Supplemental Materials for
"Using the Carrot as the Stick:
Foreign Aid and the Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions Threats"

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Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Sanctions Outcomes	463	-0.26	0.74	-2	1
U.S. Foreign Aid	463	95.44	414.95	-291.47	6258.25
High Salience Issue	463	0.16	0.37	0	1
IO Support	463	0.10	0.30	0	1
Target Economic Size	463	10.50	2.22	4.86	15.39
Target Democracy	463	0.50	0.50	0	1
Target Trade Dependence	415	0.16	0.16	0	1.12
Political Affinity	459	-0.23	0.32	-1	0.90
U.S. Defense Pact	463	0.34	0.47	0	1
Post-Cold War	463	0.68	0.47	0	1
Time	463	2.75	2.57	1	18

Table A2: Correlation Matrix

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1. *Sanctions Outcomes*	1										
2. *U.S. Foreign Aid*	-0.07	1									
3. *High Salience Issue*	-0.06	0.22	1								
4. *IO Support*	-0.04	0.00	0.31	1							
5. *Target Economic Size*	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	1						
6. *Target Democracy*	0.06	0.01	-0.16	-0.30	0.24	1					
7. *Target Trade Dependence*	-0.07	0.12	0.12	-0.01	-0.19	-0.07	1				
8. *Political Affinity*	-0.05	0.15	0.27	-0.06	0.03	0.05	0.02	1			
9. *U.S. Defense Pact*	-0.11	0.01	0.10	-0.07	-0.08	0.17	0.54	0.25	1		
10. *Post-Cold War*	0.06	-0.16	-0.41	-0.12	-0.04	0.33	-0.06	-0.47	-0.17	1	
11. *Time*	0.11	-0.11	-0.14	-0.15	0.34	0.05	-0.20	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	1

Table A3: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using Current Year Economic Data

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.323		0.358		-1.054
		(0.49)		(0.47)		(0.78)
IO Support		1.122**		1.046*		-0.154
		(0.46)		(0.57)		(0.76)
Target Economic Size		0.022		-0.161**		0.369***
		(0.10)		(0.07)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.451		0.047		-1.494***
		(0.42)		(0.35)		(0.48)
Target Trade Dependence		1.673		0.619		0.607
		(1.06)		(0.94)		(1.30)
Political Affinity		0.214		-0.402		0.840
		(0.67)		(0.53)		(0.85)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.534		0.020		1.077**
		(0.44)		(0.41)		(0.47)
Post-Cold War		0.089		-0.594		1.043
		(0.56)		(0.37)		(0.83)
Time	1.076**	1.261**	-2.790*	-2.089	-2.486***	-2.043**
	(0.53)	(0.56)	(1.48)	(1.58)	(0.84)	(0.92)
Time^2	-0.234**	-0.244**	1.102**	0.877	0.461***	0.370**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Time^3	0.010**	0.010**	-0.132**	-0.109*	-0.022***	-0.018**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.892***	-3.412***	1.050	2.108*	0.269	-4.535***
	(0.62)	(1.30)	(1.08)	(1.25)	(0.86)	(1.70)
Observations	463	413	463	413	463	413
Pseudo-R^2	0.077	0.130	0.077	0.130	0.077	0.130

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A4: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using Robust Standard Errors

