Table A1: Coup propensity model

	Coup attempt risk	Coup success risk
Log GDP per capita	-0.059	-0.318**
	(0.098)	(0.113)
Change in log gdp per capita	-1.095	-0.960
	(0.772)	(0.857)
Inter-state war (COW)	-0.684	-0.602
	(0.458)	(0.572)
Intra-state armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO)	0.480**	0.324
	(0.174)	(0.213)
Military expenditures	-0.193**	-0.200**
	(0.040)	(0.048)
Change in military expenditures	0.090	0.418**
	(0.189)	(0.131)
Democracy indicator (POLITY)	-0.619*	-0.207
	(0.274)	(0.391)
Military regime (GWF)	0.153	0.390
	(0.196)	(0.242)
Single-party regime (GWF)	-0.522**	-0.310
	(0.175)	(0.204)
Count of coup attempts since 1950	0.068+	0.084
	(0.041)	(0.055)
Cold War	0.578**	0.820**
	(0.173)	(0.220)
Years since coup attempt	-0.205**	-0.113*
	(0.034)	(0.047)
Years since coup attempt^2	0.009**	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Years since coup attempt^3	-0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.478	1.235
	(0.666)	(0.809)
Observations	6,099	6,099

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Table A2: Coup proofing controls added

	ΔMPG	% Change	Binary Indicators	Multiple Indicators
ΔMPG	-0.128*			
	(0.051)			
ΔMPG as % change in cabinet		-2.448*		
		(1.014)		
MPG decrease			0.403*	
			(0.202)	
MPG increase			0.476+	
			(0.268)	
Increase1				0.722**
				(0.254)
Increase2				0.279
				(0.553)
Increase3-5				-1.183*
				(0.564)
Increase>5				-1.006
				(0.631)
Decrease1				0.364
				(0.274)
Decrease2				0.065
				(0.529)
Decrease3-5				-0.340
				(0.414)
Decrease>5				1.805**
				(0.472)
Δ Government	-0.023		-0.030+	-0.026
	(0.017)		(0.017)	(0.018)
MPG	0.023	0.030	-0.005	0.012
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.045)
Gov. size	0.008		0.009	0.007
	(0.009)		(0.009)	(0.009)
Coup risk	11.026**	10.868**	10.637**	10.912**
	(1.056)	(1.038)	(1.091)	(1.040)
Effective number[1]	-0.055	0.023	-0.108	-0.153
	(0.730)	(0.718)	(0.714)	(0.665)
Effective number^2	0.026	0.014	0.033	0.046
	(0.187)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.157)
Military personnel[2]	-0.083	-0.061	-0.094	-0.080
	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.072)
Constant	-3.894**	-3.875**	-3.856**	-3.862**
	(0.651)	(0.654)	(0.652)	(0.643)
Observations	4,162	4,162	4,162	4,162

Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

[1] Using Pilster and Bohmelt's (2011) "Effective Organizations" measure. In line with Pilster and Bohmelt (2014), I included a squared term as well

[2] From the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 2010).

Table A3: Years since coup attempt polynomial included

	ΔMPG	% Change	Binary Indicators	Multiple Indicators
ΔMPG	-0.120*			
	(0.049)			
ΔMPG as % change in cabinet		-2.133*		
		(0.868)		
MPG decrease			0.367+	
			(0.203)	
MPG increase			0.398	
			(0.281)	
Increase1				0.518+
				(0.267)
Increase2				0.622
				(0.500)
Increase3-5				-0.799
				(0.619)
Increase>5				-0.979
				(0.725)
Decrease1				0.264
				(0.252)
Decrease2				0.259
				(0.379)
Decrease3-5				-0.046
				(0.403)
Decrease>5				1.653**
				(0.532)
Δ Government	-0.004		-0.012	-0.007
	(0.018)		(0.018)	(0.018)
MPG	0.006	0.007	-0.024	-0.008
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Gov. size	-0.000		0.001	-0.002
	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.006)
Coup risk (w/our years since coup)	5.691**	5.577**	5.838**	5.489**
	(1.063)	(1.064)	(1.048)	(0.919)
Years since coup attempt	-0.181**	-0.183**	-0.166**	-0.179**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Years since coup attempt^2	0.007**	0.007**	0.007*	0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Years since coup attempt^3	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.341**	-2.332**	-2.489**	-2.394**
	(0.312)	(0.257)	(0.306)	(0.259)
Observations	4,884	4,884	4,884	4,884

Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Table A4: Coup success risk measure used as control

