Government Rhetoric and the Representation of Public Opinion in International Negotiations

American Political Science Review

Supplemental Materials II

Christopher Wratil Jens Wäckerle Sven-Oliver Proksch

August 31, 2022

Note: These are the supplemental materials II for the paper, including an extended literature review, supporting analyses for our claims about coalition-building in the Council, additional information on the STM model, robustness tests, and additional analyses. The main appendices (A through E) can be found on the publisher's homepage.

Appendices

F Additional Information on the Dataset **1**
F.1 Validity of the DICEU Approach 1
F.2 Topics Discussed in Meetings 1

G Expectations about Intergovernmental Rhetoric from the Literature **5**

H Coalition-Building in the Council **8**
H.1 Bargaining Success of Eurosceptic Governments 8
H.2 Voting Behavior of Eurosceptic Governments 9

I Additional Information on Structural Topic Model **13**
I.1 Topic Labels 13
I.2 Validation of STM 26
I.3 Correlation Between Topics 32
I.4 Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Manifestations of Public Opinion 34
I.5 Bootstrapping Procedure for STM 37
I.6 Predicted Values for Topics of Interest 40

J Robustness Tests for Structural Topic Model **43**
J.1 STM with Year Fixed Effects 43
J.2 STM with Alternative Definition of Eurosceptic Governments 48
J.3 STM with 35 Topics 53
J.4 STM with 45 Topics 57
J.5 STM Controlling for EMU 61
J.6 STM without Government Left-Right Position 65

K Alternative Public Opinion Effects in Structural Topic Model **68**
K.1 Non-Linear Public Opinion Effects 68
K.2 Public Opinion and National Elections 71
K.3 Public Opinion and Government Bond Yields 79
K.4 Public Opinion and Negotiation Stages 81
K.5 Public Opinion and Debate Length 86
K.6 Public Opinion and Member State Size 89

L Sentiment and National Elections **93**

F Additional Information on the Dataset

This section briefly discusses the validity of DICEU data as well as provides a list of topics discussed in the Council meetings in our data.

F.1 Validity of the DICEU Approach

We obtain our speech data by following the "Debates in the Council of the European Union" (DICEU) data collection approach (Wratil and Hobolt, 2019), which makes use of transcriptions of videos of the Council's public deliberations. Wratil and Hobolt (2019) have recently validated the use of videos of public deliberations. First, with regard to face validity they show that item-response theory as well as text scaling models of public deliberations in the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) configuration between 2010 and 2015 recover conflict dimensions between national governments that resemble a north-west vs. south-east divide. Second, they demonstrate convergent validity of video data with expert data by matching governments' positions from the "Decision-Making in the European Union" dataset (Thomson, 2011) with those from video data on the very same policy issues. The bivariate correlation of government positions from the two datasets is 0.78 if public deliberations are held in the first year after the introduction of a proposal, and the legislative issues were salient. Third, they also address predictive validity and show that governments' expressed disapproval of a legislative proposal during public negotiations strongly predicts "abstain" and "no" votes on the final passage of the act. Moreover, the authors analyze who is "silent" in public Council deliberations and does not intervene. They show that there is little evidence that silence in the Council is driven by particular positions these governments hold. These results suggest that videos of public deliberations provide useful information about actual intergovernmental negotiations.

F.2 Topics Discussed in Meetings

Table F1 provides an overview of all topics covered in our sample of debates included in the STM. These topics were hand-coded by research assistants based on information from the Council agendas. If the same topics were discussed more than once, they appear as a single entry. For each agenda item, we also indicate the Council configuration in which it was discussed.

Table F1: Items Discussed During Council Meetings

Topic of Debate	**Council Configuration**
Accounting directive	Competitiveness
Alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes	Competitiveness
CO2 emissions in European Car industry	Competitiveness
Competition law provision	Competitiveness
Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME)	Competitiveness

Consumer protection law	Competitiveness
Copernicus Programme	Competitiveness
Copyright for visually impaired persons	Competitiveness
Customs 2020	Competitiveness
eCall in-vehicle system	Competitiveness
Establishing a Space Surveillance and Tracking support programme (SST)	Competitiveness
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT)	Competitiveness
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT)	Competitiveness
European Trade Mark System	Competitiveness
Geo-blocking	Competitiveness
Horizon 2020	Competitiveness
Internal Market Information System	Competitiveness
Online content services in the internal market	Competitiveness
Package travel and assisted travel arrangements	Competitiveness
Public Procurement Package	Competitiveness
Statutory audits	Competitiveness
Trade mark package	Competitiveness
Trade secrets	Competitiveness
Unified Patent Court	Competitiveness
Union Customs Code	Competitiveness
Venture Capital Funds, European Social Entrepreneurship Funds	Competitiveness
Administrative cooperation of taxation	Ecofin
Anti-Abuse Rule	Ecofin
Anti-money laundering	Ecofin
Anti-Tax Avoidance Package	Ecofin
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)	Ecofin
Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV)	Ecofin
Draft Amending Budget 2013	Ecofin
Draft Amending Budget 2014, the Draft Budget 2015 and Amendment to Regulation 1150	Ecofin
Draft Budget 2011	Ecofin
Draft Budget 2012	Ecofin
Draft Budget 2013	Ecofin
Draft Budget 2014	Ecofin
Draft Budget 2015	Ecofin
Draft Budget 2016	Ecofin
Economic Governance ('Six-Pack')	Ecofin
Economic Governance ('Two-Pack')	Ecofin
European Deposit Insurance Scheme	Ecofin
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)	Ecofin
Exchange of information on taxes	Ecofin
Fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests ("PIF" Report)	Ecofin
Hedge funds	Ecofin
Market abuse in securities transaction	Ecofin
Parent Subsidiaries Directive	Ecofin

Resilience of EU credit institutions	Ecofin
Short selling and credit default swaps	Ecofin
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)	Ecofin
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), Single Resolution Fund (SRF)	Ecofin
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)	Ecofin
Taxation of savings	Ecofin
VAT fraud (VAT Quick Reaction Mechanism)	Ecofin
Active ageing	EPSCO
Co-operation between Public Employment Services (PES)	EPSCO
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund	EPSCO
Exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work	EPSCO
Exposure to physical agents at work	EPSCO
Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived	EPSCO
Globalisation Adjustment Fund	EPSCO
Medical devices	EPSCO
Mobility services and the further integration of labour markets (EURES)	EPSCO
Pension of seafarers	EPSCO
Prevention and deterrence of undeclared work	EPSCO
Provision of services of workers	EPSCO
Threats to health	EPSCO
Tobacco	EPSCO
Worker mobility and pension rights	EPSCO
Access to genetic resources	Environment
Atmospheric pollutants	Environment
Carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport	Environment
Clean Air Programme	Environment
CO2 emissions	Environment
Cultivation of GMOs	Environment
Emission reductions and low-carbon investments	Environment
Greenhouse gas emission trading scheme	Environment
Invasive alien species	Environment
Lightweight plastic carrier bags	Environment
Marine fuels	Environment
Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE)	Environment
Public and private projects on the environment	Environment
Quality of petrol and diesel fuels	Environment
Ship recycling	Environment
Shipments of waste	Environment
Acceptance of certain public documents	JHA
Access to a lawyer and right to communicate upon arrest	JHA
Civil and commercial matters	JHA
Combating terrorism	JHA
Common European Asylum System	JHA
Confiscation of the proceeds of crime	JHA
Criminal proceedings of children	JHA

Data protection package	JHA
European Account Preservation Order	JHA
European arrest warrant proceedings	JHA
European Certificate of Succession	JHA
European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)	JHA
European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation	JHA
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights	JHA
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol)	JHA
Explosive precursors	JHA
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)	JHA
Insider dealing and market manipulation (MAD)	JHA
Insolvency proceedings	JHA
Matrimonial property regimes and registered partnerships	JHA
Presumption of innocence and right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings	JHA
Proceeds from crime in the European Union	JHA
Protection measures in civil matters	JHA
Protection of financial interests of the EU	JHA
Protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting	JHA
Terrorist offences and serious crime	JHA
Union Civil Protection Mechanism	JHA
Victims of crime	JHA

G Expectations about Intergovernmental Rhetoric from the Literature

What does the existing literature on the effect of public opinion and related factors (e.g. electoral systems) on intergovernmental bargaining expects with regard to government rhetoric? In this section, we discuss several key studies in depth and demonstrate that their implications for rhetoric vary and are often not very strong.

First, a few studies focus directly on variation in public opinion. In an excellent and highly-relevant contribution Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) show how the distribution of power between member states and the European Commission can be affected by Euroscepticism. They look at the weakening and editing of opinions in the Stability and Growth Pact. While these authors use public opinion data as their independent variable and find that different levels of domestic opinion influence negotiated outcomes in the expected ways, it is largely unclear what exactly this would imply for the negotiation rhetoric between governments. We could not spot any statement about how the authors envision the role of public opinion in intergovernmental or interinstitutional discussions. In fact, to us it seems possible that the effects of public opinion could be entirely implicit in rhetoric: all actors – from peer governments in the Council to the Commission – may understand that the member state should be given more concessions if the government faces Euroscepticism and that may never be an issue of discussion. In turn, it is also possible that member states actually have to explicitly fight for this and argue about it, lament about a domestic constraint or highlight how they are representing voters. Thus, it seems to us that Baerg and Hallerberg's (2016) findings may imply purely implicit, purely explicit, or a mix of both effects of public opinion on government rhetoric.

Similarly unclear predictions about the role of public opinion for negotiation rhetoric flow from two other studies that focus on variation in public opinion as an independent variable. Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017) show that particularly if the EU is a salient issue in domestic party systems, governments are more likely to oppose EU legislative acts in voting. However, what does this imply for bargaining rhetoric? The authors argue that opposition votes are mainly a signal to domestic audiences and may even be used by governments that were more positive to a proposal during negotiations. In this case, the results are compatible with a world in which public opinion may actually play no role at all for governments at the bargaining table – neither implicitly nor explicitly. But even if opposition votes are reflective of governments' stances during the negotiations, this is compatible with different roles of public opinion in these negotiations: governments may explicitly talk about the domestic public's constraint they face and that will lead them to oppose in voting, or they may leave this implicit and everyone may know the unspoken. Wratil (2019) assumes that public opinion has mainly implicit effects by making governments invest more bargaining resources in issues that are important to the public and where the public's view is clear-cut. However, from our perspective, nothing in the author's model excludes that public opinion could also make governments explicitly mention that they have taken a position or put special emphasis on an issue because of the public. If mechanisms of domestic constraints or rhetorical action increase bargaining power in such situations, these could simply be additional mechanisms to the one presented in Wratil (2019), and all empirical results appear compatible with them.

In sum, these pieces have no clear implications for how public opinion should manifest in intergovernmental negotiation rhetoric.

Second, Rickard and Caraway (2014), Chaudoin (2014) and Kleine and Minaudier (2019) are three contributions that do not focus on public opinion but on the temporal closeness of national elections. While we think that elections, under certain conditions, can moderate and amplify the effects of public opinion on intergovernmental negotiations, they are not public opinion themself. Think of our case: public opinion can be positively or negatively disposed towards the EU before elections. This should have very different consequences for government rhetoric. Instead, these works do not focus on variation in opinion but assume the relevant public's or audience's opinion as given or fixed, or use proxies for public opinion. For instance, in Rickard and Caraway (2014) the implicit assumption seems to be that the public always and invariably wants more lenient IMF loan terms, with less stringent labor market reform conditions. While this is arguably a plausible assumption, these authors consequently do not show the effects of variations in public opinion itself but of variations in election proximity which may make public opinion more pressing. In Chaudoin (2014) there is an implicit assumption that audiences may have different views on free trade depending on national-level unemployment, which is then used as an independent variable. Hence, public opinion is not measured but assumed to be proxied by unemployment.

But more decisive for our purpose is again that these studies do not provide clear-cut implications for the role public opinion should play in bargaining rhetoric. Rickard and Caraway (2014) do not mention the issue of public opinion and its role at the bargaining table at all. Chaudoin (2014) is about bilateral trade disputes (i.e., compliance with WTO rules) rather than multilateral negotiations over common agreements. From our reading, the author mainly assumes implicit effects of public opinion on government behavior. As public support for international trade increases, the domestic costs of non-compliance increase, and this provides incentives to the foreign government to launch a dispute. However, the author's formal model presents no clear, testable predictions about bargaining rhetoric. The main argument of Kleine and Minaudier (2019) is that governments who face elections will "increasingly [avoid] taking a specific stance on an ever-larger number of mundane international agreements" (p. 7) to not send "signals that might counteract her electoral stance in the national election" (p. 6). This idea seems to be compatible with a variety of rhetorical strategies, including entirely implicit manifestations such as remaining silent, vague or blurring on an issue, as well as explicit manifestations such as mentioning that one cannot commit before the election due to public opinion. Again, there is no direct implication of how public opinion will figure in the rhetoric of negotiations.

Finally, we discuss two pieces with a little bit less relevance for our argument. Pelc (2011) shows how democracies can obtain more favorable WTO accession terms than non-democracies. On the one hand, "democracy" as a variable is still considerably detached from public opinion. Clearly, democracies differ from non-democracies on many dimensions – the potential influence of public opinion is only one, and actually some work argues that public opinion also matters in non-democracies (e.g. see Truex, 2016). On the other hand, the mechanism for linking democracy and WTO accession terms that Pelc (2011) envisions runs through the influence of domestic interest groups in democracies rather than public opinion. This becomes apparent throughout the text like in these examples: "Indeed, there is ample evidence demonstrating that democracies are more vulnerable to interest group pressure in

setting their trade policy than nondemocracies, which do not rely as much on the political support of industries to stay in power" (2011, p. 656) and "[g]iven how democracies are more vulnerable to pressure from domestic groups, such variation should affect the extent to which preferences from these domestic import-competing groups is heeded. Specifically, while more democratic entrants commit to greater depth overall, I expect democracies to exhibit greater resistance to adjustment in the case of their most valuable industries" (p. 652). Of course, one could argue that – ultimately – these interest groups somehow influence public opinion directly or provide governments with resources to influence public opinion, but this is no matter of discussion in the piece, which puts all emphasis on interest groups themselves. Hence, from our perspective, the piece's implications for bargaining rhetoric should concern the role of interest groups (e.g. whether they are mentioned, whether they have implicit effects) rather than public opinion. We could not derive any obvious implications for the role public opinion should play in negotiation rhetoric from this research.

The same applies to Hahm et al. (2019), who look at public support for trade agreements in the context of TTIP. They demonstrate that voters do not like investor-state dispute settlement, showing that there can be domestic public opinion backlash against certain clauses in trade agreements. But as this work looks at the side of public opinion formation, it is again hard to deduce any implications from it of how governments should talk in negotiations to take heed of public opinion. Will governments only express opposition to certain clauses, keeping public opinion concerns implicit, or will they also explicitly talk about their concerns regarding public backlash? Or might they even choose not to express dissent but just try to delay negotiations and remain vague on the issue? We do not think that Hahm et al. (2019) offer clear implications in this respect.

In sum, this discussion shows that most of the literature on the role of public opinion for international negotiations provides either no or several varied expectations, instead of one clear-cut implication, for how we should expect bargaining rhetoric to unfold. To be sure: this is no inherent deficiency of this literature. It is chiefly caused by the fact that – up to now – we had little opportunities to look at international bargaining rhetoric in a quantitative framework.

