Supplementary Materials

We begin the Supplementary Materials with a more detailed discussion of the mechanisms by which the international diffusion of manifesto commitments between dominant incumbents and other parties occurs. We then outline of the rationale behind our data structure and provide a set of additional analyses and robustness checks that further support the argument and findings of our main paper. These include:

- Tables A1 and A2 re-estimate the empirical models in the main text using **seat shares of incumbents** and **incumbents' portfolio shares** as alternative measures of government clarity.
- Table A3 controls for the **size of the country of a "source party."**
- Table A4 re-estimates our main models while **controlling for economic influences**.
- Table A5 incorporates more changes in the international political context in our main model, including the **Cold War, terrorism,** and **EU membership**.
- Table A6 **omits** all parties for which **policy position estimates are likely to be too imprecise**.
- Finally (Table A7), we use **alternative lag structures for incumbency and vote share**.

International Learning from the Manifesto Commitments of Dominant Incumbents: Mechanisms

The international linkages that enable the focal party's policy advisors, party leaders, and consultants to consider whether specific policies adopted by foreign incumbents could generate an electoral advantage for them are diverse and well-documented. Parties cooperate closely in Europe's transnational party family groupings on policy proposals (Hix and Lord 1997). Senior foreign politicians are invited as guest speakers at party rallies. Parties send observers to

campaigns abroad. And electoral motivations are central to the desire to learn from the experience of dominant incumbents abroad, as it is clearly spelled out in the case-oriented literature. For instance, Philip Gould, a political consultant to the British Labour party under Tony Blair, closely observed Bill Clinton's presidential campaign in 1992, which added to the influence of New Democrat thinking in the US on Labour modernizers (Scott-Smith 2006: 215). Similarly, the internationalization of campaign consultancy is driven by the desire to secure electoral success and has facilitated the diffusion not only of campaigning techniques, but also policy ideas. Jaques Ségéula, an adviser of the French president, François Mitterrand, worked on Austrian, Italian, and Swedish campaigns; Joe Napolitan, a prominent adviser to the US Democrat party, went on to work on campaigns in at least nine other countries; and consultants who advised Margaret Thatcher during her campaigns in the 1980s subsequently played a prominent role in many Latin American elections (Farrell 1998: 171; Bowler and Farrell 1992: 228). In short, the ambition of party leaders and strategists to position their parties for electoral success results in disproportional learning from the programmatic appeals of dominant, electorally successful, high clarity incumbents abroad.

Consider the historical relationship between the US Republican party and the UK Conservative party. In the main article, we note that the Conservative party ruled in high clarity, single party majority governments from 1979-1990 under Margaret Thatcher. The learning from this government's manifesto stances did not only extend to telecommunications policy across much of Europe and parts of the OECD. The Conservatives' complete dominance of government under Thatcher also enhanced the visibility of their program and its general influence on Republican party strategies in the US. This expectation is borne out by case-oriented work (see Cooper 2012) and our own findings. Similarly, Syriza's rise to the status of a high-clarity

(dominant) incumbent after the Greek elections of January 2015 had implications for policy diffusion and learning by foreign party strategists. Our approach anticipates that Syriza's sweeping electoral victory and its ability to dominate the coalition formed with the small Independent Greeks (ANEL), enhanced Syriza's visibility, and the relevance of its platform for foreign party strategists searching for electorally successful strategies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is precisely what occurred. After the Greek election in 2015, the German party Die Linke publicly endorsed Syriza (see Küpper 2015) and announced that it would adopt some of its policies.

Data Structure Explanation

As described in the main text, cases in our data set are party-years. In principle, we could have adopted an alternative structure where cases are party-election-years only. However, there are good reasons for including the temporally lagged dependent variable in the model and these reasons are equally valid for our alternative data structure. The effect of including the temporally lagged dependent variable is implicitly to estimate a model with a geometrically declining lag on other right-hand-side variables, including the positions of other relevant parties (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). But here, the "time" variable defining this lag would be the number of elections in *i*'s system, not calendar time. In general, it is not plausible that the effect of the right-hand-side variables geometrically declines with the number of elections for systems where elections do not always occur at fixed intervals. Thus, there is further substantive justification for a research design based on party-years rather than party-elections years.

