Government Rhetoric and the Representation of Public Opinion in International Negotiations

American Political Science Review

Supplemental Materials I

Christopher Wratil Jens Wäckerle Sven-Oliver Proksch

October 19, 2022

Note: These are the supplemental materials I for the paper, including information on the dataset, the regression results for the STM model as well as full details of the analyses on the mentioning of the public, debate participation, and voting (Appendices A through E). All additional appendices (Appendices F through L) can be found on the Harvard Dataverse under the following link: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JCT3F7.

Appendices

All Appendices are intended for online publication only.

A Dataset Overview **1**
A.1 Data Collection and Corpus Creation 1
A.2 Variable Sources and Definitions 4
A.3 Missing data 10

B Structural Topic Model: Information and Results **12**
B.1 Regression Results for STM Model 12

C Mentions of the Public **14**

D Debate Participation **19**

E The Role of Public Opinion in Voting **22**

A Dataset Overview

This section provides a detailed overview of our dataset of speeches from the Council as well as of the sources and definitions of key covariates.

A.1 Data Collection and Corpus Creation

For the Ecofin configuration, we integrate the pilot dataset collected by Wratil and Hobolt (2019), which covers the years 2010 to 2015. For all other configurations as well as for Ecofin in the year 2016, we scraped the videos of public deliberations from the Council website (video.consilium.europa.eu) and parsed them through YouTube's ASR system between November 2017 and October 2018. We trained research assistants, who partitioned all transcribed videos into legislative debates and speech interventions by the national ministers (see the procedure and "debate" definition provided in Wratil and Hobolt, 2019). To code meta-information (e.g. debate titles), we also searched the Council's document register (www.consilium.europa.eu) for meeting agendas and related documents concerning the legislative procedures discussed in the debates and recorded the related inter-institutional file number(s). This yielded 397 debates with almost 13,000 raw speech interventions. However, almost 6,000 interventions were made by the Council presidency that moderates the debates. Most of these interventions are very short, for instance, the presidency just gives the floor to different national delegations. Since presidencies mainly perform the role of moderator and their speech style considerably differs from that of the other delegations, we exclude them in our analyses in the paper.[1] Below we also draw on voting data at various places. To identify Council votes on the legislative files discussed in public deliberations, we used the inter-institutional file numbers of the discussed acts and coded governments' votes from the vote sheets provided in the Council register. Note that legislative debates can relate to several legislative files (e.g. when a package is discussed such as the "Six-Pack" that reformed the EU's Stability and Growth Pack).

Besides the legislative debates, the Council also debates in open session on a few other items, which we exclude from our data. Specifically, the Council must debate in public on "important issues affecting the interests of the European Union and its citizens," on "work programmes," in which institutions outline their plans for the medium future, and on "important non-legislative proposals that impose rules which are legally binding in or for the Member States, by means of regulations, directives or decisions" (Council of the European Union, 2011). To our knowledge, whether an issue falls under the first and last category can be decided by the Council and leads to very few debates on such issues. Usually, such debates are on joint statements/conclusions (e.g. on social dialogue, dementia), preparations of international summits (e.g. Tripartite Social Summit, G20 Labour and Employment Ministers' meeting), or soft policy coordination initiatives (e.g. European network of Public Employment Services, Employment Performance Monitor). Moreover, most of these discussion points are very short (e.g. <10 minutes) with only the presidency, a single government, or the Commission informing the others or sharing a viewpoint. In turn, the "work pro-

[1] Also note that presidencies are expected to vote in favor of a proposal they lead the negotiations on. Hence, they are sometimes excluded from voting analyses.

gramme" presentations are short monologues by the presidencies in which they explain their intentions and plans for the next months of their term. These are not followed by a general discussion but only by some congratulations or a few governments highlighting what they liked about the presentation. Importantly, all these debates are not actual intergovernmental negotiations between 10+ governments expressing their views, trying to find common ground, and they are not on binding legislation. Hence, they are essentially a different text form, and including them could bias our results and would certainly weaken our claim that we focus on actual negotiations.

In total, around 35% of all debates related to issues on which no votes took place (e.g. on non-legislative issues, "work programmes," or due to withdrawal by the Commission) or on which we were unable to obtain voting records from the Council. We excluded these debates from our sample as well as further 35 debates, on which all related votes were still pending at the time of writing this paper (see Appendix A.3 for more details).

Figure A1 displays the share of debates in our dataset in which a government participated with at least one speech. This reveals that while some governments of big member states like Germany, Italy, and France participate in more than 70% of the debates, even the least participating government – Slovakia – still participates in a sizeable share of almost 40% of debates. Hence, there is limited inequality in participation. Wratil and Hobolt (2019) show that participation in debates is unrelated to governments' ideological positions.

Figure A1: Descriptive Statistics of Government Speech Data by Country



Note: Figure shows the share of debates in which a government intervened at least once; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; HR: Croatia; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom.

A.2 Variable Sources and Definitions

Below we provide the sources and definitions of all independent variables used in our analyses in the paper. Note that we link the data sources on the day/year of the Council meeting for the STM/text models and the debate participation model (in Appendix C) and on the day/year of the vote for the voting models (in Appendices E and H).

