Inadvertent Expansion: How Peripheral Agents Shape World Politics

Online Appendix

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This is an appendix accompanying the following book:

- Nicholas D. Anderson, *Inadvertent Expansion: How Peripheral Agents Shape World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024).

It presents a number of analyses that are referenced in the book or that support the analyses in the book.

Balance Test for Case Selection (Chapter 1)

The following table is referenced in the book in Chapter 1: A Theory of Inadvertent Expansion on p. 27. It compares the case studies selected with the remainder of the cases of inadvertent expansion by the great powers between 1816 and 2014. Note that the "cases" here only include successful (or "positive") cases of inadvertent expansion, since, as detailed in Chapter 2: Patterns of Inadvertent Expansion, 1816-2014 (pp. 32-33), the quantitative data consist solely of successful cases of territorial expansion. The seven cases include Florida (1819), Chimkent (1864), Tashkent (1865), Annam (1883), Tonkin (1883), East Africa (1885), and Manchuria (1932). Definitions and further details for these variables can also be found in Chapter 2 as well as in the data Codebook (Inadvertent Expansion – Codebook.pdf). And the table can be replicated using the replication file (Inadvertent Expansion – Replication File.R).

Table A1: Balance Test for Case Selection				
Variable	**Range**	**Cases** (n=7)	**Rest of Population** (n=48)	**Difference**
Year (median)	1818-1932	1883	1874	+9
Regions (count)	1-5	4	4	0
Distance (km)	1,146-19,137	5,043	7,331	-2,288
Extra_regional	0/1	0.43	0.83	-0.4
Telegraph	0/1	0.14	0.19	-0.05
Risk	0/1	0.29	0.17	+0.12
Conflict	0/1	0.57	0.35	+0.22
Annexation	0/1	0.14	0.50	-0.36
Info_capacity	0.27-0.61	0.47	0.52	-0.05
Democracy	0/1	0.43	0.29	+0.14
Autocracy	0/1	0.29	0.19	+0.1
Polity	(-10)-8	-0.4	0.9	-1.4
VDem_polyarchy	0.02-0.57	0.28	0.31	-0.03
Gainer_CINC	0.03-0.33	0.08	0.17	-0.09
Note: Values refer to averages unless otherwise noted.				

The table shows the balance between the sample of cases selected and the broader universe of cases of inadvertent expansion to be fairly even. There is little or no meaningful difference between the sample selected and the universe of cases with respect to: the *year* in which the expansion observation takes place; the number of *regions* represented;[1] whether the territory acquired is connected to the global *telegraph* network at the time of acquisition;[2] the *risk* involved in the expansion observation;[3] the great power's *information capacity*;[4] whether the great power is a *democracy*

[1] Region classification derived from: Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2004), pp. 133-154 (Region data no longer available online).
[2] Much of the telegraph data is from: Bill Glover, "Cable Timeline: 1850-2018" in History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications (2022), Available at: https://atlantic-cable.com/; Anton A. Huurdeman, *The Worldwide History of Telecommunications* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), ch. 8, Appendix A.
[3] See the book (pp. 32-33) and the Codebook for explanations of how "risk" is operationalized.
[4] See: Thomas Brambor, Agustin Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall, and Jan Teorell, "The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2020), pp. 175-213. Data available at: http://www.stanceatlund.org/information-capacity-dataset.html.

or an *autocracy*;[5] the great power's *polity* score;[6] the great power's Varieties of Democracy *polyarchy* score;[7] or the great power's *CINC* score.[8]

The variables on which there is a substantial difference between the sample selected and the broader universe are: the *distance* between the territory acquired and the great power's capital;[9] whether the expansion occurred in a region beyond the great power's own (*extra_regional*); whether the expansion was part of a broader *conflict*;[10] and whether the expansion took the form of *annexation*. The differences with respect to distance and region should, if anything, be biased against the arguments made in the book. Given that the theory is importantly about the capital's ability to monitor and control the periphery, the fact that the cases selected are, on average, closer to the great power's capital should make them a somewhat more difficult test of the theory. A similar logic applies to the difference between the book's sample and the universe in terms of conflict-related inadvertent expansion. As shown in Chapter 2 (Table 2.2, p. 40), territorial expansion by the great powers is less likely (about 18 percent) to be inadvertent when it occurs as part of, or in the immediate aftermath of, a broader conflict. Thus, the sample of cases selected should, on this measure as well, be a somewhat harder test of the theory. Finally, and as discussed in Chapter 1 (p. 29), the difference between the sample of cases and the broader universe with respect to annexation

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[5] States with Polity scores of 6 or greater are considered democracies. Those with Polity scores of -6 or lower are considered autocracies. Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018," Center for Systemic Peace (2019). Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

[6] Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018.

