De Facto States Dataset

Codebook

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1 Population of de facto states

TABLE 1 Population of de facto states

De facto state	Parent state	Emergence	Disappearance	Type of disappearance
Katanga	Congo (DRC)	1960	1963	forceful reintegration
Biafra	Nigeria	1967	1970	forceful reintegration
Krajina	Croatia	1991	1995	forceful reintegration
Chechnya	Russia	1991	1999	forceful reintegration
Anjouan	Comoros	1997	2008	forceful reintegration
Tamil Eelam	Sri Lanka	1984	2009	forceful reintegration
Rwenzururu Kingdom	Uganda	1963	1982	peaceful reintegration
Găgăuzia	Moldova	1991	1995	peaceful reintegration
Bougainville	Papua New Guinea	1975	1997	peaceful reintegration
Eastern Slavonia	Croatia	1995	1998	peaceful reintegration
Ajaria	Georgia	1991	2004	peaceful reintegration
Aceh	Indonesia	2001	2005	peaceful reintegration
Karen State	Burma	1949	—	alive
Kachin State	Burma	1961	—	alive
Taiwan	China	1971	—	alive
Mindanao	Philippines	1973	—	alive
Northern Cyprus/TRNC[a]	Cyprus	1974	—	alive
Western Sahara	Morocco[b]	1974	—	alive
Cabinda	Angola	1975	—	alive
Casamance	Senegal	1982	—	alive
Abkhazia	Georgia	1991	—	alive
Kurdistan	Iraq	1991	—	alive
Nagorno-Karabakh	Azerbaijan	1991	—	alive
Puntland	Somalia	1991	—	alive
Somaliland	Somalia	1991	—	alive
South Ossetia	Georgia	1991	—	alive
Transnistria	Moldova	1991	—	alive
Republika Srpska	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	—	alive
Palestine	Israel[c]	1995	—	alive
Gaza	Palestine[d]	2007	—	alive

TABLE 1 Population of de facto states (cont.)

De facto state	Parent state	Emergence	Disappearance	Type of disappearance
Eritrea	Ethiopia	1964	1993	statehood
East Timor	Indonesia	1975	2002	statehood
Kosovo[e]	Serbia	1998	2008	statehood
South Sudan	Sudan	1956	2011	statehood

[a]Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, [b]Administered by Morocco, [c]Under Israeli occupation, [d]Under Hamas control, [e]Not a UN member

2 De facto state abbreviations and codes

De facto state codes were constructed by adding number 1 (or 2 and 3 if there are several de facto states in a given parent country) to a country's code in the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) system membership database (Comoros is assigned a 960 code). The codes (`dfscode`) and abbreviations (`dfsabbrev`) are as follows:

TABLE 2 De facto state abbreviations and codes

De facto state	Abbreviation	Code
Krajina	KRJ	3441
Eastern Slavonia	ESV	3442
Republika Srpska	SRP	3461
Kosovo	KOS	3471
Northern Cyprus	TRC	3521
Găgăuzia	GAG	3591
Transnistria	PMR	3592
Chechnya	CHY	3651
Abkhazia	ABK	3721
Ajaria	AJA	3722
South Ossetia	SOT	3723
Nagorno-Karabakh	NKH	3731
Casamance	CAS	4331
Biafra	BIA	4751
Katanga	KGA	4901
Rwenzururu Kingdom	RWE	5001
Puntland	PUT	5201
Somaliland	SOM	5202
Eritrea	ERI	5301
Cabinda	CAB	5401
Western Sahara	WSH	6001
South Sudan	SSD	6251
Kurdistan	KUR	6451
Palestine	PAL	6661
Gaza	GAZ	6662
Taiwan	TWN	7101
Karen State	KAR	7751
Kachin State	KAC	7752
Tamil Eelam	TTE	7801
Mindanao	MIN	8401
Aceh	ACE	8501
Timor Leste (East Timor)	ETR	8502
Bougainville	BGV	9101
Anjouan	ANJ	9601

3 De facto state definition

A *de facto state* is defined as a polity that:

1. belongs to (or is administered by) a recognized country, but is not a colonial possession
2. seeks some degree of separation from that country and has declared independence (or has demonstrated aspirations for independence, for example through a referendum or a "sovereignty declaration")
3. exerts military control over a territory or portions of territory inhabited by a permanent population
4. is not sanctioned by the government
5. performs at least basic governance functions, such as provision of social and political order
6. lacks international legal sovereignty (international legal sovereignty refers to recognition from a simple majority of UN Security Council permanent members plus recognition from a simple majority of UN members)
7. exists for at least 24 months.

This definition contributes to previous categorizations in at least two ways. First, prior works focus on the goal of international recognition as a *sine qua non* characteristic of de facto separation.[1] This is problematic because it is difficult to establish a priori whether the polities that ended up as de facto states aimed at outright independence or simply at increased autonomy within the parent state or any other status on a continuum from reintegration into the parent state to sovereign statehood (Jenne 2007).[2] The

[1]Pegg (1998, 26) states that a de facto state exists "where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability, receives popular support, has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area over which effective control is maintained, views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states, and seeks widespread international recognition as a sovereign state." For Lynch (2004, 15), de facto states are secessionist entities with an "empirically defined claim to statehood." Caspersen and Stansfield (2011, 2) consider de facto states as "territories that have achieved de facto independence often, though not always, through warfare, but have failed to gain international recognition as independent states." In her turn, Caspersen (2012, 6-11) views a de facto state as an entity that: (a) has achieved de facto independence and controls at least two-thirds of the territory it claims including the main city and key regions; (b) seeks to build state institutions "and demonstrate is own legitimacy;" (c) seeks international recognition; and (d) has existed for at least 2 years.

[2]Jenne (2007, 6) notes that "separatist leaders periodically abandon their quest for sovereignty in return for a place in the government or some other side payment (e.g., the Malay-Muslims in Thailand and the Kewris of Mauritania). Others have made 180-degree reversals in their stated aims. The Baluschi leaders in Pakistan, for example, sought statehood when Pakistan gained independence, but later reverted to an integrationist stance. By the mid-1970s, however, they were again calling for sovereignty. Very often minority elites seek independence during a regime change, only to request re-annexation of few years (or even months) later. The Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea is an example of the latter pattern."

definition adopted here circumvents the problem of "imputing preferences out of outcomes" that has led to some confusion about the universe of de facto states. Observable empirical characteristics (territorial control, declaration of independence, governance activities) rather than actor preferences and strategies (which are not directly observable) determine whether we "see" a de facto state or not. Statehood may not be an ex ante goal, but may result from an escalation of demands through the dynamic interaction between minority groups and the state.[3]

Second, current research has analyzed de facto separation from the perspective of ethnically based groups advancing demands for independence. While many de facto states are indeed ethnically based (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh), not all of them are (Pegg 1998, 136). The definition proposed above is agnostic as to the type of organization that claims to represent the de facto state population. That organization could be ethnic- or non ethnic-based; for example, it can be clan-based such as in Somaliland, or can build its legitimacy on civic nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism such as in Transnistria. The minimal requirement for de facto separation is that the organization in charge of the de facto state exercise empirical sovereignty over a territory that belongs to a sovereign state and engage in at least basic governance activities. Thus, the focus is not necessarily on ethnicity but on the institutional effects of bargaining between actors in self determination struggles.

The definition also helps separate de facto states from cognate entities. De facto states are different from:

- polities that institute an alternative political order but do not seek self-determination (e.g., FNLM-controlled territory during the civil war in El Salvador)
- warlord territories where there is little institutionalization of an alternative political order (such as areas controlled by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, and the Central African Republic between 2002 and 2011)
- "roving bandits" areas where rebel territorial control is not consolidated for longer periods of time and where there is hardly any governance apparatus beyond the production of violence (such as "Taylorland" in Liberia in the 1990s)
- territories controlled by paramilitaries or militias sanctioned by the government (such as areas controlled by various anti-FARC paramilitary groups in Colombia)
- separatist movements or autonomous regions that do not exert military control over the territory (such as the Basque country and Catalonia in Spain or Naxçivan in Azerbaijan)
- internationally recognized states that do not exhibit, by historical accident or by design, most of the attributes of statehood — monopoly over the use of force,

[3]Along these lines, Sorens (2012, 5) defines secessionism "broadly to include movements that aim at substantial territorial autonomy for a minority group and do not rule out independence in the future." Furthermore, Mampilly (2011, 250) observes that "insurgent organizations commonly appropriate aspects of sovereignty without necessarily embarking on the trajectory of statehood."

extractive and redistributive functions (such as Liechtenstein whose defense and tax activities are conducted by Switzerland)

- internationally recognized micro-states (such as Andorra or Swaziland)
- internationally recognized failed states (such as Somalia)
- instances of terra nullius, i.e., ungoverned territories whose sovereignty is "up for grabs" (such as parts of Antarctica)
- UN trust territories with undetermined jurisdiction (such as the Free Territory of Trieste between 1945 and 1954)
- colonies functioning quasi-independently before independence (such as Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980)
- freely associated states (such as the Cook Islands with New Zealand)
- condominiums (such as Andorra with Spain and France)
- tracts of land inhabited by peoples that have historically fled away from centralized authority, such as Pushtun-inhabited zones straddling the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, or portions of upland Southeast Asia.

4 Description of variables

4.1 De facto state duration

De facto state emergence (`dfsonset`) is observed in the year and month when a polity in an officially recognized state (a parent state) exhibits: non-recognition (more precisely, non-universal recognition); military control over (portions of) territory; performance of basic governance functions, such as provision of security, social and political order, extraction, and redistribution; non-sanctioning by the parent state.

Characteristics 1 through 7 are necessary and sufficient for a de facto state to exist. If a de facto state was already in place before the date of declaration of independence for the parent state, then this date is used for emergence. De facto state emergence for Taiwan is the date (1971) when the People's Republic of China was admitted into the UN (including the UNSC).

De facto state duration (`duration`) captures the number of months in each calendar year when the de facto state survived. Two other variables mark de facto state survival time in years (`durationy`) and days (`durationd`).

4.2 De facto state disappearance

De facto state disappearance (`fail`) is observed in the month when a de facto state no longer exhibits characteristics 1 through 7 above. The `fail` variable is coded dichotomously with 1 denoting failure (de facto state disappearance) and 0 denoting non-failure or censoring (the de facto state did not disappear by the end of the observation period, December 2011).

4.3 De facto state outcomes

This variable (`eventtype`) captures the 3 types of outcomes for de facto states:

1 violent reintegration into the parent state with no autonomy status (*forceful reintegration*)

2 negotiated reintegration into the parent state with some type of autonomy status (*peaceful reintegration*)

3 transition to full-fledged *statehood*

A de facto state is considered a full-fledged state when at least three permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) members recognize it. This departs slightly from the technical requirements of United Nations statehood. Admission into the UN as a full member state requires a recommendation from the 15–member UNSC (with a majority of 9 votes and no veto from the permanent members) and an UN General Assembly approval (which requires a two–thirds vote among the 193 members).

Figure 1 presents the distribution of de facto state outcomes:



FIGURE 1 Distribution of de facto state outcomes

4.4 Type of de facto state emergence

Categorical variable (`typeonset`) that captures four types of de facto state emergence:

1 de facto state emerges as post-conflict outcome

2 de facto state emerges out of the contentious interaction between the parent state and separatists (non conflictual emergence)

3 de facto state emerges in the wake of state/federal collapse

4 de facto state emerges during the decolonization process (colonial divestment)

4.5 Civil war over the de facto state

This variable (`dfswar`) codes for the presence of civil war between the de facto state and the parent state (UCDP/PRIO).

4.6 De facto state war intensity

Following the UCDP/PRIO criteria, the intensity variable (`dfswarint`) is coded as follows:

0 No battle-related deaths

1 Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year

2 War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year

4.7 De facto state prior war

Coded 1 if civil war broke out in the de facto state region 1 year (`dfspwar`) and 5 years (`dfspwar5`) prior to de facto state emergence (UCDP/PRIO).

4.8 De facto state autonomy

This variable (`dfsaut`) codes for whether the de facto state benefits from de jure autonomy within the parent state (Encyclopædia Britannica; MAR).

4.9 De facto state prior independence or autonomy

This variable (`dfspriorind`) codes for whether the de facto state benefitted from independence or autonomy in the post-1812 period (Encyclopædia Britannica; MAR; Hale 2008; Wimmer 2013).

4.10 De facto state revoked autonomy

This variable (`dfsrevaut`) codes for whether a de facto state's autonomous status was revoked 5 years or less prior to emergence (Encyclopædia Britannica; MAR; Shaykhutdinov 2010).

4.11 Former colony

This variable (`colony`) codes for whether the de facto state *itself* was a colonial possession.

4.12 Presence of de facto state(s) in neighboring countries

This variable (`dfsneigh`) codes for whether de facto states are present in a neighboring country.

4.13 Number of separatist movements in the parent state

This variable (`sepnumber`) codes for the number of separatist movements present in the parent state (Walter 2009).

4.14 Degree of state building in the de facto state

This ordinal variable (`dfsbuild`) measures the degree of state building in the de facto state. State building activities correspond to the following categories:

1 *low* degree of state building: de facto state separatists control the means of violence in the territory and provide minimal public goods (such as physical security)

2 *moderate* degree of state building; in addition to 1, separatists allocate resources for civilian governance (such as minimal public administration, social security, education, health)

3 *high* degree of state building: in addition to 2, separatists develop coherent governmental structures (institutions for extraction and redistribution; internal security and border management; courts; ministries)

4 *very high* degree of state building; the polity has most characteristics of a state (including external relations, representative offices abroad, commercial relations with international partners).

4.15 Number of governance institutions in the de facto state

This variable (`dfsinst`) is a count of the number of governance institutions that are present in a de facto state *in any given year*. These institutions can be inherited from past status (e.g., regional councils established by the parent state in autonomous territories)

or can be established by the rebel group/separatist movement that is in charge of the de facto state. The variable has the following categories:[4]

1 an *executive* supported by a military (coded as present if there is a clear executive authority that makes decisions in the de facto state)

2 a *legislature* and/or regional councils (coded as present if there is a legislative body in the de facto state capital and/or regional councils)

3 a court or semi-formalized *legal system* (coded as present if there is a formal or semi-formal juridical authority that adjudicates disputes between individuals or institutions in the de facto state)

4 a civilian *tax system* (coded as present if there are institutions for regularized extraction of taxes from the local population/businesses and/or from the diaspora)

5 an *educational system* (coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state establish a system of education that functions in parallel with or in lieu of the one provided by the parent state)

6 a *welfare system* (coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state establish a system of welfare – healthcare and/or pensions – that functions in parallel with or in lieu of the one provided by the parent state)

7 institutions for *foreign affairs* (coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state engage in diplomacy – establishing missions abroad; engaging in contacts with IGOs and/or foreign governments)

8 *media* or propaganda *system* (coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state establish media or propaganda outlets)

9 *police* and/or gendarmerie *system* (coded as present if he authorities in the de facto state establish a system of internal control – police and/or gendarmerie – that operates separately from the army)

10 an independent central *banking system* (coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state establish an independent central banking system that functions separately from the parent state's banking network, or use a different currency than the official currency of the parent state.

[4]Huang (2012) uses some of these indicators to construct a rebel governance variable which is later connected to post civil war democratization. Huang's unit of analysis is the conflict spell; hence, the coding for the state building variable captures the number of governance institutions at the end of the conflict (or the end of the observation period if the conflict was ongoing). *De Facto States* codes for the presence of each governance institution in every year.

4.16 External military support

This variable codes for the presence of military assistance received by the de facto state from other countries. Because of the limited availability of information on an estimated dollar amount of military aid a de facto state gets from third parties (an ideal measure), the dataset features an alternative proxy (`mextsupcat`) aimed at capturing how much external military assistance a de facto state gets*in any given year*. This proxy variable builds on Byman et al.'s (2001) study on external support for insurgent movements, and is an index composed of five equally weighted components:

1 weaponry

2 foreign military personnel (foreign soldiers)

3 foreign military advisors

4 training for de facto state troops abroad

5 safe havens

Based on the original coding, an alternative ordinal variable (`mextsupcat2`) is also constructed. This variable has the following categories:

1 *low* degree of military external support where only one type (for example, weaponry) of military assistance is present

2 *moderate* degree of military external support where two or three types (for example, weaponry, training, and safe havens) of military assistance are present

3 *high* degree of military external support where four or all five types of assistance are present.

4.17 External political support

This count variable (`polextsup`) captures how much external political support a de facto state gets in any year from another country, and includes the following components:

1 hosting the de facto state government in exile

2 providing economic subsidies, humanitarian aid, or investment

3 assisting the de facto state with public administration experts

4.18 External patron

This variable (`patron`) codes for the presence of an external state patron for the de facto state.

4.19 Contiguous patron

This variable (`contigp`) codes for whether the patron is contiguous to the de facto state (COW).

4.20 Great or regional power patron

This variable (`gpwrp`) codes for whether the patron is a great or regional power.

4.21 Concentrated minority

This variable (`minc`) codes for the presence of a concentrated minority on the territory controlled by the de facto state (Toft 2003, 2010).

4.22 Religious differences

This variable (`reldiff`) is coded 1 if the majority of the population in the de facto state embraces a different religion from the majority population of the parent state.

4.23 Ethnic differences

This variable (`ethnic`) is coded 1 if the majority of the population of the de facto state has a different ethnicity from the majority population of the parent state.

4.24 De facto state population

Population of the de facto states in thousands (`dfspop`) and logged (`ldfspop`).

4.25 Ethnic kin in neighboring state

This variable (`kineigh`) codes for the presence of de facto state ethnic kin in a neighboring country.

4.26 Diaspora

This variable (`dias`) codes for the presence of a large diaspora originating from the de facto state.

4.27 Fragmentation

The measure of rebel movement fragmentation (`frag`) is composed of the number of factions that make demands on behalf of the de facto state (cf., Cunningham 2013; Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012). The fragmentation variable measures the degree of

cohesion of the de facto state movement, not the internal cohesion of any given organization claiming to represent the de facto state. Internal divisions of an organization speaking on behalf of the de facto state are important for the fragmentation variable if and only if such divisions results in the emergence of competitor organizations claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the de facto state.

A faction is an organization that claims to represent the population of the de facto state and that makes demands regarding the status of the de facto state, such as reintegration into the parent state, limited autonomy, broad autonomy, no change in status (continuation of the status-quo), independence; (re)union with another state, membership in a supra-national entity. Hence, only those factions with a coherent organizational structure that make demands related to the status of the de facto state are included. Democratization demands from any faction are not considered unless such demands are related to a faction's preferences about the final status of the de facto state.

A faction can be a political party, a military organization, or civic group that operates within or outside the de facto state. To identify the number of factions in a de facto state for each year, I build on the coding procedure adopted by Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour (2012). An initial list was compiled with the use of aggregate sources: UCDP/PRIO list of parties to the conflict and MAR group profiles. These aggregate resources were supplemented by news reports from Keesing's World News Archives and Lexis-Nexis and by country–specific historical information. The following search terms were used: name of the de facto state (region); name of the group inhabiting the de facto state; autonomy; independence; secession; separatism; self-determination; (self) governance; de facto control; liberation; statehood.

After each faction was identified as claiming to legitimately represent the de facto state, I looked at the tenure of each faction. I relied on a variety of sources to obtain tenure information: multiple case histories (section 6 of the codebook provides the complete list of the sources consulted); Keesing's World News Archives; Lexis-Nexis; MAR Chronology of Events; Uppsala Conflict Database.

The number of factions is a very crude measure of rebel movement fragmentation as it does not gauge the distribution of power among factions nor the degree of institutionalization of the rebel movement. Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour (2012) argue that fragmentation is best conceptualized as a "scale ranging from unified to fragmented, and on different dimensions. With this multidimensional concept, we can capture the reality of fragmentation as a characteristic that can change over time, with the degree and type of fragmentation shifting as organizations are eliminated and new ones emerge, institutions coordinate actions in the larger struggle or become irrelevant, and as power within the group is dispersed across organizations or concentrated within one of them."

Based on this rationale, I construct an alternative measure of fragmentation (`frag2`) on the unified–fragmented scale (Table 3) suggested by Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour. This scale has three constitutive dimensions:

a the *number of organizations* (factions) making demands on behalf of the de facto state

b the *degree of institutionalization* of the de facto state movement (the existence of formal or informal institutions that coordinate the actions of various organizations making demands on behalf of the de facto state)

c the *distribution of power* among factions within the rebel movement

TABLE 3 Fragmentation on the unified–fragmented scale (cf., Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012): 1–no fragmentation; 9–extreme fragmentation

	Unified/fragmented scale	Nb. of organizations	Degree of inst.	Distrib. of power
1	cohesive	one	high	concentrated
2	hegemonic	few (2–3)	low	concentrated
3	narrow rivalry	few (2–3)	low	dispersed
4	narrow hegemonic coalition	few (2–3)	high	concentrated
5	narrow coalition of equals	few (2–3)	high	dispersed
6	broad hegemonic coalition	many	high	concentrated
7	broad coalition of equals	many	high	dispersed
8	fragmented hegemonic	many	low	concentrated
9	extremely fragmented	many	low	dispersed

4.28 Leadership change in the de facto state

This variable (`dfsldrchg`) codes for whether there is a leadership change in the de facto state. Based on the organizational structure of each de facto state, the leader can be the president, prime–minister, head of a political council, or leader of the main rebel organization (Encyclopædia Britannica; Keesing's World News Archive; Lexis-Nexis; worldstatesmen.org).

4.29 Military personnel in the de facto state

Number (in thousands) of active soldiers of the de facto state (`dfsmil`).

4.30 Military personnel in the parent state

Military personnel (`milp`) in the parent state (in thousands); reservists and paramilitaries are not included.

4.31 Power balance

Ratio of de facto state military personnel to parent state military personnel (`pwrbal`): Government soldiers-(minus)de facto state soldiers/(divided by)total number of soldiers (`pwrbal2`).

4.32 Relative rebel capability

Ordinal measure (`relcap`) of relative rebel capability (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Gent 2011):

1 *weaker* than the government

2 at *parity* with the government

3 *stronger* than the government

4 *much stronger* than the government

4.33 Mineral resources

This variable (`minres`) codes for whether the de facto state *itself* is rich in exportable mineral resources (oil, natural gas, copper, phosphates, gold, silver, diamonds). The information is taken from the U.S. Geological Survey.

4.34 Distance (de facto state capital – parent state capital)

Approximate road distance (`dist`) from the de facto state capital to the parent state capital (in kilometers).

4.35 Economic base

This variable (`ecbase`) codes for whether the de facto state has a strong industrial/agricultural infrastructure.

4.36 Island

This variable is coded 1 if the de facto state is an island.

4.37 Sea access

This variable is coded 1 if the de facto state is not an island but has access to the sea/ocean.

4.38 Poor or rich region

This variable (`pori`) is coded 1 if the de facto state is a poor/rich region, and 0 if there are no large differences in per capita income between the de facto state and the parent state.

4.39 Weak parent state

Parent state military weakness is captured with two proxies: military expenditures as percentage of the GDP (`weaks`) and military expenditures per capita (`weaks2`).

4.40 GDP per capita (parent state)

Logged GDP per capita (`lgdp`) for the parent state (in 1996 US dollars).

4.41 Failed state

Coded 1 if, according to the Failed States Index, the parent state is a failed state (`fails`).

4.42 Relative political capacity

Relative political capacity (`rpc`) is the Arbetman-Kugler ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted revenue (Hendrix 2010; Sobek 2010).

4.43 New state

Coded 1 for the first 5 years after a parent state's independence (`newstate`).

4.44 State age

Number of months since the parent state became independent (`stateage`) or since 1812 if the parent state was independent before then.

4.45 Parent state veto players

This variable (`vetop`) measures the degree of veto opportunities in the parent state. More precisely, the variable gauges the ability of the parent state government to effect policy change. The basic logic is that, in order to change policies regarding a de facto state's status, a certain number of individual or collective actors within the parent state have to agree to the proposed change (cf., Tsebelis 2002, 2).

Polity IV's executive constraints (`exconst`) variable is used as a proxy for the degree of veto opportunities in the parent state. This indicator refers to "the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities" (Marshall et al. 2002, 21). The advantage of this proxy is that it encompasses constraints on decision-making from both within and outside of the government (e.g., legislatures, political parties, powerful advisers, private corporations, the army, judicial bodies).

The executive constraints variable is created on a 7-point scale, with 1 representing "unlimited decision-making authority" (no limitations on executive's decisions) and 7

representing "highly constrained decision-making authority" (several veto players can block a decision). In the middle, a value of 3 represents "slight to moderate limitation on decision-making authority," while a value of 5 represents "substantial limitations on decision-making authority." 2, 4, and 6 are intermediate categories, bridging the gap between adjacent values.

Polity IV has missing values for Somalia after 1991 for the `exconst` variable. Somalia's lack an effective government since 1991 is equivalent to "highly-constrained decision-making authority;" hence, it receives a score a score of 7 for the 1991-2011 period.

4.46 Institutional checks on executive power

Number of institutional checks (`checks`) on executive power in the parent state (Gibler 2010).

4.47 Checks on executive power

Number of checks (`checks2`) on executive power in the parent state (Keefer and Stasavage 2003; World Bank Database on Political Institutions).

