Data Appendix to accompany
Layna Mosley and Saika Uno,
"Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top?
Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights"
Comparative Political Studies 2007 40: 923-948.
[Abstract] [PDF]

- These files (available in Excel and Stata format) provide replication data for the above article. These analyses provide annual observations for 90 developing nations (listed below) for 1985-2002. There are quite a few country-years included in the dataset, but not used in the estimations reported in the CPS paper, because of missing data; the attached files provide labor rights scores for those cases, and data on other independent variables, as available. We plan to make available a broader set of labor rights data (covering all countries for the same period, with plans to extend the indicator to include 2003 and 2004) available in the near future.

- When using data from this dataset, please cite both the dataset and, where appropriate, the original source (i.e. the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*). Please cite this dataset as Layna Mosley and Saika Uno, 2007. Collective Labor Rights Dataset, University of North Carolina and University of Notre Dame.

- We ask that scholars using the labor rights data in conference papers and publications to send a copy of the papers or publications via email (mailto:mosley@unc.edu). This also will allow us to inform users of this dataset of expansions to and updates for the data.

- For questions regarding the coding of the collective labor rights indicator, or other variables in the dataset, please contact Layna Mosley, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina (mailto:mosley@unc.edu).

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Variable Names and Descriptions

Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.

AsiaandPacific: Dichotomous variable, coded 1 for Asian and Pacific region nations, zero otherwise.

Caribbean: Dichotomous variable, coded 1 for Caribbean nations, zero otherwise.

Civil War*:* Dummy variable, with 1 indicating participation in war within states, taken from the Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 1.1). The original data has three categories for the intensity of conflict (1=minor, 2= intermediate, and 3=war). Recoded so that the variable has a value of 1 if an observation has a score of either 2 or 3 on either type of conflict, i.e., internal or internationalized internal conflict. See http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/.

Country Number: Country number; used in Stata to *tsset* data.

Democracy: Combined Polity scale, with a range of –10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy), taken from the Polity IV database. See www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity.

Economic Peers' Practices: The mean score of every other country in the same income per capita decile, calculated annually. Given the theoretical reasoning behind this variable (countries compete with other countries in the same income category, regardless of their geographic location), we generated income deciles using all countries of the world for which there are data on per capita income, rather than only developing (non-OECD, non-former Soviet Union) nations. The table indicates the countries included in each decile, as well as the mean income for that decile. Countries listed in bold are those included in the reported statistical analyses.

Income Decile	Countries (bold if in reported model)	Average Income per Capita
1	**Burundi, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Ethiopia,** Eritrea, **Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone**, Tajikistan, **Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia**	$654
2	**Benin**, **Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia,** Haiti, **Kenya,** Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, **Mozambique, Nepal**, **Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda**	$1059
3	**Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros,** Djibouti, **Ghana, Guinea,** Laos, **Mauritania, Mongolia, Pakistan,** Solomon Islands, **Sudan,** Uzbekistan, **Vietnam**	$1563
4	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, **Ecuador, Egypt,** Georgia, Honduras, **India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lesotho, Nicaragua,** Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, **Syria,** Vanuatu	$2377
5	Albania, Cape Verde**, China,** El Salvador, Fiji, **Guatemala,** Guyana, **Jordan,** Lebanon, Paraguay, **Peru,** Philippines, **Swaziland,** Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Venezuela	$3487
6	**Algeria,** Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, **Colombia,** Dominica, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Namibia, Panama, Romania, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, **Turkey,** Western Samoa	$4656
7	**Botswana,** Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, **Costa Rica,** Dominican Republic, Grenada, **Iran,** Latvia, Malaysia, **Mexico**, Russia, **Thailand,** Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga, **Tunisia, Uruguay**	$6137
8	Antigua and Barbuda, **Argentina,** Barbados, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kuwait, Lithuania, **Mauritius,** Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, **South Africa,** St. Kitts	$9675
9	Bahamas, Bahrain, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, New Zealand, Portugal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom	$15667
10	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United States	$22790

Employment in Industry: Employment (proportion of total employees) in the industrial sector as a percent of total employment. Industry includes mining and quarrying (including oil production), manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction, corresponding to major ISIC divisions 2-5 (ISIC revision 2).

