It's My Party and I'll Lie If I Want To: Elite Ideological Obfuscation in Post-Authoritarian Settings

Cesar Zucco and Timothy J. Power

— Supplemental Information[1] —

Table of Contents for Supplemental Information

A	Measuring obfuscation through legislator surveys	2
B	Results for Individual and Party Obfuscation	3
C	Longitudinal Analysis including PELA data	4
D	Freshmen v. Veteran BLS Respondents	5

[1]This document and replication materials are available in https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JFSEPS."

Appendix A Measuring obfuscation through legislator surveys

The hypothesis that were assessed cross-nationally in Section 4 employed a combined data set from the PELA and BLS projects. We sought to use the earliest elite surveys available for this analysis and, in fact, we would have liked to use data from the turn of the 1980s through the 1990s. However, for many countries, PELA surveys only began in the second half of the 1990s or even later (as in the case of Brazil). Hence, we set 1988 as the cutpoint, and included all surveys from both projects taken that year or before. This was the earliest date that guaranteed at least one survey for each of the ten South American countries, and it implied using one or two PELA surveys for nine countries, and three BLS surveys for Brazil. In countries for which more than one wave was available, we pooled all waves for analysis.

We handled all of these surveys in the same way. We first kept only our main variables of interest: party affiliation, self-placement, placement of one's own party, and average placements of all parties by non-members, which is our measure of "party reputation."), as well as weights (whenever relevant), and year of birth of respondent. When then computed our measures of total, party, and individual ideological obfuscation, as defined in Section 2.

The only slightly more controversial coding decision is which responses qualify as belonging to a right-of-center party. This coding was complicated, in some instances, by the aggregation in PELA of several parties under the label "others", and the lack of distinction between party-factions in the case of Uruguay.

Table A1 reports sample sizes, number of survey waves, as well as the share of the sample that was labeled as "right-of-center" and the parties that we codes as such. Table A2, subsequently, reports the exact same results that were presented graphically in Figure 2, in the main body of the paper.

Table A1: Comparative Sample

	N	Waves	Right	Parties in right
Argentina	196	2	0.16	"Provinciales" and "other" if own party placed > 5
Bolivia	172	2	0.65	ADN, UCS, and MNR
Brazil	595	3	0.47	All estimated to be right of median
Chile	182	2	0.39	RN, UDI, and "other" if own party placed > 5
Colombia	88	1	0.33	PC
Ecuador	184	2	0.27	PSC
Paraguay	112	2	0.50	ANR
Peru	87	1	0.60	AP
Uruguay	73	1	0.30	PN
Venezuela	69	1	0.26	COPEI

Table A2: Comparative Results

	Left-of-center			Right-of-center		
	Est.	SE	Pr(>|t|)	Est.	SE	Pr(>|t|)
Argentina	-1.05	0.14	0.00	-2.67	0.14	0.00
Bolivia	-2.17	0.29	0.00	-2.69	0.18	0.00
Brazil	-0.42	0.08	0.00	-2.30	0.09	0.00
Chile	-0.05	0.11	0.65	-1.54	0.14	0.00
Colombia	-1.27	0.20	0.00	-1.53	0.26	0.00
Ecuador	-0.56	0.19	0.00	-1.41	0.27	0.00
Paraguay	-1.24	0.22	0.00	-2.29	0.22	0.00
Peru	-0.79	0.33	0.02	-0.95	0.27	0.00
Uruguay	-0.73	0.20	0.00	-2.50	0.31	0.00
Venezuela	0.43	0.26	0.10	-0.45	0.30	0.14

Appendix B Results for Individual and Party Obfuscation

Figure B1 reports *party* and individual right-of-center obfuscation. As defined earlier, *total* obfuscation is the some of the two (sums are sometimes not exact due to missing data, only).

Since party obfuscation is typically 2 to 3 times larger than individual obfuscation, the ordering of countries in Figure B1a is very similar to what we reported in Figure 2. Chile is, perhaps, exceptional in having very low individual obfuscation and reasonably high party obfuscation, and Ecuador in having similar values for party and individual obfuscation (that is, relatively low party obfuscation). We have not yet theorized about factors that can affect party and individual obfuscation differently.



(a) Party Obfuscation (b) Individual Obfuscation

Figure B1: Party and Total Obfuscation

Notes: Figure shows total and individual obfuscation, party obfuscation is the difference between the two.

Figure B2 is equivalent to Figure 3, but reports individual-obfuscation instead of total obfuscation. This figure shows that, as with total obsfuscation, this is phenomenon of the right and, in the early democratic period, of the authoritarian right in particular, and that it has eased in recent periods (though less markedly than with total obfuscation).



Figure B2: Individual obfuscation over time, by ideology and authoritarian legacy, Brazil
Notes: Figure shows individual ideological obfuscation by wave. 95% confidence intervals are shown about the left-of-center and right-of-center groups. The right-of-center group is further subdivided into those with and without personal affiliations with the authoritarian regime, represented by the dashed lines.

Appendix C Longitudinal Analysis including PELA data

In the main paper we report the longitudinal analysis of the Brazilian case based only on the nine waves of the BLS. We did not include the three waves of PELA in Brazil because the analysis of H3 requires knowing the pre-democracy affiliation of respondents and this information is only available in the BLS.

It is possible to examine the basic patterns of obfuscation in both the BLS and the PELA data. In Figure C1 we report how obfuscation varied over time among left-of-center and right-of-center legislators. In this figure, the 2005 PELA wave is merged with the 2005 wave of the BLS while the 2010 and 2014 PELA waves are shown as separate data points. The overall figure shows less obfuscation by left-of-center legislators than right-of-center ones, a difference that was less pronounced between 2009 and 2014 but visible in all other periods The most important finding of the paper is strong obfuscation by the right through 2009 and an acute reduction in obfuscation after this date.

Appendix D Freshmen v. Veteran BLS Respondents

We identified the heterogeneity between the post-PT freshmen and the more experienced members of the younger cohort inductively, while examining the data from BLS for the moment in which obfuscation on the right faded. Figure D1 was particularly important in identifying the post-PT freshmen as the culprit. It shows that there was no differences between freshmen and veteran right-of-center legislators until the 2017–2021 period.



Figure C1: Individual obfuscation over time, by ideology , including PELA data

Notes: Figure shows individual ideological obfuscation by wave. 95% confidence intervals are shown.

The difference between veterans and freshman is statistically significant in 2017 (F= 4.1 $p = 0.04$) but not for 2021 (F= 1.7, p= 0.19). When we combine the last two waves, as in Figure D1, the difference between veterans and freshmen is significant (F= 6.3, p= 0.01).



Figure D1: Obfuscation over time, by experience

Notes: Figure shows our measure of ideological obfuscation by wave. 95% confidence intervals are shown about obfuscation for the non-authoritarian legacy right-of-center subgroup.