De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945-2011)

Supplementary Materials

Adrian Florea
University of Glasgow
adrian.florea@glasgow.ac.uk

Contents

1 Identifying the Population of De Facto States **2**

2 Robustness Checks **4**

2.1 The conceptual definition for the de facto state 4

2.2 Empirical results with the Kosovo case recoded 6

2.3 Alternative variable measurements 8

2.3.1 State building 8

2.3.2 Veto players 9

2.3.3 Fragmentation 10

2.4 Additional controls 14

2.4.1 Great power patron 14

2.4.2 Number of separatist groups and external intervention on behalf of the parent state 15

2.4.3 The relationship between external military support, state building, and fragmentation 17

3 Selection Bias **21**

4 Descriptive Statistics **23**

5 Correlation Matrix **23**

6 References **24**

1 Identifying the Population of De Facto States

To identify the population of de facto states, I embarked on a multi-pronged strategy. The starting point was the fairly robust case study literature on the phenomenon of de facto separation (e.g., Bahcheli et al. 2004; Caspersen 2012; Caspersen and Stansfield 2011; Geldenhuys 2009; Lynch 2004; O'Loughlin et al. 2011; Pegg 1998; Seymour 2008). The corpus of these works begins with Pegg (1998) who identifies 4 de facto states (Eritrea, Somaliland, Transnistria, TRNC) and ends with Caspersen (2012) who categorizes 17 such entities.[1] The case study literature allowed me to put together an initial list of de facto states which was then supplemented by cases identified in quantitative and formal works. For example, Chapman and Roeder (2007) code for the presence of 10 de facto states,[2] and Sorens (2012) categorizes 12 de facto states.[3] Finally, Graham and Horne (2012) identify 27 de facto states.[4]

During the next step in the process of assembling the population of de facto states, I consulted the list of self-determination movements provided by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. This was done to ensure that other cases of de facto separation were not left out by previous qualitative, quantitative, or formal studies. However, the information provided by MAR is not comprehensive. With that in mind, I looked at several other sources to detect information about the existence of a de facto state that was not reported by MAR. These alternative sources included the following: UCDP/PRIO nonstate actor data, Uppsala Conflict Database, Sambanis's (2004) civil war coding notes, Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) list of Liberation Movements, Terrorist Organizations, Substance Cartels, and Other Para-State Entities, Keesing's World News Archives, Lexis Nexis, Library of Congress country studies, Encyclopedia Britannica, and,

[1] Abkhazia, Bougainville, Chechnya, Eritrea, Găgăuzia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, Montenegro, Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska, Krajina, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam, Transnistria, Taiwan, TRNC. All of these are included in the *De Facto States* dataset except for Montenegro which did not exert military control over its territory before independence in 2006.

[2] Abkhazia, Chechnya, Croatia, East Timor, Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, TRNC. All of these are included in the *De Facto States* dataset except for Croatia which functioned as a de facto state for one year only (1991).

[3] Abkhazia, Ajaria, Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan, Republika Srpska, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Puntland, Somaliland, Southwestern Somalia, Transnistria, TRNC. The *De Facto States* dataset includes all of them except for Southwestern Somalia—a territory controlled by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army which recognizes the government's authority over the region. I also exclude two parent states (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus) that Sorens codes as de facto states.

[4] Abkhazia, Ajaria, Anjouan, Bangladesh, Biafra, Bougainville, Chechnya, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, East Turkestan Republic, Eritrea, Găgăuzia, Hyderabad, Katanga, Kosovo, Krajina, Nagorno-Karabakh, Republic of Mahabad, Republika Srpska, Somaliland, South Ossetia, South Sudan, Taiwan, Tamil Eelam, Transnistria, TRNC, Western Bosnia, Western Sahara. I include all of these except for Bangladesh, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, East Turkestan Republic, Hyderabad, Republic of Mahabad, Western Bosnia which do not meet the definitional criteria.

most importantly, case histories on each self-determination movement. Finally, to arrive at a final list of de facto states and to guard against both false positives (cases that might have been incorrectly classified as de facto states) and false negatives (other cases of de facto separation that might have not been included in the dataset), I consulted with area experts.

For the originally coded variables, such as state building (governance) activities in each de facto state, I relied on primary and secondary sources. The codebook includes case narratives, a list of the sources consulted for each de facto state, as well as page references that justify coding decisions. I should note that, to avoid false positives and false negatives, I coded very conservatively and followed a simple rule: a de facto state characteristic (for instance, the presence of a separate educational system in a breakaway enclave) was coded as present in any given year if it was *explicitly* described in at least 3 sources.

2 Robustness Checks

In this section, I report several robustness tests. Overall, the main findings included in the manuscript are robust to a more expansive conceptual definition of the de facto state, alternative measurements for key variables, and the inclusion of additional controls.