H Coalition-Building in the Council

We argue that coalition-building in the Council nowadays revolves around the "core" of pro-EU governments, whereas Eurosceptic governments are often bystanders. While this assumption is not our focus of attention but merely a premise on which we build theoretical hypotheses about governments' engagement with public opinion, it has observable implications for bargaining success and voting behavior of governments, which we consider here.

H.1 Bargaining Success of Eurosceptic Governments

If Eurosceptic governments are mostly excluded from policy coalitions, they should also have less clout on negotiation outcomes and therefore less bargaining success compared to pro-EU governments. Viewed in a historical context, we expect that the pro-anti EU position of governments should have played little role in the 1990s, when virtually all governments were still pro-EU. But when the cleavage between pro-EU and Eurosceptic governments emerged during the last two decades, Eurosceptic governments should have increasingly lost out in negotiations. We can test this claim using the "Decision-Making in the European Union" (DEU) dataset that provides information on governments' and institutions' initial positions on EU legislative files based on expert interviews and has been widely used to assess bargaining models (e.g. see Thomson et al. 2006, 2012). This data covers 331 legislative controversies that were negotiated between 1996 and 2008.[1] We operationalize states' bargaining success on a legislative file by the absolute distance between the states' initial position and the bargaining outcome (scale from 0-100) (e.g. Bailer, 2004). We regress bargaining success on cabinet parties' pro-anti EU (CMP categories $per108 - per110$) as well as left-right positions,[2] drawing on the codings of the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2019) (see in the paper and Appendix A.2). Moreover, we control for net receipts from the EU budget as well as unemployment and inflation rates. Note that we do not control for the EU's public image here, as this measure is only available for a small part of the period covered by the DEU data. Last, we include fixed effects for countries, which controls for country-specific power resources (e.g. voting weights), and report country-cluster robust standard errors.
The results are reported in Table H1. Model 1 shows a clear negative effect of the government's EU position on the distance between its ideal point and the outcome. In other words, the more pro-EU a government is, the more bargaining success it has. In Model 2 we model a linear trend in this effect over time by including the date of the legislative proposal as a covariate (this is simply the number of days since 1st January 1960) and interacting it with the government's EU position. The effect of the interaction is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the relevance of the EU position has increased over time. In Figure H2 we plot the marginal effect of the government's EU position on bargaining success over time. This shows clearly that while historically (i.e., in the late 1990s) the effect of the EU

[1] Due to some missing data, our regressions draw on observations from 324 issues.

[2] Note that we use a continuous measure of the pro-anti EU position instead of the dummy variable for Eurosceptic governments here, as there simply very few Eurosceptic governments in the Council before the 2010s.

position on bargaining success was indistinguishable from zero, from around the early 2000s it has become statistically significant. This speaks in favor of our premise that Eurosceptic governments are nowadays often excluded from coalition-building dynamics in the Council.

Table H1: Models of Bargaining Success in the Council

	Model 1	Model 2
Government EU position	−0.971*	4.888
	(0.360)	(2.684)
Government left-right position	−0.102*	−0.111*
	(0.047)	(0.044)
Net receipts from EU budget	2.735**	3.120**
	(0.753)	(0.876)
Unemployment rate	0.039	0.091
	(0.388)	(0.355)
Inflation rate	−0.020**	−0.021**
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Date of proposal		0.001
		(0.001)
Government EU position × Date of proposal		−0.000*
		(0.000)
Constant	35.550**	16.722
	(2.822)	(12.131)
Observations	5325	5325

Note: Both are OLS regressions; Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p>0.01.

H.2 Voting Behavior of Eurosceptic Governments

If Eurosceptic governments are excluded from policy coalitions, we would also expect that they are more willing than pro-EU governments to oppose the bargaining outcome in final passage voting. Pircher and Farjam (2021) have recently reported that governments' EU ideology has an influence on opposition voting in some Council configurations using a complete dataset of all votes in the Council between 2010 and 2019. We use their comprehensive dataset here, as it covers files in all configurations and also proposals that were never controversial enough to be discussed in the ministerial Council, allowing us to test an implication of our stipulated bargaining model in the broadest possible sense. Like in Appendix E, we model the occurrence of opposition votes (i.e., "no" or "abstain") using a mixed effects logistic regression model. As covariates we include the continuous measure of governments' pro-anti EU positions (see Appendix H.1), the public image of the EU, the government left-right position, net receipts from the EU budget as well as unemployment and inflation rates.[3] Crossed random effects for countries and the legislative act account for

[3]Given that our data on net receipts from the EU budget stops in 2016, our analyses here cover the period 2010 to 2016.

Figure H1: Effect of Government EU Position on Bargaining Success over Time



unobserved heterogeneity.

The results are reported in Table H2. Model 1 clearly shows that the more Eurosceptic the government, the higher is the probability that it will cast an opposition vote. This effect is present even while controlling for the variety of factors we include in our model. Model 2 investigates whether this effect has increased over time (also see Appendix H.1) by interacting the effect of the government's EU position with the date of the vote in the Council (standardized within our sample). Indeed, this interaction term is negative and statistically significant. It suggests that Eurosceptic governments are increasingly more likely to vote against legislative proposals. We plot the effect in Figure H2. It shows that the impact of Euroscepticism on voting was indistinguishable from zero around 2010 but has increased significantly throughout our observation period. This is in line with our assumption that Eurosceptic governments are unlikely to be part of the policy coalition that supports a legislative proposal.

In total, these analyses of bargaining success and voting strongly support our premise that negotiations in the Council revolve around the "core" of pro-EU member state governments.

Table H2: Models of Opposition Votes in the Council

	Dependent variable:	
	Opposition Voting	
	(1)	(2)
Government EU position	−0.084**	−0.076*
	(0.038)	(0.040)
Date of Vote		−0.140
		(0.119)
Public image of the EU	−0.027	−0.439
	(0.452)	(0.445)
Government left-right position	0.003	0.0004
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.082	−0.076
	(0.071)	(0.069)
Unemployment rate	−0.042	−0.053**
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Inflation rate	0.038	−0.015
	(0.050)	(0.060)
Government EU position x Date of Vote		−0.071**
		(0.030)
Intercept	−4.370***	−2.932*
	(1.562)	(1.531)
Observations	19,343	19,343
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,997.595	3,991.112
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	4,068.426	4,077.683

Note: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure H2: Effect of Government EU Position on Opposition Voting over Time



I Additional Information on Structural Topic Model

In this section, we provide additional information on the structural topic model, including how we determined the topic labels, a validation of the STM, and information on the bootstrapping procedure for the standard errors.

I.1 Topic Labels

We labeled the topics in our baseline STM based on a reading of the 10 highest-probability tokens, the top 20 most frequent and exclusive (FREX) tokens as well as the 10 texts most highly associated with the topic. All labels were cross-checked by a second coder and differences in interpretation were resolved in discussion. We also labeled and checked the coherence of all topics of interest for our alternative STM specifications below.
All topics with labels in the baseline model can be found in Table I1 below. This table can be used to identify topics in figures that omit the topic label and only report the topic number (see sections below). The first five FREX words for each topic are in Figures 2 and 3 in the paper. Table I2 also displays the 20 FREX tokens for these topics and Table I3 displays the highest probability tokens. Note that all tokens are displayed as they enter the STM model, e.g. after lemmatization ("data protection" becomes "datum_protection"). Table I4 shows the five most strongly associated texts (in original form, including transcription errors) for each of our key topics of interest to which our theoretical hypotheses relate. Overall, the texts and typical tokens well reflect the labelng of the topics.

Table I1: STM Topics and Labels

Topic Number	**Topic Label**
1	Thanking I (rather specific person)
2	Exchange of information
3	Internal market
4	Ships
5	Reflection
6	Thanking II (rather abstract groups)
7	European judicial matters / European public prosecutor
8	Referring to Commissioner
9	Banking supervision
10	Burdens of implementation (esp. environment)
11	Renewable energy and climate
12	Delaying agreement
13	Formulating a demand
14	Invasive species
15	GMOs
16	Crime
17	Budget
18	Talking about legal text
19	International money laundering
20	Governance of four freedoms (e.g. capital, workers)
21	Health and medical devices
22	Supporting the compromise
23	Congratulating
24	Legal harmonization
25	Cooperation between member states
26	Air emissions and pollutants
27	Tax evasion and fraud
28	Banking union (esp. resolution and deposit insurance)
29	Data protection
30	Public procurement and tobacco
31	Financial crisis
32	More technical-level discussion needed
33	Research and development (e.g. Horizon 2020)
34	Audit and control
35	Talking about reaching compromise
36	Negotiations with EP
37	Brief intervention
38	Cautious language
39	Affirmation
40	Raising a concern

Table I2: STM Topics and 20 FREX Tokens

Topic Number	**FREX Tokens**
Topic 1	mr_chairman, much_chairman, madam_chair, republic, chairman, madam, czech_republic, chairman_first, chair, much_madam, czech, much_chair, chairman_good, effort_make, madam_chairman, effort, appreciate, chair_good, polish, slovak
Topic 2	point, mention, exchange, three, automatic, play, important_point, field, two, one_point, play_field, two_point, automatic_exchange, austrian, level_play, secondly, information, start_point, three_point, saving
Topic 3	european_union, spain, internal_market, europe, union, internal, importance, throughout, single_market, economy, attach, lose, job, platform, market, undeclared, economic, obstacle, network, build
Topic 4	ship, card, regulate_profession, profession, convention, kong, hong, hong_kong, kong_convention, regulate, professional, vessel, maritime, recognition, recycle, form, professional_card, study, international, imo
Topic 5	get, know, want, really, thing, day, lot, actually, happen, try, around, way, people, end, room, week, simply, much_much, listen, ahead
Topic 6	like, congratulate, also_like, danish, danish_presidency, welcome, cyprus, much_like, cyprus_presidency, progress_achieve, topic, join, significant_progress, progress, warmly, significant, just_like, firstly, progress_make, good_progress
Topic 7	epp, prosecutor, epp_oh, investigation, shop, office, prosecutor's, one-stop, one-stop_shop, prosecutor's_office, european_prosecutor, public_prosecutor, lawyer, prosecution, proximity, one-stop-shop, main_establishment, delegate_prosecutor, public_prosecutor's, transaction
Topic 8	dear, dear_colleague, lady, gentleman, chairman_commissioner, commissioner_colleague, good_morning, commissioner, colleague, president_commissioner, first, commissioner_lady, morning, first_question, colleague_first, madam_commissioner, chairman_dear, commissioner_dear, german, first_time
Topic 9	supervisory_board, ecb, steer_committee, vote, supervisory_mechanism, steer, supervisory, eba, ssm, majority, non-euro, plenary, qualify_majority, single_supervisory, supervision, board, one_vote, equal, majority_vote, simple_majority
Topic 10	administrative_burden, burden, waste, administrative, inspection, monitor, plan, competent, shipment, impact_assessment, compliance, competent_authority, assessment, excessive, tape, red_tape, user, protocol, environmental, resource
Topic 11	biofuel, ets, leakage, carbon_leakage, carbon, free_allocation, renewable, energy, allowance, allocation, paris_agreement, renewable_energy, climate, greenhouse, greenhouse_gas, gas, price, advance_biofuel, eu_ets, stability_reserve
Topic 12	agree, germany, late, netherlands, note, everything, see, austria, position, minute, meet, unite, sweden, kingdom, unite_kingdom, denmark, minister, since, please, swedish

Topic 13	take, account, add, take_account, value, add_value, whether, though, fact, decision, place, take_place, country, even, wonder, qualify, decide, even_though, able, belgium
Topic 14	species, invasive, v80, alien, vit, criterion, geographical, alien_species, biodiversity, invasive_species, inclusion, invasive_alien, region, threat, list, vit_fraud, fraud, distribute, cost, include
Topic 15	cultivation, gmos, gmo, reservation, agency, current, legal_framework, territory, europol, restriction, ground, restrict, legislative, current_text, lift, current_proposal, rise, prohibit, withdraw, authorization
Topic 16	victim, confiscation, criminal, crime, offence, organise_crime, serious_crime, extend_confiscation, penalty, criminal_law, terrorism, criminal_proceeding, financial_interest, organise, vulnerable, bag, serious, proceed, procedural, law_enforcement
Topic 17	amend_budget, dab, budget, eu_budget, margin, payment, draught_amend, draught_budget, appropriation, amend, redeployment, national_budget, budgetary, financial_framework, expenditure, mff, cohesion, cut, multiannual, austerity
Topic 18	article, paragraph, recital, liability, legal_basis, several_liability, control_measure, article_paragraph, joint, several, control, misgiving, suitable, provision, reference, close_list, word, delete, para, treaty
Topic 19	review, clause, rule, beneficial, available, cfc, review_clause, arrangement, lack, launder, risk, money, investment, money_launder, risk_assessment, assessment, ownership, limitation, peer, interest_limitation
Topic 20	worker, insolvency, consumer, debtor, creditor, post_worker, post, free_movement, certainty, insolvency_register, legal_certainty, movement, court, register, business, provider, foreign, company, insolvency_proceeding, competition
Topic 21	device, medical, medical_device, patient, reprocess, notify_body, notify, market_surveillance, single-use, safety, patient_safety, manufacturer, surveillance, clinical, body, coordination_group, post_market, vitro, product, implant
Topic 22	general_approach, partial, general, partial_general, text, compromise_text, presidency's, approach, support, approach_thank, bulgaria, also_support, poland, latvia, draught, full_support, lend, approach_today, text_thank, chapter
Topic 23	hard_work, italian_presidency, file, dossier, dutch_presidency, excellent_work, irish_presidency, irish, hard, work, latvian, excellent, italian, wish, look_forward, latvian_presidency, congratulation, luxembourg_presidency, presidency_thank, dutch
Topic 24	solution, different, problem, system, legislation, solve, national_level, legal_system, find, national, practise, national_legislation, create, good_solution, hand, asylum, leave, common, difference, level
Topic 25	member_state, state, member, different_member, many_member, voluntary, capacity, pool, asset, individual_member, among, another_member, state_thank, cooperate, among_member, another, justify, competence, oblige, every_member
Topic 26	pollution, air_quality, air, air_pollution, pollutant, emission, plant, combustion, ammonia, reduction, co2_emission, combustion_plant, reduction_target, co2, emission_reduction, target, car, sulphur, ambition, ambitious

