Supporting Information: Variable Descriptions and Sources

Variable	Explanation	Source
Reserves	Reserves/GDP, reserves in months of imports, and reserves in US dollars	World Development Indicators, World Bank
Financial Crisis	Dichotomous indicators for several crisis types as described in text	Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
IMF Participation Rate	IMF Participation rate (SBA and EFF): Fraction of months during each five-year period that a country operated under an IMF loan program	IMF Finance Department: Lending Arrangements
IMF loan-GDP Ratio	IMF loan-GDP ratio (SBA and EFF)	IMF finance Department: Lending Arrangements GDP : World Development Indicators, World Bank
IMF Loan Approval	IMF loan approval frequency over 5 years (SBA and EFF)	IMF Finance Department: Lending Arrangements
PA, PC, BT	Prior Actions required by the IMF prior to loan disbursement, Performance Criteria, and Benchmarks/Targets	Dreher et al (2015)
Currency Valuation	Index for undervaluation of currency	Rodrik (2008)
Peg	Indicator for pegged exchange rate regime	Reinhart and Rogoff Financial Crises Data (2010)
Import, Export, Trade	Country's total imports or exports (10 billions US dollars); bilateral trade with specific counterpart (% of GDP)	UN Comtrade
Inflation	Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	World Development Indicators, World Bank
GDP Per Capita	GDP per capita (thousands 2002 US dollars)	World Development Indicators, World Bank
GDP	GDP (millions 2002 US dollars)	World Development Indicators, World Bank
OECD	Dummy for OECD membership	OECD
Share of IMF Staff	Share of nationals among IMF economists	IMF Diversity Report, Various Years
Quota Share	Share of IMF quota	IMF Annual Reports, Various Years
Bank Lending	International Positions of Specific-Country Banks by Destination (10 billions US dollars)	BIS, Locational Banking Statistics
UN Affinity	United Nations voting affinity score vis-à-vis specific counterpart	Gartzke (2010)

Supporting Information: Supplementary Regression Tables

Table A1: Political Determinants of IMF Lending and Self-Insurance (Reserves / GDP), Disaggregating the IMF Influence Variable, 1980-2010

	Dependent Variable: Reserves / GDP							
	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit
US Bank Exposure	-0.27*							
	(0.05)							
Europe Bank Exposure		-0.15*						
		(0.03)						
Share of IMF Economists			-0.11*					
			(0.04)					
Quota Share				-0.10*				
				(0.03)				
US UN Affinity					-0.35*			
					(0.17)			
Europe UN Affinity						-0.32		
						(0.19)		
US Trade							-0.03*	
							(0.01)	
Europe Trade								-0.12*
								(0.03)
Constant	3.35*	3.46*	1.24*	1.31*	1.93*	1.99*	1.88*	1.88*
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	742	609	905	906	894	894	874	914

Controls included in the model but not shown in the table: time period dummies. Observations are in five year increments (e.g., 1980-1985, 1985-1990), with reserves measured as a five year average. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the five year period. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Star denotes a coefficient at least two standard errors removed from zero.

Table A2: Disaggregating the IMF Influence Variable for Banking Crises, 1980-2010

	Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis							
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
US Bank Exposure	0.66*							
	(0.23)							
Europe Bank Exposure		0.32*						
		(0.11)						
Share of IMF Economists			0.03					
			(0.25)					
Quota Share				0.31				
				(0.36)				
US UN Affinity					2.01*			
					(0.95)			
Europe UN Affinity						2.64*		
						(0.94)		
US Trade							-0.02	
							(0.04)	
Europe Trade								0.31*
								(0.13)
Observations	404	382	463	463	466	466	452	477

Note: Models include time period and country fixed effects. Observations are in five year increments (e.g., 1980-1985), with crises coded as 1 if any crisis occurs during the period. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the five year period. Star denotes a coefficient at least two standard errors removed from zero.

Table A3: Disaggregating the IMF Influence Variable for Currency Crises, 1980-2010

	Dependent Variable: Currency Crisis							
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
US Bank Exposure	0.57*							
	(0.21)							
Europe Bank Exposure		0.40*						
		(0.12)						
Share of IMF Economists			-0.12					
			(0.26)					
Quota Share				0.07				
				(0.39)				
US UN Affinity					-0.85			
					(0.90)			
Europe UN Affinity						-0.12		
						(0.85)		
US Trade							0.03	
							(0.04)	
Europe Trade								0.26*
								(0.11)
Observations	350	328	411	411	417	417	403	424

Note: Models include time period and country fixed effects. Observations are in five year increments (e.g., 1980-1985), with crises coded as 1 if any crisis occurs during the period. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the five year period. Star denotes a coefficient at least two standard errors removed from zero.

