, and Figure 4 in the manuscript), than when it is allowed to vary (Table C2).

How much is the gender gap in responsiveness diminished when taking into account gender differences in income? In the manuscript, I used a control variable approach (Table 4) showing that the gender gap in the US was only marginally reduced when controlling for income differences in responsiveness, while in Norway the gender gap disappeared completely. An alternative way to estimate this is to use the information in Table C1 here. With this, we can compare difference in the responsiveness coefficients of men and women at the same levels of income, with the difference between men and women overall (not accounting for income). Using this approach, the gap between the coefficients for men and women in the US is reduced by an estimated 24% when adjusting for income differences. In Norway it is reduced by 49%. This can be interpreted as gender income differences explaining more of the

observed unequal responsiveness between men and women in Norway than in the US. This results, although less dramatic than the results from the control variable method employed in the manuscript, suggest, like those results, that income differences explain a lot of the observed gender inequality in responsiveness in Norway, but less in the US.

Table C1: Full regression results for Figure 4: Policy responsiveness to men and women by income percentile and country.

| | Effect (OLS coefficient) | Standard error | Predicted probability of policy change at 20% support | Predicted probability of policy change at 80% support | Relative change in probability | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **US: Men** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | 0.18** | 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 1.4 | 1161 |
| Income P50 | 0.39*** | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.41 | 2.3 | 1161 |
| Income P90 | 0.45*** | 0.07 | 0.16 | 0.43 | 2.7 | 1161 |
| **US: Women** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 0.31 | 0.3 | 1 | 1161 |
| Income P50 | 0.12* | 0.07 | 0.27 | 0.34 | 1.3 | 1161 |
| Income P90 | 0.23*** | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 1.6 | 1161 |
| **Norway: Men** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 1.1 | 207 |
| Income P50 | 0.45** | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.46 | 2.4 | 207 |
| Income P90 | 0.6*** | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.51 | 3.3 | 207 |
| **Norway: Women** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | -0.03 | 0.15 | 0.32 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 207 |
| Income P50 | 0.28* | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.41 | 1.7 | 207 |
| Income P90 | 0.55*** | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.5 | 3 | 207 |

*Note:*
Linear probability models. Observations are the proposed policy changes where preference diverge by more than 10 percentage points either between men and women or between the 90th and 10th income percentile in each country respectively. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C2: Policy responsiveness to men and women by income percentile and country, with support variables estimated using an interaction term

| | Effect (OLS coefficient) | Standard error | Predicted probability of policy change at 20% support | Predicted probability of policy change at 80% support | Relative change in probability | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **US: Men** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | 0.19** | 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 1.5 | 1161 |
| Income P50 | 0.39*** | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.41 | 2.3 | 1161 |
| Income P90 | 0.44*** | 0.07 | 0.16 | 0.42 | 2.6 | 1161 |
| **US: Women** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 0.31 | 0.3 | 1 | 1161 |
| Income P50 | 0.11* | 0.07 | 0.27 | 0.34 | 1.3 | 1161 |
| Income P90 | 0.24*** | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 1.6 | 1161 |
| **Norway: Men** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 0.3 | 0.33 | 1.1 | 207 |
| Income P50 | 0.43** | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.45 | 2.3 | 207 |
| Income P90 | 0.62*** | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.52 | 3.5 | 207 |
| **Norway: Women** | | | | | | |
| Income P10 | -0.03 | 0.15 | 0.32 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 207 |
| Income P50 | 0.28* | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 207 |
| Income P90 | 0.51*** | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.49 | 2.7 | 207 |

*Note:*
Linear probability models. Observations are the proposed policy changes where preference diverge by more than 10 percentage points either between men and women or between the 90th and 10th income percentile in each country respectively. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C3: Mean absolute support distance (in %-points) between men and women, by income group

| Income group | United States | Norway |
|---|---|---|
| P10 (poor) | 6.6 | 7.1 |
| P50 (middle) | 6.0 | 6.8 |
| P90 (affluent) | 6.6 | 7.4 |

*Note:*
Support for each gender/income combination imputed based on the variance/covariance procedure that included an interaction term (described in Appendix C).