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.323		0.358		-1.054
		(0.54)		(0.38)		(0.74)
IO Support		1.122**		1.046**		-0.154
		(0.53)		(0.43)		(0.79)
Target Economic Size		0.022		-0.161**		0.369***
		(0.11)		(0.07)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.451		0.047		-1.494***
		(0.46)		(0.31)		(0.52)
Target Trade Dependence		1.673		0.619		0.607
		(1.37)		(0.97)		(1.34)
Political Affinity		0.214		-0.402		0.840
		(0.72)		(0.50)		(0.96)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.534		0.020		1.077**
		(0.49)		(0.36)		(0.52)
Post-Cold War		0.089		-0.594*		1.043
		(0.55)		(0.35)		(0.78)
Time	1.076**	1.261***	-2.790*	-2.089	-2.486***	-2.043**
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(1.51)	(1.62)	(0.72)	(0.81)
Time^2	-0.234**	-0.244**	1.102*	0.877	0.461***	0.370**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.58)	(0.63)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Time^3	0.010**	0.010**	-0.132**	-0.109	-0.022***	-0.018**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.892***	-3.412***	1.050	2.108	0.269	-4.535***
	(0.57)	(1.28)	(1.08)	(1.32)	(0.70)	(1.71)
Observations	463	413	463	413	463	413
Pseudo-R^2	0.077	0.130	0.077	0.130	0.077	0.130

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A5: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using Standard Errors Clustered by Country

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.323		0.358		-1.054
		(0.49)		(0.47)		(0.78)
IO Support		1.122**		1.046*		-0.154
		(0.46)		(0.57)		(0.76)
Target Economic Size		0.022		-0.161**		0.369***
		(0.10)		(0.07)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.451		0.047		-1.494***
		(0.42)		(0.35)		(0.48)
Target Trade Dependence		1.673		0.619		0.607
		(1.06)		(0.94)		(1.30)
Political Affinity		0.214		-0.402		0.840
		(0.67)		(0.53)		(0.85)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.534		0.020		1.077**
		(0.44)		(0.41)		(0.47)
Post-Cold War		0.089		-0.594		1.043
		(0.56)		(0.37)		(0.83)
Time	1.076**	1.261**	-2.790*	-2.089	-2.486***	-2.043**
	(0.53)	(0.56)	(1.48)	(1.58)	(0.84)	(0.92)
$Time^2$	-0.234**	-0.244**	1.102**	0.877	0.461***	0.370**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.15)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.010**	0.010**	-0.132**	-0.109*	-0.022***	-0.018**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.892***	-3.412***	1.050	2.108*	0.269	-4.535***
	(0.62)	(1.30)	(1.08)	(1.25)	(0.86)	(1.70)
Observations	463	413	463	413	463	413
Pseudo-R^2	0.077	0.130	0.077	0.130	0.077	0.130

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A6: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using Multinomial Probit with Dyadic Clustered Robust Standard Errors

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.232		0.288		-0.570
		(0.34)		(0.37)		(0.44)
IO Support		0.846***		0.855*		0.167
		(0.33)		(0.45)		(0.50)
Target Economic Size		0.025		-0.122**		0.219***
		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.08)
Target Democracy		-0.306		0.015		-0.925***
		(0.28)		(0.27)		(0.31)
Target Trade Dependence		1.165		0.530		0.425
		(0.72)		(0.75)		(0.89)
Political Affinity		0.170		-0.273		0.269
		(0.44)		(0.40)		(0.51)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.335		0.048		0.596*
		(0.29)		(0.31)		(0.31)
Post-Cold War		0.043		-0.410		0.409
		(0.35)		(0.28)		(0.45)
Time	0.632*	0.771**	-2.160*	-1.674	-1.410***	-1.112**
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(1.11)	(1.20)	(0.48)	(0.55)
$Time^2$	-0.140**	-0.151**	0.835**	0.688	0.254***	0.196**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.08)	(0.10)
$Time^3$	0.006**	0.007**	-0.099**	-0.084*	-0.012***	-0.009**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-1.985***	-2.444***	0.800	1.593	-0.144	-2.890***
	(0.41)	(0.90)	(0.81)	(0.99)	(0.53)	(1.07)
Observations	463	413	463	413	463	413

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A7: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats with High Leverage Egypt Cases Excluded