Table A4: IMF Influence and Various Financial Crisis Types, 1980-2010

	Logit: Twin Crisis	Logit: Market Crash	Logit: Inflation Crisis	Logit: Sovereign Debt Crisis	Logit: Any Crisis
IMF Influence (PCA Variable)	0.64* (0.23)	0.71* (0.33)	0.42 (0.74)	-1.48 (1.05)	3.60* (1.57)
GDP	10.52* (5.07)	5.19 (5.65)	0.00 (8.77)	-5.22 (8.20)	23.27 (12.97)
GDP^2	-0.45* (0.22)	-0.13 (0.24)	0.09 (0.36)	0.71 (0.41)	-1.24 (0.72)
GDP Per Capita	0.20 (0.29)	-1.02* (0.40)	-2.53 (2.60)	-12.44* (5.24)	0.89 (0.73)
GDP Per Capita^2	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.18)	0.88 (0.45)	-0.00 (0.01)
Annual Per Capita Growth	-0.22* (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.49* (0.17)	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.20)
Observations	277	212	196	141	153

Note: Models include time period and country fixed effects. Observations are in five year increments (e.g., 1980-1985), with crises coded as 1 if any crisis occurs during the period. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the five year period. Star denotes a coefficient at least two standard errors removed from zero.

Table A5: Bank Exposure and Self-Insurance (Reserves / GDP), 1980-2010

	Dependent Variable: Reserves / GDP					
	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Fixed Effects OLS
US&Europe Bank Exposure	-0.21*	-0.17*	-0.15*	-0.14*	-0.14*	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Japan Bank Exposure	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
GDP		0.03	0.13	0.14	0.08	-0.07
		(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.75)
GDP^2		-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.03
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
GDP Per Capita		0.07*	0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.20*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
GDP Per $Capita^2$		-0.00*	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Annual Per Capita Growth		0.04*	0.03	0.02	0.03*	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
OECD Dummy		-0.44*	-0.28*	-0.23	-0.19	0.51*
		(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Inflation			-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Export			0.14	0.07	-0.21	0.35
			(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.46)
Import			1.12*	1.07*	1.50*	-0.07
			(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.47)
Currency Valuation			0.16	0.16	0.20	-0.22*
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Peg			-0.16*	-0.15	-0.15*	-0.01
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
East Asia				0.26*		
				(0.13)		
Oil Exporter					0.42*	
					(0.18)	
Constant	3.49*	3.49*	2.07	2.08	2.12	1.24
	(0.10)	(0.88)	(1.18)	(1.14)	(1.23)	(4.51)
Observations	609	594	457	457	457	457

Note: Controls included in the models but not shown in the table: time period dummies. Asia and Oil Exporter are omitted from the fixed effects model due to limited temporal variation. Observations are in five year increments (e.g., 1980-1985, 1985-1990), with reserves measured as a five year average. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the five year period. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Star denotes a coefficient at least two standard errors removed from zero. The coefficient for US & Europe Bank Exposure in the final column (Fixed Effects Model with the inclusion of potentially endogenous control variables) is signed in the correct direction but not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table A6: Bank Exposure and Financial Crises, 1980-2010

	Logit: Banking Crisis	Logit: Currency Crisis	Logit: Banking Crisis	Logit: Currency Crisis	Logit: Banking Crisis	Logit: Currency Crisis
US&Europe Bank Exposure	0.71*	0.66*	0.68*	0.44*	0.61*	0.51*
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)
Japan Bank Exposure	-0.18*	-0.12	-0.16*	-0.07	-0.14	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
GDP			2.80	0.42	5.53	2.68
			(3.70)	(4.09)	(4.40)	(5.17)
GDP^2			-0.13	-0.03	-0.25	-0.08
			(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.21)
GDP Per Capita			-0.03	0.43	0.01	0.52*
			(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.26)
GDP Per $Capita^2$			0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Annual Per Capita Growth			-0.14*	-0.21*	-0.13	-0.15
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Inflation					0.64	0.85
					(0.39)	(0.50)
Export					-0.39	-0.69
					(2.35)	(2.61)
Import					2.45	-0.24
					(2.73)	(3.11)
Currency Valuation					-0.52	0.71
					(0.56)	(0.72)
Peg					-0.00	-0.79
					(0.39)	(0.43)
Observations	382	328	365	317	324	281

Note: Models include time period and country fixed effects. Observations are in five year increments (e.g., 1980-1985), with crises coded as 1 if any crisis occurs during the period. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the five year period. Star denotes a coefficient at least two standard errors removed from zero.

