How Justice Becomes Part of the Deal:
Pre-Conditions for the Inclusion of Transitional Justice Provisions in Peace Agreements

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Data Appendix

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1 Case Selection and Data Matrix

Appendix 1.1 Case selection and raw data

ID	Case	PA ID (year)	High Atrocities	Rebel strength	Conflict type	Third-party	Civil society	TJ provisions
AFG3	Afghanistan: Government	1488 (2016)	Yes	much weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
AGO3	Angola: Government	1023 (1994)	Yes	parity	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
AGO4	Angola: Government	1126 (2002)	No	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
BGD1	Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts	1057 (1997)	No	weaker	Territory	No	No	Yes
BIH4	Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serb	1073 (1995)	Yes	parity	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
BIH7	Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serb, Croat	1570 (1993)	Yes	parity	Territory	Yes	No	No
BDI1	Burundi: Government	1003 (2000)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
BDI3	Burundi: Government	1099 (2003)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
BDI7	Burundi: Government	1386 (2008)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
CAM1	Cambodia: Government	1113 (1991)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
CAM2	Cambodia: Government	1571 (1991)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
CAF2	Central African Republic: Government	1454 (2012)	No	parity	Gov.	No	No	Yes
CAF4	Central African Republic: Government	1486 (2015)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
CAF8	Central African Republic: Government	1498 (2017)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
CHA1	Chad: Government	1049 (2002)	No	much weaker	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
COL1	Colombia: Government	1079 (1991)	No	much weaker	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
COL2	Colombia: Government	1487 (2016)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
COM3	Comoros: Anjouan	1127 (2003)	No	stronger	Territory	Yes	No	No
CRO1	Croatia: Serb	1074 (1995)	No	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	No
DJI1	Djibouti: Government	1009 (1994)	No	parity	Gov.	No	No	Yes
DJI2	Djibouti: Government	1010 (2000)	No	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
DJI3	Djibouti: Government	1146 (2001)	No	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes

(continued)

Appendix 1.1 continued

ID	Case	PA ID (year)	High Atrocities	Rebel strength	Conflict type	Third-party	Civil society	TJ provisions
DRC2	DR Congo (Zaire): Government	1005 (2002)	Yes	parity	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
DRC4	DR Congo (Zaire): Government	1289 (2003)	Yes	parity	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
DRC5	DR Congo (Zaire): Government	1290 (2003)	Yes	parity	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
DRC7	DR Congo (Zaire): Government	1384 (2009)	No	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
SAL7	El Salvador: Government	1110 (1992)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
GUA1	Guatemala: Government	1081 (1996)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
GNB1	Guinea-Bissau: Government	1019 (1998)	No	stronger	Gov.	Yes	No	No
IND1	India: Bodoland	1071 (1993)	No	much weaker	Territory	No	No	Yes
IND2	India: Tripura	1121 (1993)	No	much weaker	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
IDN2	Indonesia: Aceh	1276 (2005)	No	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
CDI2	Ivory Coast: Government	1273 (2005)	No	parity	Gov.	No	No	No
CDI3	Ivory Coast: Government	1283 (2004)	No	parity	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
CDI5	Ivory Coast: Government	1359 (2007)	No	parity	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
LBR7	Liberia: Government	1101 (2003)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
MAC1	Macedonia: Government	1098 (2001)	No	much weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
MLI2	Mali: Azawad	1040 (1992)	No	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
MLI3	Mali: Azawad	1609 (2013)	No	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
MLI4	Mali: Azawad	30 (2015)	No	weaker	Territory	No	No	Yes
MOZ1	Mozambique: Government	1020 (1992)	Yes	parity	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
NPL1	Nepal: Government	1337 (2006)	No	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
NIR2	Niger: Air and Azawad	1038 (1995)	No	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
PNG1	Papua New Guinea: Bougainville	1080 (2001)	No	parity	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
PHL1	Philippines: Mindanao	1064 (1996)	no	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	No

(continued)

Appendix 1.1 continued

ID	Case	PA ID	High Atrocities	Rebel strength	Conflict type	Third-party	Civil society	TJ provisions
PHL7	Philippines: Mindanao	1477 (2014)	No	weaker	Territory	Yes	No	Yes
RWA1	Rwanda: Government	1002 (1993)	Yes	stronger	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
SLE1	Sierra Leone: Government	1011 (1996)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
SLE2	Sierra Leone: Government	1013 (1999)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
SLE3	Sierra Leone: Government	1143 (2000)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	No
SAF1	South Africa: Government	1397 (1993)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
SSD1	South Sudan: Government	1480 (2014)	No	weaker	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
SSD5	South Sudan: Government	29 (2015)	No	parity	Gov.	Yes	Yes	Yes
SSD6	South Sudan: Government	31 (2012)	No	weaker	Gov.	No	No	Yes
SUD6	Sudan: Government	1282 (2005)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
SUD9	Sudan: Government	1351 (2005)	Yes	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
TAJ1	Tajikistan: Government	1119 (1997)	No	weaker	Gov.	Yes	No	Yes
UKG1	United Kingdom: Northern Ireland	1063 (1998)	No	much weaker	Territory	No	No	Yes

