Political awareness and the identity-to-politics link in public opinion

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Abstract: Members of different social groups often hold distinctive political attitudes. Research shows substantial divides based on characteristics like religion, race, gender, and sexuality, suggesting a straightforward "identity-to-politics" link. But making that link requires some knowledge and understanding of politics, which not everyone has. As a result, I show, political awareness often moderates the link between social identity and political views. Among the least engaged, identity is only weakly related to politics, and the differences between groups are muted. As awareness increases, the connection between group membership and political attitudes tightens, and the magnitude of identity gaps grows. The substantive impact of awareness varies across groups, and there are notable exceptions to these findings. In general though, the identity-to-politics link — and thus many of the divisions attributed to demographic characteristics — is conditional on political awareness.

Members of different social groups often hold distinctive political attitudes. Research shows substantial differences in partisanship and policy preferences based on characteristics like religion (Campbell, Layman and Green, 2020; Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Layman, 2001), race and ethnicity (Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Saavedra Cisneros, 2017), gender (Conover, 1988; Ondercin, 2017; Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte, 2008), sexuality (Hertzog, 1996; Schaffner and Senic, 2006; Lewis, Rogers and Sherrill, 2011; Worthen, 2020), union membership (Frymer and Grumbach, 2021; Kim and Margalit, 2016), and military service (Klingler and Chatagnier, 2014), among others. These differences suggest a straightforward "identity-to-politics" link in public opinion (see Lee, 2008; Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Junn, 2006), echoing early research that claimed "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944, 27).

But making the link between social identity and political views requires some interest in, and understanding of, politics, which not everyone possesses to the same extent. Knowledge of "what goes with what" (Converse, 1964, 238) — or which groups are supposed to align with which political views — is far from universal (Claassen et al., 2021; Kane, Mason and Wronski, 2021). Much of the literature suggests that elite cues, party policies, and the news media help citizens link their social identities to politics. But only attentive voters are likely to be exposed to this information, leaving the less-engaged still out of the loop (Zaller, 1992, 1996).

As a result, this paper argues, the identity-to-politics link in public opinion is often moderated by political awareness.[1] I draw on pooled American National Election Studies (ANES) and Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) data to study a wider range of social groups than past research — including identities grounded in religion, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, union membership, and military veteran status. For most of these groups, the strength of the identity-to-politics link increases with political awareness. Among the least en-

[1] This is sometimes labelled sophistication, engagement, attention, or knowledge; in this paper, I treat these terms as essentially synonymous. A more formal definition follows shortly.

gaged, identities are often only loosely tied to partisanship or policy preferences. As awareness increases, the relationship between group membership and political attitudes strengthens, and the gaps between voters with different social identities widen.

The impact of awareness varies substantially across groups. Awareness is associated with particularly large increases in liberal attitudes among Black, Jewish, secular, and LGBT voters, and in conservative attitudes among evangelical Protestants. In contrast, the evidence is mixed for gender, veteran, and Hispanic identities, and there is no evidence that Asian respondents' views vary with engagement. In most cases, though, the findings show that the identity-to-politics link — and thus the attitudinal differences between social groups — is conditional on political awareness.

I begin by discussing the nature of the identity-to-politics link, before explaining why it requires some political awareness, and then the specific hypothesis tested in this study.

The identity-to-politics link in public opinion

As Lee (2008, 458) defines it, the basic premise of the identity-to-politics link is that "individuals who share a demographic label—e.g., African American, Latino, Asian American, Arab American—will also share common political goals and interests and act in concert to pursue them" (see also Junn 2006; Hajnal and Lee 2011). This idea has deep roots, with early public opinion researchers noting that different groups "think and behave politically in distinctive ways" (Campbell et al. 1960, 295; see also Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944).

Since then, numerous studies have documented substantial gaps in political attitudes based on social identity. LGBT Americans, for example, are more likely to identify as liberal Democrats, to hold progressive policy views, and to support Democratic candidates (Hertzog, 1996; Schaffner and Senic, 2006; Lewis, Rogers and Sherrill, 2011; Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor, 2017; Worthen, 2020). Likewise, research highlights the distinctively liberal views of secular (Camp-

bell, Layman and Green, 2020) and Jewish (Cohen and Liebman, 1997) Americans; Black (Dawson, 1995; White and Laird, 2020), Hispanic (Saavedra Cisneros, 2017), and Asian (Masuoka et al., 2018) Americans; women (Conover, 1988; Ondercin, 2017; Lizotte, 2020; Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte, 2008); and union members (Frymer and Grumbach, 2021; Kim and Margalit, 2016). Of course, not all social groups lean to the left. Scholars have also documented identities linked to distinctively *conservative* attitudes, including military veterans (Klingler and Chatagnier, 2014), evangelical Protestants (Layman, 2001), and men (Ondercin, 2017).

Plenty of identities — non-veterans, un-unionized workers, straight cisgender voters, etc — are unlinked to politics. There is no inevitable connection between a given demographic characteristic and distinctive attitudes (Huddy, 2001). Rather, scholars have outlined several conditions under which we should see an identity-to-politics link. These fall into two camps: those that see a direct path from identity to policy preferences, and those that envisage an indirect path via partisanship.

In the first, "direct" account, Taeku Lee (2008) outlines five steps through which membership in a social group leads to distinctive political views (see also Hajnal and Lee 2011, 114-118): (1) the group exists as a defined category; (2) individuals identify as group members; (3) members share common interests; (4) members agree that mainstream politics is the appropriate venue to pursue those interests; and (5) members agree on which parties, candidates, and policies will best further those interests. Not all social groups meet all these conditions. But on this account, the identity-to-politics link proceeds relatively directly from group membership to distinctive political attitudes via an assessment of shared interests.

A second set of accounts sees identity as *in*directly linked to politics, via partisanship (Layman, 2001; Page and Jones, 1979). In this view, group membership leads to partisan identities, which in turn shape policy preferences. For Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002, 8), for example, when developing a partisan allegiance, citizens "ask themselves two questions: What kinds of social groups come to mind as I think about Democrats, Republicans, and Indepen-

dents? Which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me?". The more voters see a party as aligned with their own social groups, the more likely they are to identify with it (Claassen et al., 2021; Mason and Wronski, 2018). And once voters adopt a party identity, they are highly likely to take on its policy positions too. In this way, identity can be linked to political attitudes far removed from group interests via its impact on partisanship (Layman, 2001, Ch.7).

Identity can lead to distinctive political attitudes directly through an evaluation of group interests, or indirectly through partisanship, or both. But making these connections requires effort. Given the public's variable interest in politics, we should not assume that everyone has what Converse (1964, 234) described as "interstitial 'linking' information" about "what goes with what". Knowledge of the parties' group coalitions varies substantially (Claassen et al., 2021; Kane, Mason and Wronski, 2021). And even early scholars who claimed that social identities "determine" political views acknowledged that "there may be many group members who are not really aware of the goals of their own group. And there may be many who, even if they were aware of these goals, would not be sufficiently interested in current events to tie the two together consciously" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944, 149; see also Converse 1964, 234-8).

So how do voters learn to link their identity with politics? Numerous accounts argue that information communicated by elites helps to make the connections clear. For example, some researchers highlight direct messages from group leaders and politicians. Dawson (1995, 57) argues that "black political and economic elites" communicate whether "a given government policy is good or bad for the racial group". Similarly, Frymer and Grumbach (2021, 229) attribute liberal racial attitudes among union members to "signals from leaders, organizers, and labor-associated Democratic candidates". Other research points to information drawn from the parties' platforms. In this vein, Turnbull-Dugarte (2020, 520) suggests that LGB liberalism is a response "to parties' positions on gay rights issues" and Cohen and Liebman (1997, 425) trace the roots of liberal Jewish attitudes in part to the Democratic Party's traditional protection of

"vulnerable minority group[s]". Elite messaging and policy stances can help voters link their social identities to political attitudes.

Media coverage of politics and the demographics of elected officials may also signal how voters are "supposed" to align their views. For example, Ondercin (2017) shows that the gender gap in partisanship varies in response to the gender composition of elected officials. Similarly, Catholics' attitudes have shifted with changes in the partisan affiliations of high-profile Catholic politicians (McDermott, 2007). More generally, news stories about how groups in the electorate vote could communicate to individuals how they themselves should think (Burden, 2008). Whether stated explicitly or not, the media may communicate what social groups "go with" what politics.

These arguments all share a common thread. Information provided by elites — group leaders, politicians, the media and others — can help voters see the links between their social identities and political views. But not everyone is equally likely to get this information. A long literature shows that elite influence on public opinion varies systematically with engagement, potentially making the identity-to-politics link conditional on voters' political awareness.

The importance of being aware

For elite communication to influence public opinion, citizens must at a minimum be exposed to it. But such exposure depends critically on voters' political awareness, "the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics *and* understands what he or she has encountered" (Zaller, 1992, 21). Following previous work, I conceptualize this as a disposition (Prior, 2019) — a "general propensity for reception of news and public affairs information" (Zaller, 1996, 22) rather than attention to any particular story or source. Highly aware voters are those who are chronically attuned to news media and more likely to be exposed to political information in general.

This general attention to politics increases the likelihood that individuals receive messages and cues from "trusted opinion leaders who bundle attitudes in ideological packages" (Kalmoe and Johnson, 2021, 3). Inattentive citizens are unlikely to come across such information, or to comprehend it fully if they do. Highly aware voters, in contrast, are more likely to get the message and incorporate it into their own thinking (Zaller, 1992, 1996; Margolis, 2018, Ch. 6). As a result, politically aware voters are more likely to connect their predispositions and values to political views in ways that echo elite rhetoric (Federico and Sidanius, 2002; Claassen and Highton, 2009; Jones and Brewer, 2020).

Of particular relevance to this paper, highly aware citizens are more likely to know which social identities "go with" which political views. The more politically attentive are more likely to describe parties in terms of their group coalitions (Rothschild et al., 2019), to correctly identify the leanings of religious identifiers (Campbell, Layman and Green, 2020, Ch. 5), to be aware of partisan stereotypes about demographic groups (Burden, 2008) and to infer issue positions based on candidates' gender (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). More aware voters are more likely to see the links that elites draw between social groups and political attitudes.

Might awareness also help voters link their *own* social identities to politics in this way? Some previous research supports this line of reasoning, although the evidence is mixed and often rests on analysis of a single identity group. For example, more attentive LGB people are more likely to vote for Democrats (Lewis, Rogers and Sherrill, 2011); more aware religious traditionalists to vote Republican (Layman, 2001, Ch.7). For other groups, the results are less consistent. Saavedra Cisneros (2017, Ch. 7) finds that greater awareness among Hispanic voters leads them to more strongly identify as Democrats; other work suggests it leads to Republican identification (Hajnal and Lee, 2011, Ch. 6). Finally, Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996, Ch.6) report that differences in policy preferences between groups (such as the gender gap on abortion, or religious gaps on LGB rights) often increase with political knowledge.

These studies mostly limit their focus to one identity type, or a specific policy area, at a

time. Whether awareness strengthens the link between social identities and political views more generally is unknown. I propose the following hypothesis:

H1: Among members of politically-aligned groups, greater awareness is associated with more group-consistent partisanship and policy preferences.