Table C4: Policy responsiveness to men and women before and after adjusting for income

| | United States | | | Norway | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Estimate | Men | Women | Gap | Men | Women | Gap |
| A. Unadjusted effects and gap | 0.4*** | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.46** | 0.25 | 0.21 |
| B. Both at low income (P10) | 0.18** | -0.01 | 0.19 | 0.07 | -0.03 | 0.1 |
| C. Both at median income (P50) | 0.39*** | 0.12* | 0.27 | 0.45** | 0.28* | 0.17 |
| D. Both at high income (P90) | 0.45*** | 0.23*** | 0.22 | 0.6*** | 0.55*** | 0.05 |
| E. Average adjusted gap | | | 0.23 | | | 0.11 |
| F. Change in gap (row A to E) | | | -24.4 % | | | -49.2 % |

# Appendix D: Interactions with time and share of women in parliament




Figure D1: Gender gap in policy responsiveness over time. Note: Conditional effects based on the regression models reported in Table 5 (models 1 and 4). Upper and lower lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Table D1: Full regression results for 'Table 5: Gender gap in responsiveness conditioned by time and the share of women in parliament' for the United States.

| | DV: Policy adopted within 4 years of survey (1, 0) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | U.S. | U.S. | U.S. | U.S. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Diff. Men-Women | 1.002*** | 0.926*** | 0.808*** | 0.886** |
| | (0.123) | (0.143) | (0.301) | (0.352) |
| Year | −0.004*** | | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| | (0.001) | | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Women MP% | | −1.219*** | −2.155*** | −2.149*** |
| | | (0.195) | (0.638) | (0.649) |
| Overall support | 0.575*** | 0.636*** | 0.593*** | 0.619*** |
| | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.109) | (0.114) |
| Diff. P90-P50 | | | | 0.120 |
| | | | | (0.323) |
| Diff. P50-P10 | | | | −0.017 |
| | | | | (0.311) |
| Diff. Men-Women x Year | −0.009 | | 0.016 | −0.007 |
| | (0.011) | | (0.037) | (0.044) |
| Overall sup. x Year | 0.007* | | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| | (0.004) | | (0.013) | (0.014) |
| Diff. Men-Women x W. MP% | | −2.192 | −5.721 | 3.946 |
| | | (2.500) | (8.503) | (10.644) |
| Overall sup. x W. MP% | | 1.993** | 0.833 | 1.173 |
| | | (0.961) | (3.171) | (3.445) |
| Diff. P90-P50 x Year | | | | 0.043 |
| | | | | (0.041) |
| Diff. P50-P10 x Year | | | | −0.013 |
| | | | | (0.039) |
| Diff. P90-P50 x W. MP% | | | | −13.370 |
| | | | | (9.929) |
| Diff. P50-P10 x W. MP% | | | | −1.603 |
| | | | | (9.349) |
| Constant | 0.306*** | 0.268*** | 0.237*** | 0.239*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| Observations | 2,255 | 2,255 | 2,255 | 2,255 |
| $R^2$ | 0.074 | 0.078 | 0.079 | 0.087 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Linear probability models. Variables beginning with 'Diff' measure the support difference between two groups, calculated as (support of group A) - (support of group B). P90, P50 and P10 represent the 90th, 50th and 10th income percentile (90th is the richest). The variables overall support, year, and Women MP% have been centered on their overall means for the combined dataset.