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.410		0.254		-1.020
		(0.49)		(0.47)		(0.81)
IO Support		1.127**		1.037*		-0.026
		(0.45)		(0.57)		(0.76)
Target Economic Size		0.020		-0.145**		0.416***
		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.11)
Target Democracy		-0.432		-0.030		-1.503***
		(0.41)		(0.34)		(0.52)
Target Trade Dependence		1.725		0.545		0.735
		(1.05)		(0.91)		(1.37)
Political Affinity		0.170		-0.484		0.930
		(0.66)		(0.53)		(0.95)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.534		0.083		1.238**
		(0.44)		(0.40)		(0.48)
Post-Cold War		0.206		-0.650*		1.685*
		(0.60)		(0.39)		(0.97)
Time	1.057**	1.224**	-2.714*	-2.111	-2.389***	-1.893**
	(0.53)	(0.55)	(1.47)	(1.57)	(0.83)	(0.92)
$Time^2$	-0.233**	-0.240**	1.087*	0.889	0.443***	0.343**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.15)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.010**	0.010**	-0.132**	-0.110*	-0.021***	-0.016**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.769***	-3.348**	0.967	2.116	0.201	-6.025***
	(0.61)	(1.31)	(1.06)	(1.31)	(0.87)	(1.68)
Observations	461	411	461	411	461	411
Pseudo-R^2	0.076	0.129	0.076	0.129	0.076	0.129

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Figure A1: Marginal Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on U.S. Backing Down with All Episodes



Figure A2: Marginal Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on U.S. Backing Down, Excluding the Egypt High Leverage Episodes



Table A8: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using Only the Public Aid Threat Episodes

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001***	0.001***	0.002**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.225		0.460		-16.343***
		(0.82)		(0.65)		(2.30)
IO Support		1.908**		-0.123		0.606
		(0.79)		(1.35)		(1.30)
Target Economic Size		-0.252**		-0.200**		0.208
		(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.16)
Target Democracy		-0.371		0.222		-0.722
		(0.63)		(0.38)		(0.72)
Target Trade Dependence		2.465**		-0.852		-1.016
		(1.00)		(1.15)		(1.69)
Political Affinity		1.235		-0.554		0.877
		(0.94)		(0.73)		(1.36)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.990		0.541		1.788***
		(0.74)		(0.43)		(0.62)
Post-Cold War		1.110		-0.937		1.124
		(1.25)		(0.63)		(1.28)
Time	1.384**	1.390**	-0.517	-0.151	-3.713***	-3.254**
	(0.59)	(0.59)	(1.48)	(1.60)	(1.35)	(1.39)
Time^2	-0.262**	-0.224**	0.424	0.309	0.703***	0.590**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Time^3	0.011**	0.009**	-0.069	-0.056	-0.034***	-0.028**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.672***	-1.778	-1.241	0.942	0.980	-2.576
	(0.83)	(1.80)	(1.12)	(1.49)	(1.24)	(2.08)
Observations	359	311	359	311	359	311
Pseudo-R^2	0.110	0.161	0.110	0.161	0.110	0.161

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A9: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats with an Interaction between *Public Aid Threat* and *U.S. Foreign Aid* (Not Referenced in the Published Version)

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001	0.000	-0.011	-0.013*	0.004**	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Public Aid Threat	-1.070***	-1.191**	-0.311	0.071	-0.872	-0.650
	(0.41)	(0.59)	(0.34)	(0.45)	(0.62)	(0.67)
USFA x PAT	0.000	0.001	0.012*	0.014**	-0.003*	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.703		0.202		-1.265
		(0.57)		(0.46)		(0.80)
IO Support		0.713		1.067*		-0.268
		(0.54)		(0.61)		(0.78)
Target Economic Size		-0.087		-0.139*		0.316**
		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.16)
Target Democracy		-0.350		-0.071		-1.378**
		(0.44)		(0.34)		(0.54)
Target Trade Dependence		1.920*		0.471		0.562
		(1.01)		(0.91)		(1.37)
Political Affinity		0.338		-0.429		0.419
		(0.67)		(0.53)		(0.81)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.437		0.081		1.182***
		(0.50)		(0.39)		(0.45)
Post-Cold War		0.336		-0.624		1.373*
		(0.58)		(0.41)		(0.76)
Time	1.153**	1.228**	-2.495*	-1.950	-2.488***	-2.085**
	(0.57)	(0.57)	(1.47)	(1.57)	(0.87)	(0.93)
$Time^2$	-0.242**	-0.229**	1.022*	0.841	0.471***	0.385**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.16)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.011**	0.010**	-0.126**	-0.106	-0.023***	-0.018**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.145***	-1.392	1.004	1.871	0.880	-3.993*
	(0.64)	(1.41)	(1.11)	(1.47)	(0.86)	(2.09)
Observations	463	413	463	413	463	413
Pseudo-R^2	0.096	0.139	0.096	0.139	0.096	0.139