Topic 27	avoidance, tax, tax_avoidance, evasion, oecd, tax_evasion, initiative, tax_fraud, vat, unanimity, reverse, reverse_charge, reaction, vat_fraud, fight, pierre, quick, commission's, reaction_mechanism, quick_reaction
Topic 28	bail-in, deposit, dgs, resolution_fund, srm, resolution, target_level, deposit_guarantee, depositor, brrd, stabilisation_tool, stabilisation, government_stabilisation, single_resolution, fund, early_intervention, scheme, intervention, tool, bail-in_rule
Topic 29	personal_datum, datum, datum_protection, public_sector, personal, controller, datum_subject, protection, expression, datum_process, risk-based, protection_officer, risk-based_approach, freedom, transfer, profile, datum_controller, travel, officer, privacy
Topic 30	tobacco, procurement, cigarette, public_procurement, custom, tobacco_product, young, contract, young_people, sale, product, health, electronic, competitive, competitive_procedure, public_health, smoke, ban, crisis, economic_crisis
Topic 31	bank_union, liquidity, capital, bank_system, basel, barnier, bank, fiscal, sovereign, michel, euro_zone, debt, systemic, buff, sovereign_debt, capital_requirement, bank_sector, macroprudential, systemic_risk, leverage
Topic 32	discussion, far, technical, still, issue, discuss, far_work, technical_level, detail, work_group, far_discussion, raise, continue, expert_level, important_issue, outstanding, expert, clarify, address, work_party
Topic 33	horizon, researcher, research, programme, framework_programme, smes, social_science, science, participation, excellence, humanity, innovation, simplification, enterprise, european_research, social, full_cost, remuneration, sme, small
Topic 34	bite, little_bite, little, legal_service, audit, bite_much, auditor, service, much_time, period, oversight, rotation, dispute, short, council_legal, firm, blacklist, oversight_body, seven, mandatory_rotation
Topic 35	compromise, reach, agreement, forward, today, compromise_proposal, ready, step_forward, put_forward, move_forward, proposal_thank, soon, prepare, good_compromise, reach_agreement, move, agreement_today, today_thank, presidency_proposal, balance_compromise
Topic 36	european_parliament, constructive, parliament, negotiation, council, political, read, trial_log, parliament_thank, trial, december, june, first_read, european_council, political_agreement, negotiate, package, positive, invite, log
Topic 37	yes_thank, thank, much_president, mr_president, much_indeed, yes, president_good, brief, good_thank, president, president_thank, briefly, president_first, many_thank, much, much_mr, indeed_president, just_briefly, president_let, much_german
Topic 38	now, something, think, look, say, france, perhaps, moment, deal, talk, just, along, come, carefully, feel, obviously, right_direction, quite, need, idea
Topic 39	make_sure, sure, make, make_progress, comment, clear, rapid, sense, easy, make_sense, properly, pay, comment_make, make_clear, rapid_progress, proposal_make, just_make, progress, contribution, careful

Topic 40	concern, important, much_important, share, particular, attention, also_important, bank_crisis, draw, concern_express, draw_attention, correct, part, finland, also, express, particular_attention, important_project, secure, refer

Table I3: STM Topics and 20 Highest Probability Tokens

Topic Number	**Highest Probability Tokens**
Topic 1	chairman, effort, presidency, chair, proposal, madam, appreciate, mr_chairman, republic, czech, much_chairman, czech_republic, madam_chair, hungary, effort_make, polish, directive, try, slovak, madam_chairman
Topic 2	point, two, one, three, mention, information, play, directive, exchange, field, role, first, level, also, secondly, already, view, luxembourg, standard, four
Topic 3	european, market, union, europe, european_union, importance, single, economic, spain, great, citizen, cooperation, improve, internal, single_market, instrument, economy, job, internal_market, throughout
Topic 4	regulation, convention, ship, regulate, international, profession, form, document, professional, believe, recognition, provision, system, european, study, use, question, requirement, ensure, card
Topic 5	much, want, get, way, know, time, really, try, thing, lot, actually, good, year, end, people, long, course, difficult, understand, mean
Topic 6	like, also, welcome, progress, presidency, commission, also_like, congratulate, achieve, danish, significant, many, great, express, cyprus, stress, danish_presidency, present, join, put
Topic 7	authority, case, european, question, epp, prosecutor, power, shop, decision, epp_oh, mechanism, court, legal, investigation, believe, office, one-stop, one-stop_shop, public, national
Topic 8	first, colleague, commissioner, good, president, let, dear, morning, say, minister, new, first_question, german, debate, dear_colleague, lady, gentleman, chairman_commissioner, today, speak
Topic 9	ecb, vote, bank, supervisory, board, one, decision, majority, think, mechanism, supervision, single, eba, committee, supervisory_board, steer, member, principle, steer_committee, issue
Topic 10	burden, administrative, authority, administrative_burden, proposal, plan, assessment, impact, scope, monitor, ensure, waste, inspection, question, much, report, regulation, competent, feel, good
Topic 11	carbon, biofuel, energy, ets, need, proposal, sector, climate, industry, leakage, emission, objective, carbon_leakage, use, also, ensure, allocation, system, price, change
Topic 12	agree, see, position, meet, change, germany, minister, late, netherlands, austria, since, note, back, early, reason, please, indeed, everything, sweden, speak
Topic 13	take, country, account, decision, able, fact, add, therefore, value, whether, even, place, decide, course, situation, though, take_account, add_value, bring, belgium

Topic 14	criterion, species, include, list, cost, also, fraud, invasive, project, inclusion, question, regulation, limit, believe, geographical, v80, much, alien, level, certain
Topic 15	current, reservation, legal, framework, proposal, cultivation, give, legislative, romania, gmos, agency, stage, territory, restriction, situation, text, restrict, allow, gmo, provide
Topic 16	criminal, crime, directive, victim, right, law, serious, offence, confiscation, minimum, much, financial, penalty, instrument, extend, protection, proposal, legal, interest, proceeding
Topic 17	budget, payment, commission, year, increase, amend, also, financial, support, eu_budget, draught, agreement, commitment, level, amend_budget, dab, margin, need, national, budgetary
Topic 18	article, provision, measure, control, basis, legal, list, paragraph, joint, several, liability, directive, word, recital, reference, accept, new, however, treaty, legal_basis
Topic 19	rule, risk, review, available, also, assessment, clause, interest, company, proposal, money, arrangement, investment, country, activity, prefer, beneficial, use, lack, regard
Topic 20	worker, right, company, balance, ensure, protection, consumer, business, interest, court, post, insolvency, legal, certainty, directive, need, service, order, protect, creditor
Topic 21	device, medical, medical_device, market, patient, body, safety, reprocess, notify, notify_body, product, ensure, surveillance, regulation, group, manufacturer, requirement, also, good, question
Topic 22	support, text, approach, general, general_approach, regulation, propose, draught, regard, believe, presidency's, fully, partial, therefore, partial_general, compromise_text, happy, however, bulgaria, poland
Topic 23	work, presidency, good, file, wish, hard, thank, dossier, excellent, achieve, result, irish, month, last, hard_work, italian, continue, irish_presidency, dutch, look_forward
Topic 24	system, solution, national, different, level, problem, find, legislation, create, need, good, common, practise, procedure, implement, base, hand, possible, leave, one
Topic 25	state, member, member_state, case, provide, commission, possibility, capacity, voluntary, among, view, another, asset, individual, process, allow, within, competence, believe, different_member
Topic 26	emission, target, air, reduction, level, directive, reduce, need, also, pollution, plant, quality, measure, ambitious, sector, health, much, objective, air_quality, ambition
Topic 27	tax, directive, support, proposal, commission, initiative, fully, commission's, fraud, fight, package, oecd, transparency, mechanism, avoidance, implement, country, implementation, also, ireland
Topic 28	fund, resolution, bail-in, deposit, use, level, dgs, resolution_fund, tool, guarantee, also, agree, target, bank, think, regard, intervention, scheme, finance, flexibility
Topic 29	datum, protection, datum_protection, right, regulation, public, sector, process, personal, citizen, risk, personal_datum, public_sector, subject, high, also, controller, business, flexibility, provide

Topic 30	public, procurement, fund, health, procedure, use, product, proposal, much, service, tobacco, crisis, also, directive, public_procurement, support, contract, high, electronic, negotiation
Topic 31	bank, think, financial, issue, also, union, capital, market, crisis, bank_union, risk, country, european, fiscal, just, system, euro, liquidity, commission, flexibility
Topic 32	issue, far, discussion, still, question, discuss, continue, believe, technical, view, basis, however, document, detail, need, numb, matter, work, raise, address
Topic 33	programme, research, horizon, smes, social, innovation, good, also, cost, project, fund, participation, much, small, simplification, support, need, framework, european, science
Topic 34	little, service, bite, period, question, audit, proposal, little_bite, legal_service, much, short, legal, time, year, quality, body, rotation, propose, alternative, provide
Topic 35	compromise, proposal, agreement, today, reach, forward, balance, possible, accept, move, find, hope, put, compromise_proposal, ready, prepare, step, table, soon, order
Topic 36	council, parliament, negotiation, european, european_parliament, political, package, constructive, hope, give, commission, start, positive, basis, future, conclusion, read, process, negotiate, adopt
Topic 37	thank, much, president, yes, mr_president, brief, yes_thank, commission, just, indeed, let, much_president, good, begin, briefly, much_mr, much_indeed, floor, good_thank, behalf
Topic 38	think, say, now, need, come, just, look, good, something, feel, deal, right, idea, talk, particularly, term, give, quite, france, moment
Topic 39	make, clear, sure, make_sure, progress, comment, pay, make_progress, sense, easy, contribution, possible, rapid, properly, fair, responsibility, considerable, matter, various, quickly
Topic 40	important, concern, also, particular, share, part, attention, much_important, express, draw, finland, context, refer, correct, also_important, secure, view, concern_express, much, bank_crisis

Table I4: STM Topics and Most Likely Texts

Topic	**Text**
Topic 12: Delaying agreement	was unanimity we see nothing that has changed since May of last year when those principles were set out in order to change the position.

Topic 12: Delaying agreement	budgets and difficult decisions to be made and savings have to be found, and yet here we are being asked to support a substantial increase in a budget which we've already supposed to have agreed. I don't think that's acceptable. I think it flows from poor financial management at a European level, and frankly we should be asking the European Commission to go back and find savings and do better. So on behalf of the United Kingdom will be voting against this budget proposal. I know that Britain is not alone in this; I know that the Netherlands and Finland and Sweden and Denmark are also very concerned and perhaps others are as well. I think we collectively as countries like our concerns reflected in the minutes and will be circulating a minute statement to express our dissatisfaction. I
Topic 12: Delaying agreement	this is one final thing and certainly speaking for the United Kingdom we're happy to go with this as a statement from the Commission and the Council.
Topic 12: Delaying agreement	Having listened to the Swedish Minister I need 5 minutes to consult with Warsaw. If the Minister says we all need formal agreement we need time,
Topic 12: Delaying agreement	not yet officially finalized its national position on chapter four as our president also said in his introduction nothing is agreed until everything is agreed thank you
Topic 13: Formulating a demand	do I'm afraid to have some serious problems with this proposal the problems of principle on the mandate for the EPP Oh for a pope there we really have a problem we're wondering whether the the directive here it is a good place to decide on the on the fo mandate or the epic oppose some competence wonder whether this is the right place to do it and then on Taxation there it has to be unanimity so we shouldn't be dealing with taxation issues here in a directive and then the the value limit is decided on by qualified majority so that value level could be brought down at any
Topic 13: Formulating a demand	is why we support both proposals, however I would like to read on the first point of monitoring the budget plans that indeed we should ask the Commission to come up with very precise proposals on how these kinds of incentives for countries outside a deficit procedure should be drafted. So this is a good idea to come up with incentives because we think it is an added value to avoid any kind of bureaucratic and other burden. The second point is on the questions of recommendations to seek assistance of course this is highly sensitive issue, so I would like to add two points to that proposal. The first is I think whenever we start to discuss whether a country should seek assistance markets will immediately react to that, so we endanger the country and we endanger the refinancing of that country. So I do not think that we should always publish the outcome of the discussion and the recommendation to seek assistance. Also I'm aware that it will become public of course but to publish it officially maybe is not a dimension, I think we should

Topic 13: Formulating a demand	so adopting such a method would not make the situation more complicated however I would I recommend this to all of my colleagues I have to say that no I couldn't recommend this I think at the decision has been made and in fact it depends on local conditions and our own experience because some some countries are good experience and another not thank you.
Topic 13: Formulating a demand	it's the kind of situation is not very probable nonetheless it's a situation where depending on how the article is interpreted you could have a conflict between the w-h-o and the European Commission and that would be pointless and needless but otherwise I call on the Commission and all the Member States to continue on this path which is so necessary thank
Topic 13: Formulating a demand	an EDP country in a non-EDP country. But I think in both cases all Member States should have some form of a budgetary monitoring process submitted to the Commission, so I support the Commission that maybe EDP countries can have a little bit more heavy kind of monitoring system. Then on the second regulation, I also support the Commission about the recommendation even with a 2/3 majority but as Germany pointed out after that there has to be a decisions made in the ESM with normally with unanimity. So maybe it's wise not to publish the recommendation until there has been a decision in the ESM, but for me that's not a very important point. I think those things are two distinctive issues, I think on one hand you have a recommendation to seek support and on the other hand you have a new concept and draft program, you have the responsibility of the Member States to assess whether or not it is sufficient and whether or not it suffice for unanimous decision into the
Topic 22: Supporting the compromise	on the proposed text we fully support its goals and we fully endorse the general approach on the basis of this text without
Topic 22: Supporting the compromise	the Presidency's efforts to improve the regulation and especially his provisions relating to the public sector and chapter 9 and Lithuania supports that propose partial general approach on the basis of the conditions identified in the press his document Thank You
Topic 22: Supporting the compromise	can also support the adoption of the partial general approach thank you
Topic 22: Supporting the compromise	broad scope so complete support the general approach and thanks to everybody who has good confirmed original petition but nevertheless support that the general approach

Topic 22: Supporting the compromise	therefore we support the general approach thank you
Topic 32: More technical-level discussion needed	us now in our opinion the legislative text could act as a springboard for further discussions at technical level however there are issues of content scope and outcome of technical discussions they are still open issues so there is a question mark over the finalization the date of finalization of these discussions and that will depend how the debate goes at technical level now on the individual questions I can be very brief on point a the approach that's being suggested on territorial scope is one that we can support wholeheartedly we feel that the scope of the basic regulation should be as wide as it can be point B the discussions that the informal Council in Athens showed that international data transfers is a highly sensitive issue there's a basic model and basic principles in Chapter five they constitute a very good basis for discussions so we should stick to that approach however they will certainly need to be further detailed discussion in the council working group on Point C there are a number of elements listed here which are important concepts that will have to be included in the regulation now thinking about the work that's been done so far a council working group level they are a good basis for further work at technical level pseudonymous a ssin is a point that will have to be discussed but i would say that we can only give a definitive opinion on that when we have an overall concept and there are legal implications arising from pseudonymous ation which we haven't fully explored yet profiling while we live in a digital age and there are many economic activities that are based on the use of user
Topic 32: More technical-level discussion needed	unclear until many questions important questions are pending in the working groups we still have scootering reservation thank you [Music]
Topic 32: More technical-level discussion needed	in the annex of the working document represents a good basis for future work and also for the future technical examination of this legal act thank you
Topic 32: More technical-level discussion needed	but we have to be able to clarify the unclear questions in the future the breakthrough so far is due to the work of the Polish presidency and therefore we propose that in the remaining questions should be examined and studied at the expert group level thank you very much

