Appendix 2 - for online publication: Leadership and incentives

2015

In this web-appendix we present the instructions that were read, instructions on screen and the control questions used in the experiment. Please note that text in brackets indicates comments to the procedure that were not read by the session leaders.

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1 General introduction (all treatments)

Welcome. My name is ... and I will lead this session. The instructions will be in English, since this is part of an international research project financed by the Norwegian Research Council. Please listen carefully to the instructions.

In this experiment you can, depending on the decisions you and others make, earn more money in addition to the 100 NOK that you receive in show-up fee. Your earnings will be added to your show-up fee and paid to you in cash at the end of the session.

You are not allowed to communicate during the session. If you have questions, please ask us. Violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the session and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of the research team will come to you and answer them in private.

You will be **completely anonymous** throughout the session, which means that it will not be possible for the other participants - or us - to identify which decisions you make. At the end of the session you will get a payment code on your screen. You will be asked to write this code down on the sheet that is in the folder next to you. You will show this sheet when you leave the session, and you will then be handed over an envelope with the corresponding code, which contains the money you have earned in the session. The research assistants who have prepared the envelope will not be in the room when the envelopes are distributed, which ensures that no one can identify how much each of you have earned in the session.

We will not speak of Norwegian kroner (NOK), but rather of points. Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the session, the total amount of points you earned will be converted to NOK, and you will be paid accordingly.

An example:

We will now introduce you to an example, and we want to make sure that you understand this example before we proceed. You will therefore be given some control questions after the description of the example, and we will not proceed before everyone has answered correctly all these questions. A copy of this example is provided by the sheet named "explanation sheet" , and you should now take out this copy and follow carefully my description of the example.

[Leader waits until everyone has taken out the copy]

Assume that you are a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member has to decide on the allocation of 20 points. You can put these 20 points

into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project, remains in your private account.

Your income from the private account:

You earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points into your private account (and therefore do not invest into the project) your income amounts to exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account is 6 points. **No one except you earns something from your private account.**

Your income from the project:

Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the project. On the other hand, you also get a payoff from the other group members' investments. The income from the project for each group member in this example is determined as follows:

Income from the project = sum of all contributions x 0.4

If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then you and the other members of your group **each** earn 60 x 0.4 = 24 points out of the project. If four members of the group contribute a total of 10 points to the project, you and the other members of your group **each** earn 10 x 0.4 = 4 points.

Total income:

Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the project:

Income from your private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)

= Total income in points

You should now move to the next screen to answer some control questions to the example.

1.1 Screenshot - control questions

http://192.168.10.51/mmin/understandingquestions/

Control questions:

Please answer the following control questions on the introductory example. They will help you understand the situations that you will face later in the experiment. *Please answer all the questions and submit your answers.*

1. Each group member has 20 points. Assume that none of the four group members (including you) contributes anything to the project.
    1. **What is *your* total income?**
    2. **What is the total income of each of the *other* group members?**
2. Each group member has 20 points. You invest 20 points in the project. Each of the other three members of the group also contributes 20 points to the project.
    1. **What is *your* total income?**
    2. **What is the total income of the *other* group members?**
3. Each group member has 20 points. The other 3 members contribute a total of 30 points to the project.
    1. **What is *your* total income, if you - in addition to the 30 points - invest 0 points into the project?**
    2. **What is your total income, if you - in addition to the 30 points - invest 10 points into the project?**
    3. **What is your total income, if you - in addition to the 30 points - invest 15 points into the project?**
4. Each group member has 20 points at his or her disposal. Assume that you invest 8 points to the project.
    1. **What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 8 points - contribute 7 points in total to the project?**
    2. **What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 8 points - contribute 12 points in total to the project?**
    3. **What is your income if the other group members - in addition to your 8 points - contribute 22 points in total to the project?**

Submit your answers

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2 C-experiment

2.1 Base treatment - C-experiment

[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all the questions]

Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.

[The following should not be read by Leader, only on screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next page]

2.1.1 Instructions on screen for base treatment

Instructions

You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.

In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of **4 participants**. The group changes at **random** after every round. **So your group consists of *different* people in all 10 rounds.** Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion rate is:

1 point = 1.00 NOK.

Your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the project:

Income from your private account	(= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project	(=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points	

In each round, you will be asked you to make two inputs.

1. First you have to **decide on your contribution to the project** in this round, that is, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how many points you want to put into your private account.
2. Afterwards you have to **estimate the average contribution to the project** (rounded to an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
   - If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
   - If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional points.
   - If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the correct result, you earn 1 additional point.
   - If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you do not earn any additional points.

You will have 90 seconds to fill in the decision screen in each round. If the time runs out you will be given 90 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment.