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Figure A3: Predictive Margins of *Pubic Aid Threats* on Threat Success Across the Values of *U.S. Foreign Aid* (Not Referenced in the Published Version)



Figure A4: Predictive Margins of *Pubic Aid Threats* on Sanctions Imposition Across the Values of *U.S. Foreign Aid* (Not Referenced in the Published Version)



Table A10: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using the Lagged Value of *U.S. Foreign Aid*

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001**	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.397		0.218		-1.218
		(0.48)		(0.47)		(0.94)
IO Support		1.119**		0.998*		-0.042
		(0.44)		(0.58)		(0.74)
Target Economic Size		0.024		-0.136*		0.431***
		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.407		-0.028		-1.570***
		(0.40)		(0.34)		(0.51)
Target Trade Dependence		1.771*		0.495		0.550
		(1.01)		(0.90)		(1.39)
Political Affinity		0.213		-0.533		0.753
		(0.67)		(0.53)		(0.90)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.556		0.113		1.253**
		(0.44)		(0.39)		(0.49)
Post-Cold War		0.220		-0.629		1.762*
		(0.60)		(0.39)		(0.92)
Time	1.055**	1.222**	-2.553*	-2.019	-2.418***	-1.939**
	(0.53)	(0.56)	(1.48)	(1.56)	(0.83)	(0.92)
$Time^2$	-0.234**	-0.242**	1.040*	0.860	0.448***	0.352**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.15)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.010**	0.010**	-0.128**	-0.108*	-0.021***	-0.017**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.744***	-3.380**	0.807	1.921	0.218	-6.217***
	(0.62)	(1.32)	(1.07)	(1.32)	(0.85)	(1.66)
Observations	461	411	461	411	461	411
Pseudo-R^2	0.076	0.129	0.076	0.129	0.076	0.129

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A11: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using the Value of *U.S. Foreign Aid* Before the Threat was Issued

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Before Threat U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.440		0.209		-1.200
		(0.48)		(0.47)		(0.91)
IO Support		1.135**		0.990*		-0.049
		(0.44)		(0.58)		(0.73)
Target Economic Size		0.028		-0.133*		0.432***
		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.11)
Target Democracy		-0.409		-0.020		-1.558***
		(0.40)		(0.34)		(0.51)
Target Trade Dependence		1.763*		0.526		0.597
		(1.00)		(0.91)		(1.37)
Political Affinity		0.172		-0.559		0.750
		(0.67)		(0.53)		(0.89)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.550		0.107		1.240**
		(0.43)		(0.39)		(0.49)
Post-Cold War		0.218		-0.645*		1.752*
		(0.60)		(0.38)		(0.93)
Time	1.072**	1.243**	-2.623*	-2.085	-2.417***	-1.931**
	(0.53)	(0.56)	(1.49)	(1.58)	(0.83)	(0.92)
$Time^2$	-0.237**	-0.245**	1.069*	0.887	0.448***	0.350**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.15)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.011**	0.011**	-0.131**	-0.111*	-0.021***	-0.017**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.760***	-3.455**	0.866	1.939	0.235	-6.218***
	(0.62)	(1.34)	(1.08)	(1.33)	(0.84)	(1.65)
Observations	461	411	461	411	461	411
Pseudo-R^2	0.076	0.129	0.076	0.129	0.076	0.129