Topic 32: More technical-level discussion needed	thank you the presidency has drawn up document for today's discussion and you in this document you've summed up the key outstanding issues in legislative acts correctly however we do feel that one of the problems of the document is the presentation of the plant continuation of the negotiations we are aware that the presidency is under time pressure because of the deadlines for the
Topic 38: Cautious language	Commission for portability of subscriptions I listened carefully to what the Commissioner said and also what the UK Minister said I think we need to look carefully at the detail of this proposal and in particular I noted the Commissioner referred to portability for days or weeks I think it's very important to clarify in the body of the regulation very specifically yeah notion of temporary portability and habitual residence because those two
Topic 38: Cautious language	don't think we can work towards the one-stop shop along the lines that we have been working on so far and that's why I replied to the questions in the way I did I think if we take the time to look at it carefully and look at the to legal advice as next to each other as suggested by the UK I think that would be a very good idea and that would mean that we would be able to come back to this issue under the Greek presidency thank you
Topic 38: Cautious language	has all sorts of nerve centers it's not just nine and twelve there are all sorts of difficulties in article 6 for example in terms of sanctions at 9 and 12 are particularly key here the new article talks about notification notify we're a bit dubious about that this is rather ambiguous language and we think that a little bit diluted as well but I just like to stress what we said this morning anything that goes in article 9 is going to have to be balanced out with something in article 12 it's all part of a package and we agree with some other countries that we need some extra
Topic 38: Cautious language	to say something on point to have it is what do I
Topic 38: Cautious language	towards that for the purposes of the debate and in the first by won't reply to the first question we would say yes we feel that if the victim is going to be activated participating in the proceedings and the trial then there has to be some kind of reimbursement or compensation on your second question when it comes to vulnerable victims vulnerable individuals there now reply to this question is that - yes do constitute a vulnerable a group of ulnar 'victim z– but there are other groups of people who would have to be seen as vulnerable victims as well and we'd also like to thank the vice present of the Commission Viviane Reding and also you yourself president for your words concerning the recent announcement by the etta terrorist group because I think this is a very good example of what I actually wanted to say anyway on the whole issue of victims because as the Commissioner has quite rightly explained and perhaps I can add something to this add an additional point or the victim of a terrorist crime is a victim of an act of terror which has been perpetrated against the

Topic Raising concern	40: a	also Finland shares the concern expressed by some of the Member States thank you
Topic Raising concern	40: a	we also share some of the concerns expressed by colleagues about administrative burdens and the need to consider SME something we discussed before lunch thank you
Topic Raising concern	40: a	can create high-quality European legislation in this area and in particularly we are happy with the work done by the presidency to refer to the article of general documentation to be covered by the community instrument this has been one of the most important issues for us in Finland as well and we also appreciate the efforts made by the presidency to find a solution to the question of a red registered consent we have had certain fears concerning this part of the proposal but thanks to the compromise proposal from the presidency the articles concerning consent have now developed in a very positive way so in principle we can support the proposal from the presidency but at the same time Finland feels that it's impossible that if necessary have the possibility to come back to these issues as because the question of whether this regulation should apply to the European Union institutions as well I can inform you that Finland things that it's important that the same principles and rules apply also to the EU institutions but we are open for discussions concerning the conditions under which this should be achieved what is important is that the end result is satisfactory that is to say that we have similar principles and rules concerning the doctor protection dealt
Topic Raising concern	40: a	the reduction of co2 we also share the concerns of Finland on the definition of transport work and on transparency and accountability and the Finnish colleague has already referred to our joint statement on that subject we also think that further work should be done on the calculation method for energy efficiency and last but not least we also underscore the point just made by the Danish
Topic Raising concern	40: a	already working on that in Spain and we also feel that it's better to have a flexible approach where each country arranges things in their own way and could I also say that we support the whole package on public procurement which is in line with the opinion we've been expressing all morning and during the lunch we want more transparency more competition in this important market segment however we're also concerned and I think it's important that the commissioners proposal to take account of the external dimension and the principle of reciprocity which is the important one and then finally the three parts of the package are important and I'd agree with what

I.2 Validation of STM

In the paper, we demonstrate as a straightforward measure of the face validity of our baseline STM that virtually all policy-specific topics make up the largest share of discussions in the Council configuration we would expect them to be discussed most (see Figure 3 in the paper). To validate our baseline STM further, we here focus on additional aspects of *construct and criterion validity*.

We probe construct validity (e.g. do we capture what we claim to capture?) in various ways. First, we investigate whether our key procedural topics with which we test our hypotheses are indeed *not* policy-specific but occur across a large domain of issues. If these topics are procedural and overarching, they should occur in all Council configurations, whereas policy-specific topics should only occur in a single or a small number of configurations (e.g. economic topics only in Ecofin, or in addition, also in COMPET, but not in ENV). Figure I1 plots gamma distributions for each of our six procedural topics of interest as well as five policy-specific topics for comparison purposes (we selected one policy-specific topic per Council configuration, see also below). In these plots, the x-axis denotes the expected proportions for a topic and the y-axis indicates the number of Council configurations to which these proportions apply. For the policy-specific topics we can see the higher bars at the left, at a proportion of zero, indicating that these topics do not at all occur in most Council configurations. In all cases, a single short bar at some proportion level indicates that the topic's occurrence is largely confined to a single configuration. In contrast, our procedural topics of interest have no bars at zero, indicating that they occur across all Council configurations, as expected.

Second, procedural topics should not only occur in all Council configurations but they should also be used – at least sometimes – by all (or the vast majority of) actors, i.e. member states. To test this, Figure I2 shows the gamma distributions by member state. Not a single of our six procedural topics has a bar at zero, indicating that the governments of all member states use all of our procedural topics of interest in some situations. This speaks against the concern that our procedural topics could capture specific rhetorical styles that are idiosyncratic to – for instance – speakers with a certain cultural background. We also find that the selected policy-specific topics are used by all governments, as expected.

Third, we consider whether the procedural topics are raised by governments at the time when we would expect them to raise them. *Across* debates the time dimension concerns whether a topic is raised at earlier stages of the negotiations (e.g. in initial presentations or policy debates) or when political agreement is sought. Topic 22 "Supporting the compromise" is indeed raised most often in debates on political agreement, when we would expect governments to establish the compromise and test support for it. In turn, it is less clear when exactly we would expect delaying tactics by governments, which appear functional at all stages, and – indeed – we find only small differences in the use of these topics by debate type: topics 32 "More technical-level discussion needed" and 38 "Cautious language" occur rather uniformly across debate types, while topic 12 "Delaying agreement" occurs less often in policy debates. The same applies to the negotiation demands topics (13, 40). They are also used quite uniformly across negotiation stages (also see Figure K4).

There is also a time dimension *within* debates, which pertains to whether a topic is raised in the beginning, middle, or end part of the speech. Expressing support for the compromise is

Figure I1: Gamma Distributions of Topics of Interest by Council Configuration



Figure I2: Gamma Distributions of Topics of Interest by Member State



a summative assessment of one's position, and indeed we find that topic 22 is more likely to be raised at the beginning as a preface or at the end as a conclusion to a speech, but a bit less so in the middle, when we would expect that governments outline the substance of what they want to say. With regard to delaying tactics, expectations are less clear again. We find no differences for explicit calls for delays (topic 12) by speech part as well as a tendency to defer things to the technical level (topic 32) towards the middle/end of a speech, potentially in terms of a conclusion, and the use of Cautious language (topic 38) slightly heightened in the middle of the speech. With regard to negotiation demands, we find that governments "Formulate a demand" (topic 13) mostly in the middle or end part of a speech, which is in line with the idea that you preface such demands with diplomatic habits (e.g. congratulations). In turn, government "Raise a concern" (topic 40) in the first and second part of the speech, indicating that they may start off a speech by saying that they are concerned about an aspect of the file (see Table B2). In total, these patterns are plausible and underline the construct validity of our baseline STM.

Second, we investigate criterion validity (e.g. do our measures relate to external events in expected ways?). For this purpose we focus on whether the prevalence of policy-specific topics over time reflects our knowledge about how the EU's legislative agenda has evolved in the years under study (i.e., concurrent validity). For each Council configuration, we select one topic as an example (see also above). Figure I3 plots the prevalence of the five topics over time (in half-yearly intervals). This first reaffirms our claim that policy-specific topics mainly occur in a single Council configuration. For all topics the prevalence in all but one configuration is essentially zero throughout the whole observation period. For JHA we selected topic 7 "European judicial matters / European public prosecutor." This topic gains traction from the second semester of 2013, stays at high levels throughout all of 2014 and remains on the agenda thereafter. This well tracks the EU's legislative agenda: the EU's general data protection regulation (GDPR) was intensely discussed in JHA already from October 2012, but the first debate with a focus on the "one-stop-shop" mechanism, which concerns the "European dimension" of GDPR, as it stipulates which authorities are responsible for organisations that are active in several member states, was held on 6 December 2013. Here, the STM is clearly able to differentiate between general issues of data protection (topic 29) and those concerning the judicial enforcement of the GDPR through European cooperation. Moreover, in 2014 the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPP/O) as a key component of European judicial cooperation entered the Council's agenda and was discussed intensely in four different JHA meetings. The EPPO stayed on the agenda (with fewer debates) throughout 2015 and 2016. This is exactly reflected in the STM's expected topic proportions.

For Ecofin we selected topic 9 "Banking supervision." This topic spikes in the second semester of 2012 as well as the first semester of 2014. Fittingly, the only two debates specifically held on the EU's "single supervisory mechanism" for the banking sector took place on 4 and 12 December 2012 respectively. Note that these were very long debates (3:20 and 2:29 h). In turn, the first semester of 2014 was marked by several discussions on the EU's "single resolution mechanism," which aims to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks. At no other moments during our observation periods were these mechanisms discussed. For the ENV configuration, we focus on topic 11 "Renewable energy and climate" that shows two spikes in the first semester of 2013 and the second semester of 2014 as well as becomes

increasingly prevalent towards the end of our observation period. Indeed, the only two debates on the recasting of the EU's renewable energy directive in our observation period were held on 21 March and 18 June 2013, whereas the second semester 2014 features debates on the EU's emission trading system ("ETS," one of the highest-probability tokens for this topic) as well as carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport. In contrast, the first half of 2015 only featured a debate on air pollution and accordingly the topic proportion drops close to zero. The last three semesters from the second half of 2015 to the end of 2016 each featured one long discussion (>90 minutes each) on a directive reforming the ETS to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments.

For EPSCO, which is a diverse configuration in terms of issue areas, we focus on topic 21 "Health and medical devices," which peaks in the first semester of 2014 and is also quite prevalent in the first semesters of 2015 as well as 2016. Fittingly, on 20th June 2014 EPSCO – for the first time – discussed two directives on medical devices. These files were discussed again on 19 June 2015 as well as 17 June 2016 but not at any other times during our observation period. In fact, given the EU's very limited competences in the health area, these directives are the only health-related files discussed in our sample. The STM captures precisely when they are discussed. Last, we consider the prevalence of topic 33 "Research and development (e.g. Horizon 2020)" in the COMPET configuration. This topic is quite prevalent in the first semester of 2012 and then fades in relevance over time. This pattern reflects the Council's legislative agenda: in 2012 COMPET held several long discussions on the establishment of the EU's research and innovation framework programme "Horizon 2020." It also discussed matters relating to the European Institute of Innovation and Technology. These discussions were concluded in 2012. The only other research-related file that COMPET discussed in our observation period was the establishment of the EU's earth-observing programme Copernicus in the second semester of 2013. In fact, the prevalence of the topic slightly increases in this semester.

In total, these analyses provide strong evidence that the STM model distinguishes meaningfully between procedural and policy-specific topics and closely tracks the legislative agendas of the Council, suggesting a high validity of our STM-based measures.

Figure I3: Policy-Specific Topics in Council Deliberations



Note: Topic proportions of selected topics in all Council configurations over time; COMPET: Competitiveness; Ecofin: Economic and Financial Affairs; ENV: Environment; EPSCO: Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; JHA: Justice and Home Affairs.

I.3 Correlation Between Topics

In this appendix, we investigate whether there are any significant correlations between the topics in our baseline STM. We are particularly interested in correlations between procedural and policy-specific topics. If our claim is correct that procedural topics are used to speak about *any* policy domain, we should not see strong cross-correlations between policy-specific and procedural topics. Moreover, as debates are on specific policies, the policy-specific topics should correlate less strongly with each other than procedural topics. It is more likely someone will congratulate the presidency and then speak in a cautious language to ask for a delay of negotiations than that someone will speak about an environmental and a public procurement topic in one speech part.

However, if certain procedural topics, especially those of key interest to us, were highly correlated with policy-specific topics, this would provide interesting further avenues for investigating and understanding the impact of public opinion. Table I5 shows all pairs of topics with empirically meaningful correlations (i.e., with $r \geq 0.30$). All possible topic correlations are also illustrated in graphical form in Figure I4. This reveals that all significant correlations are between procedural topics. Governments thank in different ways, they congratulate and thank at the same time, they use cautious language when reflecting on an issue, they refer to the Commissioner in their thanking, talk about reaching a compromise when thinking about negotiations with the European Parliament. All this appears very plausible and in many ways validates our claims. In particular, note that topic 35 "Talking about reaching a compromise," which we argued does not express support for the compromise, is associated with topic 36 "Negotiations with EP," indicating that it may often be used when talking about the inter-institutional rather than the within-Council compromise.

At the same time, these results provide no new opportunities to analyze the effect of public opinion on procedural moves with regard to particular topics. Our procedural topics indeed seem to be primarily used across domains.

Table I5: Correlation Between Topics in the Baseline STM (All Topics)

Topic Correlation	Topic 1	Topic 2	Type 1	Type 2
0.68	Topic 6: Thanking II (rather abstract groups)	Topic 37: Brief intervention	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.60	Topic 1: Thanking I (rather specific person)	Topic 37: Brief intervention	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.53	Topic 5: Reflection	Topic 38: Cautious language	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.53	Topic 1: Thanking I (rather specific person)	Topic 6: Thanking II (rather abstract groups)	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.51	Topic 6: Thanking II (rather abstract groups)	Topic 23: Congratulating	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.42	Topic 6: Thanking II (rather abstract groups)	Topic 8: Referring to Commissioner	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.42	Topic 8: Referring to Commissioner	Topic 37: Brief intervention	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.41	Topic 23: Congratulating	Topic 37: Brief intervention	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.40	Topic 1: Thanking I (rather specific person)	Topic 8: Referring to Commissioner	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.33	Topic 35: Talking about reaching compromise	Topic 36: Negotiations with EP	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic
0.32	Topic 12: Delaying agreement	Topic 38: Cautious language	Procedural Topic	Procedural Topic

Figure I4: Similarity between Topics (Baseline STM)



I.4 Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Manifestations of Public Opinion

Conceivably, we might expect there to be a correlation between explicit and implicit manifestations of public opinion. This might be the case, for example, when calls for delays or transferals to the technical level are justified by referring to public opinion. However, we might also find explicit manifestations of public opinion without implicit manifestations (e.g. talking about public opinion without it being connected to delay tactics), or the opposite (e.g. delay tactics without explicit manifestations of public opinion). In fact, the latter is what we find in the analysis of debates in the Council as described in the paper.

Nevertheless, we can also more specifically test whether the implicit manifestations we describe in the paper are related to mentioning the public explicitly. As we did not find a topic referring to the public, we use a dictionary analysis looking for the words "public*," "people*," "citizen*," "public opinion," "voter*," "constituent*," "inhabitant*," "resident*," and "taxpayer*." This analysis corresponds to Appendix C in which we analyze these explicit manifestations in relation to our independent variables.