4.48 Conscription

This variable (`conscript`) codes for the presence of enforced conscription (military draft) in the parent state (CIA country profiles; Horeman and Stolvijk 1998).

4.49 Military involvement in politics

This variable (`military`) is coded 1 if the military is directly or indirectly involved in politics (in issues other than national security) and 0 if the military is completely subordinated to a civilian government (Svolik 2012).

4.50 Political constraints

Index of political constraints (`polcon`) in the parent state in any given year. Data are taken from the Political Constraint Index (Henisz 2002).

4.51 Leadership change

This variable (`ldrchg`) codes for whether there is a change in the leadership of the parent state regarding the executive power (Archigos).

4.52 Regime change

This variable (`rchange`) codes for whether there is a shift from autocratic to democratic rule (or vice-versa) in the parent state.

4.53 Anocracy

This variable (`anocp`) codes for whether the parent state is an anocracy (a score of -5 to 5 on the Polity IV index).

4.54 Democracy

This variable (`demp`) codes for whether the parent state is a democracy (a score of 6 or higher on the Polity IV index).

4.55 Political discrimination

Political discrimination (`poldis`) in the parent state (Minorities at Risk score of political discrimination).

4.56 Exclusion

The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) variable on group exclusion (`excl`) from regional and national power.

4.57 Repression

Minorities at Risk score of governmental repression (`repress`) against civilians (those who are not engaged in violent or non-violent activities against the regime):

0 no repression

1 surveillance

2 harassment/containment

3 nonviolent coercion

4 violent coercion short of killing

5 violent coercion/killing

4.58 Repression CIRI

Transformed Cingranelli-Richards (`represciri`) repression index:

1 *low* level of repression

2 *medium* level of repression

3 *high* level of repression

4 *very high* level of repression

4.59 Political terror

Political terror (`pts`) scores for the parent state.

4.60 Population (parent state)

Parent state population in 1,000s (`pop`) and logged (`lpop`).

4.61 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (parent state)

The ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (`efl`) measures the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the parent state (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

4.62 Inequality in the parent state

GINI coefficient (World Bank; Eurostat) for the parent state (`ineq`).

4.63 Number of de facto states in the parent state

Number of de facto states in the parent state (`dfsnb`).

4.64 Federal state

This variable (`fed`) codes for whether the parent state has a federal structure (confederations and regionalized unitary structures such as Indonesia are not included).

4.65 Rivalry with neighbor

Coded 1 for each year the parent state is engaged in rivalry with a neighboring country (`riv`).[5]

[5] I am grateful to William R. Thompson for sharing the updated rivalry data with me.

4.66 Rivalry with patron state

Coded 1 for each year the parent state is engaged in rivalry with the de facto state's patron, if any (`rivp`).

4.67 War in neighboring state

Coded 1 if there is a civil war in any of the parent state's neighbors (`warneigh`).

4.68 Region

UCDP/PRIO region categorization (`region1`):

1 Europe

2 Middle East

3 Asia

4 Africa

5 Americas

4.69 Region 2

Alternative region categorization (`region2`):

1 Western Europe

2 Central and Eastern Europe

3 Eurasia (post-Soviet East European countries and the Caucasus)

4 Middle East and North Africa

5 Sub-Saharan Africa

6 Central Asia

7 Southeast Asia

8 Americas

4.70 Number of de facto states in a region

This variable (`dfsnbreg2`) codes for the number of de facto states in a region in any given year.

4.71 Strategic location

This variable (`stratloc`) is coded 1 if the de facto state is located at the periphery of a great/regional power, an alliance system, or close to narrow straits/shipping lanes.

4.72 De facto state as disputed territory between two countries

This variable (`dfsriv`) is coded 1 if the de facto state is a territory disputed by two rival countries.

4.73 Cold War

This variable (`cw`) is coded 1 for years 1945-1989, and 0 for years 1990-2011.

4.74 Systemic change

This variable (`syschange`) is coded 1 for the first 5 years after the end of WWII and the end of the Cold War, and 0 otherwise.

4.75 Decade dummies

The dataset includes dummies for each decade.

4.76 International peacekeeping

This variable (`intl`) codes for the presence of international peacekeeping forces in the de facto state (UN; OSCE; AU; Fortna 2008).

4.77 UNSC recognition

Number of United Nations Security Council permanent members that recognize the de facto state in any given year (`unscr`).

4.78 UN recognition

Number of United Nations members that recognize the de facto state in any given year (`unr`).[6]

[6] I am grateful to Timothy S. Rich for sharing his Taiwan recognition data with me.

4.79 Third-party mediation

This variable (`med`) is coded 1 when third-party mediators are present. Mediation is "a non-coercive, nonviolent, and ultimately nonbinding form of intervention. Mediators enter into a conflict to affect, change, modify, or influence the outcome. The mediator can represent a state or a nonstate actor" (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009).

4.80 Diplomatic intervention

This variable (`dipinterv`) is coded 1 when there is diplomatic intervention in a conflict over a de facto state (DeRouen et al. 2009).

4.81 Military intervention

This variable (`milinterv`) codes for whether there is military intervention on behalf of the government (Regan 2002). Intervention consists of either one or more of the following: military assistance for the government, foreign soldiers fighting on behalf of the government, enforcement of no-fly zones, direct aerial or ground attacks against the rebels, joint combat missions, logistical support.

4.82 International administration

This variable (`intl`) codes for whether the de facto state is placed under international administration.

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5 De facto state chronologies and variable codings

5.1 Krajina (KRJ)

Map of Krajina (in blue)[7]

1990, August
Serbs are in full military control of Krajina ("the frontier") under the leadership of Milan Babić, ex-mayor of Knin and the most influential leader of Krajina Serbs (Caplan 2005, 33).

1990, September
Babić demands that Krajina have the status of "free territory" within Croatia —"in effect, a state within a state" (Caplan 2005, 34).

1990, December
Croatian Serbs in Krajina announce the creation of a "Serbian Autonomous District."

1991, February
Krajina declares secession from Croatia and considers itself part of Yugoslavia.

1991, June
Croatia declares independence from Yugoslavia.

[7]Source: http://www.srpskapolitika.com/krajina/link1.html. The copyrights for all maps included in this codebook belong to the respective holders.

1991, August
War between Croats and Serbs erupts and leads to large ethnic cleansing of Croatians from Krajina.

1991, December
Krajina declares independence under the name of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina) with the capital at Knin and with Babić as president. Yugoslavia is the only country to recognize it. By the end of 1991, Serbs are in full military control of roughly one quarter of Croatia (Paris 2004, 97).

1992, January
Under UN pressure, a ceasefire is signed. A United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) is established in territories claimed by Krajina. The deployed UN forces are lightly armed and operate under very restrictive rules of engagement (in effect, they amount to an observer rather than a peacekeeping force). Babić is opposed to the UN deployment but his rival, and Milošević loyalist, Goran Hadžić, overrules him.

1992, February
Eastern Slavonia (Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem) joins Krajina. Goran Hadžić becomes president.

1992, July
Krajina begins to issue its own currency—the Krajina dinar—pegged to and used in parallel with the Yugoslav dinar.

1992, November
A ministry of foreign affairs is established. However, Krajina leaders have difficulty recruiting professional diplomats or people with strong command of foreign languages (Caspersen 2012, 56).

1993, March
The UN Security Council confirms in a resolution that Krajina and Eastern Slavonia are integral parts of the territory of Croatia. In the same month, the Serb Army of Krajina is formed.

1994, January
Milan Martić is elected president of Krajina.

1995, June
Serbian parliament in Krajina votes to form a union with the Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska. The decision is opposed by Western Srem.

1995, August
The Croatian army retakes Knin by force and the region is reintegrated into the parent state. The de facto state government moves to Eastern Slavonia.

dfsbuild

Krajina had many accoutrements of a state: an army; president; parliament (in Okučani); government (in Knin); system of administration; stamps; ministry of foreign affairs (headed by Slobodan Jarcević) and even its own currency (Bose 2007, 105–53; Stallaerts 2010, 287; Radan 2011, 523–28; Caspersen 2012, 78). At the same time, Krajina's economy—"insofar as one existed—was almost entirely based on smuggling and other forms of war profiteering" (Caspersen 2012, 21).

mextsupcat

Krajina received extensive military support (troops; weapons; materiel/logistics; training/expertise) from Serbia/Yugoslavia (UCDP).

frag

Serbian Democratic Party (SDS); Serbian Democratic Party-Krajina (SDS-K; Milan Babić faction); Serbian Democratic Party-Serb Lands (SDS-S); Goran Hadžić faction); Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS); Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS); Serb Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS).

5.2 Eastern Slavonia (ESV)

Map of Eastern Slavonia (blue enclave in the far east of Croatia)[8]

1990, August
Serbs are in full military control of Eastern Slavonia (Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem) under the leadership of Goran Hadžić.

1991, June
Croatia declares independence. Civil war erupts between Croats and Serb Croats.

1992, February
Eastern Slavonia (Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem) joins Krajina. A United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is deployed in Krajina.

1995, August
After the Croatian army retakes Knin by force, the government of Krajina moves to Eastern Slavonia where a new entity is established with capital at Vukovar.

1996, January
Eastern Slavonia falls under UN administration until January 1998. The United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) assumes full control over the region.

1998, January

[8]Source: http://www.srpskapolitika.com/krajina/link1.html.

Eastern Slavonia is reintegrated into Croatia with limited autonomy.

`dfsbuild`
As a successor entity to Krajina under UN administration, Eastern Slavonia had a more limited set of statelike institutions (president; parliament; government; system of administration) (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007; Caspersen 2007; Radan 2011).

`mextsupcat`
Eastern Slavonia received military support from Serbia (UCDP).

`frag`
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS); Serbian Democratic Party-Krajina (SDS-K; Milan Babić faction); Serbian Democratic Party-Serb Lands (SDS-S); Goran Hadžić faction); Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS); Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS); Serb Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS).

5.3 Republika Srpska (SRP)

Map of Republika Srpska (in green)[9]

1992, March
Bosnia and Herzegovina declares independence. Immediately after the declaration of independence, fighting erupts between the Bosnian Serb army, the Bosnian Muslim army, and the Bosnian Croat army.

1992, April
The European Community and the United States recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence. Republika Srpska declares independence (with capital at Pale) and is recognized only by Serbia. Radovan Karadžić becomes president.

1992, May
Radko Mladić, a Bosnian Serb, becomes the commander of the Bosnian Serb army which inherits a large military arsenal from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and enjoys support from the Yugoslav secret service and pro-government paramilitary groups from Serbia and Montenegro.

1992, July
Serb forces, backed by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), control about 70% of Bosnia's territory. The remaining territory is reportedly controlled by the Croats. The Bosnian-Croat-Serbian conflict erupts in full-scale war.

1993, August
Vance-Owen peace plan is proposed. The plan would have created a decentralized Bosnian state with 9 cantons (with 3 cantons for each minority: Serbs, Croats, Mus-

[9]Source: http://tinyurl.com/kbh2rj4.

lim). Milošević urges Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the plan. In May 1993, Bosnian Serbs reject the proposal (Bose 2007, 129).

1994, March
Muslim/Croat Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina is created.

1995, May
Bosnian Serbs take UN hostages.

1995, July
Serb forces attack Srebenica (in 1993 it had been declared a "safe haven" under UN protection). Thousands of Bosnian Muslims are massacred. Karadžić and Mladić are indicted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.

1995, August
NATO airplanes begin bombing Bosnian Serb military targets.

1995, November
Peace talks begin at Dayton, Ohio. Bosnian Serbs are represented by Slobodan Milošević.

1995, December
Dayton Accords are signed at Versailles by the presidents of Serbia (Slobodan Milošević), Croatia (Franjo Tudjman) and the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegović. The agreement leads to the incorporation of Republika Srpska as a constituent member of Bosnia-Herzegovina (with the Bosnian-Croat federation the other constituent member). NATO peacekeeping forces (IFOR) are deployed. Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes de facto administered by the international community with an Office of the High Representative as the institution designated for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords. According to the provisions of the agreement, the country's presidency is rotated among a Muslim, a Croat, and a Serb. The Dayton agreement gives each entity—Republika Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation—the right to maintain its own armed forces.

1996, July
Karadžić is indicted by the war crimes tribunal in the Hague and is barred from running in Republika Srpska elections. Another hardcore Serb nationalist, Biljana Plavšić, becomes president. Soon after the elections, rifts appeared between Karadžić loyalists and Plavšić-Dodik supporters over the control of Srpska's government. Paris (2004, 103) notes that Western governments provided extensive support to Plavšić (for instance, by funding aid projects in areas controlled by the Plavšić-Dodik faction, and denying such aid to areas controlled by Karadžić loyalists).

1997, July
A majority of legislators in Srpska's parliament call for Plavšić's removal. In retaliation,

Plavšić dissolves parliament and calls for new elections.

1997, November
Elections are held and Plavšić's Serbian People's Union wins only 15 of 83 seats (Paris 2004, 104). Together with other nationalist factions, Karadžić supporters control a majority of seats. According to Paris (2004, 104-5), unlike in 1996 when they encouraged free and fair elections, in 1997 international peacebuilders "pursued a different strategy, encouraging a split within the ruling Bosnian Serb party, precipitating new entity-level elections, and providing overt financial and political assistance to the more moderate candidates in the ensuing electoral campaign. Despite this effort, moderate candidates still fared poorly in the vote compared to the performance of extremist nationalists loyal to Karadžić, who remained the most powerful faction in the legislature."

January 1998
Plavšić's political ally, Milorad Dodik, is designated prime-minister by a small number of members of Parliament. The nomination is supported by the international community. In 1998, Banja Luka becomes the de facto capital of the republic.

1998, November
Nikola Poplašen, a hardline nationalist supported by the Karadžić faction, defeats the Western-backed Plavšić-Dodik team in elections. However, in March 1999, he is removed by the High Representative on the grounds that his tenure is conducive to heightened instability in the country.

2000, January
Another hardliner, Mirko Sarović, is elected president but is recognized as such by the High Representative only in December 2000.

2000, April
Plavšić herself is indicted for crimes against humanity. She surrenders to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in January 2001.

2001, March
Srpska Parliament votes to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2002, November
Nationalist Dragan Čavić is elected president.

2004
Sprska army begins to be gradually integrated into the Bosnian army. NATO peacekeeping forces are replaced with a 7,000-strong European Union Force (EUFOR).

2006, June
Srpska army is operationally integrated into the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2006, September
Srpska and Serbia sign a comprehensive agreement that provides for enhanced economic relations.

2006, November
Milan Jelić of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) is elected president.

2007, September-December
Jelić dies of a heart attack. Rajko Kuzmanović (SNSD) is elected president of Republika Srpska.

2010, November
Nationalist Milorad Dodik (SNSD) is elected president of the de facto state.

`dfsbuild`
In early 1992, Srpska "took on the characteristics of a state within a state, with [its] own governmental offices, administrative structures, sources of revenue and military organization" (Caplan 2005, 125).

The entity has "extensive autonomy in the conduct of its internal affairs and a large margin of independence in the conduct of foreign relationsâĂę[it also retains its wartime army]" (Zahar 2004, 32).

By the end of 2011, Republika Srpska had representative offices in Belgrade, Brussels, Moscow, Ottawa, and Stuttgart. In 2009, it is reported to have been the 3rd largest spender on US lobbying for foreign governments.

`mextsupcat`
Serbia assisted Srpska with arms, troops, military equipment, and trainers (Caplan 2005, 125). Zahar (2004, 36) states that Serbian "military and financial support was critical in the establishment of RS [Republika Srpska]. Post-1993, and with the consolidation of a thriving black market economy, the RS was increasingly able to dispense with [Serbian] material and financial support. However, the Bosnian Serb leadership became heavily dependent on Belgrade for political support."

`frag`
Democratic Progress Party (PDP); Serbian Democratic Party (SDS; Karadžić personalist); Serb Democratic Party-Serb Country (SDS-SZ); Party/Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD); Serbian People's Union/Alliance (SNSRS; Plavšić personalist); Socialist Party (SPRS); Serb Radical Party (SRS); Democratic Party; Democratic People's Alliance (DNS); Pensioners' Party (DPS) (Paris 2004, 103–110).

5.4 Kosovo (KOS)

Map of Kosovo[10]

1912
Ottoman-ruled Kosovo is conquered by the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro.

1918
Kosovo becomes a part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

1974
Kosovo is upgraded from an autonomous region to an autonomous province in the new Yugoslav Constitution. As a result, it now enjoys "almost all the rights and privileges granted to a republic, including its own constitution, assembly, and seat on the federal council. Crucially, though, it is denied the right of self-determination" (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 44).

[10]Source: United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

1989
The Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević revokes Kosovo's autonomous status (instituted in 1963 and guaranteed by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution).

1990, July
The Kosovar provincial assembly unilaterally declares Kosovo an independent Yugoslav republic. In retaliation, Belgrade dissolves the Kosovar provincial government and takes full administrative control of the province. As a response, Kosovar exiles create the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo headquartered in Zagreb (Croatia).

1990s
Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovar Albanians launch a campaign of civil disobedience and put in place parallel institutions (local government; schools; hospitals).

1991, October
Following a popular referendum, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo declares the province independent. Albania is the only country to recognize the "Republic of Kosova." The international community is generally supportive of restoration of Kosovo's autonomy rather than statehood. Bujar Bukoshi becomes the prime-minister of the Kosovar government in exile.

1992, May
The Kosovar newspaper "Rilindja" begins to be published in Switzerland (Elsie 2010). On May 26, Rugova is elected president of the Republic of Kosovo with 99% of the votes.

1992-1996
The province witnesses no military intervention from the parent state. Kosovars form parallel structures of governance (government; courts; schools; hospitals; business enterprises) that operate alongside the official Serb institutions. What emerges is a dual system of government (Geldenhuys 2009, 111).

1996
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is formed. Skirmishes between KLA and Serbian troop become more frequent. Speaking in Pristina, Robert Gelbard, the US special envoy for the Balkans, describes the KLA as a terrorist organization.

1997, November
Several associations dissatisfied with Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo form the Democratic Forum of Albanian intellectuals, headed by Rexhep Qosja.

1998
The province is engulfed by warfare between KLA irregulars and the Serb army. KLA begins to exert military control over a large part of the territory — about 40% by June 1998, with a vital corridor to the Albanian border (Paquin 2010, 109; Geldenhuys 2009,

114). The conflict produces a flood of refugees who try to take shelter in Albania and Macedonia. KLA openly states that its main objective is the unification of Kosovo with Albania.

In the same year, Christopher Hill is appointed special envoy to Kosovo, and proposes a ceasefire plan according to which Serbian military and police would fully withdraw from the province. Under the threat of NATO military intervention, Milošević agrees to reduce the number of Serbian forces. This allows the KLA (which was not bound by the ceasefire plan) to expand its territorial control and intensify attacks against Serbian troops. As a result, Milošević withdraws from the agreement and resumes full military operations in Kosovo.

1999
At Rambouillet (near Paris), Christopher Hill proposes a new plan to Milošević according to which: a) Kosovo would remain a constitutive part of Serbia with a high degree of autonomy; b) there would be a three-year interim period before the final status of the province is discussed; c) the option of independence would be on the table; d) international forces would be introduced in the province to guarantee enforcement of the agreement. Milošević rejects the agreement and steps up military operations in Kosovo. On 23 March, NATO launches an aerial bombing campaign against Belgrade.

At the conclusion of the 78-day NATO intervention, all Serbian forces withdraw from Kosovo, Kosovo Liberation Army is officially disbanded, and the province becomes a de facto UN protectorate. UNSC Resolution 1244, passed on June 10, establishes the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the ultimate authority in the province with the task of building civilian administration and gradually transferring authority to a civilian government. A joint NATO-Russian force (KFOR) is entrusted with peacekeeping. The Resolution recognizes Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo, but places the region under UN administration.

2001
The UN sets up a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Government.

2002
The first elected Kosovar government is formed.

2004, March
Violence erupts between Serbs and Albanians. Orthodox churches are vandalized and many Serbs leave the province.

2005
Martti Ahtisaari is named UN special envoy to Kosovo.

2006
Frank Wisner, the US special envoy to Kosovo, privately promises Kosovars that Wash-

ington will recognize Kosovo's secession if the rights of the Serbian minority are protected (Paquin 2010, 117).

2007, April
Ahtisaari submits his report to UN Secretary General. The report recommends that Kosovo be recognized as a sovereign state (and be supervised by the international community until it acquires all accoutrements of statehood). The report is rejected by Belgrade. China and Russia pledge to veto any application from Kosovo for UN membership.

2008, February 17
Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi declares Kosovo an independent state. The following day, Washington recognizes Kosovo as a sovereign country. Upon independence, UN authority in the province is transferred to the EU. Since 2008, Pristina has been under Brussels' de facto administration. As of December 2011, all EU-member countries, except for Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, extended official recognition to Kosovo.

2010, July
In a decision vehemently contested by Belgrade, The International Court of Justice rules that Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia does not violate international law.

`dfsbuild`
Kosovar Albanians had a cabinet in exile (until 1999), formed a formidable militia (Kosovo Liberation army-KLA), and put in place a range of parallel institutions, such as local government, schools, and hospitals (Auerswald and Auerswald 2000; Judah 2008; Paquin 2010, 103; Petersen 2011). After Kosovo became a UN protectorate in 1999, UNMIK managed to create strong state structures.

`mextsupcat`
Albania provided extensive military support to Kosovar rebels (UCDP).

`frag`
Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA); National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo; The Democratic League of Kosovo; Kosovo Parliamentary Party; Christian Democratic Party; Social Democratic Party of Kosovo; Liberal Party of Kosovo; United Democratic Movement.

5.5 Northern Cyprus (TRC)

Map of Northern Cyprus[11]



1571
Cyprus is conquered by the Ottoman Empire.

1878
Cyprus is transferred from Ottoman to British rule under the secret Anglo-Turkish Convention through which the Ottoman Empire secured Britain's support in its disputes with Russia (a transfer of administration rather than possession) (Mirbagheri 2010).

"Almost immediately, the British authorities came under pressure from the island's Greek-speaking Christian majority to allow Cyprus to be united with the Kingdom of Greece which had become an independent state fifty years earlier. London refused, arguing that the Ottoman Empire had not ceded sovereignty over the island. It had merely allowed Britain to run it" (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 40).

1914
Great Britain annexes Cyprus.

[11]Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

1925
Cyprus formally becomes a British colony.

1950
Greek Cypriots vote overwhelmingly in favor of unification with Greece.

1955
Following an unofficial referendum in which they showed overwhelming support for unification with Greece, Greek Cypriots launch a violent insurgency against British rule. "In response, the Turkish Cypriot community [calls] for the islands to be partitioned between Greece and Turkey" (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 40).

1957
Turkish Cypriots create the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT).

1960
Cyprus becomes independent. The country's independence is guaranteed by the UK, Greece, and Turkey which agree not to sanction any attempt at *enosis* (unification with Greece) or *taksim* (partition of parts of the island). The Cypriot constitution is specifically designed to address ethno-nationalist grievances and includes the following provisions: a bicameral legislature with an equally-divided upper house and 50-member house of representatives (35 Greek and 15 Turkish Cypriots); a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president elected separately by each community, with each having the power to veto legislation in areas of foreign affairs, defense and security but not in communal issues; a 10-member cabinet composed of 7 Greeks and 3 Turkish Cypriots; an army with 60% Greek soldiers and 40% Turkish Cypriots; two official languages: Greek and Turkish; separate Turkish municipalities in the main cities (Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca, and Paphos). The first president is Archbishop Makarios and the vice-president is Fazil Kuchuk.

1961
Against the opposition of vice-president Kuchuk, Cyprus joins the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

1961-1962
Weapons are smuggled into both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

1963, December
Low-level violence erupts between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot paramilitary groups.

1964, January
A mass grave with the bodies of 21 tortured Turkish Cypriots is discovered near Nicosia.

1964, August

Greek troops launch an offensive against the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Kokkina. The offensive is called off after Ankara threatens a full-scale land invasion.

1964, May
A United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) is introduced. UN forces cannot control localized fighting in Turkish enclaves in the south.

1967, April
A military junta seizes power in Greece. Greek Cypriot paramilitaries form on the island, dissatisfied with President Makarios's (Greek Cypriot) moderate stance.

1967, December
Leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community establish the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration as a guarantee that the provisions of the 1960 constitution are enforced (Geldenhuys 2009, 175).

1974, July
Following an attempted military coup by Greek nationalists who vowed unification with Greece (*enosis*), Ankara invades the northern part of the island with thousands of troops. The conflict triggers large-scale population movement with Turkish Cypriots concentrating in the northern part of the island and Greek Cypriots in the southern part. According to conservative estimates, the Turkish invasion results in the forced dislocation of about 160,000 Greek Cypriots. The capital, Nicosia, is divided in two. At the end of hostilities, the emergent de facto state in Northern Cyprus covers about 35% of the island. In the following years, conservative Turks from Turkey begin immigrating to Northern Cyprus in large numbers. At the end of 1974, the island is "completely divided: geographically, ethnically, and politically" (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 41).

1975, February
A Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) is proclaimed. A National Unity Party is founded by Rauf Raif Denktaş in Northern Cyprus.