2.1 The conceptual definition for the de facto state

A concept is internally coherent when it can be distinguished from cognate phenomena (Gerring 2012; Goertz 2006; Sartori 1970). A major consideration with this project is construct validity, i.e. whether the operational indicators are really measuring what they purport to measure (de facto separation). The de facto state definition includes seven necessary and sufficient attributes that isolate the de facto state from other types of territorial or non-territorial entities. As discussed in the manuscript, these attributes tell us not only what de facto states are but also what de facto states are *not*. The operational indicators delineate the boundaries of the concept, but, indeed, do not make for a parsimonious definition.[5]

Needless to say, there often exists some degree of arbitrariness in any coding enterprise. For instance, the Correlates of War (COW) project sees war occurring with 1,000 battle-related deaths per year while the UCDP/PRIO threshold is much lower at 25 battle-related yearly deaths. To give another example, the COW state system membership (1816-2011) is different from the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) country list[6]. To mitigate the degree of arbitrariness in the conceptualization and operationalization of the de facto state, I relied on theory and existing conventions. One of these conventions is to eliminate de facto states that survived for less than 2 years (cf. Caspersen 2012:11; Kolstø 2006:726).[7] The 24-month-

[5]Some may question the conceptualization of Taiwan as a de facto state. Taiwan is included in the dataset for two main reasons: (1) it meets all definitional criteria; and (2) it has been consistently categorized as a de facto state in prior works (cf. Caspersen and Stansfield 2011; Caspersen 2012; Graham and Horne 2012). The exact date for emergence of Taiwan as a de facto state is 1971 when the People's Republic of China took its seat in the UN, including the UN Security Council (i.e. when Taiwan lost its international legal sovereignty). From 1971 until today, Taiwan has displayed all characteristics of de facto separation.

[6]In the COW dataset, "prior to 1920, the entity must have had a population greater than 500,000 and have had diplomatic missions at or above the rank of chargé d'affaires with Britain and France. After 1920, the entity must be a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations, or have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic missions from two major powers." Gleditsch and Ward (1999) think that the COW criteria for system membership are too restrictive and lack face validity, and advance a definition of the state based on "practical sovereignty." Specifically, Gleditsch and Ward (1999:398) consider a state to be an independent polity if a) "it has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory; b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on; and c) has a population greater than 250,000." According to this definition, many de facto states would be classified as states; however, the Gleditsch and Ward list includes only Taiwan.

[7]Caspersen (2012:11) defines the de facto state as an entity that has achieved de facto independence, has declared formal independence (or demonstrated clear aspirations for independence), has not gained

survival criterion makes theoretical sense, but it could be argued that it might produce selection bias. The concern here would be that left-censoring the data may truncate the outcome and bias it against observing the forceful and peaceful reintegration trajectories. Indeed, de facto state disappearance within the first 24 months might be related to key variables, such as rebel movement fragmentation, recognition, or external support.

The best approach to deal with this potential source of bias is to recode the cases by eliminating the 24-month-survival criterion. After excluding the the 2-year-survival requirement, the de facto state population increased to 40 with 6 additional cases: **South Kasai** (DR Congo, August 1960-December 1961; forceful reintegration); **Moheli** (Comoros, August 1997-April 1999; peaceful reintegration); **Kurdish Republic of Mahabad** (Iran, January-December 1946; forceful reintegration); **Azerbaijan's Peoples Government** (Iran, November 1945-November 1946; forceful reintegration); **Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna** (Bosnia, August 1993-March 1994, peaceful reintegration); **Republic of Western Bosnia** (Bosnia, September 1993-August 1995, forceful reintegration).[8]

Table A1 presents the empirical results with the expanded de facto state population. As can be noticed, the key findings remain robust even with the addition of the six cases: those de facto states that achieve some degree of recognition are less likely to be reintegrated by force; peaceful settlements are less likely to be achieved when rebels receive military assistance from external supporters, when they engage in local governace, and when they are fragmented; transition to statehood is a likely prospect when separatists build extensive statelike institutions and do not rely on external patrons.

international recognition, and has existed for at least 2 years. According to Kolstø (2006:726-727), a de facto state fulfills three criteria: "Its leadership must be in control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to, and it must have sought but not achieved international recognition as an independent state. Finally, to eliminate a whole spate of ephemeral political contraptions, [Kolstø] exclude[s] those that have persisted in this state of non-recognition for less than two years."

[8]The list of the sources consulted for the 6 additional cases is available upon request.

