Online Appendix

Choosing International Organizations: When Do States and the World Bank Collaborate on Environmental Projects?

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A1 Mathematical Appendix

A1.1 Equilibrium Characterization

We solve the game by backward induction for a subgame Nash equilibrium with random moves by nature. Such an equilibrium consists of an optimal choice condition by the recipient and a price vector, $\mathbf{p} = (p_A, p_B)$. The choice of agency A is optimal if and only if

$$b(t)q_A - p_A > b(t)q_B - p_B \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad b(t)(q_A - q_B) > p_A - p_B.$$

This incentive compatibility constraint for r to choose agency A ensures that, in equilibrium, the more resourceful agency A has a competitive edge and holds agency B indifferent, so that $p_B^* = c_B$. With τ_L and τ_H as probabilities for type $t \in \{L, H\}$, and $\underline{p}_A > c_A$, A chooses equilibrium prices

$$p_A = \begin{cases} \overline{p}_A & \text{if} (q_A - q_B)\left(\tau_H b(H) - b(L)\right) + \tau_L(c_B + c_A) > 0 \\ \underline{p}_A & \text{if} (q_A - q_B)\left(\tau_H b(H) - b(L)\right) + \tau_L(c_B + c_A) \leq 0, \end{cases}$$

where $\overline{p}_A$ satisfies $b(H)(q_A - q_B) + c_B > p_A$ and $\underline{p}_A$ satisfies $b(L)(q_A - q_B) + c_B > p_A$. Given this pricing, r always chooses A except when the recipient is the low type and is offered a high price. For $p_A^* = \overline{p}_A$ and $t = L$, agency B is chosen in equilibrium.

The above equilibrium is unique if $\underline{p}_A > c_A$ holds. Suppose $\overline{p}_A > c_A \geq \underline{p}_A$, then $p_A^* = \overline{p}_A$ is the unique optimal price, which gets only accepted by the high type. The low type always prefers agency B. For $c_A > \overline{p}_A$, agency A withdraws from the market and B can set prices as a monopolist. For brevity, we exclude this possibility because, with only one agency, there is no selection.

A1.2 Mathematical Appendix: Comparative Statics

To derive comparative statics, we assume $\tau_H = \tau_H(s, l, d)$ is a function of project size s, the extent to which local public goods are prioritized l, and the strength of the country's democratic institutions d. This empirical focus is rationalized in the main text. The predictions are analyzed for the equilibrium in which both agencies are sometimes chosen; otherwise agency selection does not offer any empirical variation to

be explained. In this equilibrium, the recipient r selects agency A at price $\overline{p}_A$ if and only if the recipient's valuation is $t = H$. The probability of this event is $\tau_H(s, l, d)$. As explained in the main text, we assume τ_H is strictly increasing in s, l, d. The three hypotheses follow.

A2 Project Implementation in the Global Environment Facility

We now explain the GEF project cycle in further detail; for a complete description, see GEF (2010). To begin with, the GEF funds a number of different types of projects: full-sized projects (FSPs), medium-sized projects (MSPs), and enabling activities (EAs). Nevertheless, the project cycle is substantially similar across each of these project types. Each recipient's share of funding is capped by a GEF rule, currently under the title of System for Transparent Allocation of Resources.

The GEF Country Support Programme describes the project cycle in terms of four distinct stages (GEF, 2012). At the beginning of the first stage of the project cycle, recipient country stakeholders, working through a designated national focal point, collaborate with one of the GEF's formal implementing agencies to identify projects that may be eligible for GEF funding. The project cycle formally begins with the drafting of a project identification form (PIF). The most immediate purpose of the PIF is to describe the proposed project and to explain how it promotes the GEF's organizational mission. The PIF estimates the cost of the project, requests a specific amount of funding from the GEF, and describes the level of cofinancing available for the project. Once the PIF is complete and has been approved by the recipient country's designated focal point, the relevant implementing agency forwards it to the GEF secretariat for preliminary approval.

If the PIF is approved, the project proceeds to the second stage, where it is considered for approval at a GEF Council meeting. The purpose of this stage, according to the GEF Country Support Programme, is to ensure a distribution of projects that is consistent with the GEF's overall programmatic and geographic goals. At this stage, the GEF Council works with implementing agencies and recipient stakeholders to ensure that project design also serves procedural goals, such as replicability. As a result, some projects may be modified prior to receiving formal approval from the GEF Council. By rule, the GEF Council employs a double-majority voting system, requiring approval by three-fifths of council members as well as council members representing three-fifths of contributions to the GEF. In practice, however, decision making is consensual. By 2010, the GEF Council had not voted on a single project (Ramankutty, 2011).

At the third stage, the relevant implementing agency submits complete project documentation to the GEF secretariat, where the project is reviewed a final time to ensure that the final project design complies with GEF policies. Once certified, the GEF Trust disburses funds to the relevant agency for project implementation. The fourth stage consists of project implementation and post-implementation review.

A3 Summary Statistics

Table A1 provides the summary statistics.

Summary statistics

	count	mean	sd	min	max
IBRD Implementing Agency	1321	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Democracy	1321	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Project Cost (logged)	1321	14.57	2.58	0.00	21.01
Global Public Good	1321	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
GDP p.c. (logged)	1321	7.12	1.13	4.39	9.79
Population (logged)	1321	16.95	1.78	12.58	21.00
Corruption	1321	2.62	0.88	0.00	5.00
Investment Profile	1321	7.80	1.96	1.00	12.00
IBRD Projects (cum. #)	1321	4.19	5.11	0.00	29.00
WB Executive Board Member	1321	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Security Council Member	1321	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00

Table A1: Summary statistics for agency selection. The numbers are based on the model that includes all the control variables discussed in the main text.