2 Analysis of Transitional Justice provisions

Appendix 2.1 Analysis of superset relations for the presence and absence of TJ provisions

Conditions	Presence of TJ provisions (TJ)			Absence of TJ provisions (tj)		
	Consistency	*Relevance*	*Coverage*	*Consistency*	*Relevance*	*Coverage*
ATR	0.471	0.941	0.923	0.286	0.571	0.077
atr	0.529	0.839	0.844	0.714	0.491	0.156
REB	0.255	0.911	0.765	0.571	0.759	0.235
reb	0.745	0.850	0.927	0.429	0.309	0.073
GOV	0.765	0.842	0.929	0.429	0.291	0.071
gov	0.235	0.913	0.750	0.571	0.778	0.250
THIRD	0.686	0.739	0.854	0.857	0.327	0.146
third	0.314	0.976	0.941	0.143	0.719	0.059
CIV	0.176	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.845	0.000
civ	0.824	0.562	0.857	1.000	0.176	0.143

Note: The superset analysis was performed in R using the "pof command" in the *QCA* package. For details see R script.

Appendix 2.2 Sufficiency plot for the intermediate solution



Appendix 2.3 Categorization of cases, outcome TJ provisions

Case Types	Term 1:	Term 2:	Term 3:	Term 4:
Typical	DJI2, DJI3, DRC7, NPL1, SSD6, AGO4, MAC1, TAJ1, CHA1, COL1, SSD1, AFG3, CAM2, CAF4, GUA1, SAF2, BDI3, BDI7, CAM1, COL2, SAL7, SLE1, SLE2, SLE3, SUD6, SUD9, BDI1, CAF8, LBR7	BDI3, BDI7, CAM1, COL2, SAL7, SLE1, SLE2, SLE3, SUD6, SUD9, BDI1, CAF8, LBR7, AGO3, DRC5, MOZ1, RWA1, DRC2, DRC4	CHA1, COL1, SSD1, SSD5, BDI1, CAF8, LBR7, DRC2, DRC4	BGD1, IND1, MLI4, UKG1, DJI2, DJI3, DRC7, NPL1, SSD6, AFG3, CAM2, CAF4, GUA1, SAF2
Deviant consistency	SLE3	SLE3		
Deviant coverage for solution formula	IDN2, IND2, MLI2, MLI3, NIR2, PHL7, PNG1, CAF2, DJI1, CDI3, CDI5, BIH4			
IIR cases[a]	CRO1, PHL1, COM3, CDI2, GNB1, BIH7			

[a] Individually irrelevant cases, that are non-members of the solution formula and the outcome

Appendix 2.4 Truth table for "no TJ provisions" and five types of context conditions

Row	Conditions					Outcome			
	ATR	REB	GOV	THIRD	CIV	tj	No.	Cons.	Cases
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.500	COM3, PNG1
2	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.500	BIH4, BIH7
3	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.333	CAF2, DJI1, CDI2
4	0	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.333	GNB1, CDI3, CDI5
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	8	0.250	CRO1, IND2, IDN2, MLI2, MLI3, NIR2, PHL1, PHL7
6	1	0	1	1	0	0	10	0.100	BDI3, BDI7, CAM1, COL2, SAL7, SLE1, SLE2, SLE3, SUD6, SUD9
7	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0.000	DJI2, DJI3, DRC7, NPL1, SSD6
8	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	0.000	AFG3, CAM2, CAF4, GUA1, SAF2
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.000	BGD1, IND1, MLI4, UKG1
10	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	0.000	AGO3, DRC5, MOZ1, RWA1
11	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.000	AGO4, MAC1, TAJ1
12	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	0.000	CHA1, COL1, SSD1
13	1	0	1	1	1	0	3	0.000	BDI1, CAF8, LBR7
14	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0.000	DRC2, DRC4
15	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.000	SSD5
16-32						—	—		

Note: The truth table was created via the 'truth table command' in the *QCA* package. — indicates logical remainders. Bold letters imply contradictory cases in kind.

A minimization of the truth table is not possible, since all outcome values have been coded to zero. No truth table row has a consistency higher than 0.5 which means that we cannot deduce a solution formula for the non-inclusion of transitional justice provisions. The model of the five contextual conditions is thus only good for explaining why TJ provisions are included.

3 Robustness Tests

When analyzing data on peace agreements, it is sensible to check for possible hidden clusters within the data. Such clusters can occur along temporal dimensions (such as years, decades), geographic units (such as regions, subnational units), or other substantive lines, such as political parties, or regime types (Oana & Schneider, 2018). In order to check for possible analytical differences, I empirically test whether it is ok to pool cases across different factors of the conflict environment and different conflict issues.

