Sensitivity Analysis Appendix

I. Sensitivity Analyses of Results in Figures 4.5 and 4.6

Latent homophily and environment confounding could be inflating the effect sizes (reported in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 and Tables A.6 through A.9) that we interpret as evidence of genuine social influence within dyads. We report sensitivity analyses that show how highly correlated an omitted confound would need to be with the independent variable of alter vote choice *and* the dependent variable of ego vote choice—after conditioning on the observed independent variables—to reduce the coefficients with italicized labels (i.e., those that are shaded in the tables) to statistical zero.

Imagine a variable, *U*, that is unobserved/omitted from one of our multinomial logit (MNL) models. In this model, our estimate of the effect of genuine intradyadic social influence is $\hat{\beta}$. Think of $\hat{\beta}$ as one of the italicized-label coefficients in Figures 4.5 and 4.5. If *U* is correlated with the dependent variable Y_{ie} (i.e., how the ego *i* voted as reported in the election wave) *and* X_{je} (i.e., how the alter *j* voted, as reported in the election wave) even after conditioning on the other independent variables, then $\hat{\beta}$ is biased as a measure of social influence. The question we can answer with sensitivity analysis is the following: How large would these two correlations need to be to produce the $\hat{\beta}$ we estimate if social influence has not actually taken place—that is, if the true β=0? To do this, we specify different combinations of these two correlations and calculate what would be the new effect sizes produced by these $\hat{\beta}$'s and the new lower bounds of their 95 percent confidence intervals. If weak correlations produce new effects that are statistical zeroes, then our claims of genuine social influence are not robust to omitted variable bias. If it takes very strong correlations to do so, then our causal claims rest on firm ground.

Using the technique described by Vanderveele,[1] we conduct and report one sensitivity analysis for each of the coefficients with an italicized label in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. There are 18 in all, one per page. Each page contains two tables: The top one shows how the effect size varies under different assumptions while the bottom one shows how the lower bound of the effect size varies under these same assumptions. When the lower bound falls below zero, then the effect size would no longer be statistically significant. Note that both sets of cell entries are reported as relative risk ratios (converted to percentages), meaning the new probability (i.e., Pr(Y=1) given a discussant who voted for the numerator candidate after intending in the campaign wave to vote for the denominator candidate) divided by the original probability (i.e., Pr(Y=1) given a discussant who voted for the denominator candidate after intending to vote for this same candidate in the campaign wave). (Note that Y=1 means a vote for the candidate named in the numerator and Y=0 means a vote for the candidate named in the denominator.) Some of these ratios are extremely large because the original probability is small.

As mentioned, omitted variable bias exists when *two* different correlations exist: one between the omitted variable and ego vote choice (Y_{ie}) and another between the omitted variable and alter vote choice (X_{je}). Therefore, our sensitivity analyses vary the sizes of each of these two correlations independently of one another—one across the columns and the other across the rows. Across the rows, we vary γ, which captures the relationship strength between the unobserved variable U and the dependent variable Y_{ie}. For ease of exposition, we cast U as a binary variable, so γ is the change in the ratio of Pr(Y=1)/Pr(Y=0) upon changing U from 0 to 1. For example, γ=2 if this change in U increases the probability that Y=1 from .5 to .66, and γ=3 if

[1] VanderWeele, "Sensitivity Analysis for Contagion Effects in Social Networks."

U increases the probability from .5 to .75. Substantively, γ=3 means there is an omitted variable that increases the relative risk of ego switching to the numerator candidate by a factor of 3.

The parameter that is varied across the rows, $\pi_1 - \pi_0$, captures the degrees of association between *U* and X_{je}. π_1 is the prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switch to the numerator candidate, and π_0 is the prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who stay with the denominator candidate. Substantively, this is the extent to which homophily drives ego to select an alter who later ends up with ego's identical temporal vote pattern (i.e., the same dynamics over both campaign and election waves). The span of this variable across the rows is vast—we doubt there is a *U* that averages, say, .9 among egos who have an alter with one type of switching pattern and .1 among egos who have a stable alter ($\pi_1 - \pi_0 = .8$). But we report results across this entire span nonetheless.

The first row and column of each table shows the relative risk ratios that we are effectively assuming with our estimates—that is, under the assumption of no omitted variable bias (either *U* and Y_{ie} are correlated or *U* and X_{je} are uncorrelated). The tables shade cells with negative risk ratios. These correspond to (what we will call) sign-switching scenarios in which the hypothetical omitted variable bias is so great that our estimated positive coefficient ($\hat{\beta}$) masks a true influence effect that is negative. Our primary substantive conclusions lie in the fact that these instances are relatively rare. For many tables, they are nonexistent, meaning a γ as large as 3 would be insufficient to induce the sign-switching effect under even the strongest possible correlation between *U* and X_{je}. The most sensitive results correspond to the Lula/Serra contrast in 2002, but these relative risk ratios tend to be low because the baseline probability of voting for Lula is high.

Figure 4.5/Table A.6 (Full Sample): Lula/Serra

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Lula (γ)

POINT ESTIMATE:	**2.01**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Lula **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Lula ($\pi_1 - \pi_0$)	0	33.31%	33.31%	33.31%	33.31%	33.31%
	0.1	33.31%	28.08%	24.71%	22.35%	20.61%
	0.2	33.31%	23.05%	16.64%	12.26%	9.07%
	0.3	33.31%	18.21%	9.07%	2.93%	-1.47%
	0.4	33.31%	13.56%	1.94%	-5.71%	-11.13%
	0.5	33.31%	9.07%	-4.78%	-13.74%	-20.02%
	0.6	33.31%	4.74%	-11.13%	-21.23%	-28.22%
	0.7	33.31%	0.56%	-17.13%	-28.22%	-35.82%
	0.8	33.31%	-3.47%	-22.82%	-34.77%	-42.87%
	0.9	33.31%	-7.36%	-28.22%	-40.91%	-49.44%
	1	33.31%	-11.13%	-33.35%	-46.68%	-55.56%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Lula (γ)

LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Lula **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Lula ($\pi_1 - \pi_0$)	0	30.88%	30.88%	30.88%	30.88%	30.88%
	0.1	30.88%	25.74%	22.43%	20.12%	18.41%
	0.2	30.88%	20.81%	14.52%	10.21%	7.08%
	0.3	30.88%	16.06%	7.08%	1.06%	-3.27%
	0.4	30.88%	11.49%	0.08%	-7.43%	-12.75%
	0.5	30.88%	7.08%	-6.52%	-15.32%	-21.47%
	0.6	30.88%	2.83%	-12.75%	-22.66%	-29.53%
	0.7	30.88%	-1.27%	-18.64%	-29.53%	-36.99%
	0.8	30.88%	-5.23%	-24.23%	-35.95%	-43.91%
	0.9	30.88%	-9.05%	-29.53%	-41.98%	-50.36%
	1	30.88%	-12.75%	-34.56%	-47.65%	-56.37%