H1 is formulated broadly, and so I note several points here. Although I follow calls for political psychology to study a broader range of groups (e.g., Huddy, 2001), the survey data I use still only ask about a limited number. For clarity, Table 1 lists each of the identities included in these analyses.

H1's expectations for each group are based on its partisan alignment. For Republican-aligned groups, greater awareness should be associated with more conservative policy preferences and Republican partisanship. For Democratic-aligned groups, greater awareness should lead to more *liberal* and *Democratic* views. H1 makes no predictions for groups without a partisan alignment, since elite messaging about those identities' politics is mixed or non-existent.

Following the identity-to-politics link literature, decisions about a group's political alignment were made based on three sources: (1) previous academic research; (2) the party affiliation of elected officials from the group; and (3) the vote choice of group members in presidential elections. Details are in online appendix A1, but take evangelical Protestants as one example. Their categorization as Republican-aligned is based on (1) research that documents the ties between the GOP and evangelical groups (e.g., Layman, 2001); (2) evidence that around 90% of evangelical Members of Congress identify as Republicans (Mathew, 2018); and (3) evidence that evangelical voters lean Republican, voting for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton by 37 points according to the 2016 CCES. I therefore count evangelical Protestants as a Republican-aligned group, and expect more aware evangelicals to hold more conservative/Republican views. Similar assessments are made for each identity.[2]

[2] Most cases are clear-cut. An argument could be made for White identity being Republican-aligned (see Jardina

Table 1: Social identity groups studied in this article and hypothetical expectations

	Social identity group	Group more aligned with	Relative to less aware members, H1 expects more aware members to be
Religion	Evangelical Protestants	Republican Party	More conservative/Republican
	Jewish respondents	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Secular respondents	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Mainline Protestants	Neither party	No expectations
	Catholics	Neither party	No expectations
Race/ethnicity	Black respondents	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Hispanic respondents	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Asian respondents	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	White respondents	Neither party	No expectations
Gender	Women	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Men	Republican Party	More conservative/Republican
Sexuality	LGBT respondents	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Straight cisgender respondents	Neither party	No expectations
Union membership	Union members	Democratic Party	More liberal/Democratic
	Non-members	Neither party	No expectations
Veteran status	Veterans	Republican Party	More conservative/Republican
	Non-veterans	Neither party	No expectations

Note: See online appendix A1 for details of how each group's partisan alignment was decided.

Finally, H1 makes no predictions about which identities are most strongly linked to politics. It is agnostic about whether we should see greater differences associated with race than with gender, for example Its claim is just that *within* each party-aligned group, more politically aware members are more likely to hold attitudes consistent with the group. I return to possible explanations for the varying impact of awareness on different groups after presenting the main results.

2019), and this group voted for Trump by 13 points. There are few elite cues about how White voters should behave, however, and majorities of both parties' officeholders are White. I therefore count them as unaligned.

Putting identity, politics, and awareness in order

Although most of the literature assumes identities shape political views, recent scholarship suggests that causal path can be reversed. Egan (2020), for example, uses GSS panel data to show that some respondents change their reported identities over time to match their political beliefs. Liberal Democrats in early waves were more likely to switch into claiming LGB, secular, Black, Asian, and Hispanic identities later on; conservative Republicans to later claim Protestant and born-again identities (see also Margolis, 2018, for similar findings on religion). H1 is deliberately agnostic about whether identity leads to politics or vice versa: all it says is that awareness should strengthen the link between them. After all, any pressure to align identity and politics (in whichever order) rests on knowing how they are *supposed* to be linked — which is more likely for the most engaged (Margolis, 2018, Ch.6).

The identities studied here do, however, vary in their likely endogeneity to politics. Some tend to be transmitted from parent to child (like race and ethnicity) and thus developed prior to political attitudes; others acquired in adolescence (like LGBT identity) or adulthood (like union membership and veteran status) and thus formed after political views (Egan, 2012). They also vary in how fluid and influenced by politics they are, as Egan (2020) documents. Although the focus of this paper is on how awareness moderates the relationship between identities and political views, I also examine how its impact varies across groups.

This raises questions about where in the causal order awareness falls, however. Previous research sees it as "a relatively long-term and stable characteristic of individuals" (Claassen and Highton, 2009, p539) that is unlikely to change in response to political views. A related concept, interest in politics, likewise shows "immense individual-level stability" over time (Prior, 2019, 352). In terms of its development in the life cycle, the roots of awareness appear to lie in childhood (Prior, 2019) or genetics (Arceneaux, Johnson and Maes, 2012). This suggests

awareness comes temporally prior to, and is exogenous from, political views.[3]

Ultimately, determining the causal relationships between these three variables is beyond the scope of this paper. H1 poses a more modest and first-order question: does awareness moderate the link between identity and politics? At the same time, the range of identities studied offers some leverage on the impact of awareness on different groups, which I turn to after the main analyses.

Data and methods

I use pooled CCES data from 2016 and 2018, and pooled ANES data from 2008, 2012, and 2016. Unlike other potential sources, these surveys (1) included numerous attitudinal items; (2) measured political awareness; and (3) interviewed enough respondents to create large subsamples of identity groups (in the CCES, there are 124,600 total respondents; in the ANES, 12,506). Descriptive statistics and question wordings are in online appendix A2. I analyze each dataset separately, but the coding of variables is largely consistent across sources.

Political attitudes: I constructed two dependent variables from each survey, coded to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more liberal responses. *Party identity* was measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from Strong Republican (0) to Strong Democrat (1). *Policy preferences* is an index of attitudes on multiple issues, with at least 18 items from each survey. Each item was coded to range between 0 (most conservative position) and 1 (most liberal), and then a simple mean taken. Cronbach's alpha ranged from .84 to .94, depending on the survey, suggesting these form reliable indices.[4]

Respondent identities: *Religion* is coded as mainline Protestant (the reference category

[3] A further complication is that identity *strength* could be related to awareness, if those who feel more closely linked to a group are more likely to learn about politics as a result. I discuss this possibility, and some evidence bearing on it, at the end of the paper.

[4] Additional models using ideology and presidential vote choice as dependent variables reached similar substantive conclusions as those presented here; results are in online appendix A4.

in models); evangelical Protestant; Catholic; Jewish; secular; and those of other religions. In both surveys, respondents were asked directly if they identified as Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, among other faiths. To distinguish between evangelical and mainline Protestants, the ANES data rely on the specific church respondents belonged to, the CCES data on a follow-up question asking if respondents identified as evangelical. "Secular" respondents are those who said they never attended religious services and did not think of themselves as part of a religion (in the ANES), or those who selected atheist, agnostic, or "nothing in particular" when asked to describe their religion (in the CCES). *Race and ethnicity* is coded as White (the reference category); Black; Hispanic; Asian; and those of other races. *Gender* is a binary variable, with values of 1 for women, 0 for men. For *LGBT* identities, both surveys measured sexual orientation, but only the CCES included transgender identities. For ease of exposition, I use the term "LGBT" to discuss the results, but note that the ANES estimates for LGBT people do not include transgender respondents who identified as straight. *Union membership* is an indicator variable, with 1 signifying those in a union, 0 everyone else. *Veteran* is likewise coded as 1 for those who served in the military, 0 otherwise.

Political awareness: Following previous work (e.g., Zaller, 1992, 1996; Federico and Sidanius, 2002; Kalmoe and Johnson, 2021), I use an index of items capturing factual knowledge of, and self-reported attention to, politics. In keeping with the conceptualization of awareness as "habitual news reception" (Zaller, 1996, 22) these measure general political information and engagement rather than attention to specific sources or events.[5] Each survey included between ten and seventeen such items (Cronbach's alpha ranged from 0.72 to 0.89). I took each respondent's average score, and then calculated their percentile ranking within their survey, to create a measure that is comparable across datasets. These percentile scores were divided by

[5] General knowledge items have limitations, not least that varying item salience can inflate differences between groups (Pérez, 2015*a*). Models that measure awareness just with attention to politics, however, yield the same substantive results (see online appendix A4). In general though, researchers should be cautious when comparing social groups on the basis of knowledge items alone.

100, so the variable ranges from 0 (least aware) to 1 (most aware). Full details are in online appendix A3.[6]

Other covariates: All models control for other characteristics. To measure *income* comparably, respondents are coded into quintiles by survey year: the resulting scale runs from 1 (poorest fifth) to 5 (richest). *Education* is a five-category variable (those with less than high school; high school; some college; a BA; or advanced degree). An indicator variable references currently *married* respondents. *Age* is measured in years. *Religiosity* is based on how often the respondent attends religious services, ranging from 1 (never) to 6 (more than once a week). *Region* is coded as South (the reference level), Midwest, Northeast, or West, based on Census definitions of each state. I also control for the survey year, given these are pooled data.

Models and presentation of results: Separate linear regression models are fitted for each dependent variable and dataset. Survey weights are used throughout. All of the identity measures are interacted with political awareness. Coefficients and standard errors are shown in online appendix A4. Results are presented here as predicted values: I simulate each model with control variables held at their mean or modal value and calculate predicted party identity and policy preferences on the 0–1 linear scale, given different levels of awareness. As examples of "less" and "more" aware voters, in the text I discuss estimates for those in the 10th and 90th awareness percentiles, respectively.

[6] Regression models predicting political awareness, shown in online appendix A3, find small but significant differences between groups. As in previous work, (e.g., Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996, Ch.4), the largest gaps are based on gender (where women are estimated to score .10 points lower than men on the 0–1 scale) and race (where Black respondents score .05 points, and Asian respondents .06 points, lower than Whites). None of the other differences are greater than 0.05 points, indicating that identifying with a politically-aligned group does not necessarily translate into greater awareness.

Awareness and the identity-to-politics link

As a case study and introduction to how the results are presented, I first show how awareness moderates the identity-to-politics link for one group in particular, LGBT Americans.

Linking LGBT identity to politics

Figure 1 shows predicted values for LGBT respondents (solid lines) and straight cisgender respondents (dashed lines), across the range of political awareness. Recall that the dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more liberal policy preferences and Democratic partisanship.

In every case, as awareness increased, so too did LGBT respondents' liberalism.[7] Take, for example, respondents' policy preferences in the CCES, shown in plot (a). Less aware LGBT respondents (those in the 10th percentile of awareness) are predicted to score .62 [95% confidence intervals=.61, .64] on the 0–1 scale. More aware LGBT respondents (those in the 90th percentile) were much more liberal, scoring .74 [.73, .76]. The ANES estimates in plot (b) show a similar pattern: less aware LGB voters had predicted scores of .56 [.53, .59]; more aware LGB voters, .71 [.68, .75]. The same is true for respondents' party identity. In the CCES, more aware LGBT respondents were more Democratic (moving from the 10th to 90th awareness percentile is associated with an increase from .53 [.51, .56] to .66 [.64, .68]). A similar shift in the ANES data is associated with an increase from .38 [.31, .45] to .68 [.61, .75]. In line with H1, greater awareness is associated with more liberal views among LGBT respondents.