A4 Correlation Matrix

Table A2 shows the correlation matrix.

Correlation matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) IBRD Implementing Agency	1.000										
(2) Democracy	0.085**	1.000									
(3) Project Cost (logged)	0.429***	0.025	1.000								
(4) Global Public Good	-0.146***	-0.008	-0.056*	1.000							
(5) GDP p.c. (logged)	-0.002	0.223***	0.106***	0.096***	1.000						
(6) Population (logged)	0.152***	-0.135***	0.293***	-0.044	-0.109***	1.000					
(7) Corruption	-0.050	-0.189***	0.025	-0.084**	-0.242***	0.184***	1.000				
(8) Investment Profile	-0.050	0.198***	0.007	-0.019	0.364***	-0.190***	-0.070*	1.000			
(9) IBRD Projects (cum. #)	0.191***	0.044	0.285***	-0.138***	0.151***	0.608***	0.170***	0.122***	1.000		
(10) WB Executive Board Member	0.094***	0.013	0.203***	-0.006	0.139***	0.603***	0.069*	-0.103***	0.456***	1.000	
(11) Security Council Member	0.039	-0.190***	0.184***	-0.013	0.063*	0.461***	0.097***	-0.043	0.419***	0.409***	1.000

Table A2: Correlation matrix for agency selection. The correlations are based on the model that includes all the control variables discussed in the main text.

A5 Data Description: Variable Distributions

Figures A1 to A6 illustrate distributions of our main variables.

- Figure A1 shows the histogram of logged total project costs.
- Figure A2 shows the histogram of logged GDP per capita.
- Figure A3 shows the histogram of logged total population.
- Figure A4 shows the histogram of the corruption variable.
- Figure A5 shows the histogram of the investment profile variable.
- Figure A6 shows the histogram of cumulative project count of IBRD projects.



Figure A1: Histogram of project costs in US$ (logged).



Figure A2: Histogram of GDP per capita in US$ (logged).



Figure A3: Histogram of total population (logged).



Figure A4: Histogram of corruption variable.



Figure A5: Histogram of investment profile variable.



Figure A6: Histogram of cumulative number of IBRD projects.

A6 Data Details: Random Sample of 50 GEF Projects

As the GEF does not provide project details for all of the 2,882 projects, we cannot assess the funding sources for all GEF projects. To better ascertain funding sources, we selected a random sample of 50 projects and coded additional information about the availability of private capital and other co-financing from NGOs and non-recipient sources.

Under private capital, we coded co-financing specifically classified as private, enterprises, or beneficiaries with a note on the private sector. For non-governmental organizations, we only included non-profit civil society organizations. Under other forms of non-recipient co-financing, we only included concessional funding. If the recipient government borrowed money for the project, this was assumed to be part of the recipient's share because the government would ultimately have to pay the loan back.

Table A3, which reports the results of our coding, shows that funding by GEF agencies is, indeed, a major source. The role of funding from other bilateral sources, including private capital, NGO funds, or concessional funding, is more limited. With GEF agencies contributing about 19% of total project funding, this makes us confident to believe that capital for project implementation is, for sure, one of the most important resources that GEF funding agencies bring to the table.

Project ID	Recipient	Focal Area	Enabling Act.	GEF funding	Co-financing	Private capital	NGO	Other, non-rec.
459	Argentina	Waters	No	8.35	20.5	NA	NA	NA
3540	Iran	Climate	No	5.45	15.15	6	0	0.1
3637	Mexico	Biodiversity	No	6.9	17.37	2.2	0.6	2.7
1497	Egypt	POPs	Yes	0.5	0	0	0	0
4784	Ukraine	Climate	No	5.55	39.75	24.55	0.15	0.15
1518	Macedonia	POPs	Yes	0.5	0	0	0	0
307	Thailand	Climate	Yes	0.19	0	0	0	0
477	Slovenia	Biodiversity	Yes	0.09	0	0	0	0
2482	Sierra Leone	Climate	Yes	0.2	0.02	0	0	0
3379	Mauritania	Land	No	4.19	19.28	1.36	0	0.65
2031	Sudan	Climate	Yes	0.2	0.05	0	0	0
863	Belize	Biodiversity	No	0.81	0.26	NA	NA	NA
2465	Togo	Climate	Yes	0.2	0.02	0	0	0
2702	Nicaragua	Biodiversity	No	1.8	3.82	NA	NA	NA
2363	Bolivia	Multi	Yes	0.2	0	0	0	0
546	Benin	Biodiversity	Yes	0.01	0	0	0	0
346	Cote D'Ivoire	Biodiversity	No	3	1.9	NA	NA	NA
1353	China	Multi	No	3.65	22.95	0	2.49	0.39
4109	China	Climate	No	4	20.1	16	0	0
1904	Haiti	Climate	No	0.98	3.66	NA	NA	NA
807	Russia	Waters	No	0.73	2.01	0	0	1.07
2826	Uruguay	Climate	No	0.95	6	0	0	0
220	Comoros	Biodiversity	No	2.44	0.84	0	0	0.59
4477	Pakistan	POPs	No	5.15	20.06	11.76	2	1
330	El Salvador	Climate	Yes	0.32	0	0	0	0
1045	Latvia	Biodiversity	No	2.66	10.74	0.9	0.53	8.68
1029	Maldives	Climate	No	0.73	2.01	0	0	0.36
3548	Ecuador	Biodiversity	No	4	6	0	0	0
205	Argentina	Biodiversity	No	5.2	12.9	NA	NA	NA
3772	Congo DR	Biodiversity	No	6	62	0	3	7
1999	Kenya	Biodiversity	No	0.73	0.51	NA	0.27	0
255	St. Kitts and Nevis	Biodiversity	Yes	0.1	0	0	0	0
3043	Moldova	Biodiversity	No	0.54	0.15	0	0	0
2366	Lao PDR	Climate	No	5	27.88	0	0	0
1314	Bolivia	Biodiversity	Yes	0.196	0.02	0	0	0
1803	Moldova	Multi	Yes	0.02	0.03	0	0	0
2702	Nicaragua	Biodiversity	No	7	15.7	0.6	0.5	4.5
4760	Vietnam	Biodiversity	No	3.18	14.63	NA	NA	NA
3992	China	Biodiversity	No	5.35	18.5	0	0	0
3242	Egypt	Climate	No	4	12	0	0	0
3192	Kyrgyzstan	Biodiversity	No	0.95	3.12	0	1.69	0.45
1926	Antigua and Barbuda	Biodiversity	Yes	0.21	0.05	0	0	0
428	Egypt	Biodiversity	Yes	0.01	0	0	0	0
2739	Latvia	Land	No	0.72	17.58	5.52	0.06	0
4353	Mexico	Multi	No	4.44	5.9	2.35	0	1.35
350	Nepal	Biodiversity	No	3.8	2.7	NA	NA	NA
3068	Nicaragua	Multi	No	0.47	0.13	NA	NA	NA
2105	Croatia	Biodiversity	No	6.99	24.33	5.52	0.57	0.59
269	Cape Verde	Climate	Yes	0.32	0	0	0	0
4116	Mexico	Climate	No	7.12	225	0	0	0
TOTAL				126.096	655.62	76.76	11.86	29.58
RATIO TO TOTAL CO-FINANCING				0.19	1	0.12	0.02	0.05

