Replication:
A matter of representation: spatial voting and inconsistent policy preferences

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

Figure 1: Parameter estimates for policy-weighted model using perceived (Black) and mean distance (Grey) to candidate platform. Figure shows point estimates as well as 95% and 99% confidence intervals for the direct effect of policy distance and interaction effect with inconsistency.



Figure 2: Marginal effect of policy distance on difference in expected utility for varying levels of inconsistency. The left panel shows the marginal effect for mean candidate positions, the right panel for perceived candidate distance. The lines on the x-axis show the distribution of inconsistency in the sample.



Figure 3: Probability to vote for Obama by policy distance to Obama minus distance to McCain simulated from mean platform model. The left panel shows the voting probabilities for a respondent with consistent policy preferences (value correspondent to the median value in the sample). The right panel shows the voting probabilities for respondent with inconsistent policy preferences (value correspondent to the 95 % quantile in the sample).



Figure 4: Average expected distance for varying degrees of inconsistency. The x-axis shows the expected distance to a respondent's representative. Values of zero imply that a voter is expected to share the same position with the candidate she intends to vote for. Decreasing values indicate a stronger expected distance.