Supporting Information: Additional Information for Synthetic Control Method

Table A7: Synthetic Control Weights for Taiwan

COW Country Code	Country Name	Synthetic Control Weight
2	United States of America	0
20	Canada	0
42	Dominican Republic	0
70	Mexico	0
90	Guatemala	0
91	Honduras	0
92	El Salvador	0
94	Costa Rica	0
95	Panama	0
100	Colombia	0
101	Venezuela	0.004
130	Ecuador	0
135	Peru	0
140	Brazil	0
145	Bolivia	0
150	Paraguay	0
155	Chile	0
160	Argentina	0
165	Uruguay	0
200	United Kingdom	0
210	Netherlands	0
211	Belgium	0
220	France	0
230	Spain	0
235	Portugal	0
305	Austria	0
325	Italy	0
350	Greece	0
375	Finland	0
380	Sweden	0
385	Norway	0
390	Denmark	0
437	Ivory Coast	0
452	Ghana	0
475	Nigeria	0
482	Central African Republic	0
501	Kenya	0
551	Zambia	0

552	Zimbabwe	0
600	Morocco	0
615	Algeria	0
616	Tunisia	0
640	Turkey	0.172
651	Egypt	0
732	South Korea	0.332
740	Japan	0.030
750	India	0
780	Sri Lanka	0
800	Thailand	0.419
820	Malaysia	0
830	Singapore	0
840	Philippines	0
850	Indonesia	0
900	Australia	0.044

Note: Synthetic Taiwan most heavily weights Thailand, South Korea, Turkey. The specific country weights are sensitive to the control variables used in the analysis. However, we tried a variety of alternative control variables and combinations as reported in the text, and the substantive results never differed from those reported: Taiwan's reserve accumulation accelerated sharply compared to synthetic Taiwan regardless of which control variables (and hence country weights) were used.

Table A8: Predictor Means Before IMF Expulsion of Taiwan

Variable	Taiwan	Synthetic Taiwan	Average of All Control States
Reserves/GDP (1979)	0.04	0.05	0.07
Reserves/GDP (1975)	0.07	0.07	0.06
Reserves/GDP (1970)	0.08	0.08	0.05
GDP per Capita	1008.17	1008.41	2316.49
Nominal GDP	16609.70	43136.13	83358.51
Nominal GDP Growth (%)	22.98	18.97	15.91
Inflation Rate (%)	7.47	12.63	18.00
Exports	7041.38	5549.58	9855.38
Imports	6748.90	6767.36	10987.08
Undervaluation	0.04	0.09	0.02
Peg	0.90	0.68	0.54
OECD Dummy	0	0.24	0.33
East Asia Dummy	1	0.78	0.13

Note: The predictor variables for Taiwan and synthetic Taiwan are well balanced, particularly when compared to the average of all control states. Synthetic Taiwan has a higher nominal GDP than Taiwan, but GDP/capita is essentially identical (i.e. the difference is entirely attributable to the somewhat larger population size of synthetic Taiwan). We also reran the synthetic control method with fewer control variables, which produces near-identical balance at the expense of less information used to estimate synthetic Taiwan: this produces substantive results essentially identical to those reported, i.e. a large gap in reserves after 1980 between Taiwan and synthetic Taiwan.

Figure A1: Placebo Test with Treatment at 1971, the Year of Taiwan's Expulsion from the United Nations



Note: In this figure, the synthetic control method is applied with the treatment year set to 1971, the year Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations. This is a placebo test to examine if Taiwan's international isolation contributed to reserve accumulation. As the figure shows, Taiwan's reserves do not diverge from synthetic Taiwan when the treatment is set to 1971. It is only in 1980 that reserves begin to diverge. This suggests that the beginning of international isolation was not an important turning point for Taiwan's reserve accumulation. We also tried various other placebo treatment years and obtained similar results.