Table A3: Descriptive statistics for a random sample of 50 GEF projects.

A7 Robustness: Additional Specifications

To show the robustness of our models, we implement additional model specification. First, we add project fixed effects for all GEF focal areas to all our nine models (see Table A4). Second, we allow for greater flexibility of the error structure by estimating a hierarchical random effects probit model (see Table A5). Third, we estimate an OLS model with robust standard errors at the country level, with share of WB implemented projects as dependent variable (see Table A6).

For our project type fixed effects, we use the GEF's official seven focal areas for biodiversity (1,073 projects, or 37%), climate change (912 projects, or 32%), international waters (191 projects, or 7%), land degradation (97 projects, or 3%), ozone depletion (28 projects, 1%), persistent organic pollutants (225 projects, or 8%), and multi focal projects (356 projects, or 12%). The results presented in Table A4 show that results are virtually to those from our main models discussed in the main text.

To account for the fact that projects are nested into countries, we estimate random effects probit models. The results are shown in Table A5 below. If anything, the results become even stronger with democracy and project costs showing strongly positive effects, while projects fostering global public goods have a consistently negative effect. Levels of statistical significance are as in our main models.

For a country-level analysis, we aggregate our project-level data at the country level and use linear least squares to estimate the effect of country-level variables on a dependent variable, which measures the share of projects implemented by World Bank relative to all GEF projects hosted in a given country. All these models are estimated with robust standard errors and region fixed effects. For models (1) to (4) we do not re-weight the variance of each country, while we re-weight the variance of each country's value by the inverse of the number of total GEF projects in models (5) to (8). The estimation results show that the effect of democracy is positive and strongly statistically significant for all our models. This provides strong empirical evidence in support of our argument with cross-sectional data.

Main results with project fixed effects

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.239***	0.337***	0.324***	0.283**	0.201	0.208*	0.042	0.138	0.239*
	(0.077)	(0.096)	(0.114)	(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.162)	(0.130)	(0.123)
Project Cost (logged)	0.278***	0.263***	0.247***	0.245***	0.253***	0.246***	0.402***	0.144***	0.293***
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Global Public Good	-0.576***	-0.561***	-0.519***	-0.531***	-0.625***	-0.636***	-0.710***	-0.621***	-0.635***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.096)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.067	-0.127	-0.172**	-0.172**	-0.162**	-0.154**	-0.198***	-0.177**
		(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.076)
Population (logged)		0.068**	0.061*	-0.039	-0.017	-0.032	-0.145**	-0.045	-0.033
		(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Corruption			-0.111**	-0.082	-0.076	-0.043	-0.089	-0.086	-0.071
			(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.056)
Investment Profile			-0.025	-0.032	-0.024	-0.019	-0.075**	-0.028	-0.024
			(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.033)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.069***	0.086***	0.087***	0.181***	0.082***	0.090***
				(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.026)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.123	-0.107	-0.132	-0.078	-0.006	-0.101
				(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.116)
Security Council Member					-0.557***	-0.523***	-0.497***	-0.609***	-0.587***
					(0.152)	(0.160)	(0.184)	(0.150)	(0.153)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.243	0.255	0.235	0.253	0.278	0.270	0.395	0.168	0.300
Correct Predictions in %	82.45	82.70	80.57	81.70	81.00	80.79	83.07	72.15	80.45

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Estimation results with project fixed effects.

Main results from random effects model

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.229***	0.300***	0.304***	0.258**	0.194*	0.203*	-0.004	0.132	0.235**
	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.124)	(0.114)
Project Cost (logged)	0.287***	0.273***	0.257***	0.258***	0.262***	0.257***	0.414***	0.132***	0.301***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Global Public Good	-0.473***	-0.462***	-0.439***	-0.445***	-0.513***	-0.522***	-0.558***	-0.594***	-0.513***
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.096)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.057	-0.123*	-0.176***	-0.169**	-0.161**	-0.170**	-0.191**	-0.175**
		(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.069)
Population (logged)		0.074***	0.070**	-0.036	-0.019	-0.032	-0.155***	-0.056	-0.038
		(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.045)
Corruption			-0.121**	-0.092	-0.090	-0.059	-0.102	-0.099	-0.087
			(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.062)
Investment Profile			-0.034	-0.039	-0.030	-0.025	-0.078**	-0.036	-0.031
			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.029)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.071***	0.088***	0.089***	0.180***	0.087***	0.093***
				(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.015)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.087	-0.074	-0.097	-0.077	0.028	-0.061
				(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.155)	(0.147)	(0.134)
Security Council Member					-0.544***	-0.486***	-0.525***	-0.588***	-0.581***
					(0.150)	(0.157)	(0.176)	(0.158)	(0.154)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Countries	145	141	99	99	99	99	99	90	99

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Estimation results from random effects probit model.