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A12: The Effects of Increasing and Decreasing Foreign Aid Flows on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Declining U.S. Aid	0.077	-0.006	1.250***	1.593***	0.369	0.190
	(0.43)	(0.58)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.56)	(0.64)
Increasing U.S. Aid	0.350	0.543	0.729**	1.351***	-0.915	-1.319
	(0.41)	(0.50)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.72)	(0.87)
High Salience Issue		-0.228		0.595		-1.017
		(0.49)		(0.47)		(0.73)
IO Support		1.166***		1.075*		-0.429
		(0.43)		(0.65)		(0.75)
Target Economic Size		0.035		-0.028		0.414***
		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.327		0.129		-1.681***
		(0.39)		(0.33)		(0.55)
Target Trade Dependence		1.996*		0.248		1.107
		(1.10)		(0.92)		(1.26)
Political Affinity		0.438		-0.436		0.515
		(0.73)		(0.56)		(1.10)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.669		-0.208		1.295***
		(0.49)		(0.37)		(0.45)
Post-Cold War		0.055		-0.972**		1.810*
		(0.61)		(0.42)		(0.93)
Time	0.956*	1.124**	-2.494*	-1.841	-2.381***	-1.854**
	(0.52)	(0.54)	(1.48)	(1.61)	(0.84)	(0.94)
Time^2	-0.214**	-0.221*	0.997*	0.809	0.435***	0.326*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.56)	(0.61)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Time^3	0.010**	0.009*	-0.121**	-0.104	-0.020***	-0.015*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.726***	-3.459**	0.184	-0.228	0.371	-5.825***
	(0.66)	(1.47)	(1.14)	(1.49)	(0.84)	(1.78)
Observations	461	411	461	411	461	411
Pseudo-R^2	0.086	0.146	0.086	0.146	0.086	0.146

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A13: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Excluding the Cases of Negative *U.S. Aid Foreign Aid* Values

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001***	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.275		0.242		-1.167
		(0.55)		(0.49)		(0.90)
IO Support		1.047*		1.484**		0.150
		(0.59)		(0.65)		(0.84)
Target Economic Size		-0.025		-0.261***		0.414***
		(0.11)		(0.09)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.293		0.064		-1.292**
		(0.42)		(0.39)		(0.50)
Target Trade Dependence		1.799*		0.982		0.975
		(1.05)		(0.99)		(1.30)
Political Affinity		0.215		-0.443		0.737
		(0.69)		(0.63)		(0.88)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.531		-0.215		1.036**
		(0.49)		(0.42)		(0.45)
Post-Cold War		0.262		-0.647		1.432*
		(0.63)		(0.44)		(0.84)
Time	0.959*	1.091*	-2.423*	-1.865	-2.727***	-2.288**
	(0.56)	(0.58)	(1.47)	(1.47)	(0.90)	(0.99)
$Time^2$	-0.222*	-0.221*	0.983*	0.813	0.504***	0.412**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.16)	(0.18)
$Time^3$	0.010**	0.010*	-0.120**	-0.099*	-0.024***	-0.019**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.631***	-2.785*	0.564	2.851*	0.509	-5.495***
	(0.65)	(1.51)	(1.07)	(1.51)	(0.90)	(1.84)
Observations	420	372	420	372	420	372
Pseudo-R^2	0.085	0.144	0.085	0.144	0.085	0.144

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A14: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Excluding the Significant Foreign Aid Dependency Cases