TABLE A1: Results with the expanded de facto state dataset

	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	0.638(0.425)	1.667(1.499)	
Colony	0.220(0.259)	0.330(0.324)	
Peacekeepers	1.094(0.842)	$8.481^{\dagger}$(11.389)	7.430^{**}(6.638)
Recognition	0.998^{**}(0.001)		
Military support	0.998(0.002)	0.986^{**}(0.006)	0.986^{***}(0.003)
State building	0.997(0.002)	0.996^{**}(0.001)	1.015^{***}(0.005)
Fragmentation	$1.002^{\dagger}$(0.001)	0.987^{**}(0.005)	1.002^{***}(0.001)
Veto players	1.001(0.001)	1.006^{**}(0.002)	0.993^{***}(0.002)
Subjects	40	40	40
Failures	10	8	4
N	796	796	796

Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state.
†p<.11, *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01

2.2 Empirical results with the Kosovo case recoded

Questions could also arise with respect to the Kosovo case.[9] The categorization of Kosovo as a de facto state that experienced the transition to statehood in February 2008 is consistent with the definitional criteria. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Kosovo is categorized as a state, beginning with 2008, in both the Correlates of War and Gleditsch and Ward system membership datasets.

Nonetheless, one question could be whether the recoding of Kosovo might substantially alter the main findings. To examine this possibility, I re-ran the main models with Kosovo recoded as a de facto state that is still alive rather than a de facto state that made the transition to statehood. Overall, as shown in Table A2 below, the empirical patterns are fairly consistent. International recognition remains a robust inhibitor of a de facto state's forceful reintegration into the parent state. Peaceful reintegration is less likely when a de facto state receives military support from outside sponsors, when the rebels institutionalize their rule through the construction of complex governance systems, and when the separatist movement is highly fractured. At the same time, a negotiated settlement is more likely

[9] As of March 2016, Kosovo was recognized by 111 UN-member states.

when the parent state displays a larger number of veto players.[10] When it comes to the transition to statehood outcome, the recoding of the Kosovo case reduces the number of observations with implications for model convergence. An alternative strategy is to run bivariate models, and compare them with the original specifications. Model 9 in Table A2 reveals that, consistent with the main results, state building and fragmentation are associated with a higher likelihood of transition to statehood. External military support operates in the expected direction (lower probability of transition to statehood for those de facto states that receive external military assistance), but fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

TABLE A2: Results without the Kosovo case recoded

	(7)	(8)	(9)‡
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	1.234(1.103)	0.515(0.639)	
Colony	0.860(1.250)	0.243(0.316)	
Peacekeepers	3.072(4.477)	7.125(11.328)	4.678(5.159)
Recognition	0.998^{**}(0.001)		
Military support	0.995(0.003)	0.990^{*}(0.005)	0.847(0.343)
State building	0.997(0.003)	0.997^{**}(0.001)	1.851^{***}(0.390)
Fragmentation	1.003(0.002)	0.986^{**}(0.006)	1.524^{*}(0.376)
Veto players	1.001(0.002)	1.005^{**}(0.002)	1.145(0.385)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	3
N	783	783	783

Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state.
‡bivariate results, *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01

[10]Note that the presence of veto players might proxy for levels of democracy in the parent state – a point that I emphasize in the main manuscript.

2.3 Alternative variable measurements

2.3.1 State building

Some may ask why the indicators for the state building variable are weighted equally. The main reason for doing so is theoretical. The burgeoning case study literature on de facto states reveals that both institutional and ideational forms of state building matter for the long-term sustainability of these entities. De facto states rulers attempt not only to create a state, but also a "state of mind" – an ethnic- or civic-based identity that is separate from the one of the titular nation. While practical governance mechanisms (a functioning government and local bureaucracy) are obviously central for the institutionalization of self-rule, the other indicators of state building, such as a media/propaganda system, are equally important. Symbolic acts of statehood are orchestrated for both domestic and international audiences, and are aimed at reinforcing the enclave's separation. De facto state leaders cleverly exploit the power of symbolic imagery to puncture any links that may remain between the local population and the parent state.[11]

At the same time, it might be the case that some institutions of governance (state building) are more important than others for the observed outcomes. To investigate this possibility, Table A3 presents the empirical results with an alternative coding of the state building covariate. Specifically, the models include an ordinal variables which measures the degree of state building in the de facto state (`dfsbuild`).[12] State building activities correspond to the following categories:

1 *low* degree of state building: de facto state separatists control the means of violence in the territory and provide minimal public goods (such as physical security)

2 *moderate* degree of state building; in addition to 1, separatists allocate resources for civilian governance (such as public administration, social security, education, health)

3 *high* degree of state building: in addition to 2, separatists develop coherent governmental structures (institutions for extraction and redistribution; internal security and border management; courts; ministries)

4 *very high* degree of state building; the polity displays most characteristics of a well-functioning polity (including media/propaganda systems; external relations, representative offices abroad, commercial relations with international partners).

[11] For recent discussions of the symbolic aspects of nation and state building, see Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011) and Kolstø (2014).

[12] Subjective weighting based on relative importance of each state building activity is likely to introduce more bias. For a discussion of the bias introduced by subjective weighting, see Vogt (2011).

