Immigration and International Law: Online Appendices

Appendix A: Extensions and Robustness Checks

The following pages display additional information and robustness checks as discussed in the text and include

- Table A1 replicates table 1 model 2 to include the ratio of the receiving state's GDP per capita to the sending state's as in Chilton and Posner (2017) and splines instead the years since treaty variable squared and cubed.
- Table A2 replicates table 1 using a Markov transition model and interacting the independent variables with an indicator for whether a treaty was in force in the previous year (value of 1) or not (value of 0) to understand treaty onset and persistence.
- Table A3 replicates table 1 but does not drop the years in which a treaty was in force.
- Table A4 replicates table 1 but includes other measures of remoteness.
- Table A5 replicates table 1 model 2 to include immigration policy as coded by Peters (2015) and dyadic immigrant flow and stock data from Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets (2014).
- Table A6 replicates table 1 model 2 using different types of logits. Model 1 is the rare events logit for reference and model 2 is a logit.
- Table A7 replicates both model 1 and model 2 of table 1 including both originating treaties and amending or supplemental treaties.
- Figures A1–A3 display the results from the synthetic case comparison for a treaty's signing.
- Figures A4–A7 display the results from the synthetic case comparison for a treaty's end.

Table A1: Robustness checks for logistic regressions testing the hypotheses

DV: Originating Treaties	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Labor Force Participation (RS; 1yr lag)	5.86***	5.55***	5.69***	5.43***
	(0.81)	(0.86)	(0.80)	(0.87)
Remote (RS)	0.44**	1.05***	0.49**	1.09***
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	1.05***	0.96***	1.10***	1.05***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.07***	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP (RS; logged)	0.33***	0.30***	0.35***	0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.27***	0.22***	0.29***	0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ratio of GDP per capita (RS/SS)	-0.01	-0.01		
	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Econ/Aid treaty		0.90***		0.92***
		(0.20)		(0.20)
Anocracy (RS)		-0.31		-0.43
		(0.66)		(0.67)
Democracy (RS)		0.68		0.59
		(0.69)		(0.70)
Democratizing (RS)		0.34		0.43
		(0.27)		(0.28)
Veto players (RS)		2.68***		2.78***
		(0.70)		(0.70)
Veto players*Democracy (RS)		-2.75**		-2.91**
		(0.93)		(0.95)
Exec Constraints (RS)		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Same colonial system		0.73***		0.74***
		(0.18)		(0.18)
Minimum Distance		-0.16***		-0.16***
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Years Since Treaty	-0.41***	-0.38***	-0.23***	-0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years Since Treaty Squared	0.01***	0.01***		
	(0.00)	(0.00)		
Years Since Treaty Cubed	-0.00***	-0.00***		
	(0.00)	(0.00)		
Spline 1			0.00	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Spline 2			-0.00***	-0.00***
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Spline 3			0.00***	0.00***
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-14.64***	-13.86***	-16.01***	-15.15***
	(0.70)	(0.93)	(0.71)	(0.94)
Observations	324,581	317,988	324,581	317,988

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See the text for more details on the variables.

Table A2: Markov transition model testing the hypotheses for onset and persistence