Main results from country level analysis

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model
Democracy	0.113***	0.116***	0.110***	0.124***	0.109***	0.124***	0.124***	0.131***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.036)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.003	-0.022	-0.024		0.006	-0.016	-0.015
		(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)		(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Population (logged)		0.039***	0.042***	0.041***		0.039***	0.043***	0.044***
		(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.012)		(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Corruption			-0.044**	-0.043*			-0.044*	-0.042*
			(0.022)	(0.022)			(0.023)	(0.024)
Investment Profile			-0.007	-0.007			-0.006	-0.006
			(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.010)	(0.010)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.059				-0.032
				(0.043)				(0.051)
Security Council Member				0.156*				0.040
				(0.087)				(0.070)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	146	141	99	99	146	141	99	99
R^2	0.158	0.389	0.410	0.435	0.203	0.463	0.467	0.471

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Share of World Bank Implemented Projects.
Models (1) to (4) are unweighted estimations.
Model (5) to (8) are weighted estimations.
All standard errors are robust standard errors.
$^{*}\ p < 0.10$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$

Table A6: Estimation results from country level analysis with share of WB projects as dependent variable.

A8 Robustness: Interaction Models

We also test if multiplicative interaction terms between our three independent variables cause any problems for our three hypotheses. For this, we include pairwise interaction terms into our model specifications. Results for these interaction models are shown in Tables A7 to A9. Generally, our main results continue to hold even when we add interaction terms. More specifically, we only find empirical support for a statistically significant interaction between the binary indicator for global public goods (GPGs) and logged project cost. To make it easy for the reader to assess the statistical significance of interaction terms, we report test statistics and p-values from Wald tests for all our models (Ai and Norton, 2003; Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006). With a positive interaction for the GPG indicator and project cost, the negative effect of projects with a focus on GPGs on World Bank implementation decreases with project size. Likelihood ratio tests verify that a multiplicative interaction term is necessary to be included as the null hypothesis of identical models with and without the interaction term can be rejected for all nine models (Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey, 2010).

The other two model specifications with pairwise interaction terms are much less conclusive. When we include an interaction for the GPG dummy and the democracy indicator, interaction terms show sign flips, are never statistically significant according to the Wald tests, and the model with and without the interaction term are not statistically significantly different. We read this as evidence that neither democracy is conditioning the effect of GPG nor is the effect of GPG projects on World Bank implementation modified by regime type (Berry, Golder, and Milton, 2012).

While the inclusion of an interaction effect for democracy and project cost is warranted according to the likelihood ratio tests in eight out of nine models and is consistently negative, the Wald tests indicate that the interaction term is statistically significant only for two models. Hence, we caution against the interpretation that the positive effect of democratic regime type on WB implementation becomes smaller once projects become larger.

Model with Global Public Good X Project Cost Interaction

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.259***	0.351***	0.357***	0.317***	0.233**	0.240**	-0.006	0.145	0.259**
	(0.076)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.149)	(0.128)	(0.119)
Project Cost (logged)	0.214***	0.198***	0.178***	0.174***	0.180***	0.178***	0.421***	0.055	0.222***
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.074)
Global Public Good	-3.058***	-3.059***	-3.408***	-3.621***	-3.615***	-3.457***	-0.416	-5.237***	-3.063***
	(0.963)	(0.931)	(0.992)	(0.947)	(0.947)	(0.913)	(0.911)	(0.965)	(1.078)
Global Public Good X Project Cost	0.171***	0.172***	0.194***	0.207***	0.204***	0.194***	-0.010	0.286***	0.166**
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.070)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.070	-0.128	-0.181**	-0.187***	-0.176**	-0.169**	-0.213***	-0.192**
		(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.075)
Population (logged)		0.063**	0.057*	-0.051	-0.027	-0.043	-0.156***	-0.074*	-0.039
		(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Corruption			-0.114**	-0.083	-0.084	-0.053	-0.102	-0.083	-0.088
			(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Investment Profile			-0.031	-0.037	-0.029	-0.025	-0.078**	-0.035	-0.028
			(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.033)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.073***	0.090***	0.091***	0.180***	0.089***	0.095***
				(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.023)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.138	-0.112	-0.139	-0.075	0.014	-0.093
				(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.149)	(0.136)	(0.116)
Security Council Member					-0.544***	-0.483***	-0.525***	-0.602***	-0.574***
					(0.156)	(0.165)	(0.174)	(0.158)	(0.159)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.231	0.243	0.225	0.246	0.267	0.256	0.366	0.178	0.279
Correct Predictions in %	81.63	81.97	79.97	80.84	81.15	80.63	82.47	70.54	80.53
Wald test $\chi^2_{df=1}$	7.037	7.703	8.849	11.159	10.767	10.428	0.023	23.334	5.665
p-value	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.881	0.000	0.017
LR test $\chi^2_{df=1}$	30.999	30.413	32.570	36.679	32.651	29.177	0.029	29.421	17.346
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.865	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Main results with global public good and project cost interaction.