Table D2: Full regression results for 'Table 5: Gender gap in responsiveness conditioned by time and the share of women in parliament' for Norway.

| | DV: Policy adopted within 4 years of survey (1, 0) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Norway | Norway | Norway | Norway |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Diff. Men-Women | 0.473* | 1.512*** | 1.529 | 2.387* |
| | (0.241) | (0.571) | (1.057) | (1.297) |
| Year | −0.004** | | −0.003 | −0.004 |
| | (0.002) | | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Women MP% | | −0.552** | −0.156 | −0.081 |
| | | (0.239) | (0.508) | (0.516) |
| Overall support | 0.334*** | 0.784*** | 0.417 | 0.415 |
| | (0.104) | (0.196) | (0.438) | (0.444) |
| Diff. P90-P50 | | | | −0.648 |
| | | | | (1.298) |
| Diff. P50-P10 | | | | −0.778 |
| | | | | (1.549) |
| Diff. Men-Women x Year | −0.032* | | 0.0005 | 0.046 |
| | (0.019) | | (0.038) | (0.044) |
| Overall sup. x Year | −0.019** | | −0.016 | −0.016 |
| | (0.008) | | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Diff. Men-Women x W. MP% | | −5.380* | −5.499 | −12.677* |
| | | (2.737) | (5.355) | (6.564) |
| Overall sup. x W. MP% | | −2.284** | −0.430 | −0.317 |
| | | (1.018) | (2.167) | (2.217) |
| Diff. P90-P50 x Year | | | | −0.056 |
| | | | | (0.050) |
| Diff. P50-P10 x Year | | | | −0.022 |
| | | | | (0.057) |
| Diff. P90-P50 x W. MP% | | | | 7.250 |
| | | | | (6.412) |
| Diff. P50-P10 x W. MP% | | | | 7.305 |
| | | | | (7.647) |
| Constant | 0.283*** | 0.389*** | 0.313*** | 0.308*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.047) | (0.100) | (0.103) |
| Observations | 395 | 395 | 395 | 395 |
| $R^2$ | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.079 | 0.117 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Linear probability models. Variables beginning with 'Diff' measure the support difference between two groups, calculated as (support of group A) - (support of group B). P90, P50 and P10 represent the 90th, 50th and 10th income percentile (90th is the richest). The variables overall support, year, and Women MP% have been centered on their overall means for the combined dataset.

Table D3: Gender gap in responsiveness conditioned by time and the share of women in top 1 percent of the income distribution

| | DV: Policy adopted within 4 years of survey (1, 0) |
|---|---|
| | U.S. |
| Diff. Men-Women | 0.980*** |
| | (0.123) |
| Women% in Top 1% | −1.560*** |
| | (0.238) |
| Overall support | 0.583*** |
| | (0.049) |
| Diff. Men-Women x W.% in Top 1% | −2.885 |
| | (3.029) |
| Overall support x W.% in Top 1% | 2.352** |
| | (1.171) |
| Constant | 0.301*** |
| | (0.010) |
| Observations | 2,255 |
| $R^2$ | 0.079 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Linear probability models. Variables beginning with 'Diff' measure the support difference between two groups, calculated as (support of group A) - (support of group B). The variables overall support, and Top 1% have been centered on their overall means for the combined dataset. Analysis performed only for the United States since data on the share of women in the top 1 percent in Norway only go back as far as 1990.




Figure D2: Gender gap in policy responsiveness as the share of women in parliament increases, non-linear effect. Note: Conditional effects based on regression models like those reported in Table D1 (models 1 and 4), but where each unique value of the share of women in parliament is treated as a dummy.

# Appendix E: Gender equality over time in both country cases




Figure E1: The United Nations Gender Inequality Index (GII), 1995-2019 for Norway, the US, and other established democracies. Note: Other countries include all in Western Europe + CA, AU, NZ, and JP (n=23). Averaged across the whole time period, Norway is #6 most equal, and the US is #23. Data downloaded from https://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/68606#, May 5, 2022




Figure E2: The V-Dem Women Political Empowerment Index, 1964-2018 for Norway, the US, and other established democracies. Note: Other countries include all in Western Europe + CA, AU, NZ, and JP (n=23). Averaged across the whole time period, Norway is #3 on women's empowerment, and the US is #18.




Figure E3: Political interest by gender over time, in Norway. Note: data from the 1965 and 2005 National Election Studies. The question asked respondents 'Would you say that you generally are', and then respondents were presented with a 4-point scale from 'Very politically interested' to 'Not interested at all'. This scale was linearly transformed to range from 0 to 1. The year 1965 is the election study that is closest to the beginning of the Norwegian opnion-policy dataset (1966). The year 2005 is shown because it is our best guess for when the gender gap in responsiveness reached zero (see Figure D1). Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals.