1976, February
Denktaş is elected president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

1977
Greek Cypriots acknowledge the principle of bizonality (two distinct and self-governing regions) as essential to peace in Cyprus.

1983, November
Northern Cyprus declares independence under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey is the only country to recognize TRNC. Longtime leader of Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Raif Denktaş, a hardliner, becomes president of the de facto state.

1989, February
Turkish Cypriots protest against rising living costs. Reuters news agency reports that the average difference in annual incomes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had widened from $425 in 1976 to $4841 in 1987 (Source: MAR Chronology for Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus).

1994
The European Court of Justice rules that no EU country can buy goods from Northern Cyprus without the approval of the Greek Cypriot government. The decision amounts to a trade embargo imposed on the de facto state.

2003, April
The border between Cyprus and Northern Cyprus (the so-called "Green Line") is opened thus allowing movement of people and goods to and from southern Cyprus. "In the first few weeks after the opening, more than twenty thousand Turkish Cypriots took the opportunity to lodge applications for Republic of Cyprus passports with the Greek Cypriot authorities" (Bose 2007, 60).

2003, December
Parliamentary elections in TRNC bring to power the center-left Republican Turkish Party which favors unification with the rest of Cyprus under a federal arrangement.

2004, April
Referendum on the Annan Plan (which proposed the establishment of a United Cyprus Republic composed of 2 self-governing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states) is held. The Cypriot president (Tassos Papadopoulos) encourages the population to reject the plan while the TRNC prime-minister (Mehmet Ali Talat) encourages Turkish Cypriots to support it. Turkish Cypriots approve the plan (65% vote in favor), but Greek Cypriots reject it (76% vote against it). Two main provisions seem to have led to Greek Cypriots' rejection: first, the plan would have allowed a small contingent of Turkish troops (about 750 soldiers) to remain on the island; second, the deal would have permitted Turks who moved into Cyprus after 1974 to remain and keep properties they confiscated from fleeing Greek Cypriots.

2004, May
Cyprus joins the European Union as a divided island. Brussels suspends the application of the *acquis communautaire* in the north. A large aid package (approx. 260 million euro) is approved for Northern Cyprus.

2005, April
Mehmet Ali Talat, the moderate TRNC prime-minister, is elected president of the de facto state.

2008, May
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders agree to restart reunification talks.

2008, June
The EU removes customs tariffs on agricultural products from Northern Cyprus.

2009, April
Parliamentary elections are won by the National Unity Party led by hardliner Derviş Eroğlu.

2010, April
Eroğlu, who served as prime minister (1985 to 1994; 2009 to 2010), is elected president of the de facto state.

`dfsbuild`
Northern Cyprus has most accoutrements of statehood. The de facto state has an independent military—the Turkish Cypriot Security Force (also, about 30,000 Turkish soldiers are stationed on the island), fully functional government, foreign missions abroad (to Washington, Brussels, and London, for instance), special representatives to the EU and the UN, and competitive party system (Bose 2007, 55–104). Northern Cyprus also issues its own passports, but only the UK, United States, and Turkey accepts them as a valid form of identity (however, the UK and US will not affix a visa to them). Northern Cyprus is also an observer member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, a 57-member organization that promotes Muslim solidarity (Hakki 2007; Hill 2010).

`mextsupcat`
Turkey has provided extensive military support to Northern Cyprus (arms, advisors, soldiers, and training). As Ankara stations about 30,000 troops in the territory, it effectively exerts military control over the northern part of the island.

`frag`
Democratic Party; Republican Turkish Party; National Unity Party; National Front; Grey Wolves; Peace and Democracy Movement; Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT); Communal Democracy Party; Freedom and Reform Party.

5.6 Găgăuzia (GAG)

Map of Găgăuzia (in pink)[12]

1989, August
The Moldovan Supreme Soviet passes a new language law that makes Romanian the sole official language in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR). The Găgăuz, Russian, and Ukrainian minorities perceive the law as a direct threat to their national identity and begin to organize for collective action. The Găgăuz are Christian-Orthodox Turks concentrated in southern Moldova. Găgăuzia encompasses the Moldovan districts of Comrat, Ceadîr-Lunga, and Vulcăneşti (southern part of the country).

1989, November
An assembly of the Găgăuz Movement (Găgăuz Halk) proclaims the Găgăuz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).

1990, August
The Găgăuz declare secession, proclaim a Găgăuz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and

[12]Source: http://moldovagate.com/article/show/99.

schedule elections for November 1990. In retaliation, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet dissolves and outlaws the Găgăuz Halk. Following this decision, paramilitary forces (the Bugeac batallion) take control of Găgăuzia and kickstart a rudimentary state building process.

1990, October
A compromise is reached between Chişinău (Moldova's capital) and Comrat (Găgăuzia's capital). The Găgăuz suspend elections and, in exchange, the Moldovan parliament declares a moratorium on the rejection of Comrat's request for autonomy.

1991, August
Moldova declares independence. Moldovan Interior Ministry troops arrest the leaders of the Găgăuzia, accusing them of having supported the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev in Moscow.

1992, October
Găgăuzia declares independence. At the same time, Comrat also starts negotiations with Chişinău regarding its status as an autonomous territory of Moldova.

1994, December
Chişinău and Comrat sign a comprehensive agreement (Law on the Special Legal Status of Găgăuzia) according to which Găgăuzia is reintegrated into Moldova as an autonomous territory.

1995, January
The Law on the Special Legal Status of Găgăuzia enters into force with its publication in Moldova's Official Monitor.

1995, June
Gheorghe Tabunşcic is elected governor (*başkan*) of Găgăuzia.

1995, August
Moldova and Găgăuzia officially declare the end of the conflict.

1995, October
Romanian (Moldovan), Russian, and Găgăuz are declared official languages in Găgăuzia.

`dfsbuild`
The Găgăuz did not establish strong statelike institutions (Chinn and Roper 1998; Thompson 1998; Minahan 2000, 272–76; Brezianu 2000; King 1999, 209–222; Minahan 2002, 630–36; Zabarah 2012, 184–88).

`mextsupcat`

In early 1991, Caucasus 'volunteers' allegedly came to assist the Găgăuz in their resistance against Chişinău (King 1999, 209–222), but there was no state sponsorship of the Găgăuz separatist movement.

`frag`
Găgăuz Halk/United Găgăuzia.

5.7 Transnistria (PMR)

Map of Transnistria[13]



1918
Moldavia (Bessarabia) unites with Romania.

1924–1940
Transnistria, a sliver of land on the east bank of the Nistru river, is included in the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) which functions under the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

1941–1944
Transnistria is incorporated into Romanian-occupied Bessarabia.

1944
Soviet forces occupy Bessarabia and form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (a union republic of the Soviet Union) that includes Transnistria (no autonomy is granted to the region on the left bank of the Nistru river).

1945–1989
Transnistria becomes an important part of the Soviet defense and heavy industry (King 1999, 183). By 1989, Russians made about a quarter of the population, were overrepresented in industry and services, and formed the majority in the major Transnistrian cities.

[13]Source: http://www.moldova.org/page/moldova-maps-771-eng.html.

1989, August
The Moldovan Supreme Soviet passes a new language law that makes Romanian the sole official language in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).

1990, September
Transnistria is proclaimed a Soviet republic. Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov forms the Republican Party. By the end of the year, paramilitary forces take control of the region and start building parallel state structures.

1990, November
Clashes are reported between Moldovan and Transnistrian 'volunteers' in Dubăsari.

1991, August
Moldova becomes independent.

1991
Pridnestrovie Communist Party favors independence for Transnistria but opposes the leadership of Igor Smirnov.

1991, December
In a referendum, Transnistrians support the independence of the region and boycott Moldovan presidential elections. Tiraspol leaders "begin a low-level military campaign for complete independence with the tacit support of Russian troops stationed in the region" (MAR Assessment for Slavs in Moldova).

1992, March
Fighting between Moldovan and Transnistrian forces intensifies. Tiraspol (Transnistria's capital) relies on the former Soviet Union's Fourteenth Army–stationed on their territory–to train and equip its military force. Also, Cossack 'volunteers' are reportedly fighting along Transnistrians. This month marks the beginning of a major escalation precipitated by the overt support from the Fourteenth Army for Transnistrian separatists.

1992, May
The deadliest month of the conflict—over 400 war-related casualties are reported.

1992, June
A ceasefire is signed. The agreement provides for the deployment of Russian peacekeepers at the border between Moldova and Transnistria.

1993, September
General Aleksander Lebed of the Russian Fourteenth Army is elected to the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Transnistria.

1994, January

Smirnov declares a state of emergency in the de facto state in an attempt to prevent the population from voting in the Moldovan elections.

1994, July
The new Moldovan Constitution provides for a "special autonomous status" for both Găgăuzia and Transnistria.

1994, October
Moldova and Russia sign an agreement that would phase the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army over a three-year period. The agreement is not ratified by the Russian parliament.

1995, March
In a referendum, Transnistrians overwhelmingly support a permanent Russian military presence in the region.

1997, May
Moldovan president Petru Lucinschi and Transnistria president Igor Smirnov sign a Memorandum of Understanding in Moscow in which they pledge to resolve the dispute peacefully.

1998, March
Tiraspol expresses its wish to acquire an observer status in the Russia-Belarus union.

1998, December
Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky visits Tiraspol and voices support for the independence of Transnistria.

1999, July
The 1994 Moscow-Chişinău agreement provided for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria within 3 years. In July 1999, about 2,500 Russian troops remain stationed in the region.

2000, January
The Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement which plainly says that, in Moscow's view, the withdrawal of Russian troops would endanger security in the region.

2000, March
The Moldovan President, Petru Lucinschi, urges Washington to intervene to help resolve the "Transnistrian 'problem."

2000, June
The Transnistrian Supreme Soviet is transformed into a unicameral body with 43 deputies.

2000, December

Parliamentary elections are held in the de facto state. Independent candidates gain 25 of the 43 seats.

2001, December
Igor Smirnov is reelected president of Transnistria with 82% of the vote.

2002, February
The European Union and the United States decide to impose a visa ban on 17 high-ranking Transnistrian officials (Hill 2012, 67).

2003, February
Transnistrian president Smirnov opposes the withdrawal of Russian armament from Transnistria.

2003, May
Moldova and Ukraine reach an agreement according to which only goods bearing the Moldovan stamps and seals could pass through Ukraine's border with Transnistria. The move is a significant blow to the Transnistrian industry which is heavily reliant on export revenues.

2003, November
The two parties are very close to signing an agreement (the Kozak Memorandum) that would have created a confederal state and would have allowed for the long-term presence of Russian forces on the left bank of the Nistru river. Upon opposition from the OSCE, EU, and the US, Moldovan president Voronin refuses to endorse the deal at the very last minute (Hill 2012, 138–59).

2005, November
The EU deploys a Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the region and appoints a special representative charged with finding a solution to the conflict. Since 2005, the peace process has been coordinated mainly by the EU and the OSCE.

2005, December
Legislative elections are held and, for the first time, Smirnov's party (Republika) loses the majority of parliament seats. Renewal Party becomes the dominant party in the Transnistrian legislature.

2006, March
Ukraine and Moldova sign an accord that regulates economic activities at the border between Transnistria and Ukraine. Tiraspol and Moscow react by labeling the agreement an "economic blockade." The decision deals a serious blow to the black market economy that sustains much of Transnistria's budget. Beary (2011, 289) states that goods were typically brought from "the Ukrainian ports of Odessa and Illichivsk to Transnistria and re-exported to other countries without duties paid on them. This illicit trade has enriched many Russians, Transnistrians, Ukrainians, and even Moldovans. It has also

created a disincentive for finding a resolution to the conflict, given that many people profit from maintaining the status quo."

2006, June
The Breakthrough Party is formed. This radical, youth-movement party is vehemently opposed to unification with Moldova. In the same month, business-oriented opposition Renewal Party is officially registered. Renewal opposes Smirnov's leadership but still advocates independence for Transnistria.

2006, August
Liberal Democratic Party of Pridnestrovie is formed. This right-wing party supports independence for Transnistria and is affiliated with the Russian Liberal Democratic Party. In the same month, Smirnov's son establishes the Patriotic Party of Pridnestrovie.

2006, September
In a referendum, Transnistrians overwhelmingly support independence from Moldova and association with Russia (Hill 2012, 173).

2006, December
The nationalist People's Will Party is formed. The party supports integration with Russia. In the same month, presidential elections are held. Smirnov is reelected with 82.5% of votes. In 2006, the Transnistrian political climate becomes somewhat less restrictive.

2007, January
Opposition Social Democratic Party is formed. The party supports unification with Moldova with a high degree of autonomy.

2007, July
Left-wing opposition Fair Republic Party is formed. The party supports independence for Transnistria.

2010, December
Legislative elections are held. Renewal Party is the clear winner and manages to secure 25 out of 43 seats in parliament.

2011, December
Presidential elections are held. Smirnov—who fell out of favor with Moscow—fails to make it to the runoff. In the second round, Yevgeny Shevchuk, a former speaker of Parliament, defeats Moscow's favorite to replace Smirnov, Anatoly Kaminsky.

2013, November
Moldova signs an Association Agreement with the EU.

2013, December
The Moldovan Constitutional Court rules that Romanian rather than "Moldovan" is the

country's official language. The decision is heavily critized by Transnistria's president, Yevgeny Shevchuk, and the Moldovan communists. Shevchuk retaliates by proposing the Transnistrian Parliament to pass legislation according to which the region would abide by the laws of the Russian Federation rather than those of Moldova.

`dfsbuild`
The state-building project in Transnistria has been quite extensive with the de facto state exhibiting: coercive structures—separate army, police and border guards; complex security apparatus; institutional structures—functional extractive and redistributive system; separate constitution, government, unicameral parliament (the Supreme Soviet), courts, central bank, and currency (Transnistrian ruble, printed in Germany); political structures—complex electoral legislation; presidential and parliamentary elections (the latest were held in 2010); a (putative) party system (King 2001; Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 2004; Lynch 2004; Geldenhuys 2009; Caspersen and Stansfield 2010; Blakkisrud and Kolsto 2011; Hill 2012).

A 2003 International Crisis Group (ICG) report on Transnistria stated that Transnistria had "established and consolidated its own state-like structures: it has an elected president and parliament, a national bank that issues currency, a judicial system from the lowest courts up to a Constitutional Court, an army, police and militia, a strong internal security service, border guards a customs service, a constitution, a national anthem, a coat of arms, and a flag" (ICG 2003, 5 quoted in Blakkisrud and Kolsto 2011, 204). Beary (2011, 291) also writes that "Transnistria has succeeded in creating all the trappings of an independent state. It has its own currency, anthem, postage stamps, police, military, executive, and legislature."

`mextsupcat`
The Russian Fourteenth Army provided weapons, training facilities, manpower and finances to Tiraspol (Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 2004, 108–109). The Russian/Soviet Military in Moldova supported Transnistria with troops as secondary warring party, weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise (UCDP).

`frag`
Power to the People Party (Vlast Narodu); Renewal (Obnovleniye); Republican Party (Respublika); Patriotic Party of Pridnestrovie; People's Will (Voinţa Populară); Fair Republic; Breakthrough (Proriv); Liberal Democratic Party of Pridnestrovie (Partidul Liberal Democrat); Pridnestrovie Communist Party; Communist Party of Pridnestrovie; Social Democratic Party.

5.8 Chechnya (CHY)

Map of Chechnya[14]

1990, November
A Congress of the Chechen People is convened in Grozny (around 1,000 delegates are present) where the guest of honor is Kazakhstan-born Dzokhar Dudayev (at the time, Soviet commander of a division of strategic bombers in Estonia).

Under pressure from the Congress of Chechen People, on November 27 the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya-Ingushetia passes a resolution declaring Chechnya-Ingushetia a sovereign republic. In Article 1, the republic is declared a "sovereign state."

1991, June
Dudayev returns from Tallin (Estonia) and convenes the second Congress of the Chechen People, now renamed the National Congress of the Chechen People.

1991, August
Following the failed August 21 coup in Moscow, Chechens begin to dismantle Soviet state structures and erect barricades. Dudayev officially backs Boris Yeltsin.

1991, November 7
The independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is proclaimed. On November 8, President Yeltsin declares a state of emergency and Russian soldiers are blocked by Chechen fighters at the outskirts of Grozny. Zurcher (2007, 102) states that "Chechnya declared and got de facto independence in 1991."

1991, December—1994, December
Russia is effectively excluded from Chechnya. This period is characterized by "growing fragmentation within the leadership and the inability to consolidate statehood" (Zurcher 2007, 81).

[14]Source: The Economist.

1992, March
Failed coup attempt against Dudayev led by Umar Avturkhanov. Factional political and military infighting dominates the politics of the republic. A constitution is adopted and reaffirms the independence of Chechnya.

1992, June
Russia withdraws all military forces from Chechnya. Most of the weapons and all of the equipment are left behind (Zurcher 2007, 109).

1994, April
Dudayev dissolves the regional parliament and installs a presidential regime.

1994, December
The Russian army enters Chechnya with about 40,000 soldiers. In the ensuing conflict, approximately 25,000 civilians and 4,000 Russian soldiers die. With the exception of Grozny, most of Chechnya continues to remain under rebel control. According to Zurcher (2007, 102), there were 5 main funding sources for the Chechen rebels: 1. profits from the shadow economy; 2. profits from oil extraction and oil export; 3. ransom payment for hostages; 4. donations by the diaspora; 5. donations by Islamic sponsors.

1996, April
Dudayev is killed by Russian laser-guided rockets. Shamil Basayev becomes the new leader of the Chechen resistance. Previously (in 1992), Basayev had fought on the side of Abkhaz separatists in Georgia.

1996–1997
Chechen writer and politician Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev serves as acting president.

1996, August
Chechen fighters recapture Grozny. Russian troops pull out of the republic, which remains controlled by a coalition of field commanders. Basayev is promoted to the rank of commander of the Chechen Armed Forces.

1996, December
Basayev runs for president of Chechnya against Aslan Maskhadov.

1997, January
Aslan Maskhadov is elected President. Basayev is appointed prime-minister.

1997, May
Maskhadov and Yeltsin sign peace treaty in Moscow. Following the agreement, Chechnya retained its de facto independence (Call 2012, 107).

1996–1999
Internal rivalries between Chechen warlords result in limited state authority. Zurcher

(2007, 86) states that, during this period, "Chechnya was characterized by the almost complete dismantling of all Soviet institutions, the loss of control over the means of violence, failure to incorporate armed groups in the state, and the radicalization of Islamic discourse."

1998, April
Basayev declares that the ultimate goal of the insurgency in the Caucasus is the unification of Chechnya and Dagestan into an Islamic state.

1999, February
Maskhadov dissolves Parliament and replaces state institutions with Sharia structures and law. Sharia law is met with resistance as it is compatible with "neither the secular Soviet law nor the Chechen customary law (*adat*)" (Zurcher 2007, 90).

1999, August
Chechen rebels invade Dagestan but are driven away by local paramilitaries aided by Russian security forces.

1999, October
The Russian army occupies Chechnya with approximately 100,000 soldiers. The Chechen de facto state ceases to exist.

2000, March
The Russian army captures Grozny and establishes full control over the entire territory of the republic (with the exception of few pockets in the far-southern mountainous area).

`dfsbuild`
Chechen territorial control was accompanied by dysfunctional state-building activities (Lapidus 1998; Lieven 1998; Evangelista 2002; Tishkov 2004; Zurcher 2007, 86–106; Bakke 2011a, 92–100; Bakke 2011b, 535–38; Call 2012, 106–112; Marten 2012, 102–111).

`mextsupcat`
Chechen rebels received substantial support (money; weapons; mercenaries; training; safe havens) from UAE, Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan (Zurcher 2007, 106–109). It is also alleged that Chechen rebels found safe havens in Georgia (UCDP).

`frag`
National Congress of the Chechen People; Daymokhk; Dudayev faction; Caucasian Federation; Union of Citizens for the Chechen Republic; Union of Patriotic Forces; Basayev faction; Maskhadov faction; Noy Worldwide Chechen Fund; Assembly in Defence of the Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; Chechnya Peace Forum; Islamic Reg-

iment; Labazanov faction; Interim Council of Chechnya; Government of People's Trust; Kadyrovtsy.

5.9 Abkhazia (ABK)

Map of Abkhazia[15]



1864
Abkhazia becomes a military province of Russia (Hewitt 1998).

1918–1921
Abkhazia becomes part of newly independent Georgia. The Abkhaz are a Caucasian ethnic group that speak a language related to Circassian. Although the Abkhaz are a mix of Orthodox Christians and Muslims, the number of Christians has increased in the 1980s and 1990s. A large number of Abkhazians reside in Turkey (roughly half a million people).

1921
Abkhazia becomes a Soviet Socialist Republic.

1931
Abkhazia is formally incorporated into Georgia and is transformed into an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).

1988
The Abkhaz communists demand that Abkhazia be made an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) separate from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).

1989, March
Abkhaz demonstrators demand that Abkhazia be promoted to the rank of union republic.

[15]Source: Le Monde Diplomatique.

1989, April
Counter-demonstrations are held by Georgian nationalists in Tbilisi. Soviet troops violently crush the demonstration. The bloody event marks the radicalization of the Georgian national movement and the emergence of loosely-organized paramilitary groups—the Mkhendrioni ('horsemen' or 'knights')—under the leadership of Jaba Ioseliani. By 1992, the Mkhendrioni have about 1,000 fighters.

1989, July
First instances of Abkhaz-Georgian intercommunal violence occur.

1989, August
The Georgian Supreme Soviet passes a language law that makes Georgian mandatory in the public sector. Sukhumi (capital of Abkhazia) reacts negatively to the decision.

1990, March
The Georgian Supreme Soviet proclaims Georgia's sovereignty; in practice, this meant that Georgian laws would have primacy over Soviet laws. At the same time, all banned opposition parties are legalized.

1990, August
The Abkhazian Supreme Soviet officially proclaims Abkhazia a sovereign union republic of the Soviet Union.

1990, September
Following local elections, more than 65% of ministers in the Abkhaz ASSR are Abkhaz although the latter represent, at this time, less than 20% of the population in the region.

1991, April
By this time, Abkhaz militias are in control of most of the region. The Abkhazian National Guard is estimated to number about 1,000 fighters. According to Zurcher (2007, 141), the Guard was financed with money from the local population and contributions from the Turkish diaspora and Abkhaz businessmen in Moscow.

1992, August
Georgian National Guard troops enter Sukhumi. The Abkhazian parliament retreats to Gudauta, a town northwest of Sukhumi, and declares mobilization (Zurcher 2007, 131). At this time, Georgia plunges into full-scale civil war as the Mkhendrioni and the Georgian National Guard fight for control over the Georgian state.

1992, September
Russia suspends delivery of weapons to Tbilisi. The following month, Georgian troops occupy a Russian arms depot in southern Georgia.

1993, January

A UN mission arrives in Georgia to assess aid needs.

1993, July–September
Supported by hundreds of well-armed volunteers from the North Caucasus (later, these would form the core of the Chechen resistance) and Russian forces, Abkhaz troops launch an attack on Sukhumi. By the end of September, the Abkhaz forces drive Georgian National Guard troops out of the region and force about 200,000 Georgians to flee.

1994, July
Russian peacekeepers (under a CIS mandate and UN monitoring) are deployed at the border between Abkhazia and Georgia.

1994, October
Abkhazia adopts a new constitution and declares itself to be an independent state (Hewitt 1998).

1994, November
Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba is elected president of the de facto state.

1995, October
Russia imposes a naval blockade on the breakaway region that cuts off most of the vital trade with Turkey.

1995
After a failed assassination attempt against the Georgian president Shevardnadze, the Mkhendrioni is disbanded and its leadership arrested.

1997, November
Russia ends its military blockade against Sukhumi.

1998
Violent clashes between Abkhaz and Georgian forces erupt in the Gali region.

1999
Ardzinba is re-elected president of Abkhazia. In the same year, Russia suspends its trade sanctions against the region.

1999, October
In a referendum, 97% of the Abkhaz support full independence for the province.

2004
In a hotly contested election, Sergey Bagapsh defeats Russian-backed Raul Khajimba to become president of Abkhazia.

2006

Approximately 80% of the Abkhaz population has Russian passports (Geldenhuys 2009, 75).

2007, March
Bagapsh's United Abkhazia party wins parliamentary elections.

2008, March
Following Kosovo's declaration of independence, Russia announces the lifting of all trade sanctions on Abkhazia (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7282201.stm).

2008, August 10
Russian troops enter Abkhazia and retake the Kodori Gorge—the only part of Abkhaz territory under Georgian control.

2008, August 28
Moscow recognizes Abkhazia as an independent state. Since 2008, Abkhazia has established diplomatic relations with Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Transnistria.

2009, December
Bagapsh is re-elected president of Abkhazia.

2011
Bagapsh unexpectedly dies of illness. In September, vice-president Aleksandr Ankvab is elected president.

`dfsbuild`
Abkhazia has managed to build strong statelike institutions. Since 2002, Russia has paid local pensions and has contributed significantly to Abkhazia's budget (Collier and Sambanis 2005b, 269–73; Zurcher 2007, 115–151; O'Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011; Caspersen 2012, 56).