Public image of the EU
To measure public opinion on EU integration, we use the "EU image" question from the Eurobarometer series (we only use the "Standard" Eurobarometers). The exact wording of the EU image question is:

"In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?"

With the following answer options:

"Very positive" = 5
"Fairly positive" = 4
"Neutral" = 3
"Fairly negative" = 2
"Very negative" = 1
Don't know / Refused / etc. = .

We simply use the average response by country (using national post-stratification weights and excluding "don't knows" and refusal responses). Hence, higher values indicate a more positive image of the EU. In line with common practice in the field, we linearly interpolate our series to cover dates between two surveys and use a six-month lag of public opinion (Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil, 2017; Wratil, 2018). For convenience, we also z-score standardize the variable.
Figure 1 in the paper plots the public image of the EU over time. In addition, Figure A2 plots the distribution of that measure. The plot shows that while the public image has become more negative during the observation period compared to before, both show a similarly wide distribution. The standard deviation in our observation period is 0.243, while it was 0.228 before and 0.217 after.

Eurosceptic government
We use a dummy variable for whether a government is "Pro-EU" ("0") or "Eurosceptic" ("1") based on whether the government parties devoted more positive vs. negative quasi-sentences to European integration in their election manifestos. This measure is based on the coding of election manifestos by the Manifesto Project (CMP, at the last election, preceding the Council meeting) (Volkens et al., 2019) and corrected cabinet composition data from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2019). More details on the merged dataset (e.g. on how we deal with missing data for single parties) are provided in the separate release of this data (Wratil, 2022). Technically, we calculate the seat-weighted mean of the cabinet parties'

Figure A2: Distribution of Public Image of the EU



Note: Period "Before" refers to observations between 2004 and the end of 2009, "After" between 2017 and the end of 2018 and "Observation Period" between 2010 and the end of 2016. Countries are included after attaining membership status in the EU (e.g. Croatia is only included after 1 July 2013).

relative use of the pro- vs- anti-EU CMP categories ($per108 - per110$) in their manifestos and assign "1" for values including and below zero, and "0" otherwise.
Table A1 below displays all governments in our period that were classified as Eurosceptic.

Table A1: List of Eurosceptic Governments in Dataset (CMP classification)

	Country	Name of Cabinet	First Speech in Dataset	Last Speech in Dataset
1	Cyprus	Anastasiades III	2016-05-25	2016-12-19
2	Denmark	Rasmussen L II	2015-10-26	2016-10-13
3	Denmark	Rasmussen L III	2016-11-28	2016-12-19
4	Greece	Pikrammenos	2012-05-30	2012-05-31
5	Greece	Samaras	2012-10-10	2013-06-21
6	Greece	Tsipras II	2015-10-09	2016-12-19
7	Hungary	Orban III	2014-05-26	2016-12-19
8	Italy	Berlusconi IV	2010-10-19	2011-10-28
9	United Kingdom	Cameron	2010-05-18	2015-03-13
10	United Kingdom	Cameron II	2015-05-28	2016-06-20
11	United Kingdom	May	2016-11-28	2016-12-19

Unemployment and inflation rates
We use information on national unemployment and inflation rates from Eurostat. The national unemployment rate is measured as the percentage of the labour-market active population that is unemployed. In turn, we measure inflation as the annual percentage change in the harmonized index of consumer prices (with base year 2015).

Net receipts from EU budget
We measure a member state's annual net receipts from the EU budget (receipts – payments) as percentage of national GDP based on information retrieved from www.money-go-round.eu.

North, south, centre
We use dummy variables for "north," "south," and "centre." Member states in the south are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. The north is made up of: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. All other governments are coded as "centre."

Government left-right position
To measure government parties' positions on left-right we again rely on the merging of Manifesto Project and ParlGov data (Volkens et al., 2019; Döring and Manow, 2019; Wratil, 2022). Specifically, we use the Manifesto Project's RILE as the difference between the percentages of "rightist" and "leftist" quasi-sentences in the cabinet parties' election manifestos at the last election before a Council meeting (seat-weighted by cabinet parties' parliamentary seats).

To provide face validity for our measurements of government ideology, we plot governments' left-right position against their position on EU integration (see above, we use $per108 - per110$ here) in Figure A3. This reveals that in our data we find the conventional curvilinear relationship between left-right and pro-anti integration hypothesized and reported by many studies (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002).

Figure A3: Governments' Left-Right and Anti-Pro EU Positions



Note: The blue fitted line plots predicted values from a bivariate regression with a squared term for government left-right position.

Council configuration

We use a categorical variable to indicate the Council configuration in which a debate takes place. Table A2 below shows the number of debates, number of speech parts, average number of participating governments as well as the average number of word tokens per speech separately for each Council configuration. Note that we report the number of speech parts after preprocessing and as very short texts (mostly beginning and end parts of speeches) might drop out because they only consist of stopwords and/or very rare words, the total number of speech parts divided by three (beginning, mid, end part) does not necessarily yield a whole number.