The same is *not* true for straight cisgender respondents, a politically unaligned group. This indicates that awareness is moderating the impact of politicized LGBT identities and not working as a liberalizing force in and of itself. For straight cisgender Americans, greater awareness is

[7] Supplementary models in online appendix A4 break this out by lesbian/gay; bisexual; and transgender identities. The results suggest liberal views increase with awareness consistently for each subgroup, with the exception of transgender respondents, where the results are more mixed.

Figure 1: Predicted policy preferences and party, by LGBT identity and political awareness



Note: Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals, simulated from regression models shown in online appendix A4. Higher values indicate more liberal policy preferences and Democratic partisanship. ANES estimates are for LGB respondents and straight respondents only.

associated with either no change or slightly more liberal views. The largest substantive change is for party identity in the ANES, shown in plot (d), which increased from .38 [.34, .43] at the 10th awareness percentile to .44 [.39, .48] at the 90th. This increase of .06 points is small, however, both in absolute terms, and relative to the equivalent increase of .30 points for LGBT respondents.

The results support H1's conjecture that awareness moderates the identity-to-politics link. The more politically aware a LGBT respondent was, the more likely they were to echo elite alignments and identify as Democrats with liberal policy views. But what of other social groups? In the next section, I replicate these analyses for the other identities studied.

Awareness and the identity-to-politics link for other groups

To streamline the analyses, I focus on the estimates from the CCES (models of the ANES data are in online appendix A4 and largely show the same results). Figure 2 replicates the analyses from Figure 1(a) and (c) for each set of identities; predicted policy preferences are shown in the top row of plots and party identity in the bottom row.

The plots in Figure 2 present a large array of estimates — sixteen identity groups across two dependent variables at different levels of awareness — but the results are generally consistent with H1. For members of politically-aligned groups, greater awareness is associated with more group-consistent attitudes. There are important exceptions, and the magnitude of awareness' impact varies across groups, both of which I discuss shortly. The general take home though is that, as with LGBT voters, awareness strengthens the link between identity and politics.

This can be seen most clearly for religious identities, shown in plots (a) and (f). Among Jewish and secular respondents — two groups aligned with the Democratic Party — greater awareness is associated with more progressive views. For Jewish respondents, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of awareness is associated with an increase in liberal policy views from .60 [.57, .62] to .73 [.71, .75], and an increase in Democratic partisanship from .47 [.41,

Figure 2: Predicted policy preferences and partisanship, by social identity and political awareness



Note: Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals, simulated from regression models using CCES data shown in online appendix A4.

.53] to .68 [.65, .70]. Secular voters show the same pattern, with liberal preferences predicted to increase from .56 [.55, .57] to .71 [.70, .72] and Democratic identity from .44 [.43, .45] to .63 [.62, .65]. The more aware these respondents were, the more liberal their attitudes.

Awareness is also associated with a stronger link between evangelical Protestant identity and politics. Given the elite alignment of that group with the Republican Party, this results in more *conservative* attitudes (i.e., a negative slope in Figure 2(a) and (f)). As awareness increases from the 10th to the 90th percentile, evangelicals are predicted to take more conservative policy positions (from .54 [.53, .54] to .38 [.37, .39]) and to be more Republican (from .39 [.38, .41] to .31 [.30, .33]). In line with elite communication about their group's political allegiances, more aware evangelicals were more likely to hold conservative attitudes.

The estimates in plots (a) and (f) also show that awareness has little effect on groups that are *not* politically aligned, such as mainline Protestants and Catholics. For these groups — like straight cisgender respondents in Figure 1 — there are only marginal differences between the least and most aware. This is again evidence that awareness in and of itself has little impact on political attitudes. Rather, distinctive views appear to result from a combination of individual awareness and information about the group's political allegiances.

There are similar, albeit more nuanced, results for the other identities. The estimates for race and ethnicity, shown in plots (b) and (g), show that more aware Black voters hold more liberal policy positions and identify more strongly as Democrats. Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile, policy views are predicted to increase from .67 [.65, .68] to .87 [.85, .89] and party identity from .80 [.78, .82] to .91 [.89, .94]. Highly engaged Black respondents were more likely to align their views with those of Black elites.

This is *not* consistently true, however, for Hispanic or Asian respondents, despite elite alignment with the Democratic Party. Highly aware Hispanic respondents hold marginally more liberal policy views (a minor increase from .66 [.65, .68] to .70 [.68, .73]). Otherwise there are no observable differences. Unlike for Black Americans, awareness has no reliable impact

on the link between Asian or Hispanic identity and politics. These differences between racial and ethnic groups are hard to explain definitively. Models of the ANES data, presented in online appendix A4, reach the same conclusions, suggesting this is not a function of the CCES sample. One possibility is that information about elite political alignment, widespread among Black Americans (White and Laird, 2020, Ch.2), is less broadly available for Hispanic and Asian Americans. Another is that the identity-to-politics link is weaker for pan-ethnic Hispanic and Asian identities in general (see McClain et al. 2009 and Lee 2008 for summaries), and so awareness does not impact these groups in the same way. Certainly, the null effects are a useful reminder to avoid "the wholesale transference of concepts" developed about one group to others without careful thought (McClain et al. 2009, 481; see also Junn 2006).

Turning to gender identities, plots (c) and (h) show that differences between men and women increase with awareness, but the reason for this varies by dependent variable. For policy preferences, greater awareness is associated with more conservative views among men (a shift from 0.54 [0.53, 0.56] to 0.48 [0.47, 0.50]) but no changes among women. Conversely, for party identity, awareness is linked to more Democratic partisanship for women (shifting from .44 [.42, .46] to .49 [.47, .50]) but no changes among men.

These results echo several findings from the literature on gender differences in public opinion. First, gender gaps are often "modest and inconsistent", with more persistent differences emerging in partisanship than policy preferences (Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte, 2008, 31). Second, gender gaps may be due to men becoming more conservative, women becoming more liberal, or both (e.g., Ondercin, 2017). And third, gender gaps in different policy domains have different causes. For some political attitudes, women's greater egalitarianism appears to play a large role; for others, differences are attributed to feminist consciousness, economic self-interest, or gender role socialization (Lizotte, 2020; Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte, 2008). If the causes of the gender gap are diverse in origin, perhaps we should expect awareness' role in linking them together to be diverse too.

For the final two groups — union members and veterans — the results are mostly consistent with H1. For union members, moving from lower to higher awareness is associated with a liberal shift in policy views from .56 [.55, .58] to .64 [.62, .66] and a Democratic shift in partisanship from .48 [.45, .51] to .57 [.55, .59]. For veterans, greater awareness is predicted to lead to more conservative policy preferences (from .56 [.54, .58] to .50 [.48, .51]), although there is no statistically significant difference in their partisanship. The literature on veterans' attitudes is more limited than that on the gender gap, but it too reports variable results. The results here align with that literature's call for "broader theory building and empirical investigation of veterans' politics" (Klingler and Chatagnier, 2014, 688).

To summarize: more aware respondents are generally more likely to hold attitudes that mirror their group's political alignments. For nine of the eleven politically aligned identities, greater engagement was associated with more group-consistent attitudes on at least one measure. As awareness increased, so did the liberalism of Jewish, secular, Black, women, LGBT, and unionized respondents, and the conservatism of men, evangelical Protestants, and veterans. For these groups, awareness tightened the link between identity and politics in ways consistent with H1's expectations. In contrast, there was no real effect for Asian or Hispanic voters. For these groups, greater awareness was not associated with more liberal Democratic views, as expected by H1. Overall, however, the more aware a respondent was, the more likely they were to align their political attitudes with their social identities.

Identity gaps increase with awareness

As a consequence of these patterns, identity gaps grow substantially with political awareness. I calculate the first difference in policy preferences between groups given different levels of awareness.[8] Table 2 presents estimates of differences between groups for those at the 10th,

[8] To simplify the presentation of results, here I show just the CCES estimates of differences in policy preferences.

50th, and 90th percentiles of awareness, holding other independent variables constant. Positive values indicate a group is more liberal, negative values that they are more conservative, again on the 0–1 scale.

As in previous work, many of these groups hold divergent preferences *on average*. Consider the middle column of estimates, for those at the median level of awareness, where we see significant gaps based on identity. Jewish and secular respondents are more liberal than evangelical Protestants, veterans more conservative than non-veterans, Black respondents more liberal than White respondents, and so on.

But focusing on average differences misses that the *size* of identity gaps varies with awareness. Take the same examples as above. For those in the 10th awareness percentile, Jewish and secular respondents were only slightly more liberal than evangelical Protestants (the first differences are .06 [.04, .09] and .02 [.02, .03]). But among the 90th percentile, the gaps widen dramatically, to .35 [.33, .37] and .33 [.32, .34], respectively. Similarly, the Black-White gap grows from .09 [.07, .10] to .29 [.27, .31] as we move across the awareness scale. And for the least aware, veterans are estimated to be −.02 [−.03, −.00] more conservative than non-veterans, a gap that widens to −.08 [−.10, −.07] among the most aware.

Seven of the nine identity gaps estimated in Table 2 are significantly larger at the 90th percentile of awareness than at the 10th. The exceptions are, again, for the differences between Hispanic, Asian, and White respondents. The size of the Hispanic-White gap increases only marginally (from .08 [.07, .10] to .12 [.10, .14]), and the Asian-White gap shows no change (it is .08 [.06, .10] for the least aware, .07 [.04, .10] for the most). For all of the other groups, however, differences in policy preferences were substantially larger (indeed, between three and thirteen times larger) among the most politically aware.

To be clear, this is not to say there are *no* identity gaps among the least aware. Even at the 10th percentile of awareness, there are still differences in the expected directions for most groups (the exception is for union members, who are predicted to be more conservative

Table 2: Identity gaps in policy preferences, by political awareness

Gap between...	10th percentile of awareness	50th percentile of awareness	90th percentile of awareness
Evangelical Protestants and			
Jewish respondents	.06 [.04, .09]	.21 [.19, .22]	.35 [.33, .37]
Secular respondents	.02 [.02, .03]	.18 [.17, .18]	.33 [.32, .34]
White respondents and			
Black respondents	.09 [.07, .10]	.19 [.18, .20]	.29 [.27, .31]
Hispanic respondents	.08 [.07, .10]	.10 [.09, .11]	.12 [.10, .14]
Asian respondents	.08 [.06, .10]	.08 [.06, .09]	.07 [.04, .10]
Straight and LGBT respondents	.04 [.03, .06]	.10 [.09, .11]	.16 [.15, .18]
Men and women	.03 [.02, .04]	.07 [.06, .07]	.10 [.08, .11]
Non-members and union members	−.02 [−.03, −.00]	.02 [.01, .03]	.06 [.04, .08]
Non-veterans and veterans	−.02 [−.03, −.00]	−.05 [−.06, −.04]	−.08 [−.10, −.07]

Note: First differences between groups in policy preferences as measured in the CCES, with 95% confidence intervals, simulated from regression models shown in online appendix A4. Positive values indicate that the second group holds more liberal preferences than the first, negative values that they hold more conservative views.

than non-members at low levels of awareness). Awareness is not the whole story: even in the absence of political engagement, there is a modest identity-to-politics link. But awareness magnifies these differences. The distinctive gaps between social groups that previous scholars have identified widen with awareness and narrow among the least engaged.

