Online appendix for *The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs*

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1 Sources utilized for building dataset on administrative crackdown

- The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project
- International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)
- USAID Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index
- USAID NGO Sustainability Index
- NGO Law Monitor
- Civicus Civil Society Index Reports
- World Movement for Democracy Defending Civil Society Reports
- Amnesty International Annual Reports
- Human Rights Watch Annual Reports
- Council on Foundations
- International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law
- Freedom House Annual Reports
- European Center for Not-for-Profit Law
- Legislationonline.org
- United States Department of State Human Rights Reports

2 Micro-states excluded from the analysis

- Vatican City
- Monaco
- Nauru
- Tuvalu
- San Marino
- Liechtenstein
- Marshall Islands Saint Kitts and Nevis
- Maldives
- Malta
- Grenada

- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- Barbados
- Antigua and Barbuda
- Seychelles
- Palau
- Andorra
- Saint Lucia
- Federated States of Micronesia
- Tonga
- Dominica
- Kiribati
- Sao Tome and Principe
- Samoa
- Brunei
- Vanuatu
- Bahamas
- Belize
- Iceland

3 States that have adopted both administrative and violent crackdown

States that adopt barriers to foreign funding for NGOs and violently attacked NGOs frequently (above 90 percentile) in the same year: Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Moldova, Russia, Belarus, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Bahrain, North Korea, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, India (post-2010), Tunisia (Pre-Revolution)

States that impose barriers to political activities by NGOs and violently attacked NGOs frequently (above 90 percentile) in the same year: New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, North Korea, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Niger, Belarus, Moldova, ireland, Czech Republic, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras, Cuba

4 Coding Rules - Administrative Crackdown

Table 1: Coding Rules - Administrative Crackdown

Barriers to Entry for NGOs	
Are NGOs required to register with the government?	Yes (1); No (0)
Is NGO registration burdensome? Yes if characterized by vague or onerous procedures and often subject to delay	Yes (1); No (0)
Can NGOs appeal if denied registration?	Yes (1); No (0)
Are barriers to entry different for NGOs receiving foreign funding?	Less burdensome (-1); Same (0); More burdensome (1)
Barriers to Funding for NGOs	
Do NGOs have to disclose funding sources to government?	Yes (1); No (0)
Do NGOs need prior approval from govt. to receive foreign funding?	Yes (1); No (0)
Are NGOs reqd. to channel foreign funding through state-owned banks or government ministries?	Yes (1); No (0)
Are any additional restrictions on foreign support in place? If so, detail.	Yes (1); No (0)
Are all NGOs prohibited from receiving foreign funds?	No (0); Up to a certain threshold (1); Yes (2)
Are a category of NGOs prohibited from receiving foreign funds?	No (0); Up to a certain threshold (1); Yes (2)
Barriers to Advocacy for NGOs	
Are NGOs restricted from engaging in political activities?	Yes (1); No (0)
Are restrictions on political activities different for NGOs receiving foreign funds?	Less restrictive (-1); Same (0); More restrictive (1)

5 Additional analysis

5.1 Random Effects

Table 2: Crackdown against NGOs, 1990-2013

	(1) Barriers to Foreign Funding	(2) Barriers to Political Activities	(3) Violence against NGO Activists
Electoral competitiveness	0.437**	-0.0206	0.00855
	(0.223)	(0.193)	(0.0153)
Protest (lag)	-0.104	-0.058	0.0104***
	(0.283)	(0.114)	(0.00365)
Polity (lag)	-0.473***	-0.19**	-0.0501***
	(0.127)	(0.08)	(0.00620)
Civil War	0.270	0.164	0.171*
	(2.949)	(0.866)	(0.0788)
GDP (logged)	1.245	2.01***	-0.115
	(1.016)	(0.75)	(0.0712)
Population (logged)	-1.667	-1.40*	0.458***
	(1.047)	(0.742)	(0.0998)
Aid dependence (lagged)	-6.298	33.65***	3.374***
	(17.42)	(11.47)	(0.686)
Neighborhood effects (lag)	56.44***	45.75***	
	(10.32)	(5.92)	
Overall repression	-0.853	-0.46	0.109***
	(0.720)	(0.487)	(0.0312)
constant	-21.05	-62.205	-6.580***
	(27.31)	(18.06)	(1.442)
Log-likelihood	-65.9705	-132.094	-3041.8108
$\ln(\alpha)$			-0.0139
			(0.143)
Observations	1852	1852	1052