Table A2: Debate Structure Data by Council Configuration

Council Configuration	Total Number of Debates	Total Number of Speech Parts	Average Number of Participating Govs	Average Speech Length
Economic and Financial Affairs	64	2531	13.18	272.10
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs	22	1008	15.27	279.05
Environment	25	1497	19.96	300.07
Justice and Home Affairs	75	3528	15.68	263.34
TOTAL	224	10214	15.20	266.67

Budget issue
We code a dummy variable whether a debate relates to the EU budget ("1"), mostly the annual amending budgets, or not ("0"). Note that we classify a debate to be on the EU budget if at least one legislative file discussed relates to the EU budget. In total, 13 debates in our sample were on budget issues.

Unanimity required
We code a dummy variable (from the voting records in the Council register) that indicates whether a debate relates to at least one legislative file on which unanimity ("1") as opposed to a qualified majority ("0") was required to pass the proposal. In total, 16.5% of the debates in our sample were associated with at least one vote that required unanimity to pass.

Part of speech
In the STM models, we use a categorical variable for whether a document is the beginning (20% of tokens), mid-part (60% of tokens) or end-part (20% of tokens) of a speech.

Debate type
In the STM models, we use a categorical variable indicating the debate type in terms of negotiation stage. This is based on the coding procedure used in Hobolt and Wratil (2020), who use draft minutes of Council meetings from the Council register to ascertain the debate type. The Council itself uses a variety of terms to indicate the debate type, such as "exchange of views," "political agreement" or "orientation debate." Based on these labels as well as a cross-check of the transcriptions (where the draft minutes were ambiguous) we allocated the debates into four categories:

1) *Initial presentations*: these debates are characterized by the presentation of new Commission proposals;

2) *Policy debates*: these debates encompass exchanges of views about the current status of proposal(s) and progress reports by the presidency;

3) *Debates on political agreement*: these debates are supposed to reach agreement on the Council's general approach on a proposal, a presidency mandate (e.g. vis-à-vis the European Parliament), or the final legislative text;

4) *Mixed debates*: these debates cover more than one of the categories above (e.g. because they cover several files at different stages).

In our sample for the STM, we have 16 initial presentations, 93 policy debates, 110 debates on political agreement as well as 5 mixed debates.
It is important to note that the debate types indicate the state of intergovernmental as opposed to inter-institutional negotiations. Hence, debates on political agreement can occur early in the legislative process, e.g. in order to find an initial (partial) general approach.

A.3 Missing data

Wratil and Hobolt (2019)'s data for Ecofin covers parts of the Council's business in 2010 and is mostly complete from 2011 onwards. For the other configurations, our data mostly starts in the second half of 2011 as well as in early 2012 (with the exception of EPSCO) and is complete onwards. Table A3 provides the first and last debate dates in our analysis dataset (after pre-processing) by configuration and Figure 1 in the paper includes a histogram of debates over time. As we focus on completed legislative procedures, some debates were excluded because they had not been concluded at the time of writing this paper. 501 speeches were excluded from our analysis because all related procedures were pending by autumn 2018. Further 82 speeches had to be excluded because meta-information on the related votes (which we use below) were missing in the Council register. Finally, 170 speeches were excluded because all related files were withdrawn by the Commission after the discussions in the Council. We also exclude two speeches by Croatia in 2012 and 2013, when it was participating in the Council as a future EU member without voting rights as well as several speeches by Denmark, Ireland and the UK who spoke on a file while not participating in voting due to their opt-outs/ins, mostly in Justice and Home Affairs (see Table A4). All our descriptive statistics in the section "Data" in the paper relate to this sample of speeches.

Table A3: First and Last Debate in Each Configuration

Council Configuration	First Debate	Last Debate
Competitiveness	2012-02-20	2016-11-28
Economic and Financial Affairs	2010-05-18	2016-12-06
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs	2012-10-04	2016-10-13
Environment	2011-12-19	2016-12-19
Justice and Home Affairs	2011-10-28	2016-12-08
TOTAL	2010-05-18	2016-12-19

Table A4: Speeches Given by Countries not Participating in Voting

	Vote1	Actor	Council Configuration	Inter-Institutional File Number
1	No member	HR	Economic and Financial Affairs	Draft budget 2013
2	No member	HR	Economic and Financial Affairs	Draft amending budget 2013
3	Not Participating	IE	Justice and Home Affairs	2009/0165 (COD)
4	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2009/0165 (COD)
5	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2009/0165 (COD)
6	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2013/0091 (COD)
7	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2011/0154 (COD)
8	Not Participating	IE	Justice and Home Affairs	2011/0154 (COD)
9	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0193 (COD)
10	Not Participating	PL	Justice and Home Affairs	2016/0059 (CNS)
11	Not Participating	EE	Justice and Home Affairs	2016/0059 (CNS)
12	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2011/0129 (COD)
13	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2013/0023 (COD)
14	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2013/0023 (COD)
15	Not Participating	IE	Justice and Home Affairs	2015/0281 (COD)
16	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2015/0281 (COD)
17	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2011/0129 (COD)
18	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0036 (COD)
19	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0036 (COD)
20	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0193 (COD)
21	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2009/0157 (COD)
22	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2009/0157 (COD)
23	Not Participating	IE	Justice and Home Affairs	2009/0157 (COD)
24	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0193 (COD)
25	Not Participating	IE	Justice and Home Affairs	2013/0408 (COD)
26	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2013/0091 (COD)
27	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2013/0091 (COD)
28	Not Participating	UK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0193 (COD)
29	Not Participating	DK	Justice and Home Affairs	2012/0193 (COD)
30	Not Participating	UK	Economic and Financial Affairs	2012/0193 (COD)