If core governance institutions are indeed the most important ones and the establishment of additional statelike structures matters little for the observed outcomes, then the ordinal covariate should not be statistically significant. The empirical results in Table A3 reveal two patterns: one the one hand, the alternative measure of state building fails to reach conventional levels of significance for the peaceful reintegration outcome; on the other hand, the ordinal measure remains a robust predictor of transition to statehood. Hence, the results might suggest that the construction of additional structures of governance may not directly matter for a de facto state's peaceful reintegration prospects, but may be pivotal for the entity's "graduation" to statehood. Nonetheless, given the fact that the ordinal variable provides a fairly rudimentary measure of state building activities, these patterns need to be interpreted with caution.

TABLE A3: Results with alternative measures of *state building*

	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	1.015(1.111)	0.402(0.497)	
Colony	1.131(1.726)	0.228(0.301)	
Peacekeepers	3.570(6.433)	2.250(3.267)	414.412^{***}(691.218)
Recognition	0.998^{*}(0.001)		
Military support	0.996(0.003)	$0.990^{\dagger}$(0.006)	0.986^{***}(0.004)
State building 2	0.998(0.006)	$1.003^{\dagger}$(0.002)	1.022^{***}(0.009)
Fragmentation	1.002(0.002)	0.986^{*}(0.007)	1.001^{*}(0.001)
Veto players	0.999(0.003)	1.004^{**}(0.002)	1.001(0.002)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	4
N	780	780	780
Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. †p<.13, *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01			

2.3.2 Veto players

The findings for veto players require some further discussion. It could be argued that the DPI (Database on Political Institutions) provides a more valid measure of veto players; however, DPI has a limited temporal domain which drops a very high number of observations

with serious implications for causal inference.[13]

An additional criticism regarding the veto player variable is that it offers a fairly crude measure of veto points in the parent state because it simply captures the number of institutional players that can oppose an agreement. The variable is a count of the independent branches of government (e.g., executive, legislature, judiciary, sub-federal institutions) with veto power over policy change. This measure might not tell us how much leverage each institution has when it comes to blocking or approving an agreement between the parent state and the de facto state.

With that in mind, I re-ran the main models using a separate measure of veto points that might better approximate the veto power of each governmental institution: the *political constraints* variable developed by Henisz (2002). In constructing this variable, Henisz started with the number of independent branches of government with power over policy change.[14] This initial measure was then "modified to account for the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches." The measure was "further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each branch. Greater within-branch heterogeneity increases (decreases) the costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) branches. Possible scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero (most hazardous) to one (most constrained)." Overall, the political constraints measure might give us a more accurate view idea about the veto power of each governmental branch as well as about the "diminishing returns" behind the addition of one veto player to the strategic interaction between the parent state and the de facto state.

2.3.3 Fragmentation

Besides the veto player variable, questions can also be raised about the fragmentation covariate. The concept of fragmentation employed in this study, as in much of the civil war literature, is useful for understanding how divisions among rebels preclude the antagonists from reaching a long-lasting settlement. The conventional coding for the fragmentation variable – number of factions in each de facto state – is a good barometer of the tensions that exist within the rebel movement. However, the number of factions as a measure of fragmentation might be problematic for at least three reasons. First, the measure assumes a linear relationship between the number of splinter groups and the severity of the commit-

[13]The correlation between the DPI measure and the Polity IV veto player covariate is 0.53.

[14]The preferences of each branch are assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space.

ment problem (the more factions, the more acute the commitment problem). In fact, we may see "diminishing marginal returns" with the addition of one faction beyond a "critical mass." Put otherwise, when the presence of a certain number of factions has already led to bargaining failures, the emergence of another splinter movement may do little to further exacerbate commitment problems.

Second, the measure gives equal weight to each faction. This marks a departure from the empirical record since, in many internal conflicts, there is great variability in the power of rebel groups. Not all factions "are created equal:" some are well-organized and well-equipped, attract considerable external support, and command legitimacy from the local population, while others operate at the fringes of the rebel movement. For example, although Palestine records no less than 21 factions at the end of 2011, only a handful of these have the organizational power to block agreements (e.g., Palestinian Authority/Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade).

Third, by itself, the measure simply records the presence rather than the power of each faction. The variable captures the variation in the number of rebel groups across time but says nothing about the fluctuation in the power distribution among these various groups. To continue with the Palestinian example, from radical groups originally operating on the fringes of the nationalist movement, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have emerged in the 2000s as key players holding veto power over negotiations with Israel. In short, the original measure of fragmentation is blind to critical dimensions, such as the power distribution among factions or the degree of institutionalization of each group that are key to rebels' ability to shape the bargaining environment.