After each round you will be informed about the contributions and earnings in your group in this round. We will then **randomly** select a new group for you for the next round. When you have completed all 10 rounds, you will be asked to wait until you get further instructions on the screen.

When you have completed reading these instructions, please move to the next screen. You will here be asked to wait until everyone is ready to move to the first decision screen.

I have read the instructions

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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instructions]

Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you by the sheet you have next to you named "Instructions". Please follow carefully your screen.

2.2 No compensation treatment - C-experiment

[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all the questions]

Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.

[The following should not be read by Leader, only on screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next page]

2.2.1 Instructions on screen for no compensation treatment

Instructions

You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.

In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of **4 participants**. The group changes at **random** after every round. **So your group consists of *different* people in all 10 rounds.** Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion rate is:

1 point = 1.00 NOK.

At the beginning of each round, all members of the group will be asked whether they want to be the **early contributor** of their group **in this round**. The early contributor makes his or her choice of contribution before the others, **and the choice of the early contributor is announced to the three other members of the group before they make their decision of how much to contribute**. In all other ways, the situation is identical to the example presented in the introduction.

You have 60 seconds to answer whether you want to be the early contributor of your group. If the time runs out you will be given 60 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment. If more than one person wants to be the early contributor in the group, the computer selects one of them randomly. If no one wants to be an early contributor, then there is no early contributor in the group. In this case, all four members of the group will make their decision at the same time.

Your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the project:

Income from your private account	(= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project	(=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points	

In each round, you will be asked to make two inputs.

1. First you have to **decide on your contribution to the project** in this round, that is, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how many points you want to put into your private account.
2. Afterwards you have to **estimate the average contribution to the project** (rounded to an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
   - If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
   - If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional points.
   - If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the correct result, you earn 1 additional point.
   - If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you do not earn any additional points.

You will have 90 seconds to fill in the decision screen in each round. If the time runs out you will be given 90 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment. **If someone else is an early contributor in your group, then we will post his or her contribution on your contribution decision screen. Hence, you will know his or her contribution before you make your own decision.**

After each round you will be informed about the contributions and earnings in your group in this round. We will then **randomly** select a new group for you for the next round and again ask whether you want to be the early contributor of this group. When you have completed all 10 rounds, you will be asked to wait until you get further instructions on the screen.

When you have completed reading these instructions, please move to the next screen. You will here be asked to wait until everyone is ready to move to the first decision screen.

I have read the instructions

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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instructions]

Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you by the sheet you have next to you named "Instructions". Please follow carefully your screen.

2.3 Moderate compensation treatment - C-experiment

[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all the questions]

Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.

[The following should not be read by Leader, only on screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next page]

2.3.1 Instructions on screen for moderate compensation treatment

Instructions

You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.

In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of **4 participants**. The group changes at **random** after every round. **So your group consists of *different* people in all 10 rounds.** Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion rate is:

1 point = 1.00 NOK.

At the beginning of each round, all members of the group will be asked whether they want to be the **early contributor** of their group **in this round**. The early contributor makes his or her choice of contribution before the others, **and the choice of the early contributor is announced to the three other members of the group before they make their decision of how much to contribute**. The early contributor will be paid **4** points in addition to what he or she earns from the private and public account. In all other ways, the situation is identical to the example presented in the introduction.

You have 60 seconds to answer whether you want to be the early contributor of your group. If the time runs out you will be given 60 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment. If more than one person wants to be the early contributor in the group, the computer selects one of them randomly. If no one wants to be an early contributor, then there will be no early contributor in the group. In this case, all four members of the group will make their decision at the same time.

If you are a **late contributor** your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the project:

Income from your private account	(= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project	(=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points	

If you are an **early contributor** your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account, your income from the project and the additional payment given to the early contributor:

Income from your private account	(= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project	(=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
+ Payment for being an early contributor	(=4)
= Total income in points	

In each round, you will be asked to make two inputs.

1. First you have to **decide on your contribution to the project** in this round, that is, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how many points you want to put into your private account.
2. Afterwards you have to **estimate the average contribution to the project** (rounded to an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
   - If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
   - If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional points.

- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the correct result, you earn 1 additional point.
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you do not earn any additional points.

You will have 90 seconds to fill in the decision screen in each round. If the time runs out you will be given 90 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment. **If someone else is the early contributor in your group, then we will post his or her contribution on your contribution decision screen. Hence, you will know his or her contribution before you make your own decision.**

After each round you will be informed about the contributions and earnings in your group in this round. We will then **randomly** select a new group for you for the next round and again ask whether you want to be the early contributor of this group. When you have completed all 10 rounds, you will be asked to wait until you get further instructions on the screen.