In addition, note that we use the positions of parties in the year before the last election held in their country before time *t* for the construction of the spatial lags. We deliberately opted

for the temporal lag structure for the spatial-lag variables, since developing party manifestos is a "time-consuming process [...] which typically takes place over a two-three year period during which party-affiliated research departments and committees draft sections of this manuscript, which are then circulated for revisions and approval upward to party elites and downward to activists" (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 832). Hence, simply lagging the spatial lags by one year would not address this process adequately, particularly as elections in our sample's countries are not in the same year. Similarly, while parties are likely to follow what other parties are currently doing, this will only translate into their manifestos after a certain temporal lag. Yet, given the way we have defined the between-election year values of party positions (a party's position in the year before an election at time *t* is the position from the election at time *t-1*), this might – only in extreme cases – be the party's position from two elections prior.

This could seem like a long lag and the question may arise why parties would not be looking at the more recent past (such as the most recent election prior to its own country's most recent election) when seeking to learn from/emulate successful foreign parties. To address this, we sought to estimate the average time lag that is, in fact, given with our temporal lag structure relying on the positions of parties in the year before the last election held in their country before *t* for the construction of the spatial lags. According to our data, when comparing the election dates for all pairs of parties in our data set, the effective temporal lag structure inherent in our spatial lags' weighting matrices is, on average, about five years only. That is, effectively, the spatial lags we use rely on the positions of parties about five years (on average) before time *t*. The standard deviation of the temporal lag is 1.684, while the 75th percentile lies at six years.

Seat Shares and Portfolio Shares of Incumbents

An alternative measure of high government clarity, i.e., the dominance of the main governing party, is incumbent seat share. Typically, seat shares correlate highly with vote shares. They are not perfectly correlated, however, as institutional settings determine how electoral success translates into seat allocations in the parliament. For instance, the "overhang seats" in Germany are extreme examples of how parliamentary representation may not be fully determined by party votes. Similarly, in the case of Greece, 50 additional seats are awarded as a bonus to the single party winning the largest share.

To test the robustness of our results, we examine whether dominant incumbents, identified as governing parties with large seat shares, are likely to be more visible to party strategists abroad that may consider learning from and emulating successful parties. We operationalize our new explanatory variable by defining a spatial lag, which combines foreign parties that recently participated in the government with seat share data. Hence, each element $w_{i,j}$ of the underlying connectivity matrix for this spatial lag ($\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Seat Share}}$) initially receives a value of 1 if parties *i* and *j* are not based in the same country, and if *j* has recently been part of the government (or the governing coalition) during the year before the last election in its own system before time *t* (0 otherwise). The data on incumbency status are reported in Döring and Manow (2012). We then multiply this binary element $w_{i,j}$ with the seat share data from the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2015) and, more specifically, the seat share of *j*. Ultimately, each element $w_{i,j}$ of the underlying connectivity matrix for this first spatial lag ($\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Seat Share}}$) is equal to the parliamentary seat share of the "other party" *j* in the year

before the last election in that country abroad, while *j* is defined as a foreign and recently governing party (all other parties receive a value of 0 in this connectivity matrix).

Table A1 summarizes the findings, which are virtually identical to those presented in the main text. $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Seat Share}}$ has a positively signed and statistically significant coefficient estimate. In other words, the higher government clarity, and the larger the dominant incumbent party's seat share, the greater the impact of its policy platform on the program of the focal party "at home."

Next, we consider incumbents' portfolio shares as an alternative (and widely used) measure of government clarity and the concentration of power within a government: the more ministerial posts an incumbent party possesses, the more it concentrates responsibility within government and the more visible it is to party strategists abroad. The portfolio data are based on existing data on cabinet members of the governments of several countries since 1945.[1] The data provided are based on days and we aggregated them to our party-year format: if a party gains office in a year, then the portfolios are assigned to it during that year. And if it lost the next election, it would not have portfolios in the data set for that election-year. Note that this is similar to how vote shares and seat shares are observed. To illustrate this coding, consider a government party that rules from 2000-2004; then, its 2000, 2001, and 2002 values are the values right after its election in 2000, irrespective of adjustments in 2000, 2001, and 2002. We thus create a variable that ranges in [0; 1] and captures an incumbent parties' share of government positions in the year before the last election (which is like our treatment for the other spatial lags). Each element $w_{i,j}$ of the underlying connectivity matrix for this spatial lag ($\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Portfolio Share}}$) initially receives a value of 1 if parties *i* and *j* are not based in the same country, and

[1] Available at: http://www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson/dokumentit/governm2.htm.

if *j* has been part of the government during the year before the last election (0 otherwise). We then multiply this binary element $w_{i,j}$ with the portfolio share variable.

