Supplemental Materials for Dynamics of Gubernatorial Approval: Evidence from a New Database

In the text, I constrain the models to be based on the same sample to ensure that differences across dependent variables are not due to composition effects and I impute any gaps in series that are shorter than three quarters. Below I replicate the analysis in Table 3 with (1) all the available observations for each series in Table A1 and (2) without using any imputed data in Table A2. The results for honeymoons are essentially the same in the two additional specifications, although the roughly 0.5-0.6 point "jump" the governor gets at the start of their second term is statically significant in Table A2 but not in Table 3 or A1. The most important differences in the results between the results in Table 3 and those in Table A1 and A2 are the estimates of the effect of discrete events like resignations and deaths. The effects of resignation are larger when imputed surveys are not used in Table A2, which is not surprising given that the imputation process will not capture the effect of changing governors and so imputed measures in quarters where the survey was not conducted include estimated popularities for governors who are no longer in office. The dataset also does not include any quarters where governors died, so the immediate effect of that variable (which is already tenuous) is not estimated. Then the immediate effect of unemployment on approval is not quite significant at the 0.05 level in Table A1 or A2, although the substantive sizes of the effect are not different from the one estimated in Table 3. While these variables are not the main indicators of interest, readers should be aware of differences that might emerge from specification and especially consider that the usage of imputation can have impacts on the analysis of events and use different specifications to evaluate the robustness of key findings.

Table A1: Dynamics of Governor Approval, 1976-2019 for All States that are Available for Each Series.

	Relative Approval [1]	Approval [2]	Disapproval [1]
Quarter 1, First Term	4.822*	0.956*	-7.364*
	(0.299)	(0.291)	(0.317)
Quarter 2, First Term	1.780*	0.869*	-2.591*
	(0.276)	(0.259)	(0.296)
Quarter 3, First Term	1.279*	1.065*	-1.279*
	(0.261)	(0.249)	(0.277)
Quarter 1, Second+ Term	0.650*	0.475	-0.750*
	(0.311)	(0.289)	(0.334)
Quarter 2, Second+ Term	0.226	0.279	-0.376
	(0.309)	(0.287)	(0.330)
Quarter 3, Second+ Term	0.025	0.093	0.115
	(0.292)	(0.269)	(0.312)
Unemployment in the State$_t$	-0.178*	-0.127	0.245*
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.076)
Unemployment in the State$_{t-1}$	-0.351*	-0.290*	0.338*

	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.074)
Unemployment in the State$_{t-2}$	-0.182*	-0.142	0.139*
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.076)
Elections Quarter	0.002	0.224	0.085
	(0.158)	(0.149)	(0.173)
Female	0.146	-0.406	-0.041
	(0.514)	(0.455)	(0.530)
Non-Elected Governor	2.263*	1.277*	-2.633*
	(0.482)	(0.458)	(0.522)
Governor Resigned that Quarter	3.243*	-0.023	-3.476*
	(0.602)	(0.577)	(0.667)
Governor Resigned that Quarter$_{t-1}$	2.326*	-0.162	-2.543*
	(0.688)	(0.653)	(0.753)
Governor Resigned that Quarter$_{t-2}$	0.448	-0.350	-0.597
	(0.582)	(0.561)	(0.640)
Governor Died that Quarter	2.235	1.075	-1.169
	(1.609)	(2.266)	(1.685)
Governor Died that Quarter$_{t-1}$	-0.695	1.960	2.373
	(2.134)	(3.883)	(2.164)
Governor Died that Quarter$_{t-2}$	1.186	3.128	-1.439
	(3.170)	(2.275)	(3.718)
Republican	-0.953*	-0.651*	1.176*
	(0.287)	(0.259)	(0.309)
Independent	-1.548	-1.034	1.919
	(1.231)	(1.320)	(1.277)
Constant	60.317*	53.867*	35.509*
	(0.657)	(0.572)	(0.691)
N Observations	4,677	4,736	4,617
N States	46	47	45
χ^2	413.48*	86.35*	740.13*
Generalized least squares estimates with panel-specific AR(1) corrections and heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)			

Table A2: Dynamics of Governor Approval, 1976-2019 using Only Quarters Where Data Was Actually Collected.

	Relative Approval [1]	Approval [2]	Disapproval [1]
Quarter 1, First Term	5.584*	0.915*	-8.493*
	(0.354)	(0.348)	(0.373)
Quarter 2, First Term	2.278*	0.982*	-3.293*
	(0.330)	(0.316)	(0.354)
Quarter 3, First Term	1.576*	1.079*	-1.749*

	(0.312)	(0.303)	(0.331)
Quarter 1, Second+ Term	0.569	0.299	-0.673
	(0.370)	(0.363)	(0.388)
Quarter 2, Second+ Term	0.265	0.342	-0.293
	(0.364)	(0.355)	(0.383)
Quarter 3, Second+ Term	-0.034	0.057	0.232
	(0.345)	(0.335)	(0.362)
Unemployment in the State$_t$	-0.234*	-0.181	0.323*
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.102)
Unemployment in the State$_{t-1}$	-0.414*	-0.387*	0.351*
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.098)
Unemployment in the State$_{t-2}$	-0.100	-0.081	0.079
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.102)
Elections Quarter	-0.244	0.279	0.619
	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.245)
Female	-0.339	-0.337	0.717
	(0.591)	(0.548)	(0.603)
Non-Elected Governor	2.101*	1.286*	-2.535*
	(0.600)	(0.577)	(0.644)
Governor Resigned that Quarter	4.929*	-0.322	-5.875*
	(0.791)	(0.751)	(0.911)
Governor Resigned that Quarter$_{t-1}$	3.662*	-0.297	-4.367*
	(0.794)	(0.777)	(0.862)
Governor Resigned that Quarter$_{t-2}$	0.894	-0.544	-1.138
	(0.752)	(0.714)	(0.828)
Governor Died that Quarter	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
Governor Died that Quarter$_{t-1}$	5.653	0.259	0.786
	(4.953)	(4.623)	(4.474)
Governor Died that Quarter$_{t-2}$	2.093	-0.580	-2.236
	(4.948)	(4.617)	(4.467)
Republican	-1.126*	-0.694*	1.152*
	(0.335)	(0.315)	(0.358)
Independent	-2.726	-2.070	3.403*
	(1.545)	(1.580)	(1.631)
Constant	60.150*	54.099*	35.920*
	(0.698)	(0.630)	(0.729)
N Observations	3,594	3,594	3,594
N States	44	44	44
χ^2	420.5o*	76.75*	753.68*
Generalized least squares estimates with panel-specific AR(1) corrections and heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)			