DV: Originating Treaties	(1)		(2)	
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	0.33^{+}	(0.18)	0.56**	(0.20)
Remote (RS)	-0.24***	(0.04)	0.07	(0.05)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	0.24***	(0.02)	0.15***	(0.03)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.04***	0.00	0.04***	0.00
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.04***	0.00	-0.03***	0.00
GDP (RS; logged)	0.06***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.06***	(0.01)	0.06***	(0.01)
Econ/Aid treaty			0.34***	(0.07)
Anocracy (RS)			0.02	(0.21)
Democracy (RS)			0.3	(0.19)
Democratizing (RS)			-0.05	(0.08)
Veto players			0.07	(0.37)
Veto players*Democracy			0.36	(0.40)
Exec Constraints RS			0	0.00
Same colonial system			0.29***	(0.07)
Minimum Distance			-0.08***	(0.01)
Coefficients for Persistence When Treaty is In Force				
Treaty in force	6.50***	(0.55)	86.42***	(9.85)
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	-0.15	(0.68)	-1.24^{+}	(0.70)
Remote (RS)	0.27^{+}	(0.14)	0.41^{+}	(0.22)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	-0.45***	(0.08)	-0.38***	(0.10)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	-0.03**	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Employment Growth (SS)	0.01	(0.02)	0.01	(0.02)
GDP (RS; logged)	-0.03	(0.03)	0.05	(0.03)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.04	(0.03)	0.05^{+}	(0.03)
Econ/Aid treaty			-0.94***	(0.14)
Anocracy (RS)			-81.98***	(10.06)
Democracy (RS)			-86.85***	(10.71)
Democratizing (RS)			1.84***	(0.48)
Veto players			3.64	(2.43)
Veto players*Democracy			-4.33^{+}	(2.41)
Exec Constraints RS			0.89***	(0.11)
Same colonial system			-0.16	(0.18)
Minimum Distance			0.04*	(0.02)
Constant	-5.49***	(0.16)	-5.56***	(0.24)
Observations	334471		327868	

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See the text for more details on the variables.

Table A3: Logistic regressions testing the hypotheses without dropping years in which treaty is in force

DV: Originating Treaties	(1)		(2)	
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	5.00***	(0.70)	4.70***	(0.75)
Remote (RS)	0.23	(0.14)	0.70***	(0.16)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	0.73***	(0.10)	0.60***	(0.11)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.07***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.12***	(0.02)	-0.11***	(0.02)
GDP (RS; logged)	0.28***	(0.03)	0.24***	(0.04)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.21***	(0.03)	0.17***	(0.03)
Econ/Aid treaty			0.95***	(0.18)
Anocracy (RS)			-0.00	(0.64)
Democracy (RS)			0.84	(0.66)
Democratizing (RS)			0.17	(0.25)
Veto players			1.76*	(0.70)
Veto players*Democracy			-1.71^{+}	(0.88)
Exec Constraints RS			-0.01	(0.01)
Same colonial system			0.82***	(0.15)
Minimum Distance			-0.13***	(0.02)
Years Since Treaty	-0.30***	(0.03)	-0.27***	(0.03)
Years Since Treaty Squared	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
Years Since Treaty Cubed	-0.00***	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)
Constant	-13.20***	(0.57)	-12.61***	(0.87)
Observations	334471		327868	

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See the text for more details on the variables.

Table A4: Logistic regressions with different cut points for remoteness

DV: Originating Treaties	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	5.33***	5.40***	5.82***	5.88***	5.63***	5.49***
	(0.85)	(0.89)	(0.92)	(1.02)	(0.92)	(0.95)
Remote (RS; 50%)	-0.05	0.42*				
	(0.15)	(0.18)				
Remote (RS; 90%)			1.04***	1.79***		
			(0.17)	(0.22)		
Mean distance from all states (RS)					-1.25***	-1.00***
					(0.22)	(0.25)
Mean distance from all states^2 (RS)					0.09***	0.08***
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	0.90***	0.84***	0.89***	0.75***	0.88***	0.82***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP (RS; logged)	0.34***	0.28***	0.36***	0.36***	0.39***	0.38***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.28***	0.24***	0.28***	0.24***	0.28***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Econ/Aid treaty		0.88***		0.83***		0.86***
		(0.20)		(0.20)		(0.20)
Anocracy (RS)		-0.21		0.02		-0.22
		(0.67)		(0.67)		(0.67)
Democracy (RS)		0.27		0.27		0.23
		(0.69)		(0.71)		(0.70)
Democratizing (RS)		0.45		0.55$^+$		0.41
		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.28)
Veto players		2.11**		1.81**		2.46***
		(0.66)		(0.67)		(0.69)
Veto players*Democracy		-1.56$^+$		-1.69$^+$		-1.77*
		(0.83)		(0.90)		(0.90)
Exec Constraints RS		-0.01		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Same colonial system		0.86***		0.69***		0.61**
		(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.19)
Minimum Distance		-0.14***		-0.16***		-0.18***
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Years Since Treaty	-0.41***	-0.38***	-0.42***	-0.39***	-0.41***	-0.37***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Years Since Treaty Squared	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Years Since Treaty Cubed	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-14.29***	-13.50***	-14.79***	-14.06***	-10.79***	-11.32***
	(0.69)	(0.96)	(0.73)	(0.98)	(1.11)	(1.30)
Observations	324581	317988	324581	317988	324581	317988