External Debt: Total debt owed to nonresidents that is repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services, as a percentage of GDP. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly-guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt.

FDI Flows: Foreign direct investment, defined as net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, as a percentage of GDP.

FDI Stock: Existing stock of foreign direct investment, as a percentage of GDP, taken from UNCTAD's FDI Statistics database, available from http://www.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/FDIstats_ files/FDIstats.htm.

Growth Rate: Annual change in GDP per capita.

Income: Gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity, transformed as a natural logarithm.

Labor Rights: Mosley-Uno measure of collective labor rights, coded as described in text and below. Higher scores indicate better labor rights outcomes.

Latin America: Dummy variable, coded 1 for Latin American countries (Central and South America), zero otherwise.

NGOs: The total number of human rights NGOs involved in a country (internally) in a given year, from Human Rights Internet's *Master List* of organizations. Data are collected for 1986, 1991, 1994 and 2000 (years in the sample for which the *Master List* is available); intervening years are interpolated; data for 2001 and 2002 are extrapolated. Variable is transformed as a natural logarithm.

North Africa Middle East: Dummy variable, coded 1 for North Africa/Middle East countries, zero otherwise.

Population: Calculated based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, except for refugees; natural logarithm.

PLP (Potential Labor Power): The ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in an economy, multiplied by the inverse of a measure of surplus labor. Higher values indicate tight labor markets and a greater proportion of skilled workers. From Rudra (2002).

Regional Practices: The mean score of every other country in the same geographic region, calculated annually. Regions are defined as in Figure 1 of the text.

SubSaharanAfrica: Dummy variable, coded 1 for Sub-Saharan Africa nations, zero otherwise.

Trade: Trade in goods (the sum of merchandise exports and imports), as a percentage of GDP.

Nations included in sample, main model

Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
C. African Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Dem. Rep.)
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Labor Rights
Variable Information

The labor rights indicator measures the level of collective labor rights provision and observation for each country-year. It focuses on the rights of workers to act collectively – to form unions, to bargain collectively, and to strike – rather than on individual labor rights or working conditions. The coding of this variable is based on the template developed by David Kucera (included below). Our assessments of violations of collective labor rights are drawn from three sources (as are Kucera's): the U.S. State Department annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*; reports from the International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) and the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA); and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights*.

The State Department's *Country Reports* are initially drafted by embassy staff in each country, on the basis of information from government officials, opposition parties, human rights activists, academics and various others. These drafts are reviewed (and often revised) by staff of the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, with further input from other State Department staff and outside experts (Poe et al 2001). The reports have become more detailed over time; contemporary reports focus on six types of human rights – respect for personal integrity; respect for civil liberties; respect for political rights; government attitudes regarding international or NGO investigation of alleged human rights violations; discrimination, societal abuses, and trafficking in persons; and worker rights. In the early years of our sample, labor rights issues were included in Section 2 (civil liberties); more recently, they are treated in Section 6 (worker rights), and particularly in 6a (freedom of association); 6b (the right to bargain collectively and strike); and 6(f) export processing zones. The remainder of Section 6 deals with forced labor (c), child labor (d), and acceptable conditions of work (e).

Both the ILO's CEACR and the CFA provide information based on regular reports from governments as well as (potentially) complaints filed by workers' organizations, employers' organizations, or other governments. The ILO mandates that governments submit reports biennially on the steps they have taken to implement any of the eight core labor rights-related conventions they have ratified. These reports also are submitted to national workers' and employers' organizations, which may comment on the reports – or on their governments' application of the conventions generally. The CEACR was established to examine these reports; it is made up of twenty independent experts (mostly in the area of labor law), appointed by the ILO's Governing Body (its executive committee) for three year terms. Committee members, who are drawn from a variety of regions, are charged with offering technical, unbiased evaluations of governments' applications of international standards. The CEACR publishes an annual report, which contains general comments about member states' behavior and summarizes the Committee's observations on national applications of core labor standards. In some cases, the Committee also makes direct requests to member governments for additional information regarding their implementation of core conventions.