	ΔMPG	% Change	Binary Indicators	Multiple Indicators
ΔMPG	-0.126**			
	(0.048)			
ΔMPG as % change in cabinet		-2.250**		
		(0.849)		
MPG decrease			0.400+	
			(0.206)	
MPG increase			0.425	
			(0.284)	
Increase1				0.544*
				(0.263)
Increase2				0.679
				(0.490)
Increase3-5				-0.826
				(0.618)
Increase>5				-1.058
				(0.726)
Decrease1				0.305
				(0.251)
Decrease2				0.229
				(0.385)
Decrease3-5				-0.014
				(0.410)
Decrease>5				1.724**
				(0.520)
Δ Government	-0.002		-0.012	-0.006
	(0.018)		(0.018)	(0.019)
MPG	0.014	0.015	-0.018	0.000
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Gov. size	-0.002		-0.001	-0.003
	(0.007)		(0.008)	(0.006)
Coup risk (success)	6.458**	6.332**	6.833**	6.345**
	(1.904)	(1.839)	(1.893)	(1.807)
Years since coup attempt	-0.174**	-0.176**	-0.156**	-0.171**
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Years since coup attempt^2	0.007**	0.007**	0.006*	0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Years since coup attempt^3	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.122**	-2.153**	-2.295**	-2.203**
	(0.310)	(0.247)	(0.303)	(0.271)
Observations	4,884		4,884	4,884

Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Table A5: Two-way Fixed Effects (country and year)

	Delta MPG	% Change	Binary indicators	Multiple indicators
ΔMPG	-0.110**			
	(0.039)			
ΔMPG as % change in gov.		-1.904**		
		(0.713)		
MPG decrease			0.355+	
			(0.201)	
MPG increase			0.333	
			(0.218)	
Increase1				0.447+
				(0.239)
Increase2				0.459
				(0.392)
Increase3-5				-0.836
				(0.759)
Increase>5				-0.551
				(0.839)
Decrease1				0.305
				(0.251)
Decrease2				0.197
				(0.441)
Decrease3-5				-0.046
				(0.433)
Decrease>5				1.410**
				(0.498)
Δ Government	-0.027		-0.031+	-0.028
	(0.018)		(0.017)	(0.017)
MPG	0.020	0.021	-0.020	-0.001
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Gov. size	0.006		0.008	0.006
	(0.012)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	2,721	2,721	2,721	2,721
Number of ccode	69	69	69	69

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Table A6: Analysis with coup risk components rather than aggregate measure

	Delta MPG	% Change	Binary Indicators	Multiple Indicators
Δ MPG	-0.131**			
	(0.037)			
Δ MPG as percent of gov.		-2.390**		
		(0.618)		
MPG decrease			0.371+	
			(0.190)	
MPG increase			0.309	
			(0.246)	
Increase1				0.414
				(0.282)
Increase2				0.598+
				(0.339)
Increase3-5				-0.861
				(0.728)
Increase>5				-1.095
				(1.112)
Decrease1				0.235
				(0.243)
Decrease2				0.238
				(0.367)
Decrease3				0.063s
				(0.417)
Decrease>5				1.650**
				(0.413)
Δ Government	-0.015		-0.023	-0.018
	(0.020)		(0.019)	(0.019)
MPG	0.009	0.015	-0.020	-0.003
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Gov. size	0.007		0.009	0.007
	(0.011)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Log GDP per capita	-0.005	-0.019	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.117)
Change in log gdp per capita	-0.305	-0.326	-0.225	-0.163
	(0.764)	(0.760)	(0.679)	(0.553)
Inter-state war (COW)	-0.654	-0.620	-0.625	-0.620
	(0.577)	(0.595)	(0.607)	(0.568)
Intra-state armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO)	0.718**	0.715**	0.712**	0.668**
	(0.198)	(0.194)	(0.197)	(0.196)
Military expenditures	-0.233**	-0.208**	-0.237**	-0.232**
	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Change in military expenditures	-0.006	-0.003	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.257)	(0.264)	(0.262)	(0.265)

Democracy indicator (POLITY)	-0.466	-0.504	-0.410	-0.454
	(0.322)	(0.314)	(0.325)	(0.317)
Military regime (GWF)	-0.143	-0.126	-0.077	-0.111
	(0.227)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.227)
Single-party regime (GWF)	-0.368+	-0.337	-0.384+	-0.371+
	(0.211)	(0.206)	(0.204)	(0.208)
Count of coup attempts since 1950	0.100*	0.093*	0.108*	0.095*
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Cold War	0.521*	0.472*	0.549*	0.509*
	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.218)	(0.210)
Years since coup attempt	-0.163**	-0.166**	-0.150**	-0.163**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Years since coup attempt^2	0.007**	0.007**	0.006**	0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Years since coup attempt^3	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.018	0.037	-0.120	-0.036
	(0.741)	(0.746)	(0.742)	(0.757)
Observations	4,781	4,781	4,781	4,781

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)