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See the text for more details on the variables.

Table A5: Logistic regressions examining extensions to the model

DV: Originating Treaties	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	2.50	3.12^{+}	4.83^{+}	5.15^{+}	2.55	3.40
	(1.82)	(1.87)	(2.66)	(2.88)	(1.95)	(2.09)
Remote (RS)	0.13	0.61*	2.06***	1.58***	1.58***	0.68
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.42)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	1.42***	1.41***	2.33***	2.36***	2.36***	2.31***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.09***	0.10***	-0.06	-0.11	-0.10	-0.15
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.12***	-0.11***	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Immigration Policy (1yr lag)	0.93***	0.86***				
	(0.18)	(0.21)				
Dyadic Immigrant Flow (logged; 1 yr lag)			0.12	0.24		
			(0.10)	(0.15)		
Dyadic Immigrant Stock (logged; 1 yr lag)					-0.21^{+}	-0.30**
					(0.11)	(0.11)
GDP (RS; logged)	0.29***	0.19*	0.19	0.15	0.49***	0.60***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.12)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.27***	0.21***	-0.04	0.00	0.35^{+}	0.52**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Econ/Aid treaty		1.16***				
		(0.21)				
Anocracy (RS)		-0.43				
		(0.66)				
Democracy (RS)		-0.02				
		(0.73)				
Democratizing (RS)		0.25				
		(0.38)				
Veto players		3.77***				
		(0.81)				
Veto players*Democracy		-3.28**				
		(1.15)				
Exec Constraints RS		-0.01				
		(0.01)				
Same colonial system		0.53**		-0.24		1.20*
		(0.20)		(0.98)		(0.60)
Minimum Distance		-0.12***		0.13**		0.13**
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Years Since Treaty	-0.39***	-0.36***	-0.35^{+}	-0.40^{+}	-0.32*	-0.34*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Years Since Treaty Squared	0.01***	0.01***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Years Since Treaty Cubed	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-13.11***	-11.66***	-14.39***	-15.24***	-19.34***	-22.24***
	(1.62)	(1.70)	(2.91)	(2.97)	(3.57)	(3.43)
Observations	94963	93892	19137	19137	24891	24891

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See the text for more details on the variables.

Table A6: Logistic regressions testing the hypotheses using different Logistic Models

DV: Originating Treaties	(1) Rare Events Logit		(2) Logit	
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	5.46***	(0.86)	5.48***	(0.86)
Remote (RS)	1.05***	(0.20)	1.04***	(0.20)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	0.93***	(0.14)	0.94***	(0.14)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.08***	(0.02)	0.08***	(0.02)
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.11***	(0.02)	-0.11***	(0.02)
GDP (RS; logged)	0.30***	(0.04)	0.30***	(0.04)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.23***	(0.04)	0.23***	(0.04)
Econ/Aid treaty	0.89***	(0.20)	0.89***	(0.20)
Anocracy (RS)	-0.32	(0.66)	-0.28	(0.66)
Democracy (RS)	0.67	(0.69)	0.72	(0.69)
Democratizing (RS)	0.34	(0.27)	0.33	(0.27)
Veto players	2.70***	(0.70)	2.73***	(0.70)
Veto players*Democracy	-2.76**	(0.93)	-2.79**	(0.93)
Exec Constraints RS	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)
Same colonial system	0.73***	(0.18)	0.73***	(0.18)
Minimum Distance	-0.16***	(0.03)	-0.16***	(0.03)
Years Since Treaty	-0.37***	(0.04)	-0.38***	(0.04)
Years Since Treaty Squared	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
Years Since Treaty Cubed	-0.00***	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)
Constant	-13.91***	(0.93)	-14.03***	(0.93)
Observations	317988		317988	

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
See the text for more details on the variables.