`mextsupcat`
In addition to volunteer fighters from the Caucasus during the early 1990s, Abkhazia benefitted from extensive military support from Russia: "weapons from a battalion of Russian forces stationed in Sukhumi and volunteer training camps under the leadership of Russian instructors. Furthermore, Russia supported the Abkhazians logistically, provided them with weapons, and occasionally leveled air strikes on Georgia from an airbase in Abkhazia" (Zurcher 2007, 141).

`frag`
Communist Party of Abkhazia; My Home Abkhazia; Abkhazia Liberation Party; Peo-

ple's Party; Social Democratic Party of Abkhazia; United Abkhazia; Forum of the National Unity of Abkhazia; Economic Development Party; Amtsakhara; Russian Citizens Union.

5.10 Ajaria (AJA)

Map of Ajaria (Adjara)[16]

1991
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ajaria — an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic under the leadership of Aslan Abashidze (the descendant of an influential Ajar clan since the 15th century) — declares itself an autonomous state with Batumi as capital city. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the Georgian nationalist movement, voices his intention to abolish Ajaria's autonomy. The declaration triggers a large, pro-Soviet Ajar mobilization in Batumi (Zurcher 2007, 202–203). On April 22, pro-Abashidze protestors occupy administrative buildings in Batumi. The Abashidze regime cuts off Ajaria from the rest of Georgia by establishing military checkpoints and policing the region's borders. At this time, Ajaria has many trappings of statehood: supreme council, ministries, tax authority, Supreme Court. From 1991 to 2004, Abashidze officially rejects independence from Georgia, maintains close ties with Moscow, and rules Ajaria as his personal fiefdom (Zurcher 2007, 203; Marten 2012, 71). During this period, Ajaria enjoys de facto independence from Georgia (Source: MAR).

The Ajars are Muslim Georgians who, throughout history, have tended to associate themselves more with the Turks rather than with the Georgians. The Ajars speak the Gurian dialect of Georgian which uses many Turkic words. Nowadays, however, about 60% of people living in Ajaria are Georgian Orthodox Christians.

1992, January
Zviad Gamsakhurdia is ousted from office. In Ajaria, Abashidze declares a state of emergency, closes the borders with Georgia, and establishes his own party, the Union for the Revival of Ajaria. Zurcher (2007, 204) states that, at this time, Abashidze takes full control over the "customs division, the Batumi seaport...[creates] his own semiofficial armed

[16]Source: Encyclopædia Britannica.

units...and [exerts] full control over the Batumi-based 25th Brigade of Georgia's Defense Ministry." Marten (2012, 64) notes that Abashidze "built a private militia to guard the border between Ajaria and Georgia, and stole the state's customs revenues on his territory bordering the Black Sea."

1993
The newly-elected Georgian president Eduard Shevarnadze visits Batumi in an attempt at reconciliation with Abashidze. The meeting ends in an informal agreement according to which Abashidze is allowed to rule over Ajaria if he refrains from officially pushing for full secession (Zurcher 2007, 205).

1994
Ajaria declares itself a free economic zone. Abashidze reaffirms his support for the stationing of Russian troops in Batumi as guarantors of stability in the region.

2000
Abashidze threatens to run against Shevarnadze in presidential elections. He eventually withdraws from the race in exchange for full republic status for Ajaria (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

2003
Shevarnadze is deposed in the "Rose Revolution." The leader of the opposition, Mikheil Saakashvili, promises to reestablish control over all of Georgia's breakaway regions.

2004, March
Saakashvili demands the right to campaign in Ajaria, but pro-Abashidze armed groups prevent him from entering the region. In retaliation, Saakashvili "responded by ending all attempts at accommodation. He closed Ajaran airspace, put Georgian Army forces on high alert on the other side of the province border, froze the Georgian bank accounts of Abashidze and his supporters, revoked the Georgian legal licenses of all banks that continued to operate in Ajara, arrested some of Abashidze's associates, sent Georgian Coast Guard forces to blockade the port (and oil terminal) at Batumi, and closed the Sarpi customs checkpoint on the Ajaran-Turkish border" (Marten 2012, 79).

2004, May 4
A pro-Saakashvili rally in Batumi is attacked by local security forces. The next day, tens of thousands of protestors demand Abashidze's resignation. Georgian forces enter Ajaria and start disarming the pro-Abashidze militias. On May 6, Abashidze leaves for Moscow where he is granted political asylum. Tbilisi reasserts full control over Ajaria.

2007, November
Russia closes its military base in Batumi.

`dfsbuild`

Moderate state-building activities: executive, legislature, ministries, tax inspectorate (Collier and Sambanis 2005b, 289-93; De Waal 2010, 145-47; Zurcher 2007, 200-208; Sabanadze 2010; Marten 2012, 64-101).

`mextsupcat`
Abashidze has allegedly procured most the weapons for his militias through the illicit global trade in arms. Occasionally, Turkey has allegedly supported Ajars' calls for increased autonomy (Derluguian 2005; Marten 2012). Abashidze's militia "would grow to between five hundred and a thousand men, and [a]massed twenty armored vehicles (including four T-72 Russian battle tanks) and a number of helicopters and coastal vessels" (Marten 2012, 72).

`frag`
Despite some internal disagreements, no splinter organization emerged out of the pro-Abashidze militia group.

5.11 South Ossetia (SOT)

Map of South Ossetia[17]



1922
The South Ossetian Autonomous Region is created within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Ossetians are Christian Orthodox Caucasian people who speak a language related to Farsi. Ossetians have had a long history of loyalty to Russia (Beary 2011, 284).

1989, August
Tskhinvali (capital of South Ossetia) passes a law that makes Ossetian the official language in the region. The South Ossetian Supreme Soviet votes to unite with North Ossetia (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 48).

1989, November
South Ossetia demands that its status of autonomous region (*oblast*) be upgraded to autonomous republic of the Soviet Union (ASSR). At this time, the first South Ossetian militias are formed under the banner of Adamon Nykhas/People's Assembly (Zurcher 2007, 125).

1990, September
The South Ossetian Soviet proclaims the region a "Democratic Soviet Republic." Following this decision, Tbilisi revokes South Ossetia's autonomous status and imposes a harsh economic blockade.

[17]Source: Le Monde Diplomatique.

1991
In January, about 5,000 paramilitary Georgian troops enter Tskhinvali and attack civilians. In March 1991, facing an offensive led by Ossetian irregulars, Georgian paramilitaries withdraw from Tskhinvali. By April 1991, Ossetian militias are in full control of the region. The estimated number of South Ossetian forces is about 1,500 (Zurcher 2007, 142). Civil war breaks out. Beary (2011, 286) notes that, since November 1991, South Ossetians "have effectively acted as a sovereign nation."

1992, January
Georgian leader Gamsakhurdia is ousted in a military coup. Georgia's new leader, Eduard Shevarnadze, orders the Georgian National Guard to attack Tskhinvali. Civil war erupts and lasts until June 1992 when an agreement is signed between Shevarnadze, Boris Yeltsin, and Ossetian leaders. According to the agreement, a Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force under Russian leadership is deployed to monitor the negotiated ceasefire.

1992, May
Tskhinvali declares independence from Georgia. The armed hostilities end.

1992, June
The Sochi Agreement is signed. The agreement marks the ceasefire between the Georgian and South Ossetian forces and establishes a security corridor along the border of South Ossetia.

1992, July
The joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force is deployed to the province.

1996, September
The South Ossetian parliament amends the constitution to create the institution of the presidency. In November, presidential elections are won by Lyudvig Chibirov, a moderate.

1997, April
The OSCE opens a mission in South Ossetia (its mandate expired at the end of 2008).

1999, May
Parliamentary elections are held in the region with most of the seats being taken by pro-Russia candidates.

2001
Russian-backed Eduard Kokoity of the Unity Party is elected president of South Ossetia.

2002
Russia begins distributing passports to the South Ossetian population.

2004, May
Parliamentary elections are held. President Kokoity's Unity Party unseats the Communist Party and wins 20 of the 30 contested seats.

2004, November
In a referendum, 99% of Ossetians support independence from Georgia. Kokoity is re-elected president.

2005, May
In retaliation to the 2004 referendum on independence, Georgia establishes the Provisional Administration of South Ossetia (headquartered in Kurta, a village situated 10 kilometers northeast of Tskhinvali).

2006, September-November
Skirmishes between South Ossetian and Georgian forces are reported. Kokoity announces his intention to officially request the Russian Constitutional Court the annexation of the territory by Moscow (Geldenhuys 2009, 87).

2008, August 8
Georgian forces invade Tskhinvali. The following day, Russian forces enter South Ossetia and advance into Georgian territory. Tbilisi desperately asks for a ceasefire and for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia. Under international pressure, Moscow agrees to withdraw its forces from inside Georgia but establishes a buffer zone around South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2008, August 26
Moscow recognizes South Ossetia as an independent state. By December 2011, 4 other states recognize South Ossetia's independence: Nicaragua (September 4, 2008), Venezuela (September 10, 2009), Nauru (December 16, 2009), and Tuvalu (September 19, 2011).

2009, September
Moscow signs a 49-year renewable agreement with Tskhinvali on maintaining a military base in the region.

2010
According to an International Crisis Group report, independent South Ossetia is de facto administered by Russia: "Moscow staffs over half the government, donates 99% of the budget and provides security" (ICG 2010).

2011, November-December
Presidential elections are held. Moscow's favorite candidate, Anatoly Bibilov, is defeated by the former South Ossetian Education Minister, Alla Dzhioyeva. Following the results, the South Ossetian Supreme Court invalidates the results (alleging fraud and intimidation) and bars Dzhioyeva from taking part in the rerun elections to be held in March

2012. Dzhioyeva supporters rally in Tskhinvali and threaten to set up a parallel government. Under Moscow's mediation, an agreement is reached whereby Dzhioyeva is allowed to run for the presidency in March 2012, thus reversing Supreme Court's earlier decision. Eventually, in March 2012, neither Dzhioyeva nor Bibilov were permitted to run. Instead, Leonid Tibilov, a pro-independence candidate, won the presidency with about 54% of the vote.

`dfsbuild`
South Ossetia has managed to build strong statelike institutions. Russia has provided direct military, financial, technical, and social assistance that has enabled the entity to survive to this day (Zurcher 2007, 115-51; De Waal 2010, 135-45; Beary 2011, 284-85).

`mextsupcat`
South Ossetians have received substantial support (arms, volunteer fighters, trainers) from kin Ossets living in North Ossetia (part of the Russian Federation). In the early 1990s, "North Ossetia had several large Soviet army garrisons, which were leaking arms to local militias who then delivered them to the conflict area" (Zurcher 2007, 142). Russia continues to station military troops in the region.

`frag`
South Ossetian Popular Front; Communist Party of South Ossetia; Unity Party; People's Party; Republican Socialist Party ("Fatherland"); Forward Ossetia! Party; Social Democratic Party.

5.12 Nagorno-Karabakh (NKH)

Map of Nagorno-Karabakh[18]

1917
The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh ("Mountainous Black Garden") is incorporated into the Transcaucasian Federation, a union between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

1920
Nagorno-Karabakh is incorporated into the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia.

1923
Although Armenians comprise an overwhelming majority of the local population, the territory is made an autonomous region (*oblast*) of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic.

1988, February
The Soviet of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region asks Moscow that the territory be transferred to Armenia. The request is not granted.

1989, January-1991, August
Nagorno-Karabakh is placed under direct Soviet administration.

1989, November
Moscow revokes Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomy.

1990, August
Azerbaijan claims Nagorno-Karabakh as a region under its jurisdiction and abolishes its formal autonomy.

1991, September
Nagorno-Karabakh leaders declare the region an independent Soviet republic.

[18]Source: Encyclopædia Britannica.

1991, December
Azerbaijan becomes independent and claims sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.

1992, January
The Nagorno-Karabakh legislature declares the independence of the "Republic of Mountainous Karabakh." Soon thereafter, full-scale civil war breaks out.

1992, June
Nagorno-Karabakh rebels manage to open the "Lachin corridor" which connects the de facto state with Armenia. In the same month, Abulfez Elchibey is elected president of Azerbaijan.

1993, June
Following popular protests against his handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azeri president Elchibey is ousted from power. Heydar Aliyev assumes presidential powers.

1994, January-February
Renewed fighting breaks out in Nagorno-Karabakh.

1994, May
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a peace plan, the Bishkek protocol, under Russian mediation.

1994, December
Robert Kocharyan becomes president of Nagorno-Karabakh.

1995, May
First parliamentary elections are held in the de facto state.

1995, December
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agrees to send a 3,000-strong peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakh (Russians make up about one third of the total number of soldiers).

1996, December
Robert Kocharyan is re-elected president of Nagorno-Karabakh.

1997, March
Kocharyan is appointed prime-minister of Armenia. Leonard Petrosyan becomes the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh.

1997, September
Nagorno-Karabakh's foreign minister, Arkadi Ghukasyan, is elected president of the de

facto state.

1998, April
Kocharyan is elected president of Armenia.

1999, March
A delegation from Nagorno-Karabakh headed by the newly elected president, Arkadi Ghukasyan, visits the United States. In the same year, tensions erupt between Ghukasyan and Nagorno-Karabakh's defense minister, Samvel Babayan.

2000, June
Parliamentary elections are held in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Artsak Democratic Movement manages to secure 13 of 33 parliamentary seats.

2001-2006
Several rounds of talks between the two sides fail to produce an agreement.

2007, September
Bako Sahakyan is elected president of Nagorno-Karabakh.

2011, November-December
Tensions rise at the de facto border with Azerbaijan. Two Armenian soldiers die from what authorities in Stepanakert (capital of Nagorno-Karabakh) describe as sniper fire from Azerbaijani army positions.

`dfsbuild`
Nagorno-Karabakh has strong state-building institutions (Zurcher 2007, 152-85; De Waal 2010, 98-130). According to Beary (2011, 264), "Karabakh Armenians have since 1992 operated a de facto independent state that has its own legislature, executive, and military, and is based in the city of Stepanakerk." (Caspersen 2012, 1) notes that Nagorno-Karabakh "certainly has the semblance of a state with its own flag, army, government, and basic public services such as health and education."

`mextsupcat`
Armenia has supported Nagorno-Karabakh with troops, weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic aid (Zurcher 2007; De Waal 2010; Beary 2011; Caspersen 2012). Nagorno-Karabakh is effectively linked to Armenia through the Lachin corridor.

`frag`
Democratic Party of Artsak; Free Motherland Party; Armenian Revolution Federation-Dashnaktsutyun; Movement 88; Armenian Republican Party; Armenian Revolutionary

Federation; Social Justice Party.

5.13 Casamance (CAS)

Map of Casamance[19]

1959, January
Senegal and Mali form a federation, French Sudan.

1960, August
Senegal (including Casamance) breaks from the French Sudan federation and forms modern-day Senegal.

1982, February
Senegal and Gambia form a confederation, Senegambia.

1982
A secessionist insurgency, led by the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC), breaks out in Casamance. In December, MFDC demands independence for the region. From 1982 to 2007, MFDC is led by a Catholic priest, Father Augustin Diamancoune Senghor. Almost all MFDC members are of Diola origin, an ethnic group with a long history of exclusion.

1989, September
Senegambia officially dissolves.

1990s
The conflict between Dakar (Senegal's capital) and MFDC escalates.

[19]Source: http://www.uniglobetravel.com/315/destination-guides/country/Senegal/.

1991
MFDC splinters into two factions: the northern front, the Atika which embraces non-armed struggle (founded by Sidy Badji, a former officer of the French colonial army); and the southern front which continues the armed struggle, led by Diamancoune (Schlichte 2009, 94).

1994
Atika's leader, Leopold Sagna, is replaced with a triumvirate of young fighters led by Salif Sadio (Foucher 2007, 172). Factional infighting intensifies.

1999
Meetings are held in Banjul, Gambia, in an attempt to unify the MFDC. Factionalism became so prevalent that the Senegalese government "encouraged the reunification (on its own terms) of the MFDC as a prerequisite for the peace process" (Foucher 2007, 185).

2003
The northern front of the MFDC is confronted with internecine fighting (Foucher 2007, 186).

2004, December
A ceasefire and peace agreement are signed between Dakar and MFDC.

2005, September
Senegal's President, Abdoulaye Wade, dispatches the head of the gendarmerie in Casamance "to reassert his trust in Father Augustine Diamancoune, the leader of the MFDC" (Foucher 2007, 171).

2006, March
Fighting resumes between the MFDC southern faction and government forces.

2007-2011
The conflict remains frozen. The MFDC insurgency "has left Casamance...cut off from the rest of the country and suspended between 'neither war nor peace'...Analysts say a low-level 'war economy' which benefits combatants on both sides and centers on illegal logging, the cashew nut industry and illegal cannabis growing and smuggling, has undermined any sense of urgency to end the conflict." (Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02
senegal-casamance-idUSTRE81O09C20120225.)

`dfsbuild`
Casamance displays limited statelike characteristics (Collier and Sambanis 2005a, 247-302; Schlichte 2010, 99-103; Beary 2011). MFDC exercises a violence monopoly over some pockets of territory. Additionally, the rebels have established checkpoints at the border with Gambia and collect taxes from local businesses. MFDC has also accrued revenues through the illicit trade in timber, cashews and cannabis (Evans 2004, 10).

mextsupcat
MFDC allegedly received limited support (arms, training, safe havens) from Libya, Guinea-Bissau (considered to be the main external patron), Mauritania, Gambia, and Iraq (Evans 2004, 6-10; Foucher 2007, 177-80; Notholt 2008; Beary 2011, 32).

frag
MFDC northern faction; MFDC southern faction.

5.14 Biafra (BIA)

Map of Biafra[20]



1960
Nigeria gains independence. After independence, the country is divided along ethnic lines with Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups concentrated in the north, predominantly Christian Yoruba groups in the southwest, and traditional and Christian Igbo groups in the oil-rich southeast.

1966, January
A group led by Igbo officers stages a coup during which Nigeria's prime minister is killed. Following the coup, the Igbo commander-in-chief, General Ironsi, proclaims himself head of state (Collier and Sambanis 2005, 92).

1966
In July, Muslim officers in the North organize a counter-coup. In September, attacks against the Christian Igbo population intensify. In October, about 30,000 Igbos are massacred by northern troops; the atrocities lead to the exodus of about 1 million Igbos from the northern region to the southeast. The autonomy rights of the southeastern region are rescinded.

1967, May
C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the southeastern region, declares the territory a free, sovereign, and independent state by the name of Republic of Biafra with Enugu as capital city. "The motivation for secession was rivalry and resentment among the tribes that made up the colonially contrived artifice called Nigeria" (Clodfelter 2008, 622). During its short existence as a self-proclaimed state, Biafra was officially recognized by 5 countries: Tanzania (13 April 1968); Gabon (8 May 1968); Ivory Coast (9 May

[20]Source: http://www.blackpast.org/gah/republic-biafra-1967-1970.

1968); Zambia (20 May 1968); and Haiti (22 March 1969). However, none of these states established formal diplomatic relations with Biafra.

1967, July
Federal troops invade the breakaway region but Biafran rebels manage to repel them. By this time, Biafran rebels manage to acquire a small air force, commanded by the Swedish Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, a mercenary pilot (Clodfelter 2008, 622).

1968
Biafra adopts its own currency, the Biafran pound.

1968, September
Federal troops, whose numbers swelled to about 100,000 soldiers from 30,000 in just a year, capture the Biafran town of Owerri and the official capital of Enugu (the latter fell to Nigerian forces on October 4, 1967).

1969, April
Despite being inferior in number and artillery, Biafran rebels manage to recapture Owerri which now becomes the de facto capital of the region. "The Biafrans never had more than 50,000 men under arms at any one time" (Clodfelter 2008, 622).

1969
The federal army expands to about 200,000 soldiers and attacks Biafra on three fronts. In October, the Biafran leader Ojukwu unsuccessfully appeals to UN mediation.

1970, January
Suffering sustained attacks on several fronts, Biafran resistance collapses and the de facto capital Owerri is captured. Ojukwu flees to Ivory Coast. By the end of the month, government troops exert complete control of the entire territory of Biafra.

`dfsbuild`
Biafra managed to acquire some institutions of statehood (government; inchoate system of administration), but because of the continued offensive from the federal government, military activities took precedence over state-building efforts (Heraclides 1991; Collier and Sambanis 2005a, 89-122; DeRouen and Heo 2007, 570-75).

`mextsupcat`
"The bulk of Biafra's military supplies was purchased on the international arms market with unofficial assistance provided by France through former West African colonies. In one of the most dramatic episodes of the civil war, Carl Gustav von Rosen, a Swedish count who at one time commanded the Ethiopian air force, and several other Swedish pilots flew five jet trainers modified for combat in successful strikes against Nigerian military installations" (Source: globalsecurity.org).

`frag`
The Biafran rebel movement was unitary.

5.15 Katanga (KGA)

Map of Katanga[21]

1910
Katanga is integrated into the Belgian Congo with a high degree of autonomy.

1960, June
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) gains independence. Katanga, a region mainly populated by the Lunda and Yeke people, is made an autonomous province.

1960, July
On July 11, an independent state of Katanga is proclaimed with capital at Elisabethville (the current name of the town is Lubumbashi). "Although the Belgian government did not officially recognize the Katangan secession, it nonetheless strongly supported [Katangan President] Tshombé's government militarily, financially, and diplomatically. Belgian troops prevented attacks by the ANC [Armée Nationale Congolaise] against Katanga, and Belgium established consular relations with Tshombé's government" (Collier and Sambanis 2005a, 67). In the same month, the UN establishes the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) and the first UN troops are deployed to the region.

1960, August
Congolese authorities imprison Katangan president Moïse Kapenda Tshombé.

1960, September
Over 200 Belgian soldiers remain in Katanga assisting the separatist movement as mercenaries.

[21]Source: http://www.katangamining.com/about-us/do-business-drc.aspx.

1960, November
Mobutu Sese Seko assumes de facto power in Congo, captures the former Congolese leader Lumumba, and sends him to Katanga.

1961, November
Government forces manage to recapture the northern part of Katanga.

1963, January
Congolese troops conquer the entire region and divide it into two provinces: Katanga Oriental and Lualaba.

`dfsbuild`
Katanga had a strong mercenary army but managed to build only basic institutions of statehood (government; inchoate system of administration) (Horowitz 1985, 256-57; Collier and Sambanis 2005a, 65-67; Kisangani and Bobb 2009, 80-83; Villafaña 2009, 50-54).

`mextsupcat`
Belgium allegedly provided extensive military support to Katanga (Collier and Sambanis 2005a, 67). The Katangan army (Katangan Gendarmerie) is believed to have been staffed by several hundred officers and mercenaries predominantly from Belgium, South Africa, France, and Rhodesia (Villafaña 2009, 54). The Gendarmerie even had a small air force. The Belgian intervention on behalf of the separatists "has been heavily associated with the influence of the Belgian mining company, Union Miniére du Haut Katanga, which supplied nearly 10 percent of the world's copper and about 60 percent of its cobalt from the mines in Katanga" (Aydin 2012, 124).

`frag`
Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT, Confédération des Associations Tribales de Katanga); Baluba Association of Katanga (BALUBAKAT).

5.16 Rwenzururu Kingdom (RWE)

Map of Uganda (Rwenzururu Kingdom encompassed the regions of Bundibugyo and Kasese, south of Lake Albert)[22]

1962, October
Uganda gains independence from Britain. At the same time, in the western part of the country, the Rwenzururu separatist movement arises seeking "autonomous rule based on traditional leadership structures for the Konjo and Amba peoples. The Konjo and Amba [are] under the jurisdiction of the Toro kingdom, which [is] cooperating fully with the Ugandan state. The subnationalists [aim] to free themselves of both the kingdom and the nation-state" (Forrest 2004, 221-22).

1963
Clashes erupt between the Konjo and Amba, on one side, and the Toro and Ugandan soldiers, on the other side. On June 30, the Rwenzururu Kingdom is proclaimed in the Rwenzori mountains region with the capital at Kasese, a town that developed around a copper mine.

1966
Isaya Mukirane, the king of Rwenzururu, passes away. He is replaced by his son, Charles Wesley Mumbere.

[22]Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/uganda.html.

1979
The Ugandan dictator Idi Amin is overthrown. The collapse of Amin's regime leads to a power vacuum which allows the Rwenzururu movement to secure "significant amount of military equipment and supplies" (Rothchild 1997, 90).

1982, August
Rwenzururu leaders agree to be reincorporated into the Ugandan state. Kampala offers a large degree of autonomy to the Rwenzururu area (Rothchild 1997, 90).

`dfsbuild`
During its existence as a de facto state from June 1963 to August 1982, the Rwenzururu Kingdom managed to build a complex governmental system with: a military; security force/police; governmental bureaucracy composed of 11 ministries headed by a cabinet (by 1966 the de facto state had over 1,000 paid bureaucrats); educational system (Gulliver 1969, 248; Mampilly 2011, 1). Englebert (2009, 51) states that the Rwenzururu Kingdom developed in parallel to the Ugandan state. In fact, it "was quite successful at establishing its own government and administration away from Kampala's reach. Through the 1960s, it collected local taxes, ran schools, raised an army, and developed a bureaucracy" (Englebert 2009, 183-84). The Kingdom definitely demonstrated a "capacity for unrecognized self-rule" (Englebert 2009, 250). Peterson and Macola (2009, 184) write that "Rwenzururu broke into postcolonial Uganda's political theater by creating standardized language, nationalizing the church, outfitting a bureaucracy and creating a government. The state existed partly in the mind, as a construct, used to draw attention from the United Nations and Uganda's central administration. But it was also real: it limited citizens' movements, redirected their tax revenues, reoriented their tongues, and reshaped their religion."