Figure 4.5/Table A.6 (Full Sample): Garo./Serra

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Garo. (γ)

POINT ESTIMATE:	**3.074**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Garo. **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Garo. $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	250.69%	250.69%	250.69%	250.69%	250.69%
	0.1	250.69%	236.94%	228.06%	221.86%	217.29%
	0.2	250.69%	223.71%	206.85%	195.32%	186.93%
	0.3	250.69%	210.99%	186.93%	170.78%	159.20%
	0.4	250.69%	198.73%	168.17%	148.05%	133.79%
	0.5	250.69%	186.93%	150.49%	126.92%	110.41%
	0.6	250.69%	175.54%	133.79%	107.22%	88.83%
	0.7	250.69%	164.55%	118.00%	88.83%	68.85%
	0.8	250.69%	153.95%	103.03%	71.61%	50.29%
	0.9	250.69%	143.70%	88.83%	55.46%	33.02%
	1	250.69%	133.79%	75.34%	40.28%	16.90%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Garo. (γ)

LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Garo. **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Garo. $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	215.79%	215.79%	215.79%	215.79%	215.79%
	0.1	215.79%	203.40%	195.41%	189.83%	185.71%
	0.2	215.79%	191.50%	176.31%	165.93%	158.37%
	0.3	215.79%	180.04%	158.37%	143.84%	133.41%
	0.4	215.79%	169.00%	141.48%	123.36%	110.53%
	0.5	215.79%	158.37%	125.56%	104.33%	89.47%
	0.6	215.79%	148.12%	110.53%	86.60%	70.04%
	0.7	215.79%	138.23%	96.30%	70.04%	52.05%
	0.8	215.79%	128.67%	82.82%	54.53%	35.34%
	0.9	215.79%	119.45%	70.04%	39.99%	19.78%
	1	215.79%	110.53%	57.89%	26.32%	5.26%

Figure 4.5/Table A.6 (Full Sample): Ciro/Serra

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Ciro (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Ciro **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Ciro ($\pi_1 - \pi_0$)	1	1.5	2	2.5	3
POINT ESTIMATE: 1.771					
0	214.59%	214.59%	214.59%	214.59%	214.59%
0.1	214.59%	202.25%	194.29%	188.73%	184.63%
0.2	214.59%	190.39%	175.27%	164.92%	157.39%
0.3	214.59%	178.98%	157.39%	142.91%	132.52%
0.4	214.59%	167.98%	140.57%	122.52%	109.73%
0.5	214.59%	157.39%	124.71%	103.56%	88.75%
0.6	214.59%	147.18%	109.73%	85.89%	69.39%
0.7	214.59%	137.32%	95.56%	69.39%	51.47%
0.8	214.59%	127.81%	82.13%	53.95%	34.82%
0.9	214.59%	118.61%	69.39%	39.46%	19.33%
1	214.59%	109.73%	57.30%	25.84%	4.86%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Ciro (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Ciro **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Ciro ($\pi_1 - \pi_0$)	1	1.5	2	2.5	3
LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI					
0	148.28%	148.28%	148.28%	148.28%	148.28%
0.1	148.28%	138.55%	132.26%	127.88%	124.64%
0.2	148.28%	129.18%	117.25%	109.08%	103.14%
0.3	148.28%	120.18%	103.14%	91.71%	83.51%
0.4	148.28%	111.50%	89.86%	75.61%	65.52%
0.5	148.28%	103.14%	77.35%	60.65%	48.97%
0.6	148.28%	95.08%	65.52%	46.71%	33.69%
0.7	148.28%	87.30%	54.34%	33.69%	19.54%
0.8	148.28%	79.79%	43.74%	21.50%	6.41%
0.9	148.28%	72.54%	33.69%	10.06%	-5.82%
1	148.28%	65.52%	24.14%	-0.69%	-17.24%

Figure 4.6/Table A.6 (Stable Alters): Lula/Serra

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Lula (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Lula **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Lula ($\pi_1 - \pi_0$)	POINT ESTIMATE: **1.535**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	17.19%	17.19%	17.19%	17.19%	17.19%
	0.1	17.19%	12.60%	9.63%	7.56%	6.03%
	0.2	17.19%	8.18%	2.54%	-1.31%	-4.11%
	0.3	17.19%	3.93%	-4.11%	-9.51%	-13.38%
	0.4	17.19%	-0.17%	-10.38%	-17.11%	-21.87%
	0.5	17.19%	-4.11%	-16.29%	-24.17%	-29.68%
	0.6	17.19%	-7.92%	-21.87%	-30.75%	-36.90%
	0.7	17.19%	-11.59%	-27.15%	-36.90%	-43.57%
	0.8	17.19%	-15.14%	-32.15%	-42.65%	-49.77%
	0.9	17.19%	-18.56%	-36.90%	-48.05%	-55.55%
	1	17.19%	-21.87%	-41.40%	-53.12%	-60.94%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Lula (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Lula **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Lula ($\pi_1 - \pi_0$)	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	13.98%	13.98%	13.98%	13.98%	13.98%
	0.1	13.98%	9.51%	6.62%	4.61%	3.12%
	0.2	13.98%	5.21%	-0.27%	-4.02%	-6.75%
	0.3	13.98%	1.07%	-6.75%	-11.99%	-15.76%
	0.4	13.98%	-2.91%	-12.84%	-19.38%	-24.01%
	0.5	13.98%	-6.75%	-18.59%	-26.25%	-31.61%
	0.6	13.98%	-10.45%	-24.01%	-32.65%	-38.63%
	0.7	13.98%	-14.02%	-29.15%	-38.63%	-45.12%
	0.8	13.98%	-17.46%	-34.01%	-44.22%	-51.15%
	0.9	13.98%	-20.80%	-38.63%	-49.47%	-56.77%
	1	13.98%	-24.01%	-43.01%	-54.41%	-62.01%

Figure 4.6/Table A.6 (Stable Alters): Garo./Serra

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Garo. (γ)

POINT ESTIMATE:	**3.325**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Garo. **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Garo. $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	263.58%	263.58%	263.58%	263.58%	263.58%
	0.1	263.58%	249.32%	240.12%	233.70%	228.95%
	0.2	263.58%	235.61%	218.13%	206.17%	197.48%
	0.3	263.58%	222.42%	197.48%	180.74%	168.73%
	0.4	263.58%	209.72%	178.03%	157.17%	142.39%
	0.5	263.58%	197.48%	159.70%	135.26%	118.15%
	0.6	263.58%	185.67%	142.39%	114.84%	95.77%
	0.7	263.58%	174.28%	126.01%	95.77%	75.06%
	0.8	263.58%	163.28%	110.49%	77.92%	55.82%
	0.9	263.58%	152.66%	95.77%	61.18%	37.91%
	1	263.58%	142.39%	81.79%	45.43%	21.19%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Garo. (γ)

LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Garo. **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Garo. $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	170.71%	170.71%	170.71%	170.71%	170.71%
	0.1	170.71%	160.10%	153.25%	148.46%	144.93%
	0.2	170.71%	149.89%	136.88%	127.97%	121.49%
	0.3	170.71%	140.07%	121.49%	109.03%	100.09%
	0.4	170.71%	130.61%	107.02%	91.48%	80.48%
	0.5	170.71%	121.49%	93.37%	75.17%	62.43%
	0.6	170.71%	112.70%	80.48%	59.97%	45.77%
	0.7	170.71%	104.22%	68.28%	45.77%	30.34%
	0.8	170.71%	96.03%	56.73%	32.48%	16.02%
	0.9	170.71%	88.12%	45.77%	20.01%	2.68%
	1	170.71%	80.48%	35.36%	8.29%	-9.76%

Figure 4.6/Table A.6 (Stable Alters): Ciro/Serra

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Ciro (γ)

POINT ESTIMATE:	**1.69**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Ciro **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Ciro $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	408.25%	408.25%	408.25%	408.25%	408.25%
	0.1	408.25%	388.32%	375.46%	366.48%	359.85%
	0.2	408.25%	369.16%	344.72%	328.00%	315.84%
	0.3	408.25%	350.72%	315.84%	292.45%	275.67%
	0.4	408.25%	332.96%	288.67%	259.50%	238.84%
	0.5	408.25%	315.84%	263.04%	228.87%	204.95%
	0.6	408.25%	299.34%	238.84%	200.33%	173.68%
	0.7	408.25%	283.42%	215.94%	173.68%	144.72%
	0.8	408.25%	268.05%	194.25%	148.72%	117.82%
	0.9	408.25%	253.19%	173.68%	125.31%	92.79%
	1	408.25%	238.84%	154.13%	103.30%	69.42%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Ciro (γ)

LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Ciro **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Ciro $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	168.53%	168.53%	168.53%	168.53%	168.53%
	0.1	168.53%	158.00%	151.21%	146.46%	142.96%
	0.2	168.53%	147.88%	134.97%	126.13%	119.71%
	0.3	168.53%	138.13%	119.71%	107.35%	98.48%
	0.4	168.53%	128.75%	105.35%	89.94%	79.02%
	0.5	168.53%	119.71%	91.81%	73.76%	61.12%
	0.6	168.53%	110.99%	79.02%	58.68%	44.59%
	0.7	168.53%	102.58%	66.93%	44.59%	29.29%
	0.8	168.53%	94.45%	55.47%	31.41%	15.09%
	0.9	168.53%	86.61%	44.59%	19.04%	1.86%
	1	168.53%	79.02%	34.27%	7.41%	-10.49%

Figure 4.5/Table A.7 (Full Sample): Alckmin/Lula

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Alckmin (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Alckmin **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Alckmin $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.437**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	159.18%	159.18%	159.18%	159.18%	159.18%
	0.1	159.18%	149.01%	142.46%	137.88%	134.49%
	0.2	159.18%	139.24%	126.78%	118.26%	112.05%
	0.3	159.18%	129.84%	112.05%	100.12%	91.57%
	0.4	159.18%	120.78%	98.19%	83.32%	72.79%
	0.5	159.18%	112.05%	85.13%	67.70%	55.51%
	0.6	159.18%	103.64%	72.79%	53.15%	39.56%
	0.7	159.18%	95.52%	61.11%	39.56%	24.79%
	0.8	159.18%	87.68%	50.05%	26.83%	11.08%
	0.9	159.18%	80.11%	39.56%	14.89%	-1.69%
	1	159.18%	72.79%	29.59%	3.67%	-13.61%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Alckmin (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Alckmin **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Alckmin $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	139.08%	139.08%	139.08%	139.08%	139.08%
	0.1	139.08%	129.71%	123.66%	119.43%	116.31%
	0.2	139.08%	120.69%	109.20%	101.33%	95.61%
	0.3	139.08%	112.02%	95.61%	84.61%	76.71%
	0.4	139.08%	103.66%	82.83%	69.11%	59.39%
	0.5	139.08%	95.61%	70.77%	54.70%	43.45%
	0.6	139.08%	87.85%	59.39%	41.28%	28.74%
	0.7	139.08%	80.36%	48.62%	28.74%	15.11%
	0.8	139.08%	73.13%	38.42%	17.00%	2.46%
	0.9	139.08%	66.14%	28.74%	5.98%	-9.31%
	1	139.08%	59.39%	19.54%	-4.37%	-20.31%

Figure 4.5/Table A.7 (Full Sample): Helena/Lula

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Helena (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Helena **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Helena $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.902**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	511.25%	511.25%	511.25%	511.25%	511.25%
	0.1	511.25%	487.28%	471.82%	461.01%	453.04%
	0.2	511.25%	464.23%	434.85%	414.74%	400.12%
	0.3	511.25%	442.05%	400.12%	371.98%	351.80%
	0.4	511.25%	420.70%	367.43%	332.35%	307.50%
	0.5	511.25%	400.12%	336.61%	295.52%	266.75%
	0.6	511.25%	380.27%	307.50%	261.20%	229.14%
	0.7	511.25%	361.12%	279.97%	229.14%	194.31%
	0.8	511.25%	342.63%	253.88%	199.12%	161.97%
	0.9	511.25%	324.77%	229.14%	170.97%	131.85%
	1	511.25%	307.50%	205.63%	144.50%	103.75%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Helena (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Helena **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Helena $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	347.76%	347.76%	347.76%	347.76%	347.76%
	0.1	347.76%	330.20%	318.87%	310.96%	305.11%
	0.2	347.76%	313.32%	291.79%	277.06%	266.35%
	0.3	347.76%	297.07%	266.35%	245.74%	230.95%
	0.4	347.76%	281.42%	242.40%	216.71%	198.51%
	0.5	347.76%	266.35%	219.83%	189.73%	168.65%
	0.6	347.76%	251.81%	198.51%	164.58%	141.10%
	0.7	347.76%	237.78%	178.34%	141.10%	115.59%
	0.8	347.76%	224.24%	159.23%	119.12%	91.90%
	0.9	347.76%	211.15%	141.10%	98.49%	69.84%
	1	347.76%	198.51%	123.88%	79.10%	49.25%