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001*	0.001*	0.002**	0.001**	0.002**	0.002***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.151		0.304		-0.988
		(0.48)		(0.50)		(0.87)
IO Support		1.129**		0.818		-0.090
		(0.45)		(0.58)		(0.79)
Target Economic Size		0.013		-0.130*		0.407***
		(0.10)		(0.07)		(0.12)
Target Democracy		-0.300		-0.047		-1.668***
		(0.44)		(0.37)		(0.49)
Target Trade Dependence		2.691*		1.339		1.437
		(1.42)		(1.04)		(1.75)
Political Affinity		0.029		-0.473		1.133
		(0.80)		(0.60)		(1.03)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.539		-0.091		1.056**
		(0.50)		(0.42)		(0.49)
Post-Cold War		-0.101		-0.707*		1.779*
		(0.63)		(0.43)		(0.95)
Time	0.975*	1.211**	-3.143*	-2.376	-2.370***	-1.912**
	(0.57)	(0.61)	(1.77)	(1.85)	(0.84)	(0.94)
$Time^2$	-0.222*	-0.237*	1.328*	1.064	0.438***	0.351**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.68)	(0.72)	(0.15)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.010**	0.010*	-0.168**	-0.140*	-0.021***	-0.017**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.670***	-3.340**	1.162	2.097	0.222	-5.942***
	(0.65)	(1.46)	(1.26)	(1.41)	(0.87)	(1.73)
Observations	415	369	415	369	415	369
Pseudo-R^2	0.074	0.129	0.074	0.129	0.074	0.129

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A15: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats During the Cold War (Model 1) and Post-Cold War Eras (Model 2)

	Success vs. Persist		Sanctions vs. Persist		Back Down vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.000	0.004***	0.001***	0.003*	0.001*	0.003**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue	-1.453*	2.318***	-0.342	3.168***	-2.013**	0.663
	(0.78)	(0.74)	(0.54)	(0.92)	(0.83)	(1.21)
IO Support	0.695	0.777	0.929	0.060	-0.696	-1.345
	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.79)	(0.82)	(1.04)	(0.98)
Target Economic Size	0.171	-0.073	-0.182	-0.149*	0.322	0.477***
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.15)
Target Democracy	0.933	-0.615	0.141	0.023	-1.381	-2.268***
	(0.90)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.44)	(1.12)	(0.66)
Target Trade Dependence	3.361	2.665***	2.397	0.642	4.562	1.337
	(2.79)	(1.01)	(2.47)	(1.11)	(3.61)	(1.65)
Political Affinity	-0.159	0.354	-0.593	0.016	-4.136**	2.127**
	(1.40)	(1.18)	(0.65)	(0.85)	(2.04)	(0.94)
U.S. Defense Pact	-0.657	-0.708	-0.181	0.225	0.492	1.657***
	(0.87)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.47)	(1.70)	(0.52)
Time	0.809	3.155***	-4.944	1.303	-30.582**	2.375
	(0.67)	(1.20)	(3.08)	(1.87)	(13.01)	(1.78)
$Time^2$	-0.189	-0.697**	1.494	-0.018	16.170***	-1.059**
	(0.14)	(0.33)	(1.15)	(0.66)	(5.90)	(0.52)
$Time^3$	0.008	0.044*	-0.145	-0.035	-2.594***	0.095**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.79)	(0.04)
Constant	-4.589	-4.572***	5.413*	-1.975	10.452	-8.178***
	(3.01)	(1.65)	(2.88)	(1.60)	(8.16)	(2.52)
Observations	144	269	144	269	144	269
Pseudo-R^2	0.223	0.217	0.223	0.217	0.223	0.217

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A16: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Including *Oil and Gas Prod. Value*