Model with Global Public Good X Democracy Interaction

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.221*	0.287**	0.274**	0.265*	0.279*	0.284*	-0.005	0.145	0.350**
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.195)	(0.177)	(0.158)
Project Cost (logged)	0.285***	0.268***	0.253***	0.254***	0.261***	0.256***	0.414***	0.132***	0.301***
	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Global Public Good	-0.511***	-0.508***	-0.498***	-0.469***	-0.435***	-0.447***	-0.559***	-0.582***	-0.408***
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.128)	(0.118)	(0.130)	(0.134)	(0.163)	(0.148)	(0.140)
Global Public Good X Democracy	0.062	0.087	0.103	0.045	-0.135	-0.126	0.002	-0.020	-0.183
	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.167)	(0.154)	(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.218)	(0.230)	(0.193)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.059	-0.116	-0.166**	-0.169**	-0.159**	-0.170**	-0.192***	-0.176**
		(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Population (logged)		0.068**	0.063*	-0.042	-0.020	-0.034	-0.155***	-0.056	-0.038
		(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Corruption			-0.115**	-0.088*	-0.094*	-0.061	-0.102	-0.100	-0.093
			(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Investment Profile			-0.033	-0.038	-0.029	-0.024	-0.078**	-0.035	-0.030
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.032)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.068***	0.088***	0.088***	0.180***	0.087***	0.094***
				(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.024)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.090	-0.074	-0.095	-0.077	0.028	-0.063
				(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.112)
Security Council Member					-0.559***	-0.509***	-0.525***	-0.590***	-0.590***
					(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.174)	(0.150)	(0.152)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.217	0.229	0.207	0.225	0.247	0.237	0.366	0.152	0.268
Correct Predictions in %	81.94	81.97	79.57	80.97	81.15	80.71	82.47	70.30	80.27
Wald test $\chi^2_{df=1}$	0.164	0.331	0.379	0.085	0.490	0.413	0.000	0.008	0.895
p-value	0.686	0.565	0.538	0.770	0.484	0.521	0.992	0.929	0.344
LR test $\chi^2_{df=1}$	0.197	0.375	0.432	0.080	0.601	0.502	0.000	0.010	0.948
p-value	0.657	0.540	0.511	0.777	0.438	0.479	0.993	0.920	0.330

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Estimation results with global public good and democracy interaction.

Model with Democracy X Project Cost Interaction

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	1.399	1.394	1.676	1.555	1.574	1.438	1.423*	1.791	2.881***
	(1.031)	(1.055)	(1.383)	(1.400)	(1.427)	(1.408)	(0.800)	(1.804)	(0.919)
Project Cost (logged)	0.289***	0.278***	0.308***	0.306***	0.320***	0.308***	0.471***	0.198**	0.422***
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.043)	(0.095)	(0.039)
Global Public Good	-0.112	-0.093	-0.444***	-0.448***	-0.519***	-0.526***	-0.571***	-0.592***	-0.528***
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.103)
Democracy X Project Cost	-0.078	-0.074	-0.088	-0.082	-0.091	-0.081	-0.095*	-0.103	-0.172***
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.058)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.104*	-0.116	-0.164**	-0.169**	-0.160**	-0.167**	-0.191**	-0.174**
		(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Population (logged)		0.045	0.059	-0.044	-0.021	-0.034	-0.156***	-0.057	-0.042
		(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Corruption			-0.113**	-0.085*	-0.086	-0.056	-0.098	-0.098	-0.070
			(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Investment Profile			-0.036	-0.041	-0.033	-0.028	-0.080**	-0.038	-0.037
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.033)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.068***	0.088***	0.088***	0.180***	0.086***	0.094***
				(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.026)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.100	-0.080	-0.099	-0.079	0.018	-0.066
				(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.122)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.114)
Security Council Member					-0.584***	-0.531***	-0.542***	-0.617***	-0.635***
					(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.180)	(0.151)	(0.162)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.160	0.172	0.210	0.228	0.251	0.240	0.368	0.156	0.278
Correct Predictions in %	79.58	79.38	79.57	81.50	81.76	81.35	82.97	69.93	81.90
Wald test $\chi^2_{df=1}$	1.358	1.189	0.999	0.856	0.981	0.812	3.281	0.885	8.723
p-value	0.244	0.276	0.317	0.355	0.322	0.367	0.070	0.347	0.003
LR test $\chi^2_{df=1}$	6.931	6.001	6.855	6.013	6.507	5.159	3.018	4.445	15.612
p-value	0.008	0.014	0.009	0.014	0.011	0.023	0.082	0.035	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Estimation results with democracy and project cost interaction.

A9 Robustness: Selection Models

To corroborate our analysis against claims that selection of projects into the sample is driving our results, we re-estimate all our models for only enabling activity (EA) projects (see Table A10) as well as for a sample also including rejected GEF projects (see Table A11).

Of all 2,882 projects in our sample, 870 (about 30%) are enabling activity projects. As these projects are on average much less costly (12.23 compared to 15.88 for non-EA projects), much more global in scope (0.66 compared to 0.46 for non-EA projects), and less often implemented in democratic countries (0.49 compared to 0.54 for non-EA projects), it is remarkable that, by and large, our results continue to hold also for this subsample. While the democracy and the project cost variables lose statistical significance in some models, possibly due to severe reductions in sample size, the signs are always positive as expected. Moreover, the effect for global public good projects gets much stronger is highly statistically significant.

Another group of projects which could induce bias are canceled projects, which did not receive GEF approval. Since these projects are usually excluded from our analysis, we present a robustness check for the full sample, including implemented and canceled projects. As canceled project are more expensive (16.61 compared to 14.72 for approved projects), more global (0.69 compared to 0.52 for approved projects), and more often implemented in democracies (0.58 compared to 0.52 for approved projects), they could bias our findings. The results from Table A11 suggest, however, that there is virtually no difference between the sample with and without canceled project. Given that only 89 projects were rejected by the GEF during 1991 and 2011, this finding is not too surprising. In sum, we are confident that selection problems do not exercise undue influence on our estimation results.