`mextsupcat`
The Rwenzururu Kingdom benefitted from some external military support (light arms) from Tanzania (Englebert 2009).

`frag`
The Rwenzururu rebel movement was unitary.

5.17 Puntland (PUT)

Map of Puntland[23]

1897
Puntland, the northeastern region of Somalia populated mainly by the Darood clan, falls under Italian colonial administration.

1960
Puntland joins South Somalia and Somaliland to form modern Somalia.

1980s
The Darood-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) joins the Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somaliland in the fight against the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu (capital of Somalia).

1991, January
Barre is ousted from power. Puntland falls under the de facto administration of clan elders who set up incipient governance structures. During this time, a close relationship is forged with Ethiopia.

1994
First Darood clan conference on the future of Puntland is held.

1998, July
Second Darood clan conference is held. Puntland declares autonomy as the Puntland State of Somalia with capital at Garowe (the commercial capital is the town of Bosaso, a major seaport). SSDF is disbanded and its leader, Abdullah Yussuf Ahmed, becomes the president of the region.

2000
Confrontations between Somaliland and Puntland erupt over control of the Sool and

[23]Source: CIA World Factbook.

Sanaag regions.

2001, November
Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed is ousted from power. Jama Ali Jama becomes president of the de facto state.

2002, May
Ahmed regains power.

2004, October
Ahmed is elected president of Somalia.

2005, January
General Mohamud Muse Hersi "Adde" is elected president of Puntland. Puntland becomes a main hub for pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden. Since 2005, Puntland authorities have had a complicated relationship with Somali pirates operating off its shores "which has ranged from direct armed confrontation to allegations of complicity and outright involvement" (Bahadur 2011, 60).

2009, January
Abdirahman Mohamud Farole is elected president of Puntland.

`dfsbuild`
Before 1998, there was limited centralization of authority with some taxes being collected and basic governance provided by clan elders (Minahan 2002, 1148). After the declaration of autonomy in July 1998, administrative and political structures became more coherent (Weller and Nobbs 2010, 283). Puntland also developed a legal system that operates through a concurrent system of sharia courts, customary law, and Western legal courts (Nalla 2010, 203).

`mextsupcat`
Puntland has not received systematic external military support from a third country.

`frag`
Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed faction; Mohamud Muse faction.

5.18 Somaliland (SOM)

Map of Somaliland[24]

1884
Somaliland becomes a British protectorate. Unlike Somalis under Italian (rest of Somalia) and French (current-day Djibouti) rule, Somalis under British occupation are given autonomy to govern their own affairs.

1960
On June 26, Somaliland declares independence and is recognized by 35 countries, including the United States. Five days later, it joins South Somalia (the former Italian Somaliland) to form modern-day Somalia. Yet, the union act is not endorsed by politicians from former British Somaliland and no official international treaty is signed by the two states (Paquin 2010, 153).

1969
Siad Barre ascends to power in Somalia following a socialist coup. The constitution is suspended and the industrial sector is nationalized. Barre openly states his desire to unite all Somalis residing in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti under a Greater Somalia state.

1977
Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia (over Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in Ethiopia) erupts. Invading Somali troops are driven away from Ogaden. The war (corroborated with the 1974 ascension of power of the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia) leads to a realignment of great power support: now, Washington is the main provider of arms and foreign aid to Somalia, while the Soviet Union becomes Ethiopia's patron.

1981
The Somali National Movement (SNM) is formed in London with the goal of ousting

[24]Source: CIA World Factbook.

Barre. Between 1982 and 1988, it is headquartered in Ethiopia. SNM is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan, the largest clan in Somaliland (Isaaqs make up about 70% of the population in Somaliland). At this time, SNM does not embrace a secessionist agenda; rather, it fights for the establishment of a federal state.

1989
SNM manages to drive the government out of rural areas and to capture Hargeysa (capital of Somaliland) and Burao. The Somali military retaliates with aerial bombardments of the main cities in Somaliland.

1991
The Barre regime collapses. On May 18, Somaliland declares independence and the ruling Isaaq clan embarks on a state-building process (Geldenhuys 2009, 131). SNM leaders "argued that since Somaliland had been a distinct geopolitical entity before 1960, and had declared independence and obtained international recognition in June 1960, the 1991 declaration of independence was not an act of secession but a dissolution between sovereign states" (Paquin 2010, 156).

1994
Fighting erupts in Somaliland between secessionists and federalists during which Hargeysa and Burco (the two largest towns in the de facto state) are severely damaged.

1996, October–1997, February
A national reconciliation conference is held in Hargeysa. The venue marks Somaliland's institutionalization and democratization process (Paquin 2010, 160). A Westminster bicameral parliament is established with an elected lower house and a hereditary upper house (house of elders, the Guurti) in charge of passing legislation relating to religion, traditions (culture) and security (ICG 2009).

1998
Somaliland's regions of Sanaag and Sool become a point of contention between Somaliland and Puntland.

1999
Somaliland's president, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (a former prime-minister of Somalia in the early and late 1960s, visits Washington and meets with State Department officials in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the United States to recognize Somaliland.

2000
A USAID delegation visits Hargeysa.

2000, April
The bicameral parliament adopts the Constitution of Somaliland. The constitution declares Somaliland an independent, sovereign state.

2001, May
A referendum on the new constitution and independence is held. The vast majority of Somalilanders approve statehood for Somaliland. After the referendum, SNM is officially disbanded and political parties are formed. Since then, democratic elections have been regularly held with peaceful power transitions in 2003 and 2010.

2003
The incumbent president Dahir Rayale Kahin wins a closely contested election.

2005
Parliamentary elections are held with the opposition winning a majority of the seats. In the same year, an African Union (AU) fact-finding mission determines that Somaliland has a legitimate claim to independence (Geldenhuys 2009, 140). Although no country has officially recognized Somaliland, a few (Ethiopia and Djibouti) accept Somaliland-issued passports. In February 2010, Israel announced that it was ready to recognize Somaliland as long as the AU did so.

2007
The northeastern Somaliland region of Maakhir (adjacent to Puntland) declares itself a separate state within Somalia. In the same year, Sweden decides to designate Somaliland as a "self-governing area" and provides development aid (Geldenhuys 2009, 145).

2007, October
Somaliland President Rayale is accused of illegally extending his term in office with the help of the House of Elders, the Guurti (ICG 2009).

2010, June
After being postponed several times due to internal instability, on June 26 presidential elections are finally held. Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo of the Peace, Unity and Development Party defeats Rayale and wins the presidency with 49.6% of the popular vote.

`dfsbuild`
Mampilly (2011, 217) states that Somaliland managed to "put in place governance structures before the collapse of the incumbent state." Kaplan (2008) mentions that Somaliland has developed a sophisticated state apparatus. Menkhaus (2007, 91) notes that Somaliland "maintains a high level of public security—most of Somaliland is as safe as anywhere in the Horn of Africa. Economic recovery in Somaliland has been equally impressive, with millions of dollars of investments by the Somali diaspora in service sector businesses and real estate; Somaliland has attracted thousands of migrant laborers and hundreds of business investors from both southern Somalia and Ethiopia. Somaliland has also built up a modest but functional state structure, with ministries, municipalities, police, and a legislature all performing at variable but not inconsequential levels." Reno (2011, 19) writes that from early 1990s, the Somali National Movement "set up an administration, [began printing] its own money, [policing] local communities and even

[organizing] multiparty elections." Nordstrom (2004, 171) mentions that, unlike Somalia proper, Somaliland "reconstituted itself along innovative traditional lines to form a stable self-governing nation...In fact, Somaliland is a significant study site as an example, not of spontaneous self-destruction—which is so commonly studied—but of spontaneous stability in the midst of political chaos." In the realm of foreign relations, "Somaliland has developed functional relationships with its neighbor Ethiopia; it has signed formal memoranda with Britain and Denmark on the repatriation of failed asylum seekers; EU and UN agencies have offices in Somaliland to manage their aid programs; the Somaliland authorities have cooperated with Western intelligence services on counterterrorism; and Somaliland ministers and government employees are able to travel on Somaliland passports" (Caspersen 2012, 43).

`mextsupcat`
Much like in the rest of Somalia, arms are widely available in Somaliland. Yet, Somaliland does not have an external patron that provides it with armament on a regular basis.

`frag`
Somali National Movement (SNM); United Peoples' Democratic Party; Peace, Unity, and Development Party; Justice and Development Party; Hiil Qaran Party (officially banned). The Somaliland Constitution allows only 3 political parties and prohibits the establishment of parties based on religion or clan affiliation.

5.19 Eritrea (ERI)

Map of Eritrea (as a de facto state)[25]

1952
The UN creates the Ethiopian-Eritrean federation. Muslim-dominated Eritrea was an Italian colony between 1889 and 1941, and was administered by the British as a UN trust territory between 1941 and 1951. Under the federation agreement, Eritrea has an autonomous status (with separate constitution and parliament).

1958
Christian-dominated Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) is established.

1960
Muslim-dominated Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) is formed.

1961
Ethiopia revokes Eritrea's autonomy and annexes the territory as the country's 14th province.

1962
The Ethiopian-Eritrean federation is officially abolished.

1964
Civil war erupts. The Eritrean Liberation Front proclaims an independent state and controls parts of the territory.

[25]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

1970
The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) splinters from ELF. EPLF emerges as a highly-structured insurgent group that adapted Maoist and Vietnamese models of protracted liberation struggle (Clapham 1998, 26). According to Schlichte (2010, 173) EPLF "molded its recruits into a highly obedient and disciplined force...Central to its approach was the programmatic decision that all members of the Front would undergo a compulsory six-month training period, including political education and literacy programs. This enabled the EPLF to change the general narrative of Eritrean history and also to create a shared belief regarding its mission. Nationalist discourse was used to bridge the divide between Orthodox Coptic Christian and Sunni Muslim segments of the population that had not only been a social divide but also represented a language barrier."

1974
A Marxist military committee, the Derg, overthrows the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. Colonel Mengistu Haile Meriam becomes head of the Ethiopian state.

1975
By this time, the EPLF controls most of Eritrea's territory with the exception of Asmara (the capital) and other larger cities.

1980s
The EPLF replaces the ELF as the dominant rebel group. The EPLF became "one of the most well-organized guerilla groups in Africa. The group recruited from within the Eritrean region and trained each soldier for nine months before sending them to fight. International civil rights organizations occasionally made claims that the EPLF was forcing Eritreans to enter the army, a charge the group vehemently denies. Through involuntary conscription or not, the EPLF, with the rival ELF, formed a rebel force of over 30,000 soldiers. The Ethiopian government designated 25,000 troops to fight the Eritrean rebels. International observers were impressed by the EPLF's emergence as a well-disciplined army and their ability to maintain strength without outside support. The EPLF was largely armed with abandoned or stolen weapons from the Ethiopian Army (Source: START).

1990
The EPLF expells the last of the Ethiopian troops from Eritrea, forms an interim government and holds a U.N.-supervised referendum on independence.

1991, May
The Ethiopian government collapses under attack from both the EPLF and the Tigray National Liberation Front (TPLF), a national liberation organization opposed to Mengistu's rule. The leader of the EPLF becomes the first president of Eritrea and the EPLF emerges as the single ruling party. The organziation renames itself the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (Source: START).

1993, April
99% of Eritreans approve independence in a referendum. Following the referendum, Asmara declares independence. Washington immediately recognizes the new state.

1993, June
Eritrea becomes a UN member state.

dfsbuild
Pool (2001) and Mampilly (2011, 217) state that the EPLF developed governance structures of impressive sophistication. Schlichte (2010, 174) mentions that the EPLF displayed "a highly centralized organizational structure that combined elements of democratic centralism and free elections. Deliberation was allowed, but once decisions were made, deviations were severely punished. The cadres trained in China, Syria, and Cuba formed a resolute leadership and selected personnel for parallel institutions such as a clandestine party, political cadres, and an internal security organization...The armed group took on statelike form and functions, granted majority votes to poor peasants, and distributed basic medical and veterinary services to pastoralists. However, the EPLF was cautious in changing political and social structures too quickly, especially in rural areas. In cities, though, it established people's assemblies via its mass organizations that dealt with judicial cases, collective work, checked price controls, and collected taxes. When the EPLF eventually took over the new independent state of Eritrea, it thus already had a long-standing experience of government."

mextsupcat
Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq and China are credited with providing substantial military support and training. The EPLF also managed to establish safe havens in Sudan (Iyob 1995; Clapham 1998, 27-33; Horowitz 2000, 271). Horowitz (2000, 272) states that "at various times, Eritrean rebels have had training in Syria, bases in the Sudan, Soviet and Chinese weapons sent through Libya and South Yemen, and financial aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait." According UCDP, the ELF and, later, the EPLF, received support (arms, materiel/logistics, funding/economic support; safe havens) from Libya, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and United Arab Emirates.

frag
Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM); Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF); Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).

5.20 Cabinda (CAB)

Map of Cabinda[26]

1963

The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) is founded. FLEC has always claimed that, given the enclave's separate history, identity and culture, it has a legitimate claim for independence. Cabinda's claim for independence "is based upon the 1885 Treaty of Simulambaco, which first linked Cabinda to Angola while recognizing Cabinda's special status. The treaty between the Portuguese and local Cabindan chiefs was an attempt by Portugal to resist encroachment upon its African empire by the French, Belgian, and British, during the 'Scramble for Africa,' and was a bid by the Cabindans to resist demands for forced labor by King Leopold's Belgian Congo" (Wells 2003, 5-6).

1975

Angola becomes independent. FLEC demands independence for Cabinda. The rebels separate into three main organizations: FLEC: FLEC–R (Renewed), FLEC–FAC (Forces Amardas de Cabinda), and Frente Democratica de Cabinda (FDC). "The FLEC–R, with the support of some Cabindans, make three arguments for independence from Angola. The first argument is geographic. Cabinda and Angola are non-contiguous. A thin strip of land belonging to the Democratic Republic of the Congo separates Cabinda from Angola. Second, some historical documents imply that Portugal, Angola's former colonizer, regarded Angola and Cabinda as separate states. Finally, and most importantly, Cabinda produces 60% of Angola's total oil output of approximately 700,000 barrels per day. Angola's oil accounts for 90% of its total export earnings, so the financial argument for Cabindan independence is strong. The Cabindan oil industry, however, is not sympathetic to the FLEC–R, due to the group's practice of kidnapping oil executives" (Source: START).

1975, November

Angolan (MPLA) and Cuban troops invade Cabinda. FLEC controls parts of the province.

[26]Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/cabinda.htm.

1977
FLEC announces the establishment of a provisional government of the "Republic of Cabinda," "with Henriques Tiago Nzita declared president of what FLEC claimed was a liberated zone" (Wells 2003, 6).

1979
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda (MPLC) is established.

1983
Luanda offers unofficial amnesty to FLEC guerrillas.

1985
A ceasefire is reached between the MPLA and FLEC.

1990s
Two more groups purporting to represent the Cabindans are formed: the National Union for the Liberation of Cabinda (NULC), and the Communist Committee of Cabinda (CCC).

1992, September
FLEC and the vast majority of Cabindans boycott national elections.

1993, January
Angolan troops occupy Cabinda town. FLEC forces now control the inner rural areas (Source: http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=25&ReportId=67501).

1999
In an attempt to gain international attention for its independence aspirations, FLEC begins to target oil workers in the province.

2001, February
As a result of an increase in FLEC violent activity, the government increases its military presence in the region.

2002
The Angolan military claims to have destroyed the main bases of FLEC–FAC and FLEC–R.

2004, September
FLEC and FLEC–FAC merge and engage in negotiations with the government.

2006
A peace agreement is signed between the leader of FLEC–FAC, Antonio Bento Bembe, and the government (Bembe was subsequently appointed as minister for human rights).

The other Cabindan groups denounce the agreement and continue the violent struggle (Source: http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=61248).

2007
FLEC–FAC is officially disbanded. Many of its members are drafted into Angolan army and police. The other Cabindan rebels continue their violent campaigns against army patrols and the oil industry in Cabinda. FLEC insurgents continue to operate in the northern forest territory beyond the oil concession boundaries, and at the borders with the DRC and the Republic of Congo (Reed 2009, 137–147).

2010, January
A bus carrying the Togo national soccer team is ambushed in Cabinda (Ojakorotu 2011, 103). FLEC claims responsibility for the attack.

`dfsbuild`
FLEC has engaged in limited statebuilding activities (mostly social order and justice) in the rural areas under its control (Meier 1996; Notholt 2008; Beary 2011). Cabinda produces about 60% of Angola's oil output (the province has been described as the "African Kuwait"), but very few oil revenues trickle back into the region.

`mextsupcat`
Cabindan separatists have received military support from Togo, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, South Africa and Zambia, and have established military bases in DRC (Zaire) and Republic of Congo (Beary 2011, 26). DRC has supported FLEC–R with access to territory, weapons, materiel/logistics (Source: UCDP).

`frag`
Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC); Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC); Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Renewal (FLEC–R); Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC–FAC); FDC (Democratic Front of Cabinda); Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda (MPLC); National Union for the Liberation of Cabinda (UNLC); Communist Committee of Cabinda (CCC) (Sources: Beary 2011, 26-27; START; UCDP).

5.21 Western Sahara (WSH)

Map of Western Sahara[27]

1965, December
The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution that calls on Spain to end its colonial rule in Western Sahara, a territory inhabited by the Sahrawi people. The Sahrawi (a mix of Arab, Moor, Berber, and black Africans) are Sunni Muslim.

1973
The Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y del Río

[27]Source: United Nations. Areas east of the berm are controlled by Polisario.

de Oro) is formed. Polisario becomes the UN-recognized representative of the Sahrawi people. Its armed wing is the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army (Clodfelter 2008, 614).

1975
A UN commission concludes that the Sahrawis favor independence to annexation by Morocco. The UN classifies Western Sahara as a "non-self-governing territory."

1975, October
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules that Morocco does not have sovereign rights over Western Sahara and that the Sahrawi have a legitimate right to seek self-determination.

1975, November
The Moroccan King Hassan II leads a "Green March" to protest against ICJ's ruling on Western Sahara. About 350,000 civilians cross into Western Sahara. This event marks the beginning of Morocco's de facto occupation of much of the territory. After the Spanish withdrawal, Morocco occupies 2/3 of Western Sahara and Mauritania about 1/3.

1975–1991
Warfare between Polisario and Morocco. In the early years of the conflict, Polisario's attention is focused on Mauritania.

1976, February
Polisario declares the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The rebel organization controls about 15% of Western Sahara (the rest is under Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation). After Morocco occupies most of the region, nearly half of the Sahrawi population moves to refugee camps in Algeria (around the town of Tindouf). Algeria and Libya (the latter up to late 1980s) have been strong supporters of the Sahrawi cause (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 9). Assistance has also come from the African Union. Many African states, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, recognize SADR.

1976, March 6
Algeria recognizes SADR's independence.

1976, June
Polisario's founder, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed is killed in combat with Moroccan forces. He is succeeded by Mohammed Abdelazziz.

1979, August
Polisario and Mauritania sign a peace agreement whereby Mauritania agrees to cede the portion of Western Sahara under its control to Polisario. The deal triggers Moroccan occupation of the portion of the Western Sahara previously administered by Mauritania. "By the end of 1979, Morocco had 60,000 troops deployed in the Sahara to oppose the 10,000 to 15,000 Polisario troops, which included volunteers from Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. Eventually, Morocco would deploy more than 100,000 troops in the

Sahara" (Clodfelter 2008, 615).

1981
Morocco begins to build berms (fortified sand walls) around the Western Saharan territory under its control. According to Zunes and Mundy (2010, 21), Morocco's great berm "is the largest functional military barrier in the world." The heavily fortified Moroccan zone encircles about 85% of the territory. "The Polisario controls the remainder of the area, deemed by Morocco as a buffer zone and of no strategic or economic value" (Wehrey and Boukhars 2013, 166).

1981, October
Polisario attacks the 2400-man Morroccan garrison of Guelta Zemmar, inflicting heavy losses on government forces.

1984
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the precursor to the African Union (AU), agrees to accept SADR as a member which prompts Morocco to withdraw from the organization (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 178). In February 1984, Mauritania extends recognition to SADR.

1985
SADR president Abdelaziz is elected vice-president of OAU. In the same year, India recognizes SADR and allows it to open an embassy in New Delhi.

1986
Libya ceases to provide military support to Polisario (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 23). In exchange, Morocco "withdraws support for the Chadian government in the dispute against Libyan-backed rebels over the Ouzou Strip" (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 87).

1990
SADR president Abdelaziz is reelected vice-president of OAU.

1991
A ceasefire is signed. UN peacekeepers are deployed to the province. Under UN auspices, the parties agree to reduce number of troops, allow refugees to return, and organize a referendum for either independence or integration with Morocco. The most contentious issue that emerges is determining who is allowed to vote in the referendum. Polisario agrees to a referendum of persons listed on the 1974 Spanish census and their descendants. Rabat insists that all persons (including those transferred during the occupation) in Western Sahara should be allowed to vote.

1992
In anticipation of the referendum on the status of the region, Morocco transports "tens of thousands of [loyal] Sahrawis, mainly from the southern towns of Sidi Ifni, Guelmin, and the region of Oued Noun, to the Western Sahara to be registered to vote" (Wehrey

and Boukhars 2013, 175).

1994
The UN starts the voter identification process.

1997
SADR adops its own currency, the Sahrawi peseta (which circulates alongside the Algerian dinar).

1999
The UN finishes the voter identification process and arrives at a figure of roughly 86,000 voting-age Western Saharans. Rabat rejects it. Large-scale Sahrawi demonstrations in Laayoune mark the onset of the first Sahrawi intifada (uprising).

2000
India withdraws its recognition of SADR (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 126).

2001
Former US Secretary of State James Baker, now the UN's special envoy in the region, presents a draft of proposal for an autonomous Western Sahara.

2003, January
Baker presents the final draft for a peace plan (the Baker plan). According to the proposal, Western Sahara would have autonomy within Morocco for five to six years, after which there would be a referendum on independence. "During this time Morrocco would be responsible for Western Sahara's security and defense, and there would be autonomous local administration under an elected Western Sahara Authority " (Source: START). Polisario accepts the plan; Rabat rejects it.

2004, June
Following Rabat's intransigence vis-à-vis the peace plan, Baker resigns his position.

2004, September
South Africa officially recognizes the independence of SADR (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 16).

2005
Polisario releases hundreds of Moroccon prisoners of war.

2005, May
Massive pro-independence demonstrations are held in Western Sahara marking the outbreak of the second Sahrawi intifada. Morocco announces plans to begin implementing an autonomy plan unilaterally.

2007

Morocco submits an autonomy proposal to the UN. The Sahrawi embrace non-violent tactics as the main weapon of protest against Moroccan occupation. Zunes and Mundy (2010, 156) note that "by 2007, at least one minor public act of protest was usually taking place somewhere in Western Sahara every day."

2009
Denouncing blatant corruption within the ranks of Polisario, one of the movement's founders, Ould Souilem, defects to Morocco and is later appointed ambassador to Spain. In a confidential document, senior American official Robert P. Jackson writes that "the principal goal of most Sahrawi is more self-government than self-determination" (Wehrey and Boukhars 2013, 178).

2010, August
Polisario's police chief, Mustapha Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud, publicly endorses Morocco's proposal to grant autonomy to Western Sahara. He is later imprisoned and expelled from Polisario (Wehrey and Boukhars 2013, 176).

2010, September
Violence breaks out again in Laayoune between indigenous Sahrawi and colonists from the north.

2007–2011 The conflict reaches a stalemate with serious implications for regional security. "The ungoverned areas abutting the Western Sahara, especially northern Mauritania and the Polisario-administered camps in southwest Algeria, are becoming major hubs for drug trafficking, the smuggling of contraband, and the circulation of weapons" (Wehrey and Boukhars 2013, 166).

2011
About 82 states, the AU, the UN, and the EU continue to support the self-determination rights of the Sahrawi people in Western Sahara.

`dfsbuild`
Morocco has "more or less absolute control over 80 percent of Western Sahara, leaving roughly twenty thousand miles to Polisario" (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 21). Polisario has developed an extensive governance apparatus in the area under its control (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 123-39; Beary 2011; Jensen 2012). For example, Polisario developed its own system of internal security, administration, taxation, education, health, and sanitation (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 117). In addition to performing governmental functions in the areas it controls, Polisario conducts its own foreign policy, maintains a strong diplomatic network abroad (including embassies in several countries such as Cuba, Ethiopia, Mexico, Nigeria South Africa, and Uganda), issues its own stamps, and even contributes to AU's peacekeeping efforts (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 123-26).

mextsupcat
Polisario has received arms, training, and safe havens from Algeria and Libya (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 16, 42). "At the height of its strength in the 1980s, the Polisario Front consisted of approximately 15,000 troops. Financially supported by Libya and Algeria, the Polisario was well-trained, well-armed, and mobile. Attacks were conducted on the Moroccan military both in Western Sahara and inside Morocco, resulting in large-scale losses of Moroccan armor" (Source: START).

frag
Polisario; Khatt al-Shalid/Line of the Martyr faction (since 2004).