Table A2 presents our results for this robustness check. The coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected positive sign: focal parties respond disproportionately to high-clarity, dominant incumbents abroad, which possess larger ministerial portfolio shares. In sum, the robustness check in Table A2 lends further support to our theoretical argument developed in the main text.

Table A1. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – Incumbents' Seat Share

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	-1.3553	-1.2951	-1.2128
	(0.8670)	(0.8628)	(0.8688)
Lagged Party Position	0.7501	0.7379	0.7375
	(0.0129)***	(0.0131)***	(0.0131)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.4421	0.3876	0.3759
	(0.1579)***	(0.1575)**	(0.1581)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.0279	0.0252	0.0244
	(0.0112)**	(0.0112)**	(0.0113)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.0059	-0.0051	-0.0050
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0021)***	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$		0.0060	0.0053
		(0.0012)***	(0.0015)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Family}}$			0.0018
			(0.0024)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Seat Share}}$	0.0129	0.0109	0.0111
	(0.0064)**	(0.0064)*	(0.0064)*
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.877	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.325	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A2. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – Incumbents' Portfolio Share

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	-1.3638	-1.2933	-1.2097
	(0.8597)	(0.8556)	(0.8624)
Lagged Party Position	0.7508	0.7386	0.7383
	(0.0129)***	(0.0131)***	(0.0131)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.4465	0.3917	0.3804
	(0.1579)***	(0.1575)**	(0.1582)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.0277	0.0251	0.0243
	(0.0112)**	(0.0112)**	(0.0112)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.0059	-0.0051	-0.0050
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0021)***	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$		0.0060	0.0053
		(0.0012)***	(0.0015)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Family}}$			0.0018
			(0.0024)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Foreign Portfolio Share}}$	0.0084	0.0069	0.0070
	(0.0037)**	(0.0037)*	(0.0037)*
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.877	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.324	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Diffusion Conditional on Countries' Population Size

Thus far, we ignored the influence of country size. However, parties from smaller countries may be more likely to learn from or emulate parties from larger and, hence, more powerful or visible countries. To take account of this possibility we allow the size of a country as captured by its population to condition the effect of government clarity on party policy diffusion. To this end, Table A3 focuses on the difference in population size: ΔPopulation**:** $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$. While this item captures the rationale of our original foreign spatial lag, we also introduce the difference (not the change or growth) in countries' annual mean population (Gleditsch 2002). Specifically, this spatial lag must meet the condition of a foreign-incumbent party that we combine with the vote share in the year before the last election, but we also introduce the inverse of the following: for $i \neq j$, $w_{i,j}$=(population$_j$ – population$_i$) if population$_j$ > population$_i$ and 0 otherwise (Ward and John 2013: 16). The elements $w_{i,j}$ of the weighting matrix thus become continuous as higher values capture smaller differences between a larger (j) and a smaller (i) country.

Tables A3 summarizes our findings based on the difference in countries' population size. We obtain coefficient estimates that mirror those of the main text in direction and significance. That said, the results also emphasize that parties respond more to dominant foreign incumbents that come from those larger countries, which are most similar to their own country in size. Therefore, party policy diffusion is more likely to occur between the UK and Germany than, for example, the UK and Austria (which are more dissimilar in terms of population size than the UK-Germany dyad).

Table A3. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – ΔPopulation: $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Constant	-1.3457	-1.2179	-1.1372
	(0.8409)	(0.8379)	(0.8458)
Lagged Party Position	0.7484	0.7379	0.7376
	(0.0129)***	(0.0131)***	(0.0131)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.4469	0.3947	0.3843
	(0.1576)***	(0.1574)**	(0.1581)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.0269	0.0247	0.0240
	(0.0112)**	(0.0112)**	(0.0112)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.0060	-0.0052	-0.0051
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0021)***	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$		0.0055	0.0049
		(0.0012)***	(0.0015)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Family}}$			0.0017
			(0.0024)
$\Delta\text{Population}: \mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$	2.55e-09	1.80e-09	1.80e-09
	(7.55e-10)***	(7.69e-10)**	(7.69e-10)**
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.877	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.324	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Controlling for Economic Influences

Williams (2015), Williams and Whitten (2015), and Williams, Seki, and Whitten (2015) use a broader set of alternative predictors including economic variables such as unemployment rates, GDP growth, and inflation. We re-estimated our models with these controls (all are temporally lagged by one year), which are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. First, we additionally include inflation, which is measured by the consumer price index, reflecting the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. Second, there is national unemployment, which is the share of the labor force that is without work, but available for and seeking employment. Finally, we control for economic growth that the World Bank defines as annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 US dollars. Table A4 summarizes our main models incorporating these three additional economic controls.