How the impact of awareness varies across groups

The results so far show that, for most groups, more aware members hold more identity-consistent attitudes. But this relationship is not the same for all groups, as indicated by the varying slopes of lines in Figures 1 and 2. To estimate the impact of awareness, I calculate the first difference in policy preferences between members of the same group at the 10th and 90th percentile of awareness.[9]. Since awareness is expected to lead to more liberal attitudes

[9] Unlike in Table 2, which calculates the gap between members of different groups with the same level of awareness, this estimates the gap between members of the same group with different levels of awareness

for Democratic-aligned groups, but more conservative attitudes for Republican ones, I take the absolute value as an easily comparable measure of awareness' impact.

Doing so suggests four rough groupings of identities. First, awareness has the largest impact on Black policy preferences. Highly aware Black respondents hold policy views that are .20 [.19, .22] more liberal than less aware Black respondents. Awareness has a sizable impact on the second group of identities, albeit smaller than for Black voters: evangelical Protestants (for whom the absolute difference between more and less aware respondents is .15 [.14, .16]); Jewish (.14 [.12, .16]); secular (.15 [.14, .16]); and LGBT (.12 [.11, .14]) respondents. A third grouping consists of identities for which awareness matters, but only to a small degree: union members (a .07 [.06, .09] difference), veterans (.06 [.05, .08]), men (.06 [.05, .07]), and Hispanics (.04 [.02, .06]). Finally, for the remaining groups, there are no significant differences in policy views between the least and most aware members.

Why does awareness matter more for some groups than others? One potential answer lies in how fluid a given identity is. Recall the growing evidence that some voters switch their identities to reflect their political views (Egan, 2020; Margolis, 2018). Such switching is more likely for groups with fluid boundaries (Egan, 2020) and among those who are highly engaged with politics (Margolis, 2018, Ch. 6). As a result, we might expect the impact of awareness to be greatest within groups that are particularly fluid in the face of politics.

Measuring this fluidity is challenging, but Egan (2020) provides two sets of estimates for various groups, based on multiple GSS waves: (1) the group's "switch rate", the share of members that switched in or out of the identity between waves; and (2) the effect of politics on an identity, which is the difference between liberal and conservative respondents' likelihood of switching into (or out of) the group. Egan (2020) provides these estimates for 10 of the identities studied here.[10] Figure 3 shows how the impact of of awareness on each group —

[10] Gender, union, and veteran identities are not included in Egan's study. His estimates are based on different data, and different coding, than used here. Still, they are the best available estimates of fluidity to date.

Figure 3: Impact of awareness on policy preferences, by estimates of identity fluidity taken from Egan (2020).



Note: Absolute difference in predicted policy preferences between group members at the 10th and 90th awareness percentile, calculated from regression model using CCES data. Estimates of group switch rate and effect of politics on identity are taken from Egan (2020).

again measured as the absolute difference in policy preferences between less and more aware members — varies with the estimates of group fluidity.

The small number of data points precludes a formal analysis, but the evidence suggests at most a weak relationship between how fluid a group's identity is and how much awareness impacts its members. Some identities are relatively fixed, based on Egan's estimates, but show a significant impact of awareness on attitudes (e.g. Black or Jewish identities). Others are relatively fluid, but there are few differences between the least- and most-aware members (e.g. Mainline Protestants). The impact of awareness does not necessarily vary with the fluidity of an identity. Since it is based on a small number of estimates and cannot disentangle the precise causal mechanisms at play, this should be treated as a preliminary conclusion. But it indicates that awareness can strengthen the relationship between identity and politics for stable and

fluid identity groups alike.

Discussion and supplementary analyses

These analyses cover many identities and estimates. Overall, the results mostly support H1: awareness tightens the link between social identity and political attitudes. Three overall points can be made. First, greater political awareness is generally associated with more group-consistent attitudes for evangelical, Jewish, secular, Black, women, men, LGBT, unionized, and veteran respondents. There are no real effects for Asian or Hispanic Americans, however. Second, and as a result, most identity gaps in public opinion widen with awareness. Among the less engaged, there are only muted differences between social groups. As attention to politics increases, so does the distinctiveness of different identities. And third, the impact of awareness varies substantially across groups, with particularly large effects among Black, Jewish, secular, evangelical, and LGBT identities.

Supplementary analyses shed additional light on two questions about the identity-to-politics link more generally. One is why identity affects preferences on issues far removed from group interests. Evidence suggests an indirect link from identity to policy views via partisanship (see Layman 2001, Ch.7; Page and Jones 1979). Online appendix A5 replicates models of policy preferences controlling for party identity. This significantly reduces, but does not entirely remove, the impact of awareness, suggesting that identity is linked to party, which in turn links to policy views, and that all of these relationships are magnified by awareness.

Another query is whether awareness is simply a proxy for concepts like identity strength and group consciousness (see McClain et al., 2009; Conover, 1988; Huddy, 2001). Perhaps those with stronger attachments to a group are more likely to learn about politics, and it is actually the former that drives distinctive attitudes. The ANES included limited measures of linked fate and identity importance for several of the racial, ethnic, and religious groups. As shown in online appendix A6, models that control for these factors produce estimates of awareness that

are substantively highly similar to those reported here. This suggests that awareness helps to link identity and politics in ways that are distinct from the important contributions of identity strength or group consciousness found in other studies.

Conclusions: The conditional identity-to-politics link

A recurring finding in public opinion research is that political awareness affects the structure and content of voters' attitudes. Those who pay the most attention to politics are most likely to be exposed to elite messaging (Zaller, 1992, 1996), which helps them see the links between disparate attitudes, or "what goes with what" (Converse, 1964, 238). As a result, the more politically aware are better able to link their predispositions with specific policy preferences in ways that echo elite communication (e.g., Federico and Sidanius, 2002; Kalmoe and Johnson, 2021; Claassen and Highton, 2009; Jones and Brewer, 2020).

This paper shows that awareness can also help voters link their own social identities to political views. Although early researchers declared that "social characteristics determine political preference" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944, 27), the identity-to-politics link is not so simple (Lee, 2008; Hajnal and Lee, 2011). Elite messaging in the form of politicians' rhetoric, parties' positions, and news media coverage might help voters see what the links are "supposed" to be. But not everyone is paying attention. While the most engaged receive information that links their identities to political views, the least engaged are unlikely to get the message. As a result, the identity-to-politics link is conditional on awareness.

Across multiple social identities, greater awareness is associated with more group-consistent attitudes. For groups aligned with the Democratic Party, like Black, LGBT, or secular voters, more aware members are more likely to hold liberal policy preferences and to identify as Democrats. For groups aligned with the GOP, like evangelical Protestants or veterans, greater awareness is associated with more conservative and Republican beliefs. As a consequence, the

magnitude of many identity gaps in public opinion increases with attention to politics. Among the less aware there are only muted differences between social groups; for the most aware, these gaps widen dramatically. The link between social identities and political views tightens with engagement.

Awareness does not have an equal impact on all identities. It is particularly consequential for the views of Black, secular, Jewish, evangelical, and LGBT respondents. But there are no real effects for Asian or Hispanic respondents, echoing findings of relatively weak pan-ethnic identities among these groups (e.g., McClain et al., 2009; Lee, 2008). And the results for gender and veteran identities are uneven across dependent variables, underscoring earlier work about their inconsistent effects (e.g., Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte, 2008; Klingler and Chatagnier, 2014). There is only a weak relationship between the effect of awareness on a group and how fluid that identity is. This suggests the results are not being driven by those groups for whom social identity is particularly endogenous to political views, but require further study. For now, the main take-home is that greater awareness is frequently associated with more group-consistent attitudes.

As with any study, there are limitations here that also point to avenues for further work. This paper shows how awareness moderates the identity-to-politics link, but fundamental questions remain about the link itself. For one, what is the causal ordering of these variables? There is growing evidence that political views can lead to the adoption of identities, as well as vice-versa (Egan, 2020; Margolis, 2018). Understanding when and why these different causal pathways are activated is a vital area for future work. Second, why is the identity-to-politics link stronger for some groups than others? We lack explanations of when and why group memberships have "political kick" (Junn, 2006, 33), a task that will require more theorizing about the nature of identities themselves (Huddy, 2001). And third, why does identity affect views on policies that are far removed from a group's interests? The supplementary analyses here support claims of an *indirect* link via partisanship (Layman, 2001; Page and Jones, 1979), but require a different

research design to disentangle. More study is needed on all these fronts.

The data sources used here limit the conclusions we can reach, too. Although I investigate a wide range of groups, many others exist but are not measured by the ANES and CCES. Missing here are class identities, as well as groups beyond demographic characteristics, like feminists, gun owners, or environmentalists.[11] Even the identities that *are* covered are not fully inclusive. Neither the ANES or CCES accounted for queer identities beyond LGBT, and the ANES did not measure transgender identity at all. Both surveys treat gender as a male/female binary. More work, with better measures of identity, is needed to fully understand how group memberships shape public opinion. Finally, the data do not capture how elites communicate about these groups' politics. The intensity of messaging about "what goes with what" presumably varies across groups, in ways that might help to explain why some identities are more closely linked to politics than others.

Despite their limitations, these findings contribute to ongoing work on identity politics. As Pérez (2015*b*, 156) sums up the field, "many scholars believe group identity matters politically, yet a fog hangs over *when* and among *whom* it is politicized". Likewise, Junn (2006, 34) argues that "research should seek to systematically observe the situations under which social identities become political, how consciousness is forged, and when participation is mobilized." The results here show that political awareness is one condition under which the identity-to-politics link is strengthened. For the least engaged, connections between social group memberships and political views are often weak or non-existent. But with greater awareness comes a tighter link between the two, and more substantial gaps between groups in the electorate.

At their broadest, the results also speak to a larger literature on voter sophistication. It is sometimes assumed that identity politics is the province of the least informed. Looking for a simple shortcut, the logic would go, the less-engaged rely on their own social group

[11] Some of these are included in the ANES. Preliminary analysis suggests awareness tightens the identity-to-politics link for these groups too.

memberships to make sense of the political world. This is not the case. Among the least aware, there are only minor differences between groups. Identity gaps are at their widest among the most sophisticated. This is because identity politics — like most political reasoning — requires some knowledge of, and interest in, public affairs. As a result, it is the *most* aware, not the least, who are most likely to link their social identity to their political views.

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Political awareness and the identity-to-politics link in public opinion

Online appendix

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A1 Evidence for groups' political alignments

H1 expects more aware members of politically-aligned groups to hold more group-consistent policy preferences and partisan identities. To derive empirically-testable expectations, we need to know which groups are politically-aligned (and thus what kinds of attitudes count as "group-consistent"). Table 1 in the paper lays out which party (if any) each group is assumed to align with. These assumptions were based on evidence from three sets of sources:

- Previous academic research about that group
- The partisan affiliation of elected officials who identify with the group
- The vote choice of citizens who identify with the group

This evidence is summarized in Table A1 below, along with the conclusion reached about each group's political alignment.