Table A7: Logistic regressions testing the hypotheses on both originating and amending/ supplemental treaties

DV: All Treaties	(1)		(2)	
Reserve Pool of Labor (RS; 1yr lag)	5.26***	(0.78)	4.72***	(0.90)
Remote (RS)	0.54**	(0.17)	1.11***	(0.20)
Productivity (RS; logged; 1yr lag)	1.10***	(0.12)	1.07***	(0.14)
Years of Schooling (SS; interpolated)	0.07***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)
Employment Growth (SS)	-0.13***	(0.02)	-0.12***	(0.02)
GDP (RS; logged)	0.35***	(0.04)	0.31***	(0.04)
GDP (SS; logged)	0.35***	(0.04)	0.30***	(0.04)
Econ/Aid treaty			0.77***	(0.20)
Anocracy (RS)			-0.45	(0.51)
Democracy (RS)			0.40	(0.58)
Democratizing (RS)			0.39	(0.24)
Veto players			2.73***	(0.62)
Veto players*Democracy			-2.62**	(0.89)
Exec Constraints RS			-0.00	(0.01)
Same colonial system			0.57**	(0.18)
Minimum Distance			-0.14***	(0.03)
Years Since Treaty	-0.51***	(0.05)	-0.48***	(0.05)
Years Since Treaty Squared	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
Years Since Treaty Cubed	-0.00***	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)
Constant	-14.82***	(0.70)	-13.75***	(0.86)
Observations	324673		318080	

Standard errors clustered by dyads in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

See the text for more details on the variables.

Figure A1: Treaties that Led to a Great Increase in Migrant Flows from the Sending State



Figure A2: Treaties that Led to an Increase in Migrant Flows from the Sending State



Figure A3: Treaties that Led to Little Increase or Delayed Increase in Migrant Flows from the Sending State



Figure A4: Abrogation of a Treaty that Led to a Great Decrease in Migrant Flows from the Sending State



Figure A5: Abrogation of a Treaty that Led to a Decrease in Migrant Flows from the Sending State



Figure A6: Abrogation of a Treaty that Did Not Lead to a Decrease in Migrant Flows from the Sending State

Figure A7: Abrogation of a Treaty that Reflected the New Status Quo?



Appendix B: Coding of Treaties

Compilation of the Dataset

The set of treaties was compiled from several sources. The United Nations Treaty Collection (*UNTC*; 2011) was searched using the terms "immigration," "migration," and "labor." The World Treaty Index was also searched using the term "labor" (Bommarito, Katz and Poast 2011; Rohn 1983). Treaty documents are not available from the World Treaty Index; where possible, I found copies of the treaty in the UNTC. Treaties listed in the World Treaty Index but not in the UNTC, therefore, we included only if they were bilateral and clearly about migrant labor. I also examined all bilateral treaties in the IOM's International Migration Law Database (2011). The IOM database includes text of the treaties; again only those bilateral treaties for migrant labor were included. The OECD's (2004) "Migration for Employment: Bilateral Agreements at a Crossroads" provided an partial list of treaties in OECD states. References to treaties from several secondary sources were included if they were about a bilateral labor migration treaty.[1] Finally, Chilton and Posner (2017) have created a similar dataset using some of the same sources. I incorporated their data with mine and found we had 220 treaties in common; they had 353 treaties that were not in my dataset; and I had 207 treaties that were not in their dataset.[2] Overall, there was much overlap between the sources. In all, there are 779 treaties in the dataset; nonetheless, the data is likely an undercount of BLAs as many countries do not report them to the UNTC or another international organization.