Estimation results for enabling activity projects

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model
Democracy	0.497**	0.562**	0.531**	0.413	0.474*	0.474*	0.568**	0.246
	(0.197)	(0.219)	(0.239)	(0.259)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.279)	(0.233)
Project Cost (logged)	0.095	0.089	0.213**	0.226**	0.168*	0.168*	0.214**	0.106
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.098)
Global Public Good	-0.805***	-0.890***	-0.835***	-0.860***	-0.862***	-0.862***	-0.887***	-0.999***
	(0.154)	(0.173)	(0.215)	(0.208)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.205)	(0.240)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.224**	-0.288*	-0.309*	-0.401**	-0.401**	-0.402**	-0.531**
		(0.107)	(0.162)	(0.173)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.190)	(0.215)
Population (logged)		0.105*	0.093	-0.105	-0.108	-0.108	-0.108	-0.237*
		(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Corruption			-0.120	-0.174	-0.161	-0.161	-0.153	-0.225
			(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.155)
Investment Profile			-0.124	-0.141*	-0.131*	-0.131*	-0.147*	-0.082
			(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.083)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.198***	0.207***	0.207***	0.226***	0.286***
				(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.056)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.447	-0.604	-0.604	-0.710	-0.560
				(0.356)	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.435)	(0.396)
Security Council Member					0.487	0.487	0.595	0.582
					(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.469)	(0.515)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	788	734	496	496	493	492	454	402
Pseudo R^2	0.134	0.228	0.244	0.300	0.308	0.307	0.317	0.342
Correct Predictions in %	95.05	95.23	95.36	95.16	95.33	95.33	94.71	95.27

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Estimation results from probit model with only enabling activity projects.

Estimation results for full sample

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.278***	0.357***	0.353***	0.313***	0.224*	0.235*	0.042	0.163	0.268**
	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.151)	(0.133)	(0.120)
Project Cost (logged)	0.291***	0.272***	0.257***	0.258***	0.265***	0.260***	0.417***	0.137***	0.305***
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Global Public Good	-0.488***	-0.466***	-0.451***	-0.450***	-0.517***	-0.524***	-0.557***	-0.600***	-0.516***
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.102)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.064	-0.120	-0.167**	-0.168**	-0.158**	-0.168**	-0.190***	-0.173**
		(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Population (logged)		0.066**	0.059	-0.043	-0.021	-0.034	-0.154***	-0.056	-0.039
		(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Corruption			-0.118**	-0.088*	-0.085*	-0.055	-0.091	-0.094	-0.080
			(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.056)
Investment Profile			-0.035	-0.041	-0.034	-0.029	-0.083**	-0.041	-0.036
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.032)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.070***	0.089***	0.089***	0.181***	0.088***	0.094***
				(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.023)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.125	-0.111	-0.132	-0.120	-0.026	-0.100
				(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.111)
Security Council Member					-0.546***	-0.497***	-0.512***	-0.574***	-0.570***
					(0.145)	(0.154)	(0.168)	(0.138)	(0.149)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2003	1953	1528	1528	1346	1284	1023	833	1190
Pseudo R^2	0.228	0.235	0.213	0.232	0.254	0.244	0.370	0.159	0.275
Correct Predictions in %	81.63	81.93	79.52	80.69	81.05	80.76	81.92	70.59	80.42

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Estimation results from probit model for full sample, including canceled projects.

A10 Qualitative Evidence: Interview Questionnaire

Here, we provide the interview questionnaire used it to gather information from the GEF Country Focal Points.[1] All interviews were conducted by Patrick Bayer. We sent out emails on July 15, 2013 to GEF Focal Points in the top-10 GEF project host countries asking for Skype interview requests. Each target was given the choice between a phone interview or an email response. Specifically, we contacted GEF Focal Points in China (97 projects), India (55 projects), Brazil (46 projects), Mexico (44 projects), Russia (43 projects), the Philippines (39 projects), Indonesia (38 projects), Vietnam (37 projects), Peru (34 projects), Columbia (29 projects), and South Africa (29 projects).

As we only received a response from Brazil by July 24, 2013, we sent reminder emails with the interview questions to all the GEF's focal points mentioned above. In addition, we contacted the focal points of Kenya (28 projects), Egypt (26 projects), Argentina (25 projects), Ecuador (24 projects), Tanzania (24 projects), Morocco (24 projects), Jordan (23 projects), Ghana (23 projects), Pakistan (23 projects), Mongolia (23 projects), Burkina Faso (23 projects), and Chile (23 projects).

After an additional reminder email that was sent on August 14, 2013, we received responses from South Africa and Mexico on that day. Two further reminder emails were sent on September 5, 2013 and September 22, 2013, with Burkina Faso's focal point replying on September 7, 2013. Overall, we obtained four responses from 23 contacted GEF Country Focal Points, yielding a response rate of 17%.

[1] See `http://www.thegef.org/gef/focal_points_list` for a full list of GEF Focal Points. Accessed on July 15, 2013.

Interview Questions on Government Interaction with GEF Agencies

Contact details: Patrick Bayer, Ph.D., School of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, University of Mannheim, Germany. Email: pbayer@mail.uni-mannheim.de. Phone: +49 621/181-2418.

Introduction

I am conducting a project on how national governments and agencies interact with the GEF in project implementation. I am particularly interested in project proposals and design as well as in how country drivenness materializes in the early stages of project development.

Question 1: First, I would like to know what role national governments play in initiating projects. More specifically, does the idea for a particular project emanate from the country or do GEF agencies contact national governments with project proposals?