	Success vs. Persist	Sanctions vs. Persist	Back Down vs. Persist
Variables	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue	-0.312	0.407	-1.166
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.90)
IO Support	1.093**	0.981*	-0.189
	(0.45)	(0.58)	(0.78)
Target Economic Size	0.028	-0.064	0.543***
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Target Democracy	-0.400	-0.035	-1.782***
	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.59)
Target Trade Dependence	1.561	0.408	0.213
	(1.06)	(0.89)	(1.22)
Political Affinity	0.154	-0.545	0.297
	(0.66)	(0.55)	(0.81)
U.S. Defense Pact	-0.428	0.227	1.474***
	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.53)
Post-Cold War	0.203	-0.624	1.529*
	(0.58)	(0.38)	(0.87)
Oil and Gas Production Value	-0.022	-0.061	-0.222**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Time	1.209**	-2.936*	-1.988**
	(0.55)	(1.68)	(0.91)
Time^2	-0.237**	1.197*	0.364**
	(0.11)	(0.64)	(0.16)
Time^3	0.010**	-0.144**	-0.017**
	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.379**	1.877	-6.680***
	(1.47)	(1.50)	(1.92)
Observations	402	402	402
Pseudo-R^2	0.134	0.134	0.134

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A17: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using an Interaction Term with *High Salience Issue*

	Success vs. Persist	Sanctions vs. Persist	Back Down vs. Persist
Variables	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.003***	0.001	0.003**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue	-0.128	0.199	-0.590
	(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.72)
U.S. F.A. x HSI	-0.002**	0.000	-0.014***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
IO Support	1.192***	1.037*	-0.069
	(0.46)	(0.58)	(0.74)
Target Economic Size	0.010	-0.140*	0.393***
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Target Democracy	-0.390	-0.029	-1.533***
	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.45)
Target Trade Dependence	1.853*	0.528	0.707
	(1.05)	(0.93)	(1.40)
Political Affinity	0.314	-0.448	0.888
	(0.72)	(0.55)	(0.88)
U.S. Defense Pact	-0.635	0.108	1.126**
	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.45)
Post-Cold War	0.254	-0.621	1.464*
	(0.59)	(0.39)	(0.77)
Time	1.250**	-2.069	-2.009**
	(0.55)	(1.56)	(0.93)
$Time^2$	-0.240**	0.876	0.368**
	(0.11)	(0.59)	(0.17)
$Time^3$	0.010**	-0.109*	-0.018**
	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.446**	2.053	-5.478***
	(1.35)	(1.33)	(1.64)
Observations	413	413	413
Pseudo-R^2	0.137	0.137	0.137

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Figure A5: Predictive Margins of *High Salience* on Threat Success Across the Values of *U.S. Foreign Aid*



Figure A6: Predictive Margins of *High Salience* on Sanctions Imposition Across the Values of *U.S. Foreign Aid*



Table A18: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Using U.S. Defense Pacts Coded with ATOP Data

	Success vs. Persist	Sanctions vs. Persist	Back Down vs. Persist
Variables	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue	-0.165	0.569	0.569
	(0.51)	(0.44)	(0.44)
IO Support	1.925***	1.360**	1.360**
	(0.46)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Target Economic Size	0.459***	0.034	0.034
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Target Democracy	-0.431	-0.704	-0.704
	(0.56)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Target Trade Dependence	2.252	0.851	0.851
	(1.83)	(1.30)	(1.30)
Political Affinity	0.851	0.011	0.011
	(1.28)	(0.62)	(0.62)
U.S. Defense Pact (ATOP)	-0.155	-0.177	-0.177
	(0.78)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Post-Cold War	-0.221	-1.588***	-1.588***
	(0.65)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Time	0.803	-6.419**	-6.419**
	(0.68)	(3.22)	(3.22)
$Time^2$	-0.197	2.047	2.047
	(0.16)	(1.27)	(1.27)
$Time^3$	0.009	-0.204	-0.204
	(0.01)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	-8.516***	3.915	3.915
	(2.24)	(2.50)	(2.50)
Observations	303	303	303
Pseudo-R^2	0.245	0.245	0.245

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Figure A7: Scatter Plot of Terminal Success Outcome Observations Illustrating *U.S. Foreign Aid* Values for Cases Not Included in the Statistically Significant Confidence Intervals



Notes: The red line represents the approximate boundary at which *U.S. Foreign Aid* values stop being statistically significant.