For all treaties in the dataset, the year of the treaty is the year the treaty is signed. We also know when some, but not all, treaties were formally abrogated from the UNTC or from the secondary literature. Abrogation occurred in two ways: in some case, including those listed in the UNTC, the treaty was formally repealed and in others, it simply fell into disuse once the receiving country no longer asked for migrant workers. But, for many, there is no record of whether the treaty is still in force.

These searches also turned up several categories of treaties that were not included. Treaties that address enforcement of migration regulations are excluded as they deal with existing flows rather than create new flows. Treaties that regulate refugees were excluded, as treaties of this nature are fundamentally different than treaties on labor migration. Repatriation treaties were also excluded. These treaties ensure that one country will take back its

[1] Al Tamini & Company (2010); Basok (2007); Booth (1992); Geddes (2003); Marshall (2000).

[2] Chilton and Posner (2017) include treaties on frontier workers, working holiday programs, and trainee programs which were not in my original data collection and likely account for many of the additional treaties in their dataset.

citizens that are deported from another country and (often) citizens of third countries who had travelled through it. These treaties are frequently used by wealthier countries as a way to ensure the expulsion of undesirable immigrants. The country that takes these deportees often receives aid in return.[3]

The search terms also turned up treaties that, while related to migration, are not about directing or affecting the migration flow. For example, the term "labor," also turned up treaties on the treatment of social security payments by citizens from other countries as well as treaties on the tax treatment of individuals. Since these treaties are about labor that has already moved, and not about the movement of labor, they were excluded.

Finally, I exclude preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that include labor provisions. In most PTAs and BITs, the migration provisions are often for a limited number of workers, either to allow managers to move or to allow a limited number of trainees to come to the home state. I exclude them for two reasons; first, they usually only cover a very small number of workers and second, they are clearly tied to other economic flows and are, thus, easily explained by issue linkage.

Coding of the Attributes of the Treaties

We coded the text of the treaties we could find in the UNTC. Altogether, 218 treaties were coded. The attributes we coded fall broadly into four categories. The first are provisions that delegate the screening process to the sending state. Second, provisions that aid the receiving state in preventing shirking by the sending state, such as regulating the number or skill level of migrants. There is also a category of provisions that help the sending state benefit from emigration and protect workers from the sending state. Finally, there are those elements of the treaties that facilitate the migration program and make cooperation between the states run smoothly.

Delegation

- *Sending state screens (sscreens)*: Whether the sending state is responsible for at least the first screening of migrants. Includes any case where the applicants apply to a sending state body first and that body passes on selected applicants to the receiving state, where the sending state conducts pre-screening as part of the process of application to the receiving state, or where there is a joint selection commission including representatives of the two states (e.g. UNTC I-39344).

  – For contract treaties and some other cases, it can be assumed that all of the

[3]For more on repatriation treaties, see Money (2013).

specific elements of screening (health, education, experience, and training) are conducted on the sending side, by the employer, but only sscreens is coded as 1 because these other aspects are not mentioned explicitly in the treaty.

- *Screening for Health (sscreenshealth)*: Any case where applicants must undergo a medical examination administered by the sending state.
  - In some cases, the receiving state even dictates what health issues the exams will be screening for, while delegating the process itself to the sending state.
- *Screening for Education, Experience or Training (sscreensedu, sscreensexper, sscreenstrain)*:
  - Where education, experience, or training is mentioned explicitly, that variable is the only one coded as 1. Where the treaty provides for "professional screening" by the sending state, all three are coded as 1.
- *Sending State Recruits (srecruit)*: Where the sending state engages in recruiting of workers (e.g. publicizing offers of employment) or promotion of the migration program, for example through advertising.
  - Treaties including language like the following: "Application forms shall be prepared by [the receiving state] and shall be distributed by [the sending state] to prospective migrants" (UNTC I-4047) were also included.
- *Sending state paying for transportation (stransport)*: Where the sending state contributes to the costs of transporting the workers, generally to the place of recruitment/screening or from the recruitment center to the border.
- *Sending state can establish an organization (sorgan)*: Where the sending state can establish an organization in the receiving state to keep in touch with migrants and manage migration affairs.
  - The receiving state is able to delegate the process of keeping track of migrants and addressing their concerns to the sending state even within country.