"Democratic margin in U.S. House" is the percentage of Members of Congress (MCs) from each group that affiliate with the Democratic Party minus the percentage who affiliate with the Republican Party. Positive values indicate elected officials from that group tend to be more Democratic; negative values that they tend to be more Republican. For example, MCs who identify as evangelical Protestants affiliate with the Republican Party by 76.5 points; Jewish MCs with the Democratic Party by 86.7 points. In contrast, some groups show no particular alignment: Mainline Protestants in Congress are almost evenly split, just 3.0 points more Republican than Democratic. Depending on data availability, these statistics are for the 115th–117th Congresses, as noted at the bottom of Table A1.

"Democratic margin in 2016 vote" is the percentage of group identifiers who voted for Hillary Clinton minus the percentage who voted for Donald Trump in 2016, according to the CCES. Positive values indicate the group tended to vote for Clinton; negative values that they tended to vote for Trump. For example, evangelical voters chose Trump by 36.7 points; Jewish voters chose Clinton by 41.2 points. Again indicating their lack of alignment, mainline Protestants split almost evenly, preferring Clinton by 1.9 points.

Table A1: Sources for expectations about group alignments in Table 1

	Group more aligned with	Previous research	Democratic margin in U.S. House	Democratic margin in 2016 vote
Evangelical Protestants	Republican Party	Layman (2001); Margolis (2020); Mathew (2018); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017)	−76.5[a]	−36.7
Jewish voters	Democratic Party	Cohen and Liebman (1997); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017); Wald (2019)	+86.7[a]	+41.2
Secular voters	Democratic Party	Campbell, Layman, and Green (2020); Claassen (2015); Driggers and Burge (2021)	+100.0[a]	+33.2
Mainline Protestants	No alignment		−3.0[a]	+1.9
Catholics	No alignment		−23.9[a]	−2.1
Black respondents	Democratic Party	Dawson (1995); White and Laird (2020); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017)	+91.3[b]	+81.3
Hispanic respondents	Democratic Party	Hajnal and Lee (2011); Saavedra Cisneros (2017); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017)	+57.6[b]	+39.7
Asian respondents	Democratic Party	Hajnal and Lee (2011); Kuo et al. (2016); Masuoka et al. (2018)	+100.0[b]	+45.0
White respondents	No alignment			−13.2
Women	Democratic Party	Conover (1988); Deckman and McTague (2015); Ondercin (2017); Lizotte (2020); Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte (2008); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017)	+48.8[b]	+9.3
Men	Republican Party	Kaufmann and Petrocik (1999); Ondercin (2017); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017)	−25.5[b]	−5.5

Continued over...

Table A1 continued

	Group more aligned with	Previous research	Democratic margin in U.S. House	Democratic margin in 2016 vote
LGBT respondents	Democratic Party	Hertzog (1996); Schaffner and Senic (2006); Lewis, Rogers and Sherrill (2011); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017); Worthen (2020)	+100.0[c]	+50.2
Straight cisgender respondents	No alignment			−2.1
Union members	Democratic Party	Francia and Bigelow (2010); Frymer and Grumbach (2021); Kim and Margalit (2016); Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor (2017)	+100.0[d]	+17.2
Non-members	No alignment			+1.1
Veterans	Republican Party	Foy and Restivo (2018); Klingler and Chatagnier (2014)	−43.2[e]	−28.3
Non-veterans	No alignment			+6.5

[a]Updated data for 116th House of Representatives from Matthew (2018).
[b]Data for 115th House of Representatives from Manning (N.d).
[c]Data for 116th House of Representatives from Reynolds (2019).
[d]Data for 116th House of Representatives from Quinnell (2019).
[e]Data for 117th House of Representatives from Shane (2020).

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A2 Information about survey samples and items used

A2.1 Question wording for dependent variables

Question wording and response options for the dependent variables are shown below. Notes on the coding are *italicized*. All variables are coded to range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more liberal responses.

CCES, 2016–2018

Party identity Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...Democrat; Republican; Independent; Other? [IF DEMOCRAT/REPUBLICAN:] Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican, or not so strong Democrat/Republican? [IF INDEPENDENT:] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? *7-point party ID scale recoded to range from 0 [Strong Republican] to 1 [Strong Democrat].*

Policy views *An average of the following items, all coded to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more liberal positions:*

- **Support more gun control (1)** On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Background checks for all sales, including at gun shows and over the Internet. *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*
- **Support more gun control (2)** Ban assault rifles. *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*
- **Support more gun control (3)** Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*.
- **Pro-choice abortion views (1)** Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*
- **Pro-choice abortion views (2)** Prohibit all abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*
- **Pro-choice abortion views (3)** Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*
- **Pro-choice abortion views (4)** Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **Pro-choice abortion views (5)** Make abortions illegal in all circumstances. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **Support environmental protections (1)** Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Give Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate Carbon Dioxide emissions. *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*

- **Support environmental protections (2)** Lower the required fuel efficiency for the average automobile from 35 mpg to 25 mpg. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **Support environmental protections (3)** Require a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase somewhat. *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*

- **Support environmental protections (4)** Strengthen enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs US jobs *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*

- **Oppose repealing Obamacare** Thinking now about health care policy, would you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Repeal the entire Affordable Care Act. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2016) (1)** What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply. Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. *Recoded to 0 [not selected], 1 [selected].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2016) (2)** Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school. *Recoded to 0 [not selected], 1 [selected].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2016) (3)** Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. *Recoded to 0 [selected], 1 [not selected].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2016) (4)** Identify and deport illegal immigrants. *Recoded to 0 [selected], 1 [not selected].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2018) (1)** What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following? Increase spending on border security by $25 billion, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2018) (2)** Reduce legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2018) (3)** Withhold federal funds from any local police department that does not report to the federal government anyone they identify as an illegal immigrant.. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2018) (4)** Send to prison any person who has been deported from the United States and reenters the United States. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose].*

- **More liberal immigration views (2018) (5)** Provide legal status to children of immigrants who are already in the United States and were brought to the United States by their parents. Provide these children the option of citizenship in 10 years if they meet citizenship requirements and commit no crimes. (DACA). *Recoded to 0 [oppose], 1 [support].*

- **Support marriage equality** Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally? *Recoded to 1, 0, respectively. 2016 only.*

- **Oppose transgender military ban** President Trump has issued many orders over the first two years of his presidency. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the order in principle. Ban Transgender People in the Military. Support; Oppose. *Recoded to 0, 1, respectively. 2018 only.*

- **Support infrastructure spending** Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress would you vote For or Against each of the following? Highway and Transportation Funding Act. Authorizes $305 Billion to repair and expand highways, bridges, and transit over the next 5 years. *Recoded to 0 [against], 1 [for]. 2016 only.*

- **Support raising minimum wage** Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress would you vote For or Against each of the following? Minimum wage. Raises the federal minimum wage to $12 an hour by 2020. *Recoded to 0 [against], 1 [for]. 2016 only.*

- **Oppose Gorsuch confirmation** Over the past two years, Congress voted on many issues. If you were in Congress would you have voted FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Appoint Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States. *Recoded to 0 [for], 1 [against]. 2018 only.*

- **Oppose Kavanaugh confirmation** Over the past two years, Congress voted on many issues. If you were in Congress would you have voted FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Appoint Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court of the United States. *Recoded to 0 [for], 1 [against]. 2018 only.*

- **Support Russia sanctions** Over the past two years, Congress voted on many issues. If you were in Congress would you have voted FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Require that the President get approval from Congress to ease any existing sanctions on Russia. *Recoded to 0 [against], 1 [for]. 2018 only.*

- **Oppose Jerusalem as capital** President Trump has issued many orders over the first year of his presidency. Do you support or oppose each of the following decisions? Recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Oppose Keystone pipeline** President Trump has issued many orders over the first year of his presidency. Do you support or oppose each of the following decisions? Allow the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Support Paris climate agreement** President Trump has issued many orders over the first year of his presidency. Do you support or oppose each of the following decisions? Withdraw the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Oppose TPP withdrawal** President Trump has issued many orders over the first year of his presidency. Do you support or oppose each of the following decisions? Withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, a free trade agreement that included the U.S., Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Canada, Chile, others. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Support clean power rules** President Trump has issued many orders over the first two years of his presidency. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the order in principle. Repeal the Clean Power Plant Rules, which calls for power plants to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 32 percent by 2030. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Support Iran nuclear deal** President Trump has issued many orders over the first two years of his presidency. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the order in principle. Withdraw US from the Iran Nuclear Accord and reimpose sanctions on Iran. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Oppose travel ban** President Trump has issued many orders over the first two years of his presidency. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the order in principle. Ban immigrants from Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Libya from coming to the United States for 90 days. Permanently prohibits Syrian refugees from entering country. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

- **Oppose cutting regulations** President Trump has issued many orders over the first two years of his presidency. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the order in principle. Requires that with each new regulation enacted, two must be cut. Any new costs created by new regulations must be matched with eliminations. *Recoded to 0 [support], 1 [oppose]. 2018 only.*

ANES, 2008–2016

Party identity Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? [IF DEMOCRAT/REPUBLICAN:] Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican, or a not very strong Democrat/Republican? [IF INDEPENDENT:]

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic party? *7-point party ID scale recoded to range from 0 [Strong Republican] to 1 [Strong Democrat].*

Policy views *An average of the following items, all coded to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more liberal positions:*

- **Increase spending and services** Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Reduce defense spending** Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? *Reversed and recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Support government insurance** There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? *Reversed and recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Support guaranteed jobs** Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? *Reversed and recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Support aid to blacks** Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. (Suppose these

people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? *Reversed and recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Support marriage equality** Which comes closest to your view? Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry; Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry; There should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple's relationship. *Recoded to values 1, 0.5, 0, respectively.*

- **Support LGB adoption rights** Do you think gay or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt children? Yes; No. *Recoded to 1, 0, respectively*

- **Support LGB job protections** Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals/gays and lesbians from job discrimination? Do you favor [oppose] such laws strongly or not strongly? *Recoded to range from 0 [strongly oppose] to 1 [strongly favor].*

- **Increase spending on Social Security** Should federal spending on Social Security be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Increase spending on public schools** Should federal spending on public schools be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Increase spending on science** Should federal spending on science and technology be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Increase spending on welfare** Should federal spending on welfare programs be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Increase spending on child care** Should federal spending on child care be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Increase spending on environment** Should federal spending on protecting the environment be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Oppose death penalty** Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? Do you favor [oppose] the death penalty for persons convicted of murder) STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY? *Recoded to range from 0 [strongly favor] to 1 [strongly oppose].*

- **Make it harder to buy guns** Do you think the federal government should make it MORE DIFFICULT for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it EASIER for people to buy a gun, or keep these rules ABOUT THE SAME as they are now? *Recoded to values 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively.*

- **Increase immigration levels** Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be INCREASED A LOT, INCREASED A LITTLE, LEFT THE SAME as it is now, DECREASED A LITTLE, or DECREASED A LOT? *Recoded to range from 0 [decreased a lot] to 1 [increased a lot].*

- **Pro-choice abortion view** There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose. (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted; (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger; (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established; (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. *Recoded to values 0, .33, .67, and 1, respectively.*

- **Support larger government (1)** Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your own views: (1) ONE, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR TWO, government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger. *Recoded to values 0 and 1, respectively.*

- **Support larger government (2)** ONE, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; OR TWO, the free market can handle these problems without government being involved. *Recoded to values 1 and 0, respectively.*

- **Support larger government (3)** ONE, the less government, the better; OR TWO, there are more things that government should be doing? *Recoded to values 0 and 1, respectively.*

- **Support affirmative action** Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion – are you FOR or AGAINST preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? Do you favor/oppose preference in hiring and promotion STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY? *Recoded to range from 0 [strongly oppose] to 1 [strongly favor].*

A2.2 Descriptive statistics

Table A2: Descriptive statistics for CCES, 2016-2018

	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Party identity	0.00	1.00	0.54	0.37
Policy preferences	0.00	1.00	0.58	0.28
Political awareness	0.02	0.90	0.49	0.28
Women*	0.00	1.00	0.52	
LGBT*	0.00	1.00	0.09	
Union member*	0.00	1.00	0.07	
Veteran*	0.00	1.00	0.11	
Married*	0.00	1.00	0.49	
Age	18.00	98.00	47.45	17.77
Income	1.00	5.00	2.74	1.45
Education	1.00	5.00	2.89	1.12
Religiosity	1.00	6.00	2.93	1.71

*Binary variable

Note: Statistics from weighted dataset.