Figure 4.6/Table A.7 (Stable Alters): Alckmin/Lula

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Alckmin (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Alckmin **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Alckmin $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.034**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	125.37%	125.37%	125.37%	125.37%	125.37%
	0.1	125.37%	116.53%	110.83%	106.84%	103.90%
	0.2	125.37%	108.03%	97.20%	89.78%	84.39%
	0.3	125.37%	99.85%	84.39%	74.02%	66.58%
	0.4	125.37%	91.98%	72.34%	59.41%	50.25%
	0.5	125.37%	84.39%	60.98%	45.83%	35.22%
	0.6	125.37%	77.07%	50.25%	33.17%	21.35%
	0.7	125.37%	70.01%	40.09%	21.35%	8.51%
	0.8	125.37%	63.20%	30.48%	10.29%	-3.41%
	0.9	125.37%	56.61%	21.35%	-0.09%	-14.52%
	1	125.37%	50.25%	12.68%	-9.85%	-24.88%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Alckmin (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Alckmin **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Alckmin $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	97.15%	97.15%	97.15%	97.15%	97.15%
	0.1	97.15%	89.42%	84.43%	80.95%	78.38%
	0.2	97.15%	81.99%	72.51%	66.02%	61.31%
	0.3	97.15%	74.83%	61.31%	52.23%	45.72%
	0.4	97.15%	67.94%	50.76%	39.45%	31.43%
	0.5	97.15%	61.31%	40.82%	27.57%	18.29%
	0.6	97.15%	54.91%	31.43%	16.50%	6.16%
	0.7	97.15%	48.73%	22.55%	6.16%	-5.07%
	0.8	97.15%	42.77%	14.14%	-3.52%	-15.51%
	0.9	97.15%	37.00%	6.16%	-12.60%	-25.22%
	1	97.15%	31.43%	-1.42%	-21.14%	-34.28%

Figure 4.6/Table A.7 (Stable Alters): Helena/Lula

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Helena (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Helena **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Helena $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.629**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	534.87%	534.87%	534.87%	534.87%	534.87%
	0.1	534.87%	509.97%	493.91%	482.69%	474.41%
	0.2	534.87%	486.03%	455.51%	434.63%	419.44%
	0.3	534.87%	463.00%	419.44%	390.22%	369.25%
	0.4	534.87%	440.81%	385.49%	349.05%	323.25%
	0.5	534.87%	419.44%	353.48%	310.80%	280.92%
	0.6	534.87%	398.83%	323.25%	275.15%	241.85%
	0.7	534.87%	378.94%	294.65%	241.85%	205.68%
	0.8	534.87%	359.73%	267.56%	210.68%	172.09%
	0.9	534.87%	341.18%	241.85%	181.44%	140.81%
	1	534.87%	323.25%	217.43%	153.95%	111.62%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Helena (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Helena **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Helena $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	161.00%	161.00%	161.00%	161.00%	161.00%
	0.1	161.00%	150.77%	144.16%	139.55%	136.14%
	0.2	161.00%	140.92%	128.38%	119.79%	113.55%
	0.3	161.00%	131.45%	113.55%	101.53%	92.91%
	0.4	161.00%	122.33%	99.59%	84.61%	74.00%
	0.5	161.00%	113.55%	86.43%	68.88%	56.60%
	0.6	161.00%	105.07%	74.00%	54.23%	40.54%
	0.7	161.00%	96.90%	62.24%	40.54%	25.67%
	0.8	161.00%	89.00%	51.11%	27.72%	11.86%
	0.9	161.00%	81.37%	40.54%	15.70%	-1.00%
	1	161.00%	74.00%	30.50%	4.40%	-13.00%

Figure 4.5/Table A.8 (Full Sample): Aécio/Dilma

		Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Aécio (γ)				
POINT ESTIMATE:	**4.26**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Aécio **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Aécio $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	921.22%	921.22%	921.22%	921.22%	921.22%
	0.1	921.22%	881.17%	855.34%	837.29%	823.96%
	0.2	921.22%	842.67%	793.57%	759.98%	735.55%
	0.3	921.22%	805.61%	735.55%	688.54%	654.82%
	0.4	921.22%	769.93%	680.93%	622.33%	580.81%
	0.5	921.22%	735.55%	629.44%	560.79%	512.73%
	0.6	921.22%	702.39%	580.81%	503.45%	449.89%
	0.7	921.22%	670.40%	534.81%	449.89%	391.70%
	0.8	921.22%	639.51%	491.23%	399.75%	337.67%
	0.9	921.22%	609.66%	449.89%	352.71%	287.36%
	1	921.22%	580.81%	410.61%	308.49%	240.41%

		Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Aécio (γ)				
LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Aécio **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Aécio $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	725.36%	725.36%	725.36%	725.36%	725.36%
	0.1	725.36%	693.00%	672.11%	657.52%	646.76%
	0.2	725.36%	661.87%	622.19%	595.04%	575.30%
	0.3	725.36%	631.92%	575.30%	537.30%	510.05%
	0.4	725.36%	603.09%	531.16%	483.79%	450.24%
	0.5	725.36%	575.30%	489.54%	434.06%	395.22%
	0.6	725.36%	548.50%	450.24%	387.71%	344.43%
	0.7	725.36%	522.64%	413.06%	344.43%	297.40%
	0.8	725.36%	497.68%	377.84%	303.90%	253.73%
	0.9	725.36%	473.56%	344.43%	265.88%	213.07%
	1	725.36%	450.24%	312.68%	230.14%	175.12%

Figure 4.5/Table A.8 (Full Sample): Marina/Dilma

		Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Marina (γ)				
POINT ESTIMATE:	**3.003**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Marina **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Marina $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	805.30%	805.30%	805.30%	805.30%	805.30%
	0.1	805.30%	769.79%	746.89%	730.89%	719.08%
	0.2	805.30%	735.66%	692.13%	662.35%	640.70%
	0.3	805.30%	702.81%	640.70%	599.03%	569.13%
	0.4	805.30%	671.18%	592.29%	540.33%	503.53%
	0.5	805.30%	640.70%	546.64%	485.78%	443.18%
	0.6	805.30%	611.30%	503.53%	434.95%	387.47%
	0.7	805.30%	582.94%	462.75%	387.47%	335.88%
	0.8	805.30%	555.56%	424.12%	343.02%	287.98%
	0.9	805.30%	529.10%	387.47%	301.32%	243.39%
	1	805.30%	503.53%	352.65%	262.12%	201.77%

		Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Marina (γ)				
LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Marina **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Marina $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	405.33%	405.33%	405.33%	405.33%	405.33%
	0.1	405.33%	385.52%	372.73%	363.80%	357.21%
	0.2	405.33%	366.46%	342.17%	325.54%	313.45%
	0.3	405.33%	348.12%	313.45%	290.19%	273.51%
	0.4	405.33%	330.47%	286.43%	257.43%	236.89%
	0.5	405.33%	313.45%	260.95%	226.98%	203.20%
	0.6	405.33%	297.05%	236.89%	198.61%	172.10%
	0.7	405.33%	281.22%	214.13%	172.10%	143.31%
	0.8	405.33%	265.93%	192.56%	147.29%	116.57%
	0.9	405.33%	251.16%	172.10%	124.01%	91.68%
	1	405.33%	236.89%	152.67%	102.13%	68.44%

Figure 4.6/Table A.8 (Stable Alters): Aécio/Dilma

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Aécio (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Aécio **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Aécio (π_1- π_0)	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.762**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	944.20%	944.20%	944.20%	944.20%	944.20%
	0.1	944.20%	903.25%	876.83%	858.37%	844.75%
	0.2	944.20%	863.88%	813.67%	779.33%	754.34%
	0.3	944.20%	825.99%	754.34%	706.28%	671.80%
	0.4	944.20%	789.50%	698.51%	638.58%	596.13%
	0.5	944.20%	754.34%	645.86%	575.66%	526.52%
	0.6	944.20%	720.44%	596.13%	517.03%	462.26%
	0.7	944.20%	687.73%	549.10%	462.26%	402.76%
	0.8	944.20%	656.14%	504.54%	410.99%	347.51%
	0.9	944.20%	625.63%	462.26%	362.89%	296.08%
	1	944.20%	596.13%	422.10%	317.68%	248.07%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Aécio (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Aécio **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Aécio (π_1- π_0)	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	219.76%	219.76%	219.76%	219.76%	219.76%
	0.1	219.76%	207.22%	199.13%	193.48%	189.31%
	0.2	219.76%	195.17%	179.79%	169.27%	161.62%
	0.3	219.76%	183.56%	161.62%	146.91%	136.35%
	0.4	219.76%	172.39%	144.52%	126.17%	113.18%
	0.5	219.76%	161.62%	128.40%	106.91%	91.86%
	0.6	219.76%	151.24%	113.18%	88.95%	72.18%
	0.7	219.76%	141.22%	98.77%	72.18%	53.96%
	0.8	219.76%	131.55%	85.13%	56.48%	37.04%
	0.9	219.76%	122.21%	72.18%	41.75%	21.29%
	1	219.76%	113.18%	59.88%	27.91%	6.59%

Figure 4.5/Table A.8 (Stable Alters): Marina/Dilma

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Marina (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Marina **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Marina $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.984**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	1377.55%	1377.55%	1377.55%	1377.55%	1377.55%
	0.1	1377.55%	1319.61%	1282.23%	1256.11%	1236.83%
	0.2	1377.55%	1263.90%	1192.86%	1144.26%	1108.91%
	0.3	1377.55%	1210.28%	1108.91%	1040.90%	992.10%
	0.4	1377.55%	1158.66%	1029.89%	945.10%	885.04%
	0.5	1377.55%	1108.91%	955.40%	856.06%	786.53%
	0.6	1377.55%	1060.93%	885.04%	773.10%	695.61%
	0.7	1377.55%	1014.65%	818.48%	695.61%	611.41%
	0.8	1377.55%	969.95%	755.43%	623.06%	533.24%
	0.9	1377.55%	926.77%	695.61%	555.00%	460.45%
	1	1377.55%	885.04%	638.78%	491.02%	392.52%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Marina (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Marina **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Marina $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	190.08%	190.08%	190.08%	190.08%	190.08%
	0.1	190.08%	178.70%	171.36%	166.24%	162.45%
	0.2	190.08%	167.76%	153.82%	144.28%	137.34%
	0.3	190.08%	157.24%	137.34%	123.98%	114.41%
	0.4	190.08%	147.10%	121.82%	105.18%	93.38%
	0.5	190.08%	137.34%	107.20%	87.70%	74.05%
	0.6	190.08%	127.92%	93.38%	71.41%	56.20%
	0.7	190.08%	118.83%	80.32%	56.20%	39.67%
	0.8	190.08%	110.06%	67.94%	41.95%	24.32%
	0.9	190.08%	101.58%	56.20%	28.59%	10.03%
	1	190.08%	93.38%	45.04%	16.03%	-3.31%

Figure 4.5/Table A.9 (Full Sample): AMLO/Calderón

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to AMLO (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to AMLO **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to AMLO $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.39**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	407.61%	407.61%	407.61%	407.61%	407.61%
	0.1	407.61%	387.71%	374.86%	365.89%	359.27%
	0.2	407.61%	368.57%	344.16%	327.46%	315.32%
	0.3	407.61%	350.15%	315.32%	291.95%	275.19%
	0.4	407.61%	332.41%	288.17%	259.04%	238.41%
	0.5	407.61%	315.32%	262.58%	228.46%	204.57%
	0.6	407.61%	298.84%	238.41%	199.95%	173.33%
	0.7	407.61%	282.94%	215.54%	173.33%	144.41%
	0.8	407.61%	267.58%	193.88%	148.41%	117.55%
	0.9	407.61%	252.75%	173.33%	125.02%	92.54%
	1	407.61%	238.41%	153.81%	103.05%	69.20%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to AMLO (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to AMLO **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to AMLO $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	200.60%	200.60%	200.60%	200.60%	200.60%
	0.1	200.60%	188.81%	181.20%	175.89%	171.97%
	0.2	200.60%	177.47%	163.02%	153.14%	145.94%
	0.3	200.60%	166.57%	145.94%	132.11%	122.18%
	0.4	200.60%	156.06%	129.87%	112.62%	100.40%
	0.5	200.60%	145.94%	114.71%	94.50%	80.36%
	0.6	200.60%	136.18%	100.40%	77.63%	61.86%
	0.7	200.60%	126.77%	86.86%	61.86%	44.73%
	0.8	200.60%	117.67%	74.03%	47.10%	28.83%
	0.9	200.60%	108.89%	61.86%	33.25%	14.02%
	1	200.60%	100.40%	50.30%	20.24%	0.20%

Figure 4.5/Table A.9 (Full Sample): Madrazo/Calderón

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Madrazo (γ)

	POINT ESTIMATE:	**2.547**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Madrazo **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Madrazo	$\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	815.04%	815.04%	815.04%	815.04%	815.04%
		0.1	815.04%	779.16%	756.01%	739.83%	727.89%
		0.2	815.04%	744.65%	700.66%	670.56%	648.67%
		0.3	815.04%	711.45%	648.67%	606.55%	576.33%
		0.4	815.04%	679.48%	599.74%	547.22%	510.03%
		0.5	815.04%	648.67%	553.60%	492.08%	449.02%
		0.6	815.04%	618.96%	510.03%	440.71%	392.71%
		0.7	815.04%	590.29%	468.81%	392.71%	340.57%
		0.8	815.04%	562.62%	429.76%	347.79%	292.16%
		0.9	815.04%	535.88%	392.71%	305.64%	247.08%
		1	815.04%	510.03%	357.52%	266.02%	205.01%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Madrazo (γ)