Provisions to preventing shirking

- *Number*: The number of workers specified for each year (e.g. yearly averages).
- *Industry*: If the treaty is only concerned with workers in one industry.

- *Industry code (industrycode)*: NAICS code for industry.
- *Skills mentioned (skillmentioned)*: If the treaty mentions that only workers of a certain skill level are desired.
- *Level of skills required (skillsrequired)*: If the treaty offers any details about what skill level workers must have, beyond the mention of "skills" in general.
  - 1 for basic skills, i.e. generally unskilled workers but with some experience in industry.
  - 2 for medium skills, i.e. the worker is somewhat educated or has several years of experience in industry.
  - 3 for high skills, i.e. workers who have higher education and who have substantial (more than 5 years) expertise in industry.
- *Is the worker tied to one employer (workertied)*: If the worker is able to change jobs of his own accord.
  - Coded 0 if worker is tied to the job he has been contracted for. In such cases, the worker is able to apply to the receiving state to change employers if there is a problem.
  - Only coded 1 if worker is admitted and then free to be employed where he chooses.
- *Provisions on disputes between employer and worker (disputework)*: Treaty provides for how a dispute between the worker and the employer is to be settled. Whether the worker or the employer is at fault, these provisions tighten receiving state control on the migration program.
- *Is dispute adjudicated locally? (disputereceiving)*: Disputes between workers and employers are adjudicated through a receiving state body (court, arbitration, etc.).
- *Is there a return date for migrant? (returndate)*: The treaty states that workers are supposed to return home after a specific period of time or by a certain date. This includes cases where contracts are concluded for a set period of time but can be renewed or extended.
- *Renewal*: The treaty provides that workers can be renewed or that their contract can be extended.

- *Must a worker leave before being renewed? (renewalbreak)*: In order for the worker to be renewed, he must leave the receiving country for a certain period of time.
- *Period of break (breaktime)*: How long, in months, the worker is required to reside outside of the receiving country before he can be renewed.
- *Provisions on repatriation (provisionsreturn)*: The treaty provides for how and under what conditions workers are to be repatriated.
- *Is money held until migrant returns (moneyheld)*: In order to facilitate repatriation, the treaty provides that a portion of workers' wages is to be held until they return to the sending country.

Sending state input and benefits

- *Does the sending state have a say in number of migrants recruited (snumber)*: Where the sending state has some say in the number of workers recruited. For example, where the receiving state proposes the number of workers it is looking for, and the sending state then states the number of workers it is willing to send. Also includes cases where the number is decided by joint consultation and agreement between the two parties.
- *Remittances (remit)*: The treaty mentions that migrants may remit funds to the sending country or provides for a specific channel through which remittances are to be sent. Any mention that migrants have the right to remit is coded as 1 because it can be understood as a guarantee by the receiving state that this right will not be denied.
- *Contract*: The treaty includes a sample contract, or it clearly and explicitly states the terms of employment. This does not include all mentions of contracts or working conditions. For example, cases where the treaty provides that working conditions are to be the same as for natives are not included because they do not mention what those conditions are.
- *Wage*: The treaty mentions wages. For example, by explicitly stating how much workers are to be paid, providing a process for determining wage levels, or by stating that workers are to be paid at the same rate as native workers in the same job.
- *Working Conditions (workcon)*: The treaty mentions working conditions, including hours.
- *Are working conditions the same as those for natives (workconsame)*: The treaty states that working conditions for migrants are to be at the same standard as for native workers.