Table A19: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Excluding the Israel 1992 Outlier Case

	Success vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001*	0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.301
		(0.47)
IO Support		1.085**
		(0.45)
Target Economic Size		0.025
		(0.09)
Target Democracy		-0.437
		(0.42)
Target Trade Dependence		1.636
		(1.07)
Political Affinity		-0.032
		(0.68)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.473
		(0.44)
Post-Cold War		0.110
		(0.57)
Time	1.080**	1.253**
	(0.53)	(0.57)
Time^2	-0.238**	-0.246**
	(0.11)	(0.12)
Time^3	0.011**	0.011**
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.777***	-3.422***
	(0.62)	(1.33)
Observations	462	412
Pseudo-R^2	0.077	0.127

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A20: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Excluding All Observations Greater than $400 Million of Aid

	Success vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		-0.284
		(0.50)
IO Support		1.199***
		(0.45)
Target Economic Size		0.007
		(0.10)
Target Democracy		-0.228
		(0.43)
Target Trade Dependence		1.764
		(1.08)
Political Affinity		-0.113
		(0.70)
U.S. Defense Pact		-0.628
		(0.49)
Post-Cold War		0.018
		(0.61)
Time	1.055**	1.222**
	(0.54)	(0.56)
Time^2	-0.232**	-0.238**
	(0.11)	(0.12)
Time^3	0.010**	0.010**
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.774***	-3.276**
	(0.63)	(1.40)
Observations	443	393
Pseudo-R^2	0.068	0.118

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Figure A8: Scatter Plot of Sanctions Imposition Outcomes Observations Illustrating *U.S. Foreign Aid* Values for Cases Not Included in the Statistically Significant Confidence Intervals



Notes: The red line represents the approximate boundary at which *U.S. Foreign Aid* values stop being statistically significant.

Table A21: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Excluding the India 1965 Outlier Case

	Sanctions vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		0.268
		(0.46)
IO Support		1.052*
		(0.57)
Target Economic Size		-0.143**
		(0.07)
Target Democracy		-0.027
		(0.35)
Target Trade Dependence		0.525
		(0.91)
Political Affinity		-0.420
		(0.52)
U.S. Defense Pact		0.102
		(0.40)
Post-Cold War		-0.608
		(0.38)
Time	-2.693*	-2.084
	(1.47)	(1.57)
$Time^2$	1.080*	0.880
	(0.55)	(0.59)
$Time^3$	-0.131**	-0.110*
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Constant	0.951	2.058
	(1.07)	(1.32)
Observations	462	412
Pseudo-R^2	0.074	0.126

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A22: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Yearly Outcomes of Economic Sanctions Threats Excluding All Observations Greater than $1.6 Billion of Aid

	Sanctions vs. Persist	
Variables	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.001	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Salience Issue		0.246
		(0.46)
IO Support		0.941
		(0.59)
Target Economic Size		-0.139*
		(0.07)
Target Democracy		-0.099
		(0.35)
Target Trade Dependence		0.568
		(0.90)
Political Affinity		-0.436
		(0.54)
U.S. Defense Pact		0.121
		(0.40)
Post-Cold War		-0.625*
		(0.37)
Time	-2.534*	-1.873
	(1.44)	(1.52)
$Time^2$	1.025*	0.806
	(0.54)	(0.57)
$Time^3$	-0.126**	-0.102
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	0.868	1.952
	(1.05)	(1.31)
Observations	457	407
Pseudo-R^2	0.069	0.119

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.

Table A23: The Effects of *U.S. Foreign Aid* on the Imposition of U.S. Economic Sanctions Threats Using Logit, 1960-2005

Variables	Model 1
U.S. Foreign Aid	0.0002
	(0.0002)
Constant	-3.865***
	(0.0824)
Observations	7550
Pseudo-R^2	0.0004

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.