Note: Estimates in column 1 and 2 are from a logistic regression panel analysis, while those in column 3 are from a zero-inflated poisson model, all include random effects. The unit of observation is country-year. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.2 Robustness checks - other tactics of administrative crackdown

Table 3: Crackdown against NGOs using various administrative crackdown tactics, 1990-2013

	(1) Burdensome Registration	(2) Channel funds through govt banks	(3) Restrictions on Foreign Support
Electoral Competitiveness	0.41**	1.179*	0.431**
	(0.182)	(0.669)	(0.210)
Protest (lagged)	-0.103	-0.160	-0.232*
	(0.08)	(0.361)	(0.121)
Polity (lagged)	-0.213**	-4.261***	-0.219**
	(0.104)	(1.340)	(0.110)
Civil War	-3.48**	-2.069	-2.391*
	(1.46)	(4.696)	(1.392)
GDP (logged)	0.496	4.137**	5.084***
	(0.671)	(1.928)	(0.844)
Population (logged)	-0.113*	-0.724	-0.817
	(0.842)	(2.125)	(1.017)
Aid Dependence (lag)	13.8*	80.33***	9.924
	(8.32)	(26.81)	(9.196)
Overall Repression	-0.702	3.057*	0.726*
	(0.434)	(1.576)	(0.379)
Constant	-22.29	-221.5***	-142.9***
	(13.18)	(36.95)	(15.05)
Log-likelihood	-141.513	-29.801	-153.845
Observations	1067	1743	1791

Note: Results based on a logistic regression panel analysis with random effects. The unit of observation is country-year. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.3 Accounting for reporting bias

Table 4: Crackdown against NGOs, alternative variables to account for reporting bias

	(1) Violence against NGO activists	(2) CSO Repression VDEM
Electoral Competitiveness	-0.0366 (0.0255)	-0.0417 (0.0337)
Anti-system movements	0.204*** (0.0444)	0.142** (0.0625)
Polity (lag)	-0.0270*** (0.00859)	-0.252*** (0.0114)
Civil wars	-0.0771 (0.149)	0.0379 (0.186)
GDP (logged)	0.102 (0.0810)	-0.332*** (0.0770)
Population (logged)	0.174** (0.0691)	0.288*** (0.0755)
Aid Dependence (lag)	0.299 (1.199)	-5.250*** (1.221)
Overall Repression	0.0302 (0.0566)	0.334*** (0.0630)
Constant	-4.106** (1.918)	
inflate		
Polity IV	0.107*** (0.0126)	
Observations	1053	1862

Note: Estimates in column 1 are from a zero-inflated poisson model while those in column 2 are from an ordered logit model. Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.4 Crackdown using both violent & administrative means

Table 5: Crackdown against NGOs using both violent and administrative crackdown, 1990-2013

	(1) Both repression
Electoral Competitiveness	-0.155 (0.165)
Protest (lag)	-0.174 (0.110)
Polity (lag)	0.0219 (0.0598)
Civil War	-2.701* (1.117)
GDP (logged)	1.297* (0.538)
Population (logged)	-0.639 (0.494)
Aid Dependence (lag)	14.47* (7.092)
Overall Repression	0.116 (0.324)
Rule of Law	-0.985 (0.666)
Constant	-36.71** (12.37)
Log-likelihood	-195.543
Observations	958

Note: Results are based on a logistic regression panel analysis with random effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.5 Administrative crackdown using index of obstruction

Table 6: Administrative crackdown against NGOs (overall) using the index of obstruction, 1990-2013

	(1) Index of Anti-NGO Laws
Electoral Competitiveness	0.0506* (0.0297)
Protest (lag)	-0.00322 (0.0137)
Polity (lag)	-0.0553*** (0.00867)
Civil War	0.0378 (0.167)
GDP (logged)	0.127** (0.0587)
Population (logged)	0.0105 (0.0568)
Aid dependence (lag)	-0.766 (0.957)
Neighborhood effects	1.185* (0.703)
Overall Repression	0.124** (0.0518)
Constant	0.897 (0.796)
Observations	1776

Notes: Results are based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$