Table I6 shows the correlation between topic prevalence and mentions of the public. Table I7 shows the same analysis for nouns only. Topics 29 and 30 have the most mentions of the public, those are the topics that deal with data protection and public procurement respectively. The key procedural topics from the main analysis are all unrelated or even negatively related to mentions of the public. Overall, there is no indication that implicit manifestations of public opinion correlate with explicit manifestations.

Table I6: Correlation Between Topics and Mentions of Public

Topic	Category	Correlation between Topic Prevalence and Mentions of the Public
Topic 29	Policy-specific	0.29
Topic 30	Policy-specific	0.17
Topic 7	Policy-specific	0.13
Topic 3	Policy-specific	0.09
Topic 5	Other Procedural Topic	0.06
Topic 4	Policy-specific	0.05
Topic 24	Other Procedural Topic	0.04
Topic 20	Policy-specific	0.04
Topic 10	Policy-specific	0.03
Topic 25	Other Procedural Topic	0.03
Topic 13	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	0.02
Topic 19	Policy-specific	0.02
Topic 28	Policy-specific	0.01
Topic 38	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	0.01
Topic 15	Policy-specific	0.01
Topic 31	Policy-specific	0.01
Topic 40	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	0.00
Topic 34	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 16	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 21	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 39	Other Procedural Topic	-0.01
Topic 26	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 17	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 33	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 27	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 18	Other Procedural Topic	-0.02
Topic 9	Policy-specific	-0.03
Topic 14	Policy-specific	-0.03
Topic 2	Policy-specific	-0.03
Topic 32	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	-0.04
Topic 11	Policy-specific	-0.04
Topic 12	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	-0.07
Topic 8	Other Procedural Topic	-0.08
Topic 22	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	-0.09
Topic 36	Other Procedural Topic	-0.09
Topic 23	Other Procedural Topic	-0.10
Topic 1	Other Procedural Topic	-0.11
Topic 35	Other Procedural Topic	-0.12
Topic 6	Other Procedural Topic	-0.13
Topic 37	Other Procedural Topic	-0.18

Table I7: Correlation Between Topics and Mentions of Public (Nouns only)

Topic	Category	Correlation between Topic Prevalence and Mentions of the Public
Topic 29	Policy-specific	0.16
Topic 5	Other Procedural Topic	0.12
Topic 3	Policy-specific	0.11
Topic 7	Policy-specific	0.09
Topic 30	Policy-specific	0.08
Topic 38	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	0.05
Topic 20	Policy-specific	0.04
Topic 24	Other Procedural Topic	0.04
Topic 39	Other Procedural Topic	0.03
Topic 4	Policy-specific	0.03
Topic 13	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	0.03
Topic 31	Policy-specific	0.03
Topic 40	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	0.02
Topic 16	Policy-specific	0.02
Topic 19	Policy-specific	0.02
Topic 25	Other Procedural Topic	0.01
Topic 28	Policy-specific	-0.00
Topic 10	Policy-specific	-0.00
Topic 15	Policy-specific	-0.00
Topic 21	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 26	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 17	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 9	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 34	Policy-specific	-0.01
Topic 2	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 18	Other Procedural Topic	-0.02
Topic 27	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 33	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 14	Policy-specific	-0.02
Topic 11	Policy-specific	-0.03
Topic 32	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	-0.04
Topic 12	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	-0.05
Topic 8	Other Procedural Topic	-0.05
Topic 36	Other Procedural Topic	-0.06
Topic 23	Other Procedural Topic	-0.07
Topic 35	Other Procedural Topic	-0.07
Topic 22	Key Procedural Topic from Main Analysis	-0.08
Topic 1	Other Procedural Topic	-0.08
Topic 6	Other Procedural Topic	-0.10
Topic 37	Other Procedural Topic	-0.13

I.5 Bootstrapping Procedure for STM

Standard errors reported by the "stm" package (Roberts et al., 2020) do not account for the clustering of observations at different levels. While this is potentially a problem in all topic model analyses in which several documents stem from the same author(s) or treatments are assigned at an aggregate level, in our case it is particularly relevant as we only have a small number of member state governments giving the speeches as well as our main treatment (public opinion) being assigned at the member state level. To provide more conservative, corrected standard errors, we therefore implement a nonparametric bootstrapping procedure to obtain our STM estimates.

Note that the STM package reports the effects of covariates on topic proportions by taking 25 random draws of the predicted topic proportions for all topics and documents from the variational posterior of the STM (which is estimated through semi-collapsed variational expectation maximization (EM)). For each topic, the package then performs 25 OLS regressions – one for each draw from the variational posterior – with the topic's predicted proportions for each document being the dependent variable regressed on all covariates. While the variance estimates (i.e., standard errors) from each single regression account for the underlying sampling variability (e.g. we are only looking at a sample out of the universe of possible documents), performing a regression for each of the 25 draws from the variational posterior accounts for the estimation uncertainty stemming from the variational EM. The two types of uncertainty are joined through a simulation step in which the package takes 500 draws of each of the 25 regressions' coefficients from a multivariate normal distribution using the coefficient estimates as means as well as their covariance matrix. This results in 500 * 25 simulations for each coefficient, reflecting sampling and estimation uncertainty. The regression coefficients (as means) and variance estimates are then derived from these simulated values.

Our procedure intervenes in the first step of sampling from the variational posterior. Instead of taking 25 draws, we take a much larger number of draws but resample each dataset at the country level with replacement, i.e. we perform a cluster bootstrap. Thereby, we create some samples that contain the documents from some countries two times, three times etc., whereas other countries may be missing. This accounts for the clustering of our observations at the country level (e.g. it provides an estimate of the variability of our samples assuming they were drawn from an imaginative population of potential EU countries). As rare draws may cause problems with the OLS regressions in the next step in case the sample of countries does not cover all values of all covariates (e.g. only pro-EU governments in the sample), we reject all samples in which the variance of any covariate is zero. The following steps remain the same. Again, we simulate 500 coefficient sets from each OLS regression to combine the resampled draws from the variational posterior.

For all results reported, we take 10,000 resampled draws from the variational posterior. We determined this value through simulation. Specifically, we ran the procedure with varying numbers of resamples, ranging from 5 to 10,000, and repeated it several times with each number to determine at what number key test statistics of interest converge across different runs. This is illustrated in Figure I5, which plots t-statistics of the effects of public opinion on the use of topic 40 "Raising a concern" (a key topic of interest to us) for both types of governments. It clearly shows that the runs converge onto very similar t-statistics from

around 2,500 resampled draws. For results in the paper, we take 10,000 draws to provide some safety (e.g. as other t-statistics may converge later). Robustness tests and alternative public opinion effects presented in the appendices below are run with 2,500 draws.

Figure I5: Simulation of T-Statistics for the Effect of Public Image of the EU (Baseline STM)



Note: X-axis denotes the number of resampled draws from the variational posterior; We run the procedure 10 times per number of resampled draws.

One simpler alternative to correct for the uncertainty related to the country clustering of our data is to just take the STM's main document topic-proportion matrix and perform linear regressions with all covariates on them while bootstrapping the standard errors at the country level. While this does not account for the uncertainty associated with the STM results themselves, it is more straightforward and neatly illustrates the need for bootstrapping. In Table I8 we run regular OLS regressions on the topic-proportion matrix for our topics of interest and compare their standard errors to regressions with cluster-bootstrapped standard errors at the country level (using the "multiwayvcov" package in R, see Graham, Arai and Hagströmer (2016)). The dependent variable is the topic prevalence from the STM regressed on all variables used in the main analysis. Note that the estimates themselves are similar, but not identical to the estimates presented in Table B2, as those were calculated within the STM package. While the clustered and unclustered standard errors are similar for many estimates, for two of our key variables ("Eurosceptic Government" and the interaction term "Eurosceptic Government x Public Image of the EU"), the standard errors without clustering are often five to ten times smaller than with clustering, which reflects the small number of countries with a Eurosceptic government in our data (6 countries), the assignment of public opinion on the country level, and potentially also the reduced debate participation by Eurosceptic governments facing positive public opinion. This is strong evidence for the need for clustered standard errors, which we use throughout the paper.

Table I8: Standard and Cluster-Bootstrapped OLS Results

	Dependent variable:											
	Topic Prevalence Topic 12		Topic Prevalence Topic 13		Topic Prevalence Topic 22		Topic Prevalence Topic 32		Topic Prevalence Topic 38		Topic Prevalence Topic 40	
	Standard OLS	Clustered OLS	Standard OLS	Clustered OLS	Standard OLS	Clustered OLS	Standard OLS	Clustered OLS	Standard OLS	Clustered OLS	Standard OLS	Clustered OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Intercept	0.019***	0.019***	0.008***	0.008***	0.076***	0.076***	0.021***	0.021***	0.042***	0.042***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)
Eurosceptic Government	0.007***	0.007	−0.003**	−0.003	0.004*	0.004	−0.008***	−0.008	0.009***	0.009	0.001**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.033)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.0005)	(0.003)
Public Image of the EU	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.001***	0.001*	0.005***	0.005***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.004***	−0.004**	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Middle Part of Speech	0.0005	0.0005	0.014***	0.014***	−0.008***	−0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.011***	0.011***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
End Part of Speech	0.001***	0.001***	0.013***	0.013***	0.002*	0.002	0.011***	0.011***	0.005***	0.005***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0004**	−0.0004	0.001***	0.001***	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.0005	−0.0005	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0002)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.007***	0.007***	0.004***	0.004***	−0.012***	−0.012***	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Budget issue	0.011***	0.011***	0.001	0.001	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.011***	−0.011***	0.008***	0.008***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Unanimity Required	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	−0.009***	−0.009***	−0.005***	−0.005***	0.001	0.001	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.001**	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002***	−0.002**	−0.002***	−0.002	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Inflation Rate	0.001***	0.001**	0.002***	0.002***	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.003***	−0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Northern Europe	0.007***	0.007***	−0.005***	−0.005***	0.002	0.002	0.002*	0.002	−0.008***	−0.008***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.0002)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	0.0002	0.0002	−0.004***	−0.004**	−0.002*	−0.002	−0.005***	−0.005**	0.008***	0.008	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002**	−0.002*	0.007***	0.007***	−0.029***	−0.029***	0.006***	0.006***	0.009***	0.009***	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.002*	0.003**	0.003**	−0.012***	−0.012***	0.010***	0.010***	0.003*	0.003*	0.001**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.008***	−0.008***	0.005***	0.005***	−0.037***	−0.037***	0.012***	0.012***	0.003***	0.003***	−0.0002	−0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.008***	−0.034***	−0.034***	0.007***	0.007***	0.003***	0.003	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.001	0.001	0.004***	0.004***	−0.025***	−0.025***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Council configuration: ENV	−0.0002	−0.0002	0.005***	0.005***	−0.027***	−0.027***	−0.009***	−0.009***	−0.012***	−0.012***	−0.001***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.005***	0.008***	0.008***	−0.003*	−0.003	0.020***	0.020***	0.006***	0.006***	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government x Public Image of the EU	0.002***	0.002	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.004***	−0.004	0.009***	0.009	0.003***	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.0003)	(0.002)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Clustered OLS regressions using 2,000 replications at the country level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I.6 Predicted Values for Topics of Interest

To further illustrate our main results, we also plot predicted values (i.e., estimated topic proportions) for all key topics of theoretical interest depending on public opinion and whether the government is pro-EU vs. Eurosceptic. For these predictions, the "stm" package (Roberts et al., 2020) fixes all continuous covariates at their median and all others at their modal values. For the plots below this means that the left-right position is fixed at -0.05, the contribution to the EU budget at -0.54, unemployment at -0.26, and inflation at -0.03. The categorical variables are fixed at "No" for budget speeches, "No" for unanimity, the middle part of speeches, central European countries, Debates on Political Agreement and Justice and Home Affairs debates. The expected topic proportions relating to the topic for hypothesis H2 is in Figure I6. Those for the topics relating to hypotheses H3 and H4 are in Figures I7 and I8, respectively. These predicted values are based on the models presented in Appendix B.1, Table B2.

Figure I6: Public Opinion and Support for the Compromise during Council Deliberations



Note: Estimated topic proportions are plotted for all observed values of the public image of the EU; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Figure I7: Public Opinion and Delaying Tactics during Council Deliberations



Note: Estimated topic proportions are plotted for all observed values of the public image of the EU; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Figure I8: Public Opinion and Negotiation Demands during Council Deliberations



Note: Estimated topic proportions are plotted for all observed values of the public image of the EU; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

J Robustness Tests for Structural Topic Model

In this section, we perform several robustness checks of our baseline STM results by adjusting key model parameters such as the set of fixed effects, the number of topics, or the set of control variables. They generally confirm our main results in the paper. The first section J.1 below – on an alternative specification using year fixed effects – outlines in detail how we analyze the alternative specifications. The following sections focus on the main findings for each specification.

J.1 STM with Year Fixed Effects

Our first robustness check adds fixed effects for each year to the model. This accounts for common shocks in public opinion that may also be related to a change in the legislative agenda and therefore in governments' rhetoric (e.g. due to the eurozone crisis public opinion and the legislative agenda may change). In such a case, public opinion and government's rhetoric would be erroneously correlated, both being driven by the shock directly.

First, we assess the overall semantic similarity of the baseline model in the paper with the alternative specification of the STM including year fixed effects. For this purpose, we compare the top 20 FREX words for each topic in both models by calculating the cosine similarity of the word vectors between a topic in the baseline model and all topics in the alternative specification. The overall similarity is plotted as a "heat map" in Figure J1. The more each topic of the baseline model only has a high similarity to a single topic in the alternative specification, e.g. having a single "match" (as opposed to being similar to several topics or no topic), the higher the overall semantic similarity of the two STMs. In fact, if the models do not differ much, even the number of a topic may not change (given that we use spectral initialization in estimation, which is deterministic). Figure J1 reveals a very high semantic similarity between the baseline model and the model with year fixed effects: the similarities are concentrated on a single match and topics only share a few very low similarities with a second or third topic. Hence, accounting for year effects does not change the overall meaning of the topics.

Second, to assess potential changes in our hypotheses tests we replicate Figure 4 from the paper using the results from the alternative specification with year fixed effects. These results are plotted in Figure J2. They are substantively identical with those in the paper. Pro-EU governments increase their rhetorical support for the compromise if public opinion is more pro-EU and their use of delaying tactics if public opinion is more anti-EU. Like in the paper, we do not find that either type of government would significantly adjust the formulation of negotiation demands to public opinion. Table J1 displays the resulting slopes and related significance tests for the effect of the EU's image on the proportions of our topics of interest for pro-EU and Eurosceptic governments separately. This is a direct replication of Table B1 for the alternative specification. All effects for pro-EU governments significant in the baseline STM are also significant when including year fixed effects. In contrast, as in the baseline model, we never find that public opinion significantly affects the rhetoric of Eurosceptic governments.

In total, the alternative specification with year fixed effects therefore strongly supports our main findings in the paper. Our results are not due to any common contemporaneous

shocks that may influence public opinion in most member states and governments' rhetoric simultaneously.