5.22 South Sudan (SSD)

Map of South Sudan (as a de facto state)[28]

1956
Sudan gains independence. The Christian/African southern part of the country (comprising the Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria provinces) is marginalized by the majority Muslim north Sudan. Upon independence, southern militias begin setting up a parallel government (Johnson 2011).

1962, February
Sudan Africa Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) is formed as an umbrella organization promoting the rights of Southern Sudanese.

1963
SACDNU changes its name to Sudan African National Union (SANU) and demands independence for Southern Sudan. A full-scale insurgency breaks out. Anya Nya emerges as the most important group fighting the government. In the following years, the group manages to expel most of the central government officials from the southern districts. By 1970s, Anya Nya controls many rural areas in southern Sudan.

1971
Anya Nya military leaders form a political organization, the Southern Sudan Liberation

[28]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

Movement (SSLM).

1972, March
Addis Ababa accords signed between Khartoum (capital of Sudan) and SSLM. According to the provisions, SSLM agrees to observe a ceasefire and Khartoum to offer autonomy for the 3 southern provinces.

1981
The government unilaterally abrogates the Addis Ababa accords and dissolves the Southern Regional Assembly.

1983, August
A former colonel in the Sudanese army, John Garang, forms the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Unlike many other insurgent armies, SPLA has substantial military capacity from the very outset mainly because of extensive support from Ethiopia. Ethiopia supports SPLM/A as a counterweight to Sudan's assistance to separatists in Eritrea.

1985, August
Khartoum imposes sharia law throughout the entire country. Fierce fighting between SPLA and the government ensues. Unlike its predecessor, the SSLM, the SPLM does not officially seek independence from Sudan, but autonomy in a secular and democratic federal system.

1985–early 1990s
The war continues with SPLA forces often prevailing in military clashes with the government. In early 1990s, the government still holds several important southern towns, including the largest cities of Juba and Yei. However, these cities are constantly besieged by the SPLA which is in control of most of the rural areas.

1991
The SPLA splits into two groups: the Torit faction (Dinka-dominated and led by John Garang) and the Nasir/United faction (Nuer-dominated and led by Riek Machar). The former demands autonomy within a federal state (mainly in deference to its Ethiopian patron which was engaged in a protracted struggle against the Eritrean separatists), while the latter seeks an independent, non-Islamic state.

1991
With the collapse of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia withdraws its support for the SPLA.

1991–1999
Factional infighting between the Dinka and the Nuer engulfs the southern region. The internecine war results in more civilian casualties than the conflict with Khartoum. Gradually, the Nuer faction is delegitimized because it accepts extensive support from Khartoum. The factional split within SPLM/A results in substantial territorial loss to govern-

mental forces.

1994
Eritrea severs diplomatic ties with Sudan accusing it of supporting the Eritrean Islamic Jihad whose aim is to overthrow the Eritrean government. Sudan, in its turn, accuses Eritrea of supporting the SPLA.

1995
Uganda also cuts diplomatic ties with Khartoum.

1995
The southern rebel movement splits again (largely along ethnic lines) into the SPLA-Main faction composed mainly of Dinka and led by Garang, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) led by Riek Machar and composed mainly of Nuers, and the SPLA-United faction led by Lam Akol and composed mainly of Shilluk coethnics.

1996, December
The SPLM, SPLA's political wing, teams up with six northern opposition groups to form the NDA (National Democratic Alliance). Their goal is to topple the central government in Khartoum controlled by the National Islamic Front (NIF). With the formation of the new alliance, the struggle in Sudan becomes a much broader conflict engulfing a larger part of the country and even spilling over into Ethiopia and Eritrea.

1997, April
The Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) signs a peace agreement with the government.

1997, September
John Garang claims full SPLA control over the southern part of the country. In Juba, the capital of South Sudan, most young men are enrolled in the SPLA.

1998, May
The SPLA and Khartoum agree to hold an internationally supervised referendum on the future of southern Sudan.

2002
A ceasefire between the government and the SPLA is signed.

2004, May
The government and SPLM/A sign three protocols critical to ending the civil war. The agreements stipulate that the warring parties will form a government of national unity for an interim period of six years after which southern Sudan will hold a referendum on whether or not it should secede from the rest of Sudan.

2005, January
A peace agreement is formally signed between SPLM/A and Khartoum. John Garang becomes vice-president. According to the agreement, oil revenues are to be equally divided between the south and the north.

2005, July
Garang dies in a helicopter crash.

2005, October
The autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), led by First Vice President Salva Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) acting as ruling party, is established.

2008, January
The first contingents of a 26,000-strong UN peacekeeping force arrive in southern Sudan.

2011, January
Referendum on South Sudan's status is held with more than 98% of the population voting in favor of independence.

2011, July
South Sudan officially declares independence and is admitted into the UN. The north and the south have not yet resolved a lingering dispute over the Dinka-dominated and oil rich Abyei border area. By the end of December 2011, Abyei borders were still to be demarcated and the situation remained highly volatile.

2013, July
The South Sudanese Salva Kiir president sacks his entire cabinet in an apparent power struggle with the vice-president, Riek Machar.

`dfsbuild`
Mampilly (2011, 5–6) states that the "SPLM/A in Sudan took a more circumscribed approach to governance, focusing its resources primarily on developing a security system that could ensure stability while incorporating traditional courts for resolving civilian disputes. Efforts to provide other public goods like education and health were more limited and relied heavily on the involvement of the international community, especially transnational aid organizations that proliferated through the area of rebel control." By 1994, SPLM/A developed a "civil administration formally independent of the military command, with its own civilian police force, judicial system, and even a Department of Wildlife" (Mampilly 2011, 146). Yet, "the majority of the health, educational, infrastructural, and, in places, nutritional needs of the Southern Sudanese during the war were fulfilled by foreign aid organizations" (Mampilly 2011, 151).

mextsupcat
Until the mid-1980s, the SPLA benefited from extensive military support from Libya. It also received arms from Ethiopia, and operated from bases in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. Observers (Clapham 1998; Johnson 2011) credit Ethiopia for furnishing the bulk of the SPLA's weaponry throughout the 1980s.

frag
Any Nya; Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); SPLA-Nasir; SPLA-United; Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM); United Democratic Salvation Front; Sudan National Party; The Eastern Front.

5.23 Iraqi Kurdistan (KUR)

Map of Greater Kurdistan[29]



1991

At the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, the Western powers impose a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan. At this time, the territory encompassing the Iraqi provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah acquires autonomy and functions independently of the Iraqi state.

From 1991 until early 2003, the Kurds in Iraq enjoy de facto autonomy in the northern part of the country. At the end of the Gulf War (1991), the territory is designated as an allied-protected autonomous region. Kurdish autonomy was to be formally recognized in 2005 (Source: MAR assessment for Kurds in Iraq).

1991, March

Kurdish uprising against Saddam breaks out. "Within days Sulaymaniya, Erbil, and Duhok fell to Kurdish fighters as did the oil city of Kirkuk, which had been the major source of contention between the Kurds and the government since the early 1970s" (Bengio 2012, 198).

1991, March–April

Fighting between Iraqi and Kurdish forces lead to a flood of Kurdish refugees in neighboring countries. US military initiates Operation Provide Comfort, a relief aid campaign in northern Iraq intended to provide food and temporary shelter to more than 700,000 refugees (Source: MAR chronology for Kurds in Iraq).

1991, October

[29]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

Kurdish forces take control of most of northern Iraq. Baghdad imposes an economic blockade on the region and pursues an active divide-and-rule strategy vis-á-vis the Kurdish leadership (Bengio 2012, 201). At the same time, Saddam withdraws all Iraqi forces from the province.

1992
Voice of America radio introduces daily broadcasts in the Kurdish language (Bengio 2012, 204).

1992, May
Kurdistan holds the first free legislative elections (for the Kurdistan National Assembly). The vote is equally split between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the two main Kurdish parties.

1992, June
The Kurdistan National Assembly holds its first meeting in Erbil. A cabinet (the Kurdistan Regional Government, KRG) with 15 ministries is formed.

1992, September
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) agree to merge their guerrilla forces (*peshmerga*) into a unified force of about 30,000 troops to be commanded by the Kurdish National Assembly.

1992, October
Turkish forces launch an attack against PKK (Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers Party) irregulars stationed in the remote border areas of northern Iraq.

1992, November
A court of appeals and a separate educational system (with Kurdish as the main language of instruction) are established. PUK's Jalal Talabani advocates independence for Kurdistan while KDP's Masoud Barzani favors a high degree of autonomy within a democratic Iraq. By the end of 1992, "not a single country or international body extended recognition to the Kurdish government or established diplomatic relations with it" (Bengio 2012, 206).

1993, April
Barzani and Talabani visit Washington DC where they are received by Vice-President Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake (Bengio 2012, 224).

1994, May
Fighting breaks out between PUK and KDP forces. PUK takes control of parliament and government buildings in Erbil. PUK gets most of its supporters from the urban Kurdish population and radicals, and its influence is centered on the city of Sulaymaniyah. KDP derives most of its support from the village population and its influence is centered on

the cities of Erbil and Duhok. As for external support, PUK allegedly receives support from Syria while KDP is backed by Iran (Bengio 2012, 220-21).

1994, June
The French President François Mitterand initiates a mediation process between PUK and KDP.

1995, March–May Turkey invades Iraqi Kurdistan in order to stamp out PKK (People's Workers Party) rebels. KDP leader Barzani agrees not to allow the PKK rebels to use Iraqi Kurdistan as a base for their attacks against Turkish troops. At this time, KDP controls most of the border between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey.

1995
PUK and KDP leaders meet in Drogheda, Ireland, and agree to a ceasefire.

1996, April
US State Department envoy Robert Deutsch travels to northern Iraq in an attempt to broker a final settlement between the PUK and the KDP. No resolution is reached.

1996, August
KDP leader Barzani asks for the support of the Iraqi army in his struggle against PUK.

1996, September
PUK surrenders the cities of Erbil and Sulaymaniya (the traditional PUK stronghold) to rival KDP forces supported by Iraqi troops. The following month, with Iranian support, PUK regains control over Sulaymaniya.

1997, October
PUK officials accuse Ankara of arming and funding the KDP in return for assistance with Turkey's offensive against PKK forces in northern Iraq.

1998, September
Baghdad lifts the economic embargo on Kurdistan.

1998, October
PUK's Talabani and KDP's Barzani meet in Ankara and agree to a power-sharing agreement which establishes a regional assembly for Kurdistan. The meeting officially ends the civil war between PUK and KDP.

1998, December
Following Saddam's refusal to grant access to UN inspectors to suspected nuclear sites, US and Great Britain launch airstrikes against the Iraqi air defense systems and communications networks in northern Iraq.

1999, January

Barzani and Talabani meet in the Salah al-Din province and agree to "halt mutual hostile propaganda" (Bengio 2012, 276).

2000
Elections are held in both PUK- and KDP-controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. KDP-controlled areas are economically better off than PUK-controlled areas mainly due to the fact that the KDP collects customs revenue from commerce with Turkey (Bengio 2012, 276).

2001, November
Barham Salih, head of the PUK government, meets with the US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld in Washington DC (Bengio 2012, 266).

2001
An independent Kurdish Central Bank is established in Erbil.

2002, April
Barzani and Talabani meet with President George W. Bush (Bengio 2012, 266).

2002, October
The Kurdish National Assembly reconvenes after eight years of paralysis.

2003, February
KDP and PUK decide to jointly support the upcoming US invasion of Iraq.

2003, March
A US-led invasion ousts Saddam Hussein from power. The Iraqi army is disbanded. Kurdish forces occupy the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.

2004
Sporadic clashes erupt between Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen in Kirkuk (the main city in Kurdistan). In October, hundreds of Kurdish residents in Kirkuk call for an independent Kurdish state with Kirkuk as its capital.

2005, August
Thousands of Kurds demonstrate in Erbil, Kirkuk, Dohuk, and Sulaiymaniya, calling for a Kurdish right of self-determination, a redefinition of the borders of the Kurdish region, and Kurdish control of Kirkuk (Source: MAR chronology for Kurds in Iraq).

2005, December
KDP leader, Masoud Barzani, becomes president of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). PUK leader, Jalal Talabani, becomes President of Iraq (a largely ceremonial office after the downfall of Saddam Hussein). KRG boasts a fully-equipped army, the *Peshmerga* ("those who face death"), composed of mountain troops, counterterrorism forces, and quick-reaction battalions that are under the command of the KRG president.

2006, May
The Kurdish parliament votes for the unification of the KDP and PUK governments.

2006, September
The Kurdistan Regional Government establishes a Department of Foreign Relations headed by Falah Mustafa Bakir. In the following years, KRG establishes representations in several countries (United States; Great Britain; France; Iran; Belgium/EU) (Bengio 2012, 305).

2009, June
A Kurdish constitution is drafted and approved by the Kurdish parliament.

2009, July
For the first time, KDP and PUK form a joint list in the elections for the Kurdish parliament (Bengio 2012, 299). A third movment âĂŞ Gorran (Movement for Change) âĂŞ is formed. "Gorran's platform called for social justice; the institutionalization of the separation of powers within the KRG; limitations on KDP and PUK powers over the government, the judicial system, and parliament; and fighting corruption" (Bengio 2012, 318).

2010, December
Barzani calls for Kurdish self-determination.

2013, November
Erbil and Ankara sign a series of contracts that would allow Kurdistan to export oil and gas to Turkey independently of Baghdad. The deal infuriates the Iraqi government.

`dfsbuild`
By the end of 2011, Iraqi Kurdistan acquired most characteristics of statehood except for international recognition (Stansfield 2003; Natali 2010; Beary 2011; Bengio 2012). "The framework of a separate Kurdish entity has been in the making from the early 1990s. It included a constitution, a parliament, a cabinet, and security forces – namely, the Peshmerga, Parastin, and Asayish – all of which became state symbols and functioned independently of Baghdad. Even though the territorial and political frameworks for the Kurdish entity had yet to be settled with Baghdad, Kurdish state building and nation building proceeded apace, unhindered." Kurdistan established "police-gendarmerie units to maintain law and order...[and printed] Kurdistan stamps, featuring scenes of northern Iraqi Kurdistan and a portrait of the late Mulla Mustafa Barzani, founder of the KDP. Another important move was Masoud Barzani's decision to adopt the national anthem of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, established in Iran in 1946" (Bengio 2012, 279-80).

`mextsupcat`

Syria, Iran, and Turkey have allegedly provided arms, military trainers, and safe havens to both PUK and KDP (Natali 2010; Beary 2011, 213; Bengio 2012).

`frag`
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP); Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU); Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP); Kurdistan Toilers' Party (KTP); Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP); Gorran (Movement for Change).

5.24 Palestine (PAL)

Map of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza)[30]

1987, December
Palestinian demonstrations against Israeli occupation coalesce into a coordinated uprising (intifada) with Gaza being the epicenter of protest. Soon, demonstrations spread to the West Bank. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is at first taken by surprise by the extent of the uprising. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a violent offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood founded in the late 1970s, is largely credited with rallying Palestinians in coordinated popular actions against Israel (Tessler 2009, 694–96).

[30]Source: United Nations.

1988, January
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), or Hamas, is formed. The organization describes itself as the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and receives extensive support from Saudi Arabia. It also rejects peaceful solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Pearlman 2011, 101).

1988, November
Yasser Arafat issues a declaration of independence for Palestine. East Jerusalem is declared capital (Ramallah in the West Bank becomes the de facto capital). Palestinian statehood is immediately recognized by 55 countries.

1988–1993
Violence continues in both West Bank and Gaza while several diplomatic efforts are initiated to end the conflict and produce a long-lasting settlement. Palestinian violence is also targeted at Palestinian collaborators with Israel.

1993, January
Fatah-Hamas tensions flare up (Pearlman 2011, 119).

1993, August
Information emerges that PLO and Israel are engaged in secret peace negotiations in Oslo, Norway.

1993, September
The Oslo Accords are signed between PLO and Israel. Yasser Arafat recognizes Israel's right to exist and renounces terrorism. Israel's prime-minister, Yitzhak Rabin, recognizes the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

1994
While PLO conducts negotiations with Israel, Hamas claims responsibility for a series of violent acts perpetrated by Palestinians.

1994, May
The Palestinian Authority (PA) is created to administer Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

1995, May
PA acquires jurisdiction over "banking, energy, industry, labor, securities, insurance, postal services, local government, and agriculture in the West Bank" (Tessler 2009, 764).

1995, August
Arafat and Rabin sign the "Oslo Interim Agreement" (Oslo II). The accord provides for the redeployment of Israeli forces and the transfer of power and authority to the Palestinian Authority. The agreement delineates 3 categories of territorial control: area A (3% of the West Bank which includes major cities in West Bank plus Jericho and Gaza)

would be under exclusive Palestinian civilian and military control; in area B (24% of the West Bank which includes smaller towns and refugee camps), Palestinians would have civilian control and Israel would exercise military authority; in area C (73% of the West Bank which includes Israeli settlements and IDF bases), Israel would have exclusive authority. The Palestinian Legislative Council is established as the organ with legislative and executive authority. The arrangement is described as a "quasi-state with incomplete powers over a crazy quilt of land" and as "ersatz sovereignty" (imitation of sovereignty) (Bose 2007, 252).

1995, November
Yitzak Rabin is assassinated in Tel Aviv by a Jewish extremist.

1996, January
Elections are held in Gaza and the West Bank. Arafat's Fatah wins 68 of the Palestinian Legislative Council's 88 seats. Hamas boycotts the elections.

1996, May
Shimon Peres, the Israeli prime minister (Labor Party), narrowly loses elections to hardliner Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud Party).

1999, May
Labor leader, Ehud Barak, defeats Netanyahu in elections.

1999, August
Under pressure from the United States and Israel, the Jordanian King Abdullah expels Hamas leadership (including its leader, Khaled Meshal) from Amman. Hamas moves its political bureau to Syria (Damascus).

1991–2000
During this period, the number of Jewish settlers in Palestinian territories doubles from about 200,000 to 400,000. During the 1990s, "divide and conquer tactics gave rise to a chronically weak PA [that] was characterized by infighting at all levels and a personalized centralization of power at the top" (Pearlman 2011, 133).

2000, September
The second intifada breaks out. During the uprising, Palestinian factions "had incongruent strategies and clashing organizational ambitions. They were all therefore unable to develop an organizational structure that coordinated all political groups" (Pearlman 2011, 155).

Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AMB) is formed as a militia group through which Fatah engages in violent attacks against Israel. Pearlman (2011, 168) states that AMB was part Fatah militia and part semi-splinter group as Arafat did not have full control over the activities of the organization.

2001, February
Ariel Sharon is elected prime minister of Israel. In 2001, the number of Israeli settlers living in the West Bank reaches 192,000 (Tessler 2009, 820).

2002, March
Israel launches "Operation Defensive Shield" in Gaza, occupies the West Bank cities (except for Jericho), arrests thousands of Palestinians, imposes a stringent curfew, destroys significant property, and confines Arafat to his Ramallah compound. The operation undoes "much of the state-building process undertaken [by the Palestinian Authority] in the 1990s" (Pearlman 2011, 172). The level of crime throughout Palestine reaches unprecedented levels.

2003, March
Mahmoud Abbas becomes the Palestinian prime minister. Six months later, he resigns.

2004, November
Arafat dies in a hospital in France. Abbas becomes head of the PLO. It is alleged that the Palestinian authority lacks the institutional and military capacity to stop violent factions (Hamas, AMB, Islamic Jihad) from acting autonomously (Pearlman 2011, 167).

2005, January
Abbas is elected president of the Palestinian Authority. According to Pearlman (2011, 180), Abbas "inherited a situation characterized by weak institutions, intense factional competition, strategic directionlessness, and economic crisis. This was to say nothing of a society traumatized by years of violence."

2005, March
In Cairo, Abbas negotiates with 13 Palestinian factions the conditions for bringing all Palestinian forces "under one authority, one law, and one gun." An agreement is reached whereby all parties agree to cooperate to form a common political system.

2005, August–September
Israel withdraws from Gaza. By the end of 2005, there are about 259,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank (Tessler 2009, 820).

2006, January
Following a massive stroke, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon enters a comatose state and is replaced by Ehud Olmert. In the same month, Hamas decisively wins Palestinian elections. "Most analysts emphasize PA corruption, Hamas's social welfare activities, and the role of armed struggle in persuading Israel to withdraw from Gaza when assessing Palestinian voter motivation" (Tessler 2009, 841).

2006, February
Abbas invites Hamas to form a cabinet without Fatah. Hamas nominates Ismail Haniyeh, a moderate, as its candidate for prime minister.

2006, April
The EU and US coordinate to halt economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

2007, February
In Mecca, Hamas and Fatah pledge to form a national unity government. Israel refuses to recognize such government. The United States is reportedly funding and arming Fatah to defeat the radical Islamists, while Israel assists Fatah by releasing prisoners and channeling money to Abbas (Pearlman 2011, 183).

2007, June
Hamas forces seize control of Gaza and expel Fatah soldiers from the region.

2008, December
Israel launches an air and land invasion of Gaza that produces more than 1,300 Palestinian victims and 5,300 casualties (in addition to severe destruction of property).

2010, May
Israeli soldiers forcefully take control of a Turkish ship that intends to break the blockade against Gaza. Nine activists are killed onboard.

2011, March
The Palestinian Authority initiates a concerted effort toward global recognition of Palestine.

2011, April
The World Bank and IMF declare that PA is fully capable of running the economy of an independent state. Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad declares that, with the IMF and World Bank reports, Palestinians had received a "birth certificate" for statehood.

2011, September
Abbas takes the Palestinian statehood bid to the UN.

2011, November
The Icelandic parliament votes in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with Palestine. On December 14, Iceland becomes the first Western European country to recognize Palestine within the 1967 lines.

2011, December
Abbas meets exiled Hamas chief, Khaled Meshaal, in Cairo; the two agree to form a unity government.

2012, November
In a highly contentious vote, the UN General Assembly elevates Palestine's status from "non-member observer entity" to "non-member observer state" (same category as the

Vatican).

`dfsbuild`
After 1995, Palestine displayed many characteristics of statehood (government; police force; judicial system; diplomatic corps) (Jamal 2005; Bose 2007, 204–85; Tessler 2009; Dowty 2012). However, Pearlman (2011, 227) argues that Palestinian institutions "remained partial due to the absence of [full] territorial control and a monopoly on coercion."

`mextsupcat`
At various points, PLO, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad received extensive military support (arms; trainers; safe havens) from: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Cuba, and the Soviet Union (Tessler 2009).

`frag`
Fatah; Palestinian Liberation Organization; Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement); al-Khalas National Islamic Party; Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Hezbollah; Palestinian Democratic Union; Palestinian People's Party; al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade; Palestine Liberation Front; Palestinian Popular Struggle Front; Alliance of Palestinian Forces; Arab Liberation Front; Abu Nidal Organization; Popular Resistance Committees; Palestine National Salvation Front; Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Sons of the Village; Third-Way Party.

5.25 Gaza (GAZ)

Map of Gaza[31]

2007, June

Hamas forces seize control of Gaza. "Thereafter, Gaza and the West Bank [have] separate and competing administrations...with the former territory [u]nder the control of Hamas" (Tessler 2009, 844). According to Shachar (2010, 174), "as Israel allowed President Abbas's forces in the West Bank to rearm and take over the large towns, and Hamas quickly consolidated its hold over the [Gaza] Strip, *two quasi-states* took shape" (emphasis added).

[31]Source: United Nations.

Prior to the takeover of Gaza, Hamas had built a reputation "for clean administration, delivered needed social services, and did not compromise on its criticism of Oslo [Accords]. Defying Arafat's strategies for managing fragmentation, it represented a tenacious fissure in the organizational structure of the [Palestinian] national movement" (Pearlman 2011, 134). Pearlman (2011, 170) also states that, much like Fatah, Hamas also suffered from fragmentation; "one source of fragmentation in Hamas remained its political wing's lack of full command and control over the military wing."

2007, September
The Israeli government declares Gaza an enemy territory and cuts off electricity and fuel supplies.

2008, June
An Egyptian-brokered truce between Hamas and Israel takes effect. Israel permits the entry of strict necessities into Gaza.

2008, December
Hamas declares an end to the truce and fires 70 rockets into Israel — an all-time record. In retaliation, Israel bombs Hamas buildings inflicting heavy losses to the organization.

2009, February
Following the devastating December 2008–January 2009 Israeli attacks, Gaza is left in a rubble. Hamas declines Fatah's offer to assist with the reconstruction efforts in Gaza (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 181).

2011, June
Egypt agrees to allow 550 people a day through the Rafah border-crossing with Gaza.

2011, October
Israel frees hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in 2006.

2011, November
Talks between Hamas and Fatah to form a national unity government fail.

2011, December
Abbas meets exiled Hamas chief, Khaled Meshaal, in Cairo; the two agree to form a unity government.