	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI		**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Madrazo **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Madrazo	$\pi_1 - \pi_0$	0	249.35%	249.35%	249.35%	249.35%	249.35%
		0.1	249.35%	235.65%	226.81%	220.64%	216.08%
		0.2	249.35%	222.48%	205.68%	194.19%	185.83%
		0.3	249.35%	209.80%	185.83%	169.75%	158.22%
		0.4	249.35%	197.60%	167.15%	147.10%	132.90%
		0.5	249.35%	185.83%	149.54%	126.05%	109.61%
		0.6	249.35%	174.49%	132.90%	106.44%	88.11%
		0.7	249.35%	163.55%	117.17%	88.11%	68.21%
		0.8	249.35%	152.98%	102.26%	70.96%	49.72%
		0.9	249.35%	142.77%	88.11%	54.87%	32.51%
		1	249.35%	132.90%	74.68%	39.74%	16.45%

Figure 4.6/Table A.9 (Stable Alters): AMLO/Calderón

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to AMLO (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to AMLO **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to AMLO $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.408**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	263.84%	263.84%	263.84%	263.84%	263.84%
	0.1	263.84%	249.57%	240.36%	233.93%	229.19%
	0.2	263.84%	235.85%	218.36%	206.39%	197.69%
	0.3	263.84%	222.65%	197.69%	180.94%	168.92%
	0.4	263.84%	209.94%	178.23%	157.35%	142.56%
	0.5	263.84%	197.69%	159.88%	135.42%	118.30%
	0.6	263.84%	185.87%	142.56%	115.00%	95.91%
	0.7	263.84%	174.47%	126.17%	95.91%	75.18%
	0.8	263.84%	163.47%	110.64%	78.05%	55.93%
	0.9	263.84%	152.84%	95.91%	61.29%	38.01%
	1	263.84%	142.56%	81.92%	45.54%	21.28%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to AMLO (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to AMLO **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to AMLO $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	121.63%	121.63%	121.63%	121.63%	121.63%
	0.1	121.63%	112.94%	107.33%	103.41%	100.52%
	0.2	121.63%	104.58%	93.92%	86.63%	81.33%
	0.3	121.63%	96.54%	81.33%	71.13%	63.81%
	0.4	121.63%	88.79%	69.48%	56.76%	47.75%
	0.5	121.63%	81.33%	58.30%	43.41%	32.98%
	0.6	121.63%	74.14%	47.75%	30.96%	19.34%
	0.7	121.63%	67.19%	37.77%	19.34%	6.71%
	0.8	121.63%	60.49%	28.31%	8.46%	-5.02%
	0.9	121.63%	54.01%	19.34%	-1.75%	-15.93%
	1	121.63%	47.75%	10.81%	-11.35%	-26.12%

Figure 4.6/Table A.9 (Stable Alters): Madrazo/Calderón

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Madrazo (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Madrazo **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Madrazo $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	POINT ESTIMATE: **2.607**	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	817.83%	817.83%	817.83%	817.83%	817.83%
	0.1	817.83%	781.84%	758.61%	742.39%	730.42%
	0.2	817.83%	747.23%	703.10%	672.91%	650.95%
	0.3	817.83%	713.92%	650.95%	608.70%	578.40%
	0.4	817.83%	681.85%	601.87%	549.20%	511.89%
	0.5	817.83%	650.95%	555.59%	493.89%	450.70%
	0.6	817.83%	621.15%	511.89%	442.35%	394.22%
	0.7	817.83%	592.40%	470.54%	394.22%	341.92%
	0.8	817.83%	564.63%	431.37%	349.15%	293.36%
	0.9	817.83%	537.81%	394.22%	306.87%	248.14%
	1	817.83%	511.89%	358.91%	267.13%	205.94%

Effect of *U*=1 on likelihood (relative to *U*=0) of switching to Madrazo (γ)

Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who switched to Madrazo **minus** Prevalence of *U* among egos with alters who did not switch to Madrazo $\pi_1 - \pi_0$	LOWER BOUND OF 95% CI	**1**	**1.5**	**2**	**2.5**	**3**
	0	273.16%	273.16%	273.16%	273.16%	273.16%
	0.1	273.16%	258.52%	249.08%	242.48%	237.62%
	0.2	273.16%	244.45%	226.51%	214.24%	205.31%
	0.3	273.16%	230.91%	205.31%	188.13%	175.81%
	0.4	273.16%	217.87%	185.35%	163.94%	148.77%
	0.5	273.16%	205.31%	166.54%	141.45%	123.89%
	0.6	273.16%	193.19%	148.77%	120.50%	100.93%
	0.7	273.16%	181.50%	131.96%	100.93%	79.67%
	0.8	273.16%	170.22%	116.04%	82.61%	59.92%
	0.9	273.16%	159.31%	100.93%	65.42%	41.54%
	1	273.16%	148.77%	86.58%	49.26%	24.39%

II. Friends-Only Dyadic Models

We re-estimate the models in Tables A.6 through A.9—hence we name and number them identically here—while limiting the sample of dyads to those in which the main respondent said the discussant was a friend, not a relative. We use *Relationship with discussant* to classify this relationship. Despite the smaller sample sizes, sixteen of the eighteen relevant coefficients (which are shaded) remain statistically significant, and the two that are not are significant at $p<.1$.

Table A.6 (Friend Alters Only): Ego Vote Choice by Alter Vote Choice in Brazil 2002: Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors

	Full Sample			Stable Alters Sample		
	Lula / Serra	*Garo. / Serra*	*Ciro / Serra*	*Lula / Serra*	*Garo. / Serra*	*Ciro / Serra*
Horizontal Intermediation						
Alter vote choice *e wave*						
Lula	1.653* (0.231)	0.782* (0.346)	0.614* (0.287)			
Garotinho	0.234 (0.568)	1.891* (0.521)	-0.404 (0.583)			
Ciro	0.926* (0.346)	0.549 (0.494)	0.864* (0.357)			
No one	1.202* (0.252)	0.731* (0.330)	0.559 (0.313)			
Serra	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline			
Alter vote intention *c wave*						
Lula	-0.608* (0.271)	-0.223 (0.388)	-0.181 (0.387)	0.898* (0.363)	0.471 (0.512)	0.559 (0.529)
Garotinho	-0.008 (0.558)	-0.407 (0.604)	0.105 (0.743)	0.669 (0.904)	2.202* (0.860)	0.292 (1.199)
Ciro	-0.249 (0.270)	-0.248 (0.374)	0.513 (0.347)	0.579 (0.542)	0.131 (0.666)	1.604* (0.591)
No one	-0.545 (0.293)	-0.516 (0.393)	0.273 (0.390)	0.485 (0.415)	0.045 (0.579)	0.683 (0.590)
Serra	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Political Predispositions						
Macroeconomic evaluations *pc wave*	-0.087 (0.095)	0.003 (0.125)	-0.157 (0.116)	0.088 (0.123)	-0.003 (0.164)	-0.165 (0.150)
PT partisanship *pc wave*	2.250* (0.592)	0.811 (0.694)	0.012 (0.692)	2.981* (0.862)	1.042 (0.916)	0.471 (0.859)
Partisanship toward another party or no partisanship *pc wave*	0.546 (0.368)	0.084 (0.412)	0.217 (0.405)	1.238* (0.484)	0.170 (0.549)	0.153 (0.532)
PSDB partisanship *pc wave*	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Position in issue space *pc wave*	0.131 (0.115)	0.242 (0.152)	-0.067 (0.136)	0.397* (0.171)	0.294 (0.212)	0.047 (0.185)
Ego vote intention *c wave*						
Lula	4.514* (0.486)	2.519* (0.680)	5.026* (1.139)	4.716* (0.648)	1.327 (0.965)	15.530* (0.642)
Garotinho	1.969* (0.526)	3.983* (0.641)	2.961* (1.284)	3.455* (0.684)	4.641* (0.785)	-2.343* (0.606)
Ciro	1.543* (0.322)	1.699* (0.500)	5.431* (1.046)	2.149* (0.454)	1.812* (0.618)	17.053* (0.334)
No one	2.184* (0.363)	2.147* (0.572)	3.817* (1.144)	2.539* (0.491)	1.884* (0.737)	15.659* (0.618)
Serra	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Ego vote intention *pc wave*						
Lula	2.889* (0.625)	2.043* (0.747)	1.940* (0.730)	2.600* (0.833)	2.498* (1.014)	2.168* (0.955)
Garotinho	0.807 (0.470)	1.471* (0.558)	0.650 (0.556)	0.635 (0.606)	2.091* (0.767)	1.193 (0.730)

Ciro	1.113*	0.603	1.283*	1.063	0.689	0.660
	(0.449)	(0.585)	(0.461)	(0.546)	(0.825)	(0.579)
Other	0.706*	-0.075	-0.206	0.651	0.432	-0.262
	(0.341)	(0.502)	(0.420)	(0.419)	(0.713)	(0.570)
No one	0.695	0.188	0.201	0.624	0.757	0.328
	(0.372)	(0.550)	(0.487)	(0.470)	(0.760)	(0.614)
Serra	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Juiz de Fora resident	1.520*	0.968*	1.667*	1.691*	1.510*	1.669*
	(0.248)	(0.340)	(0.323)	(0.321)	(0.462)	(0.418)
Constant	-5.639*	-5.136*	-8.495*	-7.081*	-6.199*	-19.994*
	(0.630)	(0.930)	(1.314)	(0.885)	(1.174)	(0.931)
Observations		2,357			1,201	

Table A.7 (Friend Alters Only): Ego Vote Choice by Alter Vote Choice in Brazil 2006: Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors

	Full Sample		Stable Alters Sample	
	Alckmin / *Lula*	*Helena* / *Lula*	*Alckmin* / *Lula*	*Helena* / *Lula*
Horizontal Intermediation				
Alter vote choice$_{e\ wave}$				
Alckmin	1.818* (0.309)	0.426 (0.434)		
Helena	1.664* (0.534)	2.641* (0.559)		
Other	0.403 (0.465)	0.671 (0.553)		
No one	0.765* (0.336)	0.486 (0.411)		
Lula	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline		
Alter vote intention$_{c\ wave}$				
Alckmin	-0.038 (0.385)	0.258 (0.481)	1.583* (0.413)	0.863 (0.590)
Helena	0.422 (0.682)	-0.330 (0.646)	15.508* (0.761)	16.506* (0.714)
Other	-0.844 (0.721)	-0.232 (0.801)	0.775 (0.863)	-10.872* (0.759)
No one	-0.323 (0.358)	-0.032 (0.386)	0.465 (0.469)	0.761 (0.475)
Lula	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Political Predispositions				
Macroeconomic evaluations$_{c\ wave}$	-0.079 (0.153)	0.159 (0.244)	-0.030 (0.220)	0.204 (0.304)
Presidential approval$_{c\ wave}$	-0.620* (0.181)	-0.417 (0.232)	-0.580* (0.227)	-0.201 (0.314)
PSDB partisanship$_{c\ wave}$	4.141* (1.310)	3.273* (1.482)	4.501* (1.524)	3.189 (1.711)
Partisanship toward another party or no partisanship$_{c\ wave}$	0.742* (0.347)	0.533 (0.465)	1.520* (0.479)	1.044 (0.537)
PT partisanship$_{c\ wave}$	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted Baseline
Position in issue space$_{c\ wave}$	-0.007 (0.141)	0.347 (0.197)	-0.160 (0.207)	0.248 (0.262)
Ego vote intention$_{c\ wave}$				
Alckmin	3.276* (0.425)	2.368* (0.668)	3.456* (0.578)	2.511* (0.911)
Helena	1.944* (0.443)	3.642* (0.602)	1.813* (0.544)	3.861* (0.766)
Other	2.818* (0.886)	2.634* (1.134)	2.805* (1.131)	2.339 (1.630)
No one	2.398* (0.458)	2.337* (0.634)	2.453* (0.660)	2.709* (0.765)
Lula	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted Baseline
Juiz de Fora resident	-0.748* (0.295)	0.905* (0.383)	-0.636 (0.399)	1.121* (0.500)
Constant	0.179	-4.659*	-0.610	-6.488*

	(1.013)	(1.361)	(1.261)	(1.799)
Observations	1,147		602	

Entries are multinomial logit coefficients with robust standard errors (corrected for clustering on main respondent) in parentheses.