In our analyses, we however have to exclude a few more observations due to missing values in the Manifesto Project data. Malta has not been included in the project for years and we fully have to exclude it from all analyses (121 speeches). Due to gaps, we also have to exclude several speeches from Belgium (13), the Czech Republic (62) and Poland (16). These same gaps lead to missing data in the voting dataset (as votes are considerably later than speeches), that lead to the exclusion of votes from Belgium (2), Czech Republic (73), Malta (121) and Poland (24) in the voting analyses presented below. Moreover, as we lack information on net receipts from the EU budget beyond our observation period (from 2017 onward), we have to exclude 243 votes from the voting analyses, where the vote took place after 2016.

B Structural Topic Model: Information and Results

In this section, we provide information on our structural topic model analyses and report full results for the main models used in the paper. All our models were estimated using the "stm" package (Roberts et al., 2020) in *R*. We use spectral initialization to determine the starting values of the STM parameters. For lemmatization we use the "lexicon" package (Rinker, 2018) in *R*. Note that due to our use of automatic transcriptions without human post-correction, some tokens in the model include transcription errors. This chiefly applies to some abbreviations, such as "epp_oh" for EPPO. To our knowledge this did not significantly affect the STM results except for in the case of topic 14 "Invasive Species" that does not only cover the environmental issue but also some transcription errors got lumped in this topic such as "v80" for VAT or "vit_fraud." Given that neither this topic nor any policy-specific topics were of key interest to us in this paper, we did not correct this issue.

B.1 Regression Results for STM Model

In Table B2 below we report the topic prevalence regressions from our STM baseline model for the six procedural topics of interest that relate to our hypotheses. The coefficient on the "Public image of the EU" directly represents the effect of public opinion on expected topic proportions for pro-EU governments. In turn, the effect of public opinion for Eurosceptic governments is a linear combination of this coefficient and the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy variable for Eurosceptic governments and the public image of the EU (last coefficient in the table). We report the size and significance of all public opinion effects for both types of governments in Table B1.

Table B1: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects (Baseline STM)

Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Topic	Government Ideology	Topic Label
-0.00199	0.00070	-2.84094	0.00451	12	Pro-EU Government	Delaying agreement
0.00022	0.01330	0.01627	0.98702	12	Eurosceptic Government	Delaying agreement
0.00091	0.00080	1.14513	0.25218	13	Pro-EU Government	Formulating a demand
-0.00068	0.01528	-0.04454	0.96447	13	Eurosceptic Government	Formulating a demand
0.00396	0.00146	2.71192	0.00670	22	Pro-EU Government	Supporting the compromise
0.00378	0.02785	0.13564	0.89211	22	Eurosceptic Government	Supporting the compromise
-0.00289	0.00120	-2.39969	0.01643	32	Pro-EU Government	More technical-level discussion needed
-0.00665	0.01465	-0.45378	0.65000	32	Eurosceptic Government	More technical-level discussion needed
-0.00345	0.00145	-2.37734	0.01746	38	Pro-EU Government	Cautious language
0.00242	0.02275	0.10633	0.91533	38	Eurosceptic Government	Cautious language
-0.00091	0.00037	-2.47153	0.01347	40	Pro-EU Government	Raising a concern
0.00097	0.00620	0.15690	0.87533	40	Eurosceptic Government	Raising a concern

Note: Standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level.

Table B2: Topic Proportion Regressions for Procedural Topics of Interest (Baseline STM)

	Dependent variable:					
	Topic Prevalence					
	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 22	Topic 32	Topic 38	Topic 40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.017***	0.007***	0.069***	0.020***	0.034***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government	0.005	−0.002	0.002	−0.007	0.008	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.009)
Public Image of the EU	−0.002***	0.001	0.004***	−0.003**	−0.003**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Middle Part of Speech	−0.0002	0.012***	−0.009***	0.006***	0.007***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
End Part of Speech	0.0001	0.011***	−0.0002	0.008***	0.002	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Government Left-Right position	−0.001	0.001	−0.0003	−0.0005	−0.003**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.002***	−0.002***	0.007***	0.004***	−0.009***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Budget issue	0.013***	0.004	−0.011***	−0.007**	0.013***	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Unanimity Required	0.003*	0.003*	−0.008***	−0.004	0.002	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Inflation Rate	0.0005	0.002***	−0.005***	−0.003***	0.003***	0.0005*
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Northern Europe	0.006***	−0.004***	0.002	0.002	−0.006**	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Southern Europe	0.0003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.004	0.007	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.002	0.006**	−0.026***	0.006	0.007*	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.002	0.003	−0.009	0.010**	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	−0.007***	0.004***	−0.033***	0.010***	0.002*	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Council configuration: Ecofin	0.006***	0.007***	−0.028***	0.007**	0.003	0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.001	0.004**	−0.021***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Council configuration: ENV	0.0001	0.005**	−0.023***	−0.008***	−0.008***	−0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Council configuration: JHA	0.005***	0.007***	−0.001	0.018***	0.005**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Eurosceptic Government x Public Image of the EU	0.002	−0.002	−0.0002	−0.004	0.006	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.006)
Observations	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214	10,214

Note: Country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Topic labels for each topic number are in Table B1.