When you have completed reading these instructions, please move to the next screen. You will here be asked to wait until everyone is ready to move to the first decision screen.

I have read the instructions

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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instructions]

Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you by the sheet you have next to you named "Instructions". Please follow carefully your screen.

2.4 High compensation treatment - C-experiment

[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all the questions]

Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.

[The following should not be read by Leader, only on screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next page]

2.4.1 Instructions on screen for high compensation treatment

Instructions

You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.

In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of **4 participants**. The group changes at **random** after every round. **So your group consists of *different* people in all 10 rounds.** Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion rate is:

1 point = 1.00 NOK.

At the beginning of each round, all members of the group will be asked whether they want to be the **early contributor** of their group **in this round**. The early contributor makes his or her choice of contribution before the others, **and the choice of the early contributor is announced to the three other members of the group before they make their decision of how much to contribute**. The early contributor will be paid **12** points in addition to what he or she earns from the private and public account. In all other ways, the situation is identical to the example presented in the introduction.

You have 60 seconds to answer whether you want to be the early contributor of your group. If the time runs out you will be given 60 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment. If more than one person wants to be the early contributor in the group, the computer selects one of them randomly. If no one wants to be an early contributor, then there will be no early contributor in the group. In this case, all four members of the group will make their decision at the same time.

If you are a **late contributor** your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the project:

Income from your private account	(= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project	(=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points	

If you are an **early contributor** your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account, your income from the project and the additional payment given to the early contributor:

Income from your private account	(= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project	(=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
+ Payment for being an early contributor	(=12)
= Total income in points	

In each round, you will be asked to make two inputs.

1. First you have to **decide on your contribution to the project** in this round, that is, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how many points you want to put into your private account.
2. Afterwards you have to **estimate the average contribution to the project** (rounded to an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
   - If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
   - If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional points.

- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the correct result, you earn 1 additional point.
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you do not earn any additional points.

You will have 90 seconds to fill in the decision screen in each round. If the time runs out you will be given 90 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of the experiment. **If someone else is the early contributor in your group, then we will post his or her contribution on your contribution decision screen. Hence, you will know his or her contribution before you make your own decision.**

After each round you will be informed about the contributions and earnings in your group in this round. We will then **randomly** select a new group for you for the next round and again ask whether you want to be the early contributor of this group. When you have completed all 10 rounds, you will be asked to wait until you get further instructions on the screen.

When you have completed reading these instructions, please move to the next screen. You will here be asked to wait until everyone is ready to move to the first decision screen.

I have read the instructions

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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instructions]

Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you by the sheet you have next to you named "Instructions". Please follow carefully your screen.

3 P-experiment

[Leader moves on when everyone has completed the C-experiment]

We will now conduct another experiment, please follow carefully the instructions on the screen.

[The following should not be read by Leader, only on screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next page]

3.1 Instructions on screen to P-experiment

Instructions

This experiment will only be conducted **once** and is the last experiment in the session.

You will be asked to make a decision in a situation identical to the example presented in the introduction. Your group consists of **4 participants**, and the formation of groups is random. Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. Each point you do not invest into the project is automatically placed in your private account. The conversion rate is:

The conversion rate in this experiment:

1 point = 5.00 NOK.

Your total income in this experiment is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the project:

Income from your private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points

Each subject has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we refer to below as the **"unconditional contribution"** and the **"contribution table"**.

1. **Unconditional contribution:** Your first task will be to decide how many of the 20 points you want to invest into the project when you have no information about the contributions of the other group members.
2. **Contribution table:** Your second task is to fill in a "contribution table" where you indicate how many points **you** want to contribute to the project **for each possible average contribution of the other group members** (rounded to the nearest integer). To illustrate, consider the table below, which will be presented to you in the experiment.

Your conditional contribution to the project (Contribution schedule)

0:	7:	14:
1:	8:	15:
2:	9:	16:
3:	10:	17:
4:	11:	18:
5:	12:	19:
6:	13:	20:

OK

The numbers in the table are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group members to the project. You simply have to insert how many points you will contribute to the project into each input box. You have to make an entry into each input box. For example, you will have to indicate how much you contribute to the project if the others contribute 0 points to the project, how much you contribute if the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 points, etc. You can insert any integer numbers from 0 to 20 in each input box. Once you have made an entry in each input box, click "OK".

After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled in their contribution table, the computer randomly selects one of the group members. The contribution table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly selected member, the unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other three group members. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you

make your unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will therefore have to think carefully about both types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. Two examples should make this clear.