Table A.8 (Friend Alters Only): Ego Vote Choice by Alter Vote Choice in Brazil 2014: Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors

	Full Sample		Stable Alters Sample	
	Aécio / *Dilma*	*Marina* / *Dilma*	*Aécio* / *Dilma*	*Marina* / *Dilma*
Horizontal Intermediation				
Alter vote choice$_{e\ wave}$				
Aécio	5.106* (0.899)	2.191* (1.118)		
Marina	1.525 (0.955)	3.161* (0.867)		
Other	-14.360* (2.029)	-14.202* (1.432)		
No one	-17.638* (2.211)	-0.498 (1.545)		
Dilma	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline		
Alter vote intention$_{c\ wave}$				
Aécio	-3.187* (1.333)	0.275 (1.172)	6.060 (3.163)	5.571* (2.277)
Marina	0.790 (0.780)	0.093 (0.786)	2.861 (1.477)	4.564* (1.349)
Other	-18.424* (1.758)	1.385 (1.412)		
No one	2.826 (1.729)	3.211* (1.434)	-13.673* (1.918)	5.334* (2.246)
Dilma	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Political Predispositions				
Macroeconomic evaluations$_{pc\ wave}$	0.709 (0.509)	-0.417 (0.359)	0.419 (0.497)	-1.738* (0.607)
Presidential approval$_{pc\ wave}$	0.052 (0.489)	-0.722 (0.412)	-1.795 (1.220)	-2.156* (1.094)
PSDB partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	4.673* (1.710)	6.709* (1.993)	1.865 (1.543)	7.635* (2.322)
PSB partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	4.354* (2.062)	4.255 (2.441)	-11.432* (2.870)	4.628 (3.540)
PT partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted Baseline
Partisanship toward another party or no partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	0.788 (0.772)	3.202* (1.270)	-0.010 (1.439)	2.839 (1.816)
Position in issue space$_{pc\ wave}$	0.493 (0.373)	-0.110 (0.255)	-0.898 (0.556)	-0.174 (0.829)
Ego vote intention$_{c\ wave}$				
Aécio	5.268* (1.528)	2.418 (1.323)	0.690 (2.693)	-14.783* (2.209)
Marina	1.726 (0.887)	3.713* (0.985)	0.245 (1.753)	8.386* (2.106)
Other	1.041 (1.414)	4.265* (1.265)	-15.046* (2.850)	12.298* (3.384)
No one	1.626 (1.448)	2.936* (0.999)	1.542 (2.097)	7.637* (2.538)
Dilma	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Ego vote intention$_{pc\ wave}$				
Aécio	-0.195 (1.368)	-1.079 (1.412)	-0.460 (1.713)	-7.164* (2.481)
Marina	0.177 (1.317)	0.869 (1.092)	-15.680* (1.446)	-5.333* (2.157)
Other	2.193* (1.118)	0.334 (1.238)	2.687 (1.911)	-4.333 (2.728)

No one	-0.563	-1.055	0.574	-5.914*
	(1.100)	(1.098)	(1.425)	(2.078)
Dilma	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline	Omitted baseline
Constant	-1.815	-6.149*	-1.149	-5.756
	(2.001)	(2.096)	(3.784)	(5.070)
Observations	270		163	

C wave is waves 4 and 5. Entries are multinomial logit coefficients with robust standard errors (corrected for clustering on main respondent) in parentheses.

Table A.9 (Friend Alters Only): Ego Vote Choice by Alter Vote Choice in Brazil 2006: Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors

	Full Sample		Stable Alters Sample	
	$\frac{AMLO}{Calderón}$	$\frac{Madrazo}{Calderón}$	$\frac{AMLO}{Calderón}$	$\frac{Madrazo}{Calderón}$
Horizontal Intermediation				
Alter vote choice$_{e\ wave}$				
AMLO	1.580 (0.915)	-1.232 (0.966)		
Madrazo	1.060 (0.941)	2.832* (0.972)		
Other	-12.464* (1.480)	0.140 (1.346)		
No one	-0.889 (1.070)	-1.942 (1.440)		
Calderón	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline		
Alter vote intention$_{c\ wave}$				
AMLO	2.758* (0.841)	1.263 (0.883)	4.121* (1.535)	-0.176 (1.327)
Madrazo	2.191* (1.074)	-0.191 (0.800)	3.236* (1.640)	4.154* (1.225)
Other	-12.788* (1.525)	4.223* (1.309)	-11.961* (2.559)	8.506 (4.791)
No one	1.357 (1.018)	0.902 (0.865)	1.056 (1.345)	0.994 (3.286)
Calderón	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline
Political Predispositions				
Macroeconomic evaluations$_{pc\ wave}$	-0.039 (0.401)	-1.012 (0.617)	-0.441 (0.560)	-1.881* (0.797)
Presidential approval$_{pc\ wave}$	-0.373 (0.373)	-1.030* (0.505)	0.152 (0.430)	-0.462 (0.701)
PRI partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	-2.301 (1.762)	-2.875 (1.742)	-0.607 (1.953)	-0.567 (2.097)
PRD partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	1.859 (1.855)	1.526 (2.510)	3.886 (3.383)	3.084 (3.539)
Partisanship toward another party or no partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	0.660 (0.836)	-0.035 (1.523)	1.764* (0.897)	0.803 (1.750)
PAN partisanship$_{pc\ wave}$	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline
Position on trade with US$_{pc\ wave}$	0.567 (0.291)	-0.185 (0.288)	0.617 (0.405)	-0.655 (0.383)
Position on privatization$_{pc\ wave}$	-0.094 (0.184)	-0.568 (0.311)	-0.124 (0.244)	-1.250 (0.638)
Position on abortion$_{pc\ wave}$	0.024 (0.206)	0.421 (0.231)	0.033 (0.276)	0.410 (0.364)
Position on capital punishment$_{pc\ wave}$	0.044 (0.203)	0.091 (0.202)	-0.125 (0.295)	-0.353 (0.410)
Ego vote intention$_{c\ wave}$				
AMLO	4.532* (1.059)	3.093 (1.634)	5.517* (1.526)	4.245 (2.227)
Madrazo	0.411 (1.195)	8.546* (1.844)	0.334 (1.261)	9.475* (2.453)
Other	21.253* (2.118)	20.718* (1.826)	31.459* (2.926)	10.450* (4.262)

No one	0.749	0.447	0.694	4.101
	(1.286)	(1.719)	(1.433)	(3.079)
Calderón	Omitted baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline
Ego vote intention*pc wave*				
AMLO	1.642	-1.993	0.947	12.357*
	(1.119)	(1.963)	(1.348)	(3.062)
Madrazo	1.779	1.829	1.461	15.330*
	(1.682)	(1.368)	(1.982)	(3.197)
Other	-5.320*	-1.866	-13.981*	16.830*
	(2.253)	(2.180)	(1.724)	(3.418)
No one	-0.875	2.010	0.651	16.588*
	(1.217)	(1.355)	(1.329)	(2.184)
Calderón	Omitted baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline
Constant	-5.578	1.104	-6.804	-11.356*
	(2.878)	(2.358)	(4.118)	(2.826)
Observations	403		283	

VanderWeele, Tyler J. “Sensitivity Analysis for Contagion Effects in Social Networks.” *Sociological Methods & Research* 40, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 240–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124111404821.