Figure J1: FREX Tokens Cosine Similarity (Baseline vs. Year Fixed Effects STM)



Figure J2: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (Year Fixed Effects STM)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Table J1: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (Year Fixed Effects STM)

	Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
1	-0.00238	0.00078	-3.05719	0.00224	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
2	-0.00046	0.00494	-0.09242	0.92636	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
3	0.00115	0.00093	1.24481	0.21323	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
4	-0.00073	0.00580	-0.12604	0.89970	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
5	0.00386	0.00155	2.48259	0.01306	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
6	0.00206	0.00947	0.21797	0.82746	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
7	-0.00320	0.00129	-2.48060	0.01313	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
8	-0.00711	0.00777	-0.91502	0.36020	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
9	-0.00445	0.00167	-2.65879	0.00785	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
10	0.00176	0.00868	0.20263	0.83943	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
11	-0.00111	0.00039	-2.89010	0.00386	40	Pro-EU Government	Raising a concern
12	0.00109	0.00307	0.35650	0.72147	40	Eurosceptic Government	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

J.2 STM with Alternative Definition of Eurosceptic Governments

As a second alternative specification, we challenge our identification of Eurosceptic governments based on the CMP and additionally use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on parties Jolly et al. (2022). Clear advantages of using the CMP include: 1) Statements in party manifestos at the last election are arguably more exogenous to governments' behavior at the EU-level than expert data, as experts may partially base their assessment of a government party's Euroscepticism on its ministers' behavior in the Council. 2) A larger coverage of countries and time periods in the CMP (all EU countries except Malta), while the CHES has only recently extended its coverage and its gaps are more significant. However, one drawback of the CMP are heterogeneous amounts of measurement error across countries and parties, stemming from the different lengths of manifestos as well as differential politicization of the EU issues in different party systems (e.g. some parties may spend many more quasi-sentences on EU integration than others). While this issue is also present in the CHES in the form of varying numbers of experts per country/party, it is arguably of smaller magnitude.

For these reasons, we test the robustness of our findings to an alternative classification of Eurosceptic governments that includes information from the CHES. As the CHES does not cover all our countries in our time frame, and henceforth, an analysis just based on CHES would lead to a significantly different sample, we instead construct a new Eurosceptic government dummy variable that combines information from both data sources. This variable is "1" for all Eurosceptic governments according to the CMP *and* for all governments with a seat-weighted CHES position on EU integration ("EU POSITION") below 4.5 (half-way between 4 = "Neutral" and 5 = "Somewhat in favor"), i.e. governments that could be deemed Eurosceptic according to the CHES. This represents a wider definition of Eurosceptic governments than used in our baseline model. Specifically, it adds seven additional Eurosceptic governments. The whole list of Eurosceptic governments according to this definition is displayed in Table J2.

Table J2: List of Eurosceptic Governments in Dataset (CMP+CHES classification)

	Country	Name of Cabinet	First Speech in Dataset	Last Speech in Dataset	EU Position in CHES	EU Position in CMP
1	Cyprus	Anastasiades III	2016-05-25	2016-12-19	6.75	-0.42
2	Czech Republic	Necas I	2010-10-19	2012-04-26	4.35	1.21
3	Czech Republic	Necas II	2012-04-27	2013-06-21	4.28	1.20
4	Denmark	Rasmussen L II	2015-10-26	2016-10-13	5.82	-0.99
5	Denmark	Rasmussen L III	2016-11-28	2016-12-19	4.90	-0.64
6	Greece	Pikrammenos	2012-05-30	2012-05-31		-1.26
7	Greece	Samaras	2012-10-10	2013-06-21	5.27	0.00
8	Greece	Tsipras I	2015-03-13	2015-06-19	3.35	0.61
9	Greece	Tsipras II	2015-10-09	2016-12-19	3.37	-1.14
10	Finland	Sipilae	2015-06-15	2016-12-08	4.24	0.28
11	Hungary	Orban III	2014-05-26	2016-12-19	2.71	-0.85
12	Italy	Berlusconi IV	2010-10-19	2011-10-28	3.84	0.00
13	Netherlands	Rutte I	2010-10-19	2012-03-09	4.48	1.15
14	Netherlands	Rutte II	2012-04-26	2012-10-26	4.48	1.15
15	Poland	Szydlo	2015-12-16	2016-12-19	3.82	
16	United Kingdom	Cameron	2010-05-18	2015-03-13	2.85	-0.11
17	United Kingdom	Cameron II	2015-05-28	2016-06-20	3.14	-4.03
18	United Kingdom	May	2016-11-28	2016-12-19	3.14	-4.03

The results with this alternative definition largely replicate our baseline results. Figure J3 reveals a strong overall similarity of the two topic models. Consequently, we were able to identify our key topics of interest in the alternative specification and test our hypotheses. Figure J4 shows that pro-EU governments express significantly more support for the compromise if their domestic public at home has a positive image of the EU. It also reveals that pro-EU governments also use more delaying tactics when public opinion is anti-EU. For the "Cautious language" topic this effect is marginally not significant at the 5% level ($p = 0.051$), but substantively the result holds. As in the baseline model, Figure J4 does not provide any evidence that public opinion would be used by governments to formulate more negotiation demands when cross-pressured. We only find two substantive differences to our baseline results: 1) Eurosceptic governments now also significantly reduce their use of the "More technical-level discussion needed" topic in response to pro-EU opinion, showing that with a wider definition of Eurosceptic governments, some effects of public opinion may be found, but most effects remain indistinguishable from zero. 2) The "Raising a concern" topic has no statistically significant effect anymore for pro-EU governments, underlining that we have no robust evidence for negotiation demands being related to public opinion. In total, the results clearly underline our baseline results.

Figure J3: FREX Tokens Cosine Similarity (Baseline vs. CMP-CHES STM)



Figure J4: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (CMP-CHES STM)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Table J3: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (CMP-CHES STM)

	Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
1	-0.00185	0.00080	-2.31606	0.02057	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
2	-0.00134	0.00195	-0.68633	0.49252	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
3	0.00036	0.00082	0.43417	0.66418	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
4	0.00052	0.00220	0.23492	0.81428	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
5	0.00465	0.00143	3.25017	0.00116	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
6	0.00108	0.00317	0.34003	0.73384	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
7	-0.00312	0.00130	-2.39617	0.01659	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
8	-0.00658	0.00279	-2.36130	0.01823	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
9	-0.00298	0.00153	-1.95243	0.05091	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
10	0.00226	0.00348	0.65051	0.51538	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
11	-0.00099	0.00060	-1.66496	0.09595	40	Pro-EU Government	Raising a concern
12	0.00068	0.00108	0.62858	0.52964	40	Eurosceptic Government	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

J.3 STM with 35 Topics

We also vary the number of topics in the STM to see to what extent our substantive conclusions are dependent on k. Figure J5 compares the baseline model to an alternative specification with $k = 35$. While this reveals generally a solid similarity between the two models, the substantively important topics "Cautious language" (topic 38) as well as "Raising a concern" (topic 40) in the baseline model have no clear equivalent in the alternative specification. For both topics, their cosine similarity to any topic in the alternative model is < 0.5. This indicates that "More technical-level discussion needed" and "Delaying agreement" are more prevalent as delaying tactics than "Cautious language" as well as "Formulating a demand" is more prevalent as a negotiation demand than "Raising a concern." But, on a general level, all rhetorical elements of interest we find in the baseline model (support for the compromise, delaying tactics, negotiation demands) are still present in this model. As the baseline STM, this model likewise lacks a topic on public opinion specifically.

Figure J6 shows that pro-EU governments adjust their support for the compromise to public opinion as in the baseline model ($p = 0.07$). It also shows that they use more delaying tactics if public opinion is negative towards the EU, by calling for more work at the technical level. However, the effect for "Delaying agreement" is only statistically significant at the 10% level ($p = 0.097$). As in the baseline model, the formulation of negotiation demands is unrelated to public opinion. While these results are marginally weaker than those in our baseline model, they are all in line with them. After all, the STM with 35 topics may simply merge topics that do not have the same semantic meaning, which may veil and weaken effects.

Figure J5: FREX Tokens Cosine Similarity (Baseline vs. 35 Topics STM)



Figure J6: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (35 Topics STM)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Table J4: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (35 Topics STM)

	Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
1	-0.00155	0.00093	-1.66218	0.09651	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
2	0.00187	0.02394	0.07804	0.93780	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
3	0.00095	0.00082	1.15977	0.24617	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
4	-0.00145	0.01927	-0.07544	0.93987	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
5	0.00349	0.00193	1.80472	0.07115	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
6	0.00300	0.03386	0.08859	0.92941	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
7	-0.00306	0.00138	-2.22355	0.02620	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
8	-0.00783	0.02079	-0.37641	0.70662	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

J.4 STM with 45 Topics

Figure J7 shows the similarity between our baseline model and a model with $k = 45$ topics. This reveals a good consistency of topics when increasing k. All our key topics of interest are still present, except for Topic 40 ("Raising a Concern"), which does not have a comparable topic in the 40 topic model. The leading token "concern" is now part of several topics, in particular another topic indicating assessment of the compromise text but mixing positively and negatively valenced tokens. In addition, when labeling the new topics, we also encountered another topic that could relate to our hypothesis H1, namely topic 42, which we labeled as "Cautious support of the proposal." This is a topic that is most prevalent in initial presentations of a proposal. While relevant for H1, it is unclear how the aspect of caution plays in. In contrast, even with 45 topics we still do not find any topic that raises the issue of public opinion or voters.

Figure J8 replicates our findings from the baseline model for the "Supporting the compromise" topic, and reveals similar patterns for the new "Cautious support of the proposal" topic. However, while the effects of public opinion are still highly significant for the former, they are not for the latter. In any case, the effects for both topics point in the same direction, but they are only significant for the baseline topic of "Supporting the compromise." Figure J8 also replicates all results for the delaying tactics. All public opinion effects for pro-EU governments remain statistically significant. As our baseline results, Figure J8 reveals no evidence that governments adapt their formulation of negotiation demands to public opinion. In sum, this alternative specification entirely backs our findings from our baseline STM.

Figure J7: FREX Tokens Cosine Similarity (Baseline vs. 45 Topics STM)



Figure J8: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (45 Topics STM)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Table J5: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (45 Topics STM)

	Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
1	-0.00128	0.00056	-2.29666	0.02166	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
2	0.00017	0.01433	0.01171	0.99066	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
3	0.00083	0.00066	1.25753	0.20859	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
4	-0.00102	0.01419	-0.07191	0.94268	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
5	0.00275	0.00110	2.50906	0.01212	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
6	0.00405	0.01619	0.25026	0.80239	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
7	-0.00238	0.00108	-2.20066	0.02778	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
8	-0.00588	0.01442	-0.40799	0.68329	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
9	-0.00287	0.00122	-2.35321	0.01863	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
10	0.00133	0.02980	0.04466	0.96438	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
11	0.00031	0.00083	0.37406	0.70837	42	Pro-EU Government	Cautious support of the proposal
12	0.00405	0.01233	0.32837	0.74264	42	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious support of the proposal

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

J.5 STM Controlling for EMU

One potentially important control variable that is not included in our baseline model is a country's membership in the eurozone, especially given that our observation period largely overlaps with the eurozone's sovereign debt crisis. Note that we did not include EMU membership in our baseline model, because we are not aware of any research that shows that eurozone governments drive negotiations or would be particularly successful in bargaining in the Council. However, we here estimate an alternative STM that also includes a dummy variable for whether the country is part of the eurozone.

Figure J12 shows the similarity between this model and our baseline model. Figure J10 also shows that our main results on the hypotheses tests still hold. The exact effect sizes are reported in Table J6. Moreover, we also plot the direct difference in topic proportions between eurozone and non-eurozone members for each topic in Figure J11. This reveals few differences in rhetoric. The only significant effect is that eurozone members use one thanking topic (Topic 1) less often.

Table J6: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (STM Controlling for EMU)

	Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
1	-0.00191	0.00071	-2.68351	0.00730	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
2	-0.00015	0.00481	-0.03141	0.97494	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
3	0.00105	0.00082	1.28187	0.19992	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
4	-0.00034	0.00567	-0.06058	0.95169	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
5	0.00387	0.00144	2.69152	0.00712	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
6	0.00274	0.00999	0.27404	0.78406	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
7	-0.00279	0.00121	-2.30714	0.02107	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
8	-0.00675	0.00770	-0.87697	0.38053	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
9	-0.00328	0.00141	-2.32753	0.01996	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
10	0.00283	0.00832	0.33977	0.73404	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
11	-0.00105	0.00039	-2.71425	0.00665	40	Pro-EU Government	Raising a concern
12	0.00120	0.00287	0.41745	0.67636	40	Eurosceptic Government	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

Figure J9: FREX Tokens Cosine Similarity (Baseline vs. EMU STM)



Figure J10: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (STM Controlling for EMU)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Figure J11: Euro Membership and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for eurozone members compared to non-eurozone members; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal lines.

J.6 STM without Government Left-Right Position

In this appendix, we check the robustness of our results to the exclusion of the government's left-right position as a control variable. For this purpose, we estimate an STM that is identical to the baseline STM except for the exclusion of the government's left-right position. Figure J12 reveals a high similarity of the topics in this model to the topics in the baseline model. The resulting public opinion effects are reported in Table J7; and Figure 4 from the paper is replicated in Figure J13. All our main substantive results hold. Only the estimated effect for pro-EU governments of the EU's public image on the "Cautious language" topic drops in statistical significance to the 10% level ($p = 0.09$). However, given that the effects of the other two delaying tactics clearly stay statistically significant, this is a small variation in our results.

Table J7: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (STM without Government Left-Right Position)

	Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
1	-0.00169	0.00066	-2.56144	0.01044	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
2	-0.00024	0.00459	-0.05300	0.95773	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
3	0.00055	0.00074	0.74252	0.45779	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
4	-0.00024	0.00546	-0.04309	0.96563	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
5	0.00453	0.00146	3.09693	0.00196	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
6	0.00289	0.01018	0.28436	0.77614	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
7	-0.00279	0.00116	-2.40716	0.01609	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
8	-0.00684	0.00776	-0.88095	0.37837	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
9	-0.00249	0.00147	-1.69435	0.09023	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
10	0.00238	0.00853	0.27904	0.78022	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
11	-0.00079	0.00036	-2.21695	0.02665	40	Pro-EU Government	Raising a concern
12	0.00103	0.00319	0.32369	0.74618	40	Eurosceptic Government	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

Figure J12: FREX Tokens Cosine Similarity (Baseline vs. STM without Government Left-Right Position)



Figure J13: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (STM without Government Left-Right Position)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

K Alternative Public Opinion Effects in Structural Topic Model

In the appendices below, we test various alternative ideas and assumptions about how and when exactly public opinion influences governments' rhetoric. Each section includes an alternative STM, in which we interact public opinion with a new moderator (or itself, see Appendix K.1) that is not government's pro-anti EU ideology (as in the baseline model). However, we retain our standard set of controls as well as the dummy variable for Eurosceptic governments. Sometimes we perform further analyses in addition. Wherever we present topic proportion regressions for our six procedural topics of interest, these topics were identified in the alternative model through the high cosine similarity (≥ 0.5, in most cases ≥ 0.70) of their FREX words with the topics in our baseline model. Note that we do not find any new topics dealing chiefly with public opinion, voters, or citizens in any of the additional models we estimate. Our main results are substantively supported by all analyses.