Question 2: What is the usual role of international donors/ potential implementing agencies (e.g., IBRD) in the early stages of project design? Do they engage already during the design phase of a project, and if so, in which way do they contribute to the discussion? Could you provide an example project from your own work which demonstrates country initiative?

Question 3: When you have designed a particular project, what kind of projects do you propose to the World Bank/ IBRD? Are these projects special in terms of size, scope, or the focal area? What are the most important reasons for taking a project to the World Bank/ IBRD? What are the World Bank's/ IBRD's particular strengths?

Question 4: When you have designed a particular project, what kind of projects do you propose to the United Nations agencies? Are these projects special in terms of size, scope, or the focal area? What are the most important reasons for taking a project to the United Nations agencies? What are the United Nations agencies' particular strengths?

Question 5: In selecting an agency, how important is project size? Do you take small and large projects to different agencies? If so, could you please state why and provide me with example projects?

Question 6: When you want to implement a project in the focal area of climate change, do you apply special considerations? If so, could you briefly outline the rationale and comment in which sense climate change projects are different?

Question 7: Given your own experience, would you say that the World Bank/ IBRD has a particular preference for implementing projects from specific countries or specific project types?

Thank you very much for your time and efforts! Your help is highly appreciated and you greatly facilitate my research project. All interviews, if spoken or written, are anonymous, so that you as a person cannot be identified. Let me once more thank you for your contribution to political science research.

A11 Alternative Explanations

In the main text, we assess two supply side arguments, one of which claims that the positive correlation between democratic countries and WB project implementation is due to democracies' control in the World Bank's Executive Board (WBEB). To test this argument, we compute the share of democratic countries on the WBEB and code a binary indicator as 1 if the share of democracies war above the mean in our sample. The results of this test are reported in Table A12; as the interaction effect is found to be negative this is evidence against such a supply side effect. Since interpreting statistical significance for the interaction coefficient alone is insufficient for non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003; Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006), we calculated Wald tests for each of our nine models to find that the interactive effect for democracies and democratic supermajority in the WBEB is not statistically significant for any of the models. Democratic dominance in the Bank's Executive Board neither increases nor decreases the agency's bias in favor of democracies.

To further test this claim, we implemented two additional robustness checks. Specifically, we included another control variable for democratic World Bank control, both as count (see Table A13) and share (see Table A14) of democratic members in the WBEB. For the models with the count variable, we simply counted how many democratic countries, according to Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), were members in the WBEB during the years of study in our paper. For the models with the share variable, we divided democratic country counts by the total number of countries on the WBEB. For information on countries serving on the WBEB, we used data provided by Kilby (2009).

Interestingly, neither the count nor the share variable on democratic countries on the WBEB has a consistent effect on WB project implementation. Results in Tables A13 and A14 even show sign flips and none of the coefficients attains statistical significance at standard levels. More important for our study, none of our hypothesized effects of democratic countries, project size, or global public goods is affected by including these additional variables.

The second supply side argument one could raise is that the WB, as largest GEF agency, has an advantage in terms of economies of scale. Large projects can only be implemented by the WB as no other agency has the capacities and resources. To test this claim, we re-estimate our main models for a sample that excludes all large GEF projects from the dataset. Results are reported in Table A15 and are virtually identical to

the ones we report in the main results table. Together with the findings presented above, we take this as sufficient evidence against a strong supply side story.

Estimation results with democratic supermajority in WBEB

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.277**	0.366***	0.444***	0.399***	0.275*	0.318**	0.078	0.185	0.316**
	(0.116)	(0.137)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.175)	(0.160)	(0.137)
Project Cost (logged)	0.288***	0.271***	0.256***	0.255***	0.260***	0.254***	0.416***	0.130**	0.298***
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.057)
Global Public Good	-0.489***	-0.469***	-0.449***	-0.454***	-0.514***	-0.518***	-0.583***	-0.594***	-0.509***
	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.124)	(0.129)	(0.100)
Democratic Supermajority in WBEB	-0.062	-0.037	0.016	0.048	0.094	0.140	0.043	0.075	0.154
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Democracy x Supermajority WBEB	-0.041	-0.059	-0.198	-0.194	-0.150	-0.201	-0.157	-0.091	-0.166
	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.165)	(0.204)	(0.192)	(0.169)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.061	-0.117	-0.167**	-0.170**	-0.159**	-0.172**	-0.190***	-0.178**
		(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Population (logged)		0.067**	0.062*	-0.040	-0.016	-0.029	-0.145***	-0.052	-0.036
		(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Corruption			-0.120**	-0.092*	-0.091*	-0.060	-0.105	-0.100	-0.086
			(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Investment Profile			-0.035	-0.038	-0.028	-0.022	-0.075**	-0.035	-0.027
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.032)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.067***	0.085***	0.085***	0.168***	0.083***	0.091***
				(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.086	-0.067	-0.089	-0.068	0.037	-0.054
				(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.111)
Security Council Member					-0.544***	-0.491***	-0.510***	-0.579***	-0.574***
					(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.173)	(0.145)	(0.154)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.218	0.230	0.208	0.226	0.246	0.236	0.362	0.150	0.267
Correct Predictions in %	81.79	81.97	79.51	80.71	81.45	81.03	82.57	70.67	80.70
Wald test $\chi^2_df = 1$	0.078	0.160	1.649	1.617	0.900	1.486	0.590	0.225	0.966
p-value	0.780	0.689	0.199	0.204	0.343	0.223	0.443	0.635	0.326

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Estimation results from probit model with democratic supermajority (0.73) in WBEB as control.