In addition, the ILO constitution allows any workers' or employers' organization to bring complaints ("representations") against member states regarding their implementation of a ratified Convention. In the case of freedom of association, government ratification is not required for a

complaint to be lodged. Similarly, under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, governments may bring complaints against other governments – but if and only if the complainant government has ratified the convention in question. Throughout the life of the ILO, neither Article 24 nor Article 26 has been used very frequently; during the ILO's existence, a total of 11 Commissions of Inquiry – established via Article 26, when a member has been persistently accused of committing serious violations – have been established.

The CFA is more widely utilized when it comes to reporting and addressing violations of core labor standards. During the last fifty-plus years, the CFA has examined over 2,300 cases, and its annual caseload has expanded markedly since the 1980s (ILO 2005). It is a Governing Body committee, comprised of three representatives from governments, employers and workers, for nine total members (plus an independent chairperson). The CFA accepts complaints regarding freedom of association violations from workers' or employers' organizations in the relevant country; from international associations of workers and employers, if one of them is involved in the alleged violation, and from international organizations of employers or workers with consultative status at the ILO. CFA complaints may be filed regardless of whether the targeted government has ratified Conventions 87 (freedom of association) and 98 (collective bargaining). When complaints are lodged, the CFA first decides whether to receive them; if it does so, the CFA then engages in a dialogue with the government, in order to establish the facts of the case. If the CFA finds that a violation has occurred, it promulgates a report and recommends means of resolving the situation. In such cases, the CFA asks governments to report on whether and how the violation has been addressed; in some circumstances, the CFA also may proposed a "direct contacts" mission to the country.

The ICFTU was the major peak association of trade unions, an international confederation of national trade union associations. In October 2006, it was officially dissolved; its affiliates, along with those of the former World Confederation of Labour (WCL) formed a new body, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Prior to the formation of the ITUC, the ICFTU Included 241 affiliated organizations in 156 territories and countries; the ITUC's membership currently includes 309 affiliated organizations. The ICFTU was financed by fees from member associations, as well as by ad-hoc contributions for specific projects and issues. Beginning in 1984, the ICFTU issued an annual[1] *Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights,* which focuses on collective labor rights, including both the lack of legal rights (or many legal barriers to organization), violations of rights in practice (such as dismissals on the basis of human rights), and other interference with the exercise of trade union rights (including the murder, disappearance or detention of trade unionists). The reports are based on information reported by national union centers (and their local affiliates), as well as by locally-active NGOs; ICFTU staff sometimes supplement this information with data from country visits. The *Survey* has, like the State Department *Country Reports*, expanded in length over time, reflecting greater country coverage and greater attention to (if not actual violations of) trade union rights. The 2004 *Survey*, for instance, summarized violations in 134 countries for calendar year 2003.

While each set of reports has potential shortcomings – for instance, ICFTU reports do not

[1] ICFTU *Surveys* initially covered overlapping two year periods (1983/1984, 1984/1985 and 1985/1986). Beginning with the fourth survey (published in 1986, covering violations in 1985), the *Surveys* reviewed violations within a single year.

cover every country in every year, as they rely on reporting from national sources – the use of multiple sources helps to reduce bias. Single sources may vary over time in their geographic coverage, and in the attention given to certain types of violations. Single sources also may be prejudiced. Likewise, we might worry that – given donor interest, access to information and local activists, and the level of political openness – transnational advocacy networks pay more attention to violations in some countries than in others. Although it is impossible to remove all potential biases in reports of labor rights violations, the use of multiple sources helps to reduce many of these biases. Furthermore, we code information from ICFTU reports (which tend to be the most pro-labor of our sources) only when the reported violations are cited as "credible" or are confirmed by outside sources.