C Mentions of the Public

Neither our baseline STM nor the alternative specification with 45 topics in Appendix J.4 identifies any topic that relates to mentioning the public/citizens/voters. An unreported model with 50 topics confirms that the public is no major discussion point in Council negotiations. This does not rule out, though, that governments on some occasions mention the public, and they may do so in ways compatible with H1a or H1b. To test this possibility, we identify all mentions of the public using a small dictionary based on the word "citizen" as well as its synonyms according to a thesaurus.[2] The dictionary terms are: "public," "people," "citizen," "public_opinion," "voter," "constituent," "inhabitant," "resident," and "taxpayer." Note that we do not include terms like "Danes," "Germans," or "Hungarians" etc. to refer to one's country nationals, as these terms are extremely rarely used in the Council (they are much more often used as adjectives to refer to the "German delegation/colleague/minister/presidency"). Table C1 shows the number and share of the different dictionary terms across the corpus, revealing 1,902 uses of words related to the public in total (i.e., a bit more than 0.5 per speech). Overall, "public," "citizens," and "people" are the most frequent terms used by governments to refer to citizens, making up for about 86% of all mentions.

As these terms can occur in various contexts and "public" can even be used as an adjective, we hand-code all mentions using a keyword-in-context approach. For this purpose, we extract the 20 words before and after the keywords and evaluate whether the term is used as 1) a noun referring to a general, vague public, 2) a noun referring to the national/European public, 3) an adjective, or 4) part of a set expression (e.g. "public procurement"). Table C2 shows that governments mostly refer to the public in terms of a general, vague public. The second most frequent form of referencing the public is actually by using "public" as an adjective, which may include terms like "public money" that are still connected to the notion of the public but arguably less relevant than when the public is mentioned in form of a noun. The third most frequent category is the use of the keyword as a noun referring to the national/European public, the most relevant category.

To test whether the mentions of the public are related to public opinion and government type as stipulated by H1a and H1b, we create two dummy variables indicating whether a speech contains 1) a mention of at least one of the dictionary terms, or more restrictively, 2) a mention of at least one of the dictionary terms *as a noun* (either referring to a general, vague public or the national/European public). We regress these variables in two mixed effects logistic regression models, in which we include the interaction effect between the dummy variable for Eurosceptic governments and public opinion, all control variables as well as crossed random effects for countries and debates. The regression results are in Table C4. Figures C1 (all mentions of the public) and C2 (mentions of the public as a noun) plot the predicted probabilities of mentioning the public in a speech from each model and for pro-EU as well as Eurosceptic governments, depending on the public image of the EU. They show that pro-EU governments do not at all adjust their mentions of the public to the state of public opinion at home. In contrast, we find some evidence that Eurosceptic governments mention the public more often if it concurs with their view, i.e. the public is

[2]We also include synonyms of synonyms if they still tap into the "citizen" concept.

Figure C1: Public Opinion and Mentions of the Public



Note: Predicted probabilities are plotted for the range of observed values of the public image of the EU; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. Estimates and confidence intervals are based on the model results "Referring to the Public" presented in Table C4.

negatively disposed towards the EU. This public opinion effect for Eurosceptic governments is statistically significant (see Table C3). It may indicate that these governments try to appeal to shared democratic norms among their partners and explain their positions by reference to their domestic Eurosceptic principals they have to be responsive to. While this is in line with H1b, we do not find pro-EU governments to use positive public opinion on the EU to legitimize their positions. Given that the public does not represent a major discussion point in negotiations, our evidence – overall – for H1b is very limited and we could provide no evidence for H1a.

Table C1: References to the Public

Keyword	Number of Mentions	% Share of Mentions
public	823	43.30
citizens	428	22.50
people	380	20.00
taxpayers	50	2.60
publication	43	2.30
citizen	41	2.20
Public	35	1.80
people's	26	1.40
taxpayer	17	0.90
residential	8	0.40
publicly	7	0.40
residents	7	0.40
citizen's	6	0.30
public-private	5	0.30
publicity	5	0.30
publicizing	3	0.20
resident	3	0.20
voters	3	0.20
peoples	2	0.10
public's	2	0.10
citizenship	1	0.10
constituent	1	0.10
People	1	0.10
public-sector	1	0.10
publications	1	0.10
publicized	1	0.10
publics	1	0.10
taxpayer's	1	0.10
TOTAL	1902	100.00

Table C2: Context in Which Governments Refer to the Public

Coding	Number of Mentions	% Share of Mentions
Noun, refers to a general, vague public	792	41.60
Adjective	692	36.40
Noun, refers to national/European public	237	12.50
Part of set term, such as 'public procurement', 'public prosecutor'	106	5.60
Other	75	3.90
TOTAL	1902	100.00

Figure C2: Public Opinion and Mentions of the Public (Nouns Only)



Note: Predicted probabilities are plotted for the range of observed values of the public image of the EU; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. Estimates and confidence intervals are based on the model results "Nouns Referring to the Public" presented in Table C4.