K.1 Non-Linear Public Opinion Effects

One concern about our baseline model is that the effects of public opinion on topic proportions may be non-linear. Governments might react more strongly to extreme public opinion (either very negative or very positive), but not as strongly to shifts around the mean. To test this, we run an STM model adding the squared term for the public image on the EU, while keeping all other control variables the same (including the dummy variable on Eurosceptic governments).

As the non-linear effect is only a possibility and the linear model is more parsimonious, we first check in the STM regression models in Table K1 whether any of the quadratic terms is statistically significant with regard to our six procedural topics of interest in the paper, which would suggest a non-linear effect. In five of the six topics, the squared term is not significant and hence the inclusion of that term does not improve model fit. However, for topic 38 ("Cautious language"), the squared term is statistically significant. We plot the relationship in Figure K1. Between moderate levels of public opinion, the topic proportion changes fairly little, whereas for very positive public image, the topic proportion drops considerably. We interpret this finding to mean that governments become less cautious when their public is more positive (as we report in the paper), but that effect only starts when the public is very positive. This does not change our main findings.

For these predictions, the "stm" package (Roberts et al., 2020) fixes all continuous covariates at their median and all others at their modal values. For the plots below this means that the left-right position is fixed at -0.05, the contribution to the EU budget at -0.54, unemployment at -0.26, and inflation at -0.03. The categorical variables are fixed at "No" for budget speeches, "No" for unanimity, the middle part of speeches, central European countries, Debates on Political Agreement and Justice and Home Affairs debates.

Table K1: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Including a Squared Term)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.017***	0.007***	0.068***	0.020***	0.033***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Public Image of the EU	−0.108	0.022	0.167	−0.206*	−0.199	−0.040
	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.146)	(0.120)	(0.134)	(0.040)
Public Image of the EU (Squared)	0.018	0.024	0.028	0.024	−0.372***	0.005
	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.127)	(0.105)	(0.113)	(0.035)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.0001	0.012***	−0.009***	0.006***	0.007***	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0004	0.011***	0.0002	0.008***	0.002	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.005**	−0.003	0.003	−0.002	0.005	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0002	0.001	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.003*	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002**	0.007***	0.003***	−0.009***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Budget issue	0.013***	0.003	−0.010***	−0.008**	0.014***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.003*	0.003*	−0.008***	−0.004	0.001	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.003***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.0005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0005	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.002***	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.005***	−0.004***	0.002	0.002	−0.007**	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	−0.0002	−0.003	−0.001	−0.005	0.009**	0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002	0.006**	−0.027***	0.006*	0.007*	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.003	−0.009	0.010**	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.007***	0.004***	−0.033***	0.010***	0.002*	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.007***	−0.028***	0.007**	0.003	0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.002	0.004**	−0.021***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.0003	0.005***	−0.023***	−0.008***	−0.008***	−0.0001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.008***	−0.001	0.018***	0.006**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure K1: Topic 38 ("Cautious Language") in Model with Squared Public Image



Note: Estimates reflect predicted topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image between 5 and 95% quantiles; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

K.2 Public Opinion and National Elections

It is a standard argument in the responsiveness literature that public opinion should matter more to elite behavior when elections are approaching, as electoral pressure increases and voters are myopic, considering what politicians did in the period before elections. We do not look at this argument in the paper, because we know from previous work that EU decision-making is slowing down before electoral contests in member states (Kleine and Minaudier, 2019; Schneider, 2018) and it is argued that this is due to governments becoming more cautious and trying to avoid taking positions at the international level when elections are pending. This could mean that governments are also participating less in Council debates (or that Council debates may even be postponed), which would make it hard or impossible for us to identify any effect on the contents of their rhetoric. In Appendix D, we indeed show that governments facing pending elections at home are clearly less likely to participate in Council debates. While this suggests we may not find any effects of elections on rhetoric due to deselection from debates, we here nevertheless test for some effects: 1) a direct effect of elections on rhetoric, 2) an interactive effect between pending elections and public opinion, 3) a more long-run interactive effect between the remaining time to the next elections and public opinion. Please note that due to our limited time period of up to seven years, we are limited in our ability to identify the effects of elections, especially in case they may be concentrated on a few months before the elections – this is simply a small subset of our data.

Controlling for Pending Elections

In a first step, we just check whether our baseline results are robust to controlling for pending elections and whether rhetoric significantly changes close to elections. For this purpose, we estimate an STM with our baseline specification plus a dummy variable that is "1" if national legislative elections are ≤ 61 days away (i.e., occur within the next two months). The main results of public opinion on our topics of interest are plotted in Figure K2 and Table K2. All our main results hold when controlling for pending elections.
Moreover, we plot the direct effect of pending elections on all our topics in Figure K3. None of the topics is used significantly more often by governments if elections occur in the near future.

Figure K2: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (Controlling for Pending Elections)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Table K2: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (Controlling for Pending Elections)

Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
-0.00219	0.00075	-2.93024	0.00339	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
0.00023	0.00521	0.04454	0.96447	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
0.00115	0.00088	1.31039	0.19009	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
-0.00020	0.00633	-0.03187	0.97458	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
0.00416	0.00146	2.85466	0.00432	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
0.00313	0.00980	0.31962	0.74927	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
-0.00297	0.00122	-2.44055	0.01468	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
-0.00668	0.00784	-0.85257	0.39392	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
-0.00346	0.00150	-2.30545	0.02116	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
0.00337	0.00816	0.41337	0.67935	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
-0.00077	0.00034	-2.26898	0.02329	40	Pro-EU Government	Raising a concern
0.00101	0.00310	0.32596	0.74446	40	Eurosceptic Government	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

Figure K3: Pending Elections and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for speeches two months before elections; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Interaction Effect between Public Opinion and Pending Elections

While there is no direct effect of pending elections, we also estimate an STM in which we interact our dummy variable for pending elections with public opinion. This model does not include the interaction effect between public opinion and Eurosceptic governments. However, it is otherwise specified as our baseline model. The topic proportion regressions for our six procedural topics of interest are reported in Table K3. All interaction terms between public opinion and pending elections for our procedural topics of interest are indistinguishable from zero. Hence, we have no evidence that pending elections influence how governments engage with public opinion. Note, again, that this may be because governments select themselves out of debates in the first place.

Table K3: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Interaction with Pending Elections)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.015***	0.010***	0.066***	0.018***	0.034***	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Last two months before election	0.002	−0.002	0.003	0.002	−0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Public Image of the EU	−0.003	0.003	0.005	−0.001	−0.004	0.0002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.0001	0.012***	−0.010***	0.006***	0.007***	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0003	0.011***	−0.001	0.008***	0.002	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.004*	−0.002	0.006	−0.003	0.0004	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0004	0.001	−0.0004	−0.001	−0.003**	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.007***	0.004***	−0.009***	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Budget issue	0.013***	0.004	−0.011***	−0.007**	0.013***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.003*	0.003**	−0.008***	−0.004	0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0005	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.003***	0.0004
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.005***	−0.004***	0.002	0.002	−0.007**	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	0.0002	−0.003*	−0.002	−0.004	0.006	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002	0.007**	−0.026***	0.006	0.007*	−0.0001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.003	−0.008	0.010**	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.007***	0.004***	−0.032***	0.010***	0.002*	−0.0005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.007***	−0.028***	0.007**	0.004	0.001*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.001	0.004**	−0.021***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.00004	0.005***	−0.023***	−0.008***	−0.008***	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.007***	−0.001	0.018***	0.005**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Last two months before election x Public Image of the EU	0.001	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	0.001	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Interaction Effect between Public Opinion and Years to the Next Election

Focusing on pending elections has the limitations that only a small number of our observations occurs in the last two months before elections (3.6%) and that governments may adjust their responsiveness to public opinion already earlier (e.g. one or two years in advance). To rule out any effect of election proximity, we estimate one further STM in which we interact the public image of the EU with the distance (in years) to the next regularly scheduled elections (according to the constitutional inter-election period, see Wratil, 2018). The results of the STM topic regressions for our six topics of interest in Table K4 provide no evidence that the effect of the public image on governments' use of these topics is moderated by the proximity of the next elections. All interaction effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

In total, the analyses in this appendix show that government rhetoric and especially the effect of public opinion on it are not affected by national elections. This could be due to the fact that governments mainly select themselves out of debates before national elections, as we show in Appendix D.

Table K4: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Interaction with Years to Next Election)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.016***	0.007***	0.067***	0.020***	0.033***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Distance to Planned Election	0.0003	−0.0001	0.0004	0.0001	0.001	−0.0003
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)
Public Image of the EU	−0.002	0.001	0.006**	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.0002	0.012***	−0.009***	0.006***	0.007***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0002	0.011***	0.0001	0.008***	0.001	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.005*	−0.002	0.004	−0.004	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0003	0.001	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.003**	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.007***	0.004***	−0.010***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Budget issue	0.014***	0.003	−0.010***	−0.007**	0.013***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.003*	0.002	−0.008***	−0.004	0.001	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0002	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.003***	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.006***	−0.004***	0.002	0.002	−0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	0.0003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.004	0.006	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002	0.007**	−0.027***	0.006*	0.007*	−0.0003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.003	−0.008	0.010**	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.007***	0.005***	−0.033***	0.010***	0.002	−0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.008***	−0.028***	0.006**	0.003	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.001	0.004**	−0.020***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.00003	0.004**	−0.023***	−0.008***	−0.008***	0.0001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.008***	−0.001	0.018***	0.006***	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Distance to Planned Election x Public Image of the EU	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.001	−0.0003	−0.001	0.0001
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

K.3 Public Opinion and Government Bond Yields

During the financial crisis, many governments in the EU faced very high government bond yields as a consequence of the economic situation following the crash and the risks associated with it. The indicator is used in the Maastricht Treaty EMU convergence criteria. Some countries, such as Greece in 2012 faced as high as 29% government bond yields (the average for the period covered in our data was 3.39%).

Conceivably, high government bond yields are an indication of what Frieden and Walter (2019) call the "reversion point" in international negotiations: the point at which it becomes too costly for a government to not have an agreement in a negotiation. High government bond yields might put pressure on governments to find a bargaining solution, even against public opinion. In other words, public opinion might only matter if the government has leeway to react (e.g. through delaying or blocking a proposal) in the first place and government bond yields could significantly eliminate this leeway.

To test for this possibility, we estimate an STM with an interaction term between government bond yields and public opinion, ascertaining whether high yields can limit the effects of public opinion. For government bond yields we use official data on the Maastricht criterion from Eurostat, which are available on a monthly basis and interact that variable with the public image of the EU. We also include all our standard control variables and the Eurosceptic governments dummy. Table K5 shows the STM topic proportion regression coefficients for our topics of interest. None of the interaction terms is statistically significant and neither are the terms for bond yields themselves. We take this as an indication that, while the reversion point might be relevant for negotiation tactics generally, it does not seem to influence the use of the rhetorical elements we are interested in. Alternatively, government bond yields may not work well as a proxy for the reversion points across our diverse set of issues covered in the five Council configurations.

Table K5: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Interaction with Government Bond Yields)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 23	Topic 32	Topic 39	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.021***	0.008***	0.064***	0.018***	0.031***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Bond Yields	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.001	0.001	−0.001	0.0003
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)
Public Image of the EU	−0.003*	0.003**	0.002	−0.005**	−0.003	−0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.001	0.011***	−0.010***	0.006***	0.012***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.001	0.009***	−0.001	0.009***	0.007***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.007**	−0.001	0.002	−0.005	−0.001	−0.002*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Government Left-Right position	−0.001	0.001	0.0001	−0.001	−0.0005	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.003***	−0.002**	0.009***	0.004***	−0.008***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Budget issue	0.019***	0.003	−0.006*	−0.003	0.009***	0.004***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.004**	0.001	−0.009***	−0.001	−0.0001	0.0005
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.0003	0.001	−0.002	−0.0005	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.001*	0.002***	−0.004***	−0.004***	0.003***	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Northern Europe	0.004**	−0.003*	−0.0003	0.003	−0.005**	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	−0.001	−0.001	−0.004	−0.005	0.008*	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	0.001	0.004*	−0.018***	0.004	0.005*	0.0003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.0002	0.003	−0.011**	0.010**	0.002	0.004**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.008***	0.005***	−0.024***	0.010***	0.005***	−0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.009***	0.006***	−0.022***	0.006*	−0.001	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.003	0.003*	−0.018***	−0.002	−0.006**	−0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.001	0.005***	−0.019***	−0.008***	−0.007***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.006***	−0.001	0.021***	0.003	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Bond Yields x Public Image of the EU	0.0001	−0.0004	0.0003	0.0004	0.00001	0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0002)
Observations	9,916	9,916	9,916	9,916	9,916	9,916

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
This model has a smaller number of observations as some countries have incomplete data on government bonds.
The topics from the new model are mapped to the old topics when cosine similarity >0.5.

K.4 Public Opinion and Negotiation Stages

One possibility is that public opinion may have different effects on negotiation rhetoric depending on the stage of negotiations. For instance, public opposition may matter more for the formulation of demands in early stages of negotiations than in later ones.

To address this issue, we first investigate the direct effects of our negotiation stages on the topic proportions of our six procedural topics of interest using the estimates from our baseline model. Figure K4 shows that some of the topics are more prevalent in some negotiation stages than others. Topic 12 ("Delaying agreement") is less commonly used in policy debates, which makes sense as these debates are not meant to deal with agreement. Meanwhile, topic 13 ("Formulating a demand") is used less in debates on political agreement, presumably because that negotiation stage is too late for demands, which have to be raised during policy debates or initial presentations. Topic 22 ("Supporting the compromise") is most used in debates on political agreement, as it signals agreement to the proposed text at that stage. Demands for more technical-level discussions (Topic 32) are more prevalent during policy debates, which may indicate that calling for more expert work is less accepted at later stages. Topics 38 ("Cautious language") and 40 ("Raising a concern") do not significantly vary in their prevalence across negotiation stages. In total, these results provide some further face validity for the labeling of our topics.

Next, we assess whether there are any interaction effects between public opinion and the negotiation stage. For this purpose, we pool all debates that are *not* on political agreement (initial presentations, policy debates, mixed) and compare them to debates on political agreement. This is necessary as we do not have sufficient debates to estimate differential effects of public opinion at each negotiation stage. Instead, we simply focus on other (mostly early-stage) debates vs. debates on political agreement. Using our standard set of controls (incl. the dummy variable for Eurosceptic governments), we estimate an STM with an interaction effect between a dummy variable for other debates and the public image of the EU. The STM topic proportion regressions for our six topics of interest are reported in Table K6. They show three interaction terms that are significant at the 10% level, indicating varying effects of public opinion across negotiation stages for topic 12 "Delaying agreement," topic 22 'Supporting the compromise," and topic 40 "Raising a concern."

We plot and report the resulting marginal effects of public opinion in Figure K5 and Table K7. This reveals that the topics that are most strongly driven by public opinion in debates on political agreement are "Delaying agreement" and "Supporting the compromise." These are also both more prevalent in general in such debates, suggesting these debates are about a cleavage between those that support the compromise and those that stand on the breaks, and it is precisely the government's position on this cleavage that is most strongly influenced by public opinion. In turn, in other, earlier debates, both of these topics are not significantly related to public opinion. Instead, whether someone is cautious ($p = 0.066$), calls for technical-level discussions ($p = 0.002$), or raises a concern ($p = 0.024$) is significantly influenced by public opinion in early stages. This highlights that the most clear signals of committing or refusing to commit to international agreements ("Supporting the compromise," "Delaying agreement") are more strongly associated with public opinion at decisive, later rather than earlier stages of the negotiations.