A cluster analysis for the intermediate solution does indeed reveal certain structures around the different factors. The solution formula can be found in each sub-population, but with varying degrees of consistency. For example, the supported accountability approach (ATR*GOV*THIRD) is more sufficient in countries without a colonial legacy and when the agreement does not include provision for peace operations. The same is true for the government-centred approach (reb*GOV). In contrast, the supported inclusivity (GOV*THIRD*CIV) and domestic (reb*third) approaches show perfect consistency and coverage scores across all clusters. The cluster analysis thus reveals some underlying structures, which should be addresses by further research.

Appendix 3.1 Cluster analysis for the intermediate solution (TJ provisions)

	reb*GOV	ATR*GOV*THIRD	GOV*THIRD*CIV	reb*third
Intermediate solution				
Consistencies				
Pooled	0.966	0.947	1.000	1.000
Provisions for PKO	0.875	0.900	1.000	1.000
No provisions for PKO	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Colonial legacy	0.955	0.944	1.000	1.000
No colonial legacy	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Conflict in Europe	1.000	NaN	NaN	1.000
Conflict in Asia	1.000	1.000	NaN	1.000
Conflict in Africa	0.947	0.938	1.000	1.000
Conflict in the Americas	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Coverage				
Pooled	0.549	0.353	0.176	0.275
Provisions for PKO	0.467	0.600	0.133	0.133
No provisions for PKO	0.583	0.250	0.194	0.333
Colonial legacy	0.512	0.415	0.146	0.244
No colonial legacy	0.700	0.100	0.300	0.400
Conflict in Europe	0.333	0.000	0.000	0.333
Conflict in Asia	0.455	0.091	0.000	0.455
Conflict in Africa	0.545	0.455	0.242	0.212
Conflict in the Americas	1.000	0.500	0.250	0.250

Appendix 3.2 Overview of robustness tests for the analysis of context conditions and the inclusion of transitional justice provisions in peace agreements

Model / Change	Cons. / PRI / Coverage	Solution term (relationship of sufficiency for TJ provisions)
Intermediate solution (standard model raw cons. 0.9)	0.975 / 0.975 / 0.765	reb*GOV + reb*third + ATR*GOV*THIRD + GOV*THIRD*CIV → TJALL
Parsimonious solution	0.975 / 0.975 / 0.765	CIV + ATR*GOV + reb*GOV + reb*third → TJALL
Conservative solution	0.975 / 0.975 / 0.765	ATR*GOV*THIRD + reb*gov*~CIV + GOV*THIRD*CIV + atr*reb*third*civ → TJALL
Intermediate solution (higher raw cons. 1)	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.588	reb*third + atr*reb*GOV + GOV*THIRD*CIV + ATR*REB*GOV*THIRD → TJALL
Intermediate solution (lower raw consistency 0.75)	0.938 / 0.938 / 0.882	reb + ATR*GOV*THIRD + GOV*THIRD*CIV → TJALL
	Changing the case selection (sub-populations)	
Peace agreements with provisions for PKO	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.600	M1: reb*third + atr*reb*GOV + ATR*REB*GOV*THIRD + (reb*GOV*CIV) → TJALL M2: reb*third + atr*reb*GOV + ATR*REB*GOV*THIRD + (ATR*GOV*THIRD*CIV) → TJALL
Peace agreements without provisions for PKO	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.778	reb*third + GOV*THIRD → TJALL
Conflicts with colonial legacy	0.968 / 0.968 / 0.732	reb*GOV + reb*third + ATR*GOV*THIRD → TJ4
Conflicts without colonial legacy	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.900	reb*GOV + reb*third + GOV*THIRD*CIV → TJ4
Conflicts in Africa	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.697	atr*reb + reb*GOV*third + GOV*THIRD*CIV + ATR*REB*GOV*THIRD → TJALL
Conflicts in the Americas*	1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000	ATR*reb*GOV*civ + atr*reb*GOV*THIRD*CIV → TJALL
Conflicts in Asia	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.727	reb*GOV + reb*third + REB*THIRD → TJALL
Conflicts in Europe	1.000 / 1.000 / 0.667	reb*GOV + reb*third → TJALL

Overall, the robustness tests confirm the findings of the cluster analysis. The intermediate solution is relatively robust to various changes. However, the robustness tests also reveal that the model is better suited to explain the inclusion of transitional justice provisions in peace agreements that do not include provisions for peacekeeping missions, and which address conflicts without a colonial legacy. The solution terms show the largest discrepancies when it comes to regional subpopulations. While the model covers all negotiation processes in the Americas, it underperforms when it comes to cases in Africa and Europe, where it is only able to explain about 70% and 67% of the negotiation outcomes.

4 References

Oana, Ioana-Elena & Carsten Q. Schneider (2018) SetMethods: an Add-on R Package for Advanced QCA. *The R Journal* 10(1): 507-533.