Table C3: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effects on Mentioning the Public

Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Subset	Government
0.03	0.06	0.47	0.64	All	Pro-EU
-0.29	0.13	-2.20	0.03	All	Eurosceptic
-0.03	0.08	-0.30	0.76	Nouns Only	Pro-EU
-0.32	0.16	-2.02	0.04	Nouns Only	Eurosceptic

Table C4: Regression for Mentioning the Public

	Dependent variable:	
	Referring to the Public	Nouns Referring to the Public
	(1)	(2)
Eurosceptic Government	−0.189	−0.141
	(0.243)	(0.296)
Public Image of the EU	0.029	−0.025
	(0.062)	(0.084)
Government Left-Right position	−0.048	−0.066
	(0.048)	(0.060)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.131**	−0.186**
	(0.057)	(0.081)
Budget issue	0.347	0.240
	(0.363)	(0.347)
Unanimity Required	−0.203	−0.497**
	(0.223)	(0.219)
Unemployment Rate	0.013	0.038
	(0.068)	(0.096)
Inflation Rate	−0.092	−0.149**
	(0.057)	(0.066)
Northern Europe	−0.038	0.074
	(0.127)	(0.183)
Southern Europe	−0.009	−0.220
	(0.158)	(0.232)
Council configuration: Ecofin	−0.067	0.292
	(0.267)	(0.265)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.403	0.749***
	(0.302)	(0.290)
Council configuration: ENV	−0.276	−0.090
	(0.294)	(0.291)
Council configuration: JHA	0.547**	0.921***
	(0.233)	(0.229)
Negotiation stage: Initial Presentation	−0.659*	−0.644*
	(0.358)	(0.361)
Negotiation stage: Mixed Negotiations	0.271	0.008
	(0.482)	(0.479)
Negotiation stage: Policy Debates	0.222	0.030
	(0.163)	(0.155)
Eurosceptic Government x Public Image of the EU	−0.314**	−0.291*
	(0.134)	(0.161)
Intercept	−2.690***	−3.415***
	(0.224)	(0.241)
Debate Random Effect	Yes	Yes
Country Random Effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,214	10,214
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,842.278	4,869.279
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	6,994.140	5,021.140

Note: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

D Debate Participation

In this appendix, we investigate what factors determine whether governments participate in Council debates in the first place and take the floor to speak. Wratil and Hobolt (2019) investigate participation patterns in their Ecofin pilot dataset and find that participation is not predicted by government parties' ideological positions, which provides a key test for the data's validity to infer real negotiation stances from it. These authors find four factors that significantly affect participation in their models: the size of the member state, budget contributions, socialization of a government into debates, and the member state's accession year. We include all these factors in our model with a dummy variable for small member states (all except for Germany, Italy, France, and UK), net receipts from the EU budget, the time a government has been in office, and the year of accession. In addition, we also include our key interaction from the STM models between Eurosceptic governments and the public image of the EU as well as all additional control variables from our baseline model.

Moreover, we argue based on Kleine and Minaudier (2019) as well as Schneider (2018), who find that EU-level decision-making slows down before national elections in the member states, that governments may withdraw from taking stances in the Council when they face pending elections at home. They may simply decide to not take the floor in Council debates. To model this possibility, we also include a dummy variable for pending elections that is "1" in the two months before national legislative elections (i.e., $\leq$ 61 days). Our dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a government speaks in a debate in which it had the opportunity to speak. We use a mixed effects logistic regression model with random intercepts for member states and debates to model the data. All continuous variables are z-score standardized.

The results are reported in Table D1 as Model 1. They reveal various important patterns: 1) Governments are significantly less likely to participate in debates in the last two months before a pending election. Their predicted probability decreases from 63% to 51% in the two months before an election. This is strong evidence of deselection before elections and sheds doubts on whether any potential effects on governments' rhetoric due to elections could be detected from Council speeches, as we simply observe less speech under imminent electoral pressure and likely a selection of it. This speaks to the null findings in Appendix K.2. 2) We also find that Eurosceptic governments significantly select themselves out of debates if public opinion is positively disposed towards the EU, which is suggested by the negative and significant interaction effect between the Eurosceptic government dummy variable and the public image of the EU. In contrast, pro-EU governments are not affected in their probability to participate by public opinion, which is indicated by the insignificant coefficient on the public image of the EU. We plot both effects in Figure 5a in the paper and report them in Table D2 below. 3) We replicate the findings by Wratil and Hobolt (2019) that small member states participate less in Council debates, but we find no effects of the time a government has been in office, the year of accession, or budget contributions. These issues do not seem to matter across the much broader sample of five Council configurations we analyze here. In contrast, we find that high unemployment dampens participation, a variable not investigated in Wratil and Hobolt (2019).

Note that in Model 2 in Table D1 we also ascertain whether governments decrease their participation in debates already years before national elections. If that were the case, it

would pose a more significant challenge to the validity of the DICEU data, as it would imply more severe selection effects. To test this, we include a variable that measures the years to the next legislative elections, assuming that elections occur according to the constitutional inter-election period (also see Appendix K.2). This variable has no effect on participation, showing that the deselection from debates mostly happens when elections are imminent.