Having all this in mind, rebel fragmentation may require a more complex measure, one that goes beyond the number of factions to encapsulate other key dimensions. The multidimensionality of the fragmentation concept has been addressed by Bakke, K.G. Cunningham, and Seymour (2012:268) who suggest that fragmentation is best understood as a "scale ranging from unified to fragmented, and on different dimensions. With this multidimensional concept, we can capture the reality of fragmentation as a characteristic that can change over time, with the degree and type of fragmentation shifting as organizations are eliminated and new ones emerge, institutions coordinate actions in the larger struggle or become irrelevant, and as power within the group is dispersed across organizations or concentrated within one of them."

Based on this rationale, I constructed an alternative measure of fragmentation (`frag2`) on the unified-fragmented scale suggested by Bakke, K.G. Cunningham, and Seymour (Table A4). This scale has three constitutive dimensions: the first dimension comprises the *number of factions* (rebel groups) making demands on behalf of the de facto state; the second dimen-

sion gauges the *institutionalization* of the entire rebel movement (that is, the existence of formal or informal institutions that coordinate the actions of various organizations making demands on behalf of the de facto state); and the third dimension accounts for the *distribution of power* among factions in the rebel movement.

Table A5 presents the results of the competing risks models with the alternative measures of fragmentation and veto players. Two patterns are noteworthy. On the one hand, in contrast to the original models, we notice a significant effect of fragmentation (measured on the unified-fragmented scale proposed by Bakke, K.G. Cunningham, and Seymour) on the risk of forceful reintegration. In line with theoretical expectations, there is evidence that fragmentation saps into a de facto state's ability to resist militarily against the parent state: all else equal, the more fragmented the rebel movement is, the greater the risk of forceful reintegration. The proposition that fragmentation is an obstacle to peaceful reintegration receives statistical support even when the alternative measure of rebel fractionalization is used.[15]

On the other hand, the findings also show a strong relationship between the number of veto points in the parent state (proxied by the measure of political constraints) and the likelihood of peaceful reintegration. Again, the results indicate that, the more constrained the government is by domestic players, the greater the chances of an agreement with separatists in a de facto state. Hence, the pattern detected by the main models is not an artifact of measurement: when using the political constraints measure, the original results are reinforced.[16]

[15]The findings remain robust also when the squared value of the original framentation variable is included along the lower-order term (cf. Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006); these results are not included here, but are available from the author. The rationale behind the use of the quadratic term is that the effect of an additional faction to an already divided rebel movement may be substantively different from the effect of a newly formed splinter group in a unitary insurgent organization.

[16]With the alternative measures of *fragmentation* and *veto players*, the *military support* and *state building* hazard ratios fail to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance for the peaceful reintegration outcome.

TABLE A4: Alternative measure of rebel *fragmentation* based on Bakke, K.G. Cunningham, and Seymour (2012)

	united-fragmented scale	**nb. of factions**	**institut.**	**power distrib.**
1	cohesive	one	high	concentrated
2	hegemonic	few (2-3)	low	concentrated
3	narrow rivalry	few (2-3)	low	dispersed
4	narrow hegemonic coalition	few (2-3)	high	concentrated
5	narrow coalition of equals	few (2-3)	high	dispersed
6	broad hegemonic coalition	many	high	concentrated
7	broad coalition of equals	many	high	dispersed
8	fragmented hegemonic	many	low	concentrated
9	extremely fragmented	many	low	dispersed

TABLE A5: Results with alternative measures of rebel *fragmentation* and government *veto players*

	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	0.989(0.910)	0.201(0.395)	
Colony	1.277(1.711)	0.390(0.565)	
Peacekeepers	4.351(6.778)	2.250(3.267)	30.002^{***}(38.762)
Recognition	0.998^{*}(0.001)		
Military support	0.991(0.005)	$0.985^{\dagger}$(0.009)	0.990^{***}(0.003)
State building	0.998(0.002)	1.001(0.001)	1.005^{***}(0.001)
Fragmentation 2	1.005^{*}(0.002)	0.993^{**}(0.002)	0.998(0.002)
Veto players 2	0.977(0.017)	1.033^{*}(0.019)	0.985^{*}(0.008)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	4
N	780	780	780
Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. †p<.13, *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01			

2.4 Additional controls

2.4.1 Great power patron

In the main models, external military support emerges as a robust inhibitor of a de facto state's peaceful reintegration. When backed by external actors, de facto state leaders have few incentives to agree to a deal that offers them something less than what they already have (de facto separation). The external military support variable codes for the presence of military assistance received by separatists from other countries, but does not directly identify whether the outside supporter is a great or regional power. Does the type of external supporter matter for the outcome? This is an important question that can be addressed with one of the variables included in the dataset, great or regional power patron (`gpwrp`). As the label suggests, this covariate codes for whether the outside patron is a great or regional power.[17]

Table A6 offers a glimpse at the impact of great/regional power patron on a de facto state's reintegration (forceful and peaceful) prospects. As far as the forceful reintegration outcome is concerned, the variable is not statistically significant. In line with the theoretical expectation, the presence of a great/regional power patron seems to reduce the chances of peaceful reintegration (with the inclusion of the great/regional power dummy, the other covariates retain their significance). However, because the covariate is significant only at the .11 level, few substantive conclusions can be drawn. Hence, these results suggest that, looking at the entire post-1945 population of de facto states (i.e. beyond the post-Soviet separatist enclaves which dominate the literature on the phenomenon) what seems to matter the most is the extent, and not necessarily the source, of outside military assistance.