Figure E4: Political interest by gender, in the United States and Norway. Note: data from ISSP Role of Government (2016). The question asked respondents 'How interested would you say you personally are in politics?'. The original scale was a 4-point scale from 'Not at all interested' to 'Very interested'. This scale was linearly transformed to range from 0 to 1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals. The difference in interest between men and women is 7.3pp in the US, and 6.9pp in Norway.

# Appendix F: Logistic models




Figure F1: Policy responsiveness to men and women when their preferences diverge by more than 10 percentage points in the US and Norway, logistic models.

Table F1: Policy reponsiveness to men and women when their preferences diverge, logistic models.

| | United States | | Norway | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Effect (logit coefficient) | 1.38** | -1.02** | 3.94*** | 1.31 |
| Standard error | 0.7 | 0.46 | 1.43 | 1.13 |
| P-value | .047 | .027 | .006 | .247 |
| Predicted probability of policy change at 20% support | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.16 | 0.28 |
| Predicted probability of policy change at 80% support | 0.4 | 0.25 | 0.66 | 0.46 |
| Relative change in probability | 1.8 | 0.7 | 4.3 | 1.6 |
| Observations | 466 | 466 | 98 | 98 |

*Note:*
Bivariate logistic regression models on subsetted data. Included are policy proposals where support diverged by more than 10 percentage points between men and women. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table F2: Policy reponsiveness to men and women overall, logistic models.

| | United States | | | Norway | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | Men | Women | All | Men | Women |
| Effect (logit coefficient) | 1.97*** | 2.39*** | 1.5*** | 2.03*** | 2.18*** | 1.71*** |
| Standard error | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.51 |
| P-value | <.001 | <.001 | <.001 | <.001 | <.001 | <.001 |
| Predicted probability of policy change at 20% support | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.18 |
| Predicted probability of policy change at 80% support | 0.42 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.4 | 0.41 | 0.38 |
| Relative change in probability | 2.3 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.1 |
| Observations | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 395 | 395 | 395 |

*Note:*
Bivariate logistic regression models. The observations are proposed policy changes asked about in nationally representative surveys of the US population in the period 1964-2006 (Gilens 2012), and the Norwegian population in the period 1966-2014. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the policy change was adopted within four years of the time of the survey question. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table F3: The gender gap in responsiveness when accounting for unequal responsiveness between income groups, logistic models

| | DV: Policy adopted within 4 years of survey (1, 0) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | US | US | US | Norway | Norway | Norway |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Overall support | 2.637*** | 2.156*** | 2.723*** | 2.118*** | 2.126*** | 2.105*** |
| | (0.254) | (0.247) | (0.270) | (0.538) | (0.553) | (0.555) |
| Diff. Men-Women | 4.982*** | | 4.223*** | 2.528* | | −0.741 |
| | (0.649) | | (0.757) | (1.305) | | (1.591) |
| Diff. P90-P50 | | 3.354*** | 2.174*** | | 4.031** | 4.288** |
| | | (0.653) | (0.688) | | (1.572) | (1.671) |
| Diff. P50-P10 | | 1.595*** | −0.011 | | 3.639** | 3.982** |
| | | (0.603) | (0.668) | | (1.599) | (1.764) |
| Constant | −2.288*** | −2.034*** | −2.342*** | −2.067*** | −2.049*** | −2.034*** |
| | (0.155) | (0.149) | (0.162) | (0.300) | (0.306) | (0.308) |
| Observations | 2,255 | 2,255 | 2,255 | 395 | 395 | 395 |

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Logistic regression models. Variables beginning with 'Diff.' measure the support difference between two groups, calculated as (support of group A) - (support of group B). P90, P50 and P10 represent the 90th, 50th and 10th income percentile (90th is the richest).

# References

Gilens, Martin. 2012. *Affluence and influence: Economic inequality and political power in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' policy preferences*. University of Chicago Press.