[7] Michael Coppedge, et al., "VDem Country–Year Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (2022). https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22; Daniel Pemstein, et al., "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". *V-Dem Working Paper* No. 21. 7th ed. (2022), University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

[8] National Material Capabilities (v6.0). J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 19-48. Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.

[9] Distance is measured using the "Measure distance" tool in Google Maps to ensure as accurate a measure between locations as possible. See: Google Maps (2022). https://www.google.com/maps.

[10] For the purpose of this variable, I consider wars as being those conflicts included in the Correlates of War's "Inter-state", "Intra-state", and "Extra-state" war lists. See: "COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0)." Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.

is by design—cases of conquest were primarily selected in order to facilitate "most similar" comparisons across cases.

Data Tables on Patterns of Inadvertent Expansion (Chapter 2)

Table A2.1 presents missing data with respect to the variable *Inadvertent* by great power actor. The issue of missing inadvertent expansion data is discussed on pp. 34-35, 175n19 of the book. This table and all other tables and analyses that follow can be replicated using the replication file (Inadvertent Expansion – Replication File.R).

Table A2.1: Missing Data on Inadvertent Expansion by Great Power

Actor	Years	Coded/Total Observations	
USA	1816-2014	13/13	(100%)
U.K.	1816-1945	81/83	(98%)
France	1816-1940	46/51	(90%)
Germany	1816-1945	27/27	(100%)
Austria	1816-1918	3/3	(100%)
Italy	1860-1943	19/19	(100%)
Russia	1816-2014	35/35	(100%)
China	1950-2014	3/3	(100%)
Japan	1868-1945	24/24	(100%)
Total		**251/258**	**(97%)**

Table A2.2 presents summary statistics for key variables in the great power territorial expansion data. The variables are introduced on pp. 34-36 of the book and discussed in greater depth in the Codebook.

Table A2.2: Summary Statistics for Great Power Territorial Expansion Data			
Variable	**Range**	**Mean**	**Observations**
year	1816-2014	1891	258
inadvertent	0/1	0.22	251
telegraph	0/1	0.51	257
risk	0/1	0.43	258
annexation	0/1	0.42	258
conquest	0/1	0.58	258
extra_regional	0/1	0.61	258
distance	201-19,137	5,965	258
conflict	0/1	0.50	258
info_capacity	0.213-0.605	0.53	257
polity	(-10)-10	0.61	258
democracy	0/1	0.36	258
autocracy	0/1	0.24	258
vdem_polyarchy	0.016-0.708	0.30	258
gainer_cinc	0.02-0.384	0.14	258

Table A2.3 presents the share of each great power's territorial expansion that is coded as inadvertent in the data. This is discussed on p. 37 of the book.

Table A2.3: Inadvertent Expansion by Great Power		
Actor	**Inadvertent/Total**	**(%)**
France	19/46	(41.3%)
UK	20/81	(24.7%)
Russia	7/35	(20.0%)
Japan	4/24	(16.7%)
Germany	4/27	(14.8%)
USA	1/13	(7.7%)
Austria	0/3	(0%)
Italy	0/19	(0%)
China	0/3	(0%)
Total	**55/251**	**(21.9%)**

Table A2.4 presents the share of territorial expansion that is inadvertent by major world region. This is discussed on p. 37 of the book.

Table A2.4: Inadvertent Expansion by Region		
Region	**Inadvertent/Total**	
South & Central Asia	9/23	(39.1%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	24/66	(36.4%)
Asia-Pacific	20/90	(22.2%)
Western Hemisphere	1/6	(16.7%)
Middle East & North Africa	1/16	(6.2%)
Europe	0/50	(0%)

Table A2.5 presents the results of the significance tests conducted for the comparisons presented in Figure 2.2 in the book (p. 40). The analysis is conducted using a linear probability model. Robust standard errors are reported in each model, in order to account for error heteroskedasticity. As is clear, the bivariate relationships between the telegraph, risk, and inadvertent expansion are highly statistically significant.