[17]Following existing conventions, I relied on the Correlates of War CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) measures of national power to identify great and regional powers.

TABLE A6: Empirical results with great/regional power patron

	(16)	(17)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**
Prior status	2.045(1.817)	0.486(0.530)
Colony	1.114(1.653)	0.188(0.231)
Peacekeepers	2.132(4.105)	16.883^{*}(25.275)
Recognition	0.998^{***}(0.001)	
Great power patron	3.671(4.929)	$0.404^{\dagger}$(0.231)
Military support	$0.994^{\dagger}$(0.003)	0.989^{*}(0.005)
State building	0.997(0.002)	0.996^{**}(0.001)
Fragmentation	1.004^{*}(0.002)	0.985^{**}(0.005)
Veto players	1.000(0.00)	1.006^{**}(0.002)
Subjects	34	34
Failures	6	6
N	780	780
Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. †p<.11, *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01		

2.4.2 Number of separatist groups and external intervention on behalf of the parent state

In its original formulation, the theoretical framework privileges those factors that shape the ability or willingness of de facto state leaders to credibly commit to an agreement. However, the analysis is much more parsimonious when it comes to factors that shape a *government's* ability or willingness to strike a deal with separatists in a de facto state. Failure to account for these factors may result in underspecified models that might produce biased estimates. Essentially, this may lead to inferential errors. This section presents empirical results with two variables that are likely to alter governments' incentives to negotiate a deal with de facto state rebels: the *number of separatist groups in the parent state* and external *intervention* on behalf of the government.

Number of separatist groups in the parent state

The government's willingness to strike a bargain with de facto state leaders can be shaped by the number of separatists in the country. According to Walter (2009), states confronted

with multiple self-determination groups are concerned about building a reputation for resolve. In such environments, the actors are locked in "a complex strategic interaction where governments are actively seeking to deter separatists, and separatists are carefully trying to uncover if and when the government will grant concessions" (Walter 2009:9). State leaders often decide to continue fighting not necessarily because the territory is inherently valuable but "because fighting helps them to deter other groups from seeking secession in the future" (Walter 2009:7). Based on this rationale, we can expect a government confronted with several self-determination groups to be less likely to reach an agreement with de facto state leaders that paves the way for independence. To capture the number of separatists in any given year, I rely on data provided by Walter (2009).[18]

External intervention on behalf of the parent state

For various strategic, economic, or humanitarian reasons, outside actors frequently intervene to support the rebel side against the government. However, there are situations where external actors decide to prop up the government against the rebels. In January 2013, France intervened in northern Mali in order to restore the government's authority over swaths of territory controlled by Tuareg separatists in alliance with Islamist militants. Obviously, outside support restructures the government's preferences for war termination and settlement. When external powers intervene on its behalf, a parent state has few incentives to commit to a peaceful agreement with separatists in a de facto state. Therefore, when the government is bolstered by foreign support, we are more likely to see a de facto state being forcefully reintegrated into the parent state. In short, both the presence of other separatists and intervention on the parent state's behalf reduce the latter's willingness to commit to a deal with de facto state rebels. Table A7 presents results that assess the influence of the number of separatists and pro-government intervention on de facto state outcomes. Data on pro-government intervention are taken from Regan (2000).[19]

As can be noticed, results are generally robust to the inclusion of these two additional variables.[20] Several patterns stand out. Both the presence of a large number of separatist groups and pro-government intervention increase the chance of forceful reintegration. When confronted with multiple self-determination challengers, parent states are concerned about building a reputation for resolve, and appear to be more inclined to use force against a de facto state. Governments are also more likely to be successful at defeating de facto

[18]The data are supplemented by the author for the years up to 2011.

[19]The data are supplemented by the author for the years up to 2011.

[20]Results also remain robust to an alternative specification which includes a covariate that captures the number of military personnel (logged) in the parent state. These findings are not presented here, but are available from the author upon request.

state rebels when they benefit from outside intervention on their behalf. However, pro-government support seems to be counterbalanced by pro-rebel assistance. As hypothesized, those de facto states that receive military assistance from patrons are less likely to be forcefully reintegrated. The results in Table A7 also suggest that pro-government intervention raises the prospect of peaceful reintegration. Thus, third parties may sometimes intervene to coerce the separatists to come back at the negotiation table and strike an autonomy deal with the government. When it comes to the effect of the main variables (military support for the rebels, state building, fragmentation, veto players) on outcomes, the results remain consistent throughout.