Most of the economic controls are, in fact, statistically insignificant. The lagged inflation variable is the only exception as it has a consistently positive and statistically significant sign in Table A4. Our main results are robust as indicated by the coefficient of $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$, which is virtually unchanged in substance and statistical significance when compared to the estimations in the main text.

Table A4. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – Economic Controls

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Constant	2.5428	2.3159	2.3286
	(1.8732)	(1.8652)	(1.8659)
Lagged Party Position	0.7069	0.7004	0.7007
	(0.0170)***	(0.0170)***	(0.0170)***
Lagged Median Voter	-0.4005	-0.3353	-0.3331
	(0.3667)	(0.3653)	(0.3654)
Lagged Economic Globalization	-0.0190	-0.0149	-0.0150
	(0.0234)	(0.0233)	(0.0233)
Lag Median Voter *	0.0037	0.0031	0.0031
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0046)	(0.0045)	(0.0045)
Inflation	0.0127	0.0121	0.0121
	(0.0070)*	(0.0070)*	(0.0070)*
Unemployment	0.0011	0.0003	0.0002
	(0.0048)	(0.0048)	(0.0048)
GDP Growth	0.0048	0.0053	0.0054
	(0.0051)	(0.0051)	(0.0051)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$		0.0059	0.0053
		(0.0015)***	(0.0019)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Family}}$			0.0017
			(0.0035)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0001)***	(0.0001)*	(0.0001)*
Observations	1,824	1,824	1,824
Year and Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.872	0.874	0.874
RMSE	0.313	0.311	0.311

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Controlling for Changes in the International Political Context

It has also been suggested that more systemic changes in the international political context may affect party policy positions. System-wide shocks or variables that affect nearly all parties in our sample may well influence what issues parties perceive as policy priorities and, thereby, change their position. The year-fixed effects we include in any model estimation should address this issue and control for any relevant influences in this context more generally. That said, we also decided to examine three main influences more specifically. First, there is the end of the Cold War, which we control for in the form of a dummy variable that receives the value of 1 from 1991 onwards (0 otherwise). Second, we control for membership in the European Union (EU) as we have coded a binary variable receiving the value of 1 if a party's country of origin was a member of the EU (0 otherwise). Finally, to address any security-relevant influences stemming from a change in the international system due to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, we coded a dichotomous variable that receives the value of 1 as of the year 2001 (0 otherwise). As demonstrated in Table A5, our core result pertaining to $\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$ is robust to these changes in the model specification: high clarity incumbents are more influential abroad. Only *Cold War* that reaches conventional levels of statistical significance; in the post-Cold War period, parties are significantly more left-wing than before 1990.

Table A5. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – Systemic Influences

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Constant	-1.0782	-1.3724	-1.3477
	(0.8464)	(0.8925)	(0.8856)
Lagged Party Position	0.7385	0.7385	0.7385
	(0.0131)***	(0.0131)***	(0.0131)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.3877	0.3891	0.3877
	(0.1583)**	(0.1585)**	(0.1583)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.0254	0.0254	0.0254
	(0.0113)**	(0.0113)**	(0.0113)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.0051	-0.0051	-0.0051
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**
Cold War	-0.3026		
	(0.1369)**		
EU Membership		-0.0185	
		(0.0793)	
Terrorism			-0.0332
			(0.0505)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.0053	0.0053	0.0053
	(0.0015)***	(0.0015)***	(0.0015)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Family}}$	0.0019	0.0019	0.0019
	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0001)*	(0.0001)*	(0.0001)*
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Excluding Cases with Highly Uncertain Party Positions

Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009) estimate the uncertainty surrounding the party-policy position data of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), i.e., the data we use for our dependent variable and the construction of the spatial lags. By simulating the data's underlying error-generating processes via bootstrapping analyses of coded quasi-sentences, Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009) then provide precise levels of nonsystematic errors for the left-right party position (among other variables in the CMP).

We assessed the uncertainty surrounding each party's policy position using the left-right standard error estimate in Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009). We then omitted all observations from the sample and the corresponding weighting matrices if their standard error estimate was above the 75^{th} percentile of the standard-error variable's distribution. Table A6 summarizes the findings – our core results remain unchanged (the coefficient, 0.0002, is greater than the estimate (0.0001) that we report in the paper.).