Figure K4: Direct Negotiation Stage Effects from Baseline STM



Note: Estimates reflect expected topic proportion; 95% confidence intervals as solid lines.

Table K6: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Interaction with Negotiation Stage)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.017***	0.007***	0.069***	0.019***	0.034***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Other Debates	−0.006***	0.005***	−0.029***	0.009***	0.003***	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Public Image of the EU	−0.003***	0.0003	0.006***	−0.002*	−0.002	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Middle Part of Speech	0.00003	0.012***	−0.009***	0.007***	0.007***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0003	0.011***	−0.0004	0.008***	0.001	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.005*	−0.002	0.006	−0.003	0.0005	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0003	0.001	−0.0005	−0.001	−0.003**	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.006***	0.004***	−0.009***	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Budget issue	0.015***	0.004*	−0.008**	−0.007**	0.014***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.004**	0.003	−0.006**	−0.003	0.002	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0004	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.003***	0.0004
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.005***	−0.004***	0.002	0.002	−0.007**	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	−0.0001	−0.003*	−0.001	−0.004	0.005	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.008***	−0.029***	0.006**	0.004	0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.0003	0.004**	−0.023***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	−0.001	0.005***	−0.026***	−0.008***	−0.008***	−0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.004***	0.008***	−0.005	0.018***	0.005**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Other Debates x Public Image of the EU	0.002*	0.001	−0.004*	−0.002	−0.001	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure K5: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (Negotiation Stage Interaction)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Table K7: Size and Significance of Negotiation Stage Effects

Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
-0.00260	0.00091	-2.84546	0.00444	12	Debates on Political Agreement	Delaying agreement
-0.00080	0.00079	-1.01542	0.30993	12	Other Debates	Delaying agreement
0.00031	0.00088	0.35748	0.72074	13	Debates on Political Agreement	Formulating a demand
0.00157	0.00095	1.64982	0.09901	13	Other Debates	Formulating a demand
0.00593	0.00189	3.13495	0.00172	22	Debates on Political Agreement	Supporting the compromise
0.00206	0.00142	1.45081	0.14686	22	Other Debates	Supporting the compromise
-0.00225	0.00128	-1.75509	0.07927	32	Debates on Political Agreement	More technical-level discussion needed
-0.00445	0.00146	-3.04751	0.00231	32	Other Debates	More technical-level discussion needed
-0.00209	0.00148	-1.41888	0.15596	38	Debates on Political Agreement	Cautious language
-0.00273	0.00149	-1.83398	0.06669	38	Other Debates	Cautious language
-0.00027	0.00042	-0.63571	0.52498	40	Debates on Political Agreement	Raising a concern
-0.00109	0.00048	-2.26498	0.02353	40	Other Debates	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

K.5 Public Opinion and Debate Length

One concern might be that the effects of public opinion may differ depending on whether there is more or less conflict over an issue, which should be reflected in the length of a debate. In particular, it could be that the implicit manifestations of public opinion we uncover disproportionately pertain to shorter, less conflictual debates. Figure K6 shows the average debate length over our observation period. While our data still has significant gaps in 2010 and 2011 (e.g. in 2010, we only have Ecofin, see the paper), from 2012 onward, the average debate length is and stays around 4,000 words, with a consistent distribution between very few words and more than 15,000 words at the maximum. Overall, the average debate length is 4,023 words, with a standard deviation of 3,339.

Figure K6: Length of Debate over Time



Note: Dots are the length (in words) of each debate in the corpus. Blue line represent loess smooth estimate.

We directly test the impact of debate length on the public opinion effects with an additional STM in which we interact a dummy variable for short vs. long debates (split at median debate length) with the public image on the EU. Table K8 shows results of the topic proportion regressions for our six topics of interest from this STM, which includes our controls from the baseline model and the dummy for Eurosceptic governments. All interaction terms between short debates and the public image are not statistically significant. Hence, we have no evidence that the role of public opinion for governments' rhetoric significantly varies between shorter and longer debates (i.e. different levels of conflict over an issue). Debates in which governments endorse the compromise are thus shorter on average, but the public opinion effects are not significantly smaller in such debates.

Table K8: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Interaction with Debate Length)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.017***	0.007***	0.068***	0.021***	0.034***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Short Debate	0.002	0.002	−0.003	−0.006**	0.004	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Public Image of the EU	−0.002**	0.001	0.004***	−0.004***	−0.003*	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.0002	0.012***	−0.009***	0.006***	0.007***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0001	0.011***	0.00005	0.008***	0.001	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.004	−0.002	0.006	−0.003	0.0005	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0004	0.001	−0.0004	−0.001	−0.003**	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.006***	0.004***	−0.010***	−0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Budget issue	0.014***	0.004	−0.010***	−0.007**	0.013***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.003*	0.003	−0.008***	−0.004	0.001	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.0005	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0003	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.003***	0.0004
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.006***	−0.004***	0.002	0.002	−0.007***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	0.0003	−0.003*	−0.002	−0.004	0.006	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002	0.007**	−0.026***	0.006*	0.007*	−0.0003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.003	−0.009	0.010**	0.005	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.007***	0.005***	−0.032***	0.010***	0.002*	−0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.008***	−0.028***	0.006**	0.004	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.001	0.004**	−0.021***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.0004	0.005**	−0.023***	−0.009***	−0.008***	0.00001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.008***	−0.002	0.018***	0.006***	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Short Debate x Public Image of the EU	−0.0002	0.001	0.001	0.003	−0.001	−0.0003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

K.6 Public Opinion and Member State Size

The effects of public opinion may differ between "large" vs. "small" member states. If large member states have more bargaining clout during negotiations than small member states, this may also influence states' capacity to represent their publics. Note however that most research has found rather uniform distributions of power between member states – irrespective of size – in legislative bargaining in the Council (e.g. Thomson, 2011; Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013). Nevertheless, we test whether there is any evidence for varying public opinion effects using a dummy variable for small member states (i.e., all except for Germany, Italy, France, and the UK) and interacting it in a new STM with the public image of the EU. We also include our standard set of controls and the dummy variable for Eurosceptic governments.

In Table K9 we plot the results of the topic proportion regressions for our six procedural topics of interest. The coefficients on the dummy variable for small member states reveal that small states more often use topic 40 "Raising a concern," while large member states more often use topic 38 "Cautious language." We also plot the difference in topic usage between small and large states for all topics in Figure K8, which further reveals that large member states speak more about topic 39 "Affirmation" and topic 5 "Reflection" compared to small member states (they may just have more time for these issues, as they belong to those speaking the most). More importantly, the interaction terms between the dummy for small member states and public opinion in Table K9 is not statistically significant for five of our six procedural topics of interest, suggesting no difference in the engagement with public opinion depending on member states size. However, the term is significant for topic 40 "Raising a concern."

The differences for the resulting public opinion effects are plotted in Figure K7. This shows that small member states raise concerns less if public opinion is positive. For the large member states, all public opinion effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This may be due to this group being very small (only four member states). The finding that these member states seem to increase their talk about concerns if public opinion is positive rather than negative (but this is not statistically significant) may also be due to the fact that three of the four large member states (Germany, Italy, France) had pro-EU governments throughout our observation period and more positive opinion than the more Eurosceptic government and anti-EU public in the UK. Those large pro-EU governments may raise more demands not because of their friendly publics but because they belong to the policy coalition, whereas the UK may raise less concerns not because of their negative public but because it is outside the coalition. We cannot disentangle the effects of coalition membership and public opinion within the group of large member states.

Most importantly, our baseline model also only found very mixed evidence for hypothesis H4. This is further corroborated by these results.

Table K9: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Interaction with Large vs. Small)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.019***	0.008***	0.068***	0.017***	0.043***	0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Small Member States	−0.003	−0.001	0.001	0.004	−0.012***	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Public Image of the EU	0.0001	0.004	−0.0003	−0.004	0.003	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.0001	0.012***	−0.009***	0.006***	0.007***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0003	0.011***	−0.001	0.007***	0.002	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.005	−0.0002	0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Government Left-Right position	−0.0004	0.001	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.003**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002**	−0.002**	0.006***	0.003***	−0.008***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Budget issue	0.013***	0.003	−0.010***	−0.007**	0.013***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.003*	0.003	−0.008***	−0.004	0.001	−0.001*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.002	−0.001	−0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0004	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.003***	0.0005
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.006***	−0.003**	0.001	0.002	−0.004	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	0.0001	−0.003	−0.002	−0.004	0.006	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002	0.007**	−0.026***	0.006*	0.007*	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.003	−0.008	0.010**	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.007***	0.005***	−0.032***	0.010***	0.002*	−0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.008***	−0.028***	0.007**	0.003	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.001	0.004**	−0.020***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.0001	0.005**	−0.023***	−0.008***	−0.008***	−0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.008***	−0.001	0.018***	0.006***	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Small Member States x Public Image of the EU	−0.002	−0.004	0.005	0.001	−0.006	−0.003**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure K7: Public Opinion and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations (Country Size Interaction)



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for standard deviation change in public image; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

Figure K8: Small Member States and Topic Attention during Council Deliberations



Note: Estimates reflect change in expected topic proportion for small compared to large member states; 95% confidence intervals horizontal dashed lines.

L Sentiment and National Elections

There is the possibility that instead of adjusting their rhetoric in terms of the topics and themes governments talk about, they may alternatively adjust the sentiment of their speech in response to approaching national elections. We investigate this idea by modelling the sentiment of each speech in mixed effects linear regression models with random intercepts for member states and debates. Sentiment is calculated by taking the logged ratio of positive to negative terms in a speech, following Proksch et al. (2019). We include all our standard control variables from our STM baseline model in the regression. Moreover, we include a dummy variable for whether national legislative elections are more or less than two months away (also see above), or alternatively, a variable which measures the remaining years to the next scheduled national legislative elections according to the constitutional inter-election period (also see above). The results of alternative models are reported in Table L1. We neither find an effect of pending elections nor of the years left to the next scheduled elections on governments' sentiment in their speeches.

Table L1: Sentiment and Distance to Election Regressions

	Dependent variable:	
	Sentiment	
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	1.865*** (0.084)	1.820*** (0.070)
More Than Two Months Before Election	−0.029 (0.051)	
Distance to Planned Election		0.008 (0.008)
Eurosceptic Government	−0.013 (0.050)	−0.027 (0.051)
Public Image of the EU	−0.019 (0.017)	−0.019 (0.017)
Budget issue	0.174 (0.110)	0.177 (0.110)
Unanimity Required	0.031 (0.068)	0.032 (0.068)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.521*** (0.022)	−0.521*** (0.022)
End Part of Speech	−0.328*** (0.022)	−0.328*** (0.022)
Government Left-Right position	−0.021 (0.013)	−0.018 (0.014)
Net receipts from EU budget	0.043*** (0.016)	0.043*** (0.016)
Unemployment Rate	−0.005 (0.019)	−0.006 (0.020)
Inflation Rate	−0.029* (0.016)	−0.030* (0.016)
Northern Europe	0.039 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Southern Europe	0.056 (0.045)	0.055 (0.046)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.371*** (0.099)	−0.369*** (0.099)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.188 (0.151)	0.187 (0.151)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.116** (0.050)	−0.117** (0.050)
Council configuration: Ecofin	−0.418*** (0.080)	−0.418*** (0.080)
Council configuration: EPSCO	−0.018 (0.094)	−0.018 (0.094)
Council configuration: ENV	−0.199** (0.088)	−0.199** (0.088)
Council configuration: JHA	−0.244*** (0.071)	−0.244*** (0.071)
Country Random Effect	Yes	Yes
Debate Random Effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,214	10,214

Note: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

References

Baerg, Nicole Rae and Mark Hallerberg. 2016. "Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact: The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7):968–1009.

Bailer, Stefanie. 2004. "Bargaining Success in the European Union: The Impact of Exogenous and Endogenous Power Resources." *European Union Politics* 5(1):99–123.

Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. "Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes." *International Organization* 68(4):877–911.

Cross, James P. 2013. "Everyone's a Winner (Almost): Bargaining Success in the Council of Ministers of the European Union." *European Union Politics* 14(1):70–94.

Frieden, Jeffry and Stefanie Walter. 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond." *European Union Politics* 20(1):134–151.

Golub, Jonathan. 2012. "How the European Union Does Not Work: National Bargaining Success in the Council of Ministers." *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(9):1294–1315.

Graham, Nathaniel, Mahmood Arai and Björn Hagströmer. 2016. *multiwayvcov: Multi-Way Standard Error Clustering*. R package version 1.2.3.
URL: *https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=multiwayvcov*

Hagemann, Sara, Sara B. Hobolt and Christopher Wratil. 2017. "Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(6):850–876.

Hahm, Hyeonho, Thomas König, Moritz Osnabrügge and Elena Frech. 2019. "Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)." *International Organization* 73(4):881–900.

Jolly, Seth, Ryan Bakker, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2022. "Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2019." *Electoral Studies* 75:1–8.

Kleine, Mareike and Clement Minaudier. 2019. "Negotiating under Political Uncertainty: National Elections and the Dynamics of International Co-operation." *British Journal of Political Science* 49(1):315–337.

Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. "Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others?" *International Organization* 65(4):639–672.

Pircher, Brigitte and Mike Farjam. 2021. "Oppositional Voting in the Council of the EU between 2010 and 2019: Evidence for Differentiated Politicisation." *European Union Politics* 22(3):472–494.

Proksch, Sven-Oliver, Will Lowe, Jens Wäckerle and Stuart Soroka. 2019. "Multilingual Sentiment Analysis: A New Approach to Measuring Conflict in Legislative Speeches." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 44(1):97–131.

Rickard, Stephanie J. and Teri L. Caraway. 2014. "International Negotiations in the Shadow of National Elections." *International Organization* 68(3):701–720.

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, Dustin Tingley and Kenneth Benoit. 2020. Package 'stm'. Estimation of the Structural Topic Model. Technical report.

Schneider, Christina J. 2018. *The Responsive Union: National Elections and European Governance*. Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, Robert. 2011. *Resolving Controversy in the European Union. Legislative Decision-Making before and after Enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, Robert, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen and Thomas König. 2006. *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, Robert, Javier Arregui, Dirk Leuffen, Rory Costello, James Cross, Robin Hertz and Thomas Jensen. 2012. "A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII)." *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(4):604–622.

Truex, Rory. 2016. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Volkens, Andrea, Werner Krause, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel and Bernhard Weßels. 2019. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2019b. Technical report Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Berlin: .

Wratil, Christopher. 2018. "Modes of government responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council negotiation positions." *European Union Politics* 19(1):52–74.

Wratil, Christopher. 2019. "Territorial Representation and the Opinion-Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union." *American Journal of Political Science* 63(1):197–211.

Wratil, Christopher and Sara B. Hobolt. 2019. "Public deliberations in the Council of the European Union: Introducing and validating DICEU." *European Union Politics* 20(3):511–531.