`dfsbuild`
After taking control of Gaza, Hamas established strong structures of governance (Jamal 2005; Mishal and Sela 2006; Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010; Shachar 2010; Pearlman 2011; Roy 2011).

mextsupcat
Hamas has received extensive military support (funding; arms; trainers; safe havens) from Iran via Syria and Lebanon.

frag
Fatah; Palestinian Liberation Organization; Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement); Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam).

5.26 Taiwan (TWN)

Map of Taiwan[32]

1894–1895
At the end of the Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan is transferred to Imperial Japan (Treaty of Shimonoseki).

1895
The Taiwanese proclaim the independence of the Republic of Formosa on May 23, 1895. On October 21, 1895, the Japanese occupy the capital of the Formosa Republic (Tainan).

1945
On October 25, the Japanese occupation of the island officially ends. Control of the island is transferred to the Republic of China.

1949
Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) retreats to the island of Formosa after being defeated by communists led by Mao Zedong. KMT becomes the de facto government of Taiwan and claims sovereignty over all China.

1949–1987
Martial law is declared and enforced by the KMT on the island.

[32]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

1971
Taiwan's place at the UN, including the UN Security Council, is taken by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

1979
The United States recognizes China and withdraws recognition of Taiwan.

1986
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is established on an independence platform.

1994
Taipei officially renounces its claim of being the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese people.

1996
The first competitive elections are held. Taiwan effectively moves from military to democratic rule.

2000
The DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, wins the presidency and promotes greater separation from mainland China.

2005
Beijing passes an anti-secession law that provides for the use of military force to stop Taiwan from becoming independent.

2008
The KMT regains power in the March elections.

`dfsbuild`
Taiwan displays all attributes of statehood except for universal recognition (Copper 1996; Henckaerts 1996; Beary 2011). In December 2011, Taiwan was still recognized by 22 countries. Geldenhuys (2009, 220) states that, despite the lack of formal recognition from most states, Taiwan has engaged in a wide range of statelike activities, such as "buying heavy weapons, providing development and humanitarian assistance, concluding agreements with states, and even participating in the Olympic Games."

`mextsupcat`
Taiwan has received extensive military aid from the United States.

`frag`

Kuomintang (KMT); Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); People First Party (PFP); Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU).

5.27 Karen (Kayin) State (KAR)

Map of Karen (Kayin) State[33]

1948
Burma gains independence. The colonial power, Great Britain, rejects demands for autonomy or independence from the Karen people who are concentrated in eastern Burma (about 60% of Karens are Buddhist, 30% Baptists, and 10% animist). The Burmese government exercises little control over the Karen region. The Karen organize a separate political and economic system dominated by the Karen National Union (KNU). For the next 50 years, the Karen fund their statelike structures by controlling the border trade between Burma and Thailand (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

1949, March
Anti-communist Karen National Union (KNU) launches a campaign for independence of the Karen State. Its military wing is the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Civil war engulfs the newly independent state of Burma with the Karen joining communist rebels against the government.

1949, June
The first KNU President, Saw Baw U Gyi, proclaims the independence of the Autonomous Republic of Kaw Thoo Lei, and establishes a capital at Toungoo (Clodfelter

[33]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

2008, 683; Bjorklund 2010, 25).

1962, March
In a military coup, General Ne Win, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Burma, overthrows the democratically elected regime of U Nu. The Burmese Revolutionary Council (BRC) becomes the governing body.

1963, June
BRC invites all insurgent organizations to begin peace talks.

1984, January
The Burmese forces launch a major campaign against KNU bases in the Dawna mountain range at the border with Thailand. Reports indicate that the Karen begin levying a 5% tax on the illicit trade between Burma and Thailand, most of which passes border-crossing points under their control.

1987
A KNU representative states that the organization demands autonomy, not separation (Bjorklund 2010, 37)

1992, March
Burmese forces penetrate Thai territory while chasing Karen rebels. Thailand threatens that it will retaliate to any future incursions.

1992, April
The Burmese government announces that it will stop activities against the Karen rebels.

1993, January
KNU forms a national Burmese government, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB).

1994
Karen National Liberation Army loses parts of its headquarters and capital at Manerplaw to government forces (Clodfelter 2008, 683).

1995, January
The Burmese army overruns the KNU's headquarters at Manerplaw. This is the first time Manerplaw is captured since the guerrillas began fighting for independence. KNU splinters: a group of Buddhists form a new organization, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO), and defect to the government side (Source: START). "One report suggests that the DKBO has 500 guerrillas, while the Christian-led KNU commands the remaining 3,500 (Financial Times, 01/28/95)" (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

1995, February
Burma accuses Thailand of providing safe havens to Karen rebels.

1995, March
Bo Mya steps down after more than 21 years as commander-in-chief and president of the KNU. KNU's temporary headquarters at Kanaelay are overrun by Burmese troops.

1995, May
Thai forces attack DKBA troops and protect Karen refugees.

1996, February
A KNU delegation negotiates with the government. No agreement is reached.

1997, January
DKBA forces attack Karen refugees.

1997, March
A government offensive pushes 90,000 Karen refugees at the Burma-Thailand border.

1997, August
The United States and Canada impose sanctions on Burma.

1998, April
KNU rebels attack four government and pro-government Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) bases. In the same month, a small KNU splinter group surrenders to the government.

2004, January
Talks resume between KNU and Burmese officials. KNU is estimated to have approximately 5,000 fighters (Source: START).

2004–2011
War of attrition between the Burmese troops and Karen rebels.

2012, January
KNU and the government reach a ceasefire agreement. Following the deal, KNU is allowed to keep its weapons.

2012, February
The KNU general secretary (same status as prime-minister), Naw Zipporah Sein, demands autonomy for all ethnic regions in Burma.

`dfsbuild`
The Kawthoolei state encompasses seven administrative districts, "which in turn have townships and villages. Each district is headed by a KNU District Chairman, while a KNLA Brigade Commander leads the military brigade corresponding to the district

area...Until the fall of Kawthoolei in 1995, the KNU formed a complex and workable government" (Bjorklund 2010, 41-42). After 1995, the Karen National Union has engaged in limited state-building activities in the areas under its control. The constant flow of revenues through taxation of illegal activities at the Burma-Thailand border has been a strong disincentive to erect an extensive state-building apparatus (Fong 2008; South 2008; Thawnghmung 2008; Bleming 2009).

`mextsupcat`
Thailand has allegedly provided arms and safe havens to KNU (UCDP). According to UCDP, "India supported KNU with Funding/Economic Support."

`frag`
Karen (Kayin) National Union; Karen National Liberation Army; Karen National Defense Organization/Army; Karen National United Party (since 1953); Kayan National Guard (since 1992); Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (since 1994); Karen Peace Force (KPF) - defected to the government in 1997 and was transformed into a border guard force; Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (since 2007); God's Army (from 1999 to 2001).

5.28 Kachin State (KAC)

Map of Kachin State[34]

1948
Burma gains independence. During the colonial period, the area inhabited by the Kachin never came under direct British administration and was administered separately as a frontier region. The Kachin (also known as the Jinghpaw) are concentrated in northeast Burma, China, and India, and converted from animism to Christianity (Baptism and Roman Catholicism) in the 19th century.

1961, February
The establishment of Buddhism as the official state religion further alienates the Kachin from central authorities in Rangoon/Yangon (Burma's capital until 2005). Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) is formed by Zau Seng and his brothers Zau Tu and Zau Dan (Gin 2004). Its armed wing is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

1962, March
In a military coup, General Ne Win, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Burma, overthrows the democratically elected government in Rangoon, abrogates the Union of Burma Constitution, and installs a military regime. KIO refuses to recognize the ruling junta and declares itself the legitimate government of "Kachinland." The Burmese gov-

[34]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

ernment abolishes Kachin State's semi-autonomous status (Minahan 2002, 873).

1970s
The KIA is fighting simultaneously against the Burmese government and the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB). "After a ceasefire between the KIA and the CPB in 1976, the two groups join forces against the Burmese army, and the CPB becomes a ready source of weapons and ammunition for the KIA from ChinaâĂİ (Human Rights Watch 2012).

1975
The KIO's top leaders, Zau Seng, Zau Tu, and Pung Shwe Zau Seng, are assassinated at the Thai-Burma border (Source: Lexis-Nexis).

1970s–1980s
KIO benefits from some Chinese military support. By late 1980s, however, Beijing withdraws its assistance and the "Kachins rely heavily on the opium trade to finance their war" (Minahan 2002, 875).

1989
The New Democratic Army, Kachin (NDA-K), based in northeastern Kachin state along the Sino-Burma border, is founded "by former Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) officers Zahkung Tingying and Layawk Zelum. The pro-Communist NDA-K split from the KIO due to political differences and the faction (which included 700 soldiers) sided with the regime after agreeing to a ceasefire in 1989. It operated as the regime's 'special police' and in return received an operating budget, ration supplies and 600 soldiers were paid by the state" (Source: http://mizzima.in/news/54-archives/election-center/ethnic-profiles/3752-new-democratic-army-kachin.html).

1990
Mahtu Naw, commander of the Kachin Independence Army's 4th brigade, breaks away from the KIA and forms the Kachin Defense Army (KDA).

1990, June
KIO formally recognizes the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the Burmese national elections, as the "legal choice of the people" (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

1991
The Burmese military steps up its campaign against the KIA (Human Rights Watch 2012). Kachin Defense Army signs a peace agreement under which the rebels are allowed to keep their weapons (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

1994
A ceasefire agreement is signed between KIA and the government in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State located some 1,500 kilometers away from Rangoon. The agreement

allows the KIA to retain control over significant portions of northern Burma (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8528985.stm). Other Kachin organizations denounce the agreement with the military junta. In August, KIO leader, Zau Seng, dies in a Chinese hospital following a stroke (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

1997, January
Fifteen ethnic groups from across the country, united under the banner of the National Democratic Front (NDA), meet on Karen-held territory and issue the Mae Tha Raw Hta Agreement which calls for a democratic, federal union in Burma (Minahan 2002, 874).

2001
The KIO leadership is overthrown in a bloodless coup executed by a group of young reformists (Human Rights Watch 2012). KIO Chairman Zau Mai is ousted by a reformist faction within the party, in a coup at the KIO headquarters in Laiza. Lamung Tu Jai becomes the new KIO leader (Source: Lexis-Nexis).

2002
KIO embarks on an opium eradication program.

2005
Naypyidaw becomes Burma's new capital. Laiza, a city located on the border with China, becomes KIO's makeshift capital (Source: http://mondediplo.com/2012/06/12kachin).

2006, July
Internecine fighting breaks out between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Democratic Army, Kachin (NDA-K) (Source: MAR Group Chronology).

2008
Burma's military government announces that all armed groups bound by ceasefire agreements signed with Naypyidaw would have to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the direct control of the Burmese army, as stipulated in the 2008 Constitution. The KIO rejects the proposal, stating that it would not morph itself into a BGF without a comprehensive political solution to the underlying causes of ethnic tension and conflict (Human Rights Watch 2012).

2010, November
National elections are held. "The government bars the Kachin from registering political parties or independent candidates, removes pro-KIO candidates from the ballots, and effectively bars from voting tens of thousands of Kachin in KIO-controlled areas" (Human Rights Watch 2012). The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) rejects again the proposal from Burma's military government to become a border guard force (Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kachin.htm). In an interview with the BBC, KIA's Chief of Staff, Major General Gam Shawng states: "We will not do that [become a state-sanctioned border force], or disarm, until they have given us a place in a federal union and ethnic rights as was agreed in 1947" (Source:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8528985.stm).

2011, June
The Burmese government unilaterally breaks the 1994 ceasefire agreement with the KIA by attacking rebel positions around Laiza.

2012
By the end of the year, the Burmese government had reached ceasefire agreements with most insurgent groups except for KIA. "Although President Thein Sein's reformist government had repeatedly declared to establish long-lasting peace in Kachin State, its military has recently sent large numbers of troops into Kachin Independence Army (KIA) controlled areas in northern Shan state and Kachin state" (Source:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kachin.htm).

2012, December
The Burmese government launches a major offensive ("Operation Thunderbolt") against the KIA with the aim of taking control of KIA's headquarters around Laiza (CRS 2013).

2013, May
KIO signs a tentative peace agreement with the government (ICG 2013).

`dfsbuild`
Since 1961, the KIO "has been running its own independent quasi-state, exercising truly international politics of friendly foreign relations, business, and trade with China..In its administered territories, the KIO enjoys the status of de facto government, runs its own schools, hospitals, prisons and social projects, and uses a separate currency (the Chinese yuan)" (Berg and Van Houtum 2003, 88).

Since the 1994 ceasefire, the "KIO has been in control of about 1/5 of the Kachin state. In the rebel-controlled area, the Kachin army powers the electric grid and runs hospitals while soldiers in green uniforms adorned with the Kachin flag monitor both the border with China and the frontier with government-controlled Myanmar" (Source: Star Tribune, April 20, 2010). The Kachin Independence Organization has a full civilian government based in Laiza and provides services to most of Kachin State. "Here are a few examples of the KIO's services and level of development: they run native language schools, teacher training colleges, immigration for their borders, civilian police, a TV station, newspapers, libraries, hospitals, a nurse training collage, a sustainable hydro power station and more government departments than one can keep track of" (Source: http://www.freekachin.org/about/the-kiokia/).

According to Human Rights Watch (2012), "the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) today is Burma's second largest non-state ethnic armed group. Its political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), maintains a civilian administration that governs considerable swathes of territory, acting as a parallel state with departments of health, edu-

cation, justice, and relief and development, among other civic programs."

The KIO maintains an extralegal bureaucracy in Kachin State and has exclusive control over pockets of territory along the Chinese border. Within this territory, the KIO maintains a police department, fire brigade, educational system, immigration department and other institutions of self-government. The KIO headquarters are on a hillside overlooking the border town of Laiza. Previous headquarters were located at a higher elevation base called Pajau. The KIO collects taxes at border crossings with China and engages in various business deals throughout Kachin State, mostly related to the exploitation of natural resources such as jade, timber and gold.

The KIA has 4 brigades stationed in the Kachin State in bases close to the Chinese border, with an additional KIA brigade in northern Shan State and one mobile brigade. The KIA also maintains a military academy and officer training school near the capital of Laiza. Prior to the 1994 ceasefire, the KIA was predominantly a low-tech guerilla force, but peace has provided the opportunity to establish a military academy. The KIA is fully funded by the KIO, which raises revenue through taxes (in their area) and trade in natural resources such as jade, timber and gold (Smith 1991; Lintner 1997).

"The KIA and its civilian organization have been allowed to control a large swathe of northern Burma as part of a ceasefire agreement with the country's ruling generals. They provide power, roads and schools funded by taxes on the brisk trade from China as well as the jade and gold mines and teak" (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8528985.stm).

Since 1961, the KIA has retained effective control of the border crossing with China and has imposed levies and taxes on goods and people in transit. Most of the funding comes from the lucrative trade in jade, gold, timber, and narcotics with China. The KIA retains effective control of large portions of the Kachin state, and has operational health, education and other systems (Human Rights Watch 2012).

"The Kachin rebels depend on Chinese imports to survive. Since the fighting restarted [in 2011] almost everything — bank transfers, rice, cars, medicine — comes from China. For a 5-yuan fee, the KIA immigration office issues daily visas to Chinese citizens. The currency in Laiza is the Chinese yuan; Burmese kyat can be exchanged in several stores at the border. The KIO runs casinos in Laiza and nearby Mai Ja Yang, with hotel accommodation for 150 people, both for Chinese gamblers and their surrogates, who work through internet videophone. Medicine is smuggled in from China. Laiza High School is one of four high schools in KIO-controlled territory" (Source: http://mondediplo.com/2012/06/12kachin).

"The KIA is financed largely by taxes and illicit cross-border trade in products ranging from dry goods to teak, highlighting its awkward relationship with China, its lifeline to the world. In Laiza, the Chinese yuan is the currency, and Chinese mobile phone networks keep locals connected. China hosts Kachin university students, and when soldiers

are seriously injured, lax border controls allow them to be taken to better hospitals for treatment. Even basic necessities such as medicine and rice are smuggled into Kachin territory. This dependence is tempered by the fact that Chinese-funded infrastructure projects are at the crux of the conflict in Kachin state" (The Washington Post, June 30, 2012).

`mextsupcat`
Some Chinese support until 1980 (Minahan 2002, 874; Owen 2005, 501). Limited support from separatists in Nagaland (India) in the 1980s (Verma 2008, 26).

`frag`
Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A); New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) since 1968; Kachin Defense Army (KDA) since 1990; Kachin National Organization (KNO) since 1999.

5.29 Tamil Eelam (TTE)

Map of Tamil Eelam[35]



1948
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) gains independence. The Buddhist Sinhalese constitute about 75% of the population, and the Hindu Tamils about 20%. Roughly half of the Tamil minority is estimated to live outside of Tamil Eelam (the northern and eastern part of the island; the north has the greatest concentration of ethnic Tamils). Tamils were favored by the colonial power (Great Britain), which fully incorporated them into the colonial bureaucracy. At independence, Tamils made up 40% of the armed forces and 30% of civil servants. After independence, Sri Lanka adopted a Westminster parliamentary system that favored the Sinhalese and offered few minority protections.

1950s–1970s
Many Tamils who had been brought from southern India for labor prior to independence are denied citizenship rights. As a consequence about 50% of these Indian Tamils were repatriated by the end of the 1970s.

1948–1956

[35]Source: http://www.sangam.org.

Sri Lankan politics is dominated by Sinhalese UNP (United National Party).

1956–1970s
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) accedes to power and pursues a nationalist agenda. Discriminatory policies against Tamils (in civil service, education, armed forces) are instituted. By the early 1970s, the Tamil community is virtually excluded from the civil service, academic, and military sectors.

1972
A newly passed constitution declares Sinhala the official language. The country name ("Ceylon") is replaced with "Sri Lanka" ("resplendent land" in Sanskrit). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is established by Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Although Tamils are predominantly Hindu, LTTE has a disproportionate number of Christian Tamils in its ranks.

1976
The Tamil United Front (TUF) demands an independent, secular, and socialist state of Tamil Eelam. It also relables itself the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).

1977
Sri Lanka becomes the first South Asian country to liberalize its economy. In the July elections, TULF wins eighteen seats in the legislature, including all fourteen seats contested in the Jaffna Peninsula.

1980
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberration Front (EPRLF), an LTTE splinter group, is established (Samarasinghe and Samarasinghe 1998, 60).

1983
Fighting begins between the LTTE and government forces. In July, over 2,000 Tamils are killed. In October 1983, all 16 TULF legislators renounce their seats in the Sri Lankan Parliament. LTTE, led by Vellupilai Prabhakharan, emerges as the dominant Tamil paramilitary group and gets extensive support from India.

1985
TULF proposes an autonomous Tamil state.

1987
India ceases to support LTTE. Following the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accords, a 80,000-strong Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) is deployed to the region with the goal of disarming the LTTE.

1990
IPKF withdraws from Sri Lanka. A wide-ranging economic (including basic needs and medicinal goods) embargo is imposed on Tamil Eelam. LTTE formally establishes a po-

lice force (as well as a police academy) with stations scattered around the entire territory. Over time, the police force comes to enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy than the military branch of LTTE.

1991, May
An LTTE suicide bomber assassinates Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.

1992
A system of courts is put in place throughout Tamil-held territory.

1993, May
An LTTE suicide bomber assassinates Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.

1995–2002
Fighting between LTTE and Colombo intensifies.

2002
A ceasefire is signed between LTTE and Colombo under Norwegian mediation. The agreement establishes the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) composed of a small number of monitors from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland (with offices in Colombo and Kilinochchi–LTTE's political and administrative headquarters).

2003, October
LTTE proposes an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the north and east of Sri Lanka lasting about 5 years and dominated by LTTE appointees. Colombo rejects this proposal charging that the deal would effectively create a confederation.

2004, December
Indian Ocean tsunami hits the island leaving behind unprecedented devastation. LTTE and Colombo cooperate in the reconstruction efforts.

2005, November
Mahinda Rajapakse is elected president of Sri Lanka (with support from radical Sinhalese and Buddhist monks). Tamils boycott the election. Before the ballot, Rajapakse flatly rejects any proposal for a federation where Tamils would enjoy substantial autonomy.

2006
Fighting between LTTE and governmental forces escalates. Pro-government Tamil paramilitaries indiscriminately target LTTE supporters.

2009, January
Government renews its offensive against LTTE. LTTE top leaders are killed, and the Sri Lankan military reasserts control over the territory in May.

2009, August
The new LTTE leader, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, is arrested.

`dfsbuild`
Mampilly (2011, 5) states that the LTTE "was able to develop a comprehensive governance system that met most civilian needs and was largely embraced by the civilian population. The system had a capable police force and a functional and regularized judiciary." Yet, "education and health care [w]ere provided by the Sri Lankan government" (Mampilly 2011, 26) in an arrangement resembling a symbiotic relationship between the de facto state and the parent vis-à-vis state-building in the latter. Overall, "life in Tiger territory was impressively stable, with a clear political authority responsible for providing extensive public goods" (Mampilly 2011, 94). Mampilly (2011, 108–23) provides a thorough description of the high degree of state-building in Tamil Eelam. He concludes (Mampilly 2011, 215) that, "by claiming a mandate to represent the Tamil people and framing its struggle in a secessionist manner, the insurgency went to great lengths to mimic the behavior and appearance of a traditional nation-state."

Beary (2011, 239) stresses that "at the height of their power in the 1980s and 1990s, the Tigers had their own broadcasting authority, judiciary, police, navy, air force, banking system, and customs authority."

According to (Bose 2007, 6), Tamil Eelam had "an estimated twenty thousand fighters and [ran] its own administration, police service, judicial service, and other protogovernmental institutions in substantial parts of the north and east that [were] under its military control." In the early 1990s, LTTE began developing a navy, the Sea Tigers (Bose 2007, 35).

Schlichte (2010, 96) mentions that LTTE-governed areas became functionally equivalent to a state (see also Rotberg 1999). "In 1990, seven years after the war began, the LTTE controlled its own TV-station, an ammunition plant, the operation of its farms, taxes on tobacco and alcohol consumption in the territory it controlled, and it sent students abroad who would later serve the armed group. Since the late 1990s, the group has also maintained an air force and a commercial aviation fleet" (Schlichte 2010, 132).

Kriesberg (2009, 259) states that the LTTE "collected money from traders, imposed taxes on household goods, and ran a television station. After the Indian peacekeepers left in 1990, the LTTE put its own police force and judicial system in place, and made its tax regime more effective. The Tigers also established a visa system to monitor and regulate the flow of people to and from LTTE areas." However, "Sri Lankan government departments, for instance those responsible for agriculture, education and health, have been allowed to operate in parallel with the LTTE administration, under the conditions that they follow LTTE instructions...The LTTE has set up shadow institutions, for instance a Department for Education, which has engaged in advocacy against the government neglect of Tamil areas."

The withdrawal of Indian peacekeepers was a real boon to the Tigers who "proceeded to take over whatever infrastructure the Indians had constructedâĂęThe LTTE now had a full-fledged, ready-made sanctuary; they began consolidating control over that sanctuary and undertook the first steps towards creating their embryonic state within a state" (Hashim 2013, 98). Between 1990 and 1995, the Tigers set up "nearly all the structures essential to effective governance" (Hastings 2010, 207) and crossed the critical threshold from insurgents to state-builders. It was during this period that Tamil Eelam began to be adorned with many accoutrements of statehood.

After the LTTE consolidated territorial control after 1995, the state building project gained significant momentum. Between 1995 and 2006, "life in Tiger territory was impressively stable, with a clear political authority responsible for providing extensive public goods" (Mampilly 2011, 94). To outside observers, traveling from government-controlled to LTTE-controlled areas resembled "a border crossing between two nation-states, with well guarded border control posts where travelers [were] required to show identity cards, goods [were] inspected and customs fees [were] collected. Within the areas they control[ed], LTTE [ran] a de facto state administration, which include[d] revenue collection, police and judiciary as well as public services and economic development initiatives" (Stokke 2005, 1022).

Hashim (2013, 118) identifies two major weaknesses in " LTTE's state-building enterprise. First, despite its significant levels of funding, courtesy of the large Tamil diaspora, the LTTE spent very little on actually building the infrastructures of an independent state. Second, due to the LTTE's minimal expenditure on normal state functions such as salaries and social welfare, it was actually the Sri Lankan government that was paying the salaries of public officials in the Tamil-held areas and permitting NGOs to provide aid and funds to the north and east." It is no surprise, then, that when the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement collapsed and fighting resumed in 2006, LTTE's governance edifice began to crumble. Carefully-planned government action targeting the Tigers' fundraising and arms procurement networks quickly sapped into the viability of their state building enterprise. By 2007, the LTTE "civilian governance declined significantly...as the organization devoted most of the resources to the military wing" (Mampilly 2011, 127).