Table D1: Participation Model Results

	Dependent variable:	
	Debate Participation	
	Baseline Model	Linear Election Distance
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	1.002** (0.431)	0.982** (0.431)
Eurosceptic government	−0.872*** (0.242)	−0.883*** (0.253)
Public image of the EU	−0.049 (0.079)	−0.052 (0.079)
Last two months before election	−0.474** (0.205)	
Distance to planned election		0.022 (0.042)
Unanimity required	0.187 (0.394)	0.196 (0.394)
Budget debate	1.397** (0.642)	1.391** (0.642)
Government left-right position	0.083 (0.056)	0.090 (0.058)
Net receipts from EU budget	−0.084 (0.089)	−0.093 (0.089)
Year of Accession	−0.124 (0.113)	−0.118 (0.114)
Time in Office	−0.009 (0.046)	−0.004 (0.048)
Unemployment rate	−0.123 (0.092)	−0.124 (0.092)
Inflation rate	0.002 (0.070)	0.016 (0.070)
Northern country	−0.336* (0.192)	−0.328* (0.191)
Southern country	0.280 (0.230)	0.270 (0.230)
Small member state	−0.816*** (0.289)	−0.815*** (0.289)
Council Configuration: Ecofin	−0.589 (0.455)	−0.589 (0.454)
Council Configuration: EPSCO	0.314 (0.550)	0.324 (0.550)
Council Configuration: ENV	2.049*** (0.537)	2.050*** (0.537)
Council Configuration: JHA	0.377 (0.410)	0.377 (0.410)
Eurosceptic government x Public image of the EU	−0.363** (0.145)	−0.378*** (0.146)
Debate Random Effect	Yes	Yes
Country Random Effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,570	5,570
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,417.568	5,422.409
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	5,563.321	5,568.162

Note: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table D2: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effect on Participation

Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Government
-0.05	0.08	-0.61	0.54	Pro-EU
-0.41	0.15	-2.81	0.00	Eurosceptic

E The Role of Public Opinion in Voting

In this section, we investigate whether governments engage differently with public opinion in final passage voting, the stage of Council decision-making that follows public deliberations and discussions at technical levels, compared to public deliberations. We are, in particular, interested whether Eurosceptic governments' lack of engagement with public opinion during negotiations is replicated in voting.

Our focus on completed legislative procedures allows us to obtain voting records (from the Council register, www.consilium.europa.eu) on all legislative files that were ever discussed in any public deliberation of the Council included in our data. We only use the votes by those governments that actually spoke at least once on a legislative file during public deliberations, as they can be deemed to have participated in the bargaining process. Following existing literature, we model the occurrence of opposition votes (i.e., "no" or "abstain") using mixed effects logistic regression models and an interaction effect between the dummy of Eurosceptic governments and the public image of the EU. This probes how each type of government adjusts to public opinion in voting. We also control for the government left-right position, net receipts from the EU budget as well as unemployment and inflation rates. Moreover, we also include a dummy variable for votes on the EU budget (e.g. annual draft amending budgets) as significantly more opposition votes occur on such files as well as fixed effects for the different Council configurations. Crossed random effects for countries and the legislative act account for unobserved heterogeneity.

All results are in Table E2. Model 1 represents our baseline specification. While the effect of the public image of the EU is not statistically significant (representing the effect for pro-EU governments), the interaction effect with Eurosceptic governments is significant as well as the resulting public opinion effect for Eurosceptic governments (see Table E1). This indicates that Eurosceptic governments significantly increase the number of opposition votes they cast in the Council if public opinion at home turns more negative towards the EU, while pro-EU governments are unresponsive to public opinion – as they may be bound by their membership of the policy coalition. This powerfully demonstrates that the engagement with public opinion can vary dramatically between negotiation stages. It also supports the credibility of our main results, as our stipulated bargaining model about policy coalitions suggests that pro-EU governments should be more constrained in their behavior in voting than Eurosceptic governments. This is directly reflected in different levels of responsiveness to public opinion.

We address some concerns with these results. The first pertains to the Council presidency status. While we exclude speeches by Council presidencies in the paper, as the presidency performs the moderator role, member states that did not hold the presidency at the negotiation stage may hold it once a file is tabled for a vote (sometimes years later). While presidencies can cast opposition votes, they face additional incentives to vote in favor given that they shall represent the Council as a whole and promote the EU's legislative agenda. In Model 2 we therefore exclude all member states that hold the presidency at the time of voting. All our results hold.

Second, we address concerns that we also address with regard to the STM analyses in Appendix J. In Model 3 we include year fixed effects to the model to account for common contemporaneous shocks. This marginally affects the significance of the interaction term

that is now significant at the 10% level. In Model 4 we use a wider definition of Eurosceptic governments, merging information from the CMP and the CHES (see section J.2 on the variable construction and descriptives) to assess the sensitivity of our results. The results are substantively the same, if anything, the effect of public opinion for Eursoceptic governments is slightly larger.