Table A6. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – Omitting Cases for which Positions are Highly Uncertain (Based on Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov (2009))

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Constant	-1.3536	-1.5050	-1.2750
	(0.9252)	(0.9177)	(0.9268)
Lagged Party Position	0.7285	0.7130	0.7129
	(0.0138)***	(0.0139)***	(0.0139)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.3770	0.3675	0.3354
	(0.1659)**	(0.1645)**	(0.1654)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.0258	0.0267	0.0241
	(0.0117)**	(0.0116)**	(0.0117)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.0051	-0.0049	-0.0045
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0022)**	(0.0022)**	(0.0022)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$		0.0078	0.0060
		(0.0013)***	(0.0016)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Family}}$			0.0046
			(0.0026)*
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0001)***	(0.0001)**	(0.0001)**
Observations	2,395	2,395	2,395
Year and Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.867	0.869	0.869
RMSE	0.314	0.311	0.311

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Alternative Lag Structures for Incumbency and Vote Share

We use the positions of parties in the year before the last election held in their country before time *t* for the construction of the spatial lags. We deliberately opted for the temporal lag structure for the spatial-lag variables, since developing party manifestos is a "time-consuming process [...] which typically takes place over a two-three year period during which party-affiliated research departments and committees draft sections of this manuscript, which are then circulated for revisions and approval upward to party elites and downward to activists" (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 832). Hence, simply lagging the spatial lags by one year would not address this process adequately, particularly as elections in our sample's countries are not in the same year. Similarly, while parties then, of course, are likely to follow what other parties are currently doing, this will only translate into their manifestos after a certain temporal lag. However, given the way we have defined the between-election year values of party positions (a party's position in the year before an election at time *t* is the position from the election at time *t-1*), this might – only in extreme cases – be the party's position from two elections prior.

This may seem like a long lag and the question may arise why parties would not be looking at the more recent past (such as the most recent election prior to its own country's most recent election) when seeking to learn from/emulate successful foreign parties. We realize that this is an important point and, hence, spent a large amount of time in addressing this issue comprehensively. On one hand, we sought to estimate the average time lag that is in fact given with our temporal lag structure relying on the positions of parties in the year before the last election held in their country before time t for the construction of the spatial lags. According to our data, when comparing the election dates for all pairs of parties in our data set, the effective temporal lag structure inherent in our spatial lags' weighting matrices is on average about five

years only. That is, effectively, the spatial lags we use rely on the positions of parties about five years (on average) before time *t*. The standard deviation of the temporal lag is 1.684, while the 75^{th} percentile lies at six years.

On the other hand, we then re-estimated our main model (Model 3 in the main text) using the party position and, if appropriate, the incumbency status and vote share of (1) the year before the year under study (*t-1*), (2) two years before the year under study (*t-2*), and (3) three years before the year under study (*t-3*). As expected, however, the results turn out to be insignificant or negative. While these results then further underline that there is a significant time lag in party positions travelling from one party to another, our research suggests that the time lag of "two to three years" proposed by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009: 832) may even underestimate this.

Table A7. The Diffusion of Party Policy Positions – Different Temporal Lags

	Model 19 *t-1*	Model 20 *t-2*	Model 21 *t-3*
Constant	0.1763	-0.4087	-0.3513
	(0.8993)	(0.9251)	(0.9464)
Lagged Party Position	0.7294	0.7346	0.7360
	(0.0133)***	(0.0133)***	(0.0132)***
Lagged Median Voter	0.3753	0.3638	0.3612
	(0.1579)**	(0.1583)**	(0.1583)**
Lagged Economic Globalization	0.0251	0.0234	0.0231
	(0.0112)**	(0.0113)**	(0.0113)**
Lag Median Voter *	-0.0050	-0.0047	-0.0047
Lagged Economic Globalization	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**	(0.0021)**
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic}}$	0.0058	0.0060	0.0060
	(0.0015)***	(0.0015)***	(0.0015)***
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Domestic Ideology}}$	0.0015	0.0013	0.0013
	(0.0023)	(0.0023)	(0.0024)
$\mathbf{W}y^{\text{Incumbent Vote Share}}$	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Observations	2,718	2,718	2,718
Year and Country Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.878	0.878	0.878
RMSE	0.322	0.323	0.323

Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election.

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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