The logic behind this indicator of collective labor rights is similar to that guiding Böhning's (2005) assessments, in that it aims to derive a set of indicators in a way that is methodologically transparent, that includes elements of both legal protection and actual provision of rights, and in that it seeks indicators that allow for comparisons across cases (his measure covers approximately 160 countries, with annual observations for the 1985-2004 period). Böhning is ultimately interested in deriving a broader measure of core labor rights (including all four dimensions designated by the ILO), although he also discusses each of the four constituent elements, including freedom of association. An important way in which our data depart from his, however, is its sources: Böhning eschews the use of data from national governments or non-governmental organizations, "for fear that biases may be associated with them" (p. 22). He relies, instead, on information reported by the ILO. This information includes the ratification of and reporting on core ILO conventions (to measure the legal aspect of rights) as well as problems identified and investigated (direct requests, negative observations, and interim reports) by the CEACR and CFA. While Böhning's concerns about bias are justified, the use of multiple sources helps to address them. And, beyond the problems with ratification-based measures of rights, the use of CEACR and CFA observations alone may create selection problems. If the CFA does not investigate some subset of complaints, or if governments, NGOs and labor unions elect (for reasons related to technical capacity or to domestic political considerations) not to file complaints, the set of cases generated will be biased.

Kucera's template records thirty-seven types of violations of labor rights, in six categories: freedom of association and collective bargaining-related liberties; the right to establish and join worker and union organizations; other union activities; the right to bargain collectively; the right to strike; and rights in export processing zones. (In our data, these six components are positively and often strongly correlated with one another; factor analysis of scores by component indicates a strong loading on a single dimension). In each of these broad categories, specific violations include the absence of legal rights, limitations on legal rights, and the violations of legal rights by government agents or employers. On the basis of expert assessments, Kucera's methodology assigns a weighting to each violation, with more serious violations (e.g. general prohibitions on unions) weighted more heavily than others (e.g. a requirement of previous authorization in order for a union to join a confederation of unions).

For each country-year, we read reports described above. When a country displays a violation of labor rights for one of the 37 dimensions listed in the template, we assign a score of "1" for that category and year. If no violation is reported for a given category and year, we assign a score of zero. We then multiply these scores by the weighting for each category; the sum of these category scores provides the annual measure of labor rights violations. If a violation is recorded more than once in a source, or in multiple sources, the maximum score per category remains one. In some

instances, the reports refer to violations that were identified in previous years (and, usually, in previous reports). We code these violations for a given year *only when* the report notes that the earlier violation continues to occur. Otherwise, we assume that previous years' reports capture the violation for the year in which it occurs.

Possible scores on the labor standards indicator, then, range from zero to 76.5. In practice, however, no country exhibits violations in every category of labor rights, and maximum scores are in the mid-30s. Higher values of the labor rights indicator, then, indicate *worse* collective labor rights, and lower values represent greater respect for such rights. Scores of zero, then, indicate no recorded violations, while scores in the mid-30s indicate the worst cases. For ease of presentation, we reverse the scale of the labor rights indicator, so that higher values indicate *better* collective labor rights, and lower values represent less respect for such rights. Scores of zero, then, indicate the worst cases, while scores in the mid-30s indicate few or no violations.

While the coding scheme does not distinguish between single and multiple violations within the same category, and while most of our sources focus their reporting on workers in the formal rather than the informal sector (see National Research Council 2004), our measure allows us to capture an overall picture of variations in labor rights across countries and over time. Kucera's weightings of violations have little effect on the overall scores: the correlation between the weighted scores and an index of unweighted scores (where each category of violations is given a weight of "1") is .89 for the global sample of countries and .87 for developing nations. Factor analyses indicate that the individual sources do, in fact, capture the same underlying dimension: when we analyze scores by source (one per country year for ILO, State Department and ICFTU), all three scores load onto a single factor. This remains true whether we use the entire sample (all countries), only non-OECD countries, or only non-OECD and non-Eastern European/former Soviet Union nations.