- *Union*: The treaty explicitly states that workers can join a union or form one of their own. Some treaties mentioned that workers were subject to the collective labor laws in force- these treaties were not coded 1 for union because such legislation may or may not allow workers in the relevant industry to join or form a union.

- *Family*: The treaty allows workers to bring members of their family to the receiving state. This includes cases where migrants must work in the receiving state for a period of time before their family is allowed to join them.

- *Can the sending state intervene in disputes between employers and migrants? (disputesending)*: The treaty allows a representative of the sending state (e.g. a consular representative) to be involved in the settlement of disputes between the worker and employer.

- *Assimilation*: The treaty provides for organizations, activities, or programs to help migrants assimilate to the receiving state, or it provides in general terms that the receiving state or the employer must assist with assimilation.

- *Benefits*: The treaty mentions social security, unemployment, health care, or other benefits for the worker or his family.

- *Benefits the same as natives (benefits2)*: Such benefits are to be the same as those received by native workers.

- *Naturalization*: The treaty provides that workers may eventually naturalize and become citizens of the receiving state.

Cooperation between the states

- *Location of recruitment centers (locationsending)*: The treaty provides for where recruitment/screening centers in the sending country are to be located. In some cases, this means it states the names of cities or regions where centers are to be located. It also includes cases where the treaty states that the sending state gets to determine where centers are located. It does not include cases where the location of centers is not mentioned or the treaty provides that the receiving state will dictate the location.

- *Employer pays for transportation (etransport)*: The treaty provides that the employer will contribute to the cost of transportation, either to and from the receiving state or within the receiving state to the place of employment.

- *Receiving state pays for transportation (rtransport)*: The treaty provides that the receiving state contributes to the cost of transportation, either to and from the receiving state or within state.

- *Creation of a Joint Commission to deal with Disputes (disputestate)*: The treaty outlines the steps for dealing with any disagreement between the two states in the interpretation or implementation of the treaty, or it establishes a Joint Commission to deal with such issues.

- *Special provisions for employer to gain access to program (remployer)*: The treaty places requirements on the employer beyond the terms of employment or the funding of transportation and visas. For example, the employer is required to aid in combating illegal immigration, to ensure that there are not domestic workers available to fill the job, or to only recruit a certain number of employees through the program.

References

Al Tamini & Company. 2010. "International Agreements & Conventions UAE 1971-2004.". Unpublished Manuscript, Dubai, UAE.

Basok, Tanya. 2007. "Canada's Temporary Migration Program: A Model Despite Flaws." *Migration Information Source* . `http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/canadas-temporary-migration-program-model-despite-flaws`. Accessed 7 December 2015.

Bommarito, Michael J., Daniel Martin Katz and Paul Poast. 2011. "World Treaty Index.".

Booth, Heather. 1992. *The Migration Process in Britain and West Germany: Two Demographic Studies of Migrant Populations*. Research in ethnic relations series Brookfield, VT: Avebury.

Chilton, Adam S and Eric A Posner. 2017. "Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements.". Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 87.

Fitzgerald, Jennifer, David Leblang and Jessica C Teets. 2014. "Defying the law of gravity: The political economy of international migration." *World Politics* 66(03):406–445.

Geddes, Andrew. 2003. *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London: SAGE Publications.

International Organization for Migration. 2011. "International Migration Law Database.". **URL:** *http://www.imldb.iom.int/section.do*

Marshall, Barbara. 2000. *The New Germany and Migration in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Money, Jeanette. 2013. "The Limits of International Cooperation on Migration: Bilateral Readmission Agreements in the European Context." Unpublished manuscript, University of California - Davis.

OECD. 2004. "Migration for Employment: Bilateral Agreements at a Crossroads.".

Peters, Margaret E. 2015. "Open trade, Closed Borders Immigration in the era of Globalization." *World Politics* 67(01):114–154.

Rohn, Peter H. 1983. *World treaty index*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Information Services.

The United Nations. 2011. “United Nations Treaty Collection.”.
URL: *http://treaties.un.org/*