Table A3: Descriptive statistics for ANES, 2008–2016

	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Party identity	0.00	1.00	0.53	0.35
Policy preferences	0.00	1.00	0.56	0.19
Political awareness	0.00	0.99	0.50	0.28
Women*	0.00	1.00	0.53	
LGB*	0.00	1.00	0.05	
Union member*	0.00	1.00	0.09	
Veteran*	0.00	1.00	0.12	
Married*	0.00	1.00	0.51	
Age	17.00	93.00	47.29	17.55
Income	1.00	5.00	3.05	1.40
Education	1.00	5.00	2.91	1.15
Religiosity	1.00	6.00	2.64	1.76

*Binary variable

Note: Statistics from weighted dataset.

Table A4: Identity groups in surveys

	CCES 2016-18		ANES 2008-16	
	N	%	N	%
Religion				
Mainline Protestant	16,332	14	1,515	13
Evangelical Protestant	28,576	24	2,326	20
Catholic	22,613	19	2,483	22
Jewish	2,475	2	216	2
Secular	35,738	31	2,587	22
Other	11,401	10	2,405	21
Total	117,135	100	11,532	100
Race/ethnicity				
White	83,733	71	8,274	71
Black	14,708	13	1,356	12
Hispanic	9,689	8	1,256	11
Asian	4,138	4	278	2
Other	4,880	4	432	4
Total	117,148	100	11,596	100
Gender				
Men	56,655	48	5,500	47
Women	60,493	52	6,106	53
Total	117,148	100	11,606	100
LGBT				
Straight cisgender	103,831	91	10,869	95
LGBT	10,724	9	549	5
Total	114,555	100	11,418	100
Union membership				
Non-member	109,238	93	10,669	91
Union member	7,717	7	994	9
Total	116,955	100	11,663	100
Veteran status				
Non-veteran	104,760	89	10,294	88
Veteran	12,388	11	1,369	12
Total	117,148	100	11,663	100

Note: Statistics from weighted datasets. The ANES did not measure transgender identity; those numbers are for straight and LGB respondents only.

A3 Political awareness measures

The political awareness indices are constructed from measures of factual political knowledge and self-reported interest in politics. Here I detail the specific items used in each survey and the construction of the index.

A3.1 CCES, 2016 and 2018

The awareness index is constructed separately for each year, but consists of the same ten items in both years:

- **Knowledge of U.S. House majority party:** Which party has a majority of seats in the House of Representatives? Republicans; Democrats; Neither; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of U.S. Senate majority party:** Which party has a majority of seats in the Senate? Republicans; Democrats; Neither; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of state Senate majority party:** Which party has a majority of seats in the state Senate? Republicans; Democrats; Neither; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of state lower chamber majority party:** Which party has a majority of seats in the state's lower chamber? Republicans; Democrats; Neither; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of Governor's party:** Please indicate whether you've heard of this person and if so which party he or she is affiliated with. Never heard of person; Republican; Democrat; Other Party/Independent; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of Senator 1's party:** Please indicate whether you've heard of this person and if so which party he or she is affiliated with. Never heard of person; Republican; Democrat; Other Party/Independent; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of Senator 2's party:** Please indicate whether you've heard of this person and if so which party he or she is affiliated with. Never heard of person; Republican; Democrat; Other Party/Independent; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*
- **Knowledge of Member of Congress' party:** Please indicate whether you've heard of this person and if so which party he or she is affiliated with. Never heard of person; Republican; Democrat; Other Party/Independent; Not sure. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Relative positions of Democratic and Republican Parties:** How would you rate. . . the Democratic Party? The Republican Party? Very liberal; Liberal; Somewhat liberal; Middle of the road; Somewhat conservative; Conservative; Very conservative; Not sure. *Respondents who were able to rate both parties and placed the Democrats to the left of the Republicans coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Interest in politics**: Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs. . . Hardly at all; Only now and then; Some of the time; Most of the time. *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

Cronbach's alpha for the ten items is 0.88 in 2016 and 0.89 in 2018, suggesting combining them creates a reliable index. For each year, I take a simple average of the items. In 2016, this has a mean of 0.64 and a standard deviation of 0.32. In 2018, those values were 0.69 and 0.32, respectively. Finally, within each year, I calculate each respondent's percentile score, creating a measure of awareness relative to others in the same survey. This is divided by 100 and so ranges from 0 to 1.

A3.2 ANES, 2008

The awareness index is constructed from ten items:

- **Knowledge of U.S. House majority party:** Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington? Republicans; Democrats; Refused. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of U.S. Senate majority party:** Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. Senate? Republicans; Democrats; Refused. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Relative positions of Obama and McCain:** Where would you place [Barack Obama/John McCain] on this scale? Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate, middle of the road; Slightly conservative; Conservative; Extremely conservative; Don't know. *Respondents who were able to rate both candidates and placed Obama to the left of McCain coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Ability to rate House Democratic candidate:** Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate [Democratic House candidate]? *Respondents who were able to offer a rating coded as 1; those who did not know who the person was, couldn't place them, or said they didn't know, coded as 0.*

- **Ability to rate House Republican candidate:** Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate [Republican House candidate]? *Respondents who were able to offer a rating coded as 1; those who did not know who the person was, couldn't place them, or said they didn't know, coded as 0.*

- **Ability to rate Senate Democratic candidate:** Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate [Democratic Senate candidate]? *Respondents who were able to offer a rating coded as 1; those who did not know who the person was, couldn't place them, or said they didn't know, coded as 0.*

- **Ability to rate Senate Republican candidate:** Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate [Republican Senate candidate]? *Respondents who were able to offer a rating coded as 1; those who did not know who the person was, couldn't place them, or said they didn't know, coded as 0.*

- **Interest in government and public affairs:** Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Interest in campaigns:** Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been not much interested, somewhat interested or very much interested in the political campaigns so far this year? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Attention to campaign:** How closely did you follow the election campaign? Very closely; Fairly closely; Not very closely; Not closely at all. *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

Cronbach's alpha for the ten items is 0.72. I take a simple average of the ten items, which has a mean of 0.59 and a standard deviation of 0.25. I then calculate each respondent's percentile score on this index, divided by 100, which ranges from 0 to 1.

A3.3 ANES, 2012

The awareness index is constructed from 17 items:

- **Knowledge of U.S. House majority party:** Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington? Republicans; Democrats; Refused. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of U.S. Senate majority party:** Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. Senate? Republicans; Democrats; Refused. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of Gordon Brown:** Gordon Brown. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0)*.

- **Knowledge of Joe Biden:** Joe Biden. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0)*.

- **Knowledge of John Boehner:** John Boehner. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0)*.

- **Knowledge of John Roberts:** John Roberts. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Partial credit (.5); Not correct (0)*.

- **Knowledge of Mitt Romney's religion:** Would you say that Mitt Romney is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Mormon, some other religion, or is he not religious? *Responses of "Mormon" coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of presidential term limits:** Do you happen to know how many times an individual can be elected President of the United States under current laws? *Responses of two coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of UN Secretary General:** Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations - Kofi Annan, Kurt Waldheim, Ban Ki-moon, or Boutros Boutros-Ghali? *Responses of Ban Ki-moon coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of unemployment rate:** What was the current unemployment rate in the United States as of [date]? *Respondents given four options: the current rate, the current rate minus two points, the current rate plus two points, and the current rate plus four points. Correct answers coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of Treasury Secretary:** Which of these persons was the Secretary of the Treasury before the recent election? Hillary Clinton, Eric Holder, Leon Panetta, or Timothy Geithner? *Responses of Timothy Geithner coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of budget deficit:** Is the U.S. federal budget deficit – the amount by which the government's spending exceeds the amount of money it collects – now bigger, about the same, or smaller than it was during most of the 1990s? *Responses of bigger coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of Senate term:** For how many years is a United States Senator elected âĂŞ that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? *Responses of 6 coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of Medicare:** What is Medicare: A fed govt program to pay for old people's health care, a state program to provide health care to poor people, a private health insurance plan, or private non-profit that runs free health clinics? *Responses of a program run by the U.S. federal government coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of budget spending:** On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently spend the least- foreign aid, Medicare, national defense, Social Security? *Responses of foreign aid coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Interest in campaigns:** Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been not much interested, somewhat interested or very much interested in the political campaigns so far this year? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Attention to politics:** How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always. *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

Cronbach's alpha for the 17 items is 0.84. I take a simple average of the items, which has a mean of 0.55 and a standard deviation of 0.23. I then calculate each respondent's percentile score on this index, divided by 100, which ranges from 0 to 1.

A3.4 ANES, 2016

The awareness index is constructed from 14 items:

- **Knowledge of U.S. House majority party:** Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington? Republicans; Democrats; Refused. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of U.S. Senate majority party:** Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. Senate? Republicans; Democrats; Refused. *Correct answer coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of Angela Merkel:** Angela Merkel. What job or political office does she now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0).*

- **Knowledge of Vladimir Putin:** Vladimir Putin. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0).*

- **Knowledge of Joe Biden:** Joe Biden. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0).*

- **Knowledge of Paul Ryan:** Paul Ryan. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Not correct (0).*

- **Knowledge of John Roberts:** John Roberts. What job or political office does he now hold? *Correct (1); Partial credit (.5); Not correct (0).*

- **Knowledge of unemployment rate:** What was the current unemployment rate in the United States as of November 4, 2016 – 2.9, 4.9, 6.9, or 8.9? *Responses of 4.9 coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of Senate term:** For how many years is a United States Senator elected âĂŞ that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? *Responses of 6 coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Knowledge of budget spending:** On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently spend the least- foreign aid, Medicare, national defense, Social Security? *Responses of foreign aid coded as 1; all others as 0.*

- **Interest in politics:** How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not at all interested? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Follow politics:** And how closely do you follow politics on TV, radio, newspapers, or the Internet? Very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, or not at all? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Interest in campaigns:** Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been not much interested, somewhat interested or very much interested in the political campaigns so far this year? *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

- **Attention to politics:** How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always. *Recoded to range from 0 to 1.*

Cronbach's alpha for the 14 items is 0.85. I take a simple average of the items, which has a mean of 0.56 and a standard deviation of 0.25. I then calculate each respondent's percentile score on this index, divided by 100, which ranges from 0 to 1.