`mextsupcat`
LTTE "received significant financial and material support from India and the state government of Tamil Nadu in India's south, including military training in India and shipments of small arms such as grenades, mortars, land mines, and other conventional weapons. New Delhi viewed LTTE as a potential tool in its pursuit of hegemony in the South Asian region and used the insurgency to punish Sri Lanka for turning away from the Non-Aligned Movement that India continued to spearhead until the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu government provided considerable resources to the insurgents in response to populist mobilization in the state calling for protection of ethnic Tamil kin living across the Palk Strait in Sri Lanka. The support from the Tamil

Nadu government was extensive and included the establishment of camps for the training of rebel cadres, with the Indian government providing both the armaments and the expertise to use them." However, "Indian support for the Tigers came to an end in 1987" (Mampilly 2011, 104-105).

"From September 1983, India's federal government authorized a clandestine program of training and arming the thousands of angry young men who swelled the ranks of Tamil guerilla groups. This decision was partly motivated by an aspiring regional hegemon's desire to flex its muscles in its neighborhood, and partly was a response to the outrage expressed by south India's own Tamil population [at] the suffering of their cousins in Sri Lanka" (Bose 2007, 30).

`frag`
Tamil Congress (TC); Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF); Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF); People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE); Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO); Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF); Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS); Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP); People's Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT); Tamil National Alliance (TNA); the Rafik Group (the Karuna Group); Ceylon Workers Congress; All Ceylon Tamil Congress.

5.30 Mindanao (MIN)

Map of Mindanao[36]

1898
At the end of the Spanish-American War, the Philippines is annexed by the United States. The majority of the population is Catholic with the exception of Mindanao which is predominantly Muslim.

1935
The Commonwealth of the Philippines is established. Moros (Muslims concentrated in Mindanao and Sulu archipelagos) demand to remain under American administration.

1941

[36]Source: University of Texas Libraries.

Japan occupies the Philippines.

1946, July
The Philippines gains independence. Nationalist leaders in Manila (capital of the Philippines) encourage the influx of Christian settlers to Mindanao (Means 2009, 197).

1968
The Muslim (later renamed Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) is formed. MIM rebels receive training in Malaysia (Means 2009, 198).

1972
Communal violence leads to the imposition of martial law in Mindanao. MIM is dissolved and replaced by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Existing contacts in the Middle East allow MNLF to obtain substantial foreign support for its cause (Schlichte 2009, 39).

1973
By the end of 1973, the military wing of MNLF, the Bangsamoro Army (BMA), controls large parts of Mindanao, including 10 towns and Jolo, the capital of Sulu (Means 2009, 198).

1975
Tripoli Agreement is reached under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The agreement provides for the establishment of an autonomous Muslim region comprising thirteen geographic areas in southern Philippines (Sources: MAR Group Chronology; Means 2009, 199).

1977
Two Moro factions emerge: Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and MNLF-RG (Reformist Group). MNLF supports autonomy for Mindanao while MILF and MNLF-RG aim for full independence for a Mindanao Islamic Republic based on sharia law. MILF's main base is at Camp Abubakar As-Siddik in the province of Maguindanao and its military wing is the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF).

1980
Thousands of MNLF fighters accept government's offer of amnesty and enroll into the national army.

1986
In Manila, Marcos' autocratic regime is overthrown following massive peaceful protests. Democratic elections are held. Corazon Aquino become president of the first female president of the Philippines.

1987
Jeddah Accord is signed between MNLF and an emissary of Philippines president Cora-

zon Aquino. The accord provides for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). MILF and MNLF-RG refuse to participate in the talks and vow to continue their fight for independence.

1989, August
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is created but is staffed with "compliant Muslims who were given limited powers" (Means 2009, 199).

1980–1990
As a result of Catholic Filipino migration, Moros become a concentrated minority in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.

1991
Another MNLF splinter group appears: Abu Sayyaf ("Bearer of the Sword") Group, an extremist organization that fights for an independent, Muslim-ruled Mindanao and Sulu archipelago. ASG mostly operates in the southern Philippines, specifically in the Sulu Archipelago and the easternmost island of Mindanao (Sources: http://www.cfr.org/philippines/abu-sayyaf-group-philippines-islamist-separatists/p9235; http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/asg.html).

1993
Manila (capital of the Philippines) and MNLF engage in a new round of negotiations.

1996, September
An agreement is signed between Manila and MNLF. The agreement creates a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) managed by the MNLF. The leader of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, becames the head of the SPCPD and the governor of the ARMM. MILF and Abu Sayyaf denounce the agreement and continue to push for the creation of an Islamic state.

2000
More splintering within MNLF occurs with one faction supporting former MNLF leader Nur Misuari. In the same year, government soldiers dismantle several MILF training camps. "The all-out government offensives resulted in the suspension of the peace process, and the shift in the MILF's armed struggle from conventional to guerilla warfare" (USIP 2005, 5).

2003
Government troops launch an offensive to take control of MILF's headquarters in Buliok. The peace talks are suspended (USIP 2005).

2000–2011
Sporadic fighting occurs between Manila, MILF and ASG. Rebels retain control of swathes of territory in central Mindanao.

2012, October
MILF and Manila reach a power-sharing agreement that would set up an autonomous region (Bangsamoro) which will replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, a MILF faction, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), has vowed to continue fighting despite the peace deal. According to an International Crisis Group report (ICG 2012, 16), "a Central Mindanao-based splinter group was a thorn in the MILF's side throughout the negotiations and will remain for some time."

`dfsbuild`
Moro rebels rebels engaged in limited state-building activities in areas they controlled (Islam 1998; McKenna 1999). In the late 2000s, MILF controlled "the central regions of Mindanao in the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sud, North Cotabato, and Maguindanao" (Means 2009, 202).

Means (2009, 201-202) notes that the Moro regions controlled by MILF included "vast tracts of remote jungle forests, swamp bog lands, and imposing volcanic mountains on the large island of Mindanao. The guerilla fighters within this region were far more confident of their capacity to resist and survive the anti-insurgency operations of the Philippine army. The MNLF guerilla forces on the Sulu Archipelago...were far more exposed to anti-insurgency operations and were thus more eager to accept a peace treaty that was a compromise, giving partial rewards and benefits rather than complete independence."

`mextsupcat`
Moro rebels have received military aid from Libya and Malaysia (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group rebels have allegedly received training in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 91). Abu Sayyaf leaders were intensively involved in the 1980s Afghan war. It is also alleged that "Jemaah Islamiya supported MILF with access to military or intelligence infrastructure, training, and expertise" (Source: UCDP). Libya and Iran are believed to have supported MNLF with funding/economic support (Source: UCDP).

`frag`
Muslim/Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); Abu Sayyaf; MNLF-Nur Misuari faction.

5.31 Aceh (ACE)

Map of Aceh[37]

1945, August
Indonesia becomes independent. Aceh is incorporated into the Indonesian province of North Sumatra. Prior to the Dutch (1873) and Japanese (1942) colonial occupations, Aceh had been an independent sultanate. In the 19th century, Aceh was an "internationally recognized independent state as exemplified by the 1819 treaty between the sultan of Aceh and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty." The Acehnese are a nation of Malay, Indian, and Arabic ancestry (Minahan 2002, 26). After Indonesia became a state, Indonesian president Suharno reneged on his promise to give Aceh special status in recognition of its contribution to the struggle for Indonesian independence (Schulze 2004).

1950
Acehnese rebels declare the province independent from Jakarta (Minahan 2002, 27).

1953–1962
The Aceh rebellion against Indonesian rule intensifies. In 1959, Aceh is granted "special region" status with very limited autonomy (customary law, religious and educational affairs).

1967, March
Suharto deposes Indonesian president Sukarno and installs an autocratic regime which will last until 1998.

1968
Suharto revokes Aceh's "special region" status (Collier and Sambanis 2005, 39).

1976
Hasan di Tiro establishes Gerakan Aceh Merdeka-GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and issues a declaration of independence for "Acheh-Sumatra" (Collier and Sambanis 2005,

[37]Source: Google Maps.

39). At its inception, GAM fights for the restoration of the Islamic Aceh Sultanate, and strongly opposes foreign exploitation of Aceh's abundant natural resources.

1976–1979
The first GAM cabinet (11 ministries) is set up. In 1979, the cabinet ceases to function primarily because many GAM ministers are killed or arrested by Indonesian forces. At the beginning, GAM exerts patchy territorial control (Collier and Sambanis 2005, 41).

1979
GAM leaders are forced into exile in Stockholm, Sweden. First major split within GAM occurs as Husaini Hasan establishes Majelis Pemerintahan GAM (MP-GAM). MP-GAM sees itself as more Islamic than semi-secular GAM (Schulze 2004, 22).

1986–1989
GAM membership in Aceh swells to unprecedented levels due to three main factors: repressive activities (especially indiscriminate violence) conducted by Indonesian troops; Libya's decision to provide paramilitary training to GAM rebels; popular discontent with the expropriation of Acehnese natural resources.

1991
Due to the reprisal campaign conducted by the Indonesian military, GAM's territorial control is restricted to a few pocket areas in the northwest part of the province.

1993, January
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is formed. JI is an Indonesia-based terrorist organization whose main goal is the establishment of an Islamic state comprising southern Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and southern Philippines.

1998, May
Confronted with widespread popular unrest (precipitated by the Asian financial crisis), the Indonesian president Suharto steps down. B.J. Habibie becomes interim president.

1998, August
Indonesian army forces withdraw from Aceh. A strong security and police force remains on the island.

1999, October
A. Wahid is elected president of Indonesia. Most Acehnese boycott the election.

1999, November
Hundreds of thousands of Acehnese demonstrate in Banda Aceh calling for a referendum on the region's independence (similar to the one offered to East Timor).

2001
GAM controls about 80% of villages in Aceh.

2001, July
The Indonesian president Wahid is impeached by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). MPR appoints M. Sukarnoputri as president (she becomes Indonesia's first female president).

2001, August
Aceh is granted special autonomy and the right to control 70% of its oil and gas revenues.

2002, July
Stavanger (Norway) Declaration is issued. GAM formally articulates the movement's vision of an independent Aceh as a democracy rather than as a return to the 19th century Islamic sultanate. GAM's leadership in Sweden becomes the State of Aceh government-in-exile (Schultze 2004, 12).

2002
Another GAM splinter group called the Front Mujahidin Islam Aceh (FMIA) is formed. Its main goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in Aceh. Republik Islam Aceh (RIA) is also set up; its structures overlap with FMIA.

2003
GAM territorial control and membership reaches the highest level since 1976. Differences in exiled leaders' preferences about the final status of the province come to light (Schulze 2004, 20). It is "generally believed that the Acehnese exiled leadership and diaspora community have tended to advance inflexible positions while their compatriots on the ground are more willing to enter into messy compromises" (Schulze 2004, 21).

2003, May
Jakarta imposes martial law in Aceh.

2004, October
S.B. Yudhoyono is elected president of Indonesia.

2005, August
A Memorandum of Understanding is signed between Jakarta and GAM. According to the agreement, GAM demobilizes (Art. 4.2), amnesty is offered to former rebels (Art. 3.1.1), the province is allocated 70% of oil and gas revenues (Art 1.3.4), and Jakarta retains authority over "foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion" (Art. 1.1.2). Importantly, the central government is allowed to maintain 14,700 soldiers and 9,100 police officers (Art. 4.7) with limited movement across the province. Finally, the deal also establishes the Aceh Monitoring Mission with observers from ASEAN and the EU (Art. 5.1).

2006
GAM disbands its military wing and formally renounces violence.

2006, August
The Indonesian parliament passes the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) in accordance with the autonomy stipulations of the Memorandum of Understanding (Source: MAR Group Chronology). Provincial elections are also held. Former GAM leader, Irwandi Yusuf, is elected governor of Aceh.

2007
GAM fully demobilizes and becomes a political party, Partai Aceh (Von Hehn 2011, 30-32).

2012, April
Provincial elections are held. Free Aceh Movement activist Zaini Abdullah defeats incumbent governor Irwandi Yusuf.

2013, March
The Aceh legislature adopts a regulation making GAM's old banner the provincial flag (ICG 2013).

`dfsbuild`
Starting with the late 1990s, Aceh insurgents "have been able to increase their active membership fivefold, expand from their traditional stronghold areas into the rest of Aceh, and successfully control between 70 and 80 percent of the province including local government through their shadow civil service structure. GAM has grown from a small, armed organization with an intellectual vanguard into a popular resistance movement" (Schulze 2004, viii).

The Acehnese Sweden-based government-in-exile has been effective at giving orders to area commanders based in Aceh about the conduct of military operations and the organization of local affairs (Collier and Sambanis 2005b, 35-58).

Schulze (2004, 24-25) states that "GAM has three main sources of revenue: taxation; foreign donations [mainly from the diaspora in Malaysia and Western Europe]; crime, drugs, kidnapping...and piracy in the Malacca Straits." With respect to the first source, GAM levies an Aceh state tax (pajak nanggroe) on all elements of society (CRS 2002). Allegedly, Gam also demanded "protection funds from civil servants and government employees. Those who refused to pay, especially businessmen, oil executives, and local legislators with ties to the central government, were subject to kidnapping and ransoming. GAM was also involved in narcotics trafficking" (Phillips 2009, 147).

In June 2001, observers estimated that about 80% of Aceh's villages were under GAM's direct control or influence (Bertrand 2004; ICG 2005; Davies 2006).

mextsupcat

According to Rabasa and Haseman (2002, 100) and Schultze (2004, 14; 30-32), hundreds of GAM guerrillas trained in Libya after 1986. In the early 1990s "a significant number of GAM members including military commanders found safe haven in neighboring Malaysia where GAM continued to exist as an insurgent movement among the refugees and supported by the Acehnese diaspora" (Schulze 2004, 5). GAM weapons were mainly procured through the illegal trade in Cambodia and Thailand and from corrupt Indonesian officers. From 1991 to 1998, GAM moved its operational command to Malaysia. Overall, GAM has been very successful in creating transnational networks of weapons (Hastings 2010).

frag

Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - AGAM (Forces of the Free Aceh Movement; renamed TNA in July 2002); Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM (Free Aceh Movement); Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Majles Pemerintahan - MP-GAM (Free Aceh Movement Government Council, GAM splinter group based in Europe and Malaysia with limited support base in Aceh); Front Mujahideen Islam Aceh, FMIA (Phillips 2009, 139-151).

5.32 East Timor (ETR)

Map of East Timor (Timor Leste)[38]



1945, August
Indonesia (including West Timor) gains independence from the Dutch. East Timor remains a Portuguese colony. The East Timorese are devout Roman Catholics and speak Tatum, a West Indonesian language with pronounced Portuguese influences (Minahan 2002, 551).

1951
Portugal upgrades East Timor to the status of "overseas territory." Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, economic development accelerates such that the East Timorese enjoy a higher living standard than the Indonesian West Timorese.

1974
Following a coup d'état in Lisbon, Portugal begins the decolonization process. Three main organizations emerge in East Timor: the Democratic Union of the Timorese (UDT) which advocates a gradual transition to statehood; the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) which demands independence for the territory; and the Association for the Integration of East Timor into Indonesia (APODETI) which favors integration into Indonesia.

[38]Source: United Nations.

1975, July
Local elections are held and FRETILIN wins about 55% of the votes. Violence ensues between pro-integration and pro-independence activists.

1975, September
UDT withdraws to West Timor and leaves East Timor in the hands of FRETILIN. FALINTIL (The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) becomes FRETILIN's armed wing.

1975, November
FRETILIN declares the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor with the capital at Dili. Francisco Xavier do Amaral is appointed president.

1975, December
Indonesia invades East Timor with about 20,000 troops. Over 50,000 East Timorese die in the fighting. Despite the large-scale operation, Indonesian forces control only a few towns. UN condemns the occupation, calls on Jakarta to withdraw its troops, and continues to recognize East Timor as a Portuguese territory. FRETILIN withdraws to the mountains and establishes its base of operations around Maubisse (Clodfelter 2008, 691).

1976, July
The Indonesian parliament ratifies the annexation of East Timor as the country's 27th province, the Timor Timur province (Gunn 2010). Declassified documents indicate that the Ford-Nixon administration approved Indonesia's annexation of East Timor (Minahan 2002, 554).

1977, October
Nicolau Lobato becomes FRETILIN's new leader. The previous rebel leader, Xavier do Amaral, is accused of cooperating with Jakarta and, a year later, surrenders to Indonesian authorities.

1978, December
The FRETILIN leader, Nicolau Lobato, is killed by Indonesian forces.

1979
José Xanana Gusmão becomes the new FRETILIN leader.

1981, March
Gusmão becomes the chair of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), a new organization that coordinates the anti-Indonesian resistance.

1983, September
Indonesia launches another large-scale attack against the East Timorese rebels.

1985, August

Australia recognizes de jure Indonesian sovereignty over the region.

1987, June
Gusmão resigns as leader of FRETILIN and forms the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).

1988
The Clandestine Front, an offshoot of FALINTIL, organizes several nonviolent campaigns "inside East Timor, in Indonesia, and internationally. These [include] protests timed to the visits of diplomats and dignitaries, sit-ins inside foreign embassies, and international solidarity efforts" (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 3).

1989, October
Pope John Paul II visits East Timor. Large pro-independence demonstrations break out.

1991, October
Dili/Santa Cruz cemetery massacre: hundreds of East Timorese students are killed by Indonesian forces while protesting peacefully.

1992, March
Gusmão is captured by Indonesian troops. Mau Hunu becomes the new leader of the resistance movement.

1993
Gusmão is sentenced to life in prison. Indonesian military captures Mau Hunu as well. Nino Konis Santana becomes the new leader of the resistance movement. FRETILIN rejects an Indonesian proposal for autonomy to East Timor within 10 years.

1995
Gusmão's sentence is reduced to 20 years.

1996, December
Exiled CNRM spokesman José Ramos-Horta and Timor Leste Bishop Belo are jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

1998, April
The CNRM becomes the CNRT, the Timorese National Resistance Council. UDT joins FRETILIN in the new organization.

1998, May
Confronted with widespread popular unrest (precipitated by the Asian financial crisis), the Indonesian president Suharto resigns. B.J. Habibie, the interim president, grants "special status" to East Timor.

1998, October

Faced with widespread pro-independence demonstrations, the Indonesian military boosts its presence in the territory. The UN calls for the deployment of international peacekeepers. Australian diplomats at the UN argue against international intervention (Gunn 2010).

1999, January
Australia reverses its policy vis-à-vis East Timor: Canberra withdraws recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the region, calls for a referendum on the province's final status, and supports the deployment of UN forces.

1999, June
The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) is established. Clashes erupt between pro-Jakarta militias and pro-independence militias.

1999, August
In a referendum, 78.5% of East Timorese vote in favor of independence. After the results are published, Indonesian troops and pro-Jakarta militias engage in widespread attacks against East Timorese civilians. Following the atrocities, the US suspends all formal military cooperation with Jakarta and threatens economic sanctions.

1999, September
Following the resumption of large-scale violence, the UN Security Council authorizes the deployment of a multinational force (INTERFET) in East Timor. Australia is the main coordinator of the peacekeeping effort. East Timor is now under international administration (Minahan 2002, 553).

1999, October
East Timorese resistance leader Gusmão is released from prison and returns to Dili. The Indonesian assembly votes to allow East Timor to secede. In the same month, the last Indonesian troops leave the region.

2001, February
FALINTIL is dissolved and is replaced with the East Timorese Defense Forces. CNRT also dissolves to make way for political parties to compete in upcoming elections.

2001, August
FRETILIN wins constituent assembly elections.

2002, January
Gusmão defeats the former FRETILIN leader, Xavier do Amaral, in presidential elections.

2002, May
East Timor gains independence within the boundaries of the former Portuguese colony of Timor Leste.

`dfsbuild`
FRETILIN controlled pockets of territory outsie the main cities and engaged in rudimentary civil administration (Minahan 2002; Molnar 2009; Gunn 2010; Leach 2010).

`mextsupcat`
After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, FRETILIN did not benfit from external support, but gained access to weapons depots. After the Indonesian invasion, FRETILIN procured most of its arms through the regional illegal trade in armament and munitions.

`frag`
Association for the Integration of East Timor into Indonesia (APODETI); Democratic Union of the Timorese (UDT); Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN; armed wing: FALINTIL); Socialist Association of Timor (ASDT); Kota; Trabalhista; National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM); National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT); East Timor People's Front; United Front for East Timor Autonomy; Halintar; National Resistance of East Timor Students (RENETIL); Aitarak militia; Besi Merah Putih.

5.33 Bougainville (BGV)

Map of Bougainville[39]



Map No. 4089 UNITED NATIONS
March 1999

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

1945
Australia controls Bougainville under a UN trusteeship mandate that includes the rest of Papua New Guinea.

1975, September 1
Bougainville declares independence under the name of "Republic of the North Solomons." 95% of Bougainvilleans are Melanesian Christians who speak a pidgin form of English, Tok Pisin.

1975, September 16
Papua New Guinea becomes independent.

1976, August
An agreement for regional autonomy is signed between Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea capital) and Arawa (Bougainville capital).

1980s
Excessive mining and environmental degradation conducted by the Australian Rio Tinto company at the Panguna copper mine sparks local resentment. Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) militants attack the mine in December 1988. The mine is shut down five

[39]Source: United Nations.

months later. BRA demands $10 billion in compensation for the environmental damage and loss of local revenues.

1989
The Papua New Guinea government suspends regional autonomy for Bougainville.

1990, March
Papua New Guinea military forces withdraw completely from the island.

1990, May
The region proclaims independence again as the Republic of Bougainville ("Meekamui").

1990–1998
A protracted jungle war breaks out and leads to about 20,000 casualties.

1998, January
The Lincoln University (New Zealand) Agreement is signed according to which the island is reincorporated into the parent state. In the same year, a small UN contingent arrives on the island.

2001
The Bougainville Peace Agreement is signed. The accord grants wide-ranging autonomy rights to the region (Bougainville Government and Bougainville Constitution) and provides for a referendum to be held on the future status of the territory. The referendum is to be organized within 10 to 15 years after the election of an autonomous Bougainville Government. "Interestingly, the holding of the referendum is conditional on a holding of the ceasefire and the disarmament of the armed formations. Bougainville must also demonstrate its capacity to deliver good governance before a referendum can be held" (Weller 2005, 25).

`dfsbuild`
The BRA engaged in limited statebuilding activities (Premdas 2004; Braithwaite et al. 2010; Beary 2011).

`mextsupcat`
The Solomon Islands provided small arms and safe havens to BRA (Source: UCDP). However, like Somaliland, Bougainville is an example of de facto state that managed to survive "despite an almost complete lack of external support. [It] did so due to the extreme resourcefulness of its inhabitants: the island's rivers were used to generate electricity, coconut oil was turned into fuel, weapons were homemade or taken over from the Papua New Guinea army, and the rich soil was successfully utilized to provide basic food" (Caspersen 2012, 74).

`frag`
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA); small, BRA-splinter faction, the Meekamui Defense Force (MDF), formed after 1998.

5.34 Anjouan (ANJ)

Map of Anjouan[40]

1975
Comoros (comprising of 3 main islands, Grand Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan) declares independence from France. A fourth island close to the archipelago, Mayotte, remains under French administration. Despite French opposition, the UN recognizes Comoran claims to Mayotte.

1997, August
Anjouan (along with Moheli) declares independence, and asks to be reintegrated into France. Ibrahim Abdallah emerges as the leader of the Anjouani rebel movement. Local government offices are seized by the secessionists. The island's official designation is changed to its traditional name, Nzwani.

1997, September
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), precursor to the African Union (AU), attempts to settle the dispute peacefully. Moroni (capital of the Comoros) launches an invasion on September 3rd, but governmental forces encounter fierce resistance and are expelled from the island on September 5. Following the military defeat, Moroni imposes economic sanctions on the island.

[40]Source: United Nations.

1997, October
The population of Anjouan overwhelmingly supports independence in a popular referendum (roughly 98% approve it). Results are rejected by both Moroni and OAU. Unlike Mohelis, Anjouanis reject an offer from OAU to host an OAU observer mission.

1998, February
Divisions begin to emerge within the Anjouani independence movement.

1998, April
Anjouani leaders propose the formation of a loose confederation, the Union of Comoros States. Moroni flatly rejects the proposal.

1999, August
Ibrahim Abdallah is replaced by Said Abeid as the leader of the Anjouani self-determination movement.

2001, February
A peace agreement is signed. The deal creates a new confederation, the Union of the Comoros, comprising the three main Comoran islands (Grand Comore; Moheli; Anjouan). The agreement grants autonomy for each island and provides for a rotating presidency.

2001, August
Mohamed Bacar deposes Abeid in a coup and becomes the leader of Anjouan.

2007, April–May The Anjouani president is defeated in a disputed election and refuses to cede power. The president of the Anjouani assembly, Houmadi Caambi, becomes acting president from April 15 until he is overthrown by forces loyal to Mohamed Bacar on May 10.

2007, July
Bacar declares again independence for Anjouan.

2008, March
Aided by African Union (AU) forces, the Comorian military invades Anjouan and reestablishes military control over the island. The Anjouani de facto state disappears.

`dfsbuild`
Anjouani separatists engaged in limited statebuilding activities (Cornwell 1998; Raic 2002; Beary 2011).

`mextsupcat`
Beary (2011, 22) states that the French helped arm the Anjouanis in part because of Moroni's close ties to Iran.

`frag`
Anjouan People's Movement (MPA); Organization for the Independence of Anjouan (OPIA). (Source: Beary 2011, 24).

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