Table A2.5: Statistical Significance Tests for Telegraph, Risk, & Inadvertent Expansion

	Dependent variable:	
	inadvertent	
	(1)	(2)
telegraph	-0.299***	
	(0.050)	
risk		-0.231***
		(0.048)
Constant	0.375***	0.321***
	(0.044)	(0.040)
Observations	251	251
R2	0.130	0.077
Adjusted R2	0.127	0.073
Residual Std. Error (df = 249)	0.387	0.399
F Statistic (df = 1; 249)	37.232***	20.816***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Robustness Tests for Data Analysis (Chapter 2)

The following robustness tests are discussed in Chapter 2 on p. 43. Table A2.6 presents the results of a robustness test of the main analysis presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3, p. 42), using Logistic regression analysis rather than linear probability analysis. The results are unchanged, though *year* is now statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table A2.6: Logistic Regression Analysis of Inadvertent Expansion

	Dependent variable:
	inadvertent
telegraph	-1.438***
	(0.527)
risk	-1.154**
	(0.488)
year	-0.017**
	(0.008)
annexation	-0.498
	(0.428)
distance	-0.00000
	(0.00005)
conflict	0.288
	(0.485)
info_capacity	1.495
	(1.745)
democracy	-0.106
	(0.399)
gainer_cinc	-4.116*
	(2.432)
Constant	31.778**
	(14.095)
Observations	250
Log Likelihood	-108.812
Akaike Inf. Crit.	237.623
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2.7 is a robustness test of the main model presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3, p. 42), but with *extra_regional* instead of *distance* as the control for distance from the capital. The results are unchanged, and *extra_regional* is not statistically significant.

Table A2.7: Linear Probability Analysis with *Extra_regional*

	Dependent variable:
	inadvertent
telegraph	-0.219***
	(0.072)
risk	-0.126**
	(0.056)
year	-0.001
	(0.001)
annexation	-0.097
	(0.064)
extra_regional	0.068
	(0.096)
conflict	0.028
	(0.067)
info_capacity	0.020
	(0.330)
democracy	-0.053
	(0.068)
gainer_cinc	-0.431
	(0.355)
Constant	2.760*
	(1.525)
Observations	250
R2	0.165
Adjusted R2	0.134
Residual Std. Error	0.386 (df = 240)
F Statistic	5.268*** (df = 9; 240)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2.8 reruns the main model presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3, p. 42), but with alternative measures for the great power's domestic political regime type, including whether it was an *autocracy*, its simple *polity* score, and its Varieties of Democracy *polyarchy* score. The main results are unchanged, and none of these alternative regime type measures is statistically significant.

Table A2.8: Linear Probability Analysis with Alternative Regime Type Measures

	Dependent variable:		
	inadvertent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
telegraph	-0.235***	-0.235***	-0.235***
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.074)
risk	-0.141**	-0.139**	-0.139**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
year	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
annexation	-0.090	-0.091	-0.091
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.032	0.029	0.027
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
info_capacity	0.171	0.144	0.132
	(0.295)	(0.296)	(0.316)
autocracy	0.033		
	(0.062)		
polity		-0.001	
		(0.004)	
vdem_polyarchy			-0.018
			(0.180)
gainer_cinc	-0.288	-0.276	-0.279
	(0.350)	(0.350)	(0.349)
Constant	3.470**	3.312**	3.316**
	(1.500)	(1.446)	(1.501)
Observations	250	250	250
R2	0.163	0.163	0.163
Adjusted R2	0.132	0.131	0.131
Residual Std. Error (df = 240)	0.387	0.387	0.387
F Statistic (df = 9; 240)	5.212***	5.188***	5.183***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Tables A2.9 and A2.10 rerun the main model presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3, p. 42), but control for dichotomous variables for each of the expanding great power actors represented in the data. The main results are unchanged, and *risk* even appears to gain statistical significance when controlling for the United Kingdom (Table A2.9, model 2), Italy (Table A2.10, model 1), or Japan (Table A2.10, model 4).

Table A2.9: Linear Probability Analysis with Great Power Dummies (1)

	Dependent variable:				
	inadvertent				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
telegraph	-0.242***	-0.223***	-0.212***	-0.233***	-0.231***
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.074)
risk	-0.128**	-0.146***	-0.122**	-0.133**	-0.133**
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)
year	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
annexation	-0.092	-0.090	-0.094	-0.092	-0.093
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.031	0.026	0.015	0.018	0.029
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.067)
info_capacity	0.068	0.228	0.084	0.192	0.158
	(0.317)	(0.304)	(0.287)	(0.299)	(0.286)
democracy	-0.006	-0.016	-0.079	-0.035	-0.027
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.059)
gainer_cinc	-0.215	-0.060	0.072	-0.290	-0.332
	(0.374)	(0.342)	(0.356)	(0.348)	(0.351)
us_dummy	-0.099				
	(0.115)				
uk_dummy		-0.071			
		(0.070)			
france_dummy			0.185**		
			(0.086)		
germany_dummy				-0.043	
				(0.077)	
austria_dummy					-0.251***
					(0.092)
Constant	2.922*	3.647**	2.050	3.308**	3.651**
	(1.533)	(1.533)	(1.434)	(1.445)	(1.470)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250
R2	0.165	0.166	0.184	0.164	0.167
Adjusted R2	0.130	0.131	0.150	0.129	0.133
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.387	0.387	0.383	0.387	0.387
F Statistic (df = 10; 239)	4.731***	4.763***	5.400***	4.696***	4.808***
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05;	***p<0.01