In addition, we also assess the sensitivity of our results to varying the cutoff at which we define a government as "Eurosceptic." While we use "0" in the baseline model in the paper, which is a "natural" cutoff, as it represents equal amounts of pro- vs. anti-EU integration pledges by government parties, we re-estimate the model varying the cutoff between -0.5 and 1.5 in 0.1 steps. The resulting coefficient estimates for the interaction term between the dummy for Eurosceptic governments and the EU's public image are plotted in Figure E1. If we lower the cutoff clearly below zero, the group of Eurosceptic governments becomes too small to properly estimate the relationship. Meanwhile, the interaction stays statistically significant (with one borderline exception) between a cutoff of 0 and 0.8 (the 8^{th} and 28^{th} percentile of the distribution of the CMP Euroscepticism variable). As the median of the European integration position is 1.35, we would not expect the effect to stay significant at such values, as it would imply that 50% of governments were Eurosceptic. In conclusion, the difference in the responsiveness in voting between Eurosceptic and pro-EU governments is robust to varying the definition of Euroscepticism in various ways.

Table E1: Size and Significance of Image of the EU Effect on Voting (Baseline Model)

Estimate	Std.Error	t-value	p-value	Government
-0.11	0.21	-0.51	0.61	Pro-EU
-0.83	0.33	-2.51	0.01	Eurosceptic

Table E2: Voting Model Results and Robustness Checks

	Dependent variable:			
	Opposition Vote			
	Baseline Model	Without Presidency	Year FE	CHES+CMP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eurosceptic government	0.526	0.481	0.928	
	(0.553)	(0.550)	(0.575)	
Eurosceptic government (CHES+CMP)				0.169
				(0.437)
Public image of the EU	−0.106	−0.113	−0.047	−0.040
	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.227)	(0.221)
Government left-right position	0.011	−0.0001	−0.102	0.048
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.152)	(0.141)
Net receipts from EU budget	0.088	0.110	0.108	0.069
	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.187)	(0.189)
Budget issue	2.505***	2.508***	2.582***	2.520***
	(0.709)	(0.709)	(0.707)	(0.712)
Unemployment rate	−0.982***	−0.973***	−1.081***	−0.977***
	(0.241)	(0.237)	(0.250)	(0.248)
Inflation rate	−0.084	−0.080	−0.456**	−0.109
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.212)	(0.157)
Council configuration: Ecofin	−2.285***	−2.278***	−2.366***	−2.289***
	(0.758)	(0.758)	(0.751)	(0.761)
Council configuration: EPSCO	0.082	0.087	0.305	0.080
	(0.692)	(0.692)	(0.670)	(0.694)
Council configuration: ENV	0.720	0.725	0.903*	0.726
	(0.544)	(0.544)	(0.530)	(0.547)
Council configuration: JHA	−1.013*	−0.985	−0.885	−1.013*
	(0.603)	(0.603)	(0.598)	(0.605)
Eurosceptic government x Public image of the EU	−0.725**	−0.731**	−0.653*	
	(0.347)	(0.345)	(0.346)	
Eurosceptic government (CHES+CMP) x Public image of the EU				−0.914***
				(0.344)
Intercept	−4.202***	−4.163***	−3.699***	−4.244***
	(0.425)	(0.423)	(0.441)	(0.432)
Year-Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No
Debate Random Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Random Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,921	2,811	2,921	2,921
Log Likelihood	−466.094	−462.986	−459.806	−465.334
Akaike Inf. Crit.	962.188	955.972	961.612	960.669
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,051.884	1,045.091	1,087.185	1,050.364

Note: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure E1: Simulating Different Cutoffs for Defining Eurosceptic Governments



References

Council of the European Union. 2011. "Openness and Transparency of Council Proceedings.".

Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2019. Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies. Development Version. Technical report.

Hagemann, Sara, Sara B. Hobolt and Christopher Wratil. 2017. "Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(6):850–876.

Hobolt, Sara B. and Christopher Wratil. 2020. "Contestation and Responsiveness in EU Council Deliberations." *Journal of European Public Policy* 27(3):362–381.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson. 2002. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35(8):965–989.

Kleine, Mareike and Clement Minaudier. 2019. "Negotiating under Political Uncertainty: National Elections and the Dynamics of International Co-operation." *British Journal of Political Science* 49(1):315–337.

Rinker, Tyler W. 2018. *lexicon: Lexicon Data*. Version 1.2.1.
URL: *http://github.com/trinker/lexicon*

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, Dustin Tingley and Kenneth Benoit. 2020. Package 'stm'. Estimation of the Structural Topic Model. Technical report.

Schneider, Christina J. 2018. *The Responsive Union: National Elections and European Governance*. Cambridge University Press.

Volkens, Andrea, Werner Krause, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel and Bernhard Weßels. 2019. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2019b. Technical report Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

Wratil, Christopher. 2018. "Modes of government responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council negotiation positions." *European Union Politics* 19(1):52–74.

Wratil, Christopher. 2022. CMP-ParlGov Government Positions Data. Version 2.2. Technical report.

Wratil, Christopher and Sara B. Hobolt. 2019. "Public deliberations in the Council of the European Union: Introducing and validating DICEU." *European Union Politics* 20(3):511–531.