TABLE A7: Empirical results with additional controls (number of separatist groups and pro-government intervention)

	(18)	(19)	(20)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	0.877(1.093)	2.465(1.516)	
Colony	1.434(1.017)	0.321(0.280)	
Peacekeepers	2.887(3.219)	1.984(1.393)	5.240^{*}(4.789)
Nb. of separatist groups	1.256^{***}(0.112)	0.561(0.272)	0.656(0.221)
Pro-govt. intervention	124.522^{***}(115.598)	54.364^{**}(99.634)	
Recognition	0.998^{***}(0.005)		
Military support	0.996^{*}(0.002)	0.979^{*}(0.009)	0.983^{***}(0.004)
State building	0.999(0.001)	0.996^{**}(0.001)	1.022^{***}(0.008)
Fragmentation	1.003^{**}(0.001)	0.991^{**}(0.006)	1.003^{***}(0.001)
Veto players	1.001(0.002)	1.008^{*}(0.004)	0.991^{***}(0.002)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	4
N	780	780	780

Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state.
*p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01

2.4.3 The relationship between external military support, state building, and fragmentation

The relationship between between external military support, state building, and fragmentation may be more complex than captured by the main models. Indeed, as argued in the

extant literature (Mampilly 2011; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014; Weinstein 2007), outside assistance may obviate the need to build a complex governance structure. Additionally, military assistance could affect the degree of fragmentation within the de facto state: external resources channeled towards a dominant rebel group could reduce factional infighting or multiple outside sponsors may encourage fragmentation by supporting competing factions within the insurgent movement. As Table A12 below shows, the correlation between *Military support* and *Fragmentation* stands at 0.12 while that between *Military support* and *State-building* variables is 0.39; the latter correlation coefficient, in particular, may raise concerns about collinearity.[21] To further investigate the relationship between external support, state building, and fragmentation, I conduct two additional tests. First, to alleviate potential collinearity issues, I run the main models without the external support variable. Second, I run the main models with two interaction terms: one between external support and state building and the other between external support and fragmentation.

Table A8 below shows the main results with the *Military support* variable dropped. The hazard ratios remain consistent, with one important exception: as conjectured by (H_5) rebel fragmentation increases the likelihood of forceful reintegration into the parent state. In this model specification, the hazard for the fragmentation variable is 1.003 suggesting that, all else equal, each additional faction that emerges within the insurgent movement increases the risk of forceful reintegration by 0.3% per year. The same pattern is visible in Table A9 which shows the empirical results with an interaction variable between external support and state building. This interaction term fails to reach statistical significance for the forceful and peaceful reintegration outcomes.[22] When it comes to the transition to statehood outcome, we notice that the interaction term is positive suggesting a complex relationship between outside assistance, state building, and transition to statehood: it seems that with external support, the rebels are able to build stronger governance institutions which, in the long run, increases the prospects for transition to statehood. Nevertheless, this supposition needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Further examination of the correlation matrix of model coefficients reveals severe multicollinearity produced by the interaction term. Consequently, the inclusion of the interaction between military support and state building likely produces unreliable estimates.

Table A10 presents the results with the second interaction variable: military support x fragmentation.[23] As can be noticed, the second interaction term is not significant; at the

[21]Note that, with a correlation coefficient of approximately .4, we still have about 84% of the variability non-overlapping (.4 squared = .16, which leaves about 84% of the variance unexplained).

[22]Lack of statistical significance does not necessarily mean that the interaction term should be dropped (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006:74).

[23]Due to insufficient variation, the model for the transition to statehood outcome exhibits convergence

same time, the findings for the other covariates remain consistent. Just like with the first interaction term, a quick inspection of the correlation matrix of model coefficients unveils worrisome multicollinearity issues. Thus, the inclusion of the second interaction term rests on problematic methodological grounds as well.

TABLE A8 Empirical results without the *Military support* variable

	(21)	(22)	(23)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	0.871(0.791)	0.383(0.395)	
Colony	0.873(1.213)	0.098(0.185)	
Peacekeepers	1.626(1.973)	2.282(2.584)	2.094(2.734)
Recognition	0.998^{**}(0.001)		
State-building	0.998(0.002)	0.998^{**}(0.001)	1.002^{*}(0.001)
Fragmentation	1.003^{*}(0.001)	0.986^{***}(0.004)	1.001^{**}(0.000)
Veto players	1.001(0.002)	1.004^{***}(0.001)	0.998(0.001)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	4
N	780	780	780

Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state in parentheses. *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01

issues.