Table A2.10: Linear Probability Analysis with Great Power Dummies (2)

	Dependent variable:			
	inadvertent			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
telegraph	-0.222***	-0.234***	-0.234***	-0.229***
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)
risk	-0.157***	-0.137**	-0.140**	-0.151***
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.056)
year	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
annexation	-0.100	-0.092	-0.092	-0.094
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.030	0.027	0.025	0.016
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)
info_capacity	0.300	0.199	0.139	0.166
	(0.299)	(0.329)	(0.306)	(0.286)
democracy	-0.062	-0.024	-0.026	-0.009
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)
gainer_cinc	-0.557	-0.297	-0.285	-0.161
	(0.385)	(0.348)	(0.347)	(0.359)
italy_dummy	-0.238***			
	(0.063)			
russia_dummy		0.027		
		(0.078)		
china_dummy			-0.024	
			(0.087)	
japan_dummy				0.114
				(0.091)
Constant	3.435**	3.391**	3.161**	3.646**
	(1.455)	(1.445)	(1.553)	(1.421)
Observations	250	250	250	250
R2	0.181	0.164	0.163	0.168
Adjusted R2	0.147	0.129	0.128	0.133
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.383	0.387	0.388	0.386
F Statistic (df = 10; 239)	5.275***	4.680***	4.670***	4.832***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Finally, Table A2.11 reruns the main analysis presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3, p. 42) but controls for dichotomous variables for each of the regions one-by-one. The results are unchanged, with two exceptions. First, in model 3, which controls for Sub-Saharan Africa, the coefficient on *risk* is no longer statistically significant. That said, it is substantively similarly sized and the sign is in the expected direction. Furthermore, this region does include nearly half of all cases of inadvertent expansion in the data (24/55, or 44 percent), so perhaps it should not be surprising that it has so much such statistical influence on the results. And second, in model 6, which controls for the Asia-Pacific, the coefficient on *risk* is now statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Table A2.11: Linear Probability Analysis with Region Dummies

	Dependent variable:					
	inadvertent					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
telegraph	-0.235***	-0.201***	-0.216***	-0.240***	-0.233***	-0.245***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.073)
risk	-0.133**	-0.136**	-0.099	-0.123**	-0.138**	-0.172***
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.059)
year	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
annexation	-0.093	-0.060	-0.094	-0.099	-0.090	-0.098
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.063)
distance	-0.00000	-0.00001	0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00002
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
conflict	0.025	0.056	0.038	0.023	0.026	0.017
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.067)
info_capacity	0.107	0.229	-0.017	0.199	0.151	0.290
	(0.304)	(0.287)	(0.295)	(0.289)	(0.287)	(0.295)
democracy	-0.015	-0.075	-0.058	-0.006	-0.025	-0.004
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)
gainer_cinc	-0.279	-0.229	-0.281	-0.227	-0.296	-0.110
	(0.350)	(0.344)	(0.351)	(0.345)	(0.353)	(0.367)
whemisphere_dummy	-0.104					
	(0.159)					
europe_dummy		-0.225***				
		(0.057)				
africa_dummy			0.136*			
			(0.079)			
mena_dummy				-0.151*		
				(0.091)		
scasia_dummy					0.010	
					(0.104)	
asiapac_dummy						0.125
						(0.083)
Constant	3.394**	3.264**	2.795*	3.599**	3.223**	4.132***
	(1.422)	(1.382)	(1.452)	(1.424)	(1.433)	(1.549)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250	250
R2	0.165	0.191	0.177	0.170	0.163	0.172
Adjusted R2	0.130	0.157	0.143	0.136	0.128	0.138
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.387	0.381	0.384	0.386	0.387	0.385
F Statistic (df = 10; 239)	4.710***	5.626***	5.152***	4.903***	4.670***	4.975***
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01