A3.5 Regression models predicting political awareness

Table A5: Predicting political awareness

	CCES	ANES
Intercept	0.13 (0.01)***	0.26 (0.02)***
Catholic	−0.02 (0.00)***	−0.01 (0.01)
Evangelical Protestant	0.01 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.01)*
Jewish	0.02 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.02)
Secular	−0.01 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.01)
Other religion	−0.03 (0.01)***	−0.03 (0.01)**
Asian	−0.06 (0.01)***	−0.04 (0.02)*
Black	−0.05 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.01)*
Hispanic	−0.03 (0.01)***	−0.03 (0.01)***
Other race	0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
Women	−0.10 (0.00)***	−0.07 (0.01)***
LGBT	0.04 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.01)
Union member	0.00 (0.00)	−0.03 (0.01)***
Veteran	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	0.01 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Married	−0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.01)**
Income	0.04 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***
Education	0.07 (0.00)***	0.06 (0.00)***
Religiosity	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Region		
Midwest	0.00 (0.00)	−0.02 (0.01)**
Northeast	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.01 (0.01)
West	0.02 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.01)
Year		
2012		−0.05 (0.01)***
2016		−0.04 (0.01)***
2018	0.02 (0.00)***	
Pseudo-R^2	0.28	0.28
N	101,940	10,484

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Linear regression models. Awareness measured as simple average of items, as described above, on 0–1 scale. Excluded level for religion is mainline Protestant; for race, White.

A4 Regression models

Table A6: Main models predicting policy preferences and party identity

Table A7: Additional models predicting ideology and presidential vote choice

Table A8: Additional models breaking out LGBT subgroups

Table A9: Additional models using interest in politics in place of full awareness scale

Table A6: Main models predicting policy preferences and party identity

	Policy preferences (CCES)	Party identity (CCES)	Policy preferences (ANES)	Party identity (ANES)
Intercept	0.59 (0.01)***	0.43 (0.01)***	0.60 (0.02)***	0.46 (0.03)***
Awareness	−0.08 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)
Catholic	0.01 (0.01)	0.07 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)**	0.10 (0.03)***
× Awareness	−0.06 (0.01)***	−0.11 (0.02)***	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.13 (0.05)*
Evangelical Protestant	−0.03 (0.01)***	−0.03 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.03)*
× Awareness	−0.19 (0.01)***	−0.16 (0.02)***	−0.20 (0.03)***	−0.22 (0.05)***
Jewish	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	−0.11 (0.05)*	0.06 (0.07)
× Awareness	0.17 (0.03)***	0.20 (0.05)***	0.27 (0.07)***	0.16 (0.11)
Secular	−0.04 (0.01)***	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)
× Awareness	0.19 (0.01)***	0.18 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Other religion	−0.04 (0.01)***	−0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)*	0.05 (0.03)†
× Awareness	0.05 (0.02)**	0.03 (0.02)	−0.12 (0.03)***	−0.15 (0.05)**
Asian	0.08 (0.01)***	0.17 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)
× Awareness	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.13 (0.04)***	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.09)
Black	0.06 (0.01)***	0.35 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***	0.37 (0.02)***
× Awareness	0.25 (0.01)***	0.09 (0.02)***	0.15 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.05)
Hispanic	0.08 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.01)***	0.20 (0.02)***
× Awareness	0.05 (0.02)**	−0.07 (0.03)**	0.01 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.05)
Other race	0.08 (0.01)***	0.12 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.02)*	0.12 (0.03)***
× Awareness	−0.13 (0.02)***	−0.12 (0.03)***	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.09 (0.07)
Women	0.03 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.02)**
× Awareness	0.08 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.01)***	−0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
LGBT	0.03 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.01)***	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
× Awareness	0.15 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.20 (0.03)***	0.30 (0.05)***
Union member	−0.03 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)*	−0.03 (0.01)*	0.00 (0.03)
× Awareness	0.09 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.02)*	0.09 (0.03)**	0.12 (0.05)*
Veteran	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)†	0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.03)
× Awareness	−0.08 (0.01)***	−0.05 (0.02)*	−0.08 (0.03)**	−0.09 (0.05)†
Age	−0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)*	−0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Married	−0.04 (0.00)***	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.00)***	−0.05 (0.01)***
Income	0.00 (0.00)	−0.01 (0.00)***	−0.01 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.00)***
Education	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)**
Religiosity	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.00)***	−0.03 (0.00)***

Continued over...

Table A6 continued

	Policy preferences (CCES)	Party identity (CCES)	Policy preferences (ANES)	Party identity (ANES)
Region				
Midwest	0.01 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.01)*	0.05 (0.01)***
Northeast	0.05 (0.00)***	0.06 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)**
West	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***
Year				
2012			−0.07 (0.01)***	−0.03 (0.01)**
2016			−0.02 (0.01)***	−0.04 (0.01)**
2018	−0.02 (0.00)***	−0.02 (0.00)***		
Pseudo-R^2	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.22
Num. obs.	101,939	99,149	10,482	10,441

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Linear regression models. Dependent variables coded 0–1, with higher values indicating more liberal policy preferences and more Democratic identity. Excluded level for religion is mainline Protestant; for race, White.

Table A7: Models predicting ideology and presidential vote choice

	Ideology (CCES)	Vote choice (CCES)	Ideology (ANES)	Vote choice (ANES)
Intercept	0.46 (0.01)***	−0.86 (0.16)***	0.49 (0.02)***	−0.73 (0.36)*
Awareness	0.03 (0.01)†	0.41 (0.19)*	0.00 (0.03)	1.26 (0.44)**
Catholic	0.02 (0.01)	0.33 (0.13)*	−0.00 (0.02)	0.84 (0.30)**
× Awareness	−0.06 (0.02)***	−0.62 (0.20)**	−0.01 (0.04)	−1.24 (0.45)**
Evangelical Protestant	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.55 (0.14)***	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.12 (0.34)
× Awareness	−0.17 (0.01)***	−0.71 (0.21)***	−0.11 (0.04)**	−1.07 (0.52)*
Jewish	−0.02 (0.03)	0.71 (0.26)**	0.06 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.69)
× Awareness	0.18 (0.04)***	0.14 (0.37)	0.10 (0.07)	1.12 (0.94)
Secular	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.26 (0.12)*	−0.00 (0.02)	0.30 (0.32)
× Awareness	0.14 (0.01)***	1.38 (0.19)***	0.08 (0.04)*	0.12 (0.47)
Other religion	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.17)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.07 (0.32)
× Awareness	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.27)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.77 (0.49)
Asian	0.07 (0.02)***	1.71 (0.25)***	−0.02 (0.04)	0.32 (0.59)
× Awareness	−0.06 (0.03)†	−1.53 (0.44)***	0.06 (0.07)	0.56 (0.93)
Black	0.04 (0.01)***	3.26 (0.29)***	0.08 (0.02)***	5.35 (0.81)***
× Awareness	0.26 (0.02)***	0.23 (0.54)	0.12 (0.04)**	−1.98 (1.36)
Hispanic	0.03 (0.01)**	2.01 (0.19)***	0.07 (0.02)***	2.31 (0.26)***
× Awareness	0.07 (0.02)**	−1.38 (0.35)***	−0.02 (0.04)	−1.64 (0.45)***
Other race/ethnicity	0.06 (0.02)***	1.26 (0.22)***	0.10 (0.03)**	2.59 (0.46)***
× Awareness	−0.08 (0.03)**	−1.75 (0.36)***	−0.10 (0.06)†	−2.75 (0.74)***
Women	0.01 (0.01)	0.40 (0.10)***	0.03 (0.01)*	0.38 (0.19)*
× Awareness	0.09 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.15)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.14 (0.29)
LGBT	0.06 (0.01)***	0.63 (0.17)***	0.06 (0.03)†	1.20 (0.45)**
× Awareness	0.12 (0.02)***	0.70 (0.26)**	0.18 (0.05)***	0.75 (0.72)
Union member	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.06 (0.16)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.08 (0.31)
× Awareness	0.08 (0.02)***	0.69 (0.27)*	0.09 (0.04)*	0.76 (0.49)
Veteran	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.19 (0.17)	0.03 (0.02)	0.10 (0.34)
× Awareness	−0.07 (0.02)***	−0.56 (0.24)*	−0.10 (0.03)**	−0.79 (0.48)
Age	−0.00 (0.00)***	−0.01 (0.00)***	−0.00 (0.00)**	−0.00 (0.00)
Married	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.26 (0.04)***	−0.03 (0.01)***	−0.34 (0.08)***
Income	−0.00 (0.00)**	−0.03 (0.01)*	−0.01 (0.00)*	−0.09 (0.03)**
Education	0.03 (0.00)***	0.28 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.00)***	0.15 (0.04)***
Religiosity	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.14 (0.01)***	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.24 (0.02)***

Continued over...

Table A7 continued

	Ideology (CCES)	Vote choice (CCES)	Ideology (ANES)	Vote choice (ANES)
Region				
Midwest	0.02 (0.00)***	0.21 (0.05)***	0.02 (0.01)*	0.49 (0.10)***
Northeast	0.04 (0.00)***	0.40 (0.05)***	0.02 (0.01)*	0.21 (0.11)*
West	0.02 (0.00)***	0.38 (0.05)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.49 (0.10)***
Year				
2012			−0.02 (0.01)†	
2016			−0.00 (0.01)	
2018	0.01 (0.00)***			
Pseudo-R^2	0.25	0.28	0.20	0.23
N	96,994	36,000	8,942	7,477

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$

Note: Ideology uses linear regression model; vote choice a logistic model. Ideology coded 0–1, with higher values indicating more liberal responses. Vote choice coded as 1 if respondent voted for Democratic candidate, 0 if they voted for the Republican. Excluded level for religion is mainline Protestant; for race, White.

Of the four dependent variables, vote choice is the only one that combines both attitudes and behavior: vote choice reflects the decision to turn out *and* the decision of who to support. Both of these decisions are likely to be influenced by political awareness. More aware citizens are more likely to participate in politics (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). And once at the polling place, more aware citizens should be more likely to vote in a group-consistent manner, per H1.

As a result, we might expect the identity-to-politics link to be stronger for vote choice than for attitudes, since those who vote are a smaller (and more politically aware) subset of the total sample. Although fully testing this possibility is beyond the scope of the main paper, the models in Table A7 offer some initial supporting evidence.

Take the sexuality gap between LGBT and straight cisgender respondents as an example. On average, LGBT respondents are estimated to be .13 [.12, .15] points more Democratic in their party identity, .13 [.11, .14] points more liberal in their ideology, and .10 [.09, .11] points more progressive in their policy views than straight cisgender respondents (all of these estimates are from the CCES model). For vote choice, in comparison, LGBT voters were .24 [.20, .28] more likely to support Hillary Clinton than straight cisgender voters.

These estimates suggest that identity gaps are larger for vote choice than attitudinal dependent variables, which we would expect if awareness moderates the identity-to-politics link. It is, however, only a preliminary assessment of the potential differences across dependent variables, and future research should investigate these more thoroughly.