TABLE A9: Empirical results with external military support x state building

	(24)	(25)	(26)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**	**Statehood**
Prior status	1.275(1.151)	0.474(0.532)	
Colony	0.922(1.584)	0.100(0.230)	
Peacekeepers	2.879(5.103)	28.171(77.422)	13.068***(13.115)
Recognition	0.998***(0.001)		
Military support	0.994(0.011)	1.014(0.019)	0.958**(0.017)
State building	0.996(0.004)	1.007(0.008)	1.008**(0.003)
Mil sup.x state build.	1.000(0.002)	0.993(0.006)	1.002*(0.001)
Fragmentation	1.003*(0.002)	0.988**(0.005)	1.003***(0.001)
Veto players	1.001(0.002)	1.003*(0.002)	0.992***(0.002)
Subjects	34	34	34
Failures	6	6	4
N	780	780	780
Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01			

TABLE A10: Empirical results with external military support x fragmentation

	(27)	(28)
	Forceful reintegration	**Peaceful reintegration**
Prior status	1.234(1.100)	0.499(0.534)
Colony	0.840(1.086)	0.360(0.405)
Peacekeepers	3.170(5.103)	6.239(9.789)
Recognition	0.998*(0.001)	
Military support	0.996(0.006)	0.979**(0.008)
State building	0.997(0.002)	0.997**(0.001)
Fragmentation	1.003(0.002)	0.977**(0.010)
Mil sup.x frag.	0.999(0.001)	1.004(0.003)
Veto players	1.001(0.002)	1.005**(0.002)
Subjects	34	34
Failures	6	6
N	780	780
Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. *p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01		

3 Selection Bias

Some may also argue that the results are tainted by selection effects whereby some omitted variable might determine both whether a de facto state emerges and whether it manages to survive. This is a reasonable charge since, at least in theory, de facto state outcomes may be endogenous to origins.

A cursory glance at the population of de facto states does not reveal any systematic pattern regarding the type of emergence and the subsequent trajectory. For example, de facto states formed in the aftermath of decolonization processes have been annihilated (e.g., Biafra in Nigeria), have accepted an autonomous status within the parent state (e.g., Bougainville in Papua New Guinea), or have managed to survive for a long time (e.g., Cabinda in Angola).

Selection bias can be tackled both theoretically and statistically. From a theoretical perspective, current works on de facto states suggest that emergence and trajectory are independent processes. Extant scholarship does not identify any teleology for de facto states. For example, Caspersen (2012:50) emphatically notes that a de facto state's path to emergence "does not determine the kind of entity that is likely to evolve." More generally, the trajectories of armed groups seem to exhibit limited path dependencies. Some groups, like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, initiate rebellion with only a hundred men only to later develop into formidable organizations (Hazen 2013:75), while others, such as the Eritrean Liberation Army (EFL) start out with well-organized structures only to be pushed at the margins of the insurgency by internecine fighting (EFL was gradually eliminated by a splinter faction, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, EPLF). As Schlichte (2010:183) observes, pre-existing structures do not necessarily "preordain the manner in which an insurgency develops."

From a statistical perspective, selection bias can be tackled with a two-stage Heckman selection model. Running a Heckman model would imply obtaining estimates for the first stage of the process (de facto state emergence), saving a selection bias term, and using it to correct the estimates in the outcome stage (de facto state disappearance). Hence, if de facto state emergence and disappearance are correlated, Heckman would control for this correlation. However, there are at least two reasons why a Heckman selection model is problematic for this analysis. First, the relatively low number of observations would limit the confidence in the selection model estimates. Second, selection models tend to be poorly identified, and, thus, to produce biased estimates when the same covariates are used for predicting both se-

lection and the outcome of interest (Brandt and Schneider 2004; King 2010). Well-identified selection models are those which involve truly *exogenous* variables – variables related to the selection stage, but *not* the outcome stage. A properly identified selection model for this study would include variables related to de facto state emergence but *unrelated* to de facto state trajectories. It remains a challenge to identify a valid exogenous variable that would be correlated with de facto state emergence but uncorrelated with survival/demise. No obvious candidates for such exogenous covariates emerge from the literature on the phenomenon.

4 Descriptive Statistics

In the main manuscript, I make references to descriptive statistics for the main variables. I include below tables with measures of central tendency and correlation matrix for the key covariates.

Table A11: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Median	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Prior status	0.62	1	0.48	0	1
Colony	0.52	0	0.49	0	1
Peacekeepers	0.25	0	0.43	0	1
Recognition	7.51	0	22.03	0	190
Military support	2.78	3	1.40	1	5
State building	5.95	6	3.26	1	10
Fragmentation	3.95	3	3.35	1	21
Veto players	4.01	3	2.09	1	7

5 Correlation Matrix

Table A12: Correlation matrix for military support, state building, fragmentation, and veto players

	Military support	State building	Fragmentation	Veto players
Military support	1.000			
State building	0.398	1.000		
Fragmentation	0.128	0.272	1.000	
Veto players	-0.061	0.272	0.266	1.000

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