Estimation results from model with democratic WBEB control (counts)

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.256***	0.336***	0.330***	0.290**	0.197	0.207*	-0.004	0.132	0.231*
	(0.075)	(0.095)	(0.110)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.129)	(0.120)
Project Cost (logged)	0.285***	0.268***	0.253***	0.253***	0.259***	0.254***	0.414***	0.131***	0.298***
	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.057)
Global Public Good	-0.475***	-0.457***	-0.439***	-0.440***	-0.507***	-0.513***	-0.559***	-0.589***	-0.507***
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.100)
Democratic Countries on WBEB (Count)	0.012	0.014	-0.003	0.015	0.036	0.044	-0.005	0.040	0.044
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.056)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.060	-0.117	-0.167**	-0.171**	-0.161**	-0.169**	-0.192***	-0.178**
		(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Population (logged)		0.068**	0.063*	-0.043	-0.021	-0.035	-0.155***	-0.056	-0.039
		(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Corruption			-0.118**	-0.089*	-0.088*	-0.057	-0.102	-0.098	-0.086
			(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.058)
Investment Profile			-0.032	-0.037	-0.027	-0.022	-0.078**	-0.033	-0.028
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.032)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.068***	0.088***	0.088***	0.179***	0.087***	0.094***
				(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.024)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.092	-0.073	-0.094	-0.076	0.026	-0.063
				(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.123)	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.112)
Security Council Member					-0.552***	-0.498***	-0.525***	-0.590***	-0.582***
					(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.173)	(0.148)	(0.155)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.217	0.229	0.207	0.225	0.247	0.237	0.366	0.152	0.268
Correct Predictions in %	81.89	82.08	79.51	81.10	81.45	81.43	82.47	70.30	80.10

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Estimation results with count of democracies in WBEB as control.

Estimation results from model with democratic WBEB control (shares)

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.254***	0.333***	0.330***	0.290**	0.198*	0.208*	-0.004	0.132	0.234**
	(0.075)	(0.095)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.148)	(0.128)	(0.119)
Project Cost (logged)	0.286***	0.270***	0.255***	0.255***	0.261***	0.255***	0.415***	0.132***	0.300***
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.057)
Global Public Good	-0.485***	-0.466***	-0.452***	-0.450***	-0.511***	-0.518***	-0.563***	-0.592***	-0.508***
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.100)
Democratic Countries on WBEB (Share)	-0.755	-0.657	-1.180	-0.659	0.152	0.339	-0.369	0.457	0.649
	(1.117)	(1.113)	(1.291)	(1.298)	(1.329)	(1.523)	(1.549)	(1.550)	(1.359)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.060	-0.115	-0.165**	-0.169**	-0.159**	-0.169**	-0.192***	-0.176**
		(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Population (logged)		0.068**	0.062*	-0.042	-0.020	-0.034	-0.154***	-0.056	-0.038
		(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Corruption			-0.120**	-0.091*	-0.089*	-0.057	-0.103	-0.098	-0.085
			(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.058)
Investment Profile			-0.034	-0.039	-0.029	-0.024	-0.079**	-0.035	-0.029
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.032)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.068***	0.088***	0.088***	0.179***	0.087***	0.093***
				(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.024)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.090	-0.072	-0.094	-0.075	0.027	-0.063
				(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.122)	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.112)
Security Council Member					-0.552***	-0.500***	-0.526***	-0.590***	-0.582***
					(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.173)	(0.148)	(0.155)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1949	1925	1503	1503	1321	1260	1004	808	1166
Pseudo R^2	0.217	0.229	0.207	0.225	0.247	0.237	0.366	0.152	0.268
Correct Predictions in %	81.79	82.03	79.51	80.64	80.92	80.79	82.37	70.42	80.19

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Estimation results with share of democracies in WBEB as control.

Estimation results with large GEF projects excluded

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model
Democracy	0.327***	0.318**	0.396**	0.311*	0.231	0.231	0.083	-0.002	0.152
	(0.122)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.192)	(0.255)	(0.171)
Project Cost (logged)	0.488***	0.480***	0.507***	0.523***	0.514***	0.514***	0.493***	0.200	0.471***
	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.144)	(0.075)
Global Public Good	-0.424***	-0.398***	-0.338**	-0.323**	-0.366***	-0.366***	-0.443***	-0.315	-0.378***
	(0.112)	(0.118)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.215)	(0.143)
GDP p.c. (logged)		-0.108	-0.207*	-0.256**	-0.261**	-0.261**	-0.251**	-0.275*	-0.246*
		(0.085)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.167)	(0.132)
Population (logged)		0.076*	0.077*	-0.112*	-0.094	-0.094	-0.110	-0.133	-0.104
		(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.095)	(0.067)
Corruption			-0.053	-0.013	-0.029	-0.029	-0.084	0.087	-0.025
			(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.140)	(0.085)
Investment Profile			-0.097***	-0.109***	-0.105**	-0.105**	-0.118***	-0.079	-0.086**
			(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.043)
IBRD Projects (cum. #)				0.124***	0.129***	0.129***	0.182***	0.118***	0.140***
				(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.035)
WB Executive Board Member				-0.071	-0.213	-0.213	-0.378	0.013	-0.201
				(0.159)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.231)	(0.294)	(0.201)
Security Council Member					-0.143	-0.143	-0.010	-0.480	-0.175
					(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.308)	(0.306)	(0.284)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Time Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1152	1129	799	799	749	747	638	230	633
Pseudo R^2	0.204	0.232	0.256	0.291	0.299	0.298	0.329	0.203	0.279
Correct Predictions in %	88.89	88.40	87.61	88.36	88.52	88.49	88.09	73.91	86.89

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: World Bank Implemented Project.
Models (6) and (7) exclude years before 1994 and after 2006.
Model (8) excludes enabling activity projects.
Model (9) excludes multifocal projects.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Estimation results from probit model without large GEF projects.

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