Additional references

Delli-Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Table A8: Additional models breaking out LGBT subgroups

	Policy preferences (CCES)	Party identity (CCES)	Policy preferences (ANES)	Party identity (ANES)
Intercept	0.59 (0.01)***	0.43 (0.01)***	0.60 (0.02)***	0.46 (0.03)***
Awareness	−0.08 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)
Gay/Lesbian	0.05 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.02)***	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.05 (0.05)
× Awareness	0.16 (0.02)***	0.15 (0.03)***	0.25 (0.04)***	0.42 (0.08)***
Bisexual	0.08 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.02)**	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)
× Awareness	0.05 (0.02)**	0.09 (0.03)**	0.14 (0.04)***	0.16 (0.07)*
Transgender	−0.04 (0.01)**	0.11 (0.03)***		
× Awareness	0.13 (0.03)***	−0.11 (0.06)*		
Pseudo-R^2	0.28	0.24	0.28	0.22
N	99,439	96,788	10,482	10,441

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Models also include same covariates as shown in Table A6.

Table A9: Additional models using interest in politics in place of full awareness scale

	Policy preferences (CCES)	Party identity (CCES)	Policy preferences (ANES)	Party identity (ANES)
Intercept	0.60 (0.01)***	0.44 (0.01)***	0.63 (0.02)***	0.50 (0.03)***
Interest	−0.08 (0.01)***	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.04 (0.03)†	−0.01 (0.05)
Catholic	0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)
× Interest	−0.04 (0.01)**	−0.04 (0.02)**	0.01 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.05)
Evangelical Protestant	−0.03 (0.01)***	−0.05 (0.01)***	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.03)
× Interest	−0.11 (0.01)***	−0.08 (0.02)***	−0.09 (0.03)**	−0.10 (0.05)†
Jewish	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.08)
× Interest	0.14 (0.02)***	0.18 (0.04)***	0.24 (0.07)**	0.15 (0.12)
Secular	−0.04 (0.01)***	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)
× Interest	0.12 (0.01)***	0.11 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.05)
Other religion	−0.04 (0.01)***	−0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)
× Interest	0.03 (0.01)†	0.03 (0.02)	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.08 (0.05)
Asian	0.07 (0.01)***	0.15 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.02)†	0.07 (0.04)†
× Interest	0.01 (0.02)	−0.06 (0.03)†	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.09)
Black	0.08 (0.01)***	0.33 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.02)***
× Interest	0.13 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.02)***	0.15 (0.02)***	0.21 (0.04)***
Hispanic	0.08 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.01)***	0.15 (0.02)***
× Interest	0.02 (0.01)†	−0.03 (0.02)†	0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)
Other race/ethnicity	0.08 (0.01)***	0.14 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.02)*	0.11 (0.03)**
× Interest	−0.09 (0.02)***	−0.10 (0.02)***	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.08 (0.07)
Women	0.02 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.02)***
× Interest	0.06 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
LGBT	0.03 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
× Interest	0.11 (0.01)***	0.12 (0.02)***	0.16 (0.03)***	0.19 (0.06)**
Union member	−0.03 (0.01)**	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.01)†	0.03 (0.03)
× Interest	0.07 (0.01)***	0.09 (0.02)***	0.09 (0.03)**	0.07 (0.05)
Veteran	0.00 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.01)*	−0.05 (0.03)†
× Interest	−0.07 (0.01)***	−0.06 (0.02)**	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)
N	101,868	99,083	10,482	10,441

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Models also include same covariates as shown in Table A6.

A5 Evidence of an indirect identity-to-policy preferences link

Previous literature suggest both a direct and indirect (through partisanship or ideology) effect of identity on political views (e.g., Layman, 2001; Page and Jones, 1979). Although the assumptions for a formal mediation or path analysis are not met by these data, we can assess how the relationships between identity, awareness, and policy preferences change once controlling for party and its interaction with awareness. Table A10 shows the "baseline" model for policy preferences in the CCES, copied from Table A6, alongside a model that controls for the interaction between party identity and awareness.

As we would expect, party has a strong impact on policy views that increases with awareness. Democrats are more likely to take liberal positions than Republicans, a relationship that is strongest among the most politically aware.

Of interest to this paper, however, the coefficients suggest that controlling for partisanship diminishes, but does not completely erase, the relationship between identity, awareness, and policy preferences. Take, for example, secular Americans. In the baseline model, greater awareness is associated with more liberal policy views (the coefficient for their interaction is .19 (SE=.01), $p<.001$). Once controlling for partisanship, that relationship declines in size to .05 (.01) but remains statistically significant ($p<.001$). A similar pattern emerges for awareness' impact among evangelical Protestants, women, LGBT respondents, union members, and veterans (but not for the other groups studied, for whom the relationship between awareness and policy views washes away once controlling for partisanship).

These points are highlighted in Figure A1, which replicates the lower panel of Figure 2 in the paper. Controlling for partisanship in the policy preferences models substantially dampens the interactive effect of identity and awareness. Coupled with the evidence that identity and awareness combine to impact partisanship, this suggests that there are both direct and indirect (through party) identity-to-politics links, which are strengthened by political awareness.

Table A10: Regression models predicting policy preferences, with and without control for party identification

	Baseline model	Controlling for party identity
Intercept	0.59 (0.01)***	0.55 (0.01)***
Awareness	−0.08 (0.01)***	−0.36 (0.01)***
Catholic	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)*
× Awareness	−0.06 (0.01)***	−0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical Protestant	−0.03 (0.01)***	−0.05 (0.01)***
× Awareness	−0.19 (0.01)***	−0.02 (0.01)*
Jewish	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
× Awareness	0.17 (0.03)***	0.01 (0.02)
Secular	−0.04 (0.01)***	−0.01 (0.01)*
× Awareness	0.19 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***
Other religion	−0.04 (0.01)***	−0.04 (0.01)***
× Awareness	0.05 (0.02)**	0.04 (0.01)**
Asian	0.08 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***
× Awareness	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Black	0.06 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)*
× Awareness	0.25 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.01)
Hispanic	0.08 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***
× Awareness	0.05 (0.02)**	−0.01 (0.01)
Other race	0.08 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***
× Awareness	−0.13 (0.02)***	−0.11 (0.02)***
Women	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***
× Awareness	0.08 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)**
LGBT	0.03 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***
× Awareness	0.15 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)*
Union member	−0.03 (0.01)**	−0.02 (0.01)***
× Awareness	0.09 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.01)*
Veteran	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)*
× Awareness	−0.08 (0.01)***	−0.02 (0.01)*
Party identity		0.13 (0.01)***
× Awareness		0.63 (0.01)***
Pseudo-R^2	0.28	0.59
N	101,939	99,148

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Linear regression models predicting policy preferences using CCES data. Excluded level for religion is mainline Protestant; for race, White. Models also control for age, income, education, marital status, religiosity, region of country, and year of survey.

Figure A1: Predicted policy preferences, by social identity and political awareness, controlling for partisanship



Note: Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals, simulated from model shown in Table A10.

A6 Is awareness just a proxy for identity strength?

The main models of policy preferences in Table A6 do not control for any measures of identity strength. The CCES did not include such measures, and the ANES only included them for some identities and in some years.

The ANES asked respondents about the importance of their racial, ethnic, and religious identities. Respondents were asked "How important is being [White/Black/Hispanic/Asian] to your identity?" and "How important is being [Christian/Jewish/Muslim/Hindu/Buddhist/not religious/agnostic/atheist] to your identity?". I recode responses to range from 0 ("Not at all important") to 1 ("Extremely important"). White, Black, and Hispanic respondents were also asked about their sense of linked fate: "Do you think that what happens generally to [White/Black/Hispanic] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?". I recode responses to range from 0 (said no to initial question) to 1 (said "a lot" to follow-up question).

I re-specified the ANES models shown in Table A6, this time controlling for identity importance and linked fate. Since not all of the items were included on every survey, I estimate the impacts for religious identity and racial/ethnic identity separately.

The key items of interest in Tables A11 and A12 are the coefficients for awareness' interaction with group identity, comparing the baseline model to the new specification that also controls for identity importance and linked fate. These estimated parameters are highly similar. For example, in Table A11, the baseline model estimate for the interaction between evangelical Protestants and awareness is $-.18$ (SE=.04, $p<.001$). When controlling for the importance of evangelical identity, that estimate is $-.17$ (SE=.04, $p<.001$). Similarly, the interaction between Jewish identity and awareness is unchanged whether identity importance is controlled for or not (.37 (SE=.08, $p<.001$)). Unlike in the CCES data, the interaction between secular respondents and awareness is not significant in either model.

Like in the CCES estimates presented in the main paper, the only significant interaction effect in Table A12 is for Black respondents and awareness. It, too, remains mostly unchanged once controlling for how important being Black is to respondents and their sense of linked fate with Black Americans generally (.11 (SE=.03, $p<.001$) in the baseline model; .08 (SE=.03, $p<.05$) once controlling for the identity measures).

This indicates that awareness is not just a proxy for linked fate or identity importance (at least for those identities that the ANES asked about). The estimated impact of awareness remains largely the same once controlling for these factors, suggesting it operates independently of identity strength.

Table A11: Predicting policy preferences, controlling for religious identity importance

	Baseline model	Controlling for identity importance
Intercept	0.52 (0.02)***	0.55 (0.03)***
Awareness	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Identity importance		−0.08 (0.03)**
Catholic	0.06 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.03)†
× Awareness	−0.08 (0.04)†	−0.07 (0.04)†
× Identity importance		0.00 (0.03)
Evangelical Protestant	0.04 (0.02)†	0.03 (0.03)
× Awareness	−0.18 (0.04)***	−0.17 (0.04)***
× Identity importance		0.01 (0.03)
Jewish	−0.18 (0.05)**	−0.21 (0.06)***
× Awareness	0.37 (0.08)***	0.37 (0.08)***
× Identity importance		0.07 (0.06)
Secular	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.06 (0.03)*
× Awareness	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
× Identity importance		0.14 (0.03)***
Other religion	0.03 (0.02)*	0.03 (0.01)*
× Awareness	−0.11 (0.04)*	−0.12 (0.04)**
× Identity importance		−0.02 (0.03)
Pseudo-R^2	.26	.27
N	4,882	4,882

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$

Note: Linear regression models predicting policy preferences using ANES data. Models also control for same covariates as those shown in Table A6.

Table A12: Predicting policy preferences, controlling for racial identity importance and linked fate

	Baseline model	Controlling for identity importance and linked fate
Intercept	0.54 (0.02)***	0.55 (0.02)***
Awareness	−0.06 (0.02)***	−0.06 (0.02)***
Linked fate		−0.03 (0.01)**
Identity importance		0.00 (0.01)
Black	0.15 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.03)†
× Awareness	0.11 (0.03)***	0.08 (0.03)*
× Linked fate		0.10 (0.02)***
× Identity importance		0.08 (0.03)**
Hispanic	0.09 (0.01)***	−0.03 (0.02)
× Awareness	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
× Linked fate		0.11 (0.02)***
× Identity importance		0.11 (0.03)***
Pseudo-R^2	.30	.32
N	5,114	5,114

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$

Note: Linear regression models predicting policy preferences using ANES data. Racial identity questions only asked of White, Black, and Hispanic respondents. Models also control for same covariates as those shown in Table A6.