Labor Standards Coding Template

From Kucera 2002

Mosley and Uno coding notes are in italics.

Category	Description	Weight, if observed
	Freedom of association/collective bargaining related liberties	
1	Murder or disappearance of union members or organizers	2
2	Other violence against union members or organizers	2
3	Arrest, detention, imprisonment, or forced exile for union membership or activities	2
4	Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, free opinion, free expression	2
5	Seizure or destruction of union premises or property	2
	Right to establish and join union and worker organizations	
6	General prohibitions	10
7	General absence resulting from socio-economic breakdown	10
8	Previous authorization requirements. *Does not include requirements that unions register with governments, unless these requirements are deemed onerous by the ILO.*	1.5
9	Employment conditional on non-membership in union	1.5
10	Dismissal or suspension for union membership or activities. *Includes dismissal for strike activities.*	1.5
11	Interference of employers (attempts to dominate unions)	1.5
12	Dissolution or suspension of union by administrative authority	2
13	Only workers' committees and labor councils permitted	2
14	Only state-sponsored or other single unions permitted. *Includes allowing only one union per industry or sector.*	1.5
15	Exclusion of tradable/industrial sectors from union membership	2
16	Exclusion of other sectors or workers from union membership. *Includes exclusion of public sector workers from union membership. Excluding "essential services" is acceptable, provided the definition of "essential services" is not excessively broad (i.e. following ILO guidelines, limitations on armed forces' union membership are acceptable).*	2
17	Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition	1.5
18	(No) Right to establish and join federations or confederations of unions	1.5
19	Previous authorization requirements regarding above row	1
	Other union activities	
20	(No) right to elect representatives in full freedom. *Includes requirement that union leaders must work full time in a given industry.*	1.5
21	(No) right to establish constitutions and rules	1.5
22	General prohibition of union/federation participation in political activities. *Includes limits on union contributions to political parties.*	1.5
23	(N) Union control of finances. *Includes situations in which unions receive a substantial portion of financing from government sources, or rules that unions may not*	1.5

Category	Description	Weight, if observed
	receive financial contributions from abroad or from certain groups.	
	Right to collectively bargain	
24	General prohibitions	10
25	Prior approval by authorities of collective agreements	1.5
26	Compulsory binding arbitration. *Includes systems in which compulsory binding arbitration is necessary before a (legal) strike may be called.*	1.5
27	Intervention of authorities. *Includes unilateral setting of wages by authorities.*	1.5
28	Scope of collective bargaining restricted by non-state employers	1.5
29	Exclusion of tradable/industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain	1.75
30	Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to collectively bargain. *Includes the exclusion of civil servants or all public sector workers. Excluding "essential services" is acceptable, provided the definition of "essential services" is not excessively broad.*	1.75
31	Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition. *Includes "no legal right" to bargain collectively (but no legal prohibition on doing so).*	1.5
	Right to strike	
32	General prohibitions	2
33	Previous authorization required by authorities. *Includes requirement for official approval prior to strike. A requirement to notify officials prior to a strike is not coded as a violation.*	1.5
34	Exclusion of tradable/industrial sectors from right to strike	1.5
35	Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to strike. *Includes the exclusion of civil servants or all public sector workers. Excluding "essential services" is acceptable, provided the definition of "essential services" is not excessively broad.*	1.5
36	Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition	1.5
	Export processing zones	
37	Restricted Rights in EPZs. *Includes export processing zones, free trade zones, and/or special economic zones.*	2
	Total Score	

Sources used: ICFTU, US State Dept, ILO. Template and methodology are adapted from Kucera (2002).

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