EXAMPLE 1: Assume **that the random mechanism selects you**. **This implies that your relevant decision will be your contribution table.** The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other three group members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0, 2, and 4 points. The average contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 2 points. If you indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point if the others contribute 2 points on average, then the total contribution to the project is given by 0+2+4+1=7 points. All group members, therefore, earn 0.4x7=2.8 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 19 points if the others contribute 2 points on average, then the total contribution of the group to the project is given by 0+2+4+19=25. All group members therefore earn 0.4x25=10 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account.

EXAMPLE 2: Assume **that the random mechanism did not select you**, implying that **the unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you** and two other group members. Assume your unconditional contribution is 16 points and those of the other two group members are 18 and 20 points. Your average unconditional contribution and that of the two other group members, therefore, is 18 points. If the group member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 1 point if the other three group members contribute on average 18 points, then the total contribution of the group to the project is given by 16+18+20+1=55 points. All group members will therefore earn 0.4x55=22 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account. If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in his or her contribution table that she contributes 19 if the others contribute on average 18 points, then the total contribution of that group to the project is 16+18+20+19=73 points. All group members will therefore earn 0.4x73=29.2 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account.

When you have completed reading these instructions, please move to the next screen. You will here be asked to wait until everyone is ready to move to the first decision screen.

I have read the instructions

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[Leader moves on when everyone has completed reading the instructions]

Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the decision screen. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you by the sheet you have next to you named "Instructions". Please follow carefully your screen. When you have made your decisions, please wait for further instructions.

4 Closing remarks (all treatments)

[Leader moves on when everyone has completed the P-experiment]

Everyone has now completed the second experiment. We should now like to ask you a few questions before we present the payment screen that shows how much you have earned in the experiment.

The earnings consist of: your income from the first experiment (including your income from your correct estimates) + your income from the second experiment = total income from both experiments + 100 NOK show up fee.

There will also be a payment code on the payment screen. As soon as the envelopes with payment have been brought into the lab, we will start the payment process. On request, show the payment code to my colleague and he will hand you the envelope with this code. This envelop contains your earnings. Please remain seated until we read your payment code.

Since we will conduct further sessions today, please do not talk to anyone about the experiment before tomorrow.

You can now start answering the questions and then move to the payment screen. This part ends the session. On behalf of the research group, I should like to thank you for your participation.

5 Motivation questions (fall 2013 only)

Questions:

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements (The rating scale is 1-5, with 1 meaning "strongly agree" and 5 meaning "strongly disagree").

If one of the statements do not apply to you, you can tick off "not applicable" in the right-most column.

	1: agree strongly	2	3: neutral	4	5: disagree strongly	Not Applicable
1. When there was an early contributor, his or her contribution was very important for my decision of what to contribute.	○	○	○	○	○	○
2. When there was an early contributor, his or her contribution was very important for my beliefs about the contributions of others.	○	○	○	○	○	○
3. When I attempted to become an early contributor and was not selected I was very disappointed.	○	○	○	○	○	○
4. When I attempted to become an early contributor and was not selected I envied the leader.	○	○	○	○	○	○
5. When there was an early contributor, the fact that he was compensated for being an earlier contributor made me less motivated by his or her contribution.	○	○	○	○	○	○
6. For my contribution, considerations of inequality within the group was very important for my decision of what to contribute.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Submit answers

6 Survey questions - English translation

6.1 Survey 1

[Conducted by NORSTAT using telephone interviews]

Imagine that you live in an apartment building with 20 apartments, where four times a year there is a day where the residents do volunteer work such as garden work, painting, raking and other activities that keep the common areas nice. Estimated working time is 5-6 hours per volunteer day. One of the residents in the building has volunteered to take the responsibility of leading these events. He receives no compensation/800 USD/8000 USD in compensation for taking the lead. His tasks are to plan and organize these activities.

Assuming that you are not prevented from participating on any of the four days that are scheduled for volunteer work in your building, on how many of the days do you think that you would participate?

Choose only one of the following alternatives:

o 0

o 1

o 2

o 3

o 4

6.2 Survey 2

[Conducted by NORSTAT using telephone interviews]

We ask you what you would choose to do in the following situation:

You live in an apartment building with 20 apartments where the residents volunteer for maintenance work six Saturdays each year. The work done is painting, gardening and similar tasks. Each volunteer day lasts 5-6 hours. Several residents, you included, volunteered to lead the planning and execution of the initiative. Using a simple lottery, another resident ended up with the leadership responsibility. The leader will receive no/a small/a very high monetary compensation for doing the job, while the other residents taking part are not compensated.

Assuming that you are not prevented from participating on any of the six days that are scheduled for volunteer work in your building, on how many of the days do you think that you would participate